3 paragraphs based on articles

Mediterranean Quarterly 28:3 DOI 10.1215/10474552-4216443 Copyright 2017 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.

Democratization and the Arab Spring: A Theoretical Perspective

Abdul Gaffar

State- society relations are articulated most succinctly by Bob Jessop, who notes that the state plays the central role in political life. Further, he contends that the role of the state in relation to society cannot be adequately under- stood without examining the social environment in which it is located. He argues that modern societies are extremely complex, characterized by many subsystems that are, in essence, autonomous to varying degrees. Therefore, conception of a clear- cut boundary between state and society is not feasible, particularly at the microlevel. Legitimacy of the state is constituted through various avenues that support the creation of conditions for a good life. The state could exercise a legitimate right to violence, but this could be employed as a last resort, when all other methods of enforcement have failed. In this context, analyzing subjective interests and capacities of the functionaries of the state such as politicians, bureaucrats, and civil society groups is vital, as state power is activated via this agency. The successful execution of actions is often made possible by unacknowledged conditions and is associated with the possibility of unanticipated consequences. State power is always conditional and relational, depending on the structural ties between state and society and their complex web of interdependencies. The more the state intervenes in the different spheres of society, the more it becomes internally complex; its power becomes more fragmented among branches and policy networks. The state depends on various social forces for the success of its projects; state power thus becomes dependent on external forces — the society. Finally, sev-

Abdul Gaffar is a doctoral student in international studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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eral factors determine the state system in a society: geopolitical location, the role of the military in developing a state, and the state’s capacity to enforce collectively binding decisions shaping the character of institutions and social forces.1

Democracy must be understood in this context. Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss present an interesting analogy: in religion, divine blessings promise the fulfillment of human life, whereas, in its most demanding version, poli- tics treats the individual as the creator of his or her own destiny. It follows that “the sole alternative to the democratic legitimating of power is the theo- cratic one.”2 Democracy starts with replacing a government in power with one selected in a “free, open, and fair election.”3 Election, however, is the mini- mal definition. Democracy also requires limitation on power — an arrange- ment in which decision makers share power with other groups in the society.4

Whereas liberal democracy is more concerned with formal procedures, radical democracy emphasizes collective self- determination. It requires a few qualifications: members must try to accommodate others’ interests; they must agree on some underlying ethical principles; they must honor interpersonal trust; and they must work toward “stability” — members coming together repeatedly to decide on a variety of issues.5 It is relatively easy to democ- ratize state institutions formally, but in order to achieve substantial democ- racy, various aspects of society must be democratized, because state institu- tions can work democratically only if the people and values operating them are embedded in democratic consciousness. This is democratization: it is an ongoing process whereby democratic ideas, values, and practices continue to spread and evolve over time and space.

Democratization might be explained through various models. Democratic citizenship in Western Europe, for instance, has evolved both horizontally and vertically. Historically, social movements played pivotal roles in the

1. Bob Jessop, “Putting States in Their Place: State Systems and State Theory,” in New Develop- ments in Political Science, ed. Adrian Leftwich (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1990), 45. 2. Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, “Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources,” in Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 147. 3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Nor- man: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9. 4. Ibid., 9 – 10. 5. David Miller, “Democracy’s Domain,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37, no. 3 (2009): 201 – 28.

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democratization of various states and societies. Democracy was expressed as a social demand, emerging from society, particularly in the forms of social movements. Through petitions, demonstrations, meetings, and strikes, social movements have generally accompanied the growth of democracy. The evo- lution is further deepened with electoral politics that supports rival pro- grams and mobilization and expands the rights to speak, communicate, and assemble.6

These experiences underlie this essay’s inquiry into the theoretical impli- cations of the Arab Spring. The essay sheds light on the process of democ- ratization at two levels. First, regarding the Arab Spring, the horizontal and vertical models are not still very clear, but this essay proposes new models: geographical- spatial, temporal, and sectoral. In a geographical- spatial sense, the movements for democratization have spread from Tunisia to Egypt and the region continues to be volatile. In fact, for a more comprehensive under- standing of the Arab Spring, we need to posit it into the broader Afro- Arabic contexts, particularly Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It would lead us to comprehend the temporal dimensions of democratization, which first started in the late 1980s in the region. Sectorally, democracy spreads from one sector of our social existence to the other: from the outside world, it is surprising that despite a fair amount of economic prosperity (compared with other regions such as South Asia), every section of the population partici- pated in the prodemocracy movements of the Arab Spring. Citizens’ exposure to global levels of consumption has also led to exposure to global ideas of democracy and freedom.

Second, we are well acquainted with Western concepts of democracy, but we know very little about Eastern concepts, such as African, Arabic, Indian, and Chinese contributions to democratic theory and institutions. This essay argues for the necessity of further research on the Arabic concepts of state- society relations: to comprehend the social foundations for democracy as well as the nature of authority that commanded loyalty from people over many centuries.

As noted, in Western Europe democratization started both horizontally

6. Charles Tilly, “When Do (and Don’t) Social Movements Promote Democratization?” in Social Movements and Democracy, ed. Pedro Ibarra (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25 – 30.

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7. Raymond Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory, and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 373 – 95. 8. Steve Hess, “From the Arab Spring to the Chinese Winter: The Institutional Sources of Authori- tarian Vulnerability and Resilience in Egypt, Tunisia, and China,” International Political Science Review 34, no. 3 (2013): 254 – 72.

and vertically. Horizontally it spread through the gradual expansion of rights — civil, political, and social — and from one aspect of social life to the other, for example, from workplace to family. Vertically, democracy spread from elite levels to mass levels over a period of time: freedom of speech, for instance, has led to the growth of the printing press, which ultimately revolu- tionized the broad sociopolitical sphere. In MENA experiences, however, we find rather different methods.

Democratization and MENA: Geographical or Spatial Routes

A prime geographical aspect of the MENA region is its territorial makeup. Elections following territorial boundaries drawn by colonial rulers do not promote democratization. They intensify communal competition; the breakup of the Arab world into many small, weak states made popular movements and intellectuals emphasize pan- Arab unity rather than democratization. They also intensified an insecurity complex among the small states. As Ray- mond Hinnebusch writes, “The Middle East remains a zone of war, with all the deleterious consequences for democratization: over- sized armies, the dissent- intolerant atmosphere of national- security states, and the deterrence of investment that could generate prosperity giving people a stake in peace.”7 Thus, as an antithesis to Jessop, state and society here were not constituted by the same process; rather, the same society was divided into many states.

Still, with the Arab Spring, the idea that authorities could be confronted, despite massive state repression, has spread from one country to others in the region. It heralded a geographical- spatial course toward democratization. News of the Arab Spring, also popularly known as the Jasmine Revolution, spread with “the sudden, unpredicted collapse of seemingly durable autocra- cies in Tunisia and Egypt.”8 It started in a small way, but later shaped the contemporary history of the world.

On 17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, an unknown street vendor

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9. Hess, 254 – 5. 10. Amir Taheri, “The ‘Arab Spring’ Has Toppled Some Despots and Enriched the Arab Politi- cal Vocabulary. But What Are Its Limits and What Should Western Democracies Do to Help It Achieve Its Objectives?” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Commit- tee on American Foreign Policy 33, no. 6 (2011): 273–7. 11. Sophia Dingli, “Is the Failed State Thesis Analytically Useful? The Case of Yemen,” Politics 33, no. 2 (2013): 91 – 100.

in the small Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, triggered a chain of events that not only altered the political trajectory of his home country but also created powerful reverberations across the MENA region. Frustrated with frequent mistreatment at the hands of local officials, Bouazizi set himself on fire. This incident sparked protests across the country so powerful that they quickly destabilized the regime and drove the long- standing autocrat, Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali, from power. As Ben Ali fled to exile, the Tunisian uprising triggered protests in countries across the MENA region, including Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Within months, Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt had also collapsed. The protests in Syria turned into a bloody conflict that drew the attention and involvement of great powers.9

People from a broad section of the population participated in the revolu- tion. It is surprising that the entire regime in the region was engulfed with violence and bloodshed of such magnitude. Countries where authoritarian regimes still manage to survive offered various concessions to forestall fur- ther disruption:

• Increased salaries in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emir- ates (UAE)

• Calls for municipal elections in Saudi Arabia in support of representa- tion for women

• Increased power of the Consultative Committees in Oman and Qatar10

Chaotic internal politics, which has given Yemen a “failed state” status, helped attract massive international aid to countries of the Middle East, mostly from the United States, and it was almost usurped by the elites.

The Arab Spring, starting in February 2011, was led by the youth, who “demanded an overhaul of the current neo- patrimonial political system, and it has given rise to several grassroots organizations.”11 It is true that anti- democratic forces are again trying to establish control in this still volatile

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12. Nouzha Guessous, “Women’s Rights in Muslim Societies: Lessons from the Moroccan Experi- ence,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38, nos. 4 – 5 (2012): 525 – 33. 13. Larbi Sadiki, “Political Liberalization in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Façade Democracy,” Democratiza- tion 9, no. 4 (2002): 122 – 41. 14. Michael J. Totten, “Arab Spring or Islamist Winter?” World Affairs 174, no. 5 (2012): 23 – 42. 15. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York: United Nations, 1979), www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/.

scenario. There is a fear that women’s rights, which have made significant progress confronting patriarchy in Morocco over the past decade, well within the context of Islam, may be reversed after the Arab Spring.12 These con- cerns, however, do not nullify people’s quest for democracy, the impulse to control one’s own destiny.

Democratization and MENA: Temporal and Sectoral Routes

These temporal and sectoral routes seem to criss- cross one another. Under- standing them requires a discussion of the sociopolitical scenario and the expansion of various attributes of democracy in MENA. Tunisia was the first country in the Muslim world to have a liberal constitution, in 1861. Although the constitution was manipulated to suit the dictator ruling from 1987 until 2011 and the political space was strictly controlled by him, the country had a formal competitive party system, albeit one dubbed by critics as a “facade democracy.”13 A recent tourist- based perspective characterized Tunisia as quite liberalized and “Westernized.”14

Saudi Arabia presents a somewhat different picture: it was considered one of the world’s most repressive regimes in 2002. Subsequently, petitions demanded significant political freedom, but at the same time, memoranda from the Islamists demanded the promulgation of strong Islamic laws. The ruling elite came to understand the necessity of broadening political par- ticipation, and municipal elections were announced in 2003 – 4. Islamists condemned the elections even as Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 2000.15 In 2004 women participated in elections. In this context, the basic tenets of traditional religious ideology, such as Wahhabism, were questioned.

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16. Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Saudi Arabia: Steps toward Democratization or Reconfiguration of Authoritarianism,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 41, nos. 5 – 6 (2006): 459 – 82. 17. Lisa Blaydes and James Lo, “One Man, One Vote, One Time? A Model of Democratization in the Middle East,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 24, no. 1 (2011): 110 – 46.

Tradition plays an important part in Saudi life, especially in the rule of the monarchy.16 Saudi Arabia’s liberal- minded ruler Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1982 – 2005) did not risk initiating large- scale reforms, nor did he undertake massive repressions despite terrorist attacks in the late 1990s, because the royal family has roots in the civil society dominated by tribal clans. As a result, Saudi Arabia represented a “status quo dictatorship.”17 The kingdom, it appears, has been trying to balance between two opposing forces. Thus, many prodemocratization factors are present in Saudi Arabia, in the sense that rulers, thanks to sharp intra- elite divisions and competing networks, were virtually constrained from resorting to large- scale repression.

In Egypt, Anwar Sadat, succeeding the repressive Gamal Abdel Nasser regime, undertook massive information gathering before embarking on politi- cal openings after consolidating his power. Wanting to ensure that Islamists would not dominate civil society, he took steps toward political liberalization with a multiparty system.

Algeria also feared Islamic domination over civil society. After eco- nomic prosperity, a period of hardship came and the ruling National Lib- eration Front divided into two wings: military and bureaucratic. The latter favored political and economic liberalization; civil society opened with full vigor, and within a few months 7,350 associations emerged. The country’s first multiparty election was won by the new Islamic Salvation Front, sup- ported by the petite bourgeoisie and unemployed youth. However, when the new party was on the verge of winning elections, democratic development was halted. Two factors were responsible: the leadership’s failure to protect the process of democratization and the emergence of hardliners within the new group. The public willingness to resist despite much repression was grossly underestimated.

The temporal dimensions are visible here in the sense that democratic practices take time to mature. Sectorally, they spread from one sector to another: liberals demand the expansion of rights, women demand recogni- tion of their status, and civil society groups consolidate whenever democratic

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18. Hinnebusch, 379.

space is available, despite apprehension that it would be dominated by lead- ing religious organizations. Legislation or rule making is another important aspect for the sectoral spread of democratization. Progressive legislation, such as laws or policies promoting the development of prodemocracy values, may start from the ideas of knowledgeable people (who may include those from the ruling elite) or as forms of social demands from social movements. Once codified, they may have spillover effects; prospective beneficiaries may use or demand other forms such as representation, expansion of rights, and freedom of media for realizing those promises.

This leads to an inquiry about the nature of political authority. Hin- nebusch identifies two types of authority in MENA. “Participatory Authori- tarian (PA) regimes in the Middle East were founded on a ‘social contract,’ ” he notes, and such a contract has several features:

• It guarantees social and economic rights rather than demanding acquiescence.

• It is oriented on a nationalist agenda. • It contains bureaucratic party machines with personalized leadership

and distribution patronage for co- opting various groups. • It may include repression and surveillance. • It is characterized by revolution from above that weakened social forces

like the bourgeoisie.

Another authoritarian formation in the area is “rentier monarchy.” In order to thwart military interventions, such entities recruited military leaders from family and tribal groups rather than the middle class. In these and other arrangements, government- led liberalization, which intends to vitalize the economy with private sector capital after the era of PA, encounters problems at the early stages: crony capitalism; lack of confidence by the bourgeoisie, whom the leadership attacked previously; and retreat from welfare provi- sions (leaving gaps that the Islamists fill). In addition, rapid, simultaneous economic liberalization and democratization may be disastrous, as the case of Algeria shows. Ultimately, hard- liners on both sides could outflank the moderates.18

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19. David J. Sarquis, “Democratization after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt’s Political Transi- tion,” Politics and Policy 40, no. 5 (2012): 871 – 903. 20. Blaydes and Lo, 116.

However, liberalization without democratization did not produce any bet- ter results, as the case of Syria shows. Under a Baath regime it was social- ist in nature — it depended mainly on oil revenues for its resources and was committed to a redistribution of wealth. The oil companies, however, were never viable stand- alone industries capable of generating revenue. Bashar al- Assad’s ascendancy and retention of power was accompanied by severe repression, and massive repression meant investing disproportionately in law and order. Assad also did not promote political liberalization seriously. The transition to a liberal economy left 30 percent unemployed and between 11 and 30 percent below the poverty line.

With decolonization in the region, the previous British and French regimes were replaced by their friendly, pro- West military juntas. The West could shift its conflict of interests to the former colonies. Both Western colonialism and local authoritarianism proved too potent to sustain, however. At pres- ent, Arab demonstrators are fighting against both. After the Second World War, two tendencies emerged in the MENA region: liberal, Western- oriented Arabs and pan- Islamic Arabs aspiring for a caliphate. People were caught between the lure of Western, modern living and its associated threat to iden- tity. Much bloodshed resulted from the struggle of the religious wing and sec- ular but dictatorial authorities. From a distance, Western powers intervened to fish in these troubled waters of their national interests. After the Arab Spring, Egypt inherited a very fragmented society. Although the military did not repress the revolutionaries, it maintained its role in contemporary Egyp- tian politics.19 In the Middle East, civil society did not necessarily repre- sent a force for democratization. Many times, new rulers coming to power by election had tendencies to thwart the ongoing democratic process, rep- resenting the “one man, one vote, one time” syndrome.20 While examining the economic dimension of the Arab Spring, we need to take notice of these features.

The real economic hardships faced by people were apparently the imme- diate cause of the revolt. In this context, we should note that even during this tumultuous period, most of these countries have performed impressively

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21. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 2015 (New York: UNDP, 2015), hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf. 22. A. Testas, “Political Repression, Democratization, and Civil Conflict in Post- Independence Algeria,” Democratization 9, no. 4 (2002): 106 – 21.

on the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI). Although detailed reports on Iraq and Oman are not available, the data in table 1 reveal that three countries have scored “very high,” seven “high,” three “medium,” and only two “low.”

As seen in table 2, Arab states are among the best human development performers in the developing world. However, countries such Yemen and Sudan performed miserably in this regard.21 Two distinct economic factors are the key to understanding the Arab Spring. First, economic crises inten- sified in this region in quick succession. Lower economic growth prevents many people from earning taxable income; government revenue and thus ser- vices decrease; and young citizens (including many in Algeria) become easy recruits for religious militancy. Algeria’s decline came after comfortable eco- nomic growth.22 Although Ben Ali had regulated democracy in Tunisia with very little space for opposition and massive human rights violations, the coun- try achieved comfortable economic progress for quite some time and at one

Table 1. Human Development Index (HDI), MENA Region

Country Rank Country Rank

Qatar 32 Algeria 83 Saudi Arabia 39 Libya 95 UAE 41 Tunisia 96 Bahrain 45 Egypt 108 Kuwait 48 Palestine 113 Oman 52 Iraq 121 Lebanon 67 Syria 134 Iran 69 Yemen 160 Turkey 72 Sudan 167 Jordan 80

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 2015 (New York: UNDP, 2015), hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf.

Note: HDI ranking: very high = 1 – 49; high = 50 – 105; medium = 106 – 43; low = 145 – 88.

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23. Sadiki, 130. 24. Sarquis, 874. 25. Sami Zubaida, “Civil Society, Community, and Democracy in the Middle East,” in Civil Soci- ety: History and Possibilities, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (New Delhi: Foundation, 2002), 232.

point was tipped to be the “Mediterranean’s Singapore.”23 The crisis started in the regime with the decrease of oil prices. Egypt was also facing severe economic crises during 2007 – 8, following the global economic crisis. The fraudulent referendum of 2011, in which it approved constitutional changes that resulted in rapid elections dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and the undermining of the liberals, made matters worse.24 Rapid violence in Syria in the aftermath of the Tunis and Cairo revolts, with their accompa- nying blood feud, angered social forces. The quest for democracy thus has spread from asserting social and economic rights to promoting civil and polit- ical rights, from one sector to the other.

Almost every state in the region — monarchical or socialist — had main- tained firm control over various segments of their respective societies. It worked well where the governments were capable of dispersing welfare provi- sions among the mostly impoverished population. Sami Zubaida notes, “The decline of these resources and the ever- expanding commitments with grow- ing populations, rising expectations at all levels, arms expenditure, and mili- tary adventures (such as the two gulf wars) brought to an end this short- lived equilibrium.”25 These factors lead us to concentrate on a second economic

Table 2. Human Development Index, World Regions

Life expectancy Schooling Schooling Region at birth (mean years) (expected years)

OECD (D1) 80.2 11.5 15.8 Non- OECD (D1) 75.1 8.2 13.6 East Asia and the Pacific (D2) 74.0 7.5 12.7 Arab States (D2) 70.6 6.4 12.0 Europe and Central Asia (D2) 72.3 10.0 13.6 Latin America and the Caribbean (D2) 75.0 8.2 14.0 South Asia (D2) 68.4 5.5 11.2 Sub- Saharan Africa (D2) 58.5 5.2 9.6

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2015.

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aspect, massive corruption, which intensified the hardship of people and eroded the authority of undemocratic regimes further. Particularly in Egypt, such anger had been accumulating over quite some time:

Poverty and political impotence have been around for quite some time, yet seldom do they generate the resentment and anger that are provoked when individuals believe these were begotten in illegal or immoral ways. Accu- sations of corruption are not merely economic or financial indictments; they are first and foremost moral criticisms. Allegations of arrogance are not simply political grievances; they are also principled arguments against the misuse of political power.26

The entire MENA region reflects this scenario. Corruption defies the basic norms of civility. Where money circulates well, people have opportunities to augment their income; the mobility of lifestyle may ameliorate the humili- ation arising from asymmetric power relations, where one party must sub- mit to another through no fault of his or her own. As Samuel Huntington pointed out, authoritarian rulers must show economic performance in order to survive.27

Concomitant to this corruption, elaborate security and surveillance mech- anisms were installed.28 They required a disproportionately large slice of public investments, displacing funding for such issues as growing inequality and unemployment and generally accentuating the economic crisis. Democ- racy could have been a much more cost- effective measure for the ruling class; much discontent would have been evaporated by peaceful political expres- sion. Again, if a crisis deepens in democracies representing various social forces, a de facto understanding (consensus) emerges among elites. For example, the liberalization program initiated in India in 1991 in the con- text of severe economic crises was supported virtually by all parties. The more democratic ideas and institutions mature, the better the chances are for such consensus to emerge. However, a new democracy may also achieve

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26. James Toth, “Local Islam Gone Global: The Roots of Religious Militancy in Egypt and Its Transnational Transformation,” in Social Movements: An Anthropological Reader, ed. June Nash (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2004), 118. 27. See Huntington. 28. Mariz Tadros, “Backstage Governance,” IDS Bulletin 43, no. 1 (2012): 62 – 70.

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29. Sadiki, 133. 30. Christian Fuchs, “Behind the News: Social Media, Riots, and Revolutions,” Capital and Class 36, no. 3 (2012): 383 – 91. 31. Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World (New York: Henry Holt and Times Books, 2008), 273.

such outcomes if democratizing forces accommodate various social forces in power- sharing arrangements. At this point, the role of leadership becomes crucial. India, for instance, inherited a highly diverse, fragmented, populous, and poor society at the time of independence, but was also fortunate to have leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, ably supported by Jawaharlal Nehru, B. R. Ambedkar, and Vallabhbhai Patel, to hold the nation together and consoli- date democracy. Soon after independence, MENA countries prioritized social and economic rights at the expense of civil and political rights, although they do not contradict each other in the long run. In Tunisia for instance, govern- ment expenditure on welfare had trebled between 1986 and 1999, based on revenues mostly from exports.29 It might have averted the crisis had civil and political rights been given an equal chance. Democracy, thus, spreads naturally. Such movement might be monitored, and efforts may be made to channelize them along the desired pathways, but they should not be thwarted or impeded — that could become counterproductive for the regime.

In fact, economic prosperity generates consumerism — the impulse to con- sume more and more, in a verity of directions. Access to the Internet also facilitated social networking in the region and played a vital role in its quest for democratization. However, Christian Fuchs correctly cautions us that the role of social media should not be exaggerated. The root causes of the revolts were realities such as authoritarianism, increasing gaps between the rich and poor, increasing poverty and decreasing wages, repression of the political left and trade union activities, high illiteracy, and the contradiction between the values of Islam and that of modernization.30 Still, we cannot altogether dis- miss the supportive role of Internet. In 2006, democracy activists from the Shiite community in Bahrain used Google Earth to document the country’s extreme inequality in land and wealth — mapping where elites controlled huge tracts of land and poor Shiites had to live in “small, dense areas,” a revelation disturbing “for even an avowedly reformist monarchy.”31 During the Arab Spring, popular social media such as Facebook and Twitter were extensively used to organize the movement. When the government suspended

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32. Yusery A. Ezbawy, “The Role of the Youth’s New Protest Movements in the January 25th Revo- lution,” IDS Bulletin 43, no. 1 (2012): 26 – 36. 33. Taheri, 274. 34. Jeffrey Haynes, “Islam and Democracy in East Africa,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 490 – 507. 35. Miller, 225.

Internet and mobile phone services, “Egyptian youth abroad established a group on Facebook that monitored developments inside Egypt and reported them to the world.”32 Much of the international and Arab media depended on these kinds of sites. Social media, to an extent, supplements the role of corporate media in the sense that many seemingly unimportant, informal items are posted, although there are possibilities that it spreads rumors and half- truths as well. The important point here is that there is a spread of ideas through the Internet. Ideas are not only concerned with some normative or ideological positions such a rights and freedom; democratizing ideas are also embedded in daily practices and realities and they expand through the appli- cation of the concepts.

Islamists did not start the Arab Spring, but the continuing violence and near anarchy in MENA does not bode well for the prospects of democracy, and apprehension persists that the Islamic Brotherhood could appropriate the social space created by the democratic movements, launched by people from all sections of the population.33 There are also other varieties of Islam just bordering the MENA regions, such as Sufism.34 And in addition to Arabs, there are other ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, in the region; in addition to Muslims, there are other religious groups, such as Christians and others. The domination of a religious force in this fairly multiethnic region, there- fore, may jeopardize the chances for future democratization, and the warn- ing signals are quite apparent. The experiences of the Arab Spring shed interesting light on state- society relations in MENA. Various state projects, such as welfare and economic and political liberalization, failed to spread across the society convincingly. The rulers generally failed to take the people into their confidence. The establishment of democracy, particularly politi- cal inclusion, during times of prosperity might have averted crises of such magnitude. As a principle of inclusion, “people who live in a country and are routinely subject to its legal system are entitled to be admitted to democratic citizenship.”35

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36. Hinnebusch, 390. 37. Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 90. 38. Ibid., 91.

When prodemocratization forces were at work, antidemocracy forces were still present with equal strength, which happens even in mature democracies. Overall, regional peace protests, economic and political liberalization, and internationalist- minded elites may eventually bring democratization. Options are open for democratization from both above and below.36 We may need to search further for the indigenous routes of democracy as a form of sociopoliti- cal organization in the MENA region to identify the prospects.

Democratization and MENA: Toward Indigenous Roots?

A powerful thesis by Elie Kedourie strongly argues that Islam is an antith- esis to democracy: no representation, no self- government. Obedience must be shown to whomever becomes the king and order is preferred over flexibility. Military coups were part of the history in this region. Surveying the politics of Libya, Sudan, Egypt, and Syria, Kedourie observes the following:

It is obvious that parliamentary government, judicial independence and freedom of speech and assembly are not compatible with a revolutionary struggle designed to turn Arab society, all its institutions, customs, and modes of thought, upside down.37

Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria are countries with heterogeneous populations. One- third of Sudan’s population is Christian or pagan. Civil war is part of the country’s history. After seventeen years of civil war, a peace was negoti- ated between the Christian south and Muslim north, but the dictator, Omar Hassan al- Bashir, fearing for his position, resorted to sharia law in 1983. Civil war ensued and continues to this day. Islam is a potent factor in Sudan, propagating the ideology of togetherness.38

The Christian versus Muslim thesis, however, is too simplistic for the MENA region, as it does not take the democratizing elements of Islam into consideration. As an antithesis, we need to note several, albeit sporadic, indicators:

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39. Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 277. 40. Zubaida, 234. 41. Sarquis, 875. 42. Bryan S. Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism (London: Allen Unwin, 1986), 16.

• Tunisia had a constitution in 1861, as noted earlier (and was certainly among the first few in the developing world as well).

• Muslim countries like Bangladesh have been practicing democracy over the past two decades.

• Several surveys conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine between 2000 and 2006 found between 84 and 90 percent of respondents to be in favor of democracy. About two- thirds of the total respondents in Jordan and Palestine disagreed that Islam is incompat- ible with democracy. About half the respondents favored secular author- ity; another half favored the influence of religion in government.39

• Invoking the “example of the Prophet in Medina,” it was decided that in the relationship between new Muslims and existing non- Islamic commu- nities, tribes, and religions of Medina each community would follow its own laws and customs; matters of common interest would be specified.40 Thus, the basic idea of multiculturalism was ingrained here.

• In Islamic political philosophy, concepts like shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus) have been present since the days when the Prophet ruled the city of the Medina.41

• While examining the origins of citizenship, Bryan S. Turner finds ele- ments of egalitarianism existing in Islam; religion was seen to “bind” people with “God” and community.42

Traditional Western scholarship is comfortable looking at the East in terms of literature, music, architecture, and history. But these are not the only compo- nents of human civilization. Human relations with power is an integral part. We need to understand how ancient Arabic thought conceptualized power relations among state, society, and individuals.

We know much about the Western notions of democracy, but very little about the contribution of Eastern societies to democratic theory, although they are much older civilizations than those of the West. In Eastern civili-

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zations we do not find documentary evidence. This leads us to two types of hypotheses.

First, perhaps democracy never existed in the Eastern civilizations, even though power struggles and oppression are features of any society. It seems logical that when tyranny reaches a crescendo, protest occurs and leads to adjustment in existing power relations. Hobbesian order is, at most, a tem- porary phase in the history of any society. It cannot be sustained for long, and at the same time, religion alone cannot command loyalty if it offers no incentives.

With the expansion of umma or community in MENA, the political orga- nization became much more complex, and undemocratic features devel- oped. Western- style democracy, again, cannot simply be transposed onto the Middle East. Its concepts attack institutions like family as inimical to democracy, thus interfering with the core of their existence. It can encour- age the emergence of ethnoreligious cleavages, which make the “national” ideal somewhat elusive. Such concepts are often associated with a neoliberal, globalized economy that has painful consequences for people in these coun- tries, particularly poverty and unemployment.43 Such limitations of Western notions are found in Yemen as well. Tribalism is a word used indiscrimi- nately by Western bureaucracies, but it does not capture the full complexi- ties and flexibilities of the system. Tribes, in the community, perform many locally relevant development functions. The leadership is also heavily armed, and thus definitely controls the agenda in local politics.44 Community plays an important part in the life of MENA people, as in many parts of Eastern civilizations. These nuances of state- society relations need to be taken into consideration, because various threads of democratic ideas, values, and prac- tices are embedded in such relations.

This leads us to the second hypothesis: the experiences of these civiliza- tions are not well documented, as in Europe, where adjustments to power relations vis- à- vis conflict are recorded in documents like Magna Carta in premodern England. We need to study the Arabian version of democracy: its ideas on justice, authority, and political obligation — the ways authority

43. Ibid., 880. 44. Dingli, 93.

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Gaffar: Democratization and the Arab Spring 129

has been able to command loyalty from the subject population since ancient times. The task is twofold: refering to existing literature like the One Thou- sand and One Arabian Nights and then evolving appropriate methodologies to establish their credibility, so that they can meet the standard of rationality convincingly.

Finally, as an agenda for democratization in the MENA region, two recom- mendations are pertinent. First, taxation should be made obligatory, regard- less of how resourceful a particular state is. Taxation defines an individual as a citizen member of a sociopolitical community. Taxation also strengthens their normative claims of being the rights- bearing member of the state.

Second, any new regime requires time to settle down, even while the pressure of popular aspirations is tremendous. At this time, it is a great challenge for the new leadership to strike the fine balance between democracy and gover- nance. Democracy is required to convince people that they are included in shaping the destiny of the country. Governance, or efficient administration, is also necessary simultaneously — in order to implement the decisions and policies that are required to keep the old entrenched social forces and vested interests that may jeopardize the transition in check.

Conclusion

This essay is concerned with the spillover effects of democratization. It began by categorizing the experiences of democratization in the Western world as spreading horizontally and vertically. In light of the Arab Spring, one finds that democratization has similarly spread through geographical and sectoral routes in MENA countries.

Overall, democracy does not spread smoothly. It mostly spreads incremen- tally — it might occur in one sector and take time to spread to others. And the spreading effects may not always be instantly visible. It continuously encoun- ters antidemocratic forces, values, ideas, and maneuvers. Deepening democ- racy is generally a cumulative effect: diverse stakeholders address their own issues simultaneously. Having a minimal base is also necessary: there are many instances across the developing world where particular attributes of democracy, such as rights or empowerment, have been concretely shaped

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under unforeseen, new social circumstances. Access to the Internet and other media — the attributes of consumerism — often draws our attention to various instances of prevailing oppression and deprivation. It even stirs the passion of change among communities that may be conservative, but it is certainly neither inhuman nor dehumanized.

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