8 Pages due by 7-8hours
abbyverouden
fwdhistorytermpaper.zipSample Battle Analysis (1).docx
Todd Lance Pait
MILS303-Maneuver Warfare
Professor Carl J. Bradshaw
January 29, 2012
The early days of the American Civil War were bleak times for the Confederacy; morale was low and the initial surge of new found nationalism had worn off. The South was reeling and the wolf was at their door in the form of Northern troops sweeping into southern lands and threatening the Confederate capital. The south needed, if not a miracle, then at least a morale booster of some sort. This is exactly the sort of situation where legends arise to take their place in history. Luckily, for the South they had such a legend in General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and it was his mission to preserve the precious Shenandoah Valley where he and many of his men made their homes. Jackson was not only an accomplished military tactician, but also a man of the valley, knowing every nook and cranny of the terrain in which he was ordered to hold.
General Jackson successfully defended the Shenandoah and his ten week Valley Campaign has since become one of the most studied military campaigns in history. Jackson’s army marched the length of the Shenandoah Valley, won four major battles, and kept 70,000 Union troops occupied.[footnoteRef:1] Many historians believe the campaign actually started with a defeat at Kernstown, the only defeat of Jackson’s career, but this battle analysis will focus on the first victory of Jacksons at the Battle of McDowell. This battle set the tone for the rest of the campaign by demonstrating not only the tactical genius of General Jackson but also the difficulty Northern forces would face fighting in their enemy’s back yard. [1: David Martin, Jackson’s Valley Campaign (United States: De Capo Press, 1994), 12.]
The opening phase of the Battle of McDowell began with General Jackson approaching Union forces occupying Shenandoah Mountain. Along the route, General Jackson joined forces with General Edward “Allegheny” Johnson, which brought his overall combat strength to 10,000 troops.[footnoteRef:2] The two commanders would eventually split their forces to envelope the occupying Union force under the command of General Robert Milroy. Milroy hastily retreated to the town of McDowell to meet reinforcements; essentially giving up the strategic high ground.[footnoteRef:3] This retrograde was necessary for the survival of Milroy’s force although it allowed the Confederate forces to assume the high ground. The seizure of Sitlington’s Hill, the highest vantage point, by Jackson’s forces would become Phase II in the Battle of McDowell. [2: Ibid., 84.] [3: National Park Service, “Study of Civil War Sites in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia,” http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/shenandoah/svs3-2.html, (accessed January 27, 2012).]
The hilltop was of great importance since it offered a grand view of the valley and allowed General Jackson a perfect placement for command and control purposes. The hilltop was also strategic in the classical military sense, which dictates that the high ground is always superior. The only disadvantage was the fact that the occupying force was silhouetted on the horizon, making them an easy target for enemy sharpshooters. General Jackson occupied the hill, allowed his forces to rest and consolidate while he and his trusted mapmaker Jebediah Hotchkiss conducted a leader’s recon of the terrain.[footnoteRef:4] General Milroy deployed scouts that confirmed his fears that Confederate cavalry was attempting to flank his position. His position was becoming tenable and he desperately awaited the arrival of reinforcements. General Schenck and his brigade reinforced the Union forces at McDowell by conducting a forced march from Franklin, West Virginia.[footnoteRef:5] They arrived just in time to participate in the assault on Sitlington Hill, which is Phase III of the Battle of McDowell. [4: Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 154.] [5: National Park Service, “Study of Civil War Sites in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia.”]
General Schenck assumed command of the Union forces prior to the assault but kept the majority of his exhausted men in reserve, allowing General Milroy to press the attack. The Union forces crossed the Bullpasture River under a heavy artillery barrage and began to attack uphill toward the entrenched Confederate forces.[footnoteRef:6] The assault by the Northern infantry caught General Jackson by surprise since the move went against established military doctrine. Nevertheless, the Union attackers began to inflict heavy casualties on the entrenched Confederates. This was due in large part to the over exuberance of southern fighting men who were ill suited to fight a defensive action. The mobile foot cavalry of General Jackson army was an aggressive, attacking force whose defensive tactics were severely lacking. They silhouetted themselves against the horizon, a huge tactical error in mountain warfare, and expelled ammunition at a rapid pace.[footnoteRef:7] The opening stages of the battle were going against the numerically superior Confederates but their dynamic leader was about to insert himself and his fellow Virginians in the battle during Phase IV of the battle. [6: Martin, Jackson’s Valley Campaign, 84.] [7: Ibid., 86.]
General Jackson’s knowledge of the terrain allowed the commander to place himself in the perfect position for command and control. From the highest vantage point, Jackson was able to insert reinforcements as needed and commit his reserves at exactly the right moment. Jackson’s command of his forces during the Battle of McDowell is a lesson in itself on battlefield command and situational awareness. Each time the Union forces began to make ground, they were immediately beaten back with fresh combat troops. The withering fire proved to be too much for the Union attackers and General Schenck signaled a full retreat back to McDowell.[footnoteRef:8] The tactical gamble by Schenck and Milroy had not paid off and their combined forces were now rendered combat ineffective. They had actually suffered fewer casualties than the defending southern force but to press the attack further would have resulted in complete annihilation of their forces. The Confederate force was stung by the fierce assault on Sitlington Hill and took almost 24 hours to gather themselves before pursuing the wounded Union forces. The brave Union commanders would have one more surprise for their southern foes during the pursuit. They ordered their men to start forest fires, which allowed them to obscure their movements with dense smoke.[footnoteRef:9] This unorthodox maneuver allowed the Union forces to make it back to Franklin while Jackson turned his forces back to the south to resume his Valley campaign against General Banks. The Battle of McDowell was over but the Valley Campaign was just beginning and General Jackson would march his men to glory and into the annals of military history. [8: National Park Service, “Study of Civil War Sites in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia.” ] [9: Martin, Jackson’s Valley Campaign, 88.]
The military lessons learned from the Battle of McDowell are numerous, but there are two principles of warfare that are truly noteworthy. The first principle that was extremely effective during the Battle of McDowell was economy of force. General Jackson absolutely employed all of his available combat power in the most effective way possible. Jackson laid out a solid defense while maintaining a large concentration of troops as a rapid reserve. This allowed for the reinforcement of any breaking point along his lines. His most trustworthy brigade, the Stonewall Brigade, actually entered the fray late in the day, which may have possibly been the breaking point for the attackers. General Jackson committed all 6,000 troops under his immediate command in a masterful demonstration of economy of force and command and control.[footnoteRef:10] [10: Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, 162.]
The second principle of warfare that deserves attention during the Battle of McDowell was surprise. This principle was actually initiated by the Union forces, which ultimately lost the battle. Despite their defeat at McDowell, the surprise assault on Sitlington Hill was a brilliant tactical maneuver. The attack caught one of the greatest military commanders of all time by surprise and inflicted numerous casualties to the Confederate fighting force. The highly mobile southern force would have run the Northern army down eventually so taking the offensive was the preferred method for General’s Milroy and Schenck. If only they had faced any other Southern commander, with the exception of General Lee, their bold attack may have had a far different outcome. The Battle of McDowell was not lost because of tactical error on the Union commander’s part; in fact, their tactics were quite outstanding and deserving of General Jacksons begrudging respect. The surprise attack arguably saved lives in the end, since their fierce assault forced the Confederates to tend to their wounded and dead before pursuing the retreating Union army.
The Battle of McDowell was not an extremely important battle of the Civil War. It will never be mentioned along such hallowed battlefields as Gettysburg or Manassas. While it may not be a famous battle, it was the beginning of a campaign, which would not only illustrate the military genius of General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson but also reinvigorate the South’s will to fight. Both sides of this battle, and this war, really have nothing to be ashamed of in terms of military doctrine. The Battle of McDowell should ultimately be remembered as the point of the Civil War where the South began to truly assert themselves militarily. From this point on the carnage and horror of war would increase exponentially.
Bibliography
Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
Martin, David. Jackson’s Valley Campaign. United States: De Capo Press, 1994.
National Park Service, “Study of Civil War Sites in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia,” http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/shenandoah/svs3-2.html, (accessed January 27, 2012).
MILH360 Annotated Bibliography.docx
MILH360 Annotated Bibliography
Pohl, D. (2009). The Holocaust and the concentration camps. In Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany (pp. 161-178). Routledge.
The author is a well-known German historian and author. He is specialized in European history and has written several books on history which shows his credibility. He argues that before 1942, the concentration camps were not of much significance either it be persecution or murder of European Jewry, but people considered them important afterwards. Less than 50% of the total victims of this Holocaust got murdered in these camps. This is because of anti-Jewish policy as well as late expansion of these camps into massive systems. The fact that Jews were a major part of these concentration camps was revealed during 1990s. The source is particularly helpful to explore Holocaust Concentration Camps and their activities. However, a brief history prior to the formation of these camps could be added to enhance the understanding.
Wachsmann, D. (2015). Executions | The Nazi Concentration Camps. Camps.bbk.ac.uk. Retrieved 11 October 2021, from http://www.camps.bbk.ac.uk/themes/executions.html.
The author is a doctor and professor in modern European history. He teaches at Birkbeck and has been an incredible author of KL: A History of the Nazi Concentration Camps (2015). The author claims in the above mentioned source that the death punishment was sentenced by the judges and it had been a common practice even before any such camp was established. However, after World War 2’s outbreak, these concentration camps became the execution sites where they launched two programs. One for mass killing and second for targeting weak & disabled. The source shares how various concentration camps made the expansions easier for Hitler. But the source lacks details regarding Jewish survivors who lived a fearful life while returning home.
Wachsmann, N. (2009). The dynamics of destruction: the development of the concentration camps, 1933–1945. In Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany (pp. 29-55). Routledge.
It is the article from the same author who is a professor of modern European history and has got this article published in Taylor & Francis which an authentic and credible source of publishing articles. The author asserts that no concentration camp was there in the third Reich and highlights that the concentration camps’ incidents of terror do not have many references and have been largely put forward by various sociologists and philosophers implying it as a natural and ahistorical construct rather. The author further appeals readers that something regarding the history of camps is missing and it does not fully reflect their complex history
Fredrick's Research Paper Outline 23 oct.docx
Research Paper Proposal Battle Analysis
Name: Fredrick Sullivan
Class: World War 2
Title: Holocaust
Subject: Holocaust Concentration Camps
Thesis Statement: Between 1933 and 1945, Nazi Germany and its allies created over 44,000 concentration camps. These sites were used to detain people thought to be enemies, forced labor, and mass executions.
Outline: Main points you will discuss in your paper. Delete any portions of the outline you do not plan to use. Paragraph 3 is the most important.
Suggested Format for Modified Battle Analysis Paper
1. Before the Holocaust: Historical Anti-Semitism and Hitler’s Rise to Power:
a. Adolf Hitler’s Rise to power
b. Different concentration camps were ran by different Nazi SS Groups which made the expansions easier for Hitler.
(1) prisoners.
(2) statistics and death toll.
(3) conditions.
(4) aftermath.
2. Mass Executions:
a. Gas Chambers.
b. Weapons of choice for mass executions inside the camps.
3. Jewish survivors lives were feared of returning home:
a. Violent anti-jewish riots.
b. Survivors migrating westward.
c. The Holocaust is one of the deadliest eras in world history. The genocide claimed approximately 11 million lives.
Sources (you need at least 5): What books, journal articles, etc., will you use? See the page below on acceptable sources and format. Chicago style citations and bibliography are required. You must use at least one journal source found in the APUS library from EBSCO or ProQuest.
Sources:
Murray, Williamson, and Millet, Allan R.. 2000. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Accessed September 17, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.
History.com editors. (n.d.). The Holocaust. The Holocaust - Facts, Victims & Survivors - HISTORY
Stevens, K. (2004, September 17). 11 Million, not 6 Million, died in the Holocaust. THE WASHINGTON POST. 11 million, not 6 million, died in the Holocaust - The Washington Post
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington DC. The Aftermath of the Holocaust: Effects on Survivors. Holocaust Encyclopedia. Effects and Aftermath of the Holocaust | Holocaust Encyclopedia (ushmm.org)
Wachsmann, N. (2015). A History of the Nazi Concentration Camps. Holocaust Encyclopedia. Nazi Camps | Holocaust Encyclopedia (ushmm.org)
Battle Analysis War College.docx
BATTLE ANALYSIS FORMAT
Adaptation and Expansion by Professor Carl J. Bradshaw
from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Study Guide for Battle Analysis
Overview:
1. General: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College developed the battle analysis methodology to help its students structure their studies of battles and campaigns. The format can be easily applied by any military professional seeking insight from historical battles and campaigns to help deepen his/her understanding of warfare and the profession of arms. In this course we will use it as a structure for the final paper.
a. The battle analysis methodology is a process for systematic study of a battle or campaign.
b. This process takes the form of a checklist that ensures completeness in examining the critical aspects of the chosen subject.
c. This is a modification and simplified format adapted from CGSC.
2. Format: The checklist is divided into four steps, each of which builds on the previous one(s) to provide a logical order for the study.
a. The three steps are:
(1) Review the Setting (Set the Stage).
(2) Describe the Action.
(3) Assess the Significance of the Action.
b. In the first step, you put the battle or campaign in its overall context to the war and explain why it is important, particularly for the study of maneuver warfare. In the second, you provide a succinct description of the maneuver, battle, or campaign. In the last step, which is the most important, you analyze the information to derive “lessons learned.”
3. Purpose: The battle analysis methodology is a guide to help ensure that important aspects of the study of a historical battle or campaign are not forgotten. It is not a rigid checklist that must be followed to the letter. You do not have to use every part of it in your study, but all of the elements of battle analysis should be considered. Do not let the flow of your study be disrupted by the format’s order.
Annotated Basic Battle Analysis Methodology:
0. DEFINE THE SUBJECT/EVALUATE THE SOURCES : Just like a military operation, a successful study of military history requires a clear, obtainable objective. The battle analysis format begins with the definition of the study.
a. Define the Battle to be Analyzed. This will become your introduction
(1) Where did it take place?
(2) Who were principle adversaries?
(3) When did the battle occur?
b. Determine the research sources: Once you have chosen a subject, decide what sources you will need to make a systematic and balanced study. Books and articles will make up the majority of your sources, but other media—such as video, audio, and electronic ones—can also contribute to the study.
(1) Books: Look for a variety of sources to get a balanced account of the battle. Memoirs, biographies, operational histories, and institutional histories should all be consulted for information on your subject. Do not overlook general histories, which can help provide the strategic setting.
(2) Articles: Articles from professional military publications and historical journals can be excellent sources of information.
(3) Other: Documentaries containing film footage of actual events or interviews with people who took part in a battle can add to your understanding of the events. Transcribed oral history interviews with battle participants may also be available. In addition, check the Internet for electronic documents on more recent military operations.
c. Evaluate the research sources: Finding good sources to support your study is not easy, despite the large volume of published material. As you gather the research material, evaluate each in terms of its content and bias.
(1) Content: Determine what information the source can give you. Is it relevant to your subject? Will it help you complete your study?
(2) Bias: Decide to what extent the author is subjective or objective in his/her work. Is there a clear bias? If so, what is it? Does the bias make a difference in your use of the work?
1. REVIEW THE SETTING (Set the Stage ): This is the first part of your paper (hence the word “modified”). This portion of the battle analysis format establishes the setting for the study. You must have a good understanding of the strategic, operational, and tactical situations before you can analyze the battle. If the causes of the war and the opponents are well known, there is little reason to go into great detail. You should focus on the operational or tactical levels of the topic.
a. Strategic/Operational Overview:
(1) Identify the war this Battle is fought in to include the time frame and locations.
(2) Identify the war aims of the principle adversaries.
(3) Identify and briefly describe the campaign this battle was part of, if any. What were the events that lead to this battle being fought at this location with these units?
b. Compare the principle antagonists (Operational/Tactical): In many ways, this is the heart of the study—analyzing the opposing forces. Describe and analyze the forces involved in the following terms:
(a) Size and composition. What were the principal combat and supporting units involved in the operation? What were their numerical strengths in terms of troops and key weapon systems? How were they organized?
(b) Technology. What were the battlefield technologies, such as tanks, small arms, close support aircraft, etc., of the opposing forces? Did one side have a technological advantage over the other?
(c) Doctrine and training. What was the tactical doctrine of the opposing forces, and how did they use it? What was the level of training in the opposing forces? Were some troops experienced veterans, some not, and some in between?
(d) Leadership. Who were the leaders, and how effective had they been in past actions? How were they trained, and what was their level of experience?
d. State the mission and describe the initial disposition of the opposing forces: What were the objectives? What plans were developed to achieve the objectives? Were there other options—such as attacking, defending, or withdrawing—open to the two sides? Were those options feasible? What were the locations of the units of the opposing forces? How were the units deployed tactically?
2. DESCRIBE THE ACTION: This part of battle analysis—describing the battle itself—is what most people consider to be real military history. By following the format, you will study the battle chronologically. Do not let this approach disrupt your study of the battle. If you need to skip a phase in order to examine a combat functional area—such as maneuver, logistics, etc.—because it is more important to your overall objective, then do so.
a. Describe the opening moves of the battle: Examine the initial actions by the opposing forces. Did one side gain an advantage over the other in the opening phase of the battle?
b. Detail the major phases/key events: Establish a chronology for the battle while examining the actions after the opening moves. Look for key events or decisions that turned the battle toward one side or the other.
c. State the outcome: Who won the battle? Did either side achieve its objectives? Did the battle provide an advantage to the winning side, and what was it? Did the battle have any long term effects, and what were they?
3. ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION: This is the most important step of the battle analysis process. With this step, you are turning “combat information” in the form of the historical facts of the battle into finished analysis rendered as “lessons learned.”
a. Relate causes to effects: In trying to distill “lessons” from the study of any battle, it is important to look at why something happened. To do so you will look at the outcome and what caused it. Look for those essential elements of the victory or defeat.
b. Establish military “lessons learned”: Lessons from the past that are still relevant today are the end product of the battle analysis process. The insights, or “constants of war,” gained from the study should transcend time, place, and doctrine. You can use one of the following fundamentals (or another) for focusing analysis of military operations to help find these “constants.” These fundamentals are defined in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations and elsewhere. Below is a partial list of some of the theory, concepts, and doctrine that may help you analyze the battle or campaign and lessons learned. SEE ANNEX A FOR MORE DETAILS.
(1) Principles of War.
(2) Threads of Continuity
(3) Warfighting Functions
(4) Tenet of Army Operations
(5) Elements of Combat Power
(6) Elements of Operational Design
(7) Marine Corps Warfighting Functions
(8) Characteristics of Offensive Operations
(9) Forms of maneuver
(10) Tenets of Air and Space Power
(11) Sea Doctrine
(12) Theory and concepts from the course readings
(13) You can quote them, but no bonus points for Sun Tzu or Clausewitz
Suggested Format for Modified Battle Analysis Paper
1. INTRODUCTION
2. REVIEW THE SETTING (SET THE STAGE):
a. Strategic/Operational Overview
b. Compare the principle antagonists (Operational/Tactical).
(1) size and composition.
(2) technology.
(3) doctrine and training.
(4) leadership.
c. State the mission and describe initial disposition of the opposing forces.
3. DESCRIBE THE ACTION:
a. Describe the opening moves of the battle.
b. Detail the major phases/key events.
c. State the outcome.
4. ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION:
a. Relate causes to effects.
b. Establish military “lessons learned.”
c. Provide your analysis in terms of the principles, tenets, and doctrine you surveyed in the first paper and/or as outlined above.
5. CONCLUSION
ANNEX A
This Annex provides a menu of doctrine, theory, tenets, and concepts to choose from when analyzing a battle. Consider the most important that apply to your battle and explain how they influenced the outcome of the battle. The definitions are generally word for word from the references cited under FOR MORE DETAILS in each section.
The Principles of War:
OBJECTIVE: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive,
and attainable objective.
OFFENSIVE: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
MASS: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and
time.
ECONOMY OF FORCE: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
MANEUVER: Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible
application of combat power.
UNITY OF COMMAND: For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.
SECURITY: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
SURPRISE: Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is
unprepared.
SIMPLICITY: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to
ensure thorough understanding.
FOR MORE DETAILS: Chap 4, FM 3-0, Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf
Threads of Continuity:
MILITARY THEORY AND DOCTRINE: Ideas about war; a generally accepted body of ideas and practices that governs an army’s organization, training, and fighting.
MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: An expertise in the management of violence and is
characterized by a sense of responsibility to warriors and to the state.
GENERALSHIP: The Art of Command at high levels.
STRATEGY: A changing concept now generally divided into national (or grand) strategy and military strategy (a component of national strategy).
TACTICS: Preparation for combat and the actual conduct of combat on the battlefield.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION: The relationship between the state’s economic capacity and its ability to support military forces.
TECHNOLOGY: In a military sense, the application of science to war. Technology includes not only new ideas, techniques, and equipment but also their application.
POLITICAL FACTORS: Those characteristic elements or actions of governments affecting warfare.
SOCIAL FACTORS: Those elements affecting warfare that result from human relationships.
ECONOMIC FACTORS: Those elements affecting warfare that result from the production, distribution and consumption of the resources of the state.
FOR MORE DETAILS: Jessup, John E. and Coakley, Robert W. (1988). Guide to the Study and Use of Military History. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Chapter 3, pages 41-56. Available at: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/jessup/jessup_ch3.pdf
Warfighting Functions:
FM 3-0 Operations (2008) replaced the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) with the warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection). A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions. Army forces use the warfighting functions to generate combat power. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER: Tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy.
INTELLIGENCE: Related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations.
FIRES: Related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, joint fires, and command and control warfare, including nonlethal fires, through the targeting process.
SUSTAINMENT: Related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.
COMMAND AND CONTROL: Related tasks and systems that support commanders in exercising authority and direction.
PROTECTION: Related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power.
FOR MORE DETAILS: Chap 4, FM 3-0, 2008. Available at: http://www.jmrc.hqjmtc.army.mil/jmrc_command_docs/ref_fm3_0.pdf
The Tenets of Army Operations:
INITIATIVE: Setting or dictating the terms of action throughout the battle or operation.
AGILITY: The ability to move and adjust quickly and easily.
DEPTH: Obtain space for effective maneuver, time to conduct operations, and resources to achieve and exploit success.
SYNCHRONIZATION: Arranging activities in time, space, and purpose to mass maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.
VERSATILITY: Competence in a variety of missions and skills.
FOR MORE DETAILS: Chap 4, FM 3-0, Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf
The Elements of Combat Power:
MANEUVER: The means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance.
FIREPOWER: The destructive force essential to overcoming the enemy’s ability and will to fight.
LEADERSHIP: Confident, audacious, and competent leadership focuses the other elements of combat power.
PROTECTION: The preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place.
INFORMATION: Enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver,
firepower, and protection.
FOR MORE DETAILS: Chap 4, FM 3-0, Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf
Some Elements of Operational Design:
END STATE: Every operation should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive,
and attainable end state. This element is similar to the principle of war objective; however, it describes in detail the situation for both forces at the end of hostilities.
CENTER OF GRAVITY: The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.
DECISIVE POINTS: A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.
LINES OF OPERATION: A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives.
OPERATIONAL REACH: The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities.
TEMPO: The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations.
FOR MORE DETAILS: Chap 6, FM 3-0, 2008. Available at: http://www.jmrc.hqjmtc.army.mil/jmrc_command_docs/ref_fm3_0.pdf
Marine Corps Warfighting Functions:
COMMAND AND CONTROL: The intellectual framework and physical structures through which commanders transmit their intent and decisions to the force.
MANEUVER: The movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish our objectives.
FIRES: It is the selective application of fires to reduce or eliminate a key element, resulting in a major disabling of the enemy system.
INTELLIGENCE: Providing an understanding of the enemy and the area of operations
as well as by identifying the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.
LOGISTICS: Encompasses all activities required to move and sustain military forces.
FORCE PROTECTION: Take every possible measure to conserve our forces’
fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place.
FOR MORE DETAILS: Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1-2, Campaigning, 01 August 1997, 76. Available at:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp1_2.pdf
Characteristics of Offensive Operations:
SURPRISE: Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is
unprepared.
CONCENTRATION: Mass forces and fires at the decisive point in time and space.
TEMPO: The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations.
AUDACITY: The commander executes violently and boldly without hesitation to break the enemy’s will or destroy him.
FOR MORE DETAILS: FM 3-90, Chap 3, Available at: http://www.arkansasmilitia.us/Manuals/Xtra/Tactics.pdf
Forms of Maneuver:
ENVELOPMENT: An attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions.
TURNING MOVEMENT: The attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principle defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat.
FRONTAL ATTACK: An attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front.
PENETRATION: An attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system.
INFILTRATION: An attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires.
FOR MORE DETAILS: FM 3-90, Chap 3, Available at: http://www.arkansasmilitia.us/Manuals/Xtra/Tactics.pdf
Tenets of Air and Space Power:
CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION: Centralized Execution: Achieve synergistic effects, Establish effective priorities, Use inherent flexibility, Ensure unity of purpose, Minimize conflicting objectives, Prevent piecemeal employment, Decentralized execution of air and space missions. Decentralized Control: Achieve spans of control, Foster initiative, responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.
FLEXIBILITY AND VERSATILITY: Flexibility: Allows air and space operations to shift from one campaign objective to another, quickly and decisively. Versatility: Enables air and space forces to be employed effectively at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare.
PRIORITY: Prioritize objectives in order to maximize the impact of air and space operations.
SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS: The interaction of two or more agents or forces so that their combined effect is greater than the sum of their individual effects.
PERSISTENCE: A critical element in ensuring the prolonged effect of air and space operations.
CONCENTRATION: Allows power or force to be brought together in time and space to achieve operational objectives.
BALANCE: Commanders must balance combat opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and their impact on accomplishing assigned objectives against the associated risk to friendly air and space forces.
FOR MORE DETAILS: http://www.apc.maxwell.af.mil/l007/lframe.htm
Sea Power 21:
SEA STRIKE: Projecting Precise and Persistent Offensive Power.
SEA SHIELD: Projecting Global Defensive Assurance.
SEA BASING: Projecting Joint Operational Independence.
FOR MORE DETAILS: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Bowdish, Randal G. (2006). Campaign, Operation, and Battle Analysis, Retrieved June 4, 2011, from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/bowdish.html
Jessup, John E. and Coakley, Robert W. (1988). Guide to the Study and Use of Military History. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Chapter 3, pages 41-56. Retrieved June 4, 2011, from http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/jessup/jessup_ch3.pdf
United States Army. (n.d.). Retrieved June 4, 2011, from http://www.usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/MHIC_Link04c.doc
