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Discussion Article

Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of Russia's Foreign Policy. ‘Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by Habit’? Andrei P. Tsygankov Pages 695-713 | Published online: 08 May 2012

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Scholars disagree on how to interpret Russia's

assertive foreign policy. According to some

observers, Russia's authoritarian culture and

political system have historically required the

Kremlin to depend on the Western threat

image at home and to engage in revisionist

behaviour abroad. These observers

recommend that Western nations abstain

from engaging Russia as an equal contributor

to shaping the global system. This article

assesses the validity of the authoritarian

expansionism theory by comparing it to other

prominent perspectives on foreign policy,

realism and constructivism. The article argues

that, by perceiving Russia's historical and

institutional distinctness as fundamentally

threatening to the West, the theory overlooks

important sources of foreign policy

contestation at home and potentially varying

directions abroad. The article selects the

historically important cases of the Crimean

War, the Cold War and the Russia–Georgia

War to demonstrate the theory's !aws and to

highlight the role of factors other than Russia's

authoritarianism in the nation's foreign policy.

RUSSIA'S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR CONTINUES TO

provoke lively disagreementsamong scholars

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In this article

and policy makers alike. While some view

Russia as largely accommodationist and non-

threatening to the West, others perceive the

Kremlin's objectives as expansionist and

disrespectful towards existing international

rules.1The arrival of Barak Obama to power in

the USA and his attempts to ‘reset’ relations

with Russia have yet to clarify the question of

the motives for the Kremlin's international

behaviour. Those on the sceptical side argue

that the reset advocates misread Russia's

intentions and undermine Western allies

(Kramer 2010a, 2010b; Cohen 2010; LeVine

2010). According to this line of reasoning,

Russia's authoritarian culture and political

system require the Kremlin to depend on the

Western threat image at home and to engage

in revisionist behaviour abroad (Shlapentokh

2009; Cohen & Dale 2010; Shevtsova 2010). It

leads to the conclusion that the Western

nations are better o" trying to contain or

transform Moscow, rather than engaging with

it as an equal contributor in shaping the global

system.

Behind the policy debate about Russia's

intentions are profound theoretical, historical

and ethical questions. Is a more democratic

Russia likely to act in accordance with the

United States and Europe in international

a"airs? Does an authoritarian Russia

Related research '

Recommended articles

People also read

( Figures & data ) References * Supplemental

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4/1/2023, 7:50 pmFull article: Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of R…Foreign Policy. ‘Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by Habit’?

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Abstract

The theory of Russia's authoritarian expansionism

Critique

Three illustrations

Towards a better understanding of Russia

Additional information

Footnotes

necessarily present a threat to the West?

Should Russia's cultural and regime-based

di"erence serve as a su#cient basis for

excluding the nation from the list of partners

and potential allies? More generally, should a

di"erence in political system and values—

whether it concerns Russia, China, Iran or

another country—be treated by Western

nations as potentially threatening their values

and interests?

This article seeks to assess the validity of the

authoritarian or expansionist Russia approach

by comparing it to two other prominent

perspectives on foreign policy: realism and

constructivism. Instead of focusing on Russia's

domestic authoritarianism, realism and

constructivism study the foreign-policy impact

of international anarchy and norms,

respectively. I argue that as a guide to

understanding Russia's international

behaviour, the theory of authoritarian

expansionism is at best insu#cient and at

worst misleading. By emphasising Russia's

purportedly autocratic nature, it overlooks

important sources of contestation within the

nation's political system and the potentially

varying directions of its foreign policy. By

perceiving Russia's historical and institutional

distinctness as fundamentally threatening the

West, the theory of authoritarian

Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources of Russia's Ukraine policy

Andrei Tsygankov Post-Soviet A"airs

Published online: 4 Feb 2015

##

In search of an identity: Russian foreign policy and the end of ideology

Margot Light Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Published online: 12 Aug 2006

##

Russian foreign policy and geopolitics in the Post-Soviet

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expansionism also displays the tendency to

deny Russia its own interests and stakes

within the international system. As a result,

many of the theory's advocates blame

Moscow for everything that has gone wrong in

relations with Western nations and invariably

o"er policy advice that amounts to isolating or

containing Russia.

The article is organised in four parts. The next

section re!ects on the theory of authoritarian

expansionism's assumptions and historical

evolution. After identifying the theory's

propositions and intellectual roots, I o"er an

analysis of several biases from which it su"ers.

I then move to an empirical analysis by

selecting three cases of Russia's foreign policy

that have been important to the progression

of the theory of authoritarian expansionism.

My interpretation of these seminal cases—the

Crimean War, the Cold War and the Russia–

Georgia War—highlights the role of factors

other than Russia's authoritarianism. The

conclusion summarises the article's $ndings

and calls for a more complex and dynamic

understanding of Russia than the theory of

authoritarian expansionism-based

understanding.

The theory of Russia's authoritarian

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expansionism

Authoritarian expansionism and other theories of Russia's foreign policy

The central claims of the theory of

authoritarian expansionism may be

summarised in terms of two main

propositions—one of a descriptive and one of

a causal nature. The descriptive proposition

states that Russia's main foreign-policy

objectives include the preservation and

expansion of the country's imperial borders

and institutions. The causal proposition comes

in two distinct versions. Version One links

Russia's expansionism to its authoritarian

culture and propensity to impose itself onto

other nations. The latter is expressed through

the political regime's overcon$dence and

readiness to act unilaterally, rather than in the

spirit of international cooperation. Version

Two places emphasis on the leadership's low

con$dence and internal insecurity. The

regime's insecurity and preoccupation with

political survival lead to a diversionary form of

expansionism. This version assumes the public

to be generally passive and uninterested in the

state's international activities.

The two versions assume diverse types of

expansionism and have distinct policy

implications. While Version One identi$es

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what might be called ‘expansionism from

strength’ or ‘missionary expansionism’, Version

Two describes expansionism that is driven by

weakness or desperation and seeks to divert

the internal public's attention from the

regime's lack of legitimacy and e"ectiveness.

The two versions also di"er with respect to the

perception of cooperation of Western nations

with Russia (see ). While both versions

are sceptical of the possibility of developing a

robust relationship with Russia, Version One—

by highlighting broad authoritarian support

for international expansionism—is

considerably more pessimistic than Version

Two.

The description of Russia's international

objectives and main causes of behaviour

abroad by the theory of authoritarian

expansionism contrasts with other theories of

Russia's foreign policy. In particular, the theory

of authoritarian expansionism di"ers from

realist and social constructivist theories.

Realists typically emphasise material

capabilities and the status of a great power as

Table 1

TABLE 1 PROPOSITIONS ABOUT RUSSIA'S AUTHORITARIAN EXPANSIONISM

Download CSV Display Table

0

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state international objectives. Scholars

working in this tradition view the Russian state

as acting within the same constraints of an

international anarchical system that de$nes

the choices of other states. Although internal

factors such as ideology, nature of

government and political culture matter as

well, their role is to specify, and sometimes to

cover for but never to contradict, ‘genuine’

national interest. Realists view national

interest as a geopolitically enduring reality,

rather than something open to

interpretations, and de$ne such interest as a

preservation and enhancement of power

within the existing international system. For

instance, realists have argued that the Soviet

leaders, while employing a revolutionary

ideology and acting under a totalitarian

system of government, defended Russia's

traditional state interests.2

To social constructivists, what matters most is

not power or material capabilities objectively

de$ned but what those may mean to the Self

in terms of acquiring recognition from its

signi$cant Other. In the Russian context,

Europe and the West in general played the

role of the signi$cant Other and prominently

$gured in Russia's debates about national

identity by creating the meaningful

environment in which Russia's rulers defended

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their foreign-policy choices.3Constructivists

argue that although state behaviour is shaped

by power calculations, such behaviour can

only be understood in contexts of everyday

interactions and socio-historical development.

Even if anarchy is ‘out there somewhere’,

constructivists say, we ought to focus on

everyday interactions for understanding what

anarchy means and how social contexts of

power are being formed and unformed.

Constructivist scholars of Soviet foreign policy

therefore view such policy in terms of

signalling to the Western nations the Kremlin's

desire for equality and recognition (Nation

1992; Ringman 2002).

compares the theory of authoritarian

expansionism to other theories of Russia's

foreign policy.

Evolution of the theory of authoritarian expansionism

The context and the long history of the theory

of Russia's expansionism may be traced to

European reactions to Nicholas's suppression

Table 2

TABLE 2 THEORIES OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN

POLIC Y

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0

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of Polish demands for independence in 1830–

1831. Russia did not limit itself to suppressing

what was then an internal revolt, but also

played a prominent role during the nationalist

revolutions of the 1840s in Europe. In 1846,

Russia led the way in suppressing the Polish

uprising in Kraków, which was a part of the

Hapsburg state under the Vienna convention.

InJuly 1848, Nicholas suppressed revolutions

in the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and

Wallachia—partly to assist Turkey in defeating

the Romanian nationalist movement. In 1849,

Russia provided Austria with $nancial and

diplomatic assistance to strengthen its

position in Italy and Nicholas committed

almost 200,000 troops to help the Hapsburgs

to suppress the revolt in Hungary (Riazanovsky

1959, p. 248).

By suppressing internal opposition to the

monarchical rule, Nicholas acted within the

constraints of the Holy Alliance and had no

hegemonic ambitions of his own.4Although

Russia acted in a multilateral spirit and only

did what the system expected the Tsar to do,

Nicholas was labelled the Gendarme of Europe.

Such a presentation of Russia was partly a

product of the continent's power struggle.

Britain and France were not satis$ed with the

Vienna system and each sought to challenge

Russia's rise as a great power competitor

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(Taylor 1954, p. 61). No less signi$cant,

however, was Russia's and Europe's growing

divergence in values. European liberals now

associated Poland, and other nations that

challenged monarchies, with progressive

values, and Russia with imperialism and

repression. Russia was now deemed too

‘barbaric’ and ‘autocratic’ (Malia 1999, p. 99).

Today, scholars such as John LeDonne

continue to argue that during the 1830s and

1840s the Russians were ‘dangerously close to

the establishment of their hegemony in the

Heartland’, and that Russia's ‘expansionist

urge’ remained ‘unabated until 1917’ (LeDonne

1997, pp. 314, 348).

Such was the political context for the

emergence of the theory of authoritarian

expansionism in the liberal West. The Polish

question did not go away, and the Polish elite

led another uprising in 1863, during which the

European powers, again, opposed Russia's

e"ort to manage the issue and preserve

existing territorial boundaries.5Intellectually,

the view of Russia as a barbaric expansionist

power was supported by foreign travellers,

such as the Marquis de Custine, who began to

promote this view even before the Polish

uprising. The United States had begun to

develop negative perceptions of Russia after

the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, as

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immigrant groups (especially Jewish ones)

engaged in anti-Russian lobbying in the United

States to ‘liberate’ Russia from autocracy and

anti-Semitism.6The perception of Russia as a

dangerous autocratic power grew stronger as

Alexander III and Nicholas II sought to

preserve their in!uence in the Balkans. As

theories of authoritarian Panslavism began to

develop in the early twentieth

century,7scholars became convinced of the

primacy of ‘Panslavist imperialism’ in the Tsar's

outlook (Geyer 1987; Tuminez 2000).

The social revolution in Russia in October 1917

provided another powerful impetus for

developing the perception of the country as an

expansionist autocracy. The Soviet Union

diverged from the West in terms of internal

institutions and it challenged the West's sense

of military security. The Bolsheviks' dissolution

of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918,

its doctrine of world revolution, and the

establishment of the Communist International

(Comintern) in 1919 in order to spread

communist ideas and set up new communist

parties abroad, all contributed to the

perception of Soviet Russia as perpetuating—

in the most dangerous way—the mode of

authoritarian expansionism. Even after the

Bolsheviks had renounced the idea of world

revolution and dissolved the Comintern, the

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majority of the West's politicians and scholars

could not change their mind about the Soviet

system. Scholars became convinced that the

idea of peaceful coexistence was a Soviet

cover for an ideological expansion or an

o"ensive war on the West. A classic statement

of this position can be found in George

Kennan's (1961, p. 179) condemnation of ‘a

regime, the attitude of which towards Western

governments, psychologically and politically,

was equivalent to that which would prevail

toward an enemy in time of war’. Many

observers rejected the position that the Soviet

leaders' attitudes re!ected a defensive

response to the equally hostile Western

governments, citing the Soviet Union's

authoritarian ideology as the reason for their

distrust. For Kennan, Western governments

came to hate the Soviet leaders ‘for what they

did’, whereas the Bolsheviks hated the

Western states ‘for what they were, regardless

of what they did’ (Kennan 1961, p. 181,

emphasis in original). This distinction has

become common in Western scholarship of

Soviet foreign policy since the Cold War.8

Despite the end of the Cold War, many

observers have continued to interpret Russia

as an authoritarian state with expansionist

instincts, and not as a normal state or one

abiding by acceptable rules of international

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behaviour. Conservative representations of

the Russia-threat argument tend to focus on

the nation's political culture (Pipes 1997;

Odom 2001; Cohen 2007), while more liberal

interpretations place responsibility for Russia's

‘anti-Western’ policies on the Kremlin's

leadership (Council on Foreign Relations 2006;

Lapidus 2007; Legvold 2007, p. 98; Wallander

2008). Conservative perception was especially

visible in justi$cations of expanding NATO to

the east by incorporating former parts of

Russia's sphere of in!uence. For example, the

New York Times columnist William Sa$re (1994)

pursued the ‘window of opportunity’ argument

by insisting on the need to extend alliance

membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech

Republic, the Baltic states and ultimately

Ukraine, because ‘Russia is authoritarian at

heart and expansionist by habit’. It had to be

done promptly, he added, ‘while Russia is

weak and preoccupied with its own revival,

and not later, when such a move would be an

insu"erable provocation to a superpower’

(Sa$re 1994). Richard Pipes provided the

perspective of an academic and historian. He

reminded his readers about Russia's ‘heavy

burden of history’ and failure to make ‘a clean

break with its Soviet past’ (Pipes 1997, p. 67).

To Pipes, Russians are yet to ‘overcome not

only the communist legacy but also that of the

czars and their partner, the Orthodox Church,

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which for centuries collaborated in instilling in

their subjects disrespect for law, submission to

strong and wilful authority, and hostility to the

West’ (Pipes 1997, p. 70). He then cautioned

against viewing the country as a potential ally,

as Russia might still return as an enemy ‘if

those who guide its destiny, exploiting the

political inexperience and deep-seated

prejudices of its people, once again aspire to a

glory to which they are not yet entitled’ (Pipes

1997, p. 78).

The Kremlin's international assertiveness in

the wake of the coloured revolutions in the

former Soviet region has instilled additional

fears in both conservative and liberal Western

analysts. Russia has been frequently viewed as

reviving the lost empire, ‘back-pedalling’ on

democracy and challenging the West's vital

interests in the world (Brzezinski 2004; Council

on Foreign Relations 2006; Cheney 2006;

Satter 2007; Lucas 2009; Bugajski 2009).

Russia's intervention in Georgia in August

2008 provided a fresh pretext for resorting to

the theory of authoritarian expansionism.

Although Russia has legitimate interests in the

Caucasus, many scholars and commentators

explained the Kremlin's intervention either in

terms of Russia's expansionist determination

to secure full control over Georgia's territory

and resources (Asmus 2010; Blank 2009;

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Cornell & Starr 2009b, p. 8; Sherr 2009), or the

Kremlin's perceived insecurity in response to

the coloured revolutions and its search for

internal legitimacy (Cohen 2007; Lapidus 2007;

Allison 2008; Ambrosio 2009; Filippov 2009).

As a result, both conservative and liberal

perspectives were sceptical about Moscow

entering cooperative arrangements with

Western nations voluntarily. As an

authoritarian revisionist state, it was expected

instead that Russia would use available

opportunities to upset American plans to

remain the dominant world power. If this

reasoning iscorrect, it is suggested, American

policy makers would be wise to abandon any

search for partnership with post-Soviet Russia

and stay $rm in resisting its power aspirations.

Critique

The theory of authoritarian expansionism

su"ers from biases of essentialism, cultural

ethnocentrism and political hypocrisy.

Essentialism

The $rst problem concerns the theory of

authoritarian expansionism's presentation of

Russia as a never changing entity that is

constantly preoccupied with imperialist plans

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to subjugate and occupy other nations. This

tendency to essentialise Russia and its foreign

policy downplays the role of factors others

than the nation's political culture or the

regime's strategic design. As a result, little

serious consideration is given to the possibility

that Russia's international assertiveness may

be designed as a response to actions by the

West and to seek relatively limited objectives.

For example, despite frequent claims that St

Petersburg's nineteenth-century policy sought

to topple the Ottoman Empire and conquer

Constantinople,9Russia's eastern goals were

far less ambitious. These objectives included

protection of the Orthodox Christians in the

Balkans and the right to have a secure

passage of Russian vessels through the Black

Sea. Although inside Russia there had been

supporters of the drive to Constantinople

within intellectual and foreign-policy circles, it

would be a mistake to view Russia's foreign

policy as driven by their views. Even after

defeat in the Crimean War, the government

did not turn away from Europe as Russia's

hard-liners had hoped. As Chancellor

Alexander Gorchakov's activities

demonstrated, St Petersburg wanted

recognition of its interests in the Black Sea,

which Russia was prepared to defend even at

the cost of German uni$cation.

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Even Soviet international policy had more

limited goals than many Western scholars and

politicians believed. With the exception of the

brief period of the drive for world revolution,

the Kremlin mainly sought to establish the

Soviet Union as a great power and recognised

member of the international community, not

to expand the Soviet geopolitical boundaries.

The Cold War, including the Soviet occupation

of Eastern Europe, the Cuban missile crisis in

1962 and the military intervention in

Afghanistan in 1979, also cannot be

adequately understood without considering

actions by the Western nations. Western

suspicion and mistrust toward the Soviet

Union served to strengthen its determination

to act assertively. From the willingness to work

with Russia before and during the meeting at

Yalta, Great Britain and the United States soon

moved to unilateral and potentially

confrontational behaviour. Ideological

di"erences notwithstanding, Stalin and his

entourage did not abandon their attempts to

mend fences with the West until Truman had

made public his doctrine of globally containing

communism on 12 March 1947 and the

Marshall Plan had been proclaimed in June of

the same year.

It is equally problematic to present Russia's

more recent assertiveness as a part of a plan

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by the Kremlin to restore the empire and

dominate its neighbours, even at the price of

confrontation with the West. Those accusing

Russia of reviving the lost empire, back-

pedalling on democracy and challenging the

West's vital interests in the world oversimplify

the extremely complex process of Russia's

transformation and its relations with Western

nations. In particular, much of Russia's

assertiveness was a product of the United

States' regime-change policy, e"orts to

achieve nuclear superiority and the West's

post-Cold War advancement into what Russia

perceived as the sphere of its geopolitical

interests.10It is misleading to ignore the

interactive nature of Russia–West relations,

presenting Russia as an essentialist entity with

once-and-forever formed values and

behavioural patterns.

Ethnocentrism

The above-noted essentialist presentation of

Russia's foreign policy in part results from the

theory of authoritarian expansionism's

cultural ethnocentrism. Rather than viewing

other cultural communities as a source of

learning, ethnocentric theories tend to

perceive them as a potential threat precisely

because of their di"erence from the self.

Ethnocentrism precludes the theory of

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authoritarian expansionism from being able to

appreciate Russia's historical, geopolitical and

institutional distinctness because ethnocentric

ideas assume the superiority of their own

culture and the inferiority of others.

A good example of a Western ethnocentric

theory is that of democratic peace, according

to which democracies do not go to war with

each other.11Critics of the democratic peace

theory pointed out that it re!ects American

values of what is ‘democratic’ and that those

values themselves have been shaped by the

United States' perception of external threats

(Oren 1995, 2002). Upon closer inspection, the

theory of democratic peace is a mirror image

of the authoritarian expansionism theory.

Simply put, the two theories say that by not

$ghting each other Western-style democracies

tend to act peacefully and cooperatively

abroad, whereas the non-Western

authoritarian systems, such as Russia, are

bullish and expansionist exactly because they

are non-democracies. Yet social structures and

internal conditions are far more complex than

the two theories present. For example, in the

post-communist context, democratisation is

not infrequently accompanied by state

weakness, thereby allowing the re-emergence

and the rise of a previously dormant militant

ethnic nationalism. As a result, not only do

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some of the newly established democracies go

to war against each other, but they may also

do so in part as a result of their moving away

from authoritarianism (Mans$eld & Snyder

2007). Similarly, authoritarian regimes that

lack popular legitimacy may be cautious

enough and abstain from assertive foreign

policy if they perceive such policy as

potentially destabilising. Just as authoritarian

regimes may be compatible with building an

inclusive national identity and an e#cient

economy,12such regimes may be compatible

with a moderate international behaviour.

The highly simplistic treatment of Russia's

political system becomes especially

problematic in the post-Soviet context. Indeed,

if judged by the degree of public support,

rather than by institutionalisation of e"ective

checks and balances, Russia's political system

can hardly be called undemocratic.13Yet

Russia's system is still emerging, and can

hardly be labelled either as an established

democracy or as pure authoritarianism. More

nuanced categories and theories need to be

developed if we are to match Russia's

domestic conditions to its foreign policy. Even

within the West, meanings of democracy

change over time,14and it makes little sense

to analyse the Russian post-communist

‘democracy’ by comparing it to the model of

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Western societies (McFaul 2001; Fish 2005;

Baker & Glasser 2005), rather than to Russia's

own history.

Hypocrisy

The essentialism and ethnocentrism of the

authoritarian expansionism theory also feed

into questionable policy recommendations.

Presenting Russia as an autocratic power that

invariably threatens the outside world leaves

other countries with few options regarding

engaging Russia. If Russia—especially in

presentation of Version One of the theory of

authoritarian expansionism—was, is and will

remain an autocratic and anti-Western

imperialist state, then the West must either

contain or confront it. Such recommendations

do not only tend to perpetuate the tense state

of West–Russia relations; they are also

politically hypocritical because they deny

Russia interests and stakes that the Western

nations themselves view as fundamental to

their own existence. Russia's interests and

values are not only perceived as incompatible

with those of the West; they are also viewed as

illegitimate and not worthy of recognition.

An example of these kinds of

recommendations for Western governments

might be the calls by many advocates of the

theory of authoritarian expansionism to

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punish and contain the Kremlin following its

assertive post-9/11 policy. Disappointed by

Russia's unwillingness to follow the United

States' international agenda, analysts and

members of the American political class, such

as Senator John McCain and Vice President

Dick Cheney, issued multiple statements

indicating their concerns with Russia's new

‘imperialism’ and energy ‘blackmail’.15Steps

were proposed, such as revoking Russia's

membership in the G8, severing its ties with

other Western institutions, banning private

investments and recognising the

independence of secessionist territories (in the

case of Chechnya) (McCain 2003; Frum & Perle

2003, p. 263; Pipes 2004; Edwards & Kemp

2006; Council on Foreign Relations 2006).

These would amount to a policy of containing

Russia or returning to where the two nations

were during the Cold War.

Blaming Russia alone for the breakup of the

post-9/11 international coalition is insu#cient

at best and misleading at worst; and

recommendations to contain or punish

Moscow are counter-productive. Denying

Russia its political and energy interests and

the right to set an independent foreign policy

is sure to come with large political and

economic costs. Such an approach is not likely

to discipline a Russia that continues to be in a

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position not to yield to external pressures.

Continuous treatment of Russia as a potential

threat, rather than a legitimate member of

international society, may indeed bring to

power in Moscow those who are interested in

exacerbating relations with the West.

Politically, it may generate a prolonged cycle of

hostilities shaped by Russia and the West's

clashing perceptions of each other's

intentions. NATO expansion, as well as military

interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, has already

done its share of damage in this respect. Hard-

line nationalists in Russia will only be grateful

to hawkish pundits and politicians for assisting

them in constructing an image of the West as

a threat.

Three illustrations

This section reviews several cases of Russia's

assertiveness in order to highlight empirical

problems with employing the theory of

authoritarian expansionism for interpreting

Russia's behaviour. I have selected cases

across historical eras—the Crimean War, the

Cold War and the Russia–Georgia War—which

have been critically important to the theory's

establishment and progression.

Crimean War

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The advocates of the theory of authoritarian

expansionism have advanced two

assumptions regarding the decision by Russia

to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. First,

they have argued that the Tsar's ultimatum to

the Sultan over the rights of Orthodox

Christians was predetermined by Russia's

traditional desire to conquer

Constantinople.16Second, they have assumed

that the autocratic nature of St Petersburg's

decision making precluded any serious

opposition to the Tsar's plan. Evidence for

these assumptions is far from conclusive.

Nicholas did not seek to topple the Sultan. The

Tsar's objectives were more limited and

included the defence of the rights of Russia's

co-religionists residing within the Ottoman

Empire, preservation of the prestige of a

European power, and the right to maintain a

!eet in the Black Sea. More than a third of the

Ottoman Empire's population—approximately

13 million people—was Orthodox Christian,

and the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardzhi provided

Russia with special rights to protect Orthodox

Christians within the Ottoman Empire.

Although these rights were not clearly de$ned,

Article 7 obligated the Porte to ‘give the

Christian faith and its churches $rm

protection’, and it granted ‘the Ministries of

the Russian Imperial Court [the right] to

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protect all interests of the church built in

Constantinople’.17As a member of the Holy

Alliance, Russia also viewed its commitment to

the rights of Orthodox Christians as consistent

with its European obligations. In Nicholas's

perception, he was challenging the Sultan on

the issue of the Holy Places to return the

Ottoman principalities to the European

Concert.18Finally, the Tsar sought to con$rm

Russia's control over the Straits of the

Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which was

vital to Russia's economic ties to Europe. The

Crimean War resulted less from Russia's

expansionism and more from the West and

Russia's incorrect perceptions of each other's

motives, as well as from Nicholas's

overcon$dence.

It would be equally wrong to assume that

Nicholas's assertiveness met no opposition at

home. Advocates of a more restrained policy

within the political class included Nicholas's

most in!uential advisors, such as Count

Nesselrode and Baron Brunnow, who urged

him to be cautious in negotiations with the

Ottomans and consultations with Austria and

Prussia. On the other side of the political

spectrum, Slavophiles proclaimed the Crimean

War to serve the ‘holy’ purpose of reviving

Russia's Christian mission and pressured the

Tsar to extend military support for the Balkan

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Slavs—advice that Nicholas never accepted.19

Cold War

The early Cold War provides another seminal

case of the theory of authoritarian

expansionism which places emphasis on the

Soviet expansionist ideology and totalitarian

structure of Josef Stalin's decision making

(Kennan 1961; Kissinger 1994). Again, the

reality is far too complex to be adequately

expressed by supporters of the theory of

authoritarian expansionism.

The historical record shows that Soviet

international objectives after World War II

were limited and shaped by the state's

perception of strategic interests, rather than

communist ideology.20Before the end of 1945,

Stalin acted with restraint and generally in the

spirit of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements as

he interpreted them. He was willing to tolerate

Poland's independence, although not outside

the Soviet area of in!uence (Suny 1998, p.

344). He also planned no communist

takeovers in Europe and advised the leaders

of communist parties in Italy, France, Hungary

and Bulgaria to cooperate with national

governments and not to expect to assume

power within the foreseeable future (Roberts

1999, p. 19; LaFeber 1997, p. 20)—partly

because he wanted to prevent the

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strengthening of independent communist

centres (Daniels 1985, p. 220). In addition—

and consistent with the agreement on the

division of in!uence he had devised with

Churchill—Stalin refused to interfere in Greece

(Pikhoya 2007, p. 146). He further abstained

from interfering in Finland, which he viewed as

maintaining a generally ‘friendly’ international

posture (Alperovitz 1971, p. 22). Outside

Europe, Stalin advised Chinese communists to

enter into a coalition with their enemies, the

nationalists (Roberts 1999, p. 19). He also

refused to defy the United States by

intervening in Japan and landing in Hokkaido,

as some of his advisers encouraged him to do

after Truman had dropped two nuclear bombs

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945

(Suny 1998, p. 345).

The really radical turn in the Soviet attitude

toward the West did not take place until the

Marshall Plan was o#cially proclaimed in June

1947. ‘There is little evidence’, wrote Vladislav

Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, ‘that before

the Marshall Plan Stalin had any master plan

for immediate expansion’ (Zubok & Pleshakov

1996, p. 130). Even after Truman had

proclaimed his new doctrine in March 1947,

Stalin was hoping to continue political ties and

negotiations with the United States and Great

Britain. In April, during a long meeting with

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State Secretary George Marshall, Stalin argued

for a possible compromise on ‘all the main

questions’ and insisted that ‘it was necessary

to have patience and not become pessimistic’

(Kissinger 1994, p. 444). Marshall, however,

was of a di"erent opinion, and in his radio

address on 28 April he indicated that the

United States was no longer in a mood to

deliberate and was planning to take decisive

actions (Kissinger 1994, p. 445). On 5 June he

delivered his Marshall Plan speech, in which

he pledged $nancial assistance for the post-

war reconstruction of the European continent.

In response, Stalin and Molotov articulated

their alternative to Western policy by creating

a separate bloc with the Eastern European

states and suppressing any opposition to their

policy within the region. At home, the new

course meant a return to the pre-war system

of mass mobilisation and repressions.

In addition, the Soviet power structure, as

highly centralised as it was, did allow for

opposition to the policy of assertiveness.

Immediately following the war, Stalin's most

impatient comrades wanted him to cross the

Elbe and occupy some parts of the Western

European nations—advice that he rejected as

impractical.21From the other side of the

political spectrum, a former Foreign Minister

Maxim Litvinov and the ambassador to the

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United States Andrei Gromyko defended the

‘liberal’ approach that included more respect

for the choices of Eastern European states and

more extensive negotiations with the Western

ones (Zubok & Pleshakov 1996, pp. 29–30;

Pikhoya 2007, pp. 106–8). What exacerbated

the situation, making it ever more di#cult to

prevent a full-!edged political confrontation,

was the two sides' international ambitions and

mistrust of each other's intentions. Stalin's

geopolitically limited ‘socialist imperialism’ was

met with the West's global ‘democratic

imperialism’.22Had the West been be less

revisionist and fearful of the Kremlin's

preparedness to penetrate the Western

nations,23there was a possibility that Stalin

would have continued with post-war

cooperative security arrangements.

The Russia–Georgia War

Similar problems exist with the claims of the

theory of authoritarian expansionism that an

autocratic Moscow was seeking to establish

imperial control over Tbilisi and that the war

with Georgia was part of a broader geopolitical

plan to revive Russia's hegemony in the

former Soviet region and to challenge the

West globally (Asmus 2010, pp. 9, 14, 217–18;

Blank 2009, p. 104; Cornell & Starr 2009b, p. 8;

Sherr 2009, p. 224).24

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Russia's relationship with its Caucasian

neighbour has evolved through several

increasingly unhappy stages and Moscow's

objectives have been defensive, aiming mainly

to prevent NATO expansion and the inclusion

of Georgia and potentially Ukraine into the

alliance. Just as Tbilisi was angry with

Moscow's unwillingness to honour Georgia's

independence and the right to choose a

foreign-policy orientation, Russia was

frustrated with the lack of recognition by the

United States and NATO. While it is plausible

to assume the Kremlin's intention was to gain

full control over Georgia, it is at least as

plausible to interpret Russia's motives as

driven by defence and security considerations.

The interests of Russia's security are at least as

helpful in determining its behaviour and

explaining why it limited itself to recognising

Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence,

but abstained from pursuing the more

expansionist objectives of removing

Saakashvili from power and establishing a pro-

Kremlin regime in Tbilisi. The theory of

authoritarian expansionism lacks nuance and

a sense of proportion and, by presenting

Russia as inherently imperialist and anti-

Western, this theory is less inclined to consider

seriously the impact of contemporary

developments and international interactions

on Russia's behaviour.

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Western nations and Georgia too bear

responsibility for Russia's increasingly

assertive behaviour in the Caucasus. By

assisting Tbilisi with its political transition after

the Rose Revolution and not interfering with

its e"orts to restore control over Adjara, the

Kremlin expected Georgia to honour its

interests in the Caucasus by not pressing for

immediate military withdrawals, excluding the

use of force from dealings with South Ossetia

and Abkhazia, and consulting Russia on vital

security issues such as membership in NATO.

Soon, however, Tbilisi adopted a strategy of

solving territorial disputes without assistance

from Russia and by relying on support from

the United States. By 2004 Washington had

provided $1.2 billion in aid in the previous

decade, and deployed military advisors in

Georgia. The United States was determined to

secure its access to Caspian oil and strengthen

its geostrategic presence in the Caucasus,

which the Kremlin saw as evidence of

America's bias and lack of recognition of

Russia's role in the region. The United States

did little to restrain Georgia's militarisation

and ambitions to reign in its autonomous

regions by force.25While Russia was

increasing its support for Abkhazia and South

Ossetia, NATO and US o#cials did not hide

their backing of Tbilisi, and rarely criticised

Georgia's actions in public. For example, less

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than a month before the war, the US Secretary

of State Condoleezza Rice travelled to Europe.

She found no time to visit Moscow, but on 9

July she went to Tbilisi to demonstrate support

for Georgia's territorial integrity and NATO

aspirations.

It is also unrealistic to assume that the

Kremlin's decision-making system was

autocratic enough to exclude a serious debate

within the ruling circles. According to Gleb

Pavlovski, one faction within the Kremlin

wanted to march on Tbilisi in order to

challenge the West and fully revive Russia's

domination in the Caucasus (Felgenhauer

2009, pp. 178–79). Another faction had more

modest objectives, but did consider a decision

to remove Saakashvili. Prime Minister Vladimir

Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei

Lavrov both indicated that they wanted the

Georgian President ‘to go’ and at $rst

considered this a condition for a cease$re

(Asmus 2010, pp. 199, 220). Still another

faction seems to have been satis$ed with

achieving a military victory over Georgia and

recognition of its rebellious provinces.26The

ruling structure was far from uniform or

consolidated.

Towards a better understanding of

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Russia

The analysis in this article suggests the theory

of authoritarian expansionism has a rather

limited ability to understand Russia and its

foreign policy. Not only does the theory tend

to misrepresent the direction and scope of

Russia's international actions, but it is

potentially misleading regarding the sources

of such actions. Because of its emphasis on

the role of domestic ‘authoritarianism’ in

determining foreign policy, the theory of

authoritarian expansionism tends to miss

other important sources of state international

behaviour, such as security conditions and

actions by outside powers towards Russia. It is

not that the theory of authoritarian

expansionism is necessarily wrong, but it is

biased and incomplete and therefore

potentially wrong. To apply the late Martin

Malia's (1999, p. 9) diagnosis, ‘the West is not

necessarily most alarmed when Russia is in

reality most alarming, nor most reassured

when Russia is in fact most reassuring’. The

theory's tendency to essentialise Russia's

internal conditions and exaggerate its

international ambitions should therefore

make analysts pause before adopting the

theory of authoritarian expansionism

framework and policy recommendations.

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A better approach to Russia would be to

devise a more complex classi$cation of

Russia's foreign policy. The historical record

will show that since its emergence as an

independent centralised state, Russia has

followed not one but several distinct

trajectories in relations with the West

(Tsygankov 2012). From opening a permanent

mission in Rome in the early seventeenth

century to the collective security policy before

World War II, Russia frequently sided with a

coalition of Western states against those

whom it viewed as challenging Russian values

of security. The second distinct trajectory of

Russia's relations with the West has been that

of defensiveness or balancing through

domestic revival and !exible international

alliances. It included Russia's periods of

recovery after the Time of Troubles, the war

with Sweden, the Crimean War, the

Communist Revolution and the Soviet

disintegration. Finally, historically Russia has

resorted to assertiveness in relations with the

West, as exempli$ed by the cases considered

above of the Crimean War, Cold War and the

Russia–Georgia war of August 2008. The

theory of authoritarian expansionism is

applicable only to the third trajectory of

Russia's foreign policy and to a limited degree.

A better approach to Russia would be one free

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from crude biases and hypocritical

recommendations. Such approaches should

be eclectic and draw from various theoretical

traditions by incorporating ideas of domestic

institutions, considerations of national security

and international recognition as sources of the

nation's foreign policy.27The $rst task ought

to be to establish a meaningful context in

which Russia acts and seeks to achieve its

goals. Scholarly responsibility demands that

we should establish it by studying the relevant

historical, social, psychological and political

contexts behind what ostensibly are

‘autocratic’ decisions. Proceeding from the

200-year-old vision of Russia by the Marquis

de Custine as an essentially aggressive nation,

or engaging in reconstruction of the Kremlin's

motives without su#cient evidence at hand, is

unlikely to facilitate a better understanding of

the country or produce sound policy

recommendations. How the Russians

themselves describe their system of

commitments to relevant social communities

should give us a better clue as to what the

purpose, legitimacy and scope of their actions

might be. The second task should be to

analyse the level of power and con$dence that

provides the state with the required platform

for acting, and it incorporates power

capabilities, institutional capacity and the

leadership's perceptions of actions necessary

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for implementing the vision. Even if the

domestic belief system supports assertive

international behaviour, Russia may lack the

resources to act on it. Finally, a scholar of

foreign policy must carefully monitor the

actions of the Western states toward Russia.

As constructivism teaches us, such external

actions may serve the purpose of external

legitimisation of Russia's behaviour on the

international scene. By providing various

forms of support the outside world may have

the power to encourage Russia not to resort to

revisionist behaviour. Only such an eclectic

approach, sensitive to local systems of

perceiving the outside world, national security

interests and the behaviour of outsiders, may

bring us closer to a better understanding of an

enormously complex country, such as Russia.

Related Research Data

The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of

Russian Foreign Policy

Source: Informa UK Limited

Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources

of Russia's Ukraine policy

Source: Informa UK Limited

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Linking provided by

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrei P. Tsygankov

The author thanks the editors of Europe-

Asia Studies and two anonymous

reviewers for their comments and

suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.

Notes

For examples of scholarship on Russia's

foreign policy, see Trenin (2009), Manko"

(2009), Tsygankov (2010), Lucas (2009),

Bugajski (2009) and Kanet (2009).

For realist studies of Soviet foreign policy, see,

for example, Ulam (1968), Wohlforth (1993)

and Donaldson and Nogee (1998).

For a development of this argument, see

Neumann (1996), English (2000), Hopf (2002),

Clunan (2009) and Larson and Shevchenko

(2010).

While Prussia wanted to help Austria in

exchange for dominating Germany, Russia had

no such conditions and was assisting Austria

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out of Holy Alliance obligations (Taylor 1954, p.

30).

For example, in April 1863, Britain, France and

Austria each sent similar notes to the Russian

government asking for Poland to be given

independence and for its borders to include

Lithuania and Ruthenia (Seton-Watson 1967,

p. 435).

In 1911 the American government even

abrogated the commercial treaty with Russia

(Foglesong 2007, pp. 43–44).

For overviews of Panslavist theories, see Kohn

(1953), Petrovich (1956), Duncan (2000) and

Tuminez (2000).

For important exceptions, see revisionist

scholarship on the West–Soviet relations

(Holloway 1984; Garto" 1985; Cohen 1985;

Kolko 1994). For analysis of Western

scholarship as re!ective of an enemy's

perception, see Oren (2002) and Foglesong

(2007). For a recent study of Sovietologists, see

Engerman (2010).

For such claims, see, for example, Kissinger

(1994, pp. 140–44), Geyer (1987, p. 65) and

MacKenzie (1993, p. 220).

For development of this argument, see

Tsygankov (2010, ch. 6).

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For a summary of the debate, see Brown et al.

(1996). For other works critical of Western

ethnocentrism in analysing Russia, see Malia

(1999), Cohen (2001) and Brown (2010).

For an argument against universality of

economic and political openness for advancing

economic growth, see Bremmer (2006).

Public support for President Putin was

consistently high, ranging from 70% to 80%

during the 2000s. In addition, some polls

showed that almost half (47%) of Russians

thought that the country needed a distinct

kind of democracy that would correspond to

Russia's national traditions and speci$c

qualities, and only 17% were against a

democratic form of government (Interfax, 18

December 2007).

On contested meanings of democracy in the

United States, see Foner (1998) and Oren

(2002).

For analysis of anti-Russian currents within the

American political class and media circles, see

Tsygankov (2009) and English and Svyatets

(2010).

See for example, Kissinger (1994, pp. 140–44),

Geyer (1987, p. 65) and MacKenzie (1993, p.

220).

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For the text of the agreement, see Dmytryshyn

(1974, pp. 97–107).

The Tsar's stated objectives were that ‘all the

Christian parts of Turkey must necessarily

become independent, must become again

what they [formerly] were, principalities,

Christian states, as such re-enter the family of

the Christian states of Europe’ (Vinogradov

1993, p. 170).

Part of it was that Nicholas was wary of the

Slavophiles' insistence on abolition of

serfdom. Domestic censorship for the

Slavophiles remained tight, and the war

objectives were kept as limited and status-quo

oriented. Disappointed in Nicholas and the

course of the war, the Slavophiles soon began

to withdraw their support (for details, see

Curtiss 1979, pp. 557–60). The Tsar also

rejected plans from his own court to attack

Constantinople (Fuller 1992, pp. 235–36).

This is not to say that ideology was

unimportant. Yet, it was more important as

‘the internal lens through which the state

viewed the very legitimacy of its actions’

(Gaddis 1997, p. 290) than as a justi$cation for

hard-line actions toward the West.

For example, General Semyon Budennyi

advocated such intervention. Stalin reportedly

4/1/2023, 7:50 pmFull article: Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of R…Foreign Policy. ‘Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by Habit’?

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responded to Budennyi by posing the

rhetorical questions ‘how are we to feed

them?’ (Akstyutin 1995).

The terms of ‘socialist’ and ‘democratic’

imperialism come from Zubok and Gaddis,

respectively (Zubok 2009, ch. 2; Gaddis 1997,

pp. 284, 289).

See, for example, CIA (1948, pp. 4–7) and NSC

(1948, pp. 1–2). For analysis of the United

States' in!ated assessments of the Soviet

threat after the war, see Evangelista (1982).

Other scholars argued that the war assisted

the Kremlin with its internal legitimacy (Allison

2008, p. 1169; Filippov 2009).

According to the former Defence Minister

Irakli Okruashvili (2007), Georgia planned a

military invasion of South Ossetia in 2006.

This objective seems to have been favoured by

President Medvedev (2008).

For a recent attempt to o"er a more

sophisticated analysis of relationships

between authoritarianism and foreign policy,

see Chambers (2010).

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