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From Podcasts to Protests: Examining the Influence of Podcasts and Misinformation on Contentious Political Participation

Muhammad Ehab Rasul, Saifuddin Ahmed, Jaeho Cho & Teresa Gil-Lopez

To cite this article: Muhammad Ehab Rasul, Saifuddin Ahmed, Jaeho Cho & Teresa Gil-Lopez (2025) From Podcasts to Protests: Examining the Influence of Podcasts and Misinformation on Contentious Political Participation, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 69:3, 273-293, DOI: 10.1080/08838151.2025.2495803

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From Podcasts to Protests: Examining the Influence of Podcasts and Misinformation on Contentious Political Participation Muhammad Ehab Rasul a, Saifuddin Ahmed b, Jaeho Choa, and Teresa Gil-Lopez c

aDepartment of Communication, University of California, Davis, Davis, California, USA; bWee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore; cDepartment of Communication, University Carlos III of Madrid, Madrid, Spain

ABSTRACT As distrust in mainstream media rises, audiences increasingly turn toward alternative news sources. This study examines the impact of alternative non-mainstream podcast news use on contentious political participation through misinformation belief and sharing. Findings from a sample of US adults (N = 797) indicate that alternative non- mainstream podcast news use is significantly associated with misin- formation belief and sharing. In addition, alternative non-mainstream podcast news use is related to an increase in contentious political participation through misinformation sharing only. Ultimately, we find that political identity strength moderates the relationship between alternative non-mainstream podcast news use and conten- tious political participation only through misinformation belief.

In 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Joe Rogan, a popular podcaster with millions of followers hosted Dr. Robert Malone, a well-known conspiracy theorist on his show. What followed was a discussion of a plethora of misinformation related to efficacy of COVID lockdowns, vaccines, and treatments (Caramancion, 2022). This is one example which reflects a broader shift in news consumption: as trust in mainstream media networks decreases (Andersen et al., 2023), audiences increasingly turn to alternative channels such as non-mainstream podcasts, which often spread false claims. In fact, according to a recent study, around 49% of US adults listen to podcasts for political information (Shearer et al., 2023). In addition, another study analyzing over 36,000 political podcast episodes revealed that over 70% of podcasters shared false political beliefs (Wirtschafter, 2023). The current political information environment in the US is characterized by a fragmented partisan audience, the convergence of media genres, numerous choices for news consumption, a decline in traditional media, and widespread engagement with misinformation (Chadwick, 2017; Van Aelst et al., 2017). As a result, this may impact perceptions and opinions about politics, resulting in behavioral outcomes such as political participation.

Although there is little evidence of the link between podcast news use and political participation (see Chadha et al., 2012; Cho et al., 2023), existing research indicates that

CONTACT Muhammad Ehab Rasul [email protected] Department of Communication, University of California, 469 Kerr Hall, One Shields Ave, Davis, CA 95616, USA This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2025.2495803

JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 2025, VOL. 69, NO. 3, 273–293 https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2025.2495803

© 2025 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

traditional media consumption has mixed effects on political participation. For instance, traditional news media consumption, such as television and newspaper use, has been directly and indirectly linked to increased political participation (Shah et al., 2005). However, some researchers have found that television use is associated with decreased political participation (Gentzkow, 2006). Nonetheless, researchers largely agree that inter- net use and social media use lead to an increase in civic and political participation (Boulianne, 2011; Dimitrova et al., 2014; Shah et al., 2005), with some exceptions (see Boulianne, 2015).

Although researchers have continued to focus on traditional forms of citizen participa- tion in offline and online politics, recent years have witnessed changes in the nature and expression of political engagement in an increasingly polarized society (Bode et al., 2018). The current political climate is characterized by increased polarization and partisan ani- mosity, driven by the increasing homogeneity of groups and a heightened sense of partisan identity (Iyengar et al., 2019; Mason, 2018). As a result, a new form of political participation may manifest in novel ways, such as violent protests and beliefs that justify undermining democratic systems and processes to protect one’s political identity and in-group. This type of participation can be considered contentious political participation (see Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). As the partisan divide and animosity intensify, it becomes crucial to understand how media consumption, specifically through podcasts, which may impact misinformation engagement, influence this emerging form of political participation.

Drawing on survey data from US adults, we examine whether and how the consumption of political information from podcast sources is associated with contentious participation. We also examine whether the belief and sharing of misinformation mediate this relationship. While existing literature has explored how traditional and digital media use influences political participation, it often overlooks the evolution of political participation and the rapidly changing media environment in the current climate. By examining the link between podcast consumption and contentious political participation, we aim to contribute to understanding how citizens behave in a high-choice, partisan information environment ripe with misinformation.

Literature Review

Defining and Re-Imagining Political Participation

There is consensus among scholars that citizens’ participation in politics is a vital element of a vibrant, healthy, and representative democracy (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Cho & McLeod, 2007). Political participation has been defined as actions that have the intent to influence government action directly (i.e., affecting the implementation of public policy), or indirectly (i.e., by electing people to legislatures) (Verba et al., 1996, p. 38). This definition of political participation also includes nonpolitical activities such as social gatherings due to the mobilization opportunity to gain politically relevant information through discussion (Verba et al., 1996). Other definitions of political participation include voluntary activities of people in their daily lives, which can be political or nonpolitical (Fiorina, 2002, p. 515). Additionally, Norris (2002) defines political participation as activities that aim “to impact civil society, or which attempt to alter systematic patterns of social behavior” (p. 16). These definitions, among others in the literature, conceptualize political participation as a broad construct that lies on a continuum. In a democratic system, novel ways to engage in politics

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are constantly introduced (van Deth, 2014). Therefore, it is essential to identify these new forms of participation and understand what factors drive them.

In recent years, the citizenry in the US has been marred by partisan politics. Political positions have become increasingly polarized among all groups (Iyengar et al., 2019). Scholars have argued that periods of heightened partisan tensions may give rise to more contentious forms of participation (Bode et al., 2018). In these polarized times, citizens who are usually uninterested in politics tend to form strong opinions and engage more politically (Wells et al., 2017). Additionally, partisan tensions may re-define what an engaged citizen is. Traditionally, voting and duty-based participation has been placed at the center of an engaged citizenry. However, for an average citizen in the US, direct action, such as participating in protests and boycotts, has overtaken duty-based participation (Dalton, 2006). For example, there was a dramatic rise in clashes between protestors and the police after the murder of George Floyd by police officers in 2020. According to the US Crisis Monitor, in the months following Floyd’s murder, over 7,750 demonstrations were recorded all over the US (Kishi & Jones, 2020). Further, a Pew Research Center survey found that 78% of US citizens reported engaging more with news related to the clashes than other issues, such as Congress’ attempts to pass a federal stimulus and relief bill (Gramlich, 2020). This suggests that how citizens participate in politics are shifting.

Research suggests that engaged political participation can stimulate and mobilize citizens (Dalton, 2006). Yet, while an engaged and mobilized citizenry can increase political participation, the outcomes may not always be desirable. In times of heightened political tension, mobilized citizens may deem it necessary to engage in unconventional political activities such as demonstrations, vandalization, or occupying buildings. Prior research has argued that citizens may turn to contentious methods of participation if they do not have access through conventional forms of political participation (Dalton, 2018). For example, the tumultuous events at the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, and some protests following the arrest and death of George Floyd in 2020, saw riots, the vandalism of government struc- tures, looting, and street clashes. Many participants in these events likely viewed these actions as forms of political participation aimed at defending their partisan or racial identity, ideology, or political beliefs. While prior research has focused on contentious politics (i.e., protests and collective action), there is no clear definition of what constitutes as contentious political participation (Corrigall-Brown, 2012; Moseley, 2015). We conceptua- lize unconventional political participation activity as contentious political participation, which involves engaging in disruptive behavior to influence political outcomes (e.g., implementing or halting a policy, intimidating officials to take action, etc.), or show discontent with the government (Tsai, 2019).

Contentious Participation in a Fragmented Information Environment

Traditional news media such as television, newspapers, and radio have traditionally played a key role in disseminating political information to citizens and have gen- erally had a positive impact on political participation directly (Norris, 2000; Rojas et al., 2005), and indirectly through interpersonal discussion (D. V. Shah et al., 2005). However, in recent years, social media platforms have emerged as significant sources of political information (Newman et al., 2024). Existing scholarship has found that social media news use is associated with increased political participation

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(Boulianne, 2020), as exposure to political information on these platforms can enhance political knowledge (Kim et al., 2013), which in turn leads to greater participation (Valenzuela et al., 2019). While traditional and social media continue to serve as essential channels for disseminating political information, the rise of a high-choice media environment has challenged their dominance. Specifically, due to the multitude of options available and growing political polarization, individuals can now selectively choose which information to consume (Stroud, 2011). Additionally, trust in mainstream news media has declined (Strömbäck et al., 2020), which may be partly attributed to concerns over the dwindling quality of news content (Schuck et al., 2013). Mounting concerns about the role of traditional and social media in shaping the political information environment have led to increased demand for alternative, niche media sources such as non-mainstream podcasts, which have quietly become critical for political news consumption (Van Aelst et al., 2017).

Political podcast news can be conceptualized as news related to current affairs that is streamed or downloaded to personal digital devices and can be run by individuals, groups, or organizations (Kim & Lowrey, 2015). Further, although mainstream outlets such as ABC and the New York Times also have podcasts, our focus in this study is on alternative non- mainstream podcasts that are indepen- dently developed. As people seek out personalized niche media sources, alternative non-mainstream podcasts provide people with news that may be ignored by main- stream media (Lee et al., 2013). In addition, the accessibility of alternative non- mainstream podcasts through streaming platforms has allowed dedicated audiences to tune in (Cho et al., 2023). As a medium, podcasts allow listeners to take part in their daily activities while allowing them to engage with news (Perks & Turner, 2019). According to a recent survey, 64% of podcast listeners use the medium to stay up to date about current affairs (Shearer et al., 2023). Alternative non- mainstream news podcasts can allow politicians and journalists to bypass traditional and social media channels to communicate directly to audiences in a more perso- nalized setting. For example, now President Donald Trump and Kamala Harris made several appearances on popular podcasts to appeal directly to younger audiences leading up to the 2024 US election (Shah, 2024). Thus, it is pertinent to understand how news consumption on podcasts impacts participation.

A small but growing body of research has found that news consumption through podcasts directly affects political participation (Chadha et al., 2012). A study by Cho et al. (2023) found that podcast news indirectly increases political participation via online and offline political discussion. These findings suggest that along with information-seeking, podcast listeners engage with raw information, which may foster an increased desire for political participation. Further, Bennett and Segerberg (2012) argue that digital media outlets can transmit collective action themes, which are then spread across other media platforms and audiences’ personal networks, ultimately serving as a medium for collective mobilization. In a fragmented information environment, it is possible that podcasts may serve as vehicles for contentious political participation. While traditional, social, and alternative media news consumption has positively impacted political participation, researchers have not explicitly studied how these channels affect contentious political participation.

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Podcasts, Misinformation Engagement, and Contentious Political Participation

Scholars have raised concerns that news across channels and platforms has been less focused on facts and knowledge, allowing misinformation and conspiracy theories to enter the public arena (Mohammad, 2012). As facts are increasingly perceived as subjective opinions, citizens are exposed to information rooted in falsehoods. In fact, scholars have pointed out that the supply of misinformation in political information environments, such as on social media, has increased (Lazer et al., 2018; Rojecki & Meraz, 2016). Specifically, social media news use has been associated with misinformation engagement in recent years (Tandoc et al., 2018), with people increasingly believing and sharing misinformation about issues such as COVID-19 (Ahmed & Rasul, 2022, 2023). However, on the other hand, a growing body of research has argued that misinformation on social media is only present in small groups and that the prevalence of misinformation is exaggerated (Allen et al., 2020; Guess et al., 2019). Despite this evidence, researchers have cautioned that sufficient misinforma- tion is present on social media platforms to consider this an urgent problem (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019).

Some recent research has argued that the spread of misinformation in alternative non- mainstream podcasts is concerning and demands attention (Jones et al., 2021). For example, work by Wirtschafter (2021) has revealed that misinformation on issues such as abortion, immigration, and elections is common in news on podcasts. An analysis of over 79 prominent political podcasters after the 2020 US election found that over 70% of them shared false claims (Wirtschafter, 2023). In the same study, an analysis of over 36,000 political podcast episodes revealed that the presence of false claims such as voter fraud, jumped by 600% following the election (Wirtschafter, 2023).1 Podcasts could also unintentionally spread misinformation. One such example is when Dr. Robert Malone, who spread conspiracy theories about COVID-19, was hosted by Joe Rogan, a popular podcaster with millions of followers (Caramancion, 2022). A lack of editorial oversight and loyal listeners further allows misinformation to spread on podcasts (Döring et al., 2022). Furthermore, according to Pew Research Center, over 87% of podcast news listeners find it mostly accurate (Shearer et al., 2023). Given that most podcast listeners find news from the medium to be accurate, they may be more likely to believe in misinformation and share it. Also, since the audience cannot directly respond to the information in podcasts, it reduces their ability to fact check false claims, further rendering them susceptible to misinformation (Wirtschafter, 2021).

In summary, studies examining misinformation engagement in contemporary media have shed light on the various channels through which false information can spread. However, podcasts have emerged as a growing space where misinformation is widespread. Existing research findings, though not yet conclusive, highlight alternative non-mainstream podcasts’ role in amplifying misinformation, demonstrating how misinformation can shape user beliefs and infiltrate online networks and platforms (Jones et al., 2021; Wirtschafter, 2023). Given the evidence regarding the spread of misinformation on podcasts, we propose the following hypothesis:

H1a-b: Podcast news use is positively associated with (a) misinformation belief and (b) sharing.

1In their study, Wirtschafter (2023) included political podcasts as part of their analysis if they either (1) mentioned politics, policy, or current events in their description; or (2) had a recent episode that covered a political issue.

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Political scientists have found that beliefs in misinformation and conspiracy theories are linked to adverse political outcomes such as increased criminal behavior and extremism (Jolley et al., 2019; van Prooijen et al., 2015). Although there is limited evidence, recent scholarship suggests that belief in misinformation is also associated with protest participa- tion (Boulianne & Lee, 2022), which may manifest as or evolve into contentious political participation, depending on how it develops. Scholars have argued that misinformation beliefs can impact subsequent actions as people rely on false information to guide their behavior (Rapp & Salovich, 2018). For instance, Banaji et al. (2019) point out that mis- information about minorities and societal issues can provoke mob violence as individuals believe that the burden to resolve the issues lies on them. Evidence from Nigeria and Nepal indicates that misinformation on social media has led to cases of incited violence (IFCN, 2016). Similarly, in their study of alternative media consumption channels in four countries (i.e., US, UK, France, and Canada), Boulianne and Lee (2022) find that exposure to misinformation and embracing conspiracy theories increases the likelihood of engaging in protest activities.

People who believe in misinformation may be under the illusion that they are informed and engage in protests and other political activities to try to correct others’ views or influence an action (White et al., 2006). Once misinformation, which contains cues to non- normative (e.g., violence) collective action (Frischlich, 2022), is endorsed or shared multiple times within one’s social networks, a false image could be cultivated that a significant number of people are willing to engage in collective action (Mercier, 2020). These findings suggest that misinformation engagement can lead to contentious forms of action. Under the illusion of being informed, people may engage in contentious political participation, which, in turn, can have detrimental consequences for a healthy democracy. Hence, we propose a hypothesis as follows:

H2a-b: (a) Misinformation belief and (b) sharing are positively associated with contentious participation.

The aforementioned hypotheses point to the possibility of mediated relationships where news consumption via alternative non-mainstream podcasts indirectly influences conten- tious participation through misinformation engagement. That is, we posit that specific news consumption patterns promote beliefs in misinformation and the sharing of such informa- tion, both of which, in turn, lead to contentious participation. Building on our earlier discussion, we present a hypothesis regarding these indirect effects, as follows:

H3a-b: Podcast news use indirectly influences contentious participation through (a) mis- information belief and (b) sharing.

Party Identification Strength as a Moderating Factor

As people consume information that aligns with their political beliefs, they may become more susceptible to misinformation and sharing. Some research has found partisan differences in misinformation engagement (Gawronski et al., 2023). For example, Republicans are found to be more likely to share misinformation on social

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media (Guess et al., 2019), and less likely to accept fact checks (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2016). However, there is also evidence that this effect is not isolated among Republicans only. For instance, one study found that conservatives are more likely to be exposed to and share misinformation while strong partisans on both ends of the political spectrum spread misinformation (Rao et al., 2022). Similarly, J. Jennings and Stroud (2023) found that both Republicans and Democrats believed misinformation, particularly about the outgroup.

Further, the strength of one’s political identity has been shown to impact content selection and political participation (Huddy et al., 2015; Iyengar et al., 2019). The mobilization hypothesis suggests that the strength of political identity leads one to express this identity via forms of political participation, such as voting (Carlin & Love, 2018). As partisans participate more, their political identities are reaffirmed. Moreover, increased political identity strength over time has led to increased polar- ization and intense participation (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018), which has caused people to consume content congruent to their political beliefs increasingly (Van Aelst et al., 2017).

In summary, given the tendency of partisan-motivated information processing and reasoning (e.g., Derreumaux et al., 2022), one’s political identity strength is expected to significantly influence how individuals absorb misinformation and conspiracy theories disseminated via alternative non-mainstream podcasts and how such engagement with misinformation relates to contentious forms of participation. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H4a-b: Political identity strength moderates the indirect relationship between podcast news use and contentious political participation through (a) misinformation belief and (b) sharing.

Materials and Method

Participants

We conducted a cross-sectional survey via Qualtrics, an online platform, in November, 2022 (see supplemental materials for more details). Quota matching strategies were used to match the sample to the population for age, gender, and race. A total of 797 participants were recruited (425 Democrats, 100 Independents, 240 Republicans; Mage = 43.74, SD = 15.14; 50.3% female, 49.7% male; 74.3% White, 12.1% Black, 6.5% Hispanic, 5.3% Asian, 1.3% Other Race, 0.5% Native American). The research was approved by the institutional review board (IRB) of an affiliated institution of one of the authors. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to identify attitudes about social issues, that their participation in the study was completely voluntary, and that no identifying information (other than demographics) would be collected. All parti- cipants provided informed consent.

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Measures

Podcast News Use We measured podcast news use by asking participants to report how often they listened to 11 non-mainstream political podcasts in the last 6 months (1 = Never to 5 = Daily). These podcasts included popular conservative and liberal podcasts such as Candace Owens, The Ben Shapiro Show, Bannon’s War Room, Pod Save America, The Young Turks, etc (see supplemental materials for the full list). The popularity of podcasts was determined by ratings from two websites that rate the political ideology and ratings of podcasts: chartable. com and podchaser.com. Then, these ratings were double-checked against podcast trends on Apple and Spotify. The responses for these items were averaged to create the podcast news use variable (α = 0.97, M = 1.26, SD = 0.64).

Misinformation Belief Belief in misinformation was measured by asking participants to rate the accuracy of false headlines (1 = Not at all accurate to 5 = Extremely accurate). Participants were presented with eight false headlines (please see supplementary materials for the headlines). Previous research has utilized this approach to measure the accuracy and belief in misinformation (Ahmed & Rasul, 2023; Ståhl & Van Prooijen, 2018). The responses were averaged to create the misinformation belief variable (α = 0.70, M = 2.07, SD = 0.68).

Misinformation Sharing Participants’ willingness to share misinformation was measured by asking them to indicate how likely they were to share the false headlines they were presented with earlier (1 = Extremely to 5 = Not at all). The items were reverse-coded and then averaged to create the misinformation sharing variable (α = 0.87, M = 1.31, SD = 0.63).

Contentious Political Participation Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they would consider engaging in an unauthorized demonstration, damaging public property, disrupting daily life activities, engaging in clashes with police or other demonstrators, occupying a public space, refusing to obey the law, joining groups to enforce public order, and intimidating political oppo- nents, if they wanted to have their opinions heard (1 = Not at all likely to 5 = Extremely likely). The items were averaged to create the contentious political participation variable (α = 0.92, M = 1.53, SD = 0.75).

Political Identity Strength Participants were asked to indicate where they placed themselves on a scale from 1 = strong democrat to 7 = strong republican. The scale was folded to create the political identity strength variable (M = 2.82, SD = 1.11).

Controls In order to examine the unique impact of podcast news use on contentious political participation via misinformation belief and sharing, we controlled for demographic and

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political disposition variables such as age, gender, race, marital status, education, income, social and traditional media news use,2 partisanship, traditional non-contentious political participation, political trust, and political interest.

Results

We conducted a series of OLS regressions to examine our hypotheses. To estimate the indirect and moderating effects, we employed PROCESS, a program specialized in modeling mediation and moderation (Hayes, 2018). All analyses controlled traditional non- contentious political participation, various political dispositions (i.e., political interest, trust, partisanship), social and traditional media news use, and demographics.

First, we estimated the effects of podcast news consumption on misinformation belief and sharing (H1a-b). As reported in the first two columns of Table 1, the results suggest that podcast news consumption was significantly associated with both misinformation belief (b = 0.307, SE = 0.043, p < .001) and sharing (b = 0.309, SE = 0.036, p < .001), supporting H1a and H1b.

Second, we tested the effects of misinformation belief and sharing on contentious participation. As reported in the fourth column of Table 1, both misinformation belief (b = 0.080, SE = 0.036, p = .027) and sharing (b = 0.156, SE = 0.043, p < .001) were significantly associated with contentious participation even after considering traditional non- contentious participation and other control variables. These results support H2a and H2b.

Table 1. Predicting misinformation belief, sharing, and contentious political participation. Mediating variables Criterion variable

Misinfo. Belief Misinfo. Sharing Contentious Participation

Control Variables Political Id. Strength .019 (.022) .025 (.019) − .020 (.022) − .026 (.021) Age − .003* (.002) − .003* (.001) − .008*** (.002) − .007*** (.002) Gender (F = 1) − .022 (.048) − .127** (.040) − .122** (.046) − .100* (.046) Marital Status .051 (.048) .036 (.041) − .126** (.047) − .136** (.046) Education − .047* (.025) − .078*** (.021) − .023 (.024) − .007 (.024) Race (White = 1) .026 (.056) − .033 (.047) .089 (.055) .092 (.054) Income − .006 (.007) .007 (.006) .012(.007) .011 (.007) Political Id. (R=high) − .013 (.012) .019 (.010) − .033** (.012) − .035** (.012) Political Interest .005 (.025) .022 (.021) .059* (.024) .055* (.024) Political Trust − .082* (.039) − .012 (.033) − .042 (.038) − .033 (.037) Non-cont. Political Part. .018** (.007) .035*** (.006) .049*** (.007) .042*** (.007) Social Media News Use .023 (.016) .023 (.014) − .001 (.016) − .006 (.016) Traditional Media News Use − .006 (.028) .003 (.023) − .037 (.027) − .037 (.026) Independent Variables Podcast news use .307*** (.043) .309*** (.036) .421*** (.042) .348*** (.043) Mediators Misinfo. Belief – – – .080* (.036) Misinfo. Sharing – – – .156*** (.043) R2 .134 .289 .336 .358

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard error in parentheses. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05; Misinfo. refers to misinformation; Non-cont. Political Part. refers to non-contentious online and offline political participation.

2Traditional media news use was measured by averaging participant responses for television, radio, and newspaper news use.

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Before formally testing the hypothesized indirect effects, we also examined the direct effects of podcast news consumption on contentious participation, both with and without considering the mediating variables (i.e., misinformation belief and sharing). These results provide at least a descriptive indication of whether mediation is occurring. As reported in

Figure 1. Illustration of the mediation results with podcast news use as an independent variable with traditional media news use and social media news were controlledEffect of COVID-19 during the last six months.

Figure 2. Illustration of the moderated mediation results with podcast news use as an independent variable.

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the third and fourth columns of Table 1 podcast news use was found to have a positive and significant relationship with contentious participation regardless of the inclusion of the two mediators. Yet, the coefficient for podcast news use as a predictor of contentious participa- tion was reduced about 17%, from 0.421 (SE = 0.042, p < .001) to 0.348 (SE = 0.044, p < .001) when the two mediating variables were included in the regression equation. This result implies that the effect of podcast news consumption on contentious participation is at least partially mediated by one or both mediators.

Next, to formally test indirect effects (i.e., H3a-b), we employed PROCESS (model 4) to estimate parallel indirect effects of podcast news consumption on contentious participation through misinformation belief and sharing (see Figure 1). The results suggest that the indirect effect of podcast news use on political contentious participation through misinfor- mation belief (H3a: effect = 0.025, Boot SE = 0.014, 95% CI = [ − 0.003, 0.054]) was not significant, but was significant in a positive direction for misinformation sharing (H3b: effect = 0.048, Boot SE = 0.024, 95% CI = [0.009, 0.102]). These indirect effects results are consistent with the reduction in the coefficient for podcast news use when the mediators were included in the regression equation, as previously reported. Formal testing using PROCESS reveals that the effect of podcast news use was partially mediated, specifically through misinformation sharing, but not misinformation belief.

Finally, we employed PROCESS (model 59) to investigate whether the strength of political identification moderates the above-estimated indirect effects of news con- sumption on contentious participation (see Figure 2). This model used podcast news consumption as the independent variable, misinformation belief and sharing as mediators, political identity strength as a moderator, and contentious political participation as the dependent variable (see Figure 4). The results reveal that,

Figure 3. Conditional effects of podcast news use on contentious political participation at different levels of political identity strength.

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when it comes to the relationship between podcast news consumption and misin- formation engagement, moderation by political identity strength was significant with podcast news use as a predictor. Specifically, the interaction between podcast news use and political identity strength on misinformation belief was significant (b =

Figure 4. Conditional effects of podcast news use on misinformation belief at different levels of political identity strength.

Figure 5. Conditional effects of misinformation belief on contentious political participation at different levels of political identity strength.

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0.098, SE = 0.034, p = .004, 95% CI = [0.032, 0.164]). Conversely, the same interaction on misinformation sharing was not significant (b = − 0.011, SE = 0.029, p = .701, 95% CI = [ − 0.067, 0.045]). On the other hand, when it comes to the second path of the indirect effects, the interaction between misinformation belief and political identity strength on contentious political participation was found to be significant (b = 0.090, SE = 0.032, p = .004, 95% CI = [0.028, 0.152]) (H4a). In contrast, the interaction between misinformation sharing and political identity strength on contentious poli- tical participation was not significant (b = − 0.063, SE = 0.038, p = .096 95% CI = [ − 0.138, 0.011]) (H4b). Lastly, although not hypothesized, political identity strength was found to significantly moderate the direct relationship between podcast news use and contentious political participation (b = 0.132, SE = 0.035, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.062, 0.202]) (see Figures 3-5 for details about significant conditional effects). To summarize, these moderated mediation results suggest that political identity strength plays a significant role in shaping the effects of podcast news consumption on contentious participation, particularly through misinformation beliefs, as expected in H4a. Specifically, individuals with stronger political identities are more likely to believe misinformation when consuming podcast news, which in turn increases their likelihood of engaging in contentious political actions. However, this pattern of moderation by political identity strength was not found in relation to misinforma- tion sharing.

Discussion

This study examined whether and how news consumption through podcasts is related to contentious political participation through misinformation belief, and sharing. Further, we examined whether political identity strength moderates the two-step relationship between news consumption and contentious political participation via misinformation belief and sharing.

Overall, the results showed that podcast news use was significantly and positively related to both misinformation belief and sharing. Furthermore, as expected, engagement with misinformation, including belief and sharing, was significantly associated with contentious participation. Combining these two sets of results suggests the possibility that podcast news consumption might be linked to contentious participation via misinformation engagement. Our formal testing of these potential indirect effects indicated that news consumption via podcasts is significantly associated with contentious political participation through mis- information sharing, but not through misinformation belief. Lastly, our findings indicate that the strength of one’s political identity moderates the direct relationship between podcast news use and contentious political participation and the indirect relationship between the two through misinformation belief, but not through sharing. Specifically, the indirect effect of podcast news consumption on contentious participation through mis- information belief is significant only at higher levels of political identity strength. As noted earlier, all these findings were observed after controlling for traditional and social media news consumption, non-contentious participation, and other demographic and disposition variables. Although not hypothesized, it is noteworthy that neither traditional nor social media news consumption was significantly related to misinformation engagement (i.e., belief and sharing). This stands in clear contrast, highlighting the potential role political

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podcasts may play in the polarized and fragmented contemporary information environment.

The findings of our study have several implications for the literature on media news consumption, misinformation, and political participation. First, our findings indicate that podcast use for news could contribute significantly to misinformation engagement. There has indeed been a growing concern that misinformation has been increasingly accessible on podcasts under the radar (Wirtschafter, 2023). According to our data, information con- sumption through alternative non-mainstream podcasts appears to be related to the dis- semination of misinformation as users share it through their social networks, which in turn is associated with contentious forms of political participation. Some have argued that exposure to violent rhetoric can increase support for political violence (Kalmoe, 2014). In a similar vein, in addition to misinformation exposure, alternative non-mainstream podcast news listeners could be exposed to rhetoric that encourages sharing of misinformation, and while engaging in sharing such information with like-minded others, podcast users could be mutually mobilized into contentious political participation. Previous research and our results suggest that alternative non-mainstream podcasts may be a source of misinforma- tion a its dissemination, and could encourage contentious and disruptive forms of political participation. It is, however, essential to note that podcasts do not solely serve counter- democratic functions. They also function as an alternative niche information channel for specific audience segments to stay informed and engaged in politics. Future research, thus should explore the two-sided roles of this increasingly popular medium.

Our results of moderated indirect effects also shed light on the dynamics involving news consumption, misinformation engagement, and contentious participation. The link between podcast news consumption and contentious political participation through mis- information belief was stronger, especially for those with higher levels of political identity strength. As strong partisans tend to seek information that matches their political beliefs – a pattern known as partisan selective exposure – their information processing mechanisms change (Camaj, 2019). The motivated reasoning framework posits that people process information to reach desired conclusions (Kunda, 1990). Particularly with news and political information, people tend to seek out information consistent with their political identity (Lodge & Taber, 2013). In addition, people process information to reach conclu- sions as quickly as possible (Fiske & Taylor, 2013, p. 16), which can reduce deliberation. Then, a reduction in deliberation can leave strong partisans vulnerable to misinformation belief (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). In the current context, for strong partisans, a lack of deliberation combined with a strong motivation to seek information congruent with their political identity may lead them to accept misinformation, which, in turn, further encourages or justifies engagement in contentious forms of political participation (Boulianne & Lee, 2022). While partisan selective exposure explains the results from moderated indirect effects, it does so partially due to the measurement of the podcast news use variable.

In addition to selective exposure, because participants also reported consumption of alternative non-mainstream podcasts with an outgroup ideological leaning, cross-cutting exposure could also explain these results. There is evidence that cross-cutting exposure to political views can lead to accidental and intentional misinformation engagement on social media platforms (Rossini et al., 2021). Prior research has labeled this as a “paradox of participation and misinformation,” where behaviors that are typically related to positive

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outcomes (i.e., cross-cutting exposure) can have damaging consequences such as misinforma- tion engagement (Valenzuela et al., 2019). While this explanation may seem counterintuitive, following partisan-motivated reasoning, strong partisans follow directional goals to construct arguments (Jennings, 2019). Thus, people, particularly strong partisans, may engage in cross- cutting consumption to achieve directional partisan goals. Nonetheless, in order to better understand these results, we conducted additional analyses by separating the podcast news use variable into liberal and conservative podcast use (see supplementary materials for details). Despite doing so, the general patterns of the indirect effects stayed the same.

In the era of partisan polarization, the availability of multiple news media channels has resulted in a larger supply of personalized niche media, including podcasts. Consequently, audiences may be further fragmented, leading to even more polarization or filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011). As people increasingly turn to niche media sources to seek content with directional goals, there are concerns that this may erode social cohesion, disrupt democratic functions, and elevate conflicts among the public (Sunstein, 2007).

Lastly, the current study bridges existing gaps to provide a nuanced look at the differ- ential effects of media news use on contentious political participation. We present a unique form of civic engagement: contentious political participation, which reflects the growing intensity of political involvement in today’s divided landscape. As citizens increasingly turn to media channels that align with their ideological beliefs, the line between informed engagement and polarization becomes blurred. In an era of unprecedented partisan loath- ing and polarization (Iyengar et al., 2019), newer forms of civic engagement are emerging. Hence, it is essential to reexamine how we study political participation. In addition, we argue that podcasts substantially impact misinformation engagement and contentious political participation. Podcasts are often unregulated and can operate outside the typical frameworks of content monitoring, making spreading misinformation easier. Due to how podcasts function, tracking misinformation can be incredibly difficult (Wirtschafter, 2021). As such, the scientific community must dive deeper into more personalized and niche forms of news media, such as podcasts.

Limitations and Future Research

The current study is not without limitations. First, our measurement of alternative non- mainstream podcast news use is limited to specific podcasts, which may not capture all podcast listeners. To address the potential impact of omission, future studies should consider including a more comprehensive list of podcasts and should also focus on captur- ing the effects of political and nonpolitical podcasts. Also, examining whether podcast listeners are exposed to news incidentally is fruitful, since most listeners do not report news consumption as their primary motivation behind podcast use (Shearer et al., 2023). Second, our measure for alternative non-mainstream podcast news use does not measure whether people listened to them via a streaming app such as Spotify or whether they watched the podcast on YouTube. Future studies could examine whether podcast news consumption in video or sound-only form generates different effects for contentious political participation. Third, the cross-sectional nature of our survey design limits our ability to draw causal conclusions. Therefore, we exercise caution when interpreting the causal flow of the indirect effects. In a similar vein, due to the nature of our study, we cannot rule out reverse causation. Future research would be valuable if it explores alternative causal relationships

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using research designs, such as multi-wave panel surveys, enabling better causality testing. Lastly, while the current study adds to the existing literature, more work is needed to examine the psychological and behavioral mechanisms through which news consumption via podcasts, misinformation engagement, and contentious political participation are interrelated.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This study was funded by the Ministry of Education, Singapore.

Notes on contributors

Muhammad Ehab Rasul (M.A., University of South Florida) is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication at the University of California, Davis. His research interests focus on the impact of social media and AI, misinformation, and information consumption on political attitudes and behavior. Email: [email protected]

Saifuddin Ahmed (Ph.D., University of California, Davis) is an Assistant Professor at the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University. His research interests lie in new and emerging media, political communication, social media and politics, public opinion, and media representation of minorities. Email: [email protected]

Jaeho Cho (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is a Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California, Davis. His research concerns the influence of mass media and communication technologies on political decision-making and behavior. Email: jae- [email protected]

Teresa Gil-Lopez (Ph.D. Communication, University of California, Davis) is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Communication at University Carlos III of Madrid. She investigates the ways in which digital technologies may have altered the relationships between social movements, the media, and citizen discourse. Email: [email protected]

ORCID

Muhammad Ehab Rasul http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5175-9023 Saifuddin Ahmed http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6372-213X Teresa Gil-Lopez http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6376-0424

Data Availability Statement

The data for this study will be made available upon reasonable request.

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