

THE POLITICS OF BELONGING

INTERSECTIONAL CONTESTATIONS
NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS



would result in a full under-
 y particular social category in
 also reductionist.

The boundaries of intersectional analysis and intersectional categories

Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989: 139) define intersectionality as 'the multidimensionality of marginalized subjects' lived experiences'. Other black feminists (e.g. Dill, 1983; Bryan et al., 1985) also remain within the triad boundaries of race, class and gender. Philomena Essed (1991) even limits this to the two dimensions of 'gendered racisms' and 'racist genderisms'. Others have added the specific categories they were interested in, such as age (e.g. Bradley, 1996); disability (e.g. Oliver, 1995; Meekosha & Dowse, 1997); sedentarism (e.g. Lentin, 1999); or sexuality (e.g. Kitzinger, 1987). In other works, however, feminists attempted to develop complete lists and included in them much higher numbers – for example, Helma Lutz (2002) relates this to 14 categories while Charlotte Bunch (2001) has 16. Floya Anthias and I (1983, 1992; see also Yuval-Davis, 2006b; Yuval-Davis, 2011a) would strongly argue that intersectional analysis should not be limited only to those who are on the multiple margins of society, but rather that the boundaries of intersectional analysis should encompass all members of society and thus intersectionality should be seen as the right theoretical framework for analysing social stratification. There is a parallel here with the struggle that many of us witnessed during the 1970s and 1980s to point out (what these days seems much more obvious), that everybody, not just racialized minorities, have 'ethnicities' and that members, especially men in hegemonic majorities, are not just 'human beings' but are also gendered, classed, ethnocized, etc.

In *Gender Trouble* (1990), Judith Butler mocks the 'etc.' which often appears at the end of long (and different) lists of the social divisions mentioned by feminists, and sees it as an embarrassed admission of a 'sign of exhaustion as well as of the illimitable process of signification itself' (1990: 143). As Fraser (1995) and Knapp (1999) make clear, however, such a critique is valid only within the discourse of identity politics where there is a correspondence between social positionings or locations and identifications with particular social groupings. When no such conflation takes place, Knapp rightly finds that Butler's talk

'of an illimitable process of signification' can be reductionist if it is generalized in an unspecified way ... [and] runs the risk of levelling historically constituted 'factual' differences and thereby suppressing 'differences' on its own terms. (Knapp, 1999: 130)

Knapp's critique of Butler once again clarifies the crucial importance of the separation of the different analytical dimensions in which social divisions need to be examined as discussed above. Nevertheless, the question remains of whether there are, or are not, in any particular historical condition, specific and limited numbers of social divisions that will construct the grid of power relations within which the different members of the society are located.

As I mentioned elsewhere (Yuval-Davis, 2006b), I have two different answers to this question which are not mutually exclusive. The first one is that while in specific historical situations and in relation to the daily lives of specific people there are some social divisions which are more important than others in constructing their specific positionings relative to others around them, there are some social divisions, such as gender, stage in the life cycle, ethnicity and class which will tend to shape most people's lives in most social locations, while other social divisions such as those relating to disability, membership in particular castes or status as indigenous or refugee people will tend to affect less people globally in this way. At the same time, for those people who are affected by these and other social divisions not mentioned here in particular historical contexts, such social divisions are crucial and thus rendering them visible needs to be fought for. This is a case where recognition – of the social power axes, not of social identities – is of vital political importance.

My second answer relates to what Castoriadis called the 'creative imagination' (1987; see also Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002) that underlies any linguistic and other social categories of signification. Although certain social conditions may facilitate this, the construction of categories of signification is, in the last instance, a product of human creative freedom and autonomy. Without specific social agents who will construct and point to certain analytical and political features, the rest of us would not be able to distinguish between them. Rainbows include the whole spectrum of different colours, but how many of these colours ^{what} we distinguish will depend on our specific social and linguistic milieu. It is for this reason that struggles for recognition will always also include an element of construction and it is for this

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reason that studying the relationships between positionings, identities and political values which, as can be seen below, I view as central to the study of belonging, is so important (and impossible if these are all reduced to the same ontological level). So what are belonging and the politics of belonging?

Belonging and the politics of belonging

It is important to differentiate between belonging and the politics of belonging. Belonging is about an emotional (or even ontological) attachment, about feeling 'at home'. As Hage (1997: 103) points out, however, 'home is an on-going project entailing a sense of hope for the future' (see also Taylor, 2009). Part of this feeling of hope relates to home as a 'safe' space (Ignatieff, 2001). In the daily reality of the early twenty-first century, in so many places on the globe, this emphasis on safety acquires a new poignancy. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that feeling 'at home' does not necessarily only generate positive and warm feelings. It also allows the safety as well as the emotional engagement to be, at times, angry, resentful, ashamed, indignant (Hessel, 2010).

Belonging tends to be naturalized and to be part of everyday practices (Fenster, 2004a and b). It becomes articulated, formally structured and politicized only when it is threatened in some way. The politics of belonging comprise specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies which are themselves being constructed in these projects in very specific ways and in very specific boundaries (i.e. whether or not, according to specific political projects of belonging, Jews can be considered to be German, for example, or abortion advocates can be considered Catholic). As Antonsich (2010) points out, however, these boundaries are often spatial and relate to a specific locality/territoriality and not just to constructions of social collectivities. Of course, according to Doreen Massey (2005), space in itself is but an embodiment of social networks. However, as Carrillo Rowe (2005: 21) points out: 'belongings are conditioned by our bodies and where they are placed on the globe'. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, diasporic and transnational belongings, especially those which use the virtual realities of the internet can, at least partially, transcend these limits

of physical geography. Also bell hooks (1990) talks about 'home-space' as something which transcends the domestic. As Ulf Hannerz (2002) claims, home is essentially a contrastive concept, linked to some notion of what it means to be away from home. It can involve a sense of rootedness in a socio-geographic site or be constructed as an intensely imagined affiliation with a distant locale where self-realization can occur.

Belonging and the politics of belonging have been some of the major themes around which both classic psychology and sociology emerged. Countless psychological, and even more psychoanalytical, works have been dedicated to writings about the fears of separation of babies and children from the womb, from the mother, from the familiar, as well as the devastating – often pathological – effects on them when they cannot take belonging for granted (for more elaborate accounts of this, see, for example, Rank, 1973 [1929]; Bowlby, 1969, 1973). Similarly, much of social psychology literature has been dedicated to people's need to conform to the groups they belong to for fear of exclusion and inferiorization and the ways people's interpersonal relationships are deeply affected by their membership or lack of membership of particular groups – as well as their positions in these groups (e.g. Lewin, 1948; Billig, 1976; Tajfel, 1982).

In sociological theory as well, since its establishment, many writings have been focused on the differential ways people belong to collectivities and states – as well as the social, economic, and political effects of instances of displacement of such belonging/s as a result of industrialization and/or migration. Some basic classical examples are Tonnies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (1940 [1935]), Durkheim's division of mechanical and organic solidarity (1893) or Marx's notion of alienation (1975 [1844]). Anthony Giddens (1991) has argued that during modernity people's sense of belonging becomes reflexive and Manuel Castells (1996–98) has claimed that contemporary society has become the 'network society' in which effective belonging has moved away from civil societies of nations and states into reconstructed defensive identity communities.

This introduction – as well as the rest of the book – does not attempt to sum up this vast literature in any way. Instead, it attempts to differentiate between and identify some of the major building blocks that a comprehensive analytical framework for belonging and the politics of belonging would require. To do so, the chapter first explores the notion of 'belonging' and the different analytical facets in which it needs to be

studied, and then focuses on the politics of belonging and how these relate to the participatory politics of citizenship as well as entitlement and status. It then illustrates, using examples from Britain, some of the ways in which different political projects of belonging relate to the different analytical facets of belonging. While the rest of the book uses illustrative examples from all over the world, I thought that remaining within the boundaries of one state and society might better clarify how different political projects of belonging can construct the same collectivity in different ways and with different boundaries.

Belonging

People can 'belong' in many different ways and to many different objects of attachment. These can vary from a particular person to the whole of humanity, in a concrete or abstract way, by self or other identification, in a stable, contested or transient way. Even in its most stable 'primordial' forms, however, belonging is always a dynamic process, not a reified fixity – the latter is only a naturalized construction of a particular hegemonic form of power relations. Belonging is usually multi-layered and – to use geographical jargon – multi-scale (Antonsich, 2010) or multi-territorial (Hannerz, 2002).

To clarify our understanding of the notion of social and political belonging, it would be useful to differentiate between three major analytical facets in which belonging is constructed.³ The first facet concerns social locations; the second relates to people's identifications and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings; and the third relates to ethical and political value systems with which people judge their own and others' belonging. These different facets are interrelated, but cannot be reduced to each other.

Social locations

When it is said that people belong to a particular sex, race, class or nation, that they belong to a particular age group, kinship group or a certain profession, we are talking about people's social and economic

³As will become clearer further on in the chapter, these facets can be reconstructed and reconfigured in many different ways by different political projects of belonging.

locations, which at each historical moment would tend to carry with them particular weights in the grids of power relations operating in their society. Being a man or a woman, black or white, working class or middle class, a member of a European or an African nation, people are not just different categories of social location, with different contextual meanings, they also tend to have certain positionalities along axes of power that are higher or lower than other such categories. Such positionalities, however, would tend to be different in different historical contexts and are also often fluid and contested. Sometimes, however, as Sandra Harding (1991) and Nancy Fraser (in Fraser & Honneth, 1998) have commented, certain differences would not necessarily have differential power positionings but are only the markers for different locations. This, again, can only be related to specific differences in particular historical moments and contexts.

Social locations, however, even in their most stable format, are virtually never constructed along one power vector of difference, although official statistics – as well as identity politics – would often tend to construct them in this way. This is why the intersectional approach to social locations is so vitally important.

Marxists and other sociologists have traditionally tended to prioritize class, even when recognizing other axes of social location, while feminists have tended to prioritize gender and those who are focused on issues of race and ethnicity have tended to prioritize people's locations according to these categories. Indeed, in different historical moments, different systems of stratification tend to give differential weight to different intersectional categories of location and axes of power and they might operate in many different ways – hence the need for case studies using an intra-categorical research approach to complement more macro inter-categorical ones. Much depends on people's ability to move up those grids of power and the extent to which locations ascribed at birth can be transcended, either by moving from one category of location to another, such as becoming 'middle class' while being originally 'working class', or – even more dramatically – being trans-gendered or becoming assimilated into a different national, ethnic or even racial collectivity. Different locations along social and economic axes are often marked by different embodied signifiers, such as colour of skin, accent, clothing and mode of behaviour. However, these should not be collapsed and automatically equated with subjective identifications and social attachments.

2 Identifications and emotional attachments

Identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not) (Martin, 1995; see also Kaptani & Yuval-Davis, 2008b; Yuval-Davis, 2010). Not all of these stories are about belonging to particular groupings and collectivities – they can be, for instance, about individual attributes, body images, vocational aspirations or sexual prowess. However, even these stories will often relate, directly or indirectly, to self and/or others' perceptions of what being a member of such a grouping or collectivity (ethnic, racial, national, cultural, religious) might mean. Identity narratives can be individual or they can be collective, with the latter often acting as a resource for the former. Although they can be reproduced from generation to generation, it is always in a selective way: they can shift and change, be contested and multiple. These identity narratives can relate to the past, to a myth of origin; they can be aimed to explain the present and probably; above all, they function as a projection of future trajectory.

Margaret Wetherell (2006) argues that identity narratives provide people with a sense of 'personal order'. As will be discussed in greater detail elsewhere, I would argue that identities are not just personal – and in some way these are never just personal – and that collective identity narratives provide a collective sense of order and meaning. At the same time, as Cavarero emphasizes (1997: 3), 'narration reveals the meaning without committing the error of defining it'. This is particularly important because, as Hall (1996) argues, the production of identities is always 'in process', is never complete, contingent and multiplex. In this sense, 'order' should not be seen as the equivalent of 'coherence', but rather as pointing towards the sense of agency and continuity that encompasses changes, contestations, even raptures within the identity boundaries of the individual and/or collective subject. At Gayatri Spivak (1994) pointed out, in her seminal essay 'Can the subaltern speak?', a narrative of identity is a necessary condition for any notion of agency and subjectivity to exist.

Identity narratives can be verbal, but can also be constructed as specific forms of practices (Fortier, 2000). While MacIntyre (1981: 140) conceives identity practices as 'embodied narration in a single life', I would argue that such 'embodied narrations' are even more crucial in the construction and reproduction of collective identities. Narratives

of identities can be more or less stable in different social contexts, more or less coherent, more or less authorized and/or contested by the self and others, depending on specific situational factors, and can reflect routinized constructions of everyday life or those of significant moments of crisis and transformation. They include both cognitive and emotional dimensions with varying degrees of attachment:

individuals and groups are caught within wanting to belong, wanting to become, a process that is fuelled by yearning rather than positing of identity as a stable state. (Probyn, 1996: 19)

In her Deleuzian analysis, Probyn (1996; see also Fortier, 2000) constructs identity as transition, always producing itself through the combined processes of being and becoming, belonging and longing to belong.

Of course not every belonging is important to people in the same way and to the same extent, and emotions, as perceptions, shift in different times and situations and are more or less reflective. As a rule, the emotional components of people's constructions of themselves and their identities become more central the more threatened and less secure they become. In the more extreme cases people would be willing to sacrifice their lives – and the lives of others – in order for the narrative of their identities and the objects of their identifications and attachments to continue to exist. After a terrorist attack, or after a declaration of war, people will often seek to return to a place of less 'objective' safety, as long as it means they can be close to their nearest and dearest, and share their fate.

The narrative approach to the understanding of identities is considered in the literature (e.g. Williams, 2000; Lawler, 2008) to be just one specific approach to the theorization of identities. As I elaborate elsewhere, however (Yuval-Davis, 2010), the narrative approach encompasses, as well as being implied in, other major approaches to the study of identity, such as the performative and the dialogical, which are, at the same time, also very different from each other in their understanding of the identity question.

As Bell (1999) and Fortier (2000) comment, following Butler (1990), constructions of belonging have a performative dimension. Specific repetitive practices, relating to specific social and cultural spaces, which link individual and collective behaviour, are crucial for the construction and reproduction of identity narratives and

performativity

constructions of attachment. It is in this way, as Sara Ahmed (2004) points out, that free-floating emotions 'stick' to particular social objects. However, as Butler clarifies in her later work (1993; see also Lovell, 2003), in the performative approach to identity theorization, identity narratives can be constructed within, counter and outside pre-determined social discourses, through subversive performances, such as drags. What is hardly discussed in performative theorizations of identity, however, is from where and how – except for repetition and an assumption of social power and authority – these discourses themselves become constructed. This has been the focus of a very different theoretical approach of identity theorizations which follows on from Bakhtin's work (1981, 1984) as well as the Chicago School of Cooley (1912) and Mead (1934). It emphasizes another aspect of theatre practice, i.e. dialogue, as the constitutive element of identity construction. To use Bakhtin's words:

to be, means to be for the other and through him, for one-self. Man has no internal sovereign territory, he is always on the boundary; looking within himself he looks in the eyes of the other or through the eyes of the other. I cannot do without the other; I cannot become myself without the other; I must find myself in the other; finding the other in me in mutual reflection and perception. (1984: 311–12; see also Williams, 2000: 90)

The dialogical construction of identity, then, is both reflective and constitutive. It is not individual or collective, but involves both, in an in-between perpetual state of 'becoming', in which processes of identity construction, authorization and contestation take place. It is important to emphasize, however, that dialogical processes, by themselves, are not an alternative to viewing identity constructions as informed by power relations – just the opposite: analyzing the processes by which identity narratives are constructed in the communal context is vital in order to understand the ways intersectional power relations operate within the group. Otherwise one can easily fall into the trap of an identity politics which assumes the same positioning and identifications for all members of the grouping, and thus each member can, in principle, be a 'representative' of the grouping and an equal contributor to the collective narrative – which, of course, is virtually never the case. It is for this reason that dialogical understandings of identity constructions often lead to studies of identity constructions via conversation or narrative analysis in which the

actions and interactions of ordinary people become the primary focus of direct enquiry (see, for example, Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Silverman, 1998; Kaptani & Yuval-Davis, 2008a).

The issue, however, is not just the manner in which identity narratives are being produced, but also whether their production implies any particular relationship between self and non-self. Judith Butler (1993) argues that the construction of identities depends on excess – there is always something left outside, once the boundaries of specific identities have been constructed. In this sense all identities are exclusive, as well as inclusive.

One might argue that such a statement amounts to no more than a linguistic truism. However, an important counter-argument to that of Butler would be Jessica Benjamin's (1998) claim that by incorporating identifications into the notion of the subjective self, psychoanalysis has put in doubt the clear separation of self and non-self. It can be argued that similar reservations to the total separation between self and non-self are implied in the theorizations of the in-between 'becoming' of the dialogical approach. Charles Cooley (1912: 92) argues that 'Self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive social facts'. The way in which identities are perceived to be constructed within pre-determined discourses in the performative approach also throws doubt on the clear separation of self and non-self in the construction of the subject.

Identity theories often emphasize that identities are relational, the necessary 'excess' mentioned by Butler above. However, highlighting the fact that this relationality is not homogeneous and can be very different in nature is of vital importance for any theorization of identity, belonging and their constructions of boundaries. While a lot of the literature talks about the relationship between 'self' and 'other/s', there are many ways in which these relationships can be constructed. In my (2010) work, I've discussed four generic relations of the self and non-self in which recognition has very different implications: 'me' and 'us'; 'me'/'us' and 'them'; 'me'/'us' and 'others'; 'me' and the transversal 'us/them' (for a more detailed discussion of these issues see Chapters 5 and 6 in this volume). However, whatever kinds of boundaries are constructed between the 'me' and the 'not me', it is necessary to emphasize that not only are those boundaries shifting and contested, but also that they do not have to be symmetrical. In other words, inclusion or exclusion is often not mutual, depending on the power positionality and normative values of the social actors as well as, and in relation to, their cognitive and

emotional identifications. Constructions of self and identity can, in certain historical contexts, be forced on people. In such cases, identities and belonging/s become important dimensions of people's social locations and positionings, and the relationships between locations and identifications can also become more closely intertwined empirically. This still does not cancel out the importance of the differentiation between these analytical facets of analyzing belonging. On the contrary, without this differentiation, there could be no leverage and possibility of struggle and resistance. Biology – or belonging – would become destiny when there would not be any space for alternative imaginings. As Fanon (1967) crucially argued, politics of resistance need to be directed not only towards oppressed people's social and economic locations, but also against their internalizations of forced constructions of self and identity.

3

Ethical and political values

Belonging, therefore, is not just about social locations and constructions of individual and collective identities and attachments, it is also concerned with the ways these are assessed and valued by the self and others, and this can be done in many different ways by people with similar social locations who might identify themselves as belonging to the same community or grouping. These can vary not only in how important these locations and collectivities seem to be in one's life and that of others, but also in whether they consider this to be a good or a bad thing. Closely related to this are specific attitudes and ideologies concerning where and how identity and categorical boundaries are being/should be drawn, in more or less permeable ways, as different ideological perspectives and discourses construct them as more or less inclusive. It is in the arena of the contestations around these issues where we move from the realm of belonging into that of the politics of belonging.

The politics of belonging

The politics of belonging involves not only constructions of boundaries but also the inclusion or exclusion of particular people, social categories and groupings within these boundaries by those who have the power to do this. But what are these kind/s of power?

Politics involves the exercise of power and different hegemonic political projects of belonging represent different symbolic power orders. In recent years, the sociological understanding of power has been enriched by the theoretical contributions of Foucault (e.g. 1979, 1991a) and Bourdieu (e.g. 1984, 1990). Traditionally, power was understood and measured by the effects those with power had on others. However, feminists and other grass-roots activists, following Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970), promoted a notion of 'empowerment' in which people would gain 'power of' rather than 'power on'. While this approach has been used too often to cover intra-communal power relations and the feminist 'tyranny of structurelessness' with which Jo Freeman (1970) described the dynamics of feminist politics, the notion of empowerment does fit with alternative theoretical approaches to power which focus on symbolic power.

Max Weber's (1968) classical theory of power, which differentiated between physical and charismatic powers – those dependent on individual resources and those emanating out of legitimate authority – has been supplemented, if not supplanted by, other theoretical frameworks which have sought to explain what is happening in the contemporary world where social, political and economic powers have become more diffused, decentred and desubjectified. The most popular of these new approaches have been those by Foucault (1979, 1986 [1969], 1991a) and Bourdieu (1984, 1990; see also Bourdieu & Nice, 1977). Foucault constructed a notion of a 'disciplinary society' in which power increasingly operates through impersonal mechanisms of bodily discipline and a governmentality which escapes the consciousness and will of individual and collective social agents. Under such conditions, power, as was formerly known, starts to operate only when resistance occurs.

However, as Cronin (1996: 56) points out, while Foucault's genealogical perspective of power is of crucial importance in understanding contemporary politics, it is too radical and monolithic, and therefore 'it is impossible to identify any social location of the exercise of power or of resistance to power'. This is where Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power, while sharing some of Foucault's insights, such as the role of body practices as mediating relations of domination, can serve us better. For Bourdieu the subject is both embodied and socially constituted. His theory of practice (in which there is a constant interaction between the individual symbolically structured and socially inculcated dispositions of individual agents which he calls

(Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power)

'habitus' and the 'social field' which is structured by symbolically mediated relations of domination) offers a more empirically sensitive analytical framework for decoding impersonal relations of power.

Symbolic powers are of crucial importance when we deal with political projects of belonging, although more often than not, they are the focus for contestations and resistance. Adrian Favell (1999) defined the politics of belonging as 'the dirty work of boundary maintenance'. The boundaries the politics of belonging are concerned with are the boundaries of the political community of belonging, the boundaries which, sometimes physically, but always symbolically, separate the world population into 'us' and 'them'. The question of the boundaries of belonging, the boundaries of the Andersonian (1991 [1983]) 'imagined communities' (see the discussion in Chapter 3), is central in all the political projects of belonging examined in the following chapters. The politics of belonging involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers (within and outside the community), but also their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents. It is important to recognize, however, that such political agents would struggle both for the promotion of their specific position on the construction of collectivities and their boundaries as well as using these ideologies and positions in order to promote their own power positions within and outside the collectivities.

The politics of belonging also include struggles around the determination of what is involved in belonging, in being a member of such a community. As such, it is dialogical (Yuval-Davis & Werbner, 1999) and encompasses contestations both in relation to the participatory dimension of citizenship as well as in relation to issues related to the status and entitlements such membership entails. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 on the state citizenship question, although it also arises in all the other chapters which discuss citizenship, i.e. membership of political communities, as constructed by other political projects of belonging than the so-called 'nation-state'.

In order to understand some of the contestations involved in different constructions of belonging promoted by different political projects of belonging, we need to look at what is required from a specific person in order for her/him to be entitled to belong, to be considered as belonging, to the collectivity. Common descent (or rather the myth of common descent) might be demanded in some cases, while in others it might be a common culture, religion and/or language.

What is required from an indiv. in order to belong?

Loyalty and solidarity, based on common values and a projected myth of common destiny, tend to become requisites for belonging in pluralist societies. In other words, in different projects of the politics of belonging, the different facets of belonging – social locations, identities and ethical and political values – can become the requisites of belonging and the delineation of boundaries.


variably permeable requisites

Requisites of belonging that relate to 'ascriptive' social locations – origin, 'race', place of birth – would be the most racialized and the least permeable. Language, culture and sometimes religion are more open to a voluntary, often assimilatory, identification with particular collectivities. Using a common set of values, such as 'democracy' or 'human rights', as the signifiers of belonging can be seen as having the most permeable boundaries of all.

However, these different discourses of belonging can be collapsed together or reduced down to each other in specific historical cases. Moreover, some political projects of belonging can present themselves as promoting more open boundaries than they actually do. In the next section I shall illustrate this by briefly outlining three different political projects of belonging in the United Kingdom that have utilized discourses relating to different facets of belonging. However, such contesting political projects exist virtually everywhere, whether it is the contestation in India between its being a pluralist secular society in which belonging is defined by being born in the country or a Hindutva nation; or whether it is if aboriginals can be part of an Australian nation or need their own self-determination as a 'first nation'; or whether it is if Afrikaners can be considered 'indigenous' people in the South African context rather than 'settlers'.

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