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Vallabh Sambamurthy & Robert W. Zmud
Guiding the Digital Transformation of Organizations - Second Edition
© 2017 Legerity Digital Press
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ISBN 978-0-9857955-9-7
Digitalized Business Models for Network Ecosystems
Chapter
06
Guiding the Digital Transformation of Organizations By Vallabh Sambamurthy and Robert W. Zmud
Second Edition Copyright © 2017
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Chapter 6. Digitalized Business Models for Network Ecosystems
Today, when you use your smartphone or tablet to post content on Facebook
statuses, to tweet, exchange photos, or search for information on the Internet, you
expect these types of Internet-based services to be provided mostly free-of-charge.
In economic terms, this amounts to a vast consumer surplus being provided by
organizations offering such services. Why do organizations (e.g., Facebook, Twitter,
WhatsApp, Google, etc.) offer these free services? The not-so-subtle answer is quite
straightforward – to generate revenue streams (via advertising or access fees) by
enabling other organizations to touch an expanding network of consumers or to gain
access to information about these consumers.
But, how does this occur? Most often, it occurs through the creation of a
network (market-focused) ecosystem, with the core transaction of the market being
the free service: a Facebook post, a Twitter tweet, a WhatsApp photo-share, or a
Google Internet search. The core transaction of a network ecosystem is the
primary market exchange activity driving both producers and consumers to an
ecosystem’s market platform. The market platform of a network ecosystem is the
organized collection of digital and business platforms that hosts the content and
functionalities that establish, operate and govern the ecosystem’s market. In order
to better grasp the nature of a network ecosystem, let’s take a closer look at Google
and Facebook. Also, for the ease of understanding, we will refer to the networks
being brought together within a network ecosystem as communities.
The core transaction enabled by Google is a consumer’s search for specific
content (some unit of information) believed to exist on one or more producer websites
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(see Figure 6-1). Note especially the third community involved with Google’s
ecosystem: advertisers. Having developed state-of-the-art search algorithms and an
innovative auction scheme for selling advertising associated with specified search
outcomes, Google has built a business model that profitably monetizes Internet
search by attracting large customer and advertiser communities. Interestingly,
considerable overlap does exist across the three communities interacting through
Google’s search platform: website producers and advertisers do Internet searches
(that is, act as consumers), website producers do advertise, and advertisers do place
content on websites.
Figure 6-1
Google’s Network Ecosystem
Consumers Seeking
Information
Advertisers Producers of Websites
• Relevant, useful information
• Ease of use • Access from anywhere
• Increased traffic • Revenue opportunities • Access to network of
advertisers
• Access to network of potential buyers
• Measurable ROI on ads • Precise campaign control:
pay for clicks
Google’s Market
Platform
The core transaction enabled by Facebook is a person’s posting of content
(accompanied by Facebook immediately notifying the consumer’s friends of the
posting). As depicted in Figure 6-2, the person posting content is a member of a
producer community and the friends wishing to see the posted content are members
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of a consumer community. Somewhat unique to social media sites, these consumer
and producer communities essentially overlap their memberships (aside from pure
lurkers within the consumer community). Note also that Facebook’s ecosystem
involves two additional communities: advertisers and Facebook App producers.
Facebook generates revenue streams from these advertisers and App producers.
Figure 6-2 Facebook’s Network Ecosystem
Consumers Seeking Content
Advertisers Producers of Content
• Relevant, useful content
• Ease of use • Access from
anywhere
• Increased traffic • Revenue opportunities • Access to network of
advertisers
• Global audience of potential buyers
• Measurable ROI on ads • Precise campaign control:
pay for clicks
Facebook’s Market
Platform
Producers of Facebook
Apps
• Access to networks of consumers & producers
• Revenue opportunities
• Access to network of advertisers
This chapter introduces intuitive ways of thinking about network ecosystems
and about the digital and business platforms used to orchestrate the market spaces
established by network ecosystems. The following topics are covered:
Why Network Ecosystems Exist
Crowd-Based Capitalism
Digitalizing Network Ecosystems
Blended Organizations
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Why Network Ecosystems Exist
In explaining the economic concepts that underlie network ecosystems, we use
the example of a simplified hypothetical social media ecosystem (see Figure 6-3).
Here, community members take on the roles of producers and consumers in order to
share content. By sharing content – and, hence, gaining exposure to each other’s
likes, dislikes, experiences and perspectives - members enrich their relationships
with each other. What is the value proposition that drives a person to join,
participate, and remain in a social media ecosystem? It is the promise of more-
intensively sharing content with individuals with whom a personal relationship
already exists or of sharing content with individuals with whom no (or, at best, a
casual) personal relationship currently exists, but with whom a richer personal
relationship is desired.
Figure 6-3 Simplified Social Media Ecosystem
Consumers Seeking Content
Producers of Content
Social Media
Platform
Social Media Community
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This social media ecosystem value proposition is driven by what economists
refer to as network effects. Stated simply, as the social community grows linearly,
the number of possible relationships amongst the community’s members grows
exponentially: 1 member - 0 possible relationships, 2 members – 1 relationship, 4
members – 6 possible relationships, 12 members – 66 possible relationships, 100
members – 4,950 possible relationships, and so on. Bigger networks, as a general
rule, are more valuable to participants; thus, network effects give network
ecosystems with the largest participant communities an advantage that is hard for
competitors to overcome. We explore network effects further, starting with two-
sided markets, moving on to multi-sided markets, and concluding with a discussion
of winner-take-all markets - the competitive endgame of a market-focused network
ecosystem.
Network Effects
Network effects, or what economists term a network externality, refer to
situations where the worth of or demand for a value-unit grows as an exponential
function of the number of current consumers of a value-unit and/or the number of
complements available to these consumers. A complement increases the perceived
worth of a value-unit. A good example of a complement would be the apps available
for a particular social media ecosystem, e.g., apps that make it easier to manipulate
and share content across the ecosystem. Would you be more inclined to join a social
media ecosystem that had more or fewer of your current friends as participants?
And, is this more likely for larger or smaller social media ecosystems? Now, given
two social media ecosystems comparable regarding the likelihood of you being able
to share content with your friends, would you prefer the ecosystem with more or
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fewer valued complements (e.g., an image manipulation app)? And, would app
producers be more inclined to create apps for larger or smaller social media
ecosystems? This is the power of network effects!
How can firms capture the opportunities available through positive network
effects? Positive network externalities occur only when a customer network is
satisfied with – better yet, enthused about – the value-unit being offered. Much of
Apple’s surge in product success (iPod, iPhone, iPad, iTunes, iMusic, etc.) is a direct
result of positive word-of-mouth chatter. In contrast, negative customer experiences
and perceptions can be devastating.
The competition between HD DVD and Blu-ray as the standard for DVD players
provides an example of network externalities in action. Consider this quote from
Matthew Smith, a former SVP of merchandising for Blockbuster:31 “The consumers
are sending us a message. I can’t ignore what I’m seeing. Blockbuster has been
renting both Blu-ray and HD DVD titles in 250 stores since late last year and found
that consumers were choosing Blu-ray titles more than 70 percent of the time.”
Relatively quickly, word-of-mouth and consumer purchase decisions led to a positive
network effect for Blu-ray titles, subsequent growth in the number of Blu-ray titles
offered for sale or rent relative to the number of HD titles, and Blu-ray ultimately
winning the DVD standards war.
Because of the power of network effects, it is critical for network ecosystems
to exploit the influence of word-of-mouth and enlist their communities in growing
both community membership and member participation within a community.
31 R. Harris, “Blu-ray vs. HD DVD: Game Over,” http://blogs.zdnet.com/storage/?p=149.
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Another tactic for capturing network effects with network ecosystems is to carefully
define the architectural standards enabling connectivity and interoperability and
promote these standards such that the standards become dominant in the network
ecosystem market space. Winning standards wars is critical as this increases the
number and variety of complements available to participants. A primary factor
behind Microsoft’s dominance in PC operating systems was the wide variety of
software applications compatible with the Windows operating system. This reinforces
the dominance of Windows in the market for PC operating systems. Firms become
successful in standards wars either by leveraging their brand and existing market
presence (e.g., a Microsoft, an IBM, an Apple, a Google, etc.) or by forming alliances
with other firms and collectively engaging in persuasive tactics to influence an
industry-wide movement toward a favored standard (e.g., Bluetooth, GSM for
mobility services, Android for smart phones, etc.).
Two-Sided Markets
A key notion for understanding the nature of network ecosystems involves the
economics of two-sided markets.32 With a two-sided market, the ecosystem
owner/builder – the network orchestrator – brings together two distinct communities
to engage in value-unit exchanges. Most typically, this is accomplished by growing
one side of the market as a means of attracting participants to the other side of the
market. The two sides of the network ecosystem are perhaps best thought of as a
subsidy-side and a money-side, with the ecosystem’s market platform providing
32 T. Eisenmann, G. Parker and M. Van Alstyne, “Strategies for Two-Sided Markets,”
Harvard Business Review, October 2006, pp. 92-101.
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the rules, functionalities and resources to attract participants and to facilitate value-
unit exchanges. As a general rule, the subsidy-side is provided incentives to
participate in a network ecosystem as the primary role of the subsidy-side is to attract
the money-side, from which revenues are generated. The basic idea, thus, is to grow
the subsidized community to the point that its size becomes sufficient to attractive
money-side participants willing to pay a fee to gain access to the subsidy-side
participants.
As an example of a two-sided market, consider Figure 6-4, which depicts a
generic job-recruiting network ecosystem, e.g., CareerBuilder, Monster, Job.com,
etc. The subsidy-side is the community of individuals looking for a job. By heavily
subsidizing (free?) participation and by offering useful rules (e.g., privacy),
functionalities (e.g., resume-builder) and resources (e.g., career advice content), a
large pool of job candidates is built. If this pool of job applicants is large and of high
quality (e.g., broad ranges of skills and experiences), a high likelihood exists that a
sizable pool of recruiters will be attracted despite the participation fees being charged
to these recruiters (typically, a recruiter might be charged a modest fee to post a job
opportunity, a slightly larger fee for each match that occurs, and a much larger fee
if and when an applicant is offered a position).
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Figure 6-4 Generic Job Recruiting Network Ecosystem
Applicants
(Consumers of Jobs)
Recruiters
(Producers of Jobs)
Market Platform
Rules Functionalities Resources
Another, quite different, example of a two-sided market involves Adobe and
its Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat software (see Figure 6-5). Before Adobe Reader
and Acrobat were released, the established standard for sharing and printing
documents was a tool called PostScript. In order to make inroads into the lucrative
document creation software market, Adobe made its document reader software freely
available (subsidizing the consumers of digital documents) and encouraged adopters
to share information about Adobe Reader and how to obtain it. With positive word-
of-mouth by a large number of Adobe Reader adopters, Adobe Reader became the
de facto standard for document reading and sharing. Once Adobe Reader became
the dominant document reader for viewing any type of document, Adobe was able to
sell its document-creation software, Acrobat, to all types of document creators:
publishers, law firms, authors, etc. While Adobe continues to give Adobe Reader
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away for free, it generates sizeable revenues through its Acrobat software (now
available only by lease, a more-profitable pricing tactic).
Figure 6-5 Adobe’s Two-Sided Market Business Strategy
Consumers of Digital Documents
Producers of Digital Documents
Market Platform
Software Products to Download
User Authentication & Account Management
Payment Systems Customer Support & User Manuals
What is important about Adobe’s strategy? Adobe could have enjoyed the
benefits of network effects by only offering Adobe Reader - by standardizing their use
around it, consumers of digital documents would be able to easily exchange
documents and read them on any type of device. However, would this positive
network effect benefit Adobe to the same extent it benefited Adobe’s customers? In
other words, would Adobe have been able to eventually sell Adobe Reader at a price
sufficient to generate a lucrative profit? What price could it charge without hurting
its ability to build a critical mass of document reader users? Adobe recognized that
rather severe limits existed regarding what people would be willing to pay for a
document reader. But, Adobe also recognized that it could generate substantial
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revenue from document-creation software given that it could achieve a large,
installed base of Adobe Reader users.
Figure 6-6 provides a more nuanced depiction of the logic underlying a two-
sided market. Note that two types of positive network effects are in play. The first
is called the same-side effect and refers to the possibility of network effects with
each side of the market. In the case of Adobe, as more people adopt Adobe Reader
for viewing documents, each is presented with more opportunities to easily share
documents. This represents a positive, same-side network effect for the adopters of
Acrobat Reader. Potential same-side network effects exist, as well, for document
producers. As more producers adopt Adobe Acrobat for document creation, more
opportunities arise for these producers to exchange content in order to create
bundled offerings.
Figure 6-6 Same-Side and Cross-Side Network Effects
Side #2 Side #1
Market Platform
Same-side effect
Cross-side effect
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The second type of positive network effect is called a cross-side effect. This
refers to the potential value that one side derives when there are more participants
on the other side. Again, using the Adobe example, adopters of Adobe Reader benefit
as more producers adopt the Adobe Acrobat document creation software (because of
the increase in the number of compatible digital documents), and document
producers benefit with an increase in the number of consumers reading digital
documents through the use of Acrobat Reader (a larger consumer market for
produced digital documents).
So far, our discussion has been based on the assumption that same-side and
cross-side network effects are always positive. This is not the case, as these network
effects could be negative. Refer back to the job recruiting network ecosystem
portrayed earlier as Figure 6-4. Are the same-side network effects positive or
negative? Does a growing pool of job applicants benefit each applicant participating
in the ecosystem? Does a growing list of recruiters benefit each recruiter participating
in the ecosystem? Possibly not, as this may translate into greater competition among
applicants for the best jobs, as well as greater competition among recruiters for the
best candidates. Even though each side benefits from positive, cross-side network
effects, the potential for negative, same-side network effects could limit the number
of job seekers or job providers willing to participate in the ecosystem.33
33 The way job recruiting network systems typically deal with negative, cross-side
network effects is to segment the pools of available jobs and applicants into ‘sub-markets’
that become more-level playing fields for both recruiters and applicants.
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Multi-Sided Markets
Increasingly, today’s network ecosystems are designed as multi-sided markets
rather than as two-sided markets. A multi-sided market involves more than two
actively participating communities. In this chapter’s introduction, we described a
three-sided market (the Google search network ecosystem) and a four-sided market
(the Facebook social media network ecosystem).
With multi-sided markets, each added community presents an opportunity to
generate additional revenue streams. Facebook, for example, receives revenue from
advertisers and from app producers. But, this potential for increased revenue is
accompanied by three management challenges:
Creating and then evolving attractive value propositions for each
participating community.
Identifying and optimizing positive same-side/cross network effects.
Identifying and minimizing negative same-side/cross effects.
As the number of communities participating in a multi-side network increases, the
complexity of these management challenges tends to increase in a nonlinear fashion.
Winner-Take-All Markets
Increasingly, the payoff gap between being the best competitor in a market
and the second-best is widening into a canyon. This applies to labor markets (e.g.,
professional athletes), to technology markets (e.g., technology producers), and
especially to network ecosystems. In explaining the nature of winner-take-all
markets, we begin with the most straightforward context – that of a digital
product/service.
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As positive network effects drive more consumers to adopt a product or
service, the product/service can gain a critical mass of adopters and become
dominant in its market space. This same phenomenon occurs with network
ecosystems. A critical mass of network ecosystem participants is achieved when the
momentum produced by an ecosystem’s positive network effects is unlikely to be
reversed by the entry into the market space of an appealing new network ecosystem,
regardless of how appealing this new ecosystem’s value-units might be. Think of the
market dominance held by Microsoft Windows and Office, by Google’s Android and
Gmail, and by Blu-ray DVD players and movies. In each of these cases, the
respective markets are said to have tipped over with the winner crowding out rival
products or services. A winner-take-all market, thus, refers to a market where
the potential exists that a critical mass of consumers will adopt one producer’s
products/services.
Nintendo’s entry into the home video gaming market nicely demonstrates how
competition unfolds in winner-take-all markets. In 1985, Atari was the dominant
firm in the video game market. By Christmas 1986, the Nintendo Entertainment
System (NES) had emerged as a very popular product, creating positive network
effects with both customers and, importantly, game developers, in turn attracting
even more customers. At some point, the market tipped over to Nintendo as the
dominant competitor. Once this occurred, game developers were willing to produce
their software exclusively for Nintendo for a two-year period – indicating the
significant rewards winners can obtain in winner-take-all markets. Microsoft’s
business strategies with its operating systems and its Office software suite reflect
similar competitive dynamics.
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Network ecosystems are particularly susceptible to winner-take-all markets.
Three factors tend to characterize winner-take-all network ecosystems:
Strong producer economies of scale.
Strong positive cross-side network effects.
High consumer switching costs.
The latter factor is especially important. When participating in a competitor network
ecosystem is perceived as being costly (i.e., a non-trivial investment is required to
participate in a network ecosystem and this investment is then lost in moving to a
different ecosystem), consumers will be reluctant to either participate in multiple
network ecosystems or to switch ecosystems.
Importantly, not all market spaces are susceptible to winner-take-all market
dynamics. Consider the market space for daily deals, e.g., Groupon and
LivingSocial.34 Many early investors believed that strong cross-side network effects
would produce high stock valuations for Groupon and for LivingSocial. However, as
consumers participating in Groupon and in LivingSocial experienced very low
switching costs, little allegiance was shown to any one market platform with
consumers instead skipping through multiple platforms looking for the most attractive
deals. As one might expect, the high valuations have yet to materialize.
Generally, a market space susceptible to winner-take-all dynamics is most
likely to be seen as a winner-take-all network ecosystem when:
Participants experience significant, positive network effects.
34 A. Haigu, “Strategic Decisions for Multi-Sided Platforms,” Sloan Management
Review, Winter 2014, pp. 71-80.
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Participants are reluctant to move to a competing ecosystem.
One of the network ecosystems begins to attract a majority of the new
participants entering the market space.
This same ecosystem attracts an accelerating flow of participants from
competing ecosystems.
Competition in early-stage winner-take-all network ecosystem market spaces can be
fierce. More profitable competitors, because they are more profitable, are able to
invest more in R&D and to provide greater incentives to participants - enabling their
participating communities to grow even faster. This intense competition often results
in winner-take-all market spaces being dominated by just a few firms (two or three,
at most).
Crowd-Based Capitalism
The past decade has witnessed a reemergence of bartering, the earliest type
of market-focused ecosystem, in the form of crowd-based capitalism – that is, a
two-sided market that brings together two crowds, or communities, of individuals:
one community possessing an under-used asset or skill (the value-unit) and the other
possessing a short-term need for such an asset or skill. This new bartering ecosystem
differs from the original in two important ways:
The medium for the short-term sharing of the value-unit is money. In other words, the person that owns the shared value-unit gets paid by the person being granted short-term use of the value-unit.
The market is enabled through a digitalized market platform built, managed and owned by a third-party, the network orchestrator.
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This form of market-focused ecosystem is the basis for what is popularly referred to
as to as the sharing economy.35 Essentially, digital technologies (e.g., the Internet,
interconnected smart devices, social media, payment systems, trust systems, etc.)
are extending peoples’ options for obtaining goods and services beyond family,
friends, neighborhood stores and national/global retailers toward crowds of
entrepreneurs.
Table 6-1 lists some of the crowd-based network ecosystems that have
emerged over the last decade. As you look over this listing, notice the attributes of
value-units likely to be shared via crowd-based capitalism: low-use and high-value.
Low-use implies unused capacity (of an asset) or idle time (of a skill-provider); high-
value infers that the value-created – the consumer payment subsequently
appropriated and shared by a producer (an asset-owner or skill-provider) and a
network orchestrator – will exceed the costs associated with an exchange.
35 A. Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of
Crowd-Based Capitalism, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2016.
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Table 6-1 Examples of Crowd-Based Network Ecosystems
Crowd-Based Network Ecosystem
Value-Unit Examples
Educational Services Idle Skill Capacity SkillShare,TradeSchool, Udemy
Freelance Work Idle Expertise Capacity Amazon Mechanical Turk, InnoCentive, TopCoder, Upwork
Fundraising Idle Capital AngelList, FundiingCircle, Kickstarter
Handyman Chores Idle Labor Capacity Handy, TaskRabbit, TimesFree
High-End Fashion Unused Clothes Designer24, Rendevoux, Rent My Wardrobe, Rent the Runway, StyleLand
Lodging Unused Housing Capacity Airbnb, CouchSurfing
Personal Services Idle Labor Capacity Lux, Postmate, Shyp, Washio, Wag
Philanthropy Idle Capital DonorsChoose, Kiva
Transportation Unused Automobile
Capacity BlaBlaCar, Getaround, Lyft, Turo, Uber, Zipcar
Digitalizing Network Ecosystems
Network ecosystems existed prior to the eras of digital disruption. For
example, three pervasive pre-digital network ecosystems were those involving (as
network orchestrators) real estate brokerages, independent insurance agencies and
travel agencies. In these network ecosystems, the network orchestrator (via the
work processes shown in Figure 6-7):
Built up a portfolio of offerings from a producer community.
Attracted a consumer community.
Enriched producers’ offering creation capabilities.
Enriched consumer demand.
Matched the needs of individual consumers with the producer’s offerings.
Facilitated both exchange transactions and exchange fulfillment.
Worked to retain the members of the producer and consumer communities.
With digitalized network ecosystems, the vast majority of work processes are carried
out through a market platform (i.e., a collection of digital platforms and business
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platforms). The digitization and digitalization reflective of the three eras of digital
disruption (see Table 6-2) have produced two types of effects on network
ecosystems. First, the pre-digital network ecosystems have either radically
transformed themselves through both digitalization and specialization or have exited
their markets. Second, scores of new network ecosystems have emerged and
continue to emerge (see Table 6-3).
Figure 6-7 A Network Orchestrator’s Managerial and Operational Processes
Indirect Materials & Supplies Procurement
Human Resource Recruitment & Development; Benefits Management
Financial Services; Accounting Services
Business/Digital Strategizing; Administrative Services
Matching Consumer Demand
With Producer Supply
Growing a Producer
Community
Growing a Consumer
Community
Transaction Execution Efficiency & Safety
Exchange Fulfillment Execution & Safety
Retaining Producer
Community
Retaining Consumer
Community
S u
p p
o rt
P ro
c e
s s e
s P
ri m
a ry
P ro
c e
s s e
s
R&D; New Services Development; New Services Rollout
Digital Technology Services & Management
Facilitating Producer
Value-Unit Creation
Stimulating Consumer Demand
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Table 6-2 Evolution of Network Ecosystems
Era Value-Units Digitization & Digitalization Exchange Currency
Trust Systems
1 Digital complements
Data/document standards Point-to-point connectivity Intra- and inter-
organizational (managerial and operational) process efficiencies
Banking system
Credit/debit card systems
Government & 3rd- party institutions
Contracts Brand Social capital
2 Digital value- units
Internet One-to-many connectivity Data, process, analytic and
collaboration platforms Social media Omni-channel producer-
consumer interaction
Digitalized payment systems
3rd-party digital trust seals
Consumer monitoring (product & producer reviews)
3 Social complements
Many-to-many connectivity Smart devices Big Data platforms Big Data analytic platforms Social messaging platforms
Reputation Social capital Bitcoins
Community monitoring
Peer-regulation Self-regulation
Table 6-3 Examples of Network Ecosystems
Era Variation Examples Community 1 Community 2 Community 3
1
Services Platform Visa, MasterCard Producing
Organizations Banks Consumers
Digital Architecture Microsoft’s PC
Operating System Application Producers
PC Producers Consumers
2
B2B Horizontal Marketplace
Alibaba.com, Thomasnet.com
Producing Organizations
Advertisers Consuming
Organizations
B2B Vertical Marketplace
e-Steel, Farms.com
Producing Organizations
Advertisers Consuming
Organizations
B2C e-Commerce Amazon
Marketplace Producing
Organizations Advertisers Consumers
C2C e-Commerce eBay, Craigslist Producers Advertisers Consumers
3
Search Platform Google Content
Producers Advertisers
Content Consumers
Social Media Platform
Twitter Content
Producers Advertisers
Content Consumers
Crowd-Based Capitalism
Airbnb, Uber Asset/Skill
Owner Advertisers
Asset/Skill User
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Era 1
Two types of network ecosystems emerged during Era 1. The first of these
applied proprietary, point-to-point connectivity to create new markets based on
digitalized services. Perhaps the most familiar example is that of credit card
providers, such as Visa and MasterCard. By establishing a digitalized (in part)
services platform, merchants were able to offer a convenient, safe payment channel
to consumers and banks gained a new revenue stream.
The second type of network ecosystem that emerged involved proprietary
architectures for digital products and these product’s complements. By promoting
and licensing a product architecture that tips over a market, the architecture’s creator
is able to sustain high-margin sales for a lengthy period of time. Perhaps the most
familiar example of this is that of personal computer (PC) operating systems, such
as Microsoft OS (and then Windows). The Intel PC operating system market tipped
over to Microsoft OS because the PC application software community gave priority to
developing products to run on OS (and then on Windows) – increasing the likelihoods
that software producers would gain large revenue streams and that consumers
purchasing PCs would be able to run needed software.
Era 2
The availability of one-to-many connectivity enabled by the Internet triggered
a rapid growth in network ecosystems. Four distinct types of e-commerce
ecosystems emerged: B2B horizontal (producers offering a broad range of value-
units to any type of consumer-business) marketplaces, B2B vertical (producers
offering value-units to consumer-businesses in a single industry) marketplaces, B2C
marketplaces, and C2C marketplaces.
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B2B marketplaces generally operate in the upstream portions of industry value
streams. Connecting (raw material and component) suppliers to producers, these
intermediaries aim to disintermediate established supplier-producer relationships
with the promise of a more efficient market. The value-propositions of these B2B
marketplaces vary considerably, as reflected in the four levels of functionality that
can be established between producers and consumers: information exchange, value-
unit exchange/fulfillment transaction execution, logistical flow coordination, and
collaboration enablement.
B2C and C2C marketplaces generally operate in the downstream portions of
industry value chains. Connecting finished goods producers to consumers, these
intermediaries aim to disintermediate established retailer-consumer relationships,
again with the promise of a more efficient market. Notice in Table 6-3 (shown earlier)
that the example given for an Era 2 B2C network ecosystem is Amazon Marketplace
rather than Amazon, given Amazon Marketplace’s objective of bringing together a
broad community of small producers to interact with Amazon’s consumer community.
Two examples of C2C marketplaces, eBay and Craigslist, are used to illustrate the
variety that exists. For example, eBay utilizes an auction pricing mechanism and
offers the parties of value-unit exchanges a range of transactional and fulfillment
services, while Craigslist utilizes fixed prices and offers little in the way of
transactional and fulfillment services.
Era 3
The digital technologies associated with the third era of digital disruption –
most notably many-to-many connectivity, smart devices, social messaging and peer
regulation – triggered a fresh, explosive wave of network ecosystems focused on
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enabling and exploiting individuals’ desires to maintain anytime, anywhere
connections with the people, institutions and opportunities that are most important
to them. As listed earlier in Table 6-3, the dominant types of Era 3 network
ecosystems involve digital services (e.g., search, photo sharing, music sharing, etc.),
social media, and crowd-based capitalism. As many of these network ecosystems
involve participants and activities outside of the purview of established markets and
institutions, new forms of community-based and peer-based trust systems have
emerged. For example, there are limited regulations at present to assure consumers
of the accuracy of host-provided Airbnb lodging descriptions. In response, Airbnb
has implemented two trust mechanisms: the capturing and reporting of consumers’
lodging reviews, and host identity verification systems that combine the digitized
social capital of social media with governmental ID infrastructures. In addition,
Airbnb proactively involves hosts and consumers in developing and evolving
standards and expectations guidelines that must be agreed-to by hosts and
consumers.
Blended Organizations
Today’s most successful organizations are increasingly exhibiting the qualities
of both pipeline ecosystems and network ecosystems, and in the process becoming
a blended organization. This primarily occurs via one of two approaches:
An organization operates multiple, largely independent business models,
some of which are executed as a pipeline organization and others as a network organization.
A pipeline organization incorporates a private or semi-private network- ecosystem as a means of enhancing efficiency, effectiveness or both.
Each of these approaches is briefly described.
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The organization that best illustrates the first approach of operating both
pipeline ecosystem and network ecosystem business models is Amazon. Amazon’s
initial business model was that of a pipeline ecosystem retailer: interacting physically
with suppliers to stock product inventories, then interacting digitally with customers
to sell these products, and then interacting physically and digitally with third-party
package delivery providers in fulfilling customers’ purchases from Amazon’s brick-
and-mortar distribution centers. Over time, Amazon has expanded its portfolio of
business models to include operating as:
A pipeline ecosystem retailer that stocks, sells and delivers digital products
and smart devices.
A pipeline ecosystem producer of digital technology services for businesses
and for individuals.
A network ecosystem orchestrator of media streaming services.
A network ecosystem orchestrator of B2B and B2C marketplaces.
While Amazon’s various business models are targeted at distinct markets, they all
make extensive use of Amazon’s world-class capabilities to design, build, operate and
evolve digital platforms and business platforms.
The second approach to becoming a blended organization involves a focus on
upstream, internal and/or downstream processes.
With regard to upstream processes, for many producers (e.g., automobiles,
durable appliances, electronic products, etc.) a few of the raw materials used in
procured components represent a significant percentage of production costs. Part A
of Figure 6-8 portrays a traditional upstream value stream for a pipeline
manufacturing organization. Note that value stream participants engage with two
largely-independent markets: Market 1 involves raw material suppliers and
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component suppliers, and Market 2 involves these component suppliers and the
producers. Because of the potential for supply/demand imbalances and information
asymmetries, component suppliers tend to be disadvantaged in Market 1, passing on
market inefficiencies to the manufacturer in the form of higher prices and logistical
delays in Market 2. Part B of Figure 6-8 introduces the notion of a supply hub as a
means of overcoming these potential market inefficiencies in this upstream portion
of the traditional pipeline value stream.36 Here, the manufacturer creates a pseudo-
market (Market 3) within the established market for raw materials. After aggregating
raw material requirements and production plans across all component suppliers, a
producer is able to apply a comprehensive understanding of component supplier
demand (volumes and timings) in negotiating prices with raw material suppliers on
behalf of the component suppliers.
36 A. Agrawal, A. De Meyer and L.N. Van Wassenhove, “Managing Value in Supply
Chains: Case Studies on the Sourcing Hub Concept,” California Management Review, Winter
2014, pp. 23-54.
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Figure 6-8 Introducing a Supply Hub into a Pipeline Ecosystem Value Stream
Component Suppliers
Markets
Raw Material Suppliers
Producer Component Suppliers
Markets
Raw Material Suppliers
Producer
A. Traditional Value Stream B. Raw Material Supply Hub
1 2
3
With regard to internal processes, organizations can obtain a variety of benefits
(e.g., productivity, employee goodwill, reputation enhancement, etc.) by employing
a private network ecosystem solely inside their boundaries. The platforms used with
such internal marketplaces can be developed in-house or licensed from a third-party
platform-provider. A nice example of using a private market ecosystem is that of
Zimride, the ride-sharing platform that Lyft’s founders licensed to universities and
businesses as a private ride-sharing service used solely by a subscribing
university’s/business’s employees.37 Zimride provides a useful benefit for employees
in the form of a convenient and safe mechanism for solving employees’ commuting-
to-work problems and positions the organization as being socially-responsible, a
quality likely valued by many of the organization’s stakeholders.
37 R. Lawler, “Lyft-Off: Zimride’s Long Ride to Overnight Success,” TechCrunch, August
29, 2014: https://techcrunch.com/2014/08/29/6000-words-about-a-pink-mustache/
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With regard to downstream processes, Table 6-4 provides examples of three
organizations that have appended C2C marketplaces as complements to their
traditional sales channels. When carefully conceived and executed, the network
effects engendered can be exploited to enrich a brand and grow the consumer base
without cannibalizing pre-existing sales channels.
Table 6-4 Introducing a C2C Marketplace into a Pipeline Ecosystem Value Stream
Pipeline Organization
Network Ecosystem Strategic Value
Ikea Group Ikea Family loyalty program community: members post & sell used Ikea items.
Supports Ikea’s eco-friendly ethos.
Opens up room in members’ homes for new Ikea items.
Patagonia Partnership with eBay: consumers easily sell used Patagonia clothing items.
Supports Patagonia’s eco-friendly ethos.
Increases the visibility of the Patagonia brand both online and on the street.
DM (German
Drugstore Chain)
Sponsors & arranges clothing swap events, at which makeup/styling products & techniques are demonstrated.
Generates new consumers in the targeted demographic.
Enriches brand by leveraging the green spirit of sharing rather than buying.
Gains brand visibility as these events are featured on social media and by fashion bloggers.
A Recap and Look Ahead
Network ecosystems, as introduced and fleshed out in this chapter, represent
a rapidly increasing segment of most countries’ GNPs. In the process, existing
markets and industries are being transformed and new markets and industries are
being formed. The next chapter examines the digital strategy formulation process
for network orchestrators, regardless if a network orchestrator offers a market
platform for a public or private network ecosystem.
GLOSSARY
Blended organization – an organization that operates, to varying extents, as both
a pipeline organization and a network organization.
Complement – an entity that increases the perceived worth of a value-unit.
Core transaction – the primary market exchange activity driving both producers and consumers to an ecosystem’s market platform.
Critical mass – the point at which the number of product/service-adopters results
in the product/service becoming dominant within its market space.
Cross-side effect – existence of positive (or negative) effects felt by a community
associated with a network ecosystem as the number of members increases with another of the ecosystem’s communities.
Crowd-based capitalism – a two-sided market that brings together two crowds, or
communities, of individuals: one community possessing an under-used asset or skill (the value-unit) and the other possessing a short-term need for such an asset or
skill.
Market platform – the organized collection of digital and business platforms that hosts the content and functionalities that establish, operate and govern the
ecosystem’s market.
Money-side – a revenue-generating community associated with a network
ecosystem.
Multi-sided market – a network ecosystem with more than two actively
participating communities.
Network effects – where the worth of or demand for a value-unit grows as an exponential function of the number of current consumers of a value-unit and/or the
number of complements available to these consumers.
Network externality – where the worth of or demand for a value-unit grows as an
exponential function of the number of current consumers of a value-unit and/or the number of complements available to these consumers.
Same-side effect – existence of positive (or negative) effects within a community
associated with a network ecosystem.
Subsidy-side – an incentivized community associated with a network ecosystem.
The sharing economy – an economy driven by crowd-based capitalism.
Two-sided market – a network ecosystem in which a producer community and a consumer community are brought together to engage in value-unit exchanges.
Winner-take-all-market – a market where the potential exists that a critical mass of consumers will adopt one producer’s products/services.
- Chapter 6. Digitalized Business Models for Network Organizations
- Why Network Organizations Exist
- Crowd-Based Capitalism
- Digitalizing Network Ecosystems
- Blended Organizations
- A Recap and Look Ahead
- GLOSSARY