"But think of the exhilaration the child must experience," she said, "precisely in being more sovereignly able to distinguish fact from fantasy and in being able more reliably to predict the behavior of persons and objects. To really *know*, when previously you've only been able to intuit, can bring a powerful sense of satisfaction."

As we turn now to the era of adolescence I am certain that we can expect to hear about an equally dramatic confluence of developmental changes.

Fowler 1981

10. Adolescence

Piaget: I suspect that this discussion of adolescence from our several points of view may prove particularly valuable, in that it will show how significant a part cognitive development plays in the crises of adolescence and their resolutions. Earlier in this century authorities on adolescence wrote to the point of trivialization about the emotional upsets of puberty. They ran the risk of overemphasizing the impact of adolescent sexuality and its accompanying affective disequilibrium. It is important to recognize that while the transition from the patterns of thought that ripen in late childhood to those of adolescence does bring disequilibrium and disruption, the emerging new cognitive structures provide markedly increased capacity, flexibility and stability. In fact, as I shall try to show, the formation of personality, as a matter of reflective personal engagement, only emerges with the development of formal operational thinking.

In examining the course of cognitive development it is useful to observe a phenomenon that occurs in some form with each of the major transitions. The operations that were constitutive of the previous stage become, to some degree, the objects of reflection for the next stage. Put another way, the operations of the previous stage come to be part of the "theory" of the next stage.[25] Preoperational thinking, for example, brings the world, constructed in accordance with the sensorimotor action schemata, into language and symbolic representation. Similarly, concrete operational thought takes the mental imitations of reality composed by the preoperational stage and manipulates them in accordance with its now more stable and reversible operational structures. Pre-eminently, formal operational thinking makes the concrete operations both the *objects* of its thought as well as the *instruments* of its thinking. Formal operational thought *is thinking about thinking.* Put another way, whereas concrete operations consti-

tute a logic of objects and of the relationships between objects, formal operations constitute a logic of propositions. If concrete operations manipulate objects, formal operations manipulate *concepts* about objects and their relationships.

Consider an example. Subjects of various ages were presented with a number of metal rods of varying length, thickness, shape (cross-section would appear square, rectangular, or round) and material (in this experiment, steel and brass, which differ considerably in elasticity). The subjects were given the problem of explaining the rods' differences in flexibility. Concrete operational subjects did not attempt to inventory separately the possible factors that might have an influence. Rather, by arranging the rods in order of descending or ascending lengths they began to see whether the rods were increasingly flexible. When other variances, such as thickness or material were perceived to interfere with factors of length, these latter factors were analyzed in turn by the same method. But there was neither a systematic isolation of each separate factor, nor any recognition of the necessity of creating a synthetic perspective or theory that could coordinate the effects of all various factors. When pressed to provide proof for their conclusions subjects of nine or ten typically chose a long thin rod and a short thick one to demonstrate the role of length, because in this way, as a boy of nine and a half told us, "you can see the difference better!"

In contrast, subjects of eleven or twelve or beyond (with a leveling off at fourteen to fifteen), after some initial groping, made a list of factors by way of hypothesis and then studied them one by one. In this step, which represents the advance over the previous stage, they separated each variable factor, testing each one while controlling or keeping constant all the others. For example, they would choose two rods of the same length, same width and same cross-section but of different substances. This enabled them to attend to the impact of this last variable alone. When asked to give proof of the validity of their conclusions the subjects could show that these variables and only these could singly and in combination account for the differences, and that by systematically testing each variable, holding all the others constant, one could determine which affected flexibility and which did not. In short they could give you a method, comprehensive and exhaustive, for solving the problem and could demonstrate that it covered all possible relations between factors. We call this *hypo-*

thetico-deductive thinking. It is second-level thinking, thinking about method in thinking. This method, which we found fairly general at about fourteen, is all the more remarkable in that none of the subjects we interviewed had received instruction in it at school.[26]

In the problem I just described concrete operations were sufficient for separating the factors and for considering the variations of one of them or two of them at a time. But in such a complex system of influences the concrete operations of classification, seriation, correspondence and measurement are not sufficient. The solution requires implications, disjunctions, and exclusions, which belong to propositional operations and which presuppose both a combinitorial system and coordinations of inversion and reciprocity. As these new transformations take form the adolescent is acquiring the fully developed operations he or she will require for adult thought and for the ability to use, in principle, the scientific method.[27]

Earlier we contrasted concrete and formal operational thinking in the following way: for concrete thinking, we said, *possibility* is a subset of *reality*; for formal thinking, on the other hand, *reality* is a subset of *possibility*. In the formal operational stage thought takes wings. Able imaginatively to transcend empirical experience, formal thinking can construct ideal states or regulative norms. In social terms, formal operational thinking can be utopian. With its ability to extrapolate or imagine perfection, the adolescent mind can be quite harsh in judging friends, parents, social or political conditions generally or the self. Now able to conceive of the possibility of an infinity of perspectives on a problem, the adolescent shows both a marked improvement in taking the perspectives of others and a tendency to an overconfident distortion of others' perspectives through overassimilation of them into his or her own.

The intellectual transcendence we have just described also makes possible a new kind of reflection on the course of one's own life. The concrete operational child is *carried* by the flow of his or her life and reflects on events and relationships from *within* that flow. In contrast, the adolescent begins to be able to reflect on the life course from "above" or "beside" it. Formal operations bring the ability to construct a personal past and to anticipate a personal future, based on expected or projected developmental transformations of the self. Thus, in a qualitatively different sense than before, the youth begins to exhibit personality, that is, the disciplining and conscious effort at

shaping one's life in accordance with self-discerned patterns and aspirations.[28]

Kohlberg: M. Piaget's discussion of the implications of formal operational thought for social relations leads well into a look at corresponding advances in moral judgment and in social perspective taking. The "transcendence" of thought from its embeddedness in the concrete world of objects and relationships manifests its impact in three decisive steps in social perspective taking. I and my associates have studied these developments and as I tell about them I want particularly to draw on the work of my associate Robert Selman.[29]

Almost parallel with the appearance of early formal operations (usually about eleven) there can emerge a qualitatively new dimension in taking the perspectives of others. With the earlier concrete operational form of social perspective taking a person develops a proficiency for constructing the perspective of another or others upon a third object or person. I can show this by means of a diagram:



Let S be "self," O be "other," and *Obj* be a third object or person to which self and others relate from these different positions. In simple perspective taking I see you seeing a third object and I imaginatively construct your perspective on it. My knowledge of both you and the object is enhanced, for as I coordinate our two perspectives on it, I can compare and contrast our ways of seeing it and arrive at a more "objective" knowing of the object. I also have an expanded awareness of your standpoint.

But with the transcendence that formal operational thinking brings I am ready for both a more complex act of construction of another's perspective and a more difficult act of self-transcendence. With this new step the subject begins to construct the perspective of the other on the *self.* Put in personal terms again, "I see you seeing me; I construct the *me* I think you see." It can be diagrammed in this way:



Let S be self, O be other, and S' be other's image of self as self constructs it. We may call this step *interpersonal perspective taking.* We take a decisive step toward understanding the revolution that can occur in social relations with adolescence if we see that interpersonal perspective taking quickly becomes *mutual* and is understood as such. Let me explain. When I begin to construct your perspective on me, I soon recognize that you, likewise, are constructing my perspective on you. Hence, "I see you seeing me; I see you seeing me seeing you." Or diagrammatically:



This is *mutual interpersonal perspective taking.* Understanding this helps us grasp more fully some of the mechanisms underlying M. Piaget's account of the adolescent's new ability to make the self and the course of his or her own life objects of reflection. It also contributes to our understanding of his reference to the adolescent emergence of "personality" as the formation of a more or less conscious life project. I am certain that Professor Erikson will build on this in his discussion of identity in adolescence.

But before we can fully appreciate the potential of formal operational thought's contribution to the third stage of moral reasoning, there is one further step in the development of perspective taking which I must describe. Mutual interpersonal perspective taking creates a qualitatively new kind of objectivity, both regarding self and regarding the other or others with whom one has significant and sustained interactions. The coordination or holding together of those two more objective perspectives on self and others makes for the creation of what may be called a *"third-person" perspective.* By this we mean a more dispassionate perspective, inclusive of the perspectives of both the self and other(s), but not identical with or under the control of either. If we diagram third-person perspective taking it looks like this:



I have drawn this in such a way as to suggest that the third-person perspective is potentially a shared construction, something both or several partners cooperate in. In practice, however, it may not always have this shared quality.

A bit of reflection enables us to see how the capacity for third-person perspective taking greatly strengthens the possibility of an actor's determining what justice requires in a situation of interpersonal conflict. The distancing or transcendence it makes possible enables one to approximate the weighing of another's rights, claims and interpretations with the same scale by which one weighs one's own. The development and consistent use of third-person perspective taking would constitute a remarkable evidence of moral growth. It is not required for our third stage of moral development, though mutual interpersonal perspective taking is. In practice the third-person perspective is often appealed to in more conventional forms, namely by way of appeal to the sanction of generally accepted social expectations (G. H. Mead's "generalized other") or to a shared understanding of God as a transcendent third person.[30]

With this necessarily somewhat complex account of the formal operational developments in interpersonal perspective taking, we can now focus on the third moral stage. Stage three marks the beginning of the *conventional level* of moral judgment. We call it *mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships and interpersonal conformity*. In stage three actions are right if they conform to the expectations of one's "significant others." A powerful motive of stage three moral action is to please those persons who matter greatly and not to disappoint their opinions and expectations of us. Another criterion for the rightness of actions at stage three involves doing what people gener-

ally expect of a person in the role or relation one occupies toward others, that is, doing what a good husband, or a good daughter or a loyal friend would generally be expected to do. Relying on either a meeting of the expectations of those whose opinions about one matter a great deal, or on promise making and promise keeping or on fulfilling the customary expectations of persons in one's social role or relationship, stage three represents a conformist mode of moral decision making. The complex steps in cognitive development and social perspective taking that this stage requires, however, remind us that "conventional" moral thinking is not to be taken for granted or to be thought of as an automatic or simple achievement. This moral orientation and its view of social relations must be constructed by each person in the context of his or her interaction with others and with the help and guidance of the available contents of common-sense moral thought.

Though stage three may compose a unified set of social expectations which become part of (or constitute) a third-person perspective (the generalized other), it does not yet take a true societal perspective. It is limited to an interpersonal construction of the moral domain and formulates its moral tenets, however inclusively, primarily on the basis of an extension from face-to-face relationships. A true societal perspective awaits the next stage.[31]

Erikson: My colleague Piaget, in speaking here of the emergence of formal operations, has emphasized in a way I find helpful the consequences of this development for social interaction and personality formation. If I prefer to speak of the latter in terms of *identity* formation, it is with an awareness that our accounts overlap in interesting ways and that the cognitive developments he describes are central in the identity crisis of adolescence. Professor Kohlberg's additional explication of the dramatic new steps in social perspective taking made possible by formal operational thought indeed help us to see quite clearly what I might call the cognitive bases of the identity crisis.[32]

With the ability for entering into "mutual interpersonal perspective taking" the boy or girl suddenly becomes "self-conscious" in new and potentially confusing ways. His or her range of significant others is widened and may be somewhat diverse. The views of self that emerge in relations with peers, parents, teachers and others, therefore, like reflected images in a house of distorting mirrors, may not fit

together. The young person can say as did St. Augustine somewhere in the *Confessions*, "And I became a problem to myself!" But we must add one dimension more from among these cognitive complexities contributing to the identity crisis. M. Piaget's indication that formal operational thought brings the capacity to compose a personal past and to anticipate a personal future is an important note. Now one's sense of self—one's felt identity—must try to fit together images of a personal past and its continuities with the images of a personal future and its possibilities.

To grasp the full range of challenges the adolescent faces we must see these cognitive dimensions in the context of broader psychosexual and psychosocial changes. Even as the young person is involved in dealing with new capacities for self-awareness and for interpersonal relations, he or she is experiencing physiological transformations of a dramatic sort: changes in body size and musculature, deepening of voice timbre, the growth of body hair, the enlargement toward maturity of genitals and breasts, the onset of menstruation and the ejaculation of semen and sperm. One's body image is in flux and for a time the youth must incorporate almost daily new features in her or his physiology.

The evidences of new thought processes and reflectiveness as well as the more tangible evidences of physical change are not missed by the persons and institutions with which youth interact. New expectations, qualitatively different disciplines and a host of difficult decisions are the requirements with which societies greet the now more womanly or manly adolescent. In trying to meet and fulfill these requirements youth will call on the available and personally resonant ideological resources of their environments, particularly those that are embodied in charismatic and convincing leaders. They will seek sponsoring groups and figures and will appoint otherwise well-meaning persons as temporary enemies over against whom their identities may be clarified. They may band together in tight cliques, overemphasizing some relatively trivial commonality as a symbol of shared identity. In this cliquishness they can be quite cruel as they exclude those who do not share this common element. In a more constructive mode of approach adolescents may enter a stage of "falling in love," which is by no means entirely, or even primarily, a sexual matter—except where the mores demand it. To a considerable extent adolescent love is an attempt to arrive at a definition of one's identity by projecting

one's diffuse ego image on another and by seeing it thus reflected and gradually clarified. This is why so much of young love is conversation.

I call this developmental crisis of adolescence the struggle for *identity vs. role confusion*. By identity I mean an accrued awareness of oneself that maintains continuity with one's past meanings to others and to oneself and that integrates the images of oneself given by significant others with one's own inner feelings of who one is and of what one can do, all in such a way as to enable one to anticipate the future without undue anxiety about "losing" oneself. Identity, thought of in this way, is by no means a fully conscious matter. But when it is present it gives rise to a feeling of inner firmness or of "being together" as a self. It communicates to others a sense of personal unity or integration.[33]

The danger of this stage is role confusion. This can be exacerbated by strong previous doubt about one's sexual identity or about one's place or value in the primary relationships of the family. It can also be heightened by anxieties about the impossibility of finding adult roles in work or love or social-political status that can sustain present and future identity.

Where social conditions and favorable personal relationships support young persons in building a firm enough sense of identity to feel ready to *commit* themselves—in friendship, to future work roles or in loyalty to religious or other ideological visions and communities—we may expect the emergence in them of the ego strength or virtue we call *fidelity*.[34]

13. Structural-Developmental Theories and Faith

My purpose now is to indicate some of the ways the structural developmentalists Piaget and Kohlberg have contributed decisively to our research and theory in the study of faith development. I shall also point out some of the limitations of their approaches for our project and say some things about how we are trying to correct or go beyond these limits.

Among the most important contributions of the Piaget-Kohlberg school to our project is its broadly *epistemological focus.* Epistemology has to do with the study of *how* we know. A strong theme in the theological writings on faith of H. Richard Niebuhr and Paul Tillich has to do with faith as a way of *seeing* the world. Faith for them *is* a kind of knowing, a constructing of the world in light of certain disclosures of the character of reality as a whole that are taken as decisive. Different faiths are alternate modes of being in the world that arise out of contrasting ways of composing the ultimate conditions of existence. Ways of *being* and ways of *seeing* are reciprocal. As Niebuhr puts it in *The Responsible Self,* we shape our actions and responses in life in accordance with our interpretations of the larger patterns of actions that impinge upon us. Communities of faith are communities of shared interpretations. The previous section's discussion of the triadic dynamics of faith should have made clear how crucial a part knowing, as the construction of self, others, world and ultimate environment, plays in faith as we study it. The broad epistemological emphasis in the structural-developmental theories serves us well as a model for understanding faith as a way of knowing and interpreting. To make it serve adequately, however, we have to widen the scope of knowing involved and account for the interrelatedness of several different modes of knowing in faith. Of this widened view of knowing I say more in a moment.

A second major gift to faith development research from the structural-developmental tradition lies in its focus on the structuring of knowing as it gives form to the contents of knowledge. The structural approach suggested a way of focusing on some features of faith that may be universal despite the great variety of particular symbolic, thematic and imaginal contents. I readily grant that my appropriation of the structural approach in the study of faith has added to the difficulty of distinguishing between "structure" and "content." It has also required that we try to incorporate the structuring of affective, valuational and imaginal modes of knowing that Piaget and Kohlberg have sought to avoid. These difficulties notwithstanding, the structural approach has enabled us to find and describe structural features of faith that make comparisons possible across a wide range of "content" differences. No less important, the structural focus has made it possible for us to systematically compare and contrast differing styles or stages of faith among persons who stand in the same faith community or content-tradition.

In the fictional dialogue of Part II, I shared some of the richness of a third significant contribution that the structural-developmental theories make to faith development research. This contribution has to do with their rigorous concept of structural stages and with the actual descriptions of cognitive and moral reasoning stages as they have worked them out. Stages of faith deal with different domains of knowing than either the cognitive stages of Piaget or the moral stages of Kohlberg. Faith stages arise out of integration of modes of knowing and valuing that Piagetian and Kohlbergian stage theories have intended to avoid. Faith stages are not identical with and cannot be reduced either to cognitive or moral stages or to some mixture of the two. Nonetheless, in any holistic approach to the human construction of meaning, account must be given of the relations of reasoning to imagination, of moral judgment making to symbolic representation, of ecstatic intuition to logical deduction. I do not at all mean to imply that we have found adequate ways to model these relationships. But we have found it important to show the correlations we find between Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages (and those of Robert Selman on social perspective taking) with the forms of knowing and valuing that make up a faith stage. Moreover, we believe that the faith stages meet the structural-developmental criteria for stages. They provide generalizable, formal descriptions of integrated sets of operations of knowing and valuing. These stagelike positions are related in a sequence we believe to be invariant. Each new stage

integrates and carries forward the operations of all the previous stages. (Piaget and Kohlberg describe this cumulative integration as "hierarchi- cal." For reasons I will make clear later, I propose a different, spiraling model.) I do not feel warranted in making claims of "universality" for our stages, beyond the contention that the formal descriptions of them are generalizable and can be tested cross-culturally.

A fourth contribution of the structural developmentalists to the con- ception of our work needs to be acknowledged. Piaget, Kohlberg and their followers have resolutely approached the study of development as an *interactional* process. Behaviorist theories in psychology, such as those of B. F. Skinner, tend to see persons as passive and malleable, their patterns of action largely determined by influences from their environ- ments.[10] Maturationist theories, on the other hand, view growth or development as primarily the unfolding of innately programmed organ- ismic capacities. (Arnold Gesell and R. J. Havighurst represent this position.) The latter deemphasize the significance of environmental factors except as supports or hindrances to an essentially self-guiding process. The structural-developmental interactional approach calls us to view development as resulting from the interchange between an active, innovative subject and a dynamic, changing environment. To be sure, the adaptive capacities of subjects are not unlimited. We have a genetic potential for a given range of structuring possibilities, and these—as we saw in our conversations with Piaget and Kohlberg—are intrinsically related to maturation. Nonetheless, adaptation is invention; it is the activation and creative employment of our genetically potentiated struc- turing (knowing and acting) capacities. Similarly, environments have "structure" too. As the tree decisively interrupted Ruller's mythic con- struction of the turkey chase, so the environment "pushes back" against our structuring activities with pattern and reality of its own. As our discussion of the triadic dynamics of faith sought to show, faith is an interactional process.

Further, for Piaget and Kohlberg structural development occurs when, in the interaction of subject and environment, the subject must construct new modes of knowing and acting in order to meet new challenges of the environment. Development results from efforts to restore balance between subject and environment when some factor of maturation or of environmental change has disturbed a previous equilib- rium. Growth and development in faith also result from life crises, challenges and the kinds of disruptions that theologians call revelation.

Each of these brings disequilibrium and requires changes in our ways of seeing and being in faith.

A final important influence from the structural developmentalists on our research has to do with the *normative* directions and implications of their work. Without sacrificing commitment to empirical rigor in the testing of their claims, Piaget and Kohlberg have offered what we may call philosophical psychologies. By this I mean that they have not shrunk back from the implication that more developed structural stages of knowing are, in important ways, more comprehensive and adequate than the less developed ones; that the more developed stages make possible a knowing that in some senses is "more true" than that of less developed stages. Instinctively many of us reared in a pluralistic, democratic ethos and saturated with an implicit values relativism feel offended by claims like these. In the domain of faith the assertion that more developed stages are in significant ways more adequate than less developed ones has to be made with even greater cautions and qualifications than in the cognitive or moral reasoning spheres. Yet we cannot (and will not) avoid making and trying to corroborate that claim.

The research on faith development owes a great debt of gratitude to Piaget, Kohlberg and many of their associates. We shall continue to acknowledge and build on that indebtedness. But the structural-develop- mental perspective, as they have shaped it, also has some serious limita- tions that must be faced and dealt with in the effort to treat faith in structural-developmental terms. The first such difficulty arises out of the way Piaget, and Kohlberg following him, have conceptually separated cognition or knowing from emotion or affection. In the context of intellectual development it makes sense to focus inquiry on the emer- gence of logical operations and to bracket any serious attention to emotional development. Piaget quite freely acknowledges the impor- tance of feeling and the affections in everyday life and as a part of the life of the mind. Only cognitive operations, however, exhibit logico- mathematical structures. The development of rational maturity means precisely that capacity for "objectivity" that makes matters of emotion or affective, subjective bias immaterial. While we may want to question the adequacy of Piaget's cognitive theory even for dealing with accounts of the actual processes of scientific discovery and insight,[11] it is quite defensible to separate cognitive and affective structures as he does and to devote one's prime attention to the evolution of logical structures.

This theoretical separation of cognition and affection is less defensible

in the study of the development of moral judgment making. At least this is the case if one continues to work with as narrow a notion of cognition as does Piaget. In fact, what we find in both Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories are accounts that begin (in the earliest stages) with a much broader and undifferentiated attention to cognitive processes. Successive stages in their theories represent steps in the differentiation of strictly logical forms of knowing from other important, if different, modalities of knowing. Successive stages represent qualitative movements in the "purification" of reason. Because he studies the evolution of the logical operations that make scientific inquiry possible, Piaget can differentiate logical structures from other ways of knowing less ambiguously than can Kohlberg. In moral judgments the valuations of actions and their consequences as well as evaluations of self in relation to the expectations of the self and others are difficult to conceive, even in formal and structural terms, apart from inherent affective or emotive elements in knowing. My contention is that Kohlberg's theory already begins a fruitful (if largely unacknowledged) expansion of the notion of cognition in a way that we must further broaden (and deepen) in a structural-developmental approach to faith. In this broadening and deepening we must not lose sight of the role of reason, in the more limited sense in which Piaget describes it, as part of the more comprehensive knowing that is faith.

I have found it useful, in this regard, to make a distinction between two kinds of reasoning, one that describes the relatively narrow understanding of cognition with which Piaget works and another that characterizes the necessary combination of rationality and passionality that faith involves. The first I call the *logic of rational certainty*. This mode of knowing aims at objectivity understood as a knowing free from all particular or subjective investigation. Its truths need to be impersonal, propositional, demonstrable and replicable. The logic of rational certainty, however, is a misleading ideal when we speak about forms of knowing in which the constitution of the knowing self is part of what is at stake. The model of disinterestedness represented by scientific inquiry does not fit with the kind of knowing involved in moral reasoning or in faith's compositions. This is not to say that there is not a form of disinterestedness or "objectivity" in moral and faith knowing. It is to say this latter mode of knowing proceeds in a manner in which the knowing self is continually being confirmed or modified in the knowing. For this latter, more comprehensive form of knowing I have chosen the term the *logic of conviction*. Let me quote myself on this point:

> *In both faith-knowing and the kind of moral-knowing which gives rise to choice and action, the constitution or modification of the self is always an issue.* In these kinds of constitutive-knowing not only is the "known" being constructed, but there is also a simultaneous extension, modification, or reconstitution of *the knower in relation to the known.* To introduce this freedom, risk, passion, and subjectivity into the Piaget-Kohlberg paradigm (as we must in faith development) requires that we examine the relationship of what we may call a *logic of rational certainty* (Piaget's major concern) to what we may call a *logic of conviction.* (I use the term "logic" here in a metaphorical sense, designating two major kinds of structuring activity which interact in the constitutive knowing that is faith.) This relationship between the two "logics" is not one of choice between alternatives. A logic of conviction does not negate a logic of rational certainty. But the former, being more inclusive, does contextualize, qualify, and anchor the latter. Recognition of a more comprehensive "logic of conviction" does lead us to see that the logic of rational certainty is part of a larger epistemological structuring activity, and is not to be confused with the whole.[12]

In widening our understanding of knowing so as to include the logic of conviction, we must not capitulate to critics who see this as representing an anti-rational or irrational understanding of faith.[13] Rather we need to see "reasoning in faith" as a balanced interaction between the more limited and specialized and the more comprehensive and holistic logics we have described.

We encounter a second set of limitations of Piaget's and Kohlberg's approaches as we build on them to understand faith. This has to do with their very restrictive understanding of the role of imagination in knowing, their neglect of symbolic processes generally and the related lack of attention to unconscious structuring processes other than those constituting reasoning. Piaget mainly understands imagination as a function of childhood fantasy. Imagination is the mode of playful fantasy in which the child assimilates the world into his or her schemes without attention to "reality." On the other hand, intuitive thought, for Piaget, is reality oriented. It is the precursor of logical operations in preoperational children, and it is *accommodatory* in the sense that in intuition the child attempts to shape his or her representations of the world in accordance with reality. It is intuition that goes to school in Piaget, not imagination. As the intuition shapes up into (and is superseded by) the reversible operations of concrete thought, the distorting temptations of imagination and fantasy are more strictly relegated to the play world. With the emergence of formal operational thought and its transcen-

dence of the limitations of concrete experience, Piaget recognizes the return of a form of imagination, though now closely disciplined by the logical structures and combinatorial processes of formal operations. Piaget makes enticing comments about adolescents' capacities for ideological constructions, their interest in holistic visions of ideal societies and the like. But those capacities he links to the realm of "faith" and, following Kant, sees that kind of imaginative construction as having little to do with knowledge, properly speaking. For Piaget, we might say, such ideological visions are a form of serious adult "play." The structures of formal operational logic do make possible the development of propositions and theories. These only lead to knowledge, however, when focused on phenomena capable of being empirically investigated, proving or disproving one's theoretical claims.[14]

I do not fault Piaget for denying that ideological constructions are knowledge in his strict sense of the term. Our challenge, however, since faith in some form is necessary and inevitable for human beings, is to describe what kind of knowing faith is and to characterize the operations that constitute it.

> This latter domain—the domain of faith and of the logic of conviction—involves recognizing the role played in faith of the modes of knowing we call ecstatic and imaginative. As is becoming generally recognized, the mind employs the more aesthetically oriented right hemisphere of the brain in these kinds of knowing. To my knowledge none of the Piagetian cognitive-constructivists . . . have given any significant attention to the bihemispheric, bimodal forms of thought involved in the constitutive-knowing that is faith. To move in this direction requires coming to terms with modes of thought that employ images, symbols, and synesthesial fusions of sense and feeling. It means taking account of so-called regressive movements in which the psyche returns to preconceptual, prelinguistic modes and memories, and to primitive sources of energizing energy, bringing them into consciousness with resultant reconstruals of the experience world. To deal adequately with faith and with faith's dynamic role in the total self-constitutive activity of ego means trying to give theoretical attention to the transformation in consciousness—rapid and dramatic in sudden conversion, more gradual and incremental in faith growth—which results from the re-cognition of self-others-world in light of knowing the self as constituted by a center of value powerful enough to require or enable recentering one's ultimate environment.[15]

In a subsequent section these matters will occupy us in some fascinating ways. For now my primary point is to underscore how we must

necessarily expand the concept of cognition or knowing in order to comprehend faith's imaginal and generative knowing. As Fr. William Lynch writes: "By what and for what shall we be judged more than by and for our images?"[16] We are trying to grasp the inner dialectic of rational logic in the dynamics of a larger, more comprehensive logic of convictional orientation.

Finally, it is no critical remark to point out that neither Piaget nor Kohlberg has offered a theory of the epistemological or moral self. Kohlberg and Selman's elaboration of the development of social perspective taking moves a considerable step in this direction with its clarification of the cognitive bases of self-reflection. Kohlberg took another step toward incorporating a perspective on the developing self in his consideration of the necessity of experiences of leaving home and of the assumption of moral responsibility for others for the development of postconventional moral reasoning.[17] Faith development requires that we push further in this direction. A structural-developmental theory of faith must be a theory of personal knowing and acting. This means neither an individualistic theory, nor one that gives up the commitment to generalizability. Rather, it means a commitment to take seriously that our previous decisions and actions shape our character, as do the stories and images by which we live. It means a commitment to take seriously the fact that we are formed in social communities and that our ways of seeing the world are profoundly shaped by the shared images and constructions of our group or class.[18] It means, further, a commitment to relate structural stages of faith to the predictable crises and challenges of developmental eras and to take life histories seriously in its study.

This last point leads well into a brief consideration of the ways we have drawn on that other major school of developmental psychology, the psychosocial theorists. Erikson is the primary figure for us here, although in recent years we have attended with interest to psychosocial theories of adult development offered by Levinson, Vaillant, Gould and others, and as popularized by Gail Sheehy.[19]

14. Psychosocial Development and Faith

As we showed in our presentation of Erikson in Part II, his theory undertakes the coordination of a dizzying range of factors. In the study of ego development he has tried to relate biological maturation with changes in social role and to coordinate both with an account of persons' conscious and unconscious psychic modes of adaptation. Erikson is frequently criticized for the breadth and inclusiveness—and the resulting lack of precision—of his constructions and interpretations. Efforts to design empirical tests of the claims of his theory have yielded very mixed results.[20] Nonetheless, the central lines of his account of the growth and crises of the healthy personality have much to commend them. They were formed out of the testing and refinement in clinical experience of Freud's pioneering work. They were tested and corrected for bias in the context of several kinds of cross-cultural studies. Moreover, their use and widespread intuitive acceptance by a large and thoughtful audience represents another important, if unscientific, kind of validation.

From the beginning Erikson's account of stages or eras and the emergent crises which typify them has served as an important framework for our studies. Initially I was inclined to hypothesize stages of faith that largely paralleled Erikson's eras. After encountering the structural-developmental theories, however, and after coming to terms with their more rigorous understanding of structural stages, I began to change the focus of my effort to find stages of faith. I and my associates began to rely on Erikson's theory more as a background against which to hear and analyze the life stories that persons shared with us. We began to realize that a time of movement from one of Erikson's eras to another frequently correlated with or helped to precipitate a

change in the structural operations of faith. *But not always.* More recently we have come to see that a person's structural stage of faith (correlated with other structural aspects) has important implications for the way the person will construct the experience of crisis that inaugurates a new Eriksonian developmental era. Research by Richard Shulik, for example, has shown that elderly persons best described by faith Stage 3* construct their experience of the process of aging in qualitatively different ways than do those best described by faith Stages 4 or 5.[21]

Any effort to synthesize the perspectives of structural-developmental and psychosocial theories must come to terms with what Shulik's findings help us to see: in terms of the structural stages, normal persons can reach a longlasting or even a lifetime equilibration at any Stage from 2 on. This fact affects the *way* they experience and deal with the psychosocial crises Erikson has identified, but it in no way means that they will avoid or bypass them. Research is likely to show that a person of twenty-two, whose moral and faith structuring is best described by Stage 2, will indeed encounter the physical, social and emotional issues of the crisis of intimacy. But he or she will "construct" and experience them without benefit of a capacity for mutual interpersonal perspective taking, without a self-reflective sense of identity and with a construction of the ultimate environment likely based on intuitions of cosmic reciprocity.** As will become clear in subsequent sections of the book, other twenty-two year olds, structurally operating at Stage 3 or 4, will construct, interpret and respond to the issues of the intimacy crisis in qualitatively different ways than one at Stage 2. In some respects, we might say, *it is not even the same crisis for persons at these three different stages.*

Perhaps a chart will help to visualize the interplay we see between structural and psychosocial stages (Table 3.1). The left-hand column lists structural-developmental stages. Across the bottom are the psychosocial stages of Erikson. The solid segments of the horizontal bar lines indicate the kind of optimal correlations between structural equili-

*Faith stages will be distinguished from other stages in this manner.

**Cosmic reciprocity means the projection of a reciprocal sense of fairness—that is, goodness should be rewarded, badness punished; if I do my part you should do yours,—as the guiding image for grasping the character of the ultimate environment. It is a "pre-personal" way of constructing an image of God or reality. A Stage 2 atheist is one whose rejected God is of this sort.

Table 3.1 Interplay Between Structural and Psychosocial Stages

Structural Stages	Trust vs. Mistrust	Autonomy vs. Shame & Doubt	Initiative vs. Guilt	Industry vs. Inferiority	Identity vs. Role confusion	Intimacy vs. Isolation	Generativity vs. Stagnation	Integrity vs. Despair
6								
5								
4								
3								
2								
1								
0								
Average Ages	0–2	2–3	3–6	6–12	13–20	21– –	35– –	60– –

brations at each stage that would shape the person's experience of all the subsequent psychosocial crises.

In sum, Erikson's eras and crises provide a helpful guide to what Sheehy calls "predictable crises" of the life cycle. From our standpoint, those crises of trust, autonomy, initiative, and so forth, which are reasonably correlated with maturation and age, represent life challenges with which all persons must deal. As a part of their coping, in their adaptation, faith forms, functions and is changed. If Piaget and Kohlberg have given us impetus to study the structuring activity of faith, Erikson has helped us in many ways to focus on the *functional* aspect of faith, the expected existential issues with which it must help people cope at whatever structural stage across the life cycle.

Almost as fundamental for our work as Erikson's theory of the developmental eras and their virtues has been his own understanding of and attention to faith. His account of the crisis of the first stage, basic trust vs. mistrust, avowedly deals with the foundations of faith in human life. Erikson carefully avoids any heavy-handed determinism of the sort that would suggest that everything decisive for faith occurs in the first twelve or the first sixty months of life. But he does make plain how powerful a factor the quality of the child's first mutuality with the conditions of his or her existence and with those who mediate the ultimate environment is for all that comes thereafter in identity and faith. In a remarkably suggestive subtheme of his book *Young Man Luther*, Erikson, carefully avoiding the reductionism that marks the work of Freud and many Freudians on these matters, suggests some of the universal features of religious images of God that have their infantile origins in the child's experiences with his or her parents.[22] His attention to *fidelity* as the virtue emerging in adolescence and the accompanying attention to ideology as the young person's necessary concern for finding a comprehensive "world image" provide access to other central aspects of faith. The study of identity crisis and resolution, through the reshaping of images of faith by young Luther, opens ways to understanding the interplay of faith and culture as well as many other rich issues. Erikson's representation of ethical development in terms of widened care and more inclusive identity contributes an important set of criteria for growth in faith as well as in moral action. Avoiding the trap of identifying faith with religion or belief, Erikson suggests something of his overall orientation toward faith with this statement:

Each society and each age must find the institutionalized form of reverence which derives vitality from its world image. . . . The clinician can only observe that many are proud to be without religion whose children cannot afford their being without it. One the other hand, there are many who seem to derive a vital faith from social action or scientific pursuit. And again, there are many who profess faith, yet in practice breathe mistrust both of life and man.[23]

I have found it easier to put on paper the influence of Piaget and Kohlberg on our work than I have that of Erikson. I believe this is because Erikson's influence on me has been both more pervasive and more subtle; it has touched me at convictional depths that the structural developmentalists have not addressed. As unsystematic and unsatisfactory as it may seem, I simply have to say that Erikson's work has become part of the interpretative mind-set I bring to research on faith development. The explicit references in these pages to aspects of that influence are, I'm afraid, really only suggestive clues to a much greater—and more grateful—indebtedness.

In the late stages of completing this book I had my first opportunity to meet and work with Daniel Levinson. I had read and taught Levin- *The Seasons of a Man's Life.*[24] In my son's thought as expressed in reading and teaching, however, I had focused more on Levinson's "periods" and "transitions" in adult development than on the broader framework of "eras" he has proposed. As I heard him speak and then when I conversed with him privately, two new understandings struck me forcefully. First, I began to see that for Levinson, time—chrono- logical time by which we measure aging—has ontological significance. Being and time are profoundly linked in our experiences of self and others and in our ways of responding to our world. Second, I recog- nized that while the *periods* Levinson has identified may be variable and susceptible of differing rates and intensities of transition, the im- pact on one's way of being in the world resulting from the transition from one *era* of life to another is inevitable, unvariable and necessarily profound.

Levinson has come to view the life cycle as divided into eras of roughly twenty years duration.

Infancy, childhood and adolescence constitute the life cycle's first broad era. Revolutions in both physical and psychic life are more fre- quent in this first era than in later ones, due to the rapidity of bodily maturation and of cognitive and emotional development. The years

Table 3.2 Levinson's Eras of the Life Cycle



From *Seasons of a Man's Life* by Daniel J. Levinson and others © 1978 by Daniel J. Levinson. Reprinted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

from seventeen to twenty-two, in Levinson's view, represent both the culmination of the first era and the inauguration of the next, the first adult era. In these years a person must complete the tasks of forming a personality, of acquiring basic abilities to think and learn, of shaping values and beliefs and of preparing for separation from the matrix of home and family that has nurtured and sustained growth in the first era.

Overlapping with this work of culminating the first era, the young girl-woman or boy-man must begin the tasks of creating a life structure for the next developmental era, the first adult era. Issues of choice must be faced: the focus of study or apprenticeship, the patterns of intimacy and partners in it, the shaping of a personal and vocational "dream." The young adult takes on the tasks of building a first adult life structure that, with necessary modifications and changes, will carry him or her to mid-life.

The years from forty to forty-five Levinson sees as another major era transition. Here again the tasks of one era need to be brought to culmination and completion, even as the person begins to undertake the construction of a life structure for the second adult era, "middle adulthood." Assessments of the last era's "dream," of its patterns of commitment in work and love, and of its dominant images of self, world and reality demand attention. One's sense of time and timing

begins to change. Goals, priorities, relationships, and roles must be examined and may need to be changed. To a degree that surprised me, Levinson stressed how the early phases of the middle adult era parallel the uncertainties and stress of the twenties. We are, he points out, novices at middle adulthood, having to reshape significantly our ways of being.

The years from sixty to sixty-five, Levinson believes, bring another era shift. They represent the culmination of middle adulthood and the beginning of a third adult era, late adulthood.

I offer this overview of Levinson's account of the principal eras and transitions in the life cycle because I am coming to believe that they hold important clues for understanding the natural relation of transitions in psychosocial development to structural stage change in faith development. The results of our research so far suggest the *optimal* parallels shown in Table 3.3

A reflective examination of these parallels suggests that during the rapid revolutions in cognitive, psychosocial and physical growth that occur during the years from birth to twenty-two (Levinson's first era), we recognize four different structural stages of faith. As we shall see, not all children make these faith stage transitions, just as not all children attain the cognitive structures of formal operational thought. Ordinarily, however, Synthetic-Conventional faith does take form during adolescence and represents the culminating form of faith for the first era of the life cycle.

The period from seventeen to twenty-two, the time Levinson sees as marking the transition to the early adult era, corresponds with what appears to be the optimal time for beginning a transition from a Synthetic-Conventional toward an Individuative-Reflective stage of faith. As our subsequent discussion of these stages will show, many young adults, for a variety of reasons, do *not* enter upon a faith stage transition at this point. This group moves into the creation of a first adult life structure guided by their Synthetic-Conventional faiths. As they encounter the various predictable and unpredictable crises of their twenties and thirties some of them will make belated and usually more difficult transitions in faith stage. Some never do. Only with extended longitudinal studies will we gain reliable knowledge on these matters. Our preliminary research suggests, however, that if the transition from Synthetic-Conventional to Individuative-Reflective faith does not occur before or during the mid-life transition, its chances of occurring at all decrease markedly.

Table 3.3 Psychosocial and Faith Stages: Optimal Parallels

Levinson's Eras and Erikson's Psychosocial Stages:	*Fowler's Faith Stages*
Era of Infancy, Childhood and Adolescence	
Trust vs. Mistrust	Undifferentiated Faith (Infancy)
Autonomy vs. Shame & Doubt; Initiative vs. Guilt	1. Intuitive-Projective Faith (Early Childhood)
Industry vs. Inferiority	2. Mythic-Literal Faith (School Years)
Identity vs. Role Confusion	3. Synthetic-Conventional Faith (Adolescence)
First Adult Era	
Intimacy vs. Isolation	4. Individuative-Reflective Faith (Young Adulthood)
Middle Adult Era	
Generativity vs. Stagnation	5. Conjunctive Faith (Mid-life and Beyond)
Late Adult Era	
Integrity vs. Despair	6. Universalizing Faith

So for some adults Synthetic-Conventional faith becomes a stable, equilibrated, lifelong structural style. For others it gives way, in the early adult era, to an Individuative-Reflective style. The structuring of this latter stage is ideally suited to the tasks and challenges of the first adult era. Again, we find that for a fair number of adults this stage, formed in the twenties or thirties, becomes a permanently equilibrated style of orientation. Although it may suffer buffeting in the middle adult transition, it can persist and sustain persons through the middle adult years. Our knowledge of this is based more on observations and speculation than on longitudinal research. My hypothesis, however, is that the work of the mid-life transition is better done if it includes or corresponds to a transition in faith stages as well.

It appears that at each of the major era transitions the shaping of the new era's life structure is enhanced if we engage in those tasks bringing new and enriched ways of being in faith. Put negatively, to approach a new era in the adult life cycle while clinging too tightly to the structural style of faith employed during the culminating phase of the previous era is to risk anachronism. It means attacking a new agenda of life tasks and a potential new richness in the understanding of life with the limiting pattern of knowing, valuing and interpreting experiences that served the previous era. Such anachronism virtually assures that one will settle for a narrower and shallower faith than one needs.

This preliminary look at optimal relations between psychosocial development and structural-developmental stages of faith may help clarify in what sense faith stages may be said to be normative. The faith stages soon to be discussed are not to be understood as an achievement scale by which to evaluate the worth of persons. Nor do they represent educational or therapeutic goals toward which to hurry people. Seeing their optimal correlations with psychosocial eras gives a sense of how time, experience, challenge and nurture are required for growth in faith. Education and nurture should aim at the full realization of the potential strength of faith at each stage and at keeping the reworking of faith that comes with stage changes current with the parallel transitional work in psychosocial eras. Remedial or therapeutic nurture is called for when the anachronism of a lagging faith stage fails to keep pace with psychosocial growth. Less frequently, but just as important, sometimes precocious faith development outstrips or gets ahead of psychosocial growth. In this situation help may be needed in overcoming or reworking crippled psychosocial functioning.

NOTES

1. For such a position see Gerhard Ebeling, *The Nature of Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967).
2. See Jane Loevinger, *Ego Development* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1976).
3. In this position I am indebted—as in many places—to H. Richard Niebuhr. See especially his *The Meaning of Revelation* (New York: Macmillan, 1941) and *The Responsible Self* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
4. Flannery O'Connor, "The Turkey," in *The Complete Stories* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1979), pp. 42–53.
5. Ibid., p. 46.
6. Ibid., p. 48, parenthesis added.
7. Ibid., p. 49.
8. Ibid., p. 53.
9. See William F. Lynch, S.J., *Images of Faith* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973).
10. For a comparison of behaviorist, maturationist and structural-developmental approaches in the study of moral development see L. Kohlberg and R. Mayer, "Development as the Aim of Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 42, no. 4 (Nov., 1972).
11. For a powerful critique of the postivistic philosophies of science to which Piaget is responding and by which his epistemological focus is largely determined, see Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
12. James Fowler, "Faith and the Structuring of Meaning" in *Toward Moral and Religious Maturity* (Morristown, N.J.: Silver Burdett, 1980), pp. 61–62.
13. See Ernest Wallwork, "Morality, Religion and Kohlberg's Theory" in Brenda Munsey, ed., *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg* (Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1980), pp. 269–297.
14. Jean Piaget, *Insights and Illusions of Philosophy*, trans. Wolfe Mays (New York: World, Meridian Books, 1971).
15. Fowler, "Faith and the Structuring of Meaning," p. 63.
16. William F. Lynch, S.J., *Images of Faith* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 19.
17. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Reasoning Revisited" in Paul B. Baltes and K. Warner Schaie, eds., *Life-Span Developmental Psychology* (New York: Academic Press, 1973), pp. 179–204.
18. See Stanley Hauerwas, "Character, Narrative and Growth in the Christian Life" in *Toward Moral and Religious Maturity* (Morristown, N.J.: Silver Burdett, 1980), pp. 441–484.
19. Daniel Levinson et al., *The Seasons of a Man's Life* (New York: Knopf, 1978); George E. Vaillant, *Adaptation to Life* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Roger L. Gould, *Transformations: Growth and Change in Adult Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); Gail Sheehy, *Passages: Predictable Crises of Adult Life* (New York: Dutton, 1976).