Psychology & Law 2000words essay

Published by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

164 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 5, OCTOBER 2002

Abstract

A key problem confronting theories of false memory is that false-memory phenomena are so diverse: Some are character- istic of controlled laboratory tasks, others of everyday life; s o m e o c c u r f o r t r a u m a t i c e v e n t s w i t h l e g a l c o n s e - quences, others for innocuous events; some are characteristic of one developmental level, others of another developmen- tal level. Fuzzy-trace theory ex- plains false memories via a small set of principles that im- plement a single representa- t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n . T h o s e principles generate new pre- dictions, some of which are counterintuitive.

Keywords fuzzy-trace theory; false mem- ory; explanation; prediction

Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) is not so much a model of false memory as a model of the interface between memory and higher reasoning pro- cesses. In origin, it was a response to findings about how the validity of solutions to reasoning problems (e.g., decision making, deductive inference, quantitative judgment) is related to memory for back- ground facts that determine which solutions are valid (e.g., the pre- mises in deductive-inference prob- lems). Contrary to then-current in- formation processing models, the data suggested that the key mem- ory support for reasoning lies in having the right take on the back-

ground facts—getting the gist— and that, in contrast, remembering their exact content is not usually crucial (for a review, see Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). A surprising find- ing was that reasoning accuracy was largely independent of mem- ory accuracy.

Research on human false memo- ries intensified during the mid- 1990s, and since then, FTT’s as- sumptions have been used to gain leverage on such phenomena. The theory’s explanations and predic- tions of false-memory effects are the topics of the present article. First, we sketch general criteria for a successful theory of false mem- ory. Next, we summarize princi- ples that FTT’s account of false memory relies upon. Last, we de- scribe a series of novel predictions about false memory that fall out of those principles.

CONSTRAINTS ON THEORIES OF FALSE MEMORY

Successful theories perform two principal tasks, explanation and prediction. We postpone the issue of prediction until later. Explana- tion, telling why the data are as they are, has two aspects, ade- quacy and parsimony. Adequacy r e f e r s t o e x p l a n a t o r y b r e a d t h : Other things being equal, explain- ing more facts is preferable to ex- plaining fewer. Parsimony refers to explanatory frugality: Other things being equal, explaining known facts with fewer assumptions is prefera- ble to explaining them with more assumptions. There is a trade-off

between adequacy and parsimony such that increased adequacy can be purchased in the coin of re- duced parsimony, which means that successful theories achieve a balance between empirical breadth and assumptive frugality.

Thus, explanatory progress con- sists of improving adequacy, parsi- mony, or both. In false-memory re- search, the most pressing problem at the moment is to improve ade- quacy. The reason is apparent in Table 1, which exhibits 10 false- memory effects, arranged in ap- proximate historical order, each of which has an associated literature. The diversity of these phenomena is great: Some are produced by controlled laboratory tasks, others by real-world experiences; some involve innocuous events, others emotionally charged events with legal consequences; some are char- acteristic of adults, others of chil- dren. Therefore, although it is very desirable to be able to explain, say, false memories that arise when un- dergraduates study word lists (Ex- amples 3 and 4), the compass of a successful theory will have to be far broader, so that the theory will be applicable to topics as varied as comprehension of narratives, psy- chotherapy, forensic interviews, and human development.

Although the diversity of the p h e n o m e n a i n T a b l e 1 s e e m s d a u n t i n g , t h e r e i s a c o m m o n thread: Falsely remembered infor- mation is consistent with the gist of subjects’ experience (e.g., an un- dergraduate falsely remembers reading

doctor

after reading several medical words, a high school stu- dent falsely remembers hearing the statement

The coffee is hotter than the cocoa

after hearing

The coffee is hot- ter than the tea

and

The tea is hotter than the cocoa

, a child-abuse victim falsely remembers being touched on the right breast rather than cor- rectly remembering being touched on the left breast, an adult crime witness who knows that the prime

Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory

C.J. Brainerd

1

and V.F. Reyna

Department of Surgery (C.J.B., V.F.R.), Department of Special Education, Rehabilita- tion, and School Psychology (C.J.B.), and Department of Medicine (V.F.R.), Univer-

sity of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona

Copyright © 2002 American Psychological Society

CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 165

police suspect is a Hispanic male identifies a photograph of an inno- cent Hispanic male). It is this fre- quent feature of false-memory phe- nomena—that otherwise disparate falsely remembered objects and events fit with the gist of experi- ence—that allows them to be ex- plained with a common set of prin- ciples.

EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES

It might be thought, considering the diversity of false-memory phe- nomena, that a comprehensive the- ory would have to be quite com- plex. Research has shown, however, that this need not be the case. In FTT’s account of false memory,

most of the explanatory load is borne by the following five princi- ples, all of which implement a sin- gle representational distinction— namely, the distinction between ver- batim and gist traces of experience.

Principle 1: Parallel Storage of Verbatim and Gist Traces

S u b j e c t s p r o c e s s t h e s u r f a c e form and meaning content of expe- rience in parallel, storing dissoci- ated representations of the former (verbatim traces) and the latter (gist traces). Verbatim traces are episodically instantiated represen- tations of the surface forms of ex- perienced items, including contex- t u a l c u e s , a n d g i s t t r a c e s a r e episodic interpretations of concepts

(meanings, relations, patterns) that have been retrieved as a result of encoding items’ surface forms. Al- though it was once supposed that meaning content is extracted from previously stored verbatim memo- ries, it is now known that meaning processing begins as early as 20 to 30 ms after the onset of a stimulus, well before the processing of the item’s surface form is completed. Gist traces can be stored at various levels of specificity (e.g., reading

spaniel

may cause the concepts “hunting dog,” “farm animal,” and “pet” to be stored).

Principle 2: Dissociated Retrieval of Verbatim and Gist Traces

Memory performance is based on the retrieval of both verbatim and gist traces. The mix of verba- tim and gist retrieval, which deter- mines the level of false memory for gist-consistent information, turns on factors such as (a) retrieval cues, (b) the relative accessibility of ver- batim and gist memories, and (c) forgetting. Concerning retrieval cues, items that were experienced (e.g.,

spaniel

) are better retrieval cues for verbatim traces than items that were not, and nonexperienced items that preserve the meaning of experience (e.g.,

collie

) are usually better retrieval cues for gist traces than for verbatim traces. However, retrieval can be slanted in one di- rection or the other by instructions that tell subjects how to use re- trieval cues. Concerning relative accessibility, verbatim retrieval is favored when verbatim traces are strong relative to gist traces (as when the same item, e.g.,

spaniel

, has been repeatedly presented), and gist retrieval is favored when gist traces are strong relative to verbatim traces (as when different exemplars of a meaning are pre- s e n t e d b u t n o e x e m p l a r i s r e - peated, e.g.,

hound

,

poodle

,

retriever

,

spaniel

). Concerning forgetting, a

Table 1. Ten demonstrations of false memory

Example Phenomenon

1 After children observe a series of objects that ascend in magnitude (e.g., a series of rods that increase in length), their recall of the objects’ appearance (e.g., the rods’ lengths) is distorted upward.

2 Over repeated retellings, recall of the details of folk stories is distorted in ways that preserve their themes.

3 After studying a short word list (e.g., nurse, hospital, sick, cure, ill, . . .) whose members share a familiar semantic associate (doctor), subjects falsely recall (and recognize) the associate when asked to recall (or recognize) only list words.

4 After studying a long word list containing a few exemplars of a familiar semantic concept (e.g., elm, maple, pine), subjects falsely recognize unpresented exemplars of that concept (e.g., oak).

5 After reading a narrative, subjects falsely recognize unpresented sentences that connect the meaning of several narrative sentences.

6 Witnesses to crimes falsely recognize events that are consistent with the nature of the crimes, especially following suggestion.

7 Witnesses to crimes falsely recognize faces of innocent people that have the same gender and ethnicity as police suspects.

8 During interviews that focus on possible sexual abuse, children falsely recall incidents of abuse.

9 During psychotherapy, clients who believe that they may be victims of abuse falsely recall being sexually abused as children.

10 After reading metaphorical prose, subjects falsely recognize unstated metaphors that are consistent with the stated metaphors.

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familiar finding is that over time, memory for surface form declines more rapidly than memory for meaning, suggesting that verbatim traces become inaccessible more rapidly than gist.

Principle 3: Dual-Opponent

Processes

2

in False Memory

Verbatim and gist retrieval both support true memory for experi- enced items, either because the cor- responding experiences are speci- fically recollected (verbatim retrieval) or because items’ meanings are fa- miliar. However, verbatim and gist retrieval have opposite effects on false memory for items that pre- serve the meaning of experience (e.g.,

collie

when

spaniel

was presented). Gist retrieval supports false mem- ory because items’ meanings seem familiar, but verbatim retrieval sup- presses false memory by neutraliz- ing meaning familiarity, either at the level of individual items (“No, I distinctly remember hearing

span- iel

, not

collie

”) or at the level of gen- eral cognitive strategies (”I won’t accept any word unless I have an auditory image of its presenta- tion”). An important exception to this rule occurs when false items have b e e n p r e s e n t e d a s s u g g e s t i o n s (e.g., Example 6 in Table 1). In such circumstances, both gist retrieval and retrieval of verbatim traces of suggestions support false memory, while retrieval of verbatim traces of original experiences suppresses false

memory.

3

Principle 4: Developmental Variability

Acquisition, retention, and re- trieval of both verbatim and gist memories improve as the child de- velops into an adult. Gist memory improves during development be- cause both the ability to process the meaning of individual items and

the ability to connect meaning across different items improves. These abilities decline during late adulthood, but declines are more marked for verbatim memory.

Principle 5: Verbatim and Gist Processing Both Cause Vivid Remembering

Retrieval of verbatim traces sup- ports a vivid form of remembering, sometimes called recollection, in which subjects consciously reexpe- rience items’ occurrence in specific contexts. Retrieval of gist traces usually supports a more generic form of remembering, sometimes called familiarity, in which nonex- perienced items are perceived to resemble experienced items but their occurrence is not explicitly re- called. However, when gist traces are especially strong, they can sup- port high levels of phantom recol- lective experience for certain types of nonexperienced items—namely, items that are good cues for the gist of experience.

PREDICTIONS ABOUT FALSE MEMORY

The other task of a theory is to forecast new phenomena. Some predictions are more probative than others, and the most interest- ing ones are those that seem coun- terintuitive, either from the per- s p e c t i v e o f c u r r e n t l y a c c e p t e d theories or from the perspective of common sense. Predictions of this sort have been emphasized in ap- plications of FTT to false memory. These predictions have often been contrasted with those of one-pro- cess approaches, such as construc- tivism (Bransford & Franks, 1971) or the source-monitoring frame- w o r k ( J o h n s o n , H a s h t r o u d i , & Lindsay, 1993), which assume that true and false memories are based on a common memory code (con-

structivism) or a common retrieval process (source monitoring).

Dissociations and Associations Between True and False Memories

In memory research, two phe- nomena are said to be positively as- sociated if higher frequencies of one produce higher frequencies of

the other and lower frequencies of one produce lower frequencies of the other. Otherwise, the phenomena are said to be dissociated. Positive associations between true and false memories are basal predictions of one-process approaches (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). In contrast, FTT predicts that true-false dissocia- tions will be observed under cer- tain conditions, and associations will be observed under others. These predictions fall out of Princi- p l e s 1 t h r o u g h 3 , a c c o r d i n g t o which subjects retrieve dissociated verbatim and gist traces, with true responses being supported by both kinds of traces and false responses b e i n g s u p p o r t e d b y g i s t t r a c e s only. Thus, dissociations should be observed in situations that foster reliance on verbatim traces as the basis for true responses (e.g., when memory for memorable material is tested immediately after its presen- tation), so that true and false re- sponses will be based on different representations. Data confirming this prediction have been reported (Reyna & Kiernan, 1994, Experiment 1, and 1995, Experiment 1; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). In contrast, positive associations between true and false memory should be observed in situations that foster reliance on gist traces as the basis for true responses (e.g., when memory testing is delayed for several days and subjects are instructed to rely on the meaning content of experience), so that true and false responses will be based on the same representations. Con-

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CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 167

firmatory data have been reported for this prediction as well (Reyna & Kiernan, 1994, Experiment 2, and 1995, Experiment 2).

False Persistence

Common sense suggests that true memories will be far more sta- ble than false ones because the events that figure in the former w e r e a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d , whereas those that figure in the lat- ter were not. This idea occupies a prominent position in the law, where it is known as the consis- tency principle of testimonial cred- ibility: Events that witnesses report consistently over time are regarded a s m o r e l i k e l y t o b e t r u e t h a n events that they report inconsis- tently. However, FTT predicts, on the basis of Principles 2 and 3, that false memories can be highly per- sistent and that, surprisingly, they can be more persistent than true memories under certain condi- tions. Persistence of false memories is predicted because they arise from particularly stable memory r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s — n a m e l y , g i s t traces. The conditions under which false memories are expected to be more persistent than true memo- ries are ones in which the events in the false memories are especially good retrieval cues for strong gist memories (e.g., Examples 3 and 4 in Table 1), and initial true-mem- ory responses are based on less sta- ble verbatim traces. Several experi- ments have shown high levels of false-memory persistence, includ- ing greater persistence of false than true memories (Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse, 1995; Payne, Elie, Black- well, & Neuschatz, 1996; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999).

Creation of False Memories by Mere Testing

In the law, particularly in eye- witness-identification cases and cases in which evidence is provided by

children, it is acknowledged that false memories can be implanted by investigative interviews that suggest to witnesses events that support charges against defen- dants. However, it is also assumed that as long as interviewers do not offer suggestions and merely pro- vide recall prompts (e.g., “Tell me about the robber.”) and recognition probes (e.g., “Did the robber have a gun in his hand?”), such interviews do not elevate levels of false report- ing during subsequent interviews and sworn testimony and that, in- deed, their principal effect is to in- oculate true memories against for- getting. However, FTT predicts, on the basis of Principles 2 and 3, that neutral, nonsuggestive memory questions can substantially elevate later false memory when subjects respond to the questions by re- trieving gist traces. False-memory levels ought to rise under such con- ditions because subjects become practiced at processing the very types of representations that sup- port false-memory responses. Ex- periments have shown steady in- creases in false-memory responses over a series of nonsuggestive rec- ognition or recall tests (Brainerd & Reyna, 1996; Payne et al., 1996).

Developmental Increases in False Memory

A familiar generalization, in the law as well as the psychological lit- erature, is that children, particu- larly young children, are especially prone to false memories. Although there is much empirical support for this generalization (for a review, see Ceci & Bruck, 1993), FTT pre- dicts, on the basis of Principles 3 and 4, that only certain false mem- ories conform to this generalization and that, further, some important forms of adult false memory will be largely absent in children. Ac- cording to Principle 4, false memo- ries will conform to this generaliza-

tion if young children are able to store and retrieve the relevant gist traces; in this case, false memories will decrease with developmental improvements in the ability of ver- batim retrieval to suppress false- memory responses. By the same principle, false memories will vio- late the generalization if young children are unable to store or re- trieve the relevant gist traces, so that false memories will increase with developmental improvements in these abilities.

An example is provided by a simple ability that is surprisingly s l o w t o d e v e l o p i n c h i l d r e n — namely, the formation of gist mem- ories that involve spontaneously connecting meaning across several distinct events. (Examples 3 and 4 in Table 1, which involve the gist memories “a bunch of medical w o r d s ” a n d “ a b u n c h o f t r e e names,” are illustrative.) Because this ability develops slowly, FTT predicts that false-memory re- sponses that depend on connecting meaning across distinct events will also develop slowly. Confirmatory data have been reported (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, in press).

Phantom Recollection

FTT predicts (Principle 5) that certain false memories will be ac- companied by high levels of phan- tom recollection (illusory vivid mental reinstatement of events’ “occurrence”). Confirmatory data have been reported for tasks like those referred to in Examples 3 through 5 in Table 1 (e.g., Payne et al., 1996). A further prediction that follows from Principle 5 is that phantom recollection should be dissociated from true recollection (i.e., vivid mental experience that a c c o m p a n i e s t r u e - m e m o r y r e - sponses) by manipulations that se- lectively affect gist and verbatim memory, respectively. Confirma- tory data have also been reported f o r t h i s p r e d i c t i o n ( B r a i n e r d ,

168 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 5, OCTOBER 2002

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Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001; Payne et al., 1996).

Repetition Has Different Effects on True and False Memory

Repeated presentation of target material (i.e., the event to be re- membered) is one of the oldest ma- nipulations in memory research. By Principles 2 and 3, repetition should increase false-memory re- sponses if gist traces are not yet a v a i l a b l e , b u t s h o u l d d e c r e a s e false-memory responses if gist traces are already available (by strengthening the verbatim traces that can be used to suppress such responses; Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). Because gist traces are more stable than verbatim traces, repetition has disproportionate effects on verba- tim traces once gist traces have been stored. Seamon and his asso- ciates (e.g., Seamon et al., 2002) have proposed that with standard experimental procedures for pre- senting stimuli, the differential ef- fects of repetition on verbatim and gist traces should lead to an in- verted-U relation between repeti- tion and false-memory responses— that is, such responses should in- crease with initial repetitions but then decrease with subsequent rep- e t i t i o n s a s v e r b a t i m t r a c e s a r e strengthened. Experiments con- ducted by Seamon et al. (2002) con- firmed this prediction (see Fig. 1).

Similarity Can Be Distinctive

A seemingly self-evident claim about false-memory responses is that they will increase as their simi- larity to experienced material in- creases (e.g., for Example 4 in Table 1,

oak

will produce more false rec- ognition than, say,

fern

). However, according to FTT, this relation should hold consistently for mean- ing overlap but not for surface overlap (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). This prediction follows because increas-

ing surface overlap ought to have two opposing effects. On the one hand, high surface resemblance be- tween true and false items should make it more difficult to discrimi- nate the two when the latter are presented on memory tests, thereby increasing false responding. On the o t h e r h a n d , b e c a u s e v e r b a t i m traces are representations of sur- face information, increasing the surface resemblance between true and false items should make the latter better retrieval cues for ver- batim traces of the former, thereby decreasing false responding. Find- ings that various surface-similarity manipulations either failed to in- crease or decreased false respond- ing are consistent with this predic- tion (see the review by Reyna & Lloyd, 1997).

CONCLUSION

FTT has been applied to false memories in a range of laboratory tasks and real-world situations. The

diversity of these phenomena not- withstanding, a small set of princi- ples that implement a core repre- sentational distinction has proved useful in explaining false memory and generating new predictions about it. False-memory research is still in its infancy, however, and theoretical principles could change considerably down the road.

Recommended Reading

Brainerd, C.J., & Reyna, V.F. (2001). Fuzzy-trace theory: Dual-pro- cesses in reasoning, memory, and cognitive neuroscience. Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 28, 49–100.

Koriat, A., Goldsmith, M., & Pansky, A. (2000). Toward a psychology of memory accuracy. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 481–538.

S c h a c t e r , D . L . , N o r m a n , K . A . , & Koutstaal, W. (1998). The cogni- tive neuroscience of constructive memory. Annual Review of Psychol- ogy, 51, 289–318.

Acknowledgments—

This research was supported by a National Science Founda- tion grant (SBR-9730143), by National In-

Fig. 1. False recognition (false alarm probability) of meaning-preserving items as a function of list repetition in two experiments by Seamon et al. (2002). Example 3 in Table 1 illustrates the task used. Target lists were presented either 0, 1, 5, or 10 times (Experiment 1) or 0, 1, 5, or 25 times (Experiment 2).

Copyright © 2002 American Psychological Society

CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 169

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Sources of Bias in Memory for Emotions

Linda J. Levine and Martin A. Safer

1

Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine, California (L.J.L.), and Department of Psychology, Catholic University of America,

Washington, DC (M.A.S.)

Abstract

How accurately can people remember how they felt in the past? Although some investi- g a t o r s h o l d t h a t e m o t i o n a l m e m o r i e s a r e r e s i s t a n t t o change, we review evidence that current emotions, apprais- als, and coping efforts, as well as personality traits, are all as- sociated with bias in recalling past emotions. Bias occurs as memories of emotional states are updated in light of subse- quent experience and goals. Bi- ased memories in turn influence future plans and emotions, and may contribute to the formation

of enduring personality traits. People’s memories for emo- t i o n s p r o v i d e h i g h l y c o n - d e n s e d a n d a c c e s s i b l e summaries of the relevance of past experiences to current goals.

Keywords

memory; recall; emotion; af- fect; bias

M o s t r e s e a r c h o n e m o t i o n a l memories focuses on how accu- rately people remember the events that elicited emotions. In this arti- cle, we ask a different question:

How accurately can people remem- ber their own past emotions? Clini- cians routinely ask individuals to rate the intensity and frequency with which they have experienced affective states such as depression and anger over the past weeks or months. Diagnostic and treatment decisions concerning mental disor- ders are based partly on such self- reports. In nonclinical settings, memories for emotions inform people’s current actions and future plans. Remembering emotions may alleviate the need to store detailed information about the past, while still enabling rapid decisions based on that information. For example, one may retain “gut feelings” that g u i d e d e c i s i o n s t o s e e k o u t o r avoid a person or situation, with- out remembering the specific de- tails that led to those feelings. Thus, it is important to determine how people recall their emotions, and what factors might be associ- ated with the accuracy or distor- tion of these memories over time.

stitutes of Health grants (NIH31620 and P50AT00008), and by a Schering Plough/ Integrated Therapeutics Group grant.

Notes

1. Address correspondence to C.J. Brainerd, Departments of Surgery and Special Education, Rehabilitation, and School Psychology, University of Ari- z o n a , T u c s o n , A Z 8 5 7 2 1 ; e - m a i l : [email protected].

2.

Dual-opponent processes

means that two distinct processes are in- volved in false memory, but they have opposite effects on observed levels of false-memory responses.

3. In the interest of brevity, we ig- nore this special case, restricting our at- tention to the standard situation in which verbatim traces that support false-memory responses are not avail- able and such responses therefore arise from gist processing.