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Soccer & Society Vol. 10, No. 2, March 2009, 160–182

ISSN 1466-0970 print/ISSN 1743-9590 online © 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14660970802601647 http://www.informaworld.com

Stadiums and society in twenty-first century Buenos Aires

Chris Gaffney*

Department of Geography, University of North Carolina, Durham, USA Taylor and FrancisFSAS_A_360332.sgm10.1080/14660970802601647Soccer and Society1466-0970 (print)/1743-9590 (online)Original Article2009Taylor & Francis102000000March 2009Dr [email protected]

Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) has 69 soccer stadiums, more than any other city. It is also home to ritualized, violent conflicts between soccer fans, and between fans and police. In a stark contrast to stadiums in Europe, Asia and North America, every soccer stadium in GBA has protective fences lining the fields, most topped with razor wire. The institutional structure of soccer in Argentina and the multitude of actors associated with the stadiums in GBA complicate the management and control of the urban environment as well as the stadiums themselves. By examining the roles of soccer clubs, fans, police, government and the media in the control and operation of soccer stadiums, this essay explores the connections between soccer, society, conflict and urban governance in Argentina’s largest city.

Introduction While Argentina produces world-class athletes and teams in rugby, tennis, polo and field hockey, the overwhelming popularity of soccer sustains a network of geographic relationships that is impossible to describe in its entirety. The social, economic, polit- ical and physical infrastructures that comprise the world of soccer are interlinked, overlapping, historically continuous and staggeringly complex. The individual and collective narratives and meanings that extend from the space and place of a particular stadium form an integral component of the social and cultural history of the city as a whole. These stadium-based narratives figure in everyday language, literature, indi- vidual identities and the production of cultural norms. Thus, by entering into Argen- tine society through the stadium, we are exposed to a phenomenally complex range of ideas, issues, histories and geographic relationships.

Attending a soccer game in one of Greater Buenos Aires’ 69 stadiums (Figures 1 and 2) is one of the most spectacular and vibrant urban experiences in the world. The exuberance and passion of the fans is matched on the field by intense physical, and highly skilled, competition. Even lower division games are highly charged affairs with thousands of spectators waving flags, burning flares, chanting, singing and threatening rival groups (Figure 3). The national leagues have been repeatedly suspended in recent years due to security concerns; local and national governments are imposing punitive disciplinary measures on teams with greater frequency and severity. At issue is the control over urban space, involving a host of actors who exercise dominion over limited spatial domains both inside and outside the stadiums. The complex relation- ships between these actors impede the development of solutions to the ever present and elemental violence. This violence is historically situated in team, class, labour,

*Email: [email protected]

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ethnic and geographic antagonisms and is exacerbated by the increasing polarization of Argentine society along socio-economic lines. These forces, combined with histor- ically situated identities, rapidly transform stadiums and their surrounding urban spaces on match day and create social environments that are highly charged and frequently violent (Figure 4). Figure 1. Greater Buenos Aires.Figure 2. Soccer stadiums in Greater Buenos Aires 2006.Figure 3. The barrabrava of Dock Sud, a third division team, gets into the groove.Figure 4. The fortifications at Estadio Islas Malvinas of Club Athletico All Boys resemble a prison more than a space of leisure.

By examining the ways in which stadiums contribute to the organization, transfor- mation and contestation of urban space, this essa y explores the intersection of multi- ple actors in the stadiums of Buenos Aires and their role in the production and control of violent spectacle. This is accomplished by exploring the history of stadiums in the city and then turning to a contemporary analysis of actors and causes of violence in soccer stadiums, connecting them to larger socio-economic, cultural and political forces within the urban and national polity. The conclusion offers little hope for improvement in the current situation but offers some suggestions for making sense of the continued violence.

A brief history of soccer stadiums in Buenos Aires The British introduced modern sports to Argentina in the latter decades of the nine- teenth century.1 Commensurate with the first wave of industrial development, the approximately 40,000 expatriate British in Argentina founded private schools and

Figure 1. Greater Buenos Aires.

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social clubs where they continued the institutionalized sports that had so recently become a part of their culture.2 As early as 1876, the Sociedad Sportiva installed a 10,000 capacity horseracing stadium in the neighbourhood of Palermo on the site of today’s Hippodromo Argentino, and club members played soccer, polo and cricket on the infield.3 The first soccer team in Buenos Aires was organized at the English High School in the 1880s and modern sporting practices were generally limited to the private clubs and schools of the local elite and British expatriates.4 It was out of these institutional settings that the first soccer league in Buenos Aires emerged in 1893 and by 1899 there were two divisions – a first division of four British high school teams, and a second division of nine teams from Buenos Aires’ public secondary schools.5

As was the case in most Latin American cities, soccer’s diffusion occurred both formally and informally, between and across socio-economic groups. The most likely spaces for informal diffusion were in the dock areas where British mariners played with local labourers, or industrial settings where British managers played with and against their Argentine employees. Globally, Argentina was just behind England and Scotland in developing organized soccer leagues and we can be fairly certain that the

Figure 2. Soccer stadiums in Greater Buenos Aires 2006.

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sport’s diffusion was not strictly a top-down phenomenon.6 The spread of soccer (and stadiums) was aided and abetted by its plasticity, a lack of autochthonous urban sport- ing culture and recent European immigrants’ familiarity with it. Informal practice could happen on nearly any level ground and, in the rapidly expanding city, there was an abundance of open space. By 1901, there were four divisions in the Argentine

Figure 3. The barrabrava of Dock Sud, a third division team, gets into the groove.

Figure 4. The fortifications at Estadio Islas Malvinas of Club Athletico All Boys resemble a prison more than a space of leisure.

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Association Football League (AAFL) and, by 1907, there were around 350 soccer clubs in Buenos Aires.7 The local press referred to the growing popularity of soccer as a ‘fever’, ‘wave’ and ‘social mania’, words that suggest soccer spread contagion- like amongst young porteños (port dwellers) of all classes.8

A demographic boom and localized settlement patterns abetted the rapid spread of soccer in Buenos Aires. Between 1870 and 1930 the population of Buenos Aires exploded from 180,000 to 2,250,000, primarily as a result of European immigration. Argentina did not develop an export-orientated industrial system until the last third of the nineteenth century and along with the population, the economy grew in response to British capital investment, the development of refrigeration (which allowed for the transport of Argentine beef to Europe), and the development of rail and streetcar transport. These technological and globalizing forces also caused the city to expand away from the coast into the pampas. Many new immigrants settled into ethnic enclaves, retaining their language and culture as they tried to make sense of their new and rapidly changing urban environment. The space of the neighbour- hood frequently helped to organize these identities, marking boundaries in a complex urban world.

Within the neighbourhood context, soccer teams sprang from informal associa- tions of young men. The most important determinant of team longevity was the appro- priation of a space to play. As the city expanded, there were many open fields that were levelled and improved upon until they became playable fields, or canchas. Over time, teams improved their grounds, moved to better sites as they amassed capital, or were forced to the less expensive periphery in search of land. The fledgling teams also appropriated space in parks and in the port area, from which the municipal govern- ment expelled them from time to time.

As soccer expanded amongst nearly all segments of porteño society it began to occupy a tremendous amount of urban space. It also increased as an element of public culture, gaining increased attention in the press and providing employment in sport- ing goods manufacturing and sales. The proliferation of stadiums, most of which were very small, served to bring residents of different zones together and facilitated the development and identification of neighbourhood-specific identities. These evolv- ing identities and geographies helped to position individuals and groups within the larger urban matrix, not only in relation to each other but in opposition to other people and spaces. In addition to Porteños, many teams took the name Argentinos in order to distinguish themselves from recent immigrants. Defensores and Unidos were also prevalent names and implied defence of the locale and a united front, respec- tively. Many teams also took the name of their neighbourhood. As teams were formed with the explicit intention of confronting others, it is not surprising that the space of the stadium hosted contests between sub-cultural groups that were in direct competition with others for sporting and territorial supremacy in the rapidly evolving metropolis.

These were the basic foundations upon which a very strong soccer culture grew throughout the twentieth century. As with many stadium cultures, Buenos Aires’ stadiums became associated with powerful political figures, hosted ritualized conflicts between competing urban groups, and began to accrue sedimented layers of meaning. Given the primacy of Buenos Aires in the Argentine urban system (with one third of the national population living there), the city’s stadiums were the epicentre of national sporting culture and served to shape identities and meanings for Argentines of all classes at local, urban, national and international scales.

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The transformation of urban space There can be no question that a stadium impacts its locality and the larger urban environment with a certain periodicity. While always present as landmarks, nodes of transportation, sites of employment, tourism and collective memory, on match day stadiums energize urban districts, filling the streets and clogging transportation arteries. The effect of match day urban space around stadiums in Buenos Aires is particularly noticeable, radically transforming the feel and texture of ‘ordinary’ streets. This is especially true here where lethal agents of the state make a conspicuous display of force. The show of force is relative to the scale of the match and the potential for violence. Where a superclásico between Boca Juniors and River Plate may warrant 1,200 police (mounted, riot, traffic), a fourth division game between Sacachispas and Colegiales might only necessitate 30 or 40.

At any given game, localized geography becomes increasingly militarized as hundreds, thousands or tens of thousands of fans make their way to the stadium. Mounted and riot police control avenues of ingress and egress for home and visiting fans, altering everyday geography. The presence of hundreds and sometimes thou- sands of battle-ready and battle-tested security forces add to an already tense and anxious environment. The police are prepared for violence. If and when it occurs, the police truncheons do not tend to discriminate. For important international or derby matches (clásicos or el superclásico), visiting fans have to be bussed to the stadium as their unfamiliarity with shifting local geography could land them unwittingly in ‘enemy territory’.9 The local supporters are at a significant advantage, and visiting fans are always given a 15-minute head start after the final whistle.

Approaching or leaving the stadium, urban space is transformed through barri- cades, the presence of vendors on sidewalks, unemployed men waving their shirts in an attempt to lure drivers to empty parking spaces, or young toughs asking for change. The smell of urine surrounding the stadium is strong, and hundreds of young men make their way to the entrance drinking beer, waving flags, chanting and singing their team songs. To those who habitually and ritually participate in the transformation of urban space, the intersection of multiple actors is a negotiated routine, rather part of local cultural norms and knowledge. However, the complexity of interactions and rapid changes in flows, territories and codes are not easily negotiated or deciphered. When a group of people start running it is generally best to do the same.

On any given weekend, there are dozens of soccer games in Buenos Aires, each one requiring high levels of organization, movement, anticipation, action and reaction. Each stadium impacts its surrounding environment in different ways and involves thousands of different actors who play a particular role in the stadium spectacle. The ways in which this happens are beyond the scope of this essay. I will instead turn to the main actors in the scene.

Actors In and around the space of the stadium we find an unequal representation of a wide spectrum of society. Among fans, males between the ages of 14 and 45 are over- represented, while females of all ages are under-represented. Additionally, within certain sections of the Argentine stadium, the representational numbers are even more distorted. In the popular section of the stadium, one will rarely find anyone over the age of 35, and within the ranks of the most ‘hard-core’ fans, one will almost never find women, the very young or middle-aged.10 Elderly people are a rare sight at the

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stadium. Part of the reason for this is the highly volatile nature of the popular sections and the turbulent street scenes. There are few controls on the number of spectators allowed into these sections, and one must be willing to physically engage the crowd in order to maintain one’s undifferentiated place. The physical exertion necessary to remain standing can last for up to four hours, as important matches require that one arrive well before the scheduled kick-off. This militates against the presence of the very young, the very old and those not willing to be pressed among thousands of surging male bodies for hours at a time.

The more sedate, and typically older, crowd occupies the platea. Tickets for most platea seats were between 15 and 45 pesos in 2006, again, varying with the scale and importance of the game. Most of the women who attend stadiums in Buenos Aires will be found in the platea, as will fathers and sons, older men, families and tourists. The platea is generally free of violence and fireworks, but obscenities are more than common and passions run as deeply here as they do in the popular.

The ticket prices of Argentine stadiums are reasonably affordable even for the working classes, but it is not infrequently that one finds young men begging for money to buy a two-dollar ticket to enter the popular section of the stadium. Thus, the stadium has remained financially accessible to nearly all classes in Buenos Aires, save for the most marginalized. However, by becoming members of a barrabrava (orga- nized fan or hooligan group) even the very poor can gain free access to the stadium.

In general, and particularly in Argentina, the soccer stadium is a space for a limited, self-selecting public that tends to cut across class divisions and more research may reveal a relatively proportional representation of social classes. Despite the potential to be a fully ‘representational space’, the crowd composition at a given soccer stadium in Buenos Aires is approximately 97% male, which dramatically shapes the environment. I discuss the development of the masculine nature of stadium space in Buenos Aires in other works.11

The cumulative capacity for all of the soccer stadiums in Buenos Aires is around one million people, about one fifteenth of the metropolitan population. So even if they were all used to capacity on the same day, the vast majority of people would not be able to attend. While reliable attendance figures are not available (for reasons we shall discuss), it can be safely said that attending stadiums is everywhere a minority event at a given moment and that most people have been to a stadium at least once. In 2004, at least 3,692,773 people attended soccer games in Buenos Aires, approximately one fifth of the population.12

Within this limited, male-dominated social framework there are four principal groups of actors that contrive to shape the use, function and perception of stadium space: clubs, fans, police and the media. The relationships between these actors are much more complex than I will be able to elucidate here. But it should be taken a priori that these highly nuanced relationships are marked by corruption, ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ and mutual exploitation.13

Clubs Stadiums in Greater Buenos Aires and throughout most of Latin America are the prop- erty of social clubs. Membership in these independent clubs is open to the general public and provides a host of services to members in the sede social, or social centre. The clubs range widely in size, location and resources. Socios pay monthly member- ship dues and are granted access to the club’s varied sporting, social and educational

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resources. Some sedes sociales (Boca Juniors, River Plate, Ferrocarrill Oeste) are located next to or within their respective stadium and provide tennis courts, swimming pools, dining rooms and meeting space for the entire membership.14

Historically, many clubs have had to move their stadiums away from their sede social because of the high property values and demand for space within the city of Buenos Aires. The stadium and soccer are the most public manifestations of the social club and are responsible for bringing in the majority of club receipts, whether through cable television contracts, corporate sponsorship, the sale of players or ticket revenue.15

The democratically elected leaders of some clubs are powerful social, economic and political actors. For instance, the president of Boca Juniors, Mauricio Macri, is the leading 2007 presidential candidate of the centre-right coalition and ran for the mayor- ship of Buenos Aires on the platform that he would be able to transform the city, just as he had done with his private businesses and with Boca Juniors. The president of Chacarita Juniors, Luis Barrionuevo, also a senator in the national congress, refused to answer the questions of a federal judge regarding violence in soccer because he claimed he was being persecuted by ex-president Menem.16 Macri, Barrionuevo and others like them are often life-long members of the clubs they head up and as such have a vested personal interest in their sporting, economic and political successes. The involvement of high-level political figures in the running of social clubs, soccer teams, stadiums and associated violence frequently involves conflicts of interests, claims of corruption and a lack of transparency in local and national governance. The exact nature and extent of most of these relationships are not clear, but the effects of widespread corruption and continued violence are increasingly evident in the inability of the clubs to prevent or control violence. There is growing concern that while many clubs are falling inextricably into debt, in part due to declining memberships and increasing violence, the governing members of clubs are maintaining a level of wealth and privilege at the expense of the club, a situation many see as a reflection of Argentine society at large.

The historical relationships between clubs, local identities and national govern- ment are also quite complex. From the turn of the twentieth century, soccer clubs played a central role in the social and political life in the neighbourhoods in which they were formed. Not only did they serve as venues for organized social activities but they ‘came to represent the locality and contributed to the integration of a young immigrant population into Argentine society’.17 Because of their centrality in neigh- bourhood life, the clubs became a way for local politicians to gain visibility and to secure a solid voting block. Becoming a club director was a political process in its own right that frequently resulted in involvement in the larger political world of Buenos Aires.

When soccer was professionalized in Argentina in 1931, the importance of the clubs in economic and political spheres increased. Investing in stadium infrastructure, expanding the social club, and in some cases travelling to Europe, became ways of increasing the club’s exposure and revenue.18 While the clubs continued to be run by amateur, elected directors, the economic and political influence of the clubs further centralized soccer in the cultural life of the city.

Clubs that associated themselves with influential political figures could count on their assistance in building or improving their stadiums. This clientelism reached an apogee during Peron’s tenure as president when most of the city’s major clubs had padrinos (godfathers) in high government positions. The rash of stadiums built with state sponsorship in the 1940s and 1950s is directly attributable to the relationships

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between national political leaderships and clubs. One such stadium is the Estádio Presidente Peron of Racing Club. Indeed, most of the stadiums in Buenos Aires are named after prominent men.

By the 1950s and 1960s the economic potential of soccer began to dictate the management practices of clubs. The advent of televised games brought additional revenue to clubs and the increase of high-value player transfers to European clubs brought millions of dollars into club coffers. This further encouraged the approxima- tion of local political figures to the club and a directorship was frequently a path to riches. In the local community, clubs augmented their neighbourhood-based member- ship by providing new recreational and social facilities. As soccer expanded on local, national and global scales, the local clubs acquired more wealth through the sale of players and began to exercise more influence over their locales. Even smaller clubs extended their range of services by offering swimming, tennis, dance and other recre- ational activities. Many clubs created their own developmental programmes for young soccer players based on European models and, in the 1970s, large clubs began to take responsibility for the education of their up-and-coming soccer stars.

During the military dictatorship of 1976–83, clubs functioned as a bastion of democracy in a totalitarian environment. These civic entities provided some of the few spaces of free political association. And while there is not much historical evidence to corroborate the idea, it is possible that the social and political space of social clubs were the loci of organized resistance to the military regime. On the other hand, it is widely suspected that the military regime used the barrabravas to organize against the Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo and to chant pro-government slogans during the 1978 World Cup. The implication is that soccer stadium cultures exercised an impor- tant political role in the production, contestation and control of public space that extended well beyond the stadium walls.

During the 1990s, the historically situated identities that the clubs represented appeared to be in crisis at the same time that their centrality in the culture increased disproportionately. Alabarces suggests that this paradoxical crisis was a product of the explosion in the mediums of communication that displaced entrenched notions of class and replaced popular, national cultures with international popular cultures. In this expansion, soccer, a fundamental object of global culture, has tended to amplify its limits of representation amongst classes. However, in the same way that soccer has expanded its economic, geographic and social reach, it has produced mechanisms of exclusion. The neo-liberal regimes of the 1990s have expelled large numbers of people from the market and increased socio-economic disparities. The increased costs of tickets, relative to earned wages, and the wide availability of cable television may have altered stadium demographics.19

Following the economic and political crisis of 2001 club membership began to decline precipitously. The devaluation of the Argentine peso effectively tripled the cost of membership and the middle-class base of most clubs dwindled. Since 2004, club memberships have begun to increase although the added income from member- ship has not allowed smaller clubs to extricate themselves from grave financial diffi- culties. The increasingly critical financial association between clubs and mass-media outlets penalizes smaller clubs that compete in lower divisions. In order to make ends meet, small clubs must sell their best players to larger clubs who then sell them to European, Middle Eastern, Mexican or Brazilian clubs for millions of dollars. Smaller clubs are in severe financial difficulty and have trouble paying the limited salaries of their players. This is consistent with the fading fortunes of smaller clubs in Brazil.

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Regardless of their financial condition, the clubs continue to be the locus of very powerful identity constructions for millions of people in Buenos Aires and Argentina. These identities are based in a number of different arenas: historical, familial, national, class, ethnic, neighbourhood and labour. Club loyalties form an integral part of personal identity in Argentina. Instead of saying one likes a team or is a fan of a team, one uses the immutable verb ser, to be. This implies that club affiliation is as immu- table as ethnic, national or family identities: Yo soy un hombre / una mujer, Yo soy un professor / una profesora, Yo soy Argentino/a, Yo soy el hijo / la hija de mi padre, Yo soy de Boca/Racing/Independiente/etc [I am a man / a woman, I am a professor, I am an Argentine, I am a son, I am the daughter of my father, I am of Boca, Racing, Inde- pendiente /etc]. These identities extend across time and space to connect with the stadium, the home and principal source of territorial and symbolic identity for the team.

Simpatizante, hincha, hinchada and the barra brava There exists a hierarchy to fandom in Argentina. A simpatizante is someone who has a favourite team or teams and follows the various championships casually. He or she might go to the stadium six to ten times per year, but stays away from games that have a potential for violence. Typically, the simpatizante is not a club member and will not wear the colours of the team to the stadium for fear of reprisal from rival fans or police. The hincha (the literal translation is someone who is ‘pumped up’) is likely to be a club socio, regularly goes to the stadium, sometimes travelling to away games within the city and watches games outside of the city on television. Depending on the dedi- cation of the hincha, he or she will travel between cities to support the team. They form the majority presence at games and generally occupy space in the popular, to either side of the barrabrava. The collective group of fans in a stadium is called the hinchada. Through the diverse fan groups of the city, the population of Buenos Aires forms clans that may or may not coincide with class, ethnic or neighbourhood divisions.20 The most powerful and visible elements of these clans are groups called barrabrava.

The barrabravas first came to prominence in the mid-1960s during a time of increased political violence in Argentina and represented the tribalization of soccer supporters.21 During this time, the barrabravas became the loci of strong identity formations for socially, politically and economically marginalized youth. In an increasingly hostile political environment that limited free association in public space, the stadium became a place and space to exercise violence against the state. The tradi- tionally carnivalesque environment of the stadium became a site of violent struggle between the state (police) and disenfranchised members of society (barra brava). Although the barrabravas have many middle-class members, the majority, with little economic opportunity and less education, began to organize their lives around the one element of society in which they could be publicly seen, heard and understood: soccer. In a very short period of time, the barrabravas developed close relationships with the clubs who came to depend on them for intra- and inter-club political rivalries, economic stability in terms of labour for the club, and pride in having the most vocal, colourful and passionate group of supporters. Combined with the historical formations that I discussed earlier, the increasing marginalization of large segments of the popu- lation and the de-territorialization of the city as a whole, the stadium has become one of the last bastions of social agency for hundreds of thousands of young men. Duke and Crolley suggest that because of their connections with club directors most of the

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activity of the barrabravas is politically motivated, adding an unpredictable element to local and national affairs of state.

Club directors maintain guarded political and economic relations with the barra- bravas. The barrabravas are hierarchical organizations of primarily young, economi- cally and socially disenfranchised men that are paid by the club in a variety of ways. Some members are given fictitious jobs in the companies of directors, others are given tickets to sell on match days, while others have relationships with the stewards of the clubs and collect money from spectators who are then slid under the turnstiles. The barrabravas can also act in a more sinister fashion in the service of the club directors by disrupting rival club director’s businesses, causing political disruptions, or engaging in violent acts against other barrabravas and the police. They are in essence professional fans, operating within an institution of their own creation, financed by club management to act in the service of club directors. On the other hand, the barrabravas influence the decisions and internal politics of the directors in regards to team managers and club initiatives.

From an anthropological perspective, a barrabrava can be considered an organized, paramilitary society with specific codes, behaviours and modes of accruing status within the group. There is a strict division of labour within the barrabrava; the youth rise up through the ranks by stealing banners of opposing teams, showing courage in battle with other groups, stealing cars, or fighting with other ascendant members. The loyalty commanded by the barrabrava leaders is very strong: ‘The leaders of the barra are idols that are the official guardians of the group identity. Identification with the leader has the same characteristics as adolescent adoration, which also responds to a need to strengthen individual identity.’22 Some barrabravas are known by the weapons they use: rubber mallets at San Lorenzo, group pummelling at Huracán, and umbrellas at Independiente.23

Within this division of labour, there are specific liaisons with the media, the police and with the directors of the club. While some members are purportedly involved either in drug trafficking or with the organization and production of group spectacle in the stands, others are involved with arranging local, national, continental and inter- national transportation. The world of the barrabravas is closed and extremely danger- ous to outsiders. The barrabravas are, paradoxically, the most visible social element of the club in the stadium as they occupy entire terraces and are fundamental in the creation of the atmosphere of the stadium.

Barrabrava command strict loyalty from their members. Though it has not been empirically documented in Argentina, we know from studies in other Latin American countries and North American urban gangs, that there are initiation rites that youth must pass through in order to become part of the group.24 The majority of barrabrava are comprised of individuals from the lower-middle and lower classes. Middle and upper-middle class members comprise a smaller proportion of the membership and participate for reasons quite different from the majority. Women are almost wholly absent from the ranks of the barras and cannot occupy barra space in the stands.25

Once one has entered into the world of the barrabrava it is very difficult to leave. As one of my informants reported, ‘They were like a family to me. We ate together, went out together and fought together. I was afraid that I was never going to get out and I think the only way to make a clean break is to get married and start a family of your own. That’s what I did and I can never go back.’

The clubs and the barrabrava are locked into symbiotic relationships wherein each defines itself in terms of the other. The covert activities of the barrabravas are ‘crucial

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to the internal structures’ of soccer in Argentina. These operations include blackmail carried out against players, coaches or political rivals of the padrino or president of the club. It is not ‘uncommon for clubs to sort out their problems on the pitch via the barrabrava’.26 For instance, if a player is undergoing contract negotiations, the pres- ident of the club can ask the barra to chant abuse at the player who will then be in a weaker position to negotiate favourable terms. The barras are also well informed about the personal lives of players and coaches and the threat of violent reprisal against someone who has fallen out of favour is usually enough to gain the political ends of the directors. Coaches have been known to pay the barras to support them during a streak of poor performances. Without the support of the barra the coach cannot survive. In one well publicized example, the barrabrava of Gimnasia y Esgrima de la Plata threatened their own team, insisting that they lose a critical game against Boca Juniors so that their main rivals, Estudiantes de la Plata did not ascend to first place in the table.

The constitution of a barrabrava’s membership is dependent on the team and its location within the city; however, from my observations, many of the barrabrava have little education and very limited economic opportunities.27 They have been effectively marginalized from fully participating in society which is a threat to their masculine selves in a paternalistic society. This marginalization is to a large degree reversed within the social structure of the stadium, as the barrabrava commands as much attention as the players on the field. In this sense, the barrabrava, through their visible actions in the stadium and through media, operate within the public sphere otherwise denied them by society. It is in this guise that the violence of the stadium is a demonstration of frustration and marginality, as well as an alternative social hierar- chy. The stadium is the medium for the expression of those sentiments. The violence of the barrabravas, however, is distinct from the political violence that has periodi- cally shaken Buenos Aires in the last few years. For the barrabrava the stadium may function as a refuge from the symbolic and structural impacts of neo-liberalism and globalization. By offering a non-modern refuge of strongly felt and vibrantly experi- enced collective identity, the barras offer an alternative to the increasingly harsh economic and social realities of Buenos Aires and Argentina.

The relationships between the barras are dialectic and historically and geographi- cally situated. The communal representations of the teams do not extend equally to the whole city but pertain to micro-communities associated with neighbourhoods. In recent years an essentialized discourse has developed in relation to these micro-spaces within the city. The barrio and club has become (for the hinchas and barrabravas) a moral and spiritual reserve, an area of decontamination, and a space constructed as a reserve of the local in the face of tensions associated with a larger de-territorialization of the city as a whole.28 Youth groups are more likely to assume this discourse and produce a metonym between the neighbourhood, stadium and notions of authenticity. That which is more local is considered to be more authentic, less commercialized, and less subject to the mercantile logics of industrial culture.29

Relationships between club leaders and their barrabrava are very guarded, prima- rily because they involve national political figures and institutionalized violence. Because of this it is unlikely that the details of the relationships between them will ever be fully brought to light. However, it is clear that the relationship between the clubs and their barrabrava is complex and paradoxical. Sebreli says that the barrabrava of the 1970s were ‘ductile elements manipulated by totalitarian political interests that knew how to exploit juvenile anxieties’.30 It is unlikely that this situation

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has changed in recent years, especially with the expanded tele-visual reach of stadium events.

Scher and Palomino attribute the rise in stadium violence that began in the late 1960s to an increase in youth membership in the barrabravas. This rise might be correlated to a decline in the Argentine economy or to a sustained rise in inflation and unemployment. If this were the case, the increased death toll in the clasura tourna- ment of 2002 could be explained as an outgrowth of intolerable social conditions. In the absence of work, welfare or education, the unemployed male youth of Buenos Aires looked to assert themselves in what they believed to be a very positive arena, organized support for their soccer team. The increased power of the barrabravas was made visible through lethal acts of violence in and around the stadiums of the city.

The clubs cannot completely control their barrabrava because of the political, economic and social weight that fandom carries in Argentina. Clubs compete against each other in several spheres: on the field, economically, politically and in the terraces. It is a point of pride amongst club directors to have a large, supportive barra- brava that can afford to produce spectacles both in the home stadium and on the road.

There is also an imaginary ranking amongst these groups. Those who are more violent or who support their teams with more observable passion rise up the ranking. They know that the media amplifies their actions. In this ranking, violent confronta- tions with the police bring barras the biggest number of points. This ranking is consid- ered to be a reflection of the relative masculine power that each barra wields. The word used to define the passionate actions of soccer supporters is Aguante. This word can also be defined as an ability to act in space. The barras need to have the capacity to defend the battlefield space of the stadium and neighbourhood through physical and symbolic actions such as graffiti.31 If a group remains in the field they are victorious and the other must retreat. This territorial conquest involves physical force and skill in street fighting, the ability to steal rivals’ banners, as well as modes of intimidation which happen though chants, gestures, throwing missiles and bodily movement in and around the stadiums. Through these codes and behaviours the barras show that they are ready for battle. In many cases, battles are won and lost through intimidation with- out necessitating the hand-to-hand battle of the streets.

Despite their apparent control over players, coaches and the internal function of clubs, the barrabrava are dependent on the space of the stadium to manifest their iden- tities in public. They are fanatical followers of the team and its exploits. The barra- brava have a vested interest in maintaining the social order that permits the successful staging of sport while acknowledging through their actions that this very system creates the conditions of marginalization against which they are protesting. It is fairly certain that the barrabrava are not actively aware of these paradoxes, as one rarely sees signs of political protest in the stadiums. The textual messages displayed on terrace banners or in stadium graffiti have more to do with localized geographic iden- tity, expressions of dedication to rock and roll, alcohol, cocaine and marijuana, capac- ity for violence or vitriol aimed at the principal rivals of the club (Figure 5). The only political clout the barrabravas demonstrate an interest in wielding is in support of the club management that supports them. Figure 5. Graffiti depicting Osama bin Laden is frequent at stadiums and on banners throughout Buenos Aires. Bin Laden represents the ultimate in callous violence for these fans.

The narrative of victimization that the barras have places their violent actions in a passive framework. They do not perceive themselves to be violent actors, but are forced into a position of acting violently through the ‘system’. Since they cannot win in the economic, political or social arenas, they assert their authority in the sphere that they dominate. Any attempt to infringe on their space is a provocation that is met with

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a violent response. The history of violence between barrabravas increases on a weekly basis. Friendships and antagonisms between barras are historically situated yet shift according to present needs and values.32 The approximately 60 barrabravas in Buenos Aires describe a phenomenally complex web of political, economic, geographic, historical and sporting relationships that taken together constitute an indisputably powerful and spectacular element of stadium culture.

Police Within the governing structure of Argentine soccer, clubs are responsible for paying security costs for soccer matches. Security services are contracted to local, provincial and federal police forces who receive overtime pay at soccer matches. It is not uncom- mon to have between 800–1,200 police at important clásico or international matches. This is a strong financial burden on the clubs, who cannot use those monies for invest- ment in stadium infrastructure, buying of players, or development of other social programmes within the club itself. The costs of security are exacerbated by the violent behaviour of the fans of the club itself, an irony that is apparently lost on many of the perpetrators.

Every barrabrava considers the police as an enemy. As a result, the police are directly and indirectly involved in the production of violence in and around stadiums. On the one hand, the presence of the police is paid for by the clubs and necessitated

Figure 5. Graffiti depicting Osama bin Laden is frequent at stadiums and on banners throughout Buenos Aires. Bin Laden represents the ultimate in callous violence for these fans.

174 C. Gaffney

by the actions of the barrabrava. On the other, it is in the best interests of the police to have some level of stadium violence, as this ensures their presence and an additional source of income. Given the physical barriers separating groups of fans from each other, there is not much violence between rival groups inside the stadium. However, I have witnessed examples of violence inside the stadium on several occasions. The most notable of these was in San Lorenzo’s Estádio Nuevo Gasómetro where the barrabrava of Huracán attempted to break through the physical barriers separating them from the field. In September of 2003, fans of Boca Juniors and Chacarita Juniors battled inside the stadium causing more than 30 serious injuries and the suspension of the game.33

The police have both antagonistic and familiar relationships with the barrabrava. They are employed to control the barrabrava on a weekly basis and have developed relationships with them over decades. Because soccer fandom extends to all social classes, the police have a vested interest in what happens in and around the stadium. The barrabrava has a distinct organizational advantage over the police when it comes to dominating stadium and city space. Organizing for matches, both home and away, and preparing for violent confrontations are primary occupations of the barrabrava. The police are frequently drawn from different units, may be unfamiliar with the local terrain, and usually do not have the authority to use lethal force against the barra- brava. The barrabrava, for their part, carry small arms, knives and sharpened poles, outnumber the police by as many as ten to one and operate on their ‘home ground’. The police maintain liaisons with leaders of the barrabrava, and vice versa. When there is a truce between two barrabrava groups, the police are notified by the clubs that they will not need to provide as much security for the match.

Conversely, it is widely suspected that when confrontations between groups of barrabrava do occur in the immediate vicinity of the stadium, it is only through the complicity of the police. For instance, local geography can be negotiated (through bribes) such that the police are absent in particular areas. The barrabrava can then engage in ritual warfare in those ‘empty’ spaces. These confrontations frequently have a high human cost, and yet they fuse stadium identities with the surrounding urban space, weaving a violence-based spatiality into an urban order where violence is masked and indirect.

The police, like most men in Argentina, are soccer fans. Through the apparatus of the state they take the opportunity to exercise ‘legitimate’ violence over rival fans. The irony is not lost on members of the barrabrava who develop a narrative of victimiza- tion in relation to the police. The confrontation between legitimate and non-legitimate uses of force calls into question the authority of the state over city-space. For many fans, the disappearance of ‘justice’ as a legitimate institution of the state is represented metonymically in the stadium. The spontaneous violence of the fans is designed, also through metonymy, as an ultimate escalation of disbelief, a lack of confidence and disgust. The police, as the formal representatives of the state, are equally disgusted with the barrabravas and readily engage them in combat. This is the most ritual and visible element of class conflict in Buenos Aires, although the police are likely not representing their own class interests but those of the state.

Local and national governments There have been strong relationships between soccer clubs, local and national political figures since the 1920s. Scher and di Gano describe in detail the ways in which

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politicians have used their associations with the soccer community in pursuit of personal and ideological ends. In general terms, the non-governmental organization Associacion de Fútbol Argentino (AFA), which regulates soccer in Argentina, is answerable to the state. The state prosecutes crimes committed in and around stadium space and in 2003 created a special prosecution unit to investigate sports-related crimes. Despite the increasingly strong measures taken by the national government to control stadium-space, the continued violence has left legislators and judges with few options but to suspend play. When Nestor Kirchner assumed the presidency in 2003, he created a Sports Security Secretariat that was headed up by a former referee.

Part of the problem in controlling stadium violence through legislation is the reluc- tance of club directors to provide the names of the members of barrabravas. This effectively sidesteps one of the main provisions of the 1994 Law on Sports Event Violence. Additionally, the long delay in adjudicating crimes along with the complicity of powerful political figures in stadium violence produces few criminal convictions. The complex relationships between the powerful club directors, the barrabravas and national political leaders involve conflicts of interest, illegal activity and strong loyal- ties that all mitigate against an effective legislative solution to stadium-related violence. Part of the problem is that most of the club presidents have strong allegiances to political parties. Because of the ‘unique ties between politics and fútbol, the role of the fans is of utmost importance in the running of a club and to a politician’s career’.34

This creates a situation in which no one takes responsibility for the violence. As a consequence of these facts, many observers criticize the way that politicians, club directors and the judicial system are seen to protect the barrabravas. The institutions of the state and of soccer seem incapable of resolving the issue.

In terms of stadium construction, the participation of the state reveals a strong rela- tionship between government and soccer. Because soccer is such an important part of cultural life in Buenos Aires it offers a chance to influence mass behaviour through organized spectacles in the stadium. This gives club directors ready access to political leaders.35

Political icons such as Eva Peron used soccer for political ends. In the 1950s, she organized youth championships in Buenos Aires as a means of identification with the masses. The 1978 World Cup is regarded as the watershed moment for political influ- ence in soccer. The full details of this story are frightening and can be found in a number of excellent texts.36 The historical associations of politics with soccer in Argentina are too complex to reveal in detail here; however, almost every aspect of soccer and stadium governance in Buenos Aires is associated with elected officials at all levels of local and national government.

Media The role of the internet, television, radio and print media in producing and projecting stadium identities has changed in recent years. The proliferation of cable television has heightened the exposure of soccer, which has also led to an increase in the cover- age of sport in print media. The availability of nearly constant soccer programming on television, and exhaustive coverage in the daily press, coupled with an increase in violence in and around the stadium has convinced many middle- and upper-class people to watch matches from the security of home, or local bars and cafés. The more middle-class people stay away from the stadiums, the more they are likely to consume the performances of the clubs and the barrabrava via television. This is a point that is

176 C. Gaffney

not lost on the barrabrava, who stage elaborate pageants and performances that have two functions: 1) to show up the other fan groups, and 2) to demonstrate their capacity for organizing impressive visual spectacles to a local, national and international audi- ence. It is possible that many of these performances are designed or conditioned as media events, but more detailed knowledge of the production and performance of stadium spectacles will require much more research.37

‘Sport violence’ is considered in a different light than the urban political violence that defined Buenos Aires between the 1950s and the 1980s, or the disturbances following the economic collapse of December 2001. Journalists and academics have focused on the latter to the near total exclusion of the former, although one is most certainly a product of the other. The lack of attention paid to the root causes of soccer- related violence is the product of a generalized academic aloofness in regard to sport in Argentina.

Although no one would assert that the actualized and ritualized violence of the stadium is an acceptable societal norm, there is little mention in the daily press of stadium violence as an abnormality. However, when these confrontations turn deadly, the attention is focused on the symptoms and not the causes of the violence. This implies a toleration of violence within certain bounds that recognizes the ‘need’ for social expression of this kind. In a highly masculine culture with a long history of state-sponsored violence, reading the Argentine press does not give one the impres- sion that the combative norms of the stadium are conceptually or functionally aber- rant. Because the stadium is the locus for the acting out of a larger social problematic, the root causes of that violence are rarely addressed in public discourse. As we have seen, this violence had its origins in the gendered production of public space and in the larger socio-economic and political situation of the country; and the marginalized segments of the population find social agency through the performative violence of the barrabrava.

The hyper-visibility of soccer in television and print media assures that the actions of the barrabravas are amplified through their exposure in the media. Monge attributes violence to the desires of coaches for results and directors for profits that work within a realm of sensational media to create an exceptionally charged stadium environment. Various media augment the drama of the spectacle and the frequently bloody confron- tations make headlines. Finally, the ability of violence itself to create an alternative spatiality is too subtle (and dangerous) an idea to surface in public discourse.

At the same time that increased media exposure has augmented the visibility of the performances of the barrabravas, it is also through the mass-mediafication of soccer that women are able to manifest themselves more visibly into soccer culture. If their place in the spectacle is as an object of the masculine gaze, women appear to recog- nize and accept the rules of the game and in all cases use these rules as a means of appropriating space in the soccer-world. However, the ‘majority of the feminine images that are presented by the media of women in stadiums meet a double condi- tion: sensuality and exoticism. This signifies that not all of the women present in the stadiums (during the 1998 World Cup) were captured by the cameras, but only those that met these two conditions.’38 Thus, the media contributes to a gendered construc- tion of stadium space wherein women are valorized for their sexual characteristics and not for their ability to participate as full agents in the spectacle.

In general, we can assert that the network of stadiums and associated spaces that comprise the soccer world of Buenos Aires touches nearly every social sector and elides the distinctions between the public and private realms. Imbued with notions of

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masculinity, wrapped in a discourse of violence, and supported by powerful economic and political forces, soccer stadiums in Buenos Aires provide a window into the func- tioning of society at large. By entering into Argentine society through the soccer stadium, we are faced with the essential contradictions and paradoxes of the city that have drawn the attention of generations of scholars.

Conclusion The violence that is part of the stadium experience in Buenos Aires is pervasive and continuous, even if there are no physical confrontations between rival groups or the police. That soccer can be understood as ritualized combat that enflames passions and encourages an essentialized conception of ‘the other’ is well documented. The milita- rization of stadiums and urban space indicates a particular form of authoritarian social control and high level of reactive behaviour. Because ‘football fan cultures are satu- rated with communal identifications and sectarian antagonisms towards other teams’,39 the passions generated by this sense of belonging and opposition, as well as the virulent rhetoric of fandom, allow the stadium to take on the role of a transcendent space, where the fans are more important than the players on the field or the directors in the luxury suites. Rather than the game’s rule-based spatiality, the fan offers a spati- ality that explodes rules and their human costs. It is a form of romanticism, at the same time reflecting a very masculine utopia of brute force and clannish intensity.

Alabarces suggests that ‘the stadium does not appear as a transgressive place; instead the carnivalesque of Argentine fans has been integrated by the mass media’.40

This may be true in some instances. However, the real, physical battles that occur both inside and outside the stadiums between police forces and fans, between rival groups of fans, and between two groups of fans and the police can be understood as an attempt to suspend the dominant social order. These battles are not just staged for the media. But to what end then? It is possible that violence could be a form of social expression, wrapped inside a crisis of legitimacy. However, it is also true that the stadium is a platform for powerful political and media interests that have a vested interest in manipulating and amplifying the behaviour of the excluded for a larger audience. The stadium is a site where the social order is simultaneously contested and reaffirmed. Media broadcast both rule-based and anarchic spatiality in a single ‘pack- age’ for viewers to interpret according to their predilections and social positions.

Within the stadium society permits a certain disruption of the social order. This is natural given the historical nature of the stadium as a liminal space where transgres- sion and inversion are the norm. However, when the behaviours of the stadium spill out into the public space of the streets, society demands a different order. This order does not allow the barrabravas full social agency. The stadium is their only place where they have a voice, and they dare not overturn the order that sustains it, even though their violent actions always threaten to do so.

Contrary to Argentine sports such as rugby, polo, field hockey and tennis, soccer pertains to all social sectors and involves multi-layered conflicts and contradictions that frequently boil over into violent acts both inside and outside the stadium. Even where there is no direct physical confrontation between fans or between fans and police, soccer stadiums are cauldrons of passion where masculine, class, ethnic, labour and geographic identities clash in sanctioned, ritualized combat. The solutions to the violence, if indeed there are any, lie in understanding its cultural roots, political economy and geographic complexities.

178 C. Gaffney

Figure 7. A huge flag descends on the popular section at a Boca Juniors’ game. Boca’s barrabrava, El Doce, is notoriously violent and organized. Recently, the leader of El Doce turned himself in to federal police. Several of the Boca players made a very public social call to him in jail.

Figure 6. The San Lrenzo barrabrava in full force at River Plate, November 2006.

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Figure 8. Two San Lorenzo fans scale the barbed wire to urge on their team. Below them is a 30-foot drop onto a row of metal seats.

Figure 9. ‘They are watching us from heaven’. This mural on the side of Estadio Diego Armando Maradona of Argentinos Juniors marks the passing of members of the team’s barrabrava. Tellingly, there is ample space for more casualties.

180 C. Gaffney

Figure 6. The San Lrenzo barrabrava in full force at River Plate, November 2006.Figure 7. A huge flag descends on the popular section at a Boca Juniors’ game. Boca’s barrabrava, El Doce, is notoriously violent and organized. Recently, the leader of El Doce turned himself in to federal police. Several of the Boca players made a very public social call to him in jail.Figure 8. Two San Lorenzo fans scale the barbed wire to urge on their team. Below them is a 30-foot drop onto a row of metal seats.Figure 9. ‘They are watching us from heaven’. This mural on the side of Estadio Diego Armando Maradona of Argentinos Juniors marks the passing of members of the team’s barrabrava. Tellingly, there is ample space for more casualties.

Notes 1. Mangan, Pleasure, Profit and Proselytism; Arbena, Sport and Society; Giulianotti, Foot-

ball; Archetti, Masculinidades. 2. Holt, ‘Football’. 3. See http://www.palermonline.com.ar/noticias001/nota536_hipodromo.htm. 4. Sebreli, La Era del Futbol; Frydenberg, ‘Espacio urbana’. 5. Scher and Palomino, Futbol, 24; Chepenekas, Sabado; Mason, Passion of the People?, 2. 6. Taylor, The Beautiful Game. 7. For a perfunctory history of the early years of soccer in Argentina, see Mason, Passion of

the People?, 1–8. Similar to what happened in Rio de Janeiro, Argentine teams played against visiting English teams, which served to heighten nationalist sentiments in relation to soccer and stadiums. In 1905, 10,000 people gathered in the Palermo stadium of Sociedad Sportiva to watch the Alumni team of Buenos Aires play against Nottingham Forest of England. This was by far the largest crowd to ever watch a sporting event in South America.

8. Scher and Palomino, Futbol, 21–2. 9. For instance, at the 2003 Copa Libertadores final between Santos and Boca Juniors, the five

buses carrying the visiting Santos fans were escorted into the stadium parking lot by a squadron of police cars.

10. Argentine stadiums can be roughly divided into two sections, the popular and the platea. The former is less expensive and people tend to stand on concrete or wooden bleachers for the action, sitting during half time (the equivalent of the English terrace before Taylor). The platea typically has seats and an older more sedate crowd that sits during the action, standing at half time to stretch.

11. Gaffney, Temples of the Earthbound Gods. 12. See http://www3.terra.com.ar/canales/deportes/104/104137.html. 13. I am not including an examination of players or managers in this discussion, though they

do warrant attention. 14. Duke and Crolley, ‘Futbol, Politicians and the People’, 106. 15. Sabugo, ‘Las Canchas: Monumentos Bohemios’. 16. See www.clarin.com.ar, 4 December 2003. 17. Duke and Crolley, ‘Futbol, Politicians and the People’, 101. 18. Boca Juniors made a tour of Europe in the 1930s, winning most of their games. It was also

common in this era for English teams to tour Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro to compete against local teams.

19. Alabarces, Peligro de Gol, 215. 20. Sabugo, ‘Las Canchas: Monumentos Bohemios’, 60. 21. ‘Barrabrava’ refers both to the individual member of the group and the group itself, an odd

semantic quirk that merges the individual with the group, as if to explain their actions in a collective light. Barrabravas is used to refer to two or more individuals or groups.

22. Sebreli, ‘Las Canchas: Monumentos Bohemios’, 33. 23. Romero, Muerte en la cancha. 24. Rodgers, ‘Youth Gangs and Violence’. 25. Binello et al., ‘Mujeres y fútbol’, 42. 26. Duke and Crolley, ‘Fútbol, Politicians and the People’, 109. 27. One of the boasts of Boca Junior’s barrabrava ‘El Doce’ is that hardly any of its members

have finished primary school. 28. The de-territorialization of the city refers to a process in which the city as a whole becomes

unbounded. The increased fluidity of formerly fixed boundaries allows for more freedom of association of goods and people that has the effect of reducing the historically strong associations with place.

29. Alabarces, Peligro de Gol, 218. 30. Sebreli, ‘Las Canchas: Monumentos Bohemios’, 35. 31. Gandara, ‘Las Voces del Fútbol’. 32. The website www.barrasbravas.com.ar is dedicated to the histories, relationships and

culture of barrabrava throughout Argentina and is an excellent reference for those who wish to know more about this world.

33. See www.clarin.com.ar, 22 September 2003. 34. Duke and Crolley, ‘Futbol, Politicians and the People’, 100.

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35. Scher and Palomino, Futbol, 61. 36. Ibid., 147–75; Mason, Passion of the People?, 66–76; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 59–75;

Gulianotti, Football, 100–106; Arbena, ‘Generales and Goles’. 37. The barrabravas of Argentina are known around the soccer world. The transmission of

soccer games from Buenos Aires to Europe is one of the primary mechanisms through which stadium behaviours are diffused amongst fan groups. The innovations of the Argen- tine fans frequently manifest themselves in Italian or Spanish stadiums the following week. A well-known anecdote is that some Mexican soccer teams hired members of Argentine barrabravas to travel to Mexico to organize their fans. The Argentines were incredulous that the teams did not provide financial assistance to their fan groups. An increasingly common element of Mexican stadiums is the long vertical banners that demarcate space for the barrabrava. In Mexico, however, the crowd is much more sedate and violence among fans is a rarity.

38. Binello et al., ‘Mujeres y Futbol’, 36–7. 39. Giulianotti, Football, 97. 40. Alabarces, Futbologicas, 82.

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