Military Decision Making Process

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Chapter 9

The Military Decisionmaking Process The military decisionmaking process is one of the Army’s three planning methodologies. Before beginning an iteration of the military decisionmaking process, readers should review chapter 2 of ADRP 5-0 to understand the fundamentals of planning. This chapter defines and describes the characteristics of the military decisionmaking process. Next, it provides a detailed discussion of each step of the military decisionmaking process. The chapter concludes by providing guidance for conducting the military decisionmaking process in a time-constrained environment. Effectively conducting the military decisionmaking process requires leaders who understand the fundamentals of planning.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

9-1. The military decisionmaking process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The military decisionmaking process (MDMP) helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. This process helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning.

9-2. The MDMP facilitates collaborative planning. The higher headquarters solicits input and continuously shares information concerning future operations through planning meetings, warning orders, and other means. It shares information with subordinate and adjacent units, supporting and supported units, and unified action partners. Commanders encourage active collaboration among all organizations affected by pending operations to build a shared understanding of the situation, participate in course of action development and decisionmaking, and resolve conflicts before publishing the plan or order.

9-3. During planning, assessment focuses on developing an understanding of the current situation and determining what to assess and how to assess progress using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Developing the unit’s assessment plan occurs during the MDMP—not after developing the plan or order. (See chapter 15 for details on assessment plans.)

9-4. The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders and staffs conduct a time analysis early in the planning process. This analysis helps them determine when to begin certain actions to ensure forces are ready and in position before execution. This may require the commander to direct subordinates to start necessary movements, conduct task organization changes, begin information collection, and execute other preparation activities before completing the plan. As the commander and staff conduct the MDMP, they direct preparation tasks in a series of warning orders (WARNORDs).

9-5. Depending on the situation’s complexity, commanders can initiate the Army design methodology before or in parallel with the MDMP. If the problem is hard to identify or the operation’s end state is unclear, commanders may initiate Army design methodology before engaging in detailed planning. Army design methodology can assist the commander and staff in understanding the operational environment, framing the problem, and considering an operational approach to solve or manage the problem. The understanding and products resulting from Army design methodology guide more detailed planning during the MDMP. When used in parallel, the commander may direct some staff members to conduct mission analysis while engaging others in Army design methodology activities prior to course of action development. Results of both mission analysis and Army design methodology inform commanders in

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development of their commander’s intent and planning guidance. In time-constrained conditions, or when the problem is not complex, commanders may conduct the MDMP without incorporating formal Army design methodology efforts. During execution, the commander can use Army design methodology to help refine understanding and visualization as well as assessing and adjusting the plan as required.

THE SEVEN STEPS OF THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 9-6. The MDMP consists of seven steps, as shown in figure 9-1. Each step of the MDMP has various inputs, a step to conduct, and outputs. Each step also has a series of processes that commanders and staffs conduct to produce the outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation, facilitating the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially; however, they may revisit several steps in an iterative fashion as they learn more about the situation before producing the plan or order.

9-7. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt of, or in anticipation of, a mission. Commanders and staffs often begin planning in the absence of a complete and approved higher headquarters’ operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). In these instances, the headquarters begins a new planning effort based on a WARNORD and other directives, such as a planning order or an alert order from its higher headquarters. This requires active collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among echelons as the plan or order is developed.

THE ROLE OF COMMANDERS AND STAFFS IN THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 9-8. The commander is the most important participant in the MDMP. More than simply decisionmakers in this process, commanders use their experience, knowledge, and judgment to guide staff planning efforts. While unable to devote all their time to the MDMP, commanders follow the status of the planning effort, participate during critical periods of the process, and make decisions based on the detailed work of the staff. During the MDMP, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing.

9-9. The MDMP stipulates several formal meetings and briefings between the commander and staff to discuss, assess, and approve or disapprove planning efforts as they progress. However, experience has shown that optimal planning results when the commander meets informally at frequent intervals with the staff throughout the MDMP. Such informal interaction between the commander and staff can improve the staff’s understanding of the situation and ensure their planning efforts adequately reflect the commander’s visualization of the operation.

9-10. The chief of staff (COS) (executive officer [XO]) is a key participant in the MDMP. The COS (XO) manages and coordinates the staff’s work and provides quality control during the MDMP. To effectively supervise the entire process, this officer has to clearly understand the commander’s intent and guidance. The COS (XO) provides timelines to the staff, establishes briefing times and locations, and provides any instructions necessary to complete the plan.

9-11. The staff’s effort during the MDMP focuses on helping the commander understand the situation, make decisions, and synchronize those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities during planning initially focus on mission analysis. The products the staff develops during mission analysis help commanders understand the situation and develop the commander’s visualization. During course of action (COA) development and COA comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander in selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares the plan or order that reflects the commander’s intent, coordinating all necessary details. (See figure 9-1.)

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Figure 9-1. The seven steps of the military decisionmaking process

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MODIFYING THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 9-12. The MDMP can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and the situation permit. Performing all steps of the MDMP is detailed, deliberate, and time-consuming. Commanders use the full MDMP when they have enough planning time and staff support to thoroughly examine two or more COAs and develop a fully synchronized plan or order. This typically occurs when planning for an entirely new mission.

9-13. Commanders may alter the steps of the MDMP to fit time-constrained circumstances and produce a satisfactory plan. In time-constrained conditions, commanders assess the situation, update the commander’s visualization, and direct the staff to perform the MDMP activities that support the required decisions. In extremely compressed situations, commanders rely on more intuitive decisionmaking techniques, such as the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process. (See paragraphs 9-205 through 9-210 for information on planning in a time-constrained environment.)

STEPS OF THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 9-14. The remainder of this chapter describes the methods for conducting each step of the MDMP. It describes the key inputs and expected key outputs for each step. It also describes how the staff integrates intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), targeting, risk management, and information collection throughout the MDMP.

STEP 1–RECEIPT OF MISSION 9-15. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission. This step alerts all participants of the pending planning requirements, enabling them to determine the amount of time available for planning and preparation and decide on a planning approach, including guidance on using Army design methodology and how to abbreviate the MDMP, if required. When commanders identify a new mission, commanders and staffs perform the actions and produce the expected key outputs. (See figure 9-2.)

Figure 9-2. Step 1–receipt of the mission

Alert the Staff and Other Key Participants 9-16. As soon as a unit receives a new mission (or when the commander directs), the current operations integration cell alerts the staff of the pending planning requirement. Unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) should identify members of the planning staff who participate in mission analysis. In addition, the current operations integration cell also notifies other military, civilian, and host-nation organizations of pending planning events as required.

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Gather the Tools 9-17. Once notified of the new planning requirement, the staff prepares for mission analysis by gathering the needed tools. These tools include, but are not limited to—

Appropriate publications, including ADRP 1-02. All documents related to the mission and area of operations, including the higher headquarters’ OPLAN and OPORD, maps and terrain products, and operational graphics. Higher headquarters’ and other organizations’ intelligence and assessment products. Estimates and products of other military and civilian agencies and organizations. Both their own and the higher headquarters’ SOPs. Current running estimates. Any Army design methodology products.

9-18. The gathering of knowledge products continues throughout the MDMP. Staff officers carefully review the reference sections (located before paragraph 1. Situation) of the higher headquarters’ OPLANs and OPORDs to identify documents (such as theater policies and memoranda) related to the upcoming operation. If the MDMP occurs while in the process of replacing another unit, the staff begins collecting relevant documents—such as the current OPORD, branch plans, current assessments, operations and intelligence summaries, and SOPs—from that unit.

Update Running Estimates 9-19. While gathering the necessary tools for planning, each staff section begins updating its running estimate—especially the status of friendly units and resources and key civil considerations that affect each functional area. Running estimates not only compile critical facts and assumptions from the perspective of each staff section, but also include information from other staff sections and other military and civilian organizations. While listed at the beginning of the MDMP, this task of developing and updating running estimates continues throughout the MDMP and the operations process. (See chapter 8 for more information on running estimates.)

Conduct Initial Assessment 9-20. During receipt of mission, the commander and staff conduct an initial assessment of time and resources available to plan, prepare, and begin execution of an operation. This initial assessment helps commanders determine—

The time needed to plan and prepare for the mission for both headquarters and subordinate units. Guidance on conducting the Army design methodology and abbreviating the MDMP, if required. Which outside agencies and organizations to contact and incorporate into the planning process. The staff’s experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress.

9-21. This assessment primarily identifies an initial allocation of available time. The commander and staff balance the desire for detailed planning against the need for immediate action. The commander provides guidance to subordinate units as early as possible to allow subordinates the maximum time for their own planning and preparation of operations. As a rule, commanders allocate a minimum of two-thirds of available time for subordinate units to conduct their planning and preparation. This leaves one-third of the time for commanders and their staffs to do their planning. They use the other two-thirds for their own preparation. Time, more than any other factor, determines the detail to which the commander and staff can plan.

9-22. Based on the commander’s initial allocation of time, the COS (XO) develops a staff planning timeline that outlines how long the headquarters can spend on each step of the MDMP. The staff planning timeline indicates what products are due, who is responsible for them, and who receives them. It includes times and locations for meetings and briefings. It serves as a benchmark for the commander and staff throughout the MDMP.

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Issue the Commander’s Initial Guidance 9-23. Once time is allocated, the commander determines whether to initiate Army design methodology, perform Army design methodology in parallel with the MDMP, or proceed directly into the MDMP without the benefits of formal Army design methodology activities. In time-sensitive situations where commanders decide to proceed directly into the MDMP, they may also issue guidance on how to abbreviate the process. Having determined the time available together with the scope and scale of the planning effort, commanders issue initial planning guidance. Although brief, the initial guidance includes, but is not limited to—

Initial time allocations. A decision to initiate Army design methodology or go straight into the MDMP. How to abbreviate the MDMP, if required. Necessary coordination to exchange liaison officers. Authorized movements and initiation of information collection. Collaborative planning times and locations. Initial information requirements. Additional staff tasks.

Issue the Initial Warning Order 9-24. The last task in receipt of mission is to issue a WARNORD to subordinate and supporting units. This order includes at a minimum the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the initial timeline, and any movement or information collection to initiate.

STEP 2–MISSION ANALYSIS 9-25. The MDMP continues with an assessment of the situation called mission analysis. Commanders (supported by their staffs and informed by subordinate and adjacent commanders and by other partners) gather, analyze, and synthesize information to orient themselves on the current conditions of the operational environment. The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem, and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly why—the purpose of the operation.

9-26. Since no amount of subsequent planning can solve an insufficiently understood problem, mission analysis is the most important step in the MDMP. This understanding of the situation and the problem allows commanders to visualize and describe how the operation may unfold in their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance. During mission analysis, the commander and staff perform the process actions and produce the outputs shown in figure 9-3.

9-27. Commanders and staffs also begin the development of evaluation criteria during this step. These evaluation criteria are continually developed and refined throughout the MDMP and become a key input during Step 5—Course of Action Comparison.

Analyze the Higher Headquarters’ Plan or Order 9-28. Commanders and staffs thoroughly analyze the higher headquarters’ plan or order. They determine how their unit—by task and purpose—contributes to the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of the higher headquarters. The commander and staff seek to completely understand—

The higher headquarters’— Commander’s intent. Mission. Concept of operations. Available assets. Timeline.

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The missions of adjacent, supporting, and supported units and their relationships to the higher headquarters’ plan. The missions or goals of unified action partners that work in the operational areas. Their assigned area of operations.

Figure 9-3. Step 2–mission analysis

9-29. If the commander misinterprets the higher headquarters’ plan, time is wasted. Additionally, when analyzing the higher order, the commander and staff may identify difficulties and contradictions in the higher order. Therefore, if confused by the higher headquarters’ order or guidance, commanders must seek immediate clarification. Liaison officers familiar with the higher headquarters’ plan can help clarify issues. Collaborative planning with the higher headquarters also facilitates this task. Staffs use requests for information to clarify or obtain additional information from the higher headquarters.

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Perform Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 9-30. IPB is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. The IPB process identifies critical gaps in the commander’s knowledge of an operational environment. As a part of the initial planning guidance, commanders use these gaps as a guide to establish their initial intelligence requirements. IPB products enable the commander to assess facts about the operational environment and make assumptions about how friendly and threat forces will interact in the operational environment. The description of the operational environment’s effects identifies constraints on potential friendly COAs. It also identifies key aspects of the operational environment, such as avenues of approach, engagement areas, and landing zones, which the staff integrates into potential friendly COAs and their running estimates. For mission analysis, the intelligence staff, along with the other staff elements, will use IPB to develop detailed threat COA models, which depict a COA available to the threat. The threat COA models provide a basis for formulating friendly COAs and completing the intelligence estimate.

9-31. The intelligence staff, in collaboration with other staffs, develops other IPB products during mission analysis. That collaboration should result in the drafting of initial priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), the production of a complete modified combined obstacles overlay, a list of high value targets, and unrefined event templates and matrices. IPB should provide an understanding of the threat’s center of gravity, which then can be exploited by friendly forces.

Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks 9-32. The staff analyzes the higher headquarters’ order and the higher commander’s guidance to determine their specified and implied tasks. In the context of operations, a task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by Soldiers, units, and organizations that may support or be supported by other tasks. The “what” of a mission statement is always a task. From the list of specified and implied tasks, the staff determines essential tasks for inclusion in the recommended mission statement.

9-33. A specified task is a task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the higher headquarters’ order or plan state specified tasks. Some tasks may be in paragraphs 4 and 5. Specified tasks may be listed in annexes and overlays. They may also be assigned verbally during collaborative planning sessions or in directives from the higher commander.

9-34. An implied task is a task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but is not stated in the higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters’ order, the enemy situation, the terrain, and civil considerations. Additionally, analysis of doctrinal requirements for each specified task might disclose implied tasks.

9-35. When analyzing the higher order for specified and implied tasks, the staff also identifies any be-prepared or on-order missions. A be-prepared mission is a mission assigned to a unit that might be executed. Generally a contingency mission, commanders execute it because something planned has or has not been successful. In planning priorities, commanders plan a be-prepared mission after any on-order mission. An on-order mission is a mission to be executed at an unspecified time. A unit with an on-order mission is a committed force. Commanders envision task execution in the concept of operations; however, they may not know the exact time or place of execution. Subordinate commanders develop plans and orders and allocate resources, task-organize, and position forces for execution.

9-36. Once staff members have identified specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each task’s requirements and purpose. The staff then identifies essential tasks. An essential task is a specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit’s mission statement.

Review Available Assets and Identify Resource Shortfalls 9-37. The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the current task organization, command and support relationships, and status (current capabilities and limitations) of all units. This analysis also includes capabilities of civilian and military organizations (joint, special operations, and multinational) that operate within their unit’s area of operations. They consider relationships among

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specified, implied, and essential tasks, and between them and available assets. From this analysis, staffs determine if they have the assets needed to complete all tasks. If shortages occur, they identify additional resources needed for mission success to the higher headquarters. Staffs also identify any deviations from the normal task organization and provide them to the commander to consider when developing the planning guidance. A more detailed analysis of available assets occurs during COA development.

Determine Constraints 9-38. The commander and staff identify any constraints placed on their command. A constraint is a restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander. Constraints are found in paragraph 3 of the OPLAN or OPORD. Annexes to the order may also include constraints. The operation overlay, for example, may contain a restrictive fire line or a no fire area. Constraints may also be issued verbally, in WARNORDs, or in policy memoranda.

9-39. Constraints may also be based on resource limitations within the command, such as organic fuel transport capacity, or physical characteristics of the operational environment, such as the number of vehicles that can cross a bridge in a specified time.

9-40. The commander and staff should coordinate with the staff judge advocate for a legal review of perceived or obvious constraints, restraints, or limitations in the OPLAN, OPORD, or related documents.

Identify Critical Facts and Develop Assumptions 9-41. Plans and orders are based on facts and assumptions. Commanders and staffs gather facts and develop assumptions as they build their plan. A fact is a statement of truth or a statement thought to be true at the time. Facts concerning the operational and mission variables serve as the basis for developing situational understanding, for continued planning, and when assessing progress during preparation and execution.

9-42. An assumption is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. In the absence of facts, the commander and staff consider assumptions from their higher headquarters. They then develop their own assumptions necessary for continued planning.

9-43. Having assumptions requires commanders and staffs to continually attempt to replace those assumptions with facts. The commander and staff should list and review the key assumptions on which fundamental judgments rest throughout the MDMP. Rechecking assumptions is valuable at any time during the operations process prior to rendering judgments and making decisions.

Begin Risk Management 9-44. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). During mission analysis, the commander and staff focus on identifying and assessing hazards. Developing specific control measures to mitigate those hazards occurs during course of action development.

9-45. The chief of protection (or operations staff officer [S-3] in units without a protection cell) in coordination with the safety officer integrates risk management into the MDMP. All staff sections integrate risk management for hazards within their functional areas. Units conduct the first four steps of risk management in the MDMP. ATP 5-19 addresses the details for conducting risk management, including products of each step.

Develop Initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Essential Elements of Friendly Information

9-46. The mission analysis process identifies gaps in information required for further planning and decisionmaking during preparation and execution. During mission analysis, the staff develops information

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requirements. Some information requirements are of such importance to the commander that staffs nominate them to the commander to become a commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR).

9-47. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. A CCIR directly influences decisionmaking and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. A CCIR is—

Specified by a commander for a specific operation. Applicable only to the commander who specifies it. Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission. Time-sensitive.

9-48. Commanders consider staff input when determining their CCIRs. CCIRs are situation-dependent and specified by the commander for each operation. Commanders continuously review CCIRs during the planning process and adjust them as situations change. The initial CCIRs developed during mission analysis normally focus on decisions the commander needs to make to focus planning. Once the commander selects a COA, the CCIRs shift to information the commander needs in order to make decisions during preparation and execution. Commanders designate CCIRs to inform the staff and subordinates what they deem essential for making decisions. Typically, commanders identify ten or fewer CCIRs; minimizing the number of CCIRs assists in prioritizing the allocation of limited resources. CCIR fall into one of two categories: PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).

9-49. A PIR is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. PIRs identify the information about the enemy and other aspects of the operational environment that the commander considers most important. Lessons from recent operations show that intelligence about civil considerations may be as critical as intelligence about the enemy. Thus, all staff sections may recommend information about civil considerations as PIRs. The intelligence officer manages PIRs for the commander through planning requirements and assessing collection.

9-50. An FFIR is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. FFIRs identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages FFIRs for the commander.

9-51. In addition to nominating CCIRs to the commander, the staff also identifies and nominates essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs). An EEFI establishes an element of information to protect rather than one to collect. EEFIs identify those elements of friendly force information that, if compromised, would jeopardize mission success. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority as CCIRs and require approval by the commander. Like CCIRs, EEFIs change as an operation progresses.

9-52. Depending on the situation, the commander and selected staff members meet prior to the mission analysis brief to approve the initial CCIRs and EEFIs. This is especially important if the commander intends to conduct information collection early in the planning process. The approval of the initial CCIRs early during planning assists the staff in developing the initial information collection plan. Approval of an EEFI allows the staff to begin planning and implementing measures to protect friendly force information, such as military deception and operations security.

Develop the Initial Information Collection Plan 9-53. The initial information collection plan is crucial to begin or adjust the information collection effort to help answer information requirements necessary in developing effective plans. The initial information collection plan sets reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations in motion. It may be issued as part of a WARNORD, a fragmentary order (FRAGORD), or an OPORD. As more information becomes available, it is incorporated into a complete information collection plan (Annex L) to the OPORD.

9-54. The intelligence staff creates the requirements management tools for the information collection plan. The operations staff is responsible for the information collection plan. During this step, the operations and

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intelligence staff work closely to ensure they fully synchronize and integrate information collection activities into the overall plan.

9-55. The operations officer considers several factors when developing the initial information collection plan, including:

Requirements for collection assets in subsequent missions. The time available to develop and refine the initial information collection plan. The risk the commander is willing to accept if information collection missions are begun before the information collection plan is fully integrated into the scheme of maneuver. Insertion and extraction methods for reconnaissance, security, surveillance, and intelligence collection assets. Contingencies for inclement weather to ensure coverage of key named areas of interest or target areas of interest. The communications plan for transmission of reports from assets to command posts. The inclusion of collection asset locations and movements into the fire support plan. The reconnaissance handover with higher or subordinate echelons. The sustainment support. Legal support requirements.

FM 3-55 contains additional information on information collection, planning requirements, and assessing collection.

Update Plan for the Use of Available Time 9-56. As more information becomes available, the commander and staff refine their initial plan for the use of available time. They compare the time needed to accomplish tasks to the higher headquarters’ timeline to ensure mission accomplishment is possible in the allotted time. They compare the timeline to the assumed enemy timeline with how they anticipate conditions will unfold. From this, they determine windows of opportunity for exploitation, times when the unit will be at risk for enemy activity, or when action to arrest deterioration in the local civilian population may be required.

9-57. The commander and COS (XO) also refine the staff planning timeline. The refined timeline includes the—

Subject, time, and location of briefings the commander requires. Times of collaborative planning sessions and the medium over which they will take place. Times, locations, and forms of rehearsals.

Develop Initial Themes and Messages 9-58. Gaining and maintaining the trust of key actors is an important aspect of operations. Faced with the many different actors (individuals, organizations, and the public) connected with the operation, commanders identify and engage those actors who matter to operational success. These actors’ behaviors can help solve or complicate the friendly forces’ challenges as commanders strive to accomplish missions.

9-59. Themes and messages support operations and military actions. Commanders and their units coordinate what they do, say, and portray through themes and messages. A theme is a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the purpose for military action. Themes tie to objectives, lines of effort, and end state conditions. They are overarching and apply to capabilities of public affairs, military information support operations, and Soldier and leader engagements. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic communication that supports a theme focused on a specific actor or the public and in support of a specific action (task). Units transmit themes and messages to those actors or the public whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors matter to the success of an operation.

9-60. The public affairs officer adjusts and refines themes and messages received from higher headquarters for use by the command. These themes and messages are designed to inform specific domestic and foreign audiences about current or planned military operations. The military information support operations element receives approved themes and messages. This element adjusts or refines depending on the situation. It employs themes and messages as part of planned activities designed to influence specific

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foreign audiences for various purposes that support current or planned operations. The commander and the chief of staff approve all themes and messages used to support operations. The information operations officer assists the G-3 (S-3) and the commander to de-conflict and synchronize the use of information-related capabilities used specifically to disseminate approved themes and messages during operations.

Develop a Proposed Problem Statement 9-61. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. The problem statement is the description of the primary issue or issues that may impede commanders from achieving their desired end states.

Note: The commander, staff, and other partners develop the problem statement as part of Army design methodology. During mission analysis, the commander and staff review the problem statement and revise it as necessary based on the increased understanding of the situation. If Army design methodology activities do not precede mission analysis, then the commander and staff develop a problem statement prior to moving to Step 3—COA Development.

9-62. How the problem is formulated leads to particular solutions. It is important that commanders dedicate the time to identify the right problem to solve and describe it clearly in a problem statement. Ideally, the commander and staff meet to share their analysis of the situation. They talk with each other, synthesize the results of the current mission analysis, and determine the problem. If the commander is not available, the staff members talk among themselves.

9-63. As part of the discussion to help identify and understand the problem, the staff— Compares the current situation to the desired end state. Brainstorms and lists issues that impede the commander from achieving the desired end state.

9-64. Based on this analysis, the staff develops a proposed problem statement—a statement of the problem or set of problems to be solved—for the commander’s approval.

Develop a Proposed Mission Statement 9-65. The COS (XO) or operations officer prepares a proposed mission statement for the unit based on the mission analysis. The commander receives and approves the unit’s mission statement normally during the mission analysis brief. A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why (JP 5-0). The five elements of a mission statement answer these questions:

Who will execute the operation (unit or organization)? What is the unit’s essential task (tactical mission task)? When will the operation begin (by time or event) or what is the duration of the operation? Where will the operation occur (area of operations, objective, grid coordinates)? Why will the force conduct the operations (for what purpose)?

Example 1. Not later than 220400 Aug 09 (when), 1st Brigade (who) secures ROUTE SOUTH DAKOTA (what/task) in AREA OF OPERATIONS JACKRABBIT (where) to enable the movement of humanitarian assistance materials (why/purpose).

Example 2. 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes (what/task) JACKSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AREA OF OPERATIONS SPARTAN (why/purpose).

9-66. The mission statement may have more than one essential task. The following example shows a mission statement for a phased operation with a different essential task for each phase.

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Example. 1-509th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes (what/task) JACKSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AREA OF OPERATIONS SPARTAN (why/purpose). On order (when), secures (what/task) OBJECTIVE GOLD (where) to prevent the 2nd Pandor Guards Brigade from crossing the BLUE RIVER and disrupting operations in AREA OF OPERATIONS SPARTAN (why/purpose).

9-67. The who, where, and when of a mission statement are straightforward. The what and why are more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The what is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs. These tasks are measurable and can be grouped as “actions by friendly forces” or “effects on enemy forces.” The why puts the task into context by describing the reason for performing it. The why provides the mission’s purpose—the reason the unit is to perform the task. It is extremely important to mission command and mission orders.

9-68. Commanders should use tactical mission tasks or other doctrinally approved tasks contained in combined arms field manuals or mission training plans in mission statements. These tasks have specific military definitions that differ from standard dictionary definitions. A tactical mission task is a specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be expressed as either an action by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force (ADRP 1-03). FM 3-90-1 describes each tactical task. FM 3-07 provides a list of primary stability tasks which military forces must be prepared to execute. Commanders and planners should carefully choose the task that best describes the commander’s intent and planning guidance.

Present the Mission Analysis Briefing 9-69. The mission analysis briefing informs the commander of the results of the staff’s analysis of the situation. It helps the commander understand, visualize, and describe the operation. Throughout the mission analysis briefing, the commander, staff, and other partners discuss the various facts and assumptions about the situation. Staff officers present a summary of their running estimates from their specific functional area and how their findings impact or are impacted by other areas. This helps the commander and staff as a whole to focus on the interrelationships among the mission variables and to develop a deeper understanding of the situation. The commander issues guidance to the staff for continued planning based on situational understanding gained from the mission analysis briefing.

9-70. Ideally, the commander holds several informal meetings with key staff members before the mission analysis briefing, including meetings to assist the commander in developing CCIRs, the mission statement, and themes and messages. These meetings enable commanders to issue guidance for activities (such as reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations) and develop their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance.

9-71. A comprehensive mission analysis briefing helps the commander, staff, subordinates, and other partners develop a shared understanding of the requirements of the upcoming operation. Time permitting, the staff briefs the commander on its mission analysis using the following outline:

Mission and commander’s intent of the headquarters two echelons up. Mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of the headquarters one echelon up. A proposed problem statement. A proposed mission statement. Review of the commander’s initial guidance. Initial IPB products, including civil considerations that impact the conduct of operations. Specified, implied, and essential tasks. Pertinent facts and assumptions. Constraints. Forces available and resource shortfalls. Initial risk assessment. Proposed themes and messages.

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Proposed CCIRs and EEFIs. Initial information collection plan. Recommended timeline. Recommended collaborative planning sessions. Proposed evaluation criteria.

9-72. During the mission analysis briefing or shortly thereafter, commanders approve the mission statement and CCIRs. They then develop and issue their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance.

Develop and Issue Initial Commander’s Intent 9-73. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). The initial commander’s intent describes the purpose of the operation, initial key tasks, and the desired end state (See ADRP 5-0 for more details on commander’s intent).

9-74. The higher commander’s intent provides the basis for unity of effort throughout the force. Each commander’s intent nests within the higher commander’s intent. The commander’s intent explains the broader purpose of the operation beyond that of the mission statement. This explanation allows subordinate commanders and Soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most importantly, why the mission is being conducted.

9-75. Based on their situational understanding, commanders summarize their visualization in their initial commander’s intent statement. The initial commander’s intent links the operation’s purpose with conditions that define the desired end state. Commanders may change their intent statement as planning progresses and more information becomes available. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by leaders two echelons lower in the chain of command. The shorter the commander’s intent, the better it serves these purposes. Typically, the commander’s intent statement is three to five sentences long and contains the purpose, key tasks, and end state.

Develop and Issue Initial Planning Guidance 9-76. Commanders provide planning guidance along with their initial commander’s intent. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. This guidance may be broad or detailed, depending on the situation. The initial planning guidance outlines an operational approach—a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0). The initial planning guidance outlines specific COAs the commander desires the staff to look at as well as rules out any COAs the commander will not accept. That clear guidance allows the staff to develop several COAs without wasting effort on things that the commander will not consider. It reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent.

9-77. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance. They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while allowing the latitude necessary to explore different options. This guidance provides the basis for a detailed concept of operations without dictating the specifics of the final plan. As with their intent, commanders may modify planning guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions.

9-78. Commanders issue planning guidance initially after mission analysis. They continue to consider additional guidance throughout the MDMP including, but not limited, to the following:

Upon receipt of or in anticipation of a mission (initial planning guidance). Following mission analysis (planning guidance for COA development). Following COA development (revised planning guidance for COA improvements). COA approval (revised planning guidance to complete the plan).

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9-79. Table 9-1 lists commander’s planning guidance by warfighting function. This list is not intended to meet the needs of all situations nor be all-inclusive, and providing guidance by warfighting function is not the only method. Commanders tailor planning guidance to meet specific needs based on the situation rather than address each item. Each item does not always fit neatly in a particular warfighting function, as it may be shared by more than one warfighting function. For example, although rules of engagement fall under the protection warfighting function, each other warfighting function chief has a vested interest in gaining guidance on rules of engagement. (See table 9-1.)

Table 9-1. Examples of commander’s planning guidance by warfighting function

M is

si on

C om

m an

d Commander’s critical information requirements

Rules of engagement Command post positioning Commander’s location Initial themes and messages Succession of command

Liaison officer guidance Planning and operational guidance timeline Type of order and rehearsal Communications guidance Civil affairs operations Cyber electromagnetic considerations

In te

lli ge

nc e Information collection guidance

Information gaps Most likely and most dangerous enemy

courses of action Priority intelligence requirements Most critical terrain and weather factors

Most critical local environment and civil considerations

Intelligence requests for information Intelligence focus during phased operations Desired enemy perception of friendly forces

M ov

em en

t a nd

M an

eu ve

r Commander’s intent Course of action development guidance Number of courses of action to consider

or not consider Critical events Task organization Task and purpose of subordinate units Forms of maneuver Reserve composition, mission, priorities,

and control measures

Security and counterreconnaissance Friendly decision points Branches and sequels Task and direct collection Military deception Risk to friendly forces Collateral damage or civilian casualties Any condition that affects achievement of

end state Information operations

Fi re

s

Synchronization and focus of fires with maneuver

Priority of fires High priority targets Special munitions Target acquisition zones Observer plan Air and missile defense positioning High-value targets

Task and purpose of fires Scheme of fires Suppression of enemy air defenses Fire support coordination measures Attack guidance Branches and sequels No strike list Restricted target list

P ro

te ct

io n

Protection priorities Priorities for survivability assets Terrain and weather factors Intelligence focus and limitations for

security Acceptable risk Protected targets and areas

Vehicle and equipment safety or security constraints

Environmental considerations Unexploded ordnance Operations security risk tolerance Rules of engagement Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons Counterintelligence

S us

ta in

m en

t Sustainment priorities—manning, fueling, fixing, arming, moving the force, and sustaining Soldiers and systems

Health system support Sustainment of detainee and

resettlement operations

Construction and provision of facilities and installations

Detainee movement Anticipated requirements of Classes III, IV,

and V Controlled supply rates

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◄ Develop Course of Action Evaluation Criteria 9-80. Evaluation criteria are standards the commander and staff will later use to measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs. Developing these criteria during mission analysis helps to eliminate a source of bias prior to COA analysis and comparison. Evaluation criteria address factors that affect success and those that can cause failure. Criteria change from mission to mission and must be clearly defined and understood by all staff members before starting the war game to test the proposed COAs. Normally, the COS (XO) initially determines each proposed criterion with weights based on the assessment of its relative importance and the commander’s guidance. Commanders adjust criteria selection and weighting according to their own experience and vision. Higher weights are assigned to more important criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area ranks each COA using those criteria. The staff presents the proposed evaluation criteria to the commander at the mission analysis brief for approval.

Issue a Warning Order 9-81. Immediately after the commander gives the planning guidance, the staff sends subordinate and supporting units a WARNORD. (See appendix C for sample WARNORD.) It contains, at a minimum—

The approved mission statement. The commander’s intent. Changes to task organization. The unit area of operations (sketch, overlay, or some other description). CCIRs and EEFIs. Risk guidance. Priorities by warfighting functions. Military deception guidance. Essential stability tasks. Initial information collection plan. Specific priorities. Updated operational timeline. Movements.

STEP 3–COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT 9-82. A COA is a broad potential solution to an identified problem. The COA development step generates options for subsequent analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander’s intent and planning guidance. During COA development, planners use the problem statement, mission statement, commander’s intent, planning guidance, and various knowledge products developed during mission analysis. (See figure 9-4.)

Figure 9-4. Step 3–course of action development

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9-83. Embedded in COA development is the application of operational and tactical art. Planners develop different COAs by varying combinations of the elements of operational art, such as phasing, lines of effort, and tempo. (See ADRP 3-0 for more information on operational art.) Planners convert the approved COA into the concept of operations.

9-84. The commander’s direct involvement in COA development greatly aids in producing comprehensive and flexible COAs within the time available. To save time, the commander may also limit the number of COAs staffs develop or specify particular COAs not to explore. Planners examine each prospective COA for validity using the following screening criteria:

Feasible. The COA can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations. Acceptable. The COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained. Suitable. The COA can accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent and planning guidance. Distinguishable. Each COA must differ significantly from the others (such as scheme of maneuver, lines of effort, phasing, use of the reserve, and task organization). Complete. A COA must incorporate—

How the decisive operation leads to mission accomplishment. How shaping operations create and preserve conditions for success of the decisive operation or effort. How sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations or efforts. How to account for offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Tasks to be performed and conditions to be achieved.

9-85. It is important in COA development that commanders and staffs appreciate the unpredictable and uncertain nature of the operational environment, and understand how to cope with ambiguity. Some problems that commanders face are straightforward, as when clearly defined guidance is provided from higher headquarters, or when resources required for a mission are available and can easily be allocated. In such cases, the COA is often self-evident. However, for problems that are unfamiliar or ambiguous, Army design methodology may assist commanders in better understanding the nature of the problem, and afford both the commander and staff a level of comfort necessary to effectively advance through COA development. Commanders and staffs that are comfortable with ambiguity will often find that the Army design methodology provides flexibility in developing COAs that contain multiple options for dealing with changing circumstances. Staffs tend to focus on specific COAs for specific sets of circumstances, when it is usually best to focus on flexible COAs that provide the greatest options to account for the widest range of circumstances.

9-86. Commanders and staffs must be cautious not to attempt to identify and resolve every possible outcome to military operations. The interaction of multiple variables within an operational environment can lead to countless possible options and outcomes. Commanders and staffs should focus their efforts around known variables and analyze COAs that provide flexible options to the commander during execution. If commanders and staffs focus on what is known about a situation, it often becomes clear that the known information provides sufficient guidance to develop flexible COAs. It is important to clearly identify which variables the unit can control, which it does not control, and the implications of those that it does not control. Even when there are few facts available, it is often possible to reduce key issues to either an ability to do “X”, or an inability to do “X” as a starting point. Such a reduction is preferred over trying to derive a wide range of possibilities. It is just as important not to see facts as constraining flexibility, but seek to use them to generate flexibility. Staffs work to confirm or deny facts before developing options. Staffs must also determine what risks are associated with various COAs.

9-87. As an example, a commander may know with reasonable certainty that an enemy force is positioned on the outskirts of a town. The commander may not be certain of the exact size of the enemy force, all the resources available to the enemy force, or actions the enemy may take over time. Such unknowns are a reality in an ambiguous operational environment. But, by focusing on the known information, that is, the position of the enemy at a point in time, the staff can develop COAs that provide maximum flexibility for

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the commander. Known information can also apply to friendly actions, such as an established time for crossing a line of departure, or transition to a subsequent phase of an operation. COAs should allow for variances in timelines and resources as additional information on the enemy, as well as friendly forces, becomes available. Variances may also occur as changes in guidance from high headquarters arrives, or significant national policy decisions are made. Staffs identify risks associated with both friendly and enemy actions, as well as who is accepting the risk, and what resources should be allocated to mitigate the risks.

9-88. COA development should also identify decision points, the person responsible for making the decision, and what measures may be taken to provide the commander with additional time before making a decision. (See paragraph 9-127 for a discussion of decision points.) Good COAs provide commanders with options they can take based on anticipated and unanticipated changes in the situation. (See Chapter 14 for further discussion on decisionmaking in execution.) Staffs should highlight to the commander options that may be critical to mission success. Staffs should also identify points in time when options may no longer be viable, while working to keep options open to the commander as long as possible. In all cases, staffs provide commanders with options that are flexible, while clearly identifying risks associated with committing to options. Staffs also assess how possible options may impact on a commander’s options at a higher echelon.

9-89. The unpredictable and uncertain nature of the operational environment should not in itself result in paralysis or hesitancy in military operations. By focusing COA development around information that is known to the staff, staffs can better steer their efforts toward developing COAs that provide maximum flexibility and viable options for the commander in the execution of military operations.

Assess Relative Combat Power 9-90. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0). Combat power is the effect created by combining the elements of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, mission command, information, and leadership. The goal is to generate overwhelming combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost.

9-91. To assess relative combat power, planners initially make a rough estimate of force ratios of maneuver units two levels below their echelon. For example, at division level, planners compare all types of maneuver battalions with enemy maneuver battalion equivalents. Planners then compare friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each element of combat power. From these comparisons, they may deduce particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploited or may need protection. These comparisons provide planners insight into effective force employment.

9-92. In troop-to-task analysis for stability and defense support of civil authorities, staffs determine relative combat power by comparing available resources to specified or implied stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. This analysis provides insight as available options and needed resources. In such operations, the elements of sustainment, movement and maneuver, nonlethal effects, and information may dominate.

9-93. By analyzing force ratios and determining and comparing each force’s strengths and weaknesses as a function of combat power, planners can gain insight into—

Friendly capabilities that pertain to the operation. The types of operations possible from both friendly and enemy perspectives. How and where the enemy may be vulnerable. How and where friendly forces are vulnerable. Additional resources needed to execute the mission. How to allocate existing resources.

9-94. Planners must not develop and recommend COAs based solely on mathematical analysis of force ratios. Although the process uses some numerical relationships, the estimate is largely subjective. Assessing combat power requires assessing both tangible and intangible factors, such as morale and levels of training. A relative combat power assessment identifies exploitable enemy weaknesses, identifies

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unprotected friendly weaknesses, and determines the combat power necessary to conduct essential stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.

Generate Options 9-95. Based on the commander’s guidance and the initial results of the relative combat power assessment, the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks. In an unconstrained environment, planners aim to develop several possible COAs. Depending on available time, commanders may limit the options in the commander’s guidance. Options focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption or on those stability tasks that are most essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.

9-96. Brainstorming can be used for generating options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest range of choices. The staff (and members of organizations outside the headquarters) remains unbiased and open-minded when developing proposed options.

9-97. In developing COAs, staff members determine the doctrinal requirements for each proposed operation, including doctrinal tasks for subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires a breach force, a support force, and an assault force. Essential stability tasks require the ability to provide a level of civil security, civil control, and certain essential services. In addition, the staff considers the potential capabilities of attachments and other organizations and agencies outside military channels.

9-98. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources in order to generate options. ADRP 3-0 describes in detail three established operational frameworks. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework in organizing operations, but three operational frameworks, mentioned below, have proven valuable in the past. The higher headquarters will direct the specific framework or frameworks to be used by subordinate headquarters; the frameworks should be consistent throughout all echelons. The three operational frameworks are—

Deep-close-security. Main and supporting effort. Decisive-shaping-sustaining.

9-99. For example, when generating options for a decisive-shaping-sustaining operation, the staff starts with the decisive operation identified in the commander’s planning guidance. The staff checks that the decisive operation nests within the higher headquarters’ concept of operations. The staff clarifies the decisive operation’s purpose and considers ways to mass the effects (lethal and nonlethal) of overwhelming combat power to achieve it.

9-100. Next, the staff considers shaping operations. The staff establishes a purpose for each shaping operation tied to creating or preserving a condition for the decisive operation’s success. Shaping operations may occur before, concurrently with, or after the decisive operation. A shaping operation may be designated as the main effort if executed before or after the decisive operation.

9-101. The staff then determines sustaining operations necessary to create and maintain the combat power required for the decisive operation and shaping operation. After developing the basic operational organization for a given COA, the staff then determines the essential tasks for each decisive, shaping, and sustaining operation.

9-102. Once staff members have explored possibilities for each COA, they examine each COA to determine if it satisfies the screening criteria stated in paragraph 9-81. In doing so, they change, add, or eliminate COAs as appropriate. During this process, staffs avoid focusing on the development of one good COA among several throwaway COAs.

Array Forces 9-103. After determining the decisive and shaping operations and their related tasks and purposes, planners determine the relative combat power required to accomplish each task. Often, planners use minimum historical planning ratios as a starting point. For example, historically, defenders have over a 50 percent probability of defeating an attacking force approximately three times their equivalent strength.

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Therefore, as a starting point, commanders may defend on each avenue of approach with roughly a 1:3 force ratio. (See table 9-2.)

Table 9-2. Historical minimum planning ratios

Friendly Mission Position Friendly : Enemy Delay 1:6 Defend Prepared or fortified 1:3 Defend Hasty 1:2.5 Attack Prepared or fortified 3:1 Attack Hasty 2.5:1 Counterattack Flank 1:1

9-104. Planners determine whether these and other intangibles increase the relative combat power of the unit assigned the task to the point that it exceeds the historical planning ratio for that task. If it does not, planners determine how to reinforce the unit. Combat power comparisons are provisional at best. Arraying forces is tricky, inexact work, affected by factors that are difficult to gauge, such as impact of past engagements, quality of leaders, morale, maintenance of equipment, and time in position. Levels of electronic warfare support, fire support, close air support, civilian support, and many other factors also affect arraying forces.

9-105. In counterinsurgency operations, planners can develop force requirements by gauging troop density—the ratio of security forces (including host-nation military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents in an area of operations. A ratio of twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, such calculations strongly depend on the situation. (See FM 3-24 for more information on counterinsurgency planning.)

9-106. Planners also determine relative combat power with regard to civilian requirements and conditions that require attention, and then they array forces and capabilities for stability tasks. For example, a COA may require a follow-on force to establish civil security, maintain civil control, and restore essential services in a densely populated urban area over an extended period. Planners conduct a troop-to-task analysis to determine the type of units and capabilities needed to accomplish these tasks.

9-107. Planners then proceed to initially array friendly forces starting with the decisive operation and continuing with all shaping and sustaining operations. Planners normally array ground forces two levels below their echelon. The initial array focuses on generic ground maneuver units without regard to specific type or task organization and then considers all appropriate intangible factors. For example, at corps level, planners array generic brigades. During this step, planners do not assign missions to specific units; they only consider which forces are necessary to accomplish their task. In this step, planners also array assets to accomplish essential stability tasks.

9-108. The initial array identifies the total number of units needed and identifies possible methods of dealing with the enemy and stability tasks. If the number arrayed is less than the number available, planners place additional units in a pool for use when they develop the initial concept of the operation. (See paragraph 9-106.) If the number of units arrayed exceeds the number available and the difference cannot be compensated for with intangible factors, the staff determines whether the COA is feasible. Ways to make up the shortfall include requesting additional resources, accepting risk in that portion of the area of operations, or executing tasks required for the COA sequentially rather than simultaneously. Commanders should also consider requirements to minimize and relieve civilian suffering. Establishing civil security and providing essential services such as medical care, water, food, and shelter are implied tasks for commanders during any combat operation. (See FM 3-07 for a full discussion on stability tasks.)

Develop a Broad Concept 9-109. In developing the broad concept of the operation, the commander describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent. The broad concept concisely expresses the how

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of the commander’s visualization and will eventually provide the framework for the concept of operations and summarizes the contributions of all warfighting functions. The staff develops the initial concept of the operation for each COA expressed in both narrative and graphic forms. A sound COA is more than the arraying of forces. It presents an overall combined arms idea that will accomplish the mission. The initial concept of the operation includes, but is not limited to, the following:

The purpose of the operation. A statement of where the commander will accept risk. Identification of critical friendly events and transitions between phases (if the operation is phased). Designation of the reserve, including its location and composition. Information collection activities. Essential stability tasks. Identification of maneuver options that may develop during an operation. Assignment of subordinate areas of operations. Scheme of fires. Themes, messages, and means of delivery. Military deception operations (on a need to know basis). Key control measures. Designate the operational framework for this operation: deep-close-security, main and supporting effort, or decisive-shaping-sustaining. Designation of the decisive operation, along with its task and purpose, linked to how it supports the higher headquarters’ concept.

NOTE: For the purpose of this section, the decisive-shaping-sustaining operational framework is an example. Planners use the same process when analyzing the other two operational frameworks—deep-close-security and main and supporting effort—to develop initial concepts of the operation.

9-110. Planners select control measures, including graphics, to control subordinate units during an operation. These establish responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate units’ actions from impeding one another. These measures also foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unnecessarily restricting freedom of action. Good control measures foster decisionmaking and individual initiative. (See FM 3-90-1 for a discussion of control measures associated with offensive and defensive tasks. See ADRP 1-02 for doctrinally correct unit symbols, control measures, and rules for drawing control measures on overlays and maps.)

9-111. Planners may use both lines of operations and lines of effort to build their broad concept. Lines of operations portray the more traditional links among objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity. A line of effort, however, helps planners link multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and end state conditions. Combining lines of operations with lines of effort allows planners to include nonmilitary activities in their broad concept. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks that, when accomplished, help set end state conditions of an operation.

9-112. Based on the commander’s planning guidance (informed by the Army design methodology concept if this preceded the MDMP), planners develop lines of effort by—

Confirming end state conditions from the initial commander’s intent and planning guidance. Determining and describing each line of effort. Identifying objectives (intermediate goals) and determining tasks along each line of effort.

9-113. During COA development, lines of effort are general and lack specifics, such as tasks to subordinate units associated to objectives along each line of effort. Units develop and refine lines of effort, including specific tasks to subordinate units, during war-gaming. (See ADRP 5-0 and FM 3-07 for examples of operations depicted along lines of effort.)

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9-114. As planning progresses, commanders may modify lines of effort and add details while war-gaming. Operations with other instruments of national power support a broader, comprehensive approach to stability tasks. Each operation, however, differs. Commanders develop and modify lines of effort to focus operations on achieving an end state, even as the situation evolves.

Assign Headquarters 9-115. After determining the broad concept, planners create a task organization by assigning headquarters to groupings of forces. They consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters and the ability of that headquarters to control those units. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two subordinate maneuver units (but not more than five) for fast-paced offensive or defensive tasks. The number and type of units assigned to a headquarters for stability tasks vary based on factors of the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). If planners need additional headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task organization takes into account the entire operational organization. It also accounts for the special command requirements for operations, such as a passage of lines, or air assault.

Develop Course of Action Statements and Sketches 9-116. The G-3 (S-3) prepares a COA statement and supporting sketch for each COA. The COA statement clearly portrays how the unit will accomplish the mission. The COA statement briefly expresses how the unit will conduct the combined arms concept. The sketch provides a picture of the movement and maneuver aspects of the concept, including the positioning of forces. Together, the statement and sketch cover the who (generic task organization), what (tasks), when, where, and why (purpose) for each subordinate unit.

9-117. The COA sketch includes the array of generic forces and control measures, such as— The unit and subordinate unit boundaries. Unit movement formations (but not subordinate unit formations). The line of departure or line of contact and phase lines, if used. Information collection graphics. Ground and air axes of advance. Assembly areas, battle positions, strong points, engagement areas, and objectives. Obstacle control measures and tactical mission graphics. Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures. Main effort. Location of command posts and critical communications nodes. Known or templated enemy locations. Population concentrations.

9-118. Planners can include identifying features (such as cities, rivers, and roads) to help orient users. The sketch may be on any medium. What it portrays is more important than its form. (See figure 9-5 on page 9-24 for a sample COA sketch and COA statement for a brigade combat team using the operational framework of decisive-shaping-sustaining.)

◄ Conduct a Course of Action Briefing 9-119. After developing COAs, the staff briefs them to the commander. A collaborative session may facilitate subordinate planning. The COA briefing includes—

An updated IPB (if there are significant changes). As many threat COAs as necessary (or specified by the commander). At a minimum the most likely and most dangerous threat COAs must be developed. The approved problem statement and mission statement. The commander’s and higher commander’s intents. COA statements and sketches, including lines of effort if used.

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The rationale for each COA, including— Considerations that might affect enemy COAs. Critical events for each COA. Deductions resulting from the relative combat power analysis. The reason units are arrayed as shown on the sketch. (See ADRP 1-02 for doctrine on COA sketches.) The reason the staff used the selected control measures. The impact on civilians. How the COA accounts for minimum essential stability tasks. New facts and new or updated assumptions. Refined COA evaluation criteria.

Select or Modify Courses of Action for Continued Analysis 9-120. After the COA briefing, the commander selects or modifies those COAs for continued analysis. The commander also issues planning guidance. If commanders reject all COAs, the staff begins again. If commanders accept one or more of the COAs, staff members begin COA analysis. The commander may create a new COA by incorporating elements of one or more COAs developed by the staff. The staff then prepares to war-game this new COA. The staff incorporates those modifications and ensures all staff members understand the changed COA.

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Figure 9-5. +Sample brigade course of action sketch

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Figure 9-5. Sample brigade course of action sketch (continued)

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STEP 4–COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND WAR-GAMING 9-121. COA analysis enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties or coordination problems as well as probable consequences of planned actions for each COA being considered. It helps them think through the tentative plan. COA analysis may require commanders and staffs to revisit parts of a COA as discrepancies arise. COA analysis not only appraises the quality of each COA, but it also uncovers potential execution problems, decisions, and contingencies. In addition, COA analysis influences how commanders and staffs understand a problem and may require the planning process to restart. (See figure 9-6.)

Figure 9-6. Step 4–course of action analysis and war-gaming

9-122. War-gaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given the force’s strengths and dispositions, the enemy’s capabilities, and possible COAs; the impact and requirements of civilians in the area of operations; and other aspects of the situation. The simplest form of war-gaming is the manual method, often using a tabletop approach with blowups of matrixes and templates. The most sophisticated form of war-gaming is computer-aided modeling and simulation. Regardless of the form used, each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and enemy forces interaction. This basic war-gaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) applies to offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. When conducting COA analysis, commanders and staffs perform the process actions and produce the outputs shown in figure 9-6.

9-123. War-gaming results in refined COAs, a completed synchronization matrix, and decision support templates and matrixes for each COA. A synchronization matrix records the results of a war game. It depicts how friendly forces for a particular COA are synchronized in time, space, and purpose in relation to an enemy COA or other events in stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. The decision support template and matrix portray key decisions and potential actions that are likely to arise during the execution of each COA.

9-124. COA analysis allows the staff to synchronize the six warfighting functions for each COA. It also helps the commander and staff to—

Determine how to maximize the effects of combat power while protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage. Further develop a visualization of the operation. Anticipate operational events.

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Determine conditions and resources required for success. Determine when and where to apply force capabilities. Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized results. Determine the most flexible COA.

9-125. During the war game, the staff takes each COA and begins to develop a detailed plan while determining its strengths or weaknesses. War-gaming tests and improves COAs. The commander, staff, and other available partners (and subordinate commanders and staffs if the war game is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen events, tasks, requirements, or problems.

Gather the Tools 9-126. The first task for COA analysis is to gather the necessary tools to conduct the war game. The COS (XO) directs the staff to gather tools, materials, and data for the war game. Units war-game with maps, sand tables, computer simulations, or other tools that accurately reflect the terrain. The staff posts the COA on a map displaying the area of operations. Tools required include, but are not limited to—

Running estimates. Threat templates and models. Civil considerations overlays, databases, and data files. Modified combined obstacle overlays and terrain effects matrices. A recording method. Completed COAs, including graphics. A means to post or display enemy and friendly unit symbols and other organizations. A map of the area of operations.

List All Friendly Forces 9-127. The commander and staff consider all units that can be committed to the operation, paying special attention to support relationships and constraints. This list includes assets from all participants operating in the area of operations. The friendly forces list remains constant for all COAs.

List Assumptions 9-128. The commander and staff review previous assumptions for continued validity and necessity. Any changes resulting from this review are noted for record.

List Known Critical Events and Decision Points 9-129. A critical event is an event that directly influences mission accomplishment. Critical events include events that trigger significant actions or decisions (such as commitment of an enemy reserve), complicated actions requiring detailed study (such as a passage of lines), and essential tasks. The list of critical events includes major events from the unit’s current position through mission accomplishment. It includes reactions by civilians that potentially affect operations or require allocation of significant assets to account for essential stability tasks.

9-130. A decision point is a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). Decision points may be associated with the friendly force, the status of ongoing operations, and with CCIRs that describe what information the commander needs to make the anticipated decision. A decision point requires a decision by the commander. It does not dictate what the decision is, only that the commander must make one, and when and where it should be made to maximally impact friendly or enemy COAs or the accomplishment of stability tasks.

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Select the War-Gaming Method 9-131. Three recommended war-gaming methods exist: belt, avenue-in-depth, and box. Each considers the area of interest and all enemy forces that can affect the outcome of the operation. Planners can use the methods separately or in combination and modified for long-term operations dominated by stability.

9-132. The belt method divides the area of operations into belts (areas) running the width of the area of operations. The shape of each belt is based on the factors of METT-TC. The belt method works best when conducting offensive and defensive tasks on terrain divided into well-defined cross-compartments, during phased operations (such as gap crossings, air assaults, or airborne operations), or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined belts or echelons. Belts can be adjacent to or overlap each other.

9-133. This war-gaming method is based on a sequential analysis of events in each belt. Commanders prefer it because it focuses simultaneously on all forces affecting a particular event. A belt might include more than one critical event. Under time-constrained conditions, the commander can use a modified belt method. The modified belt method divides the area of operations into not more than three sequential belts. These belts are not necessarily adjacent or overlapping but focus on the critical actions throughout the depth of the area of operations. (See figure 9-7.)

Figure 9-7. Sample belt method

9-134. In stability tasks, the belt method can divide the COA by events, objectives (goals not geographic locations), or events and objectives in a selected slice across all lines of effort. The belt method consists of war-gaming relationships among events or objectives on all lines of effort in the belt. (See figure 9-8 on page 9-29.)

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Figure 9-8. Sample modified belt method using lines of effort

9-135. The avenue-in-depth method focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the decisive operation. This method is good for offensive COAs or in the defense when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support. (See figure 9-9.)

Figure 9-9. Sample avenue-in-depth method

9-136. In stability tasks, planners can modify the avenue-in-depth method. Instead of focusing on a geographic avenue, the staff war-games a line of effort. This method focuses on one line of effort at a time, beginning with the decisive line. The avenue-in-depth method includes not only war-gaming events and objectives in the selected line, but also war-gaming relationships among events or objectives on all lines of effort with respect to events in the selected line. (See figure 9-10 on page 9-30.)

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Figure 9-10. Sample modified avenue-in-depth method using lines of effort

9-137. The box method is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an engagement area, a wet gap crossing site, or a landing zone. It works best in a time-constrained environment, such as a hasty attack. The box method is particularly useful when planning operations in noncontiguous areas of operation. When using this method, the staff isolates the area and focuses on critical events in it. Staff members assume that friendly units can handle most situations in the area of operations and focus their attention on essential tasks. (See figure 9-11.)

Figure 9-11. Sample box method

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9-138. In stability tasks, the box method may focus analysis on a specific objective along a line of effort, such as development of local security forces as part of improving civil security. (See figure 9-12.)

Figure 9-12. Sample modified box method using lines of effort

Select a Technique to Record and Display Results 9-139. The war-game results provide a record from which to build task organizations, synchronize activities, develop decision support templates, confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and compare COAs. Two techniques are commonly used to record and display results: the synchronization matrix technique and the sketch note technique. In both techniques, staff members record any remarks regarding the strengths and weaknesses they discover. The amount of detail depends on the time available. Unit SOPs address details and methods of recording and displaying war-gaming results.

9-140. The synchronization matrix is a tool the staff uses to record the results of war-gaming that helps them synchronize a course of action across time, space, and purpose in relationship to potential enemy and civil actions. The first entry in the left column is the time, event, or phase of the operation. The second entry is the most likely enemy action. The third entry is the most likely civilian action. The fourth entry is the decision points for the friendly COA. The remainder of the matrix focuses on selected warfighting functions, their subordinate tasks, and the unit’s major subordinate commands. (See table 9-3 on page 9-32.)

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Table 9-3. Sample synchronization matrix tool

Time/Event/Phase H - 24 hours (or event or phase)

H-hour (or event or phase)

H + 24 (or event or phase)

Enemy Action Initiates threat activities and movements

Defends from security zone

Commits reserve

Population or Civilian Action

Orderly evacuation from area continues

Decision Points Conduct aviation attack of OBJ Irene

Control Measures

M ov

em en

t a nd

M

an eu

ve r

1st ABCT Move on Route Irish Cross LD Seize on OBJ Irene 2d ABCT Move on Route Longstreet Cross LD Seize on OBJ Rose 3d ABCT FPOL with 1st BCT

Avn Bde Attack enemy reserve on OBJ Irene BFSB

Reserve Information Collection Fires Prep fires initiated at H-5

Suppression of enemy air defense initiated

P ro

te ct

io n

Engineer

PMO

CBRN

Sustainment Mission Command Main CP with 1st BCT

Close Air Support Electronic Warfare Enemy command and

control jammed Nonlethal Effects Surrender broadcasts and

leaflets Host Nation Interagency NGOs Begins refugee relief Note: The first column is representative only and can be modified to fit formation needs. AMD air and missile defense Avn Bde aviation brigade ABCT armored brigade combat team CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CP command post FPOL forward passage of lines

H hour LD line of departure NGO nongovernmental organization OBJ objective PMO provost marshal office

9-141. The sketch note method uses brief notes concerning critical locations or tasks and purposes. These notes refer to specific locations or relate to general considerations covering broad areas. The commander and staff mark locations on the map and on a separate war-game work sheet. Staff members use sequential numbers to link the notes to the corresponding locations on the map or overlay. Staff members also identify actions by placing them in sequential action groups, giving each subtask a separate number. They use the war-game work sheet to identify all pertinent data for a critical event. (See table 9-4.) They assign each event a number and title and use the columns on the work sheet to identify and list in sequence—

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Units and assigned tasks. Expected enemy actions and reactions. Friendly counteractions and assets. Total assets needed for the task. Estimated time to accomplish the task. The decision point tied to executing the task. CCIRs. Control measures. Remarks.

Table 9-4. Sample sketch note method

Critical Event Seize OBJ Sword Sequence number 1 Action TF 3 attacks to destroy enemy company on OBJ

Sword Reaction Enemy company on OBJ Club counterattacks Counteraction TF 1 suppresses enemy company on OBJ Club Assets TF 3, TF 1, and TF2 Time H+1 to H+4 Decision point DP 3a and 3b Commander’s critical information requirements

Location of enemy armor reserve west of PL Jaguar

Control measures Axis Zinc and support by fire position 1 Remarks none DP decision point OBJ objective

PL phase line TF task force

War-Game the Operation and Assess the Results 9-142. War-gaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of operations given the friendly force’s strengths and dispositions, the enemy’s capabilities and possible COAs, and civilian locations and activities. During the war game, the commander and staff try to foresee the actions, reactions, and counteractions of all participants, including civilians. The staff analyzes each selected event. It identifies tasks that the force one echelon below it must accomplish, using assets two echelons below the staff. Identifying strengths and weaknesses of each COA allows the staff to adjust the COAs as necessary.

9-143. The war game focuses not so much on the tools used but on the people who participate. Staff members who participate in war-gaming should be the individuals deeply involved in developing COAs. Red team members (who can provide alternative points of view) provide insight on each COA. In stability tasks, subject matter experts in areas such as economic or local governance can also help assess the probable results of planned actions, including identifying possible unintended effects.

9-144. The war game follows an action-reaction-counteraction cycle. Actions are those events initiated by the side with the initiative. Reactions are the opposing side’s actions in response. With regard to stability tasks, the war game tests the effects of actions, including intended and unintended effects, as they stimulate anticipated responses from civilians and civil institutions. Counteractions are the first side’s responses to reactions. This sequence of action-reaction-counteraction continues until the critical event is completed or until the commander decides to use another COA to accomplish the mission.

9-145. The staff considers all possible forces, including templated enemy forces outside the area of operations, that can influence the operation. The staff also considers the actions of civilians in the area of operations, the diverse kinds of coverage of unfolding events, and their consequences in the global media.

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The staff evaluates each friendly move to determine the assets and actions required to defeat the enemy at that point or to accomplish stability tasks. The staff continually considers branches to the plan that promote success against likely enemy counteractions or unexpected civilian reactions. Lastly, the staff lists assets used in the appropriate columns of the work sheet and lists the totals in the assets column (not considering any assets lower than two command levels below the staff).

9-146. The commander and staff examine many areas during the war game. These include, but are not limited to—

All friendly capabilities. All enemy capabilities and critical civil considerations that impact operations. Global media responses to proposed actions. Movement considerations. Closure rates. Lengths of columns. Formation depths. Ranges and capabilities of weapon systems. Desired effects of fires.

9-147. The commander and staff consider how to create conditions for success, protect the force, and shape the operational environment. Experience, historical data, SOPs, and doctrinal literature provide much of the necessary information. During the war game, staff officers perform a risk assessment for their functional areas for each COA. They then propose appropriate control measures. They continually assess the risk of adverse reactions from population and media resulting from actions taken by all sides in the operation. Staff officers develop ways to mitigate those risks.

9-148. The staff continually assesses the risk to friendly forces, balancing between mass and dispersion. When assessing the risk of weapons of mass destruction to friendly forces, planners view the target that the force presents through the eyes of an enemy target analyst. They consider ways to reduce vulnerability and determine the appropriate level of mission-oriented protective posture consistent with mission accomplishment.

9-149. The staff identifies the required assets of the warfighting functions to support the concept of operations, including those needed to synchronize sustaining operations. If requirements exceed available assets, the staff recommends priorities based on the situation, commander’s intent, and planning guidance. To maintain flexibility, the commander may decide to create a reserve to maintain assets for unforeseen tasks or opportunities.

9-150. The commander can modify any COA based on how things develop during the war game. When doing this, the commander validates the composition and location of the decisive operation, shaping operations, and reserve forces. Control measures are adjusted as necessary. The commander may also identify situations, opportunities, or additional critical events that require more analysis. The staff performs this analysis quickly and incorporates the results into the war-gaming record.

9-151. An effective war game results in the commander and staff refining, identifying, analyzing, developing, and determining several effects. (See table 9-5.)

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Table 9-5. Effective war game results

The commander and staff refine (or modify)— Each course of action, to include identifying branches and sequels that become on-order or be-prepared missions. The locations and times of decisive points. The enemy event template and matrix. The task organization, including forces retained in general support. Control requirements, including control measures and updated operational graphics. Commander’s critical information requirements and other information requirements—including the latest time information is of value—and incorporate them into the information collection plan.

The commander and staff identify— Key or decisive terrain and determining how to use it. Tasks the unit retains and tasks assigned to subordinates. Likely times and areas for enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and friendly chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense requirements. Potential times or locations for committing the reserve. The most dangerous enemy course of action. The most likely enemy course of action. The most dangerous civilian reaction. Locations for the commander and command posts. Critical events. Requirements for support of each warfighting function. Effects of friendly and enemy actions on civilians and infrastructure and on military operations. Or confirming the locations of named areas of interest, target areas of interest, decision points, and intelligence requirements needed to support them. Analyzing, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of each course of action. Hazards, assessing their risk, developing control measures for them, and determining residual risk. The coordination required for integrating and synchronizing interagency, host-nation, and nongovernmental organization involvement.

The commander and staff analyze— Potential civilian reactions to operations. Potential media reaction to operations. Potential impacts on civil security, civil control, and essential services in the area of operations.

The commander and staff develop— Decision points. A synchronization matrix. A decision support template and matrix. Solutions to achieving minimum essential stability tasks in the area of operations. The information collection plan and graphics. Themes and messages. Fires, protection, and sustainment plans and graphic control measures.

The commander and staff determine— The requirements for military deception and surprise. The timing for concentrating forces and starting the attack or counterattack. The movement times and tables for critical assets, including information systems nodes. The estimated the duration of the entire operation and each critical event. The projected the percentage of enemy forces defeated in each critical event and overall. The percentage of minimum essential tasks that the unit can or must accomplish. The media coverage and impact on key audiences. The targeting requirements in the operation, to include identifying or confirming high-payoff targets and establishing attack guidance. The allocation of assets to subordinate commanders to accomplish their missions.

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Conduct a War-Game Briefing (Optional) 9-152. Time permitting, the staff delivers a briefing to all affected elements to ensure everyone understands the results of the war game. The staff uses the briefing for review and ensures that it captures all relevant points of the war game for presentation to the commander, COS (XO), or deputy or assistant commander. In a collaborative environment, the briefing may include selected subordinate staffs. A war-game briefing format includes the following:

Higher headquarters’ mission, commander’s intent, and military deception plan. Updated IPB. Assumptions. Friendly and enemy COAs that were war-gamed, including—

Critical events. Possible enemy actions and reactions. Possible impact on civilians. Possible media impacts. Modifications to the COAs. Strengths and weaknesses. Results of the war game.

War-gaming technique used.

General War-Gaming Rules and Responsibilities 9-153. War gamers need to—

Remain objective, not allowing personality or their sense of “what the commander wants” to influence them. Avoid defending a COA just because they personally developed it. Record advantages and disadvantages of each COA accurately as they emerge. Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of each COA. If a COA fails any of these tests, reject it. Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support such conclusions. Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This occurs during Step 5—COA Comparison.

Mission Command Responsibilities

9-154. The commander has overall responsibility for the war-gaming process, and the commander can determine the staff members who are involved in war-gaming. Traditionally, certain staff members have key and specific roles.

9-155. The COS (XO) coordinates actions of the staff during the war game. This officer is the unbiased controller of the process, ensuring the staff stays on a timeline and achieves the goals of the war-gaming session. In a time-constrained environment, this officer ensures that, at a minimum, the decisive operation is war-gamed.

9-156. The G-3 (S-3) assists the commander with the rehearsal. The G-3 (S-3)— Portrays the friendly scheme of maneuver, including the employment of information-related capabilities. Ensures subordinate unit actions comply with the commander’s intent. Normally provides the recorder.

9-157. The assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6 [S-6]) assesses network operations, spectrum management operations, network defense, and information protection feasibility of each war-gamed COA. The G-6 (S-6) determines communications systems requirements and compares them to available assets, identifies potential shortfalls, and recommends actions to eliminate or reduce their effects.

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9-158. The information operations officer assesses the information operations concept of support against the ability of information-related capabilities to execute tasks in support of each war-gamed COA and the effectiveness of integrated information-related capabilities to impact various audiences and populations in and outside the area of operations. The information operations officer, in coordination with the electronic warfare officer, also integrates information operations with cyber electromagnetic activities.

9-159. The assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9 [S-9]) ensures each war-gamed COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the “C” of METT-TC). The civil affairs operations officer considers not only tactical issues but also sustainment issues. This officer assesses how operations affect civilians and estimates the requirements for essential stability tasks commanders might have to undertake based on the ability of the unified action partners. Host-nation support and care of dislocated civilians are of particular concern. The civil affairs operations officer’s analysis considers how operations affect public order and safety, the potential for disaster relief requirements, noncombatant evacuation operations, emergency services, and the protection of culturally significant sites. This officer provides feedback on how the culture in the area of operations affects each COA. If the unit lacks an assigned civil affairs officer, the commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff member.

9-160. The red team staff section provides the commander and assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) with an independent capability to fully explore alternatives. The staff looks at plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities of the operational environment from the perspectives of enemies, unified action partners, and others.

9-161. The electronic warfare officer provides information on the electronic warfare target list, electronic attack taskings, electronic attack requests, and the electronic warfare portion of the collection matrix and the attack guidance matrix. Additionally, the electronic warfare officer assesses threat vulnerabilities, friendly electronic warfare capabilities, and friendly actions relative to electronic warfare activities and other cyber electromagnetic activities not covered by the G-6 or G-2.

9-162. The staff judge advocate advises the commander on all matters pertaining to law, policy, regulation, good order, and discipline for each war-gamed COA. This officer provides legal advice across the range of military operations on law of war, rules of engagement, international agreements, Geneva Conventions, treatment and disposition of noncombatants, and the legal aspects of targeting.

9-163. The operations research and systems analysis staff section provides analytic support to the commander for planning and assessment of operations. Specific responsibilities include—

Providing quantitative analytic support, including regression and trend analysis, to planning and assessment activities. Assisting other staff members in developing customized analytical tools for specific requirements, providing a quality control capability, and conducting assessments to measure the effectiveness of operations.

9-164. The safety officer provides input to influence accident and incident reductions by implementing risk management procedures throughout the mission planning and execution process.

9-165. The knowledge management officer assesses the effectiveness of the knowledge management plan for each course of action.

9-166. The space operations officer provides and represents friendly, threat, and non-aligned space capabilities.

Intelligence Responsibilities

9-167. During the war game the G-2 (S-2) role-plays the enemy commander, other threat organizations in the area of operations, and critical civil considerations in the area of operations. This officer develops critical enemy decision points in relation to the friendly COAs, projects enemy reactions to friendly actions, and projects enemy losses. The intelligence officer assigns different responsibilities to available staff members within the section (such as the enemy commander, friendly intelligence officer, and enemy recorder) for war-gaming. The intelligence officer captures the results of each enemy, threat group, and civil considerations action and counteraction as well as the corresponding friendly and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By trying to realistically win the war game for the enemy, the intelligence officer ensures

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that the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each enemy COA. For the friendly force, the intelligence officer—

Refines intelligence and information requirements and the planning requirements tools. Refines the situation and event templates, including named areas of interest that support decision points. Refines the event template with corresponding decision points, target areas of interest, and high-value targets. Participates in targeting to select high-payoff targets from high-value targets identified during IPB. Recommends priority intelligence requirements that correspond to the decision points. Refines civil considerations overlays, databases, and data files. Refines the modified combined obstacle overlays and terrain effects matrices. Refines weather products that outline the critical weather impacts on operations.

Movemenent and Maneuver Responsibilities

9-168. During the war game, the G-3 (S-3) and assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5 [S-5]) are responsible for movement and maneuver. The G-3 (S-3) normally selects the technique for the war game and role-plays the friendly maneuver commander. Various staff officers assist the G-3 (S-3), such as the aviation officer and engineer officer. The G-3 (S-3) executes friendly maneuver as outlined in the COA sketch and COA statement. The G-5 (S-5) assesses warfighting function requirements, solutions, and concepts for each COA; develops plans and orders; and determines potential branches and sequels arising from various war-gamed COAs. The G-5 (S-5) also coordinates and synchronizes warfighting functions in all plans and orders. The planning staff ensures that the war game of each COA covers every operational aspect of the mission. The members of the staff record each event’s strengths and weaknesses and the rationale for each action. They complete the decision support template and matrix for each COA. They annotate the rationale for actions during the war game and use it later with the commander’s guidance to compare COAs.

Fires Responsibilities

9-169. The chief of fires (fire support officer) assesses the fire support feasibility of each war-gamed COA. This officer develops a proposed high-payoff target list, target selection standards, and attack guidance matrix. The chief of fires works with the intelligence officer to identify named and target areas of interest for enemy indirect fire weapon systems, and identifies high-payoff targets and additional events that may influence the positioning of field artillery and air defense artillery assets. The chief of fires should also offer a list of possible defended assets for air defense artillery forces and assist the commander in making a final determination about asset priority.

Protection Responsibilities

9-170. The chief of protection assesses protection element requirements, refines EEFIs, and develops a scheme of protection for each war-gamed COA. The chief of protection—

Refines the critical asset list and the defended asset list. Assesses hazards. Develops risk control measures and mitigation measures of threats and hazards. Establishes personnel recovery coordination measures. Implements operational area security to include security of lines of communications, antiterrorism measures, and law enforcement operations. Ensures survivability measures reduce vulnerabilities. Refines chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.

Sustainment Responsibilities

9-171. During the war game, the assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1 [S-1]) assesses the personnel aspect of building and maintaining the combat power of units. This officer identifies potential shortfalls and

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recommends COAs to ensure units maintain adequate manning to accomplish their mission. As the primary staff officer assessing the human resources planning considerations to support sustainment operations, the G-1 (S-1) provides human resources support for the operation.

9-172. The assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4 [S-4]) assesses the logistics feasibility of each war-gamed COA. This officer determines critical requirements for each logistics function (classes I through VII, IX, and X) and identifies potential problems and deficiencies. The G-4 (S-4) assesses the status of all logistics functions required to support the COA, including potential support required to provide essential services to the civilians, and compares it to available assets. This officer identifies potential shortfalls and recommends actions to eliminate or reduce their effects. While improvising can contribute to responsiveness, only accurately predicting requirements for each logistics function can ensure continuous sustainment. The logistics officer ensures that available movement times and assets support each COA.

9-173. During the war game, the assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8) assesses the commander’s area of operations to determine the best COA for use of resources. This assessment includes both core functions of financial management: resource management and finance operations. This officer determines partner relationships (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational), requirements for special funding, and support to the procurement process.

9-174. The surgeon section coordinates, monitors, and synchronizes the execution of the health system activities for the command for each war-gamed COA to ensure a fit and healthy force.

Recorders

9-175. The use of recorders is particularly important. Recorders capture coordinating instructions, subunit tasks and purposes, and information required to synchronize the operation. Recorders allow the staff to write part of the order before they complete the planning. Automated information systems enable recorders to enter information into preformatted forms that represent either briefing charts or appendixes to orders. Each staff section keeps formats available to facilitate networked orders production.

STEP 5–COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON 9-176. COA comparison is an objective process to evaluate COAs independently and against set evaluation criteria approved by the commander and staff. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of COAs, enable selecting a COA with the highest probability of success, and further developing it in an OPLAN or OPORD. The commander and staff perform certain actions and processes that lead to key outputs. (See figure 9-13.)

Figure 9-13. Step 5–course of action comparison

◄ Conduct Advantages and Disadvantages Analysis 9-177. The COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. Staff members each present their findings for the others’ consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed during mission analysis and refined during

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course of action development, the staff outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages with respect to each other. (See table 9-6.)

Table 9-6. Sample advantages and disadvantages

Course of Action Advantages Disadvantages

Course of action 1

Decisive operation avoids major terrain obstacles. Adequate maneuver space available for units conducting the decisive operation and the reserve.

Units conducting the decisive operation face stronger resistance at the start of the operation. Limited resources available to establishing civil control to town X.

Course of action 2

Shaping operations provide excellent flank protection of the decisive operations. Upon completion of decisive operations, units conducting shaping operations can quickly transition to establish civil control and provide civil security to the population in town X.

Operation may require the early employment of the division’s reserve.

◄ Compare Courses of Action 9-178. Comparison of COAs is critical. The staff uses any technique that helps develop those key outputs and recommendations and assists the commander to make the best decision. A common technique is the decision matrix. This matrix uses evaluation criteria developed during mission analysis and refined during COA development to help assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA. (See table 9-7.)

Table 9-7. Sample decision matrix

Weight1 1 2 1 1 2 Criteria2

Simplicity Maneuver Fires Civil control Mass TotalCourse of Action

COA 13 2 2

(4) 2 1 1

(2) 8 (11)

COA 23 1 1 (2)

1 2 2 (4)

7 (10)

Notes: 1 The COS (XO) may emphasize one or more criteria by assigning weights to them based on a determination of their relative importance. Higher weights correspond to emphasized or more important criteria. 2 Criteria are those approved by the commander during the mission analysis brief. 3 COAs selected for war-gaming have rankings assigned with regards to each criteria based on relative advantages and disadvantages of each COA. For example, when compared for relative simplicity, COA 2 is simpler than COA 1 and is therefore ranked 1, with COA 1 ranked 2.

9-179. The decision matrix is a tool to compare and evaluate COAs thoroughly and logically. However, the process may be based on highly subjective judgments that can change dramatically during the course of evaluation. In table 9-7, the weights reflect the relative importance of each criterion as initially estimated by a COS (XO) during mission analysis and adjusted or approved by the commander. During COA comparison, rankings are assigned from 1 to however many COAs exist. Lower rankings are more preferred. After assigning ranks to COAs, the staff adds the unweighted ranks in each row horizontally and records the sum in the Total column on the far right of each COA. The staff then multiplies the same ranks by the weights associated with each criterion and notes the product in parenthesis underneath the unweighted rank. No notation is required if the weight is 1. The staff adds these weighted ranks horizontally and records the sum in parenthesis underneath the unweighted total in the Total column to the right of each COA. The staff then compares the totals to determine the most preferred (lowest total) COA

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based on both unweighted and weighted ranks. Although the lowest total denotes a most preferred solution, the process for estimating relative COA ranks and relative criteria weighting may be highly subjective. Upon review and consideration, the commander—based on personal judgment—may accept the results of the decision matrix or elect to execute one of the other COAs.

9-180. Commanders and staffs cannot solely rely on the outcome of a decision matrix, as it only provides a partial basis for a solution. During the decision matrix process, planners carefully avoid reaching conclusions from a quantitative analysis of subjective weights. Comparing and evaluating COAs by each criterion is probably more useful than merely comparing totaled ranks. Judgments often change with regard to the relative weighting of criteria during close analysis of COAs, which will change weighted rank totals and possibly the most preferred COA.

9-181. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA, the most dangerous enemy COA, the most important stability task, or the most damaging environmental impact. The selected COA should also—

Pose the minimum risk to the force and mission accomplishment. Place the force in the best posture for future operations. Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates. Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities. Provide the most secure and stable environment for civilians in the area of operations. Best facilitate information themes and messages.

9-182. Staff officers often use their own matrix to compare COAs with respect to their functional areas. Matrixes use the evaluation criteria developed before the war game. Their greatest value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, produce operational success. Staff officers use these analytical tools to prepare recommendations. Commanders provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff recommendations and making a decision.

Conduct a Course of Action Decision Briefing 9-183. After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies its preferred COA and makes a recommendation. If the staff cannot reach a decision, the COS (XO) decides which COA to recommend. The staff then delivers a decision briefing to the commander. The COS (XO) highlights any changes to each COA resulting from the war game. The decision briefing includes—

The commander’s intent of the higher and next higher commanders. The status of the force and its components. The current IPB. The COAs considered, including—

Assumptions used. Results of running estimates. A summary of the war game for each COA, including critical events, modifications to any COA, and war-game results. Advantages and disadvantages (including risks) of each COA. The recommended COA. If a significant disagreement exists, then the staff should inform the commander and, if necessary, discuss the disagreement.

STEP 6–COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL 9-184. After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA to best accomplish the mission. If the commander rejects all COAs, the staff starts COA development again. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff war-games the new COA and presents the results to the commander with a recommendation. (See figure 9-14.)

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Figure 9-14. Step 6–course of action approval

9-185. After approving a COA, the commander issues the final planning guidance. The final planning guidance includes a refined commander’s intent (if necessary) and new CCIRs to support execution. It also includes any additional guidance on priorities for the warfighting functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation. This guidance includes priorities for resources needed to preserve freedom of action and ensure continuous sustainment.

9-186. Commanders include the risk they are willing to accept in the final planning guidance. If there is time, commanders use a video teleconference to discuss acceptable risk with adjacent, subordinate, and senior commanders. However, commanders still obtain the higher commander’s approval to accept any risk that might imperil accomplishing the higher commander’s mission.

9-187. Based on the commander’s decision and final planning guidance, the staff issues a WARNORD to subordinate headquarters. This WARNORD contains the information subordinate units need to refine their plans. It confirms guidance issued in person or by video teleconference and expands on details not covered by the commander personally. The WARNORD issued after COA approval normally contains—

The area of operations. Mission. Commander’s intent. Updated CCIRs and EEFIs. Concept of operations. Principal tasks assigned to subordinate units. Preparation and rehearsal instructions not included in the SOPs. A final timeline for the operations.

STEP 7–ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION 9-188. The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations and the required supporting information. The COA statement becomes the concept of operations for the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay. If time permits, the staff may conduct a more detailed war game of the selected COA to more fully synchronize the operation and complete the plan. (See figure 9-15 on page 9-42.) The staff writes the OPORD or OPLAN using the Army’s operation order format. (See appendix C.)

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Figure 9-15. Step 7–orders production, dissemination, and transition

9-189. Normally, the COS (XO) coordinates with staff principals to assist the G-3 (S-3) in developing the plan or order. Based on the commander’s planning guidance, the COS (XO) dictates the type of order, sets and enforces the time limits and development sequence, and determines which staff section publishes which attachments.

9-190. Prior to the commander approving the plan or order, the staff ensures the plan or order is internally consistent and is nested with the higher commander’s intent. They do this through—

Plans and orders reconciliation. Plans and orders crosswalk.

Plans and Orders Reconciliation 9-191. Plans and orders reconciliation occurs internally as the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire plan or order. This reconciliation ensures that the base plan or order and all attachments are complete and in agreement. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. If staff members find discrepancies or gaps, they take corrective actions. Specifically, the staff compares the commander’s intent, mission, and commander’s CCIRs against the concept of operations and the different schemes of support (such as scheme of fires or scheme of sustainment). The staff ensures attachments are consistent with the information in the base plan or order.

Plans and Orders Crosswalk 9-192. During the plans and orders crosswalk, the staff compares the plan or order with that of the higher and adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure the plan meets the superior commander’s intent. The crosswalk identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. If staff members find discrepancies or gaps, they take corrective action.

Approving the Plan or Order 9-193. The final action in plan and order development is the approval of the plan or order by the commander. Commanders normally do not sign attachments; however, they should review them before signing the base plan or order.

9-194. Step 7 bridges the transition between planning and preparations. The plans-to-operations transition is a preparation activity that occurs within the headquarters. It ensures members of the current operations cell fully understand the plan before execution. During preparation, the responsibility for developing and maintaining the plan shifts from the plans (or future operations) cell to the current operations cell. This transition is the point at which the current operations cell becomes responsible for controlling execution of the operation order. This responsibility includes answering requests for information concerning the order and maintaining the order through fragmentary orders. This transition enables the plans cell to focus its planning efforts on sequels, branches, and other planning requirements directed by the commander. (See

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ADRP 5-0 for information on the plans to operations handover and chapter 12 of this manual for information on rehearsals.)

9-195. Commanders review and approve orders before the staff reproduces and disseminates them, unless commanders have delegated that authority. Subordinates immediately acknowledge receipt of the higher order. If possible, the higher commander and staff brief the order to subordinate commanders in person. The commander and staff conduct confirmation briefings with subordinates immediately afterwards. Confirmation briefings can be conducted collaboratively with several commanders at the same time or with single commanders. These briefings may be conducted in person or by video teleconference.

PLANNING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT 9-196. Any planning process aims to quickly develop a flexible, sound, and fully integrated and synchronized plan. However, any operation may “outrun” the initial plan. The most detailed estimates cannot anticipate every possible branch or sequel, enemy action, threat action, or reaction from the local population, unexpected opportunity, or change in mission directed from higher headquarters. Fleeting opportunities or unexpected enemy action may require a quick decision to implement a new or modified plan. When this occurs, units often find themselves pressed for time in developing a new plan.

9-197. Before a unit can effectively conduct planning in a time-constrained environment, it must master the steps in the full MDMP. A unit can only shorten the process if it fully understands the role of each and every step of the process and the requirements to produce the necessary products. Training on these steps must be thorough and result in a series of staff battle drills that can be tailored to the time available.

9-198. Quality staffs produce simple, flexible, and tactically sound plans in time-constrained environments. Any METT-TC factor, but especially limited time, may make it difficult to complete every step of the MDMP in detail. Applying an inflexible process to all situations does not work. Anticipation, organization, and prior preparation are the keys to successful planning under time-constrained conditions.

9-199. Staffs can use the time saved on any step of the MDMP to— Refine the plan more thoroughly. Conduct a more deliberate and detailed war game. Consider potential branches and sequels in detail. Focus more on rehearsing and preparing the plan. Allow subordinate units more planning and preparation time.

THE COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITY 9-200. The commander decides how to adjust the MDMP, giving specific guidance to the staff to focus on the process and save time. Commanders shorten the MDMP when they lack time to perform each step in detail. The most significant factor to consider is time. It is the only nonrenewable, and often the most critical, resource. Commanders (who have access to only a small portion of the staff or none at all) rely even more than normal on their own expertise, intuition, and creativity as well as on their understanding of the environment and of the art and science of war. They may have to select a COA, mentally war-game it, and confirm their decision to the staff in a short time. If so, they base their decision more on experience than on a formal, integrated staff process.

9-201. Effective commanders avoid changing their guidance unless a significantly changed situation requires major revisions. Making frequent, minor changes to the guidance can easily result in lost time as the staff constantly adjusts the plan with an adverse ripple effect throughout overall planning.

9-202. Commanders consult with subordinate commanders before making a decision, if possible. Subordinate commanders are closer to the operation and can more accurately describe enemy, friendly, and civilian situations. Additionally, consulting with subordinates gives commanders insights into the upcoming operation and allows parallel planning. White boards and collaborative digital means of communicating greatly enhance parallel planning.

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9-203. In situations where commanders must decide quickly, they advise their higher headquarters of the selected COA, if time is available. However, commanders do not let an opportunity pass just because they cannot report their actions.

THE STAFF’S RESPONSIBILITY 9-204. Staff members keep their running estimates current. When time constraints exist, they can provide accurate, up-to-date assessments quickly and move directly into COA development. Under time-constrained conditions, commanders and staffs use as much of the previously analyzed information and as many of the previously created products as possible. The importance of running estimates increases as time decreases. Decisionmaking in a time-constrained environment usually occurs after a unit has entered the area of operations and begun operations. This means that the IPB, an updated common operational picture, and some portions of the running estimates should already exist. Civilian and military joint and multinational organizations operating in the area of operations should have well-developed plans and information to add insights to the operational environment. Detailed planning provides the basis for information that the commander and staff need to make decisions during execution.

TIME-SAVING TECHNIQUES 9-205. Paragraphs 9-206 through 9-210 discuss time-saving techniques to speed the planning process.

Increase Commander’s Involvement 9-206. While commanders cannot spend all their time with their planning staffs, the greater the commander’s involvement in planning, the faster the staff can plan. In time-constrained conditions, commanders who participate in the planning process can make decisions (such as COA selection) without waiting for a detailed briefing from the staff.

Limit the Number of Courses of Action to Develop 9-207. Limiting the number of COAs developed and war-gamed can save planning time. If time is extremely short, the commander can direct development of only one COA. In this case, the goal is an acceptable COA that meets mission requirements in the time available. This technique saves the most time. The fastest way to develop a plan has the commander directing development of one COA with branches against the most likely enemy COA or most damaging civil situation or condition. However, this technique should be used only when time is severely limited. In such cases, this choice of COA is often intuitive, relying on the commander’s experience and judgment. The commander determines which staff officers are essential to assist in COA development. Normally commanders require the intelligence officer, operations officer, plans officer, chief of fires (fire support officer), engineer officer, civil affairs operations officer, information operations officer, military information support operations officer, electronic warfare officer, and COS (XO). They may also include subordinate commanders, if available, either in person or by video teleconference. This team quickly develops a flexible COA that it feels will accomplish the mission. The commander mentally war-games this COA and gives it to the staff to refine.

Maximize Parallel Planning 9-208. Although parallel planning is the norm, maximizing its use in time-constrained environments is critical. In a time-constrained environment, the importance of WARNORDs increases as available time decreases. A verbal WARNORD now, followed by a written order later, saves more time than a written order one hour from now. The staff issues the same WARNORDs used in the full MDMP when abbreviating the process. In addition to WARNORDs, units must share all available information with subordinates, especially IPB products, as early as possible. The staff uses every opportunity to perform parallel planning with the higher headquarters and to share information with subordinates.

Increase Collaborative Planning 9-209. Planning in real time with higher headquarters and subordinates improves the overall planning effort of the organization. Modern information systems and a common operational picture shared

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electronically allow collaboration with subordinates from distant locations, can increase information sharing, and can improve the commander’s visualization. Additionally, taking advantage of subordinates’ input and knowledge of the situation in their areas of operations often results in developing better COAs quickly.

Use Liaison Officers 9-210. Liaison officers posted to higher headquarters and unified action partners’ headquarters allow commanders to have representation in their higher headquarters’ planning session. These officers assist in passing timely information to their parent headquarters and directly to the commander. Effective liaison officers have the commander’s full confidence and the necessary rank and experience for the mission. Commanders may elect to use a single individual or a liaison team. As representatives, liaison officers must—

Understand how their commander thinks and interpret verbal and written guidance. Convey their commander’s intent, planning guidance, mission, and concept of operations. Represent their commander’s position. Know the unit’s mission; tactics, techniques, and procedures; organization; capabilities; and communications equipment. Observe the established channels of command and staff functions. Be trained in their functional responsibilities. Be tactful. Possess the necessary language expertise.

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Chapter 10

Troop Leading Procedures Troop leading procedures provide small-unit leaders with a framework for planning and preparing for operations. Leaders of company and smaller units use troop leading procedures to develop plans and orders. This chapter describes the eight steps of troop leading procedures and their relationship to the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). While this chapter explains troop leading procedures from a ground-maneuver perspective, it applies to all types of small units.

BACKGROUND AND COMPARISON TO THE MDMP 10-1. Troop leading procedures (TLP) extend the MDMP to the small-unit level. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. They are both linked by the basic Army problem-solving process (see chapter 4). Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP as their primary planning process. Company-level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. This places the responsibility for planning primarily on the commander or small-unit leader.

10-2. Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation. (See paragraphs 10-10 to 10-41 for a discussion on the eight steps of TLP.)

10-3. Leaders use TLP when working alone or with a small group to solve problems. For example, a company commander may use the executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to assist during TLP.

10-4. The type, amount, and timeliness of information passed from higher to lower headquarters directly impact the lower unit leader’s TLP. Figure 10-1 on page 10-2 illustrates the parallel sequences of the MDMP of a battalion with the TLP of a company and a platoon. The solid arrows depict when a higher headquarters’ planning event could start the TLP of a subordinate unit. However, events do not always occur in the order shown. For example, TLP may start with receipt of a warning order (WARNORD), or they may not start until the higher headquarters has completed the MDMP and issued an operation order (OPORD). WARNORDs from higher headquarters may arrive at any time during TLP. Leaders remain flexible. They adapt TLP to fit the situation rather than try to alter the situation to fit a preconceived idea of how events should flow.

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Figure 10-1. Parallel sequences of the MDMP and troop leading procedures 10-5. Normally, the first three steps (receive the mission, issue a WARNORD, and make a tentative plan) of TLP occur in order. However, the sequence of subsequent steps is based on the situation. The tasks involved in some steps (for example, initiate movement and conduct reconnaissance) may occur several times. The last step, supervise and refine, occurs throughout.

10-6. A tension exists between executing current operations and planning for future operations. The small-unit leader must balance both. If engaged in a current operation, leaders have less time for TLP. If in a lull, transition, or an assembly area, leaders have more time to perform TLP thoroughly. In some situations, time constraints or other factors may prevent leaders from performing each step of TLP as thoroughly as they would like. For example, during the step make a tentative plan, small-unit leaders often develop only one acceptable course of action (COA) instead of multiple COAs. If time permits, leaders develop, compare, and analyze several COAs before deciding which one to execute.

10-7. Ideally, a battalion headquarters issues at least three WARNORDs to subordinates when conducting the MDMP as depicted in figure 10-1. WARNORDs are issued upon receipt of mission, completion of mission analysis, and when the commander approves a COA. However, the number of WARNORDs is not fixed. WARNORDs serve a function in planning similar to that of fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) during execution. Commanders may issue a WARNORD whenever they need to disseminate additional planning information or initiate necessary preparatory action, such as movement or reconnaissance.

10-8. Leaders begin TLP when they receive the initial WARNORD or receive a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, leaders modify their assessments, update tentative plans, and continue to supervise and assess preparations. In some situations, the higher headquarters may not issue the full sequence of WARNORDs; security considerations or tempo may make it impractical. Commanders carefully consider decisions to eliminate WARNORDs. Subordinate units always need to have enough

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information to plan and prepare for the operation. In other cases, leaders may initiate TLP before receiving a WARNORD based on existing plans and orders and on their understanding of the situation.

10-9. Parallel planning hinges on distributing information as it is received or developed. Leaders cannot complete their plans until they receive their unit mission. If each successive WARNORD contains enough information, the higher headquarters’ final order will confirm what subordinate leaders have already analyzed and put into their tentative plans. In other cases, the higher headquarters’ order may change or modify the subordinate’s tasks enough that additional planning and reconnaissance are required.

STEPS OF TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES 10-10. TLP provide small-unit leaders a framework for planning and preparing for operations. TLP begin when the leader receives a mission and continues throughout the operations process (plan, prepare, execute and assess). TLP are a sequence of actions that assist leaders to effectively and efficiently use available time to issue orders and execute tactical operations.

10-11. TLP consist of eight steps. TLP are also supported by risk management. (See FM 5-19 for more information on risk management.) The sequence of the steps of TLP is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some steps are done concurrently, while others may go on continuously throughout the operation:

Step 1–Receive the mission. Step 2–Issue a warning order. Step 3–Make a tentative plan. Step 4–Initiate movement. Step 5–Conduct reconnaissance. Step 6–Complete the plan. Step 7–Issue the order. Step 8–Supervise and refine.

STEP 1–RECEIVE THE MISSION 10-12. Receive the mission may occur in several ways. It may begin when the initial WARNORD or OPORD arrives from higher headquarters or when a leader anticipates a new mission. Frequently, leaders receive a mission in a FRAGORD over the radio. Ideally, they receive a series of WARNORDs, the OPORD, and a briefing from their commander. Normally, after receiving an OPORD leaders give a confirmation brief to their higher commander to ensure they understand the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations. The leader obtains clarification on any portions of the higher headquarters plan as required.

10-13. When they receive the mission, leaders perform an initial assessment of the situation (mission analysis) and allocate the time available for planning and preparation. (Preparation includes rehearsals and movement.) When a higher headquarters assigns a mission, it provides small-unit leaders an analysis of its operational environment. Often, higher headquarters will provide this assessment using the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]). From this higher level assessment, they can draw information relevant to their own operational environments and supplement it with their own knowledge of local conditions. During mission analysis, they filter relevant information into the categories of the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]). (See appendix A for a more detailed description of PMESII-PT and METT-TC). This initial assessment and time allocation form the basis of their initial WARNORDs and addresses the factors of METT-TC. The order and detail in which leaders analyze the factors of METT-TC is flexible. It depends on the amount of information available and the relative importance of each factor. For example, leaders may concentrate on the mission, enemy, and terrain, leaving weather and civil considerations until they receive more detailed information.

10-14. Often, leaders do not receive their final unit mission until the WARNORD is disseminated after COA approval or after the OPORD. Effective leaders do not wait until their higher headquarters completes

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planning to begin their planning. Using all information available, leaders develop their unit mission as completely as they can. They focus on the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of their higher and next higher headquarters. They pick major tasks their unit will probably be assigned and develop a mission statement based on information they have received. At this stage, the mission may be incomplete. For example, an initial mission statement could be, “First platoon conducts an ambush in the next 24 hours.” While not complete, this information allows subordinates to start preparations. Leaders complete a formal mission statement during TLP step 3 (make a tentative plan) and step 6 (complete the plan).

10-15. Based on what they know, leaders estimate the time available to plan and prepare for the mission. They begin by identifying the times they must complete major planning and preparation events, including rehearsals. Reverse planning helps them do this. Leaders identify critical times specified by higher headquarters and work back from them, estimating how much time each event will consume. Critical times might include times to load aircraft, the line of departure, or the start point for movement.

10-16. Leaders ensure that all subordinate echelons have sufficient time for their own planning and preparation needs. Generally, leaders at all levels use no more than one-third of the available time for planning and issuing the OPORD. Leaders allocate the remaining two-thirds of it to subordinates. Figure 10-2 illustrates a possible time schedule for an infantry company. The company adjusts the tentative schedule as necessary.

0600–Execute mission. 0530–Finalize or adjust the plan based on leader’s reconnaissance. 0400–Establish the objective rallying point; begin leader reconnaissance. 0200–Begin movement. 2100–Conduct platoon inspections. 1900–Conduct rehearsals. 1800–Eat meals. 1745–Hold backbriefs (squad leaders to platoon leaders). 1630–Issue platoon OPORDs. 1500–Hold backbriefs (platoon leaders to company commander). 1330–Issue company OPORD. 1045–Conduct reconnaissance. 1030–Update company WARNORD. 1000–Receive battalion OPORD. 0900–Receive battalion WARNORD; issue company WARNORD.

OPORD operation order WARNORD warning order

Figure 10-2. Sample schedule

STEP 2–ISSUE A WARNING ORDER 10-17. As soon as leaders finish their initial assessment of the situation and available time, they issue a WARNORD. Leaders do not wait for more information. They issue the best WARNORD possible with the information at hand and update it as needed with additional WARNORDs.

10-18. The WARNORD contains as much detail as possible. It informs subordinates of the unit mission and gives them the leader’s timeline. Leaders may also pass on any other instructions or information they think will help subordinates prepare for the new mission. This includes information on the enemy, the nature of the higher headquarters’ plan, and any specific instructions for preparing their units. The most important thing is that leaders not delay in issuing the initial WARNORD. As more information becomes available, leaders can—and should—issue additional WARNORDs. By issuing the initial WARNORD as quickly as possible, leaders enable their subordinates to begin their own planning and preparation.

10-19. WARNORDs follow the five-paragraph OPORD format. (See appendix C for the WARNORD format.) Normally an initial WARNORD issued below battalion level includes—

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The mission or nature of the operation. The time and place for issuing the OPORD. Units or elements participating in the operation. Specific tasks not addressed by unit standard operating procedures (SOPs). The timeline for the operation.

STEP 3–MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN 10-20. Once they have issued the initial WARNORD, leaders develop a tentative plan. This step combines the MDMP steps 2 through 6: mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval. At levels below battalion, these steps are less structured than for units with staffs. Often, leaders perform them mentally. They may include their principal subordinates—especially during COA development, analysis, and comparison. However, leaders—not their subordinates—select the COA on which to base the tentative plan.

Mission Analysis 10-21. To frame the tentative plan, leaders perform mission analysis. This mission analysis follows the METT-TC format, continuing the initial assessment performed in TLP step 1. (See table 10-1 for a brief description of the mission variables and appendix A for a more detailed description.)

Table 10-1. Mission variables

Variable Description Mission Commanders and staffs view all of the mission variables in terms of their

impact on mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It is always the first variable commanders consider during decisionmaking. A mission statement contains the "who, what, when, where, and why" of the operation.

Enemy The second variable to consider is the enemy—dispositions (including organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

Terrain and weather

Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly influence each other’s impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and man-made features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain expressed in the memory aid OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment. The military aspects of weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity.

Troops and support available

This variable includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and support. These include supplies, services, and support available from joint, host nation, and unified action partners. They also include support from civilians and contractors employed by military organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel Command.

Time available Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks and operations. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and maneuver units in relationship to the enemy and conditions.

Civil considerations

Civil considerations are the influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADRP 5-0). Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

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Course of Action Development 10-22. Mission analysis provides information needed to develop COAs. COA development aims to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission. At lower echelons, the mission may be a single task. Most missions and tasks can be accomplished in more than one way. Normally, leaders develop two or more COAs. However, in a time-constrained environment, they may develop only one. Leaders do not wait for a complete order before beginning COA development. Usable COAs are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. Leaders develop COAs as soon as they have enough information to do so. To develop COAs, leaders focus on the actions the unit takes at the objective and conduct a reverse plan to the starting point.

Analyze Relative Combat Power

10-23. During COA development, leaders determine whether the unit has enough combat power to defeat the force (or accomplish a task in stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks) against which it is arrayed by comparing the combat power of friendly and enemy forces. Leaders seek to determine where, when, and how friendly combat power (the elements of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, mission command, leadership, and information) can overwhelm the enemy. It is a particularly difficult process if the unit is fighting a dissimilar unit, for example, if an infantry unit is attacking or defending against an enemy mechanized force. Below battalion level, relative combat power comparisons are rough and generally rely on professional judgment instead of numerical analysis. When an enemy is not the object of a particular mission or tasks, leaders conduct a troop-to-task analysis to determine if they have enough combat power to accomplish the tasks. For example, a company commander assigned the task “establish civil control in town X” would need to determine if there were enough Soldiers and equipment (including vehicles and barrier materials) to establish the necessary check points and security stations within the town to control the population in town X.

Generate Options

10-24. Leaders brainstorm different ways to accomplish the mission. They determine the doctrinal requirements for the operation, including the tactical tasks normally assigned to subordinates. Doctrinal requirements give leaders a framework from which to develop COAs.

10-25. Next, leaders identify where and when the unit can mass overwhelming combat power to achieve specific results (with respect to enemy, terrain, time, or civil considerations) that accomplish the mission. Offensive and defensive tasks focus on the destructive effects of combat power. Stability tasks, on the other hand, emphasize constructive effects. Leaders identify any decisive points and determine what result they must achieve at the decisive points to accomplish the mission. This helps leaders determine the required tasks and the amount of combat power to apply at a decisive point.

10-26. After identifying tasks, leaders next determine the purpose for each task. There is normally one primary task for each mission. The unit assigned this task is the main effort. The other tasks should support the accomplishment of the primary task.

Develop an Initial Concept of Operations

10-27. The concept of operations describes how the leader envisions the operation unfolding from its start to its conclusion or end state. It determines how accomplishing each task leads to executing the next. It identifies the best ways to use available terrain and to employ unit strengths against enemy weaknesses. Fire support considerations make up an important part of the concept of operations. Planners identify essential stability tasks. Leaders develop the graphic control measures necessary to convey and enhance the understanding of the concept of operations, prevent fratricide, and clarify the task and purpose of the main effort.

Assign Responsibilities

10-28. Leaders assign responsibility for each task to a subordinate. Whenever possible, they depend on the existing chain of command. They avoid fracturing unit integrity unless the number of simultaneous

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tasks exceeds the number of available elements. Different command and support arrangements may be the distinguishing feature among COAs.

Prepare a Course of Action Statement and Sketch

10-29. Leaders base the COA statement on the concept of operations for that COA. The COA statement focuses on all significant actions, from the start of the COA to its finish. Whenever possible, leaders prepare a sketch showing each COA. It is useful to provide the amount of time it takes to achieve each movement and task in the COA sketch. This helps subordinate leaders gain an appreciation for how much time will pass as they execute each task of the COA. The COA contains the following information:

Form of movement or defense to be used. Designation of the main effort. Tasks and purposes of subordinate units. Necessary sustaining operations. Desired end state.

10-30. Table 10-2 provides a sample mission statement and COA statement for an infantry company in the defense.

Table 10-2. Sample mission and course of action statements

Mission Statement:

B Co/1-31 IN defends NLT (not later than) 281700(Z) AUG 2005 from GL 375652 to GL 389650 to GL 394660 to GL 373665 to prevent the envelopment of A Co, the battalion main effort.

COA Statement:

The company defends with two platoons (PLTs) forward and one PLT in depth from PLT battle positions. The northern PLT (2 squads) destroys enemy forces to prevent enemy bypass of the main effort PLT on Hill 657. The southern PLT (3 squads, 2 Javelins) destroys enemy forces to prevent an organized company attack against the Co main effort on Hill 657. The main effort PLT (3 squads, 2 TOWS) retains Hill 657 (vicinity GL378659) to prevent the envelopment of Co A (battalion main effort) from the south. The anti-armor section (1 squad, 4 Javelins) establishes ambush positions at the road junction (vicinity GL 377653) to destroy enemy recon to deny observation of friendly defensive position and to prevent a concentration of combat power against the main effort PLT. The company mortars establish a mortar firing point vicinity GL 377664 to suppress enemy forces to protect the main effort platoon.

Analyze Courses of Action (War-game) 10-31. For each COA, leaders think through the operation from start to finish. They compare each COA with the enemy’s most probable COA. At the small-unit level, the enemy’s most probable COA is what the enemy is most likely to do given what friendly forces are doing at that instant. The leader visualizes a set of actions and reactions. The object is to determine what can go wrong and what decision the leader will likely have to make as a result.

Course of Action Comparison and Selection 10-32. Leaders compare COAs by weighing the advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each, as noted during the war game. They decide which COA to execute based on this comparison and on their professional judgment. They take into account—

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Mission accomplishment. Time available to execute the operation. Risks. Results from unit reconnaissance. Subordinate unit tasks and purposes. Casualties incurred. Posturing of the force for future operations.

STEP 4–INITIATE MOVEMENT 10-33. Leaders conduct any movement directed by higher headquarters or deemed necessary to continue mission preparation or position the unit for execution. They do this as soon as they have enough information to do so or the unit is required to move to position itself for a task. This is also essential when time is short. Movements may be to an assembly area, a battle position, a new area of operations, or an attack position. They may include movement of reconnaissance elements, guides, or quartering parties.

STEP 5–CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE 10-34. Whenever time and circumstances allow, or as directed by higher headquarters, leaders personally observe the area of operations for the mission prior to execution. No amount of information from higher headquarters can substitute for firsthand assessment of the mission variables from within the area of operations. Unfortunately, many factors can keep leaders from performing a personal reconnaissance. The minimum action necessary is a thorough map reconnaissance supplemented by imagery and intelligence products. As directed, subordinates or other elements (such as scouts) may conduct reconnaissance while the leader completes other TLP steps.

10-35. Leaders use results of the war game to identify information requirements. Reconnaissance tasks seek to confirm or deny information that supports the tentative plan. They focus first on information gaps identified during mission analysis. Leaders ensure their leader’s reconnaissance complements the higher headquarters’ information collection plan. The unit may conduct additional reconnaissance tasks as the situation allows. This step may also precede making a tentative plan if commanders lack enough information to begin planning. Reconnaissance may be the only way to develop the information required for planning.

STEP 6–COMPLETE THE PLAN 10-36. During this step, leaders incorporate the results of reconnaissance into their selected COA to complete the plan or order. This includes preparing overlays, refining the indirect fire target list, coordinating sustainment with signal requirements, and updating the tentative plan because of reconnaissance. At lower levels, this step may entail only confirming or updating information contained in the tentative plan. If time allows, leaders make final coordination with adjacent units and higher headquarters before issuing the order.

STEP 7–ISSUE THE ORDER 10-37. Small-unit orders are normally issued verbally and supplemented by graphics and other control measures. An order follows the standard five-paragraph OPORD format. (See appendix C for the OPORD format.) Typically, leaders below company level do not issue a commander’s intent. They reiterate the intent of their higher and next higher commanders.

10-38. The ideal location for issuing the order is a point in the area of operations with a view of the objective and other aspects of the terrain. The leader may perform a leader’s reconnaissance, complete the order, and then summon subordinates to a specified location to receive it. Sometimes security or other constraints make it impractical to issue the order on the terrain. Then leaders use a sand table, a detailed sketch, maps, and other products to depict the area of operations and the situation.

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STEP 8–SUPERVISE AND REFINE 10-39. Throughout TLP, leaders monitor mission preparations, refine the plan, coordinate with adjacent units, and supervise and assess preparations. Normally, unit SOPs state individual responsibilities and the sequence of preparation activities. To ensure the unit is ready for the mission, leaders supervise subordinates and inspect their personnel and equipment.

10-40. A crucial component of preparation is the rehearsal. Rehearsals allow leaders to assess their subordinates’ preparations. They may identify areas that require more supervision. Leaders conduct rehearsals to—

Practice essential tasks. Identify weaknesses or problems in the plan. Coordinate subordinate element actions. Improve Soldier understanding of the concept of operations. Foster confidence among Soldiers.

10-41. Company and smaller sized units use four types of rehearsals, and they are discussed in chapter 12: Backbrief. Combined arms rehearsal. Support rehearsal. Battle drill or SOP rehearsal.

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Chapter 11

Military Deception This chapter provides information on military deception. Initially this chapter addresses the principles of military deception. It then discusses how commanders use military deception to shape the area of operations in support of decisive action. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how to plan, prepare, execute, and assess military deception.

MILITARY DECEPTION PROCESS AND CAPABILITY 11-1. Modern military deception is both a process and a capability. As a process, military deception is a methodical, information-based strategy that systematically, deliberately, and cognitively targets individual decisionmakers. The objective is the purposeful manipulation of decisionmaking. As a capability, military deception is useful to a commander when integrated early in the planning process as a component of the operation focused on causing an enemy to act or react in a desired manner. (See JP 3-13 for a discussion in information operations and JP 3-13.4 for a more detailed discussion on military deception.)

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY DECEPTION 11-2. Military deception is applicable during any phase of military operations in order to create conditions to accomplish the commander’s intent. The Army echelon that plans a military deception often determines its type. The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategic and tactical actions. The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific levels of responsibility and military deception planning. They help organize thought and approaches to a problem. Decisions at one level always affect other levels. Common to all levels of military deception is a set of guiding principles:

Focus on the target. Motivating the target to act. Centralized planning and control. Security. Conforming to the time available. Integration.

FOCUS ON THE TARGET 11-3. Leaders determine which targeted decisionmaker has the authority to make the desired decision and then can act or fail to act upon that decision. Many times it is one, key individual, or it could be a network of decisionmakers who rely on each other for different aspects of their mission or operation.

MOTIVATING THE TARGET TO ACT 11-4. Leaders determine what motivates the targeted decisionmaker and which information-related capabilities are capable of inducing the targeted decisionmaker to think a certain way. The desired result is that the targeted decisionmaker acts or fails to act as intended. This result is favorable to friendly forces. Often, the military objective is to manipulate the targeted decisionmaker’s thinking and subsequent actions. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Leaders—

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Exploit target biases. Leaders provide the targeted decisionmakers with information that fulfills their expectations. This reinforces the target’s preexisting perceptions and can be exceptionally powerful. Employ variety. The target should receive information, true and false, through multiple means and methods, from many angles, throughout the information and operational environment. Avoid windfalls. Important military information that is too easy to obtain is usually suspect. Information that “falls” into the enemy’s hands must appear to be the result of legitimate collection activities. Leverage the truth. Any deception must conform to the target’s perception of reality. It is much simpler to have the deception adhere to the target’s belief than to make the target accept an unexpected reality as truth.

CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND CONTROL 11-5. Centralized planning and control ensures continuity. The assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5 [S-5]) usually leads the planning. However, there may be times when the commander designates a military deception officer to assist the G-5 (S-5) throughout the planning, hand-off, and termination of the deception operation. Centralizing the planning and control is imperative. It keeps the deception operation on track and limits unintended leaks and compromises.

SECURITY 11-6. Successful military deception requires strict security and protection measures to prevent compromise of both the deception and the actual operation. This includes counterintelligence, computer network defense, operations security, camouflage, and concealment. (See FM 5-19 for a discussion on risk management. See AR 530-1 for more detailed information and regulations on operations security.)

CONFORMING TO THE TIME AVAILABLE 11-7. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing military deception must conform to the time available for both sides to “play their parts” in the deception. The targeted decisionmaker requires time to see, interpret, decide, and act upon the deception. Equally important, friendly forces require time to detect and assess the targeted decisionmaker’s reaction to the deception.

INTEGRATION 11-8. A military deception is an integral part of the concept of an operation. It is not an afterthought or a stand-alone operation. The military deception officer assists the staff in integrating the deception operation throughout all phases of the operation. This begins with planning, the hand-off to current operations, and eventually the termination of the deception. Integration involves the use of information-related capabilities and activities. Military information support operations can contribute to the deception plan by providing a means to disseminate both accurate and deceptive information to the targeted decisionmakers by discreetly conveying approved tailored deception messages to selected target audiences. Therefore, the individual assigned as the military deception officer is often well versed in the use and integration information-related capabilities and activities.

MILITARY DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS 11-9. Military deception often relies on the basic understanding that the complexities and uncertainties of combat make decisionmakers susceptible to deception. The basic mechanism for any deception is either to increase or decrease the level of uncertainty, or ambiguity, in the mind of the deception target (or targeted decisionmaker). Military deception and deception in support of operations security present false or misleading information to the targeted decisionmaker with the deliberate intent to manipulate uncertainty. The aim of deception is to either increase or decrease the targeted decisionmaker’s ambiguity in order to manipulate the target to perceive friendly motives, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities erroneously and thereby alter the target’s perception of reality.

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AMBIGUITY-DECREASING DECEPTION 11-10. Ambiguity-decreasing deception reduces uncertainty and normally confirms the enemy decisionmaker’s preconceived beliefs, so the decisionmaker becomes very certain about the selected course of action (COA). This type of deception presents false information that shapes the enemy decisionmaker’s thinking, so the enemy makes and executes a specific decision that can be exploited by friendly forces. By making the wrong decision, which is the deception objective, the enemy could misemploy forces and provide friendly forces an operational advantage. For example, ambiguity-decreasing deceptions can present supporting elements of information concerning a specific enemy’s COA. These deceptions are complex to plan and execute, but the potential rewards are often worth the increased effort and resources.

AMBIGUITY-INCREASING DECEPTION 11-11. Ambiguity-increasing deception presents false information aimed to confuse the enemy decisionmaker, thereby increasing the decisionmaker’s uncertainty. This confusion can produce different results. Ambiguity-increasing deceptions can challenge the enemy’s preconceived beliefs. These deceptions draw enemy attention from one set of activities to another, create the illusion of strength where weakness exists, create the illusion of weakness where strength exists, and accustom the enemy to particular patterns of activity that are exploitable at a later time. For example, ambiguity-increasing deceptions can cause the target to delay a decision until it is too late to prevent friendly mission success. They can place the target in a dilemma for which there is no acceptable solution. They may even prevent the target from taking any action at all. Deceptions in support of operations security (OPSEC) are typically executed as this type of deception.

TACTICAL DECEPTION 11-12. Most often, Army commanders will be faced with deciding when and where to employ military deception in support of tactical operations. The intent of tactical deception is to induce the enemy decisionmakers to act in a manner prejudicial to their interests. This is accomplished by either increasing or decreasing the ambiguity of the enemy decisionmaker through the manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence. Military deception undertaken at the tactical level supports engagements, battles, and stability tasks. This focus is what differentiates tactical deception from other forms of military deception. (See JP 3-13.4 for more information on military deception.)

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MILITARY DECEPTION 11-13. Less frequently, Army commanders will employ strategic and operational military deception to influence enemy strategic decisionmakers’ abilities to successfully oppose U.S. national interests and goals or to influence enemy decisionmakers’ abilities to conduct operations. These deceptions are joint or multinational efforts. In these cases, Army commanders usually opt to form a military deception cell to plan, coordinate, integrate, assess, and terminate the deception.

11-14. On occasion, Army commanders will employ deception in support of OPSEC. This is a military deception that protects friendly operations, personal, programs, equipment, and other assets against foreign intelligence security services collection. The intent of deception in support of OPSEC is to create multiple false indicators to confuse or make friendly intentions harder to interpret by foreign intelligence security services and other enemy intelligence gathering apparatus. This deception limits the ability of foreign intelligence security services to collect accurate intelligence on friendly forces. Deceptions in support of OPSEC are general in nature, and are not specifically targeted against particular enemy decisionmakers. Deceptions in support of OPSEC are instead used to protect friendly operations and forces by obscuring friendly capabilities, intentions, or vulnerabilities. (See chapter 14 for information on risk management and AR 530-1 for information and regulations on OPSEC.)

MILITARY DECEPTION TACTICS 11-15. The selection of military deception tactics and their use depends on an understanding of the current situation as well as the desired military deception goal and objective. (See appendix A for a discussion of

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operational and mission variables.) As a rule, Army commanders should be familiar with planning and conducting feints, ruses, demonstrations, and displays.

A feint, in military deception, is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action (JP 3-13.4). A ruse, in military deception, is a trick of war designed to deceive the adversary, usually involving the deliberate exposure of false information to the adversary’s intelligence collection system (JP 3-13.4). A demonstration, in military deception, is a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended (JP 3-13.4). A display, in military deception, is a static portrayal of an activity, force, or equipment intended to deceive the adversary’s visual observation (JP 3-13.4).

COMMON MILITARY DECEPTION MEANS 11-16. Army commanders should also be familiar with some of the more commonly available military deception means that can be employed to support a given military deception. They cover the full scope of units, forces, personnel, capabilities, and resources available to the commander for the conduct of decisive action. In most cases, Army commanders have at their disposal the use of the following six information-related capabilities and other activities to support a planned military deception:

Military information support operations. OPSEC. Camouflage, concealment and decoys. Cyber electromagnetic activities. Physical attack and destruction capabilities. Presence, posture, and profile.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS 11-17. Dedicated military information support operations (MISO) assets have the ability to discretely convey intended information to the targeted decisionmaker via selected target audiences and appropriate key communicators. MISO assets can add additional fidelity to ruses, demonstrations, and displays.

OPERATIONS SECURITY 11-18. Military deception and OPSEC are complementary. They both seek to control the information available to the targeted decisionmaker. The intent is to protect indicators and deny information which could reveal the true operation. OPSEC measures do not expose the military deception while promoting and exposing those indicators and information supportive of the military deception. A deception in support of OPSEC uses false information about friendly forces’ intentions, capabilities, or vulnerabilities to shape the enemy’s perceptions. It targets the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to distract the enemy’s intelligence collection away from, or provide cover for, unit operations. A deception in support of OPSEC is a relatively easy form of deception to use and is very appropriate for use at battalion-level and below. To be successful, a balance must be achieved between OPSEC and military deception requirements.

CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND DECOYS 11-19. Camouflage, concealment, and decoy activities are normally individual or unit responsibilities and governed by standard operating procedures (SOPs). They can also play a role in a larger military deception or deception in support of OPSEC where camouflage, concealment, and decoys comprise just a few of many elements that mislead the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Merely hiding forces may not be adequate, as the enemy may need to “see” these forces elsewhere. In such cases,

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cover and concealment can hide the presence of friendly forces, but decoy placement should be coordinated as part of the deception in support of OPSEC.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES 11-20. Commanders exploit cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum for deception purposes. Cyber electromagnetic activities can be used to show friendly intentions and to shape perceptions of friendly actions. Cyber electromagnetic activities can add fidelity and believability to feints, ruses, demonstrations, and displays.

PHYSICAL ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES 11-21. Nothing is perhaps more effective at shaping an enemy’ perceptions than the attack and destruction of enemy assets, units, resources, and capabilities. When used to support a military deception, fires and physical attacks (feints, demonstrations, and displays) can exploit perceptions and biases as to where the enemy believes the friendly decisive operation will be committed.

SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITIES 11-22. Many times sustainment operations are much more visible than combat preparations, and become a key indicator of when, where, and how combat operations will be conducted. When linked with fires and physical attacks, sustainment operations used in support of military deception seek to confirm the targeted decisionmaker’s perceptions and biases as to where friendly forces will commit decisive operations.

MILITARY DECEPTION IN THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 11-23. Military deception is considered in all activities of the operations process. Planning, preparing, executing, and continually assessing military deception does not take place in isolation. It occurs simultaneously with the operations process. If it does not, then the risk increases exponentially for the military deception to be under resourced and not integrated into the larger operation as the military deception evolves. It is unlikely that an under resourced and nonintegrated military deception will succeed. Because military deception supports a range of missions, and to prevent one unit’s military deception from compromising another unit’s operations, leaders coordinate military deceptions both laterally and vertically. Deception operations are approved by the headquarters two operational echelons higher than the originating command. Only two authorities can direct a military deception: a higher headquarters and the originating unit commander.

PLANNING 11-24. Planning develops the information needed to prepare, execute, and assess a military deception. The output of the military deception mission analysis is the running estimate, prepared by the military deception officer. The running estimate identifies military deception opportunities, information and capability requirements, and recommends feasible deception goals and objectives. The military deception officer presents this estimate during the mission analysis briefing. The estimate considers current capabilities based on enemy susceptibilities, preconceptions, and biases; available time; and available military deception means. A key outcome of the running estimate is the determination of whether or not there is a viable military deception opportunity. (See chapter 8 for more information on running estimates.) Military deception may be a feasible option, if it is appropriate to the mission, and if there is a possibility of success. Issues to consider when determining if military deception is a viable course of action include:

Availability of assets. Understanding the military deception target. Suitability. Time.

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Availability of Assets 11-25. The commander determines if sufficient assets exist to support both the operation and the military deception. There are few assets specifically designed and designated for military deception. This means the commander must shift assets from the operation to support the military deception. Commanders must be certain that shifting assets to support a military deception does not adversely affect the operation or prevent mission success.

Understanding the Military Deception Target 11-26. The commander determines if sufficient information exists on how the military deception target acquires information and makes decisions, what knowledge the target has of the situation, and how the target views the friendly force. The commander also determines if sufficient information exists to reveal the targeted decisionmaker’s biases, beliefs, and fears. If necessary, the staff can make assumptions about the military deception target, but it must avoid mirror imaging its preconceptions onto the military deception’s targeted decisionmaker.

Suitability 11-27. Some missions are better suited to military deception than others. When a unit has the initiative and has some control over the area of operations, then military deception is more suitable.

Time 11-28. The commander determines if sufficient time exists to execute a military deception. Execution of the military deception must provide sufficient time for the military deception target to observe the military deception activities, form the desired perceptions, and act in a manner consistent with the deception objective.

Military Deception Planning Steps 11-29. The basic steps of military deception planning come together during COA analysis, comparison, and approval and are overseen by the military deception officer. (These are MDMP steps 2, 3, and 4. See chapter 9 for a detailed discussion of the MDMP.) The G-5 (S-5)-developed COAs provide the basis for military deception COAs. The military deception officer develops military deception COAs in conjunction with the G-5 (S-5). Basing the military deception COAs on the operational COAs ensures deception COAs are feasible, practical, and nested and effectively support the operational COAs.

11-30. The military deception officer and G-5(S-5) planners consider the military deception COAs as the staff war-games the COAs. They analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each military deception COA and compare it against the criteria established by the military deception officer for evaluating the military deception COAs.

11-31. The military deception officer, working with the G-5 (S-5) planners, prepares the military deception plan after the commander approves the military deception COA. Once the G-5 (S-5) planner completes, coordinates, and reviews the military deception for consistency, it is presented to the commander for tentative approval. To ensure synchronization of military deception at all levels, approval authority for military deception resides two echelons above the originating command. After the approving authority has approved the military deception plan, it becomes a part of the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). It is important that military deception plans are not widely distributed. In order to ensure every opportunity to succeed and to protect the military deception from compromise, access to the military deception operation is strictly limited to those with a need to know.

11-32. The military deception officer ensures that each military deception plan is properly constructed. There are ten steps in military deception planning:

Step 1—Determine the military deception goal. Step 2—Determine the deception objective. Step 3—Identify the military deception target.

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Step 4—Identify required perceptions of the military deception target. Step 5—Develop the military deception story. Step 6—Identify the military deception means. Step 7—Develop military deception events. Step 8—Develop OPSEC and other protection measures. Step 9—Develop assessment criteria. Step 10—Develop a termination plan.

Step 1—Determine the Military Deception Goal

11-33. The military deception goal is the desired contribution of the military deception to friendly mission success. The military deception goal is often expressed in terms of the desired optimal situation under which the commander wants to conduct the primary operation. The military deception goal is usually recommended in the running estimate and confirmed by the commander’s planning guidance at the conclusion of mission analysis. Alternatively, the commander can identify the military deception role and leave it to the staff to identify desired military deception actions.

Step 2—Determine the Deception Objective

11-34. The military deception objective is the purpose of the military deception expressed in terms of what the enemy is to do or not to do at the critical time and location. Like the military deception goal, the military deception objective is also recommended in the running estimate and confirmed by the commander in the commander’s planning guidance at the conclusion of mission analysis.

Step 3—Identify the Military Deception Target

11-35. The military deception target is the enemy decisionmaker or a select set of decisionmakers with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective.

Step 4—Identify Required Perceptions of the Military Deception Target

11-36. The military deception target perceptions are what the military deception target must believe in order to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. This perception of friendly force actions is based on the deception objective and exploits the military deception target’s information processing cycle. This includes the supporting information and network enabled systems, decisionmaking processes, beliefs, biases, and preconceptions regarding friendly forces and the situation. It is often more effective to tell the military deception target what the target wants to believe than it is to convince the target of something different.

Step 5—Develop the Military Deception Story

11-37. The military deception story is a plausible, but essentially false, view of the situation that leads the military deception target to act in a manner that accomplishes the military deception objective. It weaves military deception events together into a coherent whole that describes the situation that the commander wants the military deception target to perceive. If the military deception target is to develop the desired perceptions, the military deception story must be believable, verifiable, and consistent. The story must be doctrinally correct for the situation. Ideally, the military deception target should form the exact mental picture projected by the military deception story as the military deception unfolds. To develop the military deception story, the military deception officer thinks about how the target sees the situation and then writes the story from the target’s perspective. An example would be to write the story similar to the military deception target’s own intelligence estimate. The military deception story is based upon what the military deception target believes and understands already and the evidence or observables (friendly force actions, units, and real or fake resources) that reinforce the military deception target’s beliefs and understanding.

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Step 6—Identify the Military Deception Means

11-38. The military deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques used to create required observables (things the military deception target needs to see in order to deduce the desired perceptions) and act out the military deception story. The nature of the desired perception, with the indicators needed to convey the perception to the deception target, determines the deception means employed. Physical means are observable physical activities of forces, systems, and individuals that present visual indicators. Technical means could include cyber-based messaging and information sharing venues, smart phone and mobile wireless communications, radio broadcasts, radar emissions, and electromagnetic deception. Administrative means are used to convey oral, pictorial, documentary, or other material evidence to the deception target. While there may be many means available, the means employed must be consistent.

Step 7—Develop Military Deception Events

11-39. The military deception events are the activities conducted through military deception means at a specific time and location to convey the military deception story to the target. To convey the military deception story, the events must be observed and sensed by the enemy. To determine this, the military deception officer pairs up military deception means with the enemy’s intelligence collection system capabilities. If the enemy intelligence system can “see” the military deception event, then it can collect the information it needs to piece together the military deception story. The systematic, yet seemingly random, projection of deception story elements by multiple means also makes the deception more believable. The military deception officer must also take care to ensure that information reaching the enemy appears as legitimately collected. Important military information that is too easy to obtain is usually suspect.

Step 8—Develop Operations Security and Other Protection Measures

11-40. OPSEC and other protection measures are employed with military deception in order to ensure that only the desired military deception events reach the enemy and that actions in support of the supported operations are concealed. False indicators are wrapped in significant amounts of factual information to enhance their acceptance but not to compromise the supported operation. Without OPSEC, the deceptive activities may not convince the enemy to believe the military deception story if the preparations for the supported operation are also observable. Equally important is risk assessment. All military deception involves risk and cost. Commanders base the decision to conduct a military deception on a deliberate assessment that weighs costs against benefits. Risk can be mitigated by ensuring the success of the supported operation does not hinge upon the success of the military deception, anticipating conditions that could compromise the military deception, and developing responses in the event of unintended effects. (See chapter 14 for information on risk management and a discussion on risk management and AR 530-1 for information and regulations on operations security.)

Step 9—Develop Assessment Criteria

11-41. Commanders and staffs focus assessment efforts by developing criteria and feedback mechanisms that they use to assess the progress of the military deception. In particular, early and frequent coordination with the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2 [S-2]) is important. The commander and staff monitor feedback and compare it against the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) established for the operation. Feedback comes in the form of information that reveals how the military deception target is responding to the military deception story and if the plan is working. Assessment efforts focus on two types of military deception feedback:

Target feedback—information, analytical determinations and evidence (MOEs) that the target is receiving and acting on the military deception. Conduit feedback—information and evidence (MOEs) that the conduits are receiving, processing, and transmitting elements of the military deception.

Ideally, there will be indicators of whether the target is receiving the military deception story as planned, and if the target is acting in accordance with the military deception objective. (See chapter 15 for more information on assessment.)

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Step 10—Develop a Termination Plan

11-42. Military deception does not just simply end. It must be guided by a commander-approved termination plan that in essence represents a coherent, structured, and implementable exit strategy. This is important because the commander terminates a military deception after it meets its objective. Like the military deception story, the exit strategy must also be believable and consistent with friendly operational profiles. Additionally, the enemy should not know what deception means, techniques, and events were used. Otherwise, the next deception operation may not have the desired effect due to the enemy gaining insights into friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures.

PREPARING 11-43. During preparation, commanders take every opportunity to refine the military deception plan based on updated intelligence and friendly information. OPSEC activities also continue during preparation for the military deception. OPSEC is a dynamic effort that anticipates and reacts to enemy collection efforts.

11-44. Military deception plans are not static and are continually adjusted. The military deception officer normally moves with the military deception plan from the G-5 to the future operations integrating cell to oversee the refinement of the plan and ensure it is fully integrated with the operation. As assumptions prove true or false, enemy perceptions are confirmed, or the status of friendly units change, the military deception officer adjusts the military deception for the commander, or recommends aborting it if the military deception can no longer significantly influence the situation and achieve the military deception goal.

EXECUTING 11-45. Execution takes place in a dynamic environment and as part of the operation. The commander, assisted by the military deception officer, continually assesses and refines the military deception as it unfolds during execution. Consequently, the military deception officer must move from the future operations integrating cell to the current operations integrating cell with the military deception plan in order to direct the military deception operation and its termination.

11-46. Terminating a military deception is the final execution decision. When the decision to terminate is made, the appropriate termination branch or sequel becomes the basis for execution of a deliberate series of events designed to end the military deception while protecting its existence and the means and techniques employed to execute it.

ASSESSING 11-47. Assessment is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation, and execution—and evaluation of the current situation to measure the overall effectiveness of the operations (see ADRP 5-0 and chapter 15). This involves receiving information about the implementation of the military deception and evaluating it against established MOEs. It also includes continual reassessment of the military deception objective, target, story, and events to ensure they are still important to the accomplishment of the mission objectives. There are four types of assessments conducted during a military deception:

Monitoring and evaluating the military deception to ensure it continues to support the supported operations. Evaluating how the target is acting or not acting in response to the military deception story. Monitoring for unintended consequences resulting from the military deception. Determining when termination criteria are met.

11-48. Commanders continually assess military deception events. A military deception’s effectiveness is directly related to the validity of the projected situation when the supported operation starts. Validating this projection with updated information is essential to any assessment. Such assessment is necessary to determine when to commence, modify, or terminate the military deception. (See chapter 15 for more information on assessment.)

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Chapter 12

Rehearsals Rehearsing key actions before execution allows Soldiers to become familiar with the operation and translate the abstract ideas of the written plan into concrete actions. This chapter describes types of rehearsals. It then lists the responsibilities of those involved. It also contains guidelines for conducting rehearsals.

REHEARSAL BASICS 12-1. Rehearsals allow leaders and their Soldiers to practice key aspects of the concept of operations. These actions help Soldiers orient themselves to their environment and other units before executing the operation. Rehearsals help Soldiers build a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation.

12-2. Rehearsals are the commander’s tool to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the commander’s intent and the concept of operations. They allow commanders and staffs to identify shortcomings in the plan not previously recognized. Rehearsals also contribute to external and internal coordination, as the staff identifies additional coordinating requirements.

12-3. Effective and efficient units habitually rehearse during training. Commanders at every level routinely train and practice various rehearsal types. Local standard operating procedures (SOPs) identify appropriate rehearsal types and standards for their execution. All leaders conduct periodic after action reviews to ensure their units conduct rehearsals to standard and correct substandard performances. After action reviews also enable leaders to incorporate lessons learned into existing plans and orders, or into subsequent rehearsals.

12-4. Adequate time is essential when conducting rehearsals. The time required varies with the complexity of the mission, the type and technique of rehearsal, and the level of participation. Units conduct rehearsals at the lowest possible level, using the most thorough technique possible, given the time available. Under time-constrained conditions, leaders conduct abbreviated rehearsals, focusing on critical events determined by reverse planning. Each unit will have different critical events based on the mission, unit readiness, and the commander’s assessment.

12-5. The rehearsal is a coordination event, not an analysis. It does not replace war-gaming. Commanders war-game during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to analyze different courses of action to determine the optimal one. Rehearsals practice that selected course of action. Commanders avoid making major changes to operation orders (OPORDs) during rehearsals. They make only those changes essential to mission success and risk mitigation.

REHEARSAL TYPES 12-6. Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the preparation timeline. The four types of rehearsals are the—

Backbrief. Combined arms rehearsal. Support rehearsal. Battle drill or SOP rehearsal.

BACKBRIEF 12-7. A backbrief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission. Normally, subordinates perform backbriefs throughout preparation. These

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briefs allow commanders to clarify the commander’s intent early in subordinate planning. Commanders use the backbrief to identify any problems in the concept of operations.

12-8. The backbrief differs from the confirmation brief (a briefing subordinates give their higher commander immediately following receipt of an order) in that subordinate leaders are given time to complete their plan. Backbriefs require the fewest resources and are often the only option under time-constrained conditions. Subordinate leaders explain their actions from the start to the finish of the mission. Backbriefs are performed sequentially, with all leaders reviewing their tasks. When time is available, backbriefs can be combined with other types of rehearsals. Doing this lets all subordinate leaders coordinate their plans before performing more elaborate drills.

COMBINED ARMS REHEARSAL 12-9. A combined arms rehearsal is a rehearsal in which subordinate units synchronize their plans with each other. A maneuver unit headquarters normally executes a combined arms rehearsal after subordinate units issue their OPORD. This rehearsal type helps ensure that subordinate commanders’ plans achieve the higher commander’s intent.

SUPPORT REHEARSAL 12-10. The support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with the overall operation. This rehearsal supports the operation so units can accomplish their missions. Throughout preparation, units conduct support rehearsals within the framework of a single or limited number of warfighting functions. These rehearsals typically involve coordination and procedure drills for aviation, fires, engineer support, or casualty evacuation. Support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals complement preparations for the operation. Units may conduct rehearsals separately and then combine them into full-dress rehearsals. Although these rehearsals differ slightly by warfighting function, they achieve the same result.

BATTLE DRILL OR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE REHEARSAL 12-11. A battle drill is a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decisionmaking process. A battle drill or SOP rehearsal ensures that all participants understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. Throughout preparation, units and staffs rehearse battle drills and SOPs. These rehearsals do not need a completed order from higher headquarters. Leaders place priority on those drills or actions they anticipate occurring during the operation. For example, a transportation platoon may rehearse a battle drill on reacting to an ambush while waiting to begin movement.

12-12. All echelons use these rehearsal types; however, they are most common for platoons, squads, and sections. They are conducted throughout preparation and are not limited to published battle drills. All echelons can rehearse such actions as a command post shift change, an obstacle breach lane-marking SOP, or a refuel-on-the-move site operation.

METHODS OF REHEARSAL 12-13. Methods for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the commander’s imagination and available resources. Several methods are illustrated in figure 12-1. Resources required for each method range from broad to narrow. As listed from left to right, each successive method takes more time and more resources. Each rehearsal method also imparts a different level of understanding to participants.

12-14. Paragraphs 12-15 through 12-51 address these implications for each method: Time—the amount of time required to conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) the rehearsal. Echelons involved—the number of echelons that can participate in the rehearsal. Operations security (OPSEC) risks—the ease by which an enemy can exploit friendly actions from the rehearsal. Terrain—the amount of space needed for the rehearsal.

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Figure 12-1. Types of rehearsals

FULL-DRESS REHEARSAL 12-15. A full-dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the operation. It includes every participating Soldier and system. Leaders conduct the rehearsal on terrain similar to the area of operations, initially under good light conditions, and then in limited visibility. Leaders repeat small-unit actions until units execute them to standard. A full-dress rehearsal helps Soldiers clearly understand what commanders expect of them. It helps them gain confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission. Supporting elements, such as aviation crews, meet and rehearse with Soldiers to synchronize the operation.

12-16. A unit may conduct full-dress rehearsals. The higher headquarters may conduct and support full-dress rehearsals. The full-dress rehearsal is most difficult to accomplish at higher echelons. At those levels, commanders may develop an alternate rehearsal plan that mirrors the actual plan but fits the terrain available for the rehearsal.

12-17. Full-dress rehearsals consume more time than any other rehearsal type. For companies and smaller units, full-dress rehearsals most effectively ensure all units in the operation understand their roles. However, brigade and task force commanders consider how much time their subordinates need to plan and prepare when deciding whether to conduct a full-dress rehearsal.

12-18. All echelons involved in the operation participate in the full-dress rehearsal.

12-19. Moving a large part of the force may create an OPSEC risk by attracting unwanted enemy attention. Commanders develop a plan to protect the rehearsal from enemy information collection. Sometimes they develop an alternate plan, including graphics and radio frequencies, that rehearses selected actions without compromising the actual OPORD. Commanders take care not to confuse subordinates when doing this.

12-20. Terrain management for a full-dress rehearsal is challenging. Units identify, secure, clear, and maintain the rehearsal area throughout the rehearsal.

KEY LEADER REHEARSAL 12-21. Circumstances may prohibit a rehearsal with all members of the unit. A key leader rehearsal involves only key leaders of the organization and its subordinate units. It normally takes fewer resources than a full-dress rehearsal. Terrain requirements mirror those of a full-dress rehearsal, even though fewer

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Soldiers participate. The commander first decides the level of leader involvement. Then the selected leaders rehearse the plan while traversing the actual or similar terrain. Often commanders use this technique to rehearse fire control measures for an engagement area during defensive tasks. Commanders often use a key leader rehearsal to prepare key leaders for a full-dress rehearsal. The key leader rehearsal may require developing a rehearsal plan that mirrors the actual plan but fits the terrain of the rehearsal.

12-22. Often, small-scale replicas of terrain or buildings substitute for the actual area of operations. Leaders not only explain their plans, but also walk through their actions or move replicas across the rehearsal area or sand table. This is called a rock drill. It reinforces the backbrief given by subordinates, since everyone can see the concept of operations and sequence of tasks.

12-23. A key leader rehearsal normally requires less time than a full-dress rehearsal. Commanders consider how much time their subordinates need to plan and prepare when deciding whether to conduct a reduced-force rehearsal.

12-24. A small unit from the echelons involved can perform a full-dress rehearsal as part of a larger organization’s key leader rehearsal.

12-25. A key leader rehearsal is less likely to present OPSEC risks than a full-dress rehearsal because it has fewer participants. However, it requires the same number of radio transmissions as for a full-dress rehearsal.

12-26. Terrain management for the key leader rehearsal can be as difficult as for the full-dress rehearsal. Units identify, secure, clear, and maintain the rehearsal area throughout the rehearsal.

TERRAIN-MODEL REHEARSAL 12-27. The terrain-model rehearsal is the most popular rehearsal method. It takes less time and fewer resources than a full-dress or reduced-force rehearsal. An accurately constructed terrain model helps subordinate leaders visualize the commander’s intent and concept of operations. When possible, commanders place the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations. The model’s orientation coincides with that of the terrain. The size of the terrain model can vary from small (using markers to represent units) to large (on which the participants can walk). A large model helps reinforce the participants’ perception of unit positions on the terrain.

12-28. Often, constructing the terrain model consumes the most time during this technique. Units require a clear SOP that states how to build the model so it is accurate, large, and detailed enough to conduct the rehearsal. A good SOP also establishes staff responsibility for building the terrain model and a timeline for its completion.

12-29. Because a terrain model is geared to the echelon conducting the rehearsal, multi-echelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.

12-30. This rehearsal can present OPSEC risks if the area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Assembled commanders and their vehicles can draw enemy attention. Units must sanitize the terrain model after completing the rehearsal.

12-31. Terrain management is less difficult than with the previous rehearsal types. A good site is easy for participants to find, yet it is concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the unit will execute the operation.

DIGITAL TERRAIN-MODEL REHEARSAL 12-32. Digital terrain models are virtual representations of the area of operations. Units drape high-resolution imagery over elevation data thereby creating a fly-through or walk-through. Holographic imagery produces the view in three dimensions. Often, the model hot links graphics, detailed information, unmanned aircraft systems, and ground imagery to key points providing more insight into the plan. The unit geospatial engineers or imagery analysts can assist in digital model creation. Detailed city models already exist for many world cities.

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12-33. The time it takes to create the digital three-dimensional model depends on the amount of available data on the terrain being modeled.

12-34. Of all the echelons involved, this type of rehearsal best suits small units, although with a good local area network, a wider audience can view the graphics. All echelons may be provided copies of the digital model to take back to their headquarters for a more detailed examination.

12-35. If not placed on a computer network, there is limited OPSEC risk because it does not use a large physical site that requires securing and leaders can conduct the rehearsal under cover. However, if placed on a computer network, digital terrain models can be subject to enemy exploitation due to inherent vulnerabilities of networks.

12-36. This space requires the least terrain of all rehearsals. Using tents or enclosed areas conceals the rehearsal from the enemy.

SKETCH-MAP REHEARSAL 12-37. Commanders can use the sketch-map technique almost anywhere, day or night. The procedures are the same as for a terrain-model rehearsal except the commander uses a sketch map in place of a terrain model. Large sketches ensure all participants can see as each participant walks through execution of the operation. Participants move markers on the sketch to represent unit locations and maneuvers.

12-38. Sketch-map rehearsals take less time than terrain-model rehearsals and more time than map rehearsals.

12-39. Units tailor a sketch map to the echelon conducting the rehearsal. Multi-echelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.

12-40. This rehearsal can present OPSEC risks, if the area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Assembled commanders and their vehicles can draw enemy attention. Units must sanitize, secure, or destroy the sketch map after use.

12-41. This technique requires less terrain than a terrain-model rehearsal. A good site ensures participants can easily find it yet stay concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the unit will execute the operation.

MAP REHEARSAL 12-42. A map rehearsal is similar to a sketch-map rehearsal except the commander uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale used to plan the operation.

12-43. The map rehearsal itself consumes the most time. A map rehearsal is normally the easiest technique to set up since it requires only maps and graphics for current operations.

12-44. Units tailor a map rehearsal’s operation overlay to the echelon conducting the rehearsal. Multi-echelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.

12-45. This rehearsal can present OPSEC risks, if the area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Assembled commanders and their vehicles can draw enemy attention.

12-46. This technique requires the least terrain of all rehearsals. A good site ensures participants can easily find it yet stay concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the unit will execute the operation.

NETWORK REHEARSAL 12-47. Units conduct network rehearsals over wide-area networks or local area networks. Commanders and staffs practice these rehearsals by talking through critical portions of the operation over communications networks in a sequence the commander establishes. The organization rehearses only the critical parts of the operation. These rehearsals require all information systems needed to execute that portion of the operation. All participants require working information systems, the OPORD, and graphics. Command posts can rehearse battle tracking during network rehearsals.

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12-48. This technique can be time efficient, if units provide clear SOPs. However, if the organization has unclear SOPs, has units not operating on the network, or has units without working communications, this technique can be time-consuming.

12-49. This technique lends itself to multi-echelon rehearsals. Participation is limited only by the commander’s intent and the capabilities of the command’s information systems.

12-50. If a unit executes a network rehearsal from current unit locations, the OPSEC risk may increase. The enemy may monitor the increased volume of transmissions and potentially compromise information. To avoid such compromise, organizations use different frequencies from those planned for the operation. Using wire systems is an option, but this does not exercise the network systems, which is the strong point of this technique.

12-51. If a network rehearsal is executed from unit locations, terrain considerations are minimal. If a separate rehearsal area is required, considerations are similar to those of a reduced-force rehearsal.

REHEARSAL RESPONSIBILITIES 12-52. This discussion addresses responsibilities for conducting rehearsals based on the combined arms rehearsal. Responsibilities are similar for other types of rehearsals.

REHEARSAL PLANNING 12-53. Commanders and chiefs of staff (executive officers at lower echelons) plan rehearsals.

Commander 12-54. Commanders provide certain information as part of the commander’s guidance during the initial mission analysis. They may revise the following information when they select a course of action:

Rehearsal type. Rehearsal technique. Location. Attendees. Enemy course of action to be portrayed.

Chief of Staff (Executive Officer) 12-55. The chief of staff (executive officer) (COS [XO]) ensures all rehearsals are included in the organization’s time-management SOP. The COS (XO) responsibilities include—

Publishing the rehearsal time and location in the OPORD or warning order (WARNORD). Conducting staff rehearsals. Determining rehearsal products, based on type, technique, and mission variables. Coordinating liaison officer attendance from adjacent units.

REHEARSAL PREPARATION 12-56. Everyone involved in executing or supporting the rehearsal has responsibilities during preparation.

Commander 12-57. Commanders prepare to rehearse operations with events phased in proper order, from start to finish. Under time-constrained conditions, this often proves difficult. Commanders—

Identify and prioritize key events to rehearse. Allocate time for each event. Perform personal preparation, including reviews of—

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Task organization completeness. Personnel and materiel readiness. Organizational level of preparation.

Chief of Staff (Executive Officer) 12-58. The COS (XO) through war-gaming and coordination with the commander—

Prepares to serve as the rehearsal director. Coordinates time for key events requiring rehearsal. Establishes rehearsal time limits per the commander’s guidance and mission variables. Verifies rehearsal site preparation. A separate rehearsal site may be required for some events, such as a possible obstacle site. A good rehearsal site includes—

Appropriate markings and associated training aids. Parking areas. Local security.

Determines the method for controlling the rehearsal and ensuring its logical flow, such as a script.

Subordinate Leaders 12-59. Subordinate leaders complete their planning. This planning includes—

Completing unit OPORDs. Identifying issues derived from the higher headquarters’ OPORD. Providing a copy of their unit OPORD with graphics to the higher headquarters. Performing personal preparation similar to that of the commander. Ensuring they and their subordinates bring all necessary equipment.

Conducting Headquarters Staff 12-60. Conducting headquarters staff members—

Develop an OPORD with necessary overlays. Deconflict all subordinate unit graphics. Composite overlays are the first step for leaders to visualize the organization’s overall plan. Publish composite overlays at the rehearsal, including, at a minimum—

Movement and maneuver. Intelligence. Fires. Sustainment. Signal operations. Protection.

REHEARSAL EXECUTION 12-61. During the rehearsal execution, the commander, COS (XO), assistants, subordinate leaders, recorder, and staff from the conducting headquarters have specific responsibilities.

Commander 12-62. Commanders command the rehearsal just as they will command the operation. They maintain the focus and level of intensity, allowing no potential for subordinate confusion. Although the staff refines the OPORD, it belongs to the commander. The commander uses the order to conduct operations. An effective rehearsal is not a commander’s brief to subordinates. It validates synchronization—the what, when, and

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where—of tasks that subordinate units will perform to execute the operation and achieve the commander’s intent.

Chief of Staff (Executive Officer) 12-63. Normally, the COS (XO) serves as the rehearsal director. This officer ensures each unit will accomplish its tasks at the right time and cues the commander to upcoming decisions. The chief of staff’s (executive officer’s) script is the execution matrix and the decision support template. The COS (XO) as the rehearsal director—

Starts the rehearsal on time. Has a formal roll call. Ensures everyone brings the necessary equipment, including organizational graphics and previously issued orders. Validates the task organization. Linkups must be complete or on schedule, and required materiel and personnel must be on hand. The importance of this simple check cannot be overemphasized. Ensures synchronization of the operational framework being used—deep-close-security, decisive-shaping-sustaining, or main and supporting efforts. (See ADRP 3-0 for more information on the three operational frameworks.) Rehearses the synchronization of combat power from flank and higher organizations. These organizations often exceed the communications range of the commander and assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3 [S-3]) when they are away from the command post. Synchronizes the timing and contribution of each warfighting function. For each decisive point, defines conditions required to—

Commit the reserve or striking forces. Move a unit. Close or emplace an obstacle. Fire at planned targets. Move a medical unit, change a supply route, and alert specific observation posts.

Disciplines leader movements, enforces brevity, and ensures completeness. Keeps within time constraints. Ensures that the most important events receive the most attention. Ensures that absentees and flank units receive changes to the OPORD and transmits changes to them as soon as practical. Communicates the key civil considerations of the operation.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (S-3) 12-64. The G-3 (S-3) assists the commander with the rehearsal. The G-3 (S-3)—

Portrays the friendly scheme of maneuver. Ensures subordinate unit actions comply with the commander’s intent. Normally provides the recorder.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (S-2) 12-65. The assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2 [S-2]) portrays the enemy forces and other variables of the operational environment during rehearsals. The G-2 (S-2) bases actions on the enemy course of action that the commander selected during the MDMP. The G-2 (S-2)—

Provides participants with current intelligence. Portrays the best possible assessment of the enemy course of action. Communicates the enemy’s presumed concept of operations, desired effects, and end state.

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Explains other factors of the operational environment that may hinder or complicate friendly actions. Communicates the key civil considerations of the operation.

Subordinate Leaders 12-66. Subordinate unit leaders, using an established format, effectively articulate their units’ actions and responsibilities as well as record changes on their copies of the graphics or OPORD.

Recorder 12-67. The recorder is normally a representative from the G-3 (S-3). During the rehearsal, the recorder captures all coordination made during execution and notes unresolved problems. At the end of the rehearsal, the recorder—

Presents any unresolved problems to the commander for resolution. Restates any changes, coordination, or clarifications directed by the commander. Estimates when a written fragmentary order (FRAGORD) codifying the changes will follow.

Conducting Headquarters Staff 12-68. The staff updates the OPORD, decision support template, and execution matrix based on the decisions of the commander.

REHEARSAL ASSESSMENT 12-69. The commander establishes the standard for a successful rehearsal. A properly executed rehearsal validates each leader’s role and how each unit contributes to the overall operation—what each unit does, when each unit does it relative to times and events, and where each unit does it to achieve desired effects. An effective rehearsal ensures commanders have a common vision of the enemy, their own forces, the terrain, and the relationships among them. It identifies specific actions requiring immediate staff resolution and informs the higher commander of critical issues or locations that the commander, COS (XO), or G-3 (S-3) must personally oversee.

12-70. The commander (or rehearsal director in the commander’s absence) assesses and critiques all parts of the rehearsal. Critiques center on how well the operation achieves the commander’s intent and on the coordination necessary to accomplish that end. Usually, commanders leave the internal execution of tasks within the rehearsal to the subordinate unit commander’s judgment and discretion.

REHEARSAL DETAILS 12-71. All participants have responsibilities before, during, and after a rehearsal. Before a rehearsal, the rehearsal director states the commander’s expectations and orients the other participants on details of the rehearsal, as necessary. During a rehearsal, all participants rehearse their roles in the operation. They make sure they understand how their actions support the overall operation and note any additional coordination required. After a rehearsal, participants ensure they understand any changes to the OPORD and coordination requirements, and they receive all updated staff products.

12-72. Commanders do not normally address small problems that arise during rehearsals. Instead, the G-3 (S-3) recorder keeps a record of these problems. This ensures the commander does not interrupt the rehearsal’s flow. If the problem remains at the end of the rehearsal, the commander resolves it then. If the problem jeopardizes mission accomplishment, the staff accomplishes the coordination necessary to resolve it before the participants disperse. Identifying and solving such problems is a major reason for conducting rehearsals. If commanders do not make corrections while participants are assembled, they may lose the opportunity to do so. Coordinating among dispersed participants and disseminating changes to them often proves more difficult than accomplishing these actions in person.

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BEFORE THE REHEARSAL 12-73. Before the rehearsal, the rehearsal director calls the roll and briefs participants on information needed for execution. The briefing begins with an introduction, overview, and orientation. It includes a discussion of the rehearsal script and ground rules. The detail of this discussion is based on participants’ familiarity with the rehearsal SOP.

12-74. Before the rehearsal, the staff develops an OPORD with at least the basic five paragraphs and necessary overlays. The staff may not publish annexes; however, responsible staff officers should know their content.

Introduction and Overview 12-75. Before the rehearsal, the rehearsal director introduces all participants as needed. Then, the rehearsal director (normally the COS [XO]) gives an overview of the briefing topics, rehearsal subjects and sequence, and timeline, specifying the no-later-than ending time. The rehearsal director explains after action reviews, describes how and when they occur, and discusses how to incorporate changes into the OPORD. The director explains any constraints, such as pyrotechnics use, light discipline, weapons firing, or radio silence. For safety, the rehearsal director ensures all participants understand safety precautions and enforces their use. Last, the director emphasizes results and states the commander’s standard for a successful rehearsal. Subordinate leaders state any results of planning or preparation (including rehearsals) they have already conducted. If a subordinate recommends a change to the OPORD, the rehearsal director acts on the recommendation before the rehearsal begins, if possible. If not, the commander resolves the recommendation with a decision before the rehearsal ends.

Orientation 12-76. The rehearsal director orients the participants to the terrain or rehearsal medium. The rehearsal director identifies orientation using magnetic north on the rehearsal medium and symbols representing actual terrain features. After explaining any graphic control measures, obstacles, and targets, the rehearsal director issues supplemental materials, if needed.

Rehearsal Script 12-77. An effective means for the rehearsal director to control rehearsals is the use of a script. It keeps the rehearsal on track. The script provides a checklist so the organization addresses all warfighting functions and outstanding issues. It has two major parts: the agenda and response sequence.

Agenda

12-78. An effective rehearsal follows a prescribed agenda that everyone knows and understands. This agenda includes, but is not limited to—

Roll call. Participant orientation to the terrain. Location of local civilians. Enemy situation brief. Friendly situation brief. Description of expected enemy actions. Discussion of friendly unit actions. A review of notes made by the recorder.

12-79. The execution matrix, decision support template, and OPORD outline the rehearsal agenda. These tools, especially the execution matrix, both drive and focus the rehearsal. The commander and staff use them to control the operation’s execution. Any templates, matrixes, or tools developed within each of the warfighting functions should tie directly to the supported unit’s execution matrix and decision support template. Examples include an intelligence synchronization matrix or fires execution matrix.

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12-80. An effective rehearsal realistically and quickly portrays the enemy force and other variables of the operational environment without distracting from the rehearsal. One technique for doing this has the G-2 (S-2) preparing an actions checklist. It lists a sequence of events much like the one for friendly units but from the enemy or civilian perspective.

Response Sequence

12-81. Participants respond in a logical sequence: either by warfighting function or by unit as the organization deploys, from front to rear. The commander determines the sequence before the rehearsal. The staff posts the sequence at the rehearsal site, and the rehearsal director may restate it.

12-82. Effective rehearsals allow participants to visualize and synchronize the concept of operations. As the rehearsal proceeds, participants talk through the concept of operations. They focus on key events and the synchronization required to achieve the desired effects. The commander leads the rehearsal and gives orders during the operation. Subordinate commanders enter and leave the discussion at the time they expect to begin and end their tasks or activities during the operation. This practice helps the commander assess the adequacy of synchronization. Commanders do not “re-war-game” unless absolutely necessary to ensure subordinate unit commanders understand the plan.

12-83. The rehearsal director emphasizes integrating fires, events that trigger different branch actions, and actions on contact. The chief of fires (fire support officer) or firing unit commander states when to initiate fires, who to fire them, from where the firing comes, the ammunition available, and the desired target effect. Subordinate commanders state when they initiate fires per their fire support plans. The rehearsal director speaks for any absent staff section and ensures the rehearsal addresses all actions on the synchronization matrix and decision support template at the proper time or event.

12-84. The rehearsal director ensures that the rehearsal includes key sustainment and protection actions at the appropriate times. Failure to do so reduces the value of the rehearsal as a coordination tool. The staff officer with coordinating staff responsibility inserts these items into the rehearsal. Special staff officers should brief by exception when a friendly or enemy event occurs within their area of expertise. Summarizing these actions at the end of the rehearsal can reinforce coordination requirements identified during the rehearsal. The staff updates the decision support template and gives a copy to each participant. Under time-constrained conditions, the conducting headquarters staff may provide copies before the rehearsal and rely on participants to update them with pen-and-ink changes. (See table 12-1.)

Table 12-1. Example sustainment and protection actions for rehearsals

Casualty evacuation routes. Ambulance exchange point

locations. Refuel-on-the-move points. Class IV and Class V resupply

points. Logistics release points.

Support area displacement times and locations. Detainee collection points. Aviation support. Military police actions.

Ground Rules 12-85. After discussing the rehearsal script, the rehearsal director—

States the standard (what the commander will accept) for a successful rehearsal. Ensures everyone understands the parts of the OPORD to rehearse. If the unit will not rehearse the entire operation, the rehearsal director states the events to be rehearsed. Quickly reviews the rehearsal SOP if all participants are not familiar with it. An effective rehearsal SOP states—

Who controls the rehearsal. Who approves the rehearsal venue and its construction.

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When special staff officers brief the commander. The relationship between how the execution matrix portrays events and how units rehearse

events. Establishes the timeline that designates the rehearsal starting time in relation to H-hour. For example, begin the rehearsal by depicting the anticipated situation one hour before H-hour. One event executed before rehearsing the first event is deployment of forces. Establishes the time interval to begin and track the rehearsal. For example, the rehearsal director may specify that a ten-minute interval equates to one hour of actual time. Updates friendly and enemy activities as necessary. For example, the rehearsal director describes any ongoing reconnaissance.

The rehearsal director concludes the orientation with a call for questions.

DURING THE REHEARSAL 12-86. Once the rehearsal director finishes discussing the ground rules and answering questions, the G-3 (S-3) reads the mission statement, the commander reads the commander’s intent, and the G-3 (S-3) establishes the current friendly situation. The rehearsal then begins, following the rehearsal script.

12-87. Paragraphs 12-88 through 12-101 outline a generic set of rehearsal steps developed for combined arms rehearsals. However, with a few modifications, these steps support any rehearsal technique. The products depend on the rehearsal type.

Step 1–Enemy Forces Deployed 12-88. The G-2 (S-2) briefs the current enemy situation and operational environment and places markers on the map or terrain board (as applicable) indicating where enemy forces and other operationally significant groups or activities would be before the first rehearsal event. The G-2 (S-2) then briefs the most likely enemy course of action and operational context. The G-2 (S-2) also briefs the status of information collection operations (for example, citing any patrols still out or any observation post positions).

Step 2–Friendly Forces Deployed 12-89. The G-3 (S-3) briefs friendly maneuver unit dispositions, including security forces, as they are arrayed at the start of the operation. Subordinate commanders and other staff officers brief their unit positions at the starting time and any particular points of emphasis. For example, the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer states the mission-oriented protective posture level, and the chief of fires (fire support officer) or fires unit commander states the range of friendly and enemy artillery. Other participants place markers for friendly forces, including adjacent units, at the positions they will occupy at the start of the operation. As participants place markers, they state their task and purpose, task organization, and strength.

12-90. Sustainment and protection units brief positions, plans, and actions at the starting time and at points of emphasis the rehearsal director designates. Subordinate units may include forward arming and refueling points, refuel-on-the-move points, communications checkpoints, security points, or operations security procedures that differ for any period during the operation. The rehearsal director restates the commander’s intent, if necessary.

Step 3–Initiate Action 12-91. The rehearsal director states the first event on the execution matrix. Normally this involves the G-2 (S-2) moving enemy markers according to the most likely course of action. The depiction must tie enemy actions to specific terrain or to friendly unit actions. The G-2 (S-2) portrays enemy actions based on the situational template developed for staff war-gaming.

12-92. As the rehearsal proceeds, the G-2 (S-2) portrays the enemy and other operational factors and walks through the most likely enemy course of action (per the situational template). The G-2 (S-2) stresses reconnaissance routes, objectives, security force composition and locations, initial contact, initial fires

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(artillery, air, and attack helicopters), probable main force objectives or engagement areas, and likely commitment of reserve forces.

Step 4–Decision Point 12-93. When the rehearsal director determines that a particular enemy movement or reaction is complete, the commander assesses the situation to determine if a decision point has been reached. Decision points are taken directly from the decision support template.

12-94. If the commander determines the unit is not at a decision point and not at the end state, the commander directs the rehearsal director to continue to the next event on the execution matrix. Participants use the response sequence (see paragraphs 12-81 through 12-84) and continue to act out and describe their units’ actions.

12-95. When the rehearsal reaches conditions that establish a decision point, the commander decides whether to continue with the current course of action or select a branching course of action. If electing the current course of action, the commander directs the rehearsal director to move to the next event in the execution matrix. If selecting a branch, the commander states the reason for selecting that branch, states the first event of that branch, and continues the rehearsal until the organization has rehearsed all events of that branch. As the unit reaches decisive points, the rehearsal director states the conditions required for success.

12-96. When it becomes obvious that the operation requires additional coordination to ensure success, participants immediately begin coordinating. This is one of the key reasons for rehearsals. The rehearsal director ensures that the recorder captures the coordination and any changes and all participants understand the coordination.

Step 5–End State Reached 12-97. Achieving the desired end state completes that phase of the rehearsal. In an attack, this will usually be when the unit is on the objective and has finished consolidation and casualty evacuation. In the defense, this will usually be after the decisive action (such as committing the reserve or striking force), the final destruction or withdrawal of the enemy, and casualty evacuation is complete. In stability tasks, this usually occurs when a unit achieves the targeted progress within a designated line of effort.

Step 6–Reset 12-98. At this point, the commander states the next branch to rehearse. The rehearsal director resets the situation to the decision point where that branch begins and states the criteria for a decision to execute that branch. Participants assume those criteria have been met and then refight the operation along that branch until they attain the desired end state. They complete any coordination needed to ensure all participants understand and can meet any requirements. The recorder records any changes to the branch.

12-99. The commander then states the next branch to rehearse. The rehearsal director again resets the situation to the decision point where that branch begins, and participants repeat the process. This continues until the rehearsal has addressed all decision points and branches that the commander wants to rehearse.

12-100. If the standard is not met and time permits, the commander directs participants to repeat the rehearsal. The rehearsal continues until participants are prepared or until the time available expires. (Commanders may allocate more time for a rehearsal but must assess the effects on subordinate commanders’ preparation time.) Successive rehearsals, if conducted, should be more complex and realistic.

12-101. At the end of the rehearsal, the recorder restates any changes, coordination, or clarifications that the commander directed and estimates how long it will take to codify changes in a written FRAGORD.

AFTER THE REHEARSAL 12-102. After the rehearsal, the commander leads an after action review. The commander reviews lessons learned and makes the minimum required modifications to the existing plan. (Normally, a FRAGORD effects these changes.) Changes should be refinements to the OPORD; they should not be radical or significant. Changes not critical to the operation’s execution may confuse subordinates and hinder the

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synchronization of the plan. The commander issues any last minute instructions or reminders and reiterates the commander’s intent.

12-103. Based on the commander’s instructions, the staff makes any necessary changes to the OPORD, decision support template, and execution matrix based on the rehearsal results. Subordinate commanders incorporate these changes into their units’ OPORDs. The COS (XO) ensures the changes are briefed to all leaders or liaison officers who did not participate in the rehearsal.

12-104. A rehearsal provides the final opportunity for subordinates to identify and fix unresolved problems. The staff ensures that all participants understand any changes to the OPORD and that the recorder captures all coordination done at the rehearsal. All changes to the published OPORD are, in effect, verbal FRAGORDs. As soon as possible, the staff publishes these verbal FRAGORDs as a written FRAGORD that changes the operation order.

5 May 2014 FM 6-0 13-1

Chapter 13

Liaison This chapter discusses responsibilities of liaison officers and teams. It addresses requirements distinct to Army operations and unified action. It includes liaison checklists and an example outline for a liaison officer handbook.

ROLE OF LIAISON 13-1. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (JP 3-08). Most commonly used for establishing and maintaining close communications, liaison continuously enables direct, physical communications between commands and with unified action partners. Commanders use liaison during operations and normal daily activities to help facilitate a shared understanding and purpose among organizations, preserve freedom of action, and maintain flexibility. Liaison provides commanders with relevant information and answers to operational questions, thus enhancing the commander’s situational understanding.

13-2. Liaison activities augment the commander’s ability to synchronize and focus combat power. They include establishing and maintaining physical contact and communications between elements of military forces and nonmilitary agencies during unified action. Liaison activities ensure—

Cooperation and understanding among commanders and staffs of different headquarters. Coordination on tactical matters to achieve unity of effort. Synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects. Understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized results.

LIAISON OFFICER 13-3. A liaison officer (LNO) represents a commander or staff officer. LNOs transmit information directly, bypassing headquarters and staff layers. A trained, competent, trusted, and informed LNO (either a commissioned or a noncommissioned officer [NCO]) is the key to effective liaison. LNOs must have the commander’s full confidence and experience for the mission. At higher echelons, the complexity of operations often requires an increase in the rank required for LNOs. (See table 13-1.)

Table 13-1. Senior liaison officer rank by echelon

Senior liaison officer rank by echelon Recommended rank Multinational or joint force commander1 Colonel Corps Lieutenant Colonel Division Major Brigade, regiment, or group Captain Battalion Lieutenant 1These include joint force commanders and functional component commanders and may also include major interagency and international organizations.

13-4. The LNO’s parent unit or unit of assignment is the sending unit. The unit or activity that the LNO is sent to is the receiving unit, which may be a host nation. An LNO normally remains at the receiving unit until recalled. LNOs represent the commander and they—

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Understand how the commander thinks and interpret the commander’s messages. Convey the commander’s intent, guidance, mission, and concept of operations. Represent the commander’s position.

13-5. As a representative, the LNO has access to the commander consistent with the duties involved. However, for routine matters, LNOs work for and receive direction from the chief of staff or executive officer (COS [XO]). Using one officer to perform a liaison mission conserves manpower while guaranteeing a consistent, accurate flow of information. However, continuous operations may require a liaison team or liaison detachment.

13-6. The professional capabilities and personal characteristics of an effective LNO encourage confidence and cooperation with the commander and staff of the receiving unit. In addition to the discussion in paragraph 13-4, effective LNOs—

Know the sending unit’s mission; current and future operations; logistics status; organization; disposition; capabilities; and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Appreciate and understand the receiving unit’s tactics, techniques, and procedures; organization; capabilities; mission; doctrine; staff procedures; and customs. Are familiar with—

Requirements for and purpose of liaison. The liaison system and its reports, documents, and records. Liaison team training.

Observe the established channels of command and staff functions. Are tactful. Possess familiarity with local culture and language, and have advanced regional expertise if possible.

LIAISON ELEMENTS 13-7. Commanders organize liaison elements based on the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]) and echelon of command. (See appendix A for more details.) Two command liaison teams are authorized in division, corps, and theater army headquarters. Common ways to organize liaison elements include, but are not limited to—

A single LNO. A liaison team consisting of one or two LNOs, or an LNO and a liaison NCO in charge, clerical personnel, and communications personnel along with their equipment. Couriers (messengers) responsible for the secure physical transmission and delivery of documents and other materials. A digital liaison detachment comprised of several teams with expertise and equipment in specialized areas, such as intelligence, operations, fire support, air defense, and sustainment.

DIGITAL LIAISON DETACHMENTS 13-8. Digital liaison detachments provide Army commanders units to conduct liaison with major subordinate or parallel headquarters. Digital liaison detachments consist of staff officers with a broad range of expertise who are capable of analyzing the situation, facilitating coordination between multinational forces, and assisting in cross-boundary information flow and operational support. These 30-Soldier teams are essential not only for routine liaison, but also for advising and assisting multinational partners in conducting planning and operations at intermediate tactical levels. These detachments can operate as a single entity for liaison with a major multinational headquarters, or provide two smaller teams for digital connectivity and liaison with smaller multinational headquarters. Commanders can also tailor digital liaison detachments to match a given mission. The basis of digital liaison detachments allocation is five per committed theater Army, one per corps and division serving as a joint task force headquarters, or as approved by the Department of the Army. The support requirement for a coalition during

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counterinsurgency or foreign internal defense is one digital liaison detachment for each multinational headquarters (division or above) and one for the host-nation Ministry of Defense.

LIAISON PRACTICES 13-9. When possible, liaison is reciprocal among higher, lower, supporting, supported, and adjacent organizations. Each organization sends a liaison element to the other. It must be reciprocal when U.S. forces are placed under control of a headquarters of a different nationality and vice versa, or when brigade-sized and larger formations of different nationalities are adjacent. When not reciprocal, the following practices apply to liaison where applicable:

Higher-echelon units establish liaison with lower echelons. In contiguous operations units on the left establish liaison with units on their right. In contiguous operations units of the same echelon establish liaison with those to their front. In noncontiguous operations units establish liaison with units within closest proximity. Supporting units establish liaison with units they support. Units not in contact with the enemy establish liaison with units in contact with the enemy. During a passage of lines, the passing unit establishes liaison with the stationary unit. During a relief in place, the relieving unit establishes liaison with the unit being relieved.

If liaison is broken, both units act to reestablish it. However, the primary responsibility rests with the unit originally responsible for establishing liaison.

LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES 13-10. Both sending and receiving units have liaison responsibilities before, during, and after operations.

SENDING UNIT 13-11. The sending unit’s most important tasks include selecting and training the best qualified Soldiers for liaison duties. Liaison personnel should have the characteristics and qualifications discussed in paragraphs 13-3 through 13-6. (See figure 13-1 for an example outline for an LNO handbook. See figure 13-2 on page 13-4 for sample questions that LNOs should be able to answer. See figure 13-3 on page 13-5 for a sample LNO packing list.)

Sample Liaison Officer Handbook Outline

Table of contents.

Sending unit’s tasking order.

Purpose statement.

Introduction statement.

Definitions.

Scope statement.

Responsibilities and guidelines for conduct.

Actions to take before departing from the sending unit.

Actions to take on arriving at the receiving unit.

Actions to take during liaison operations at the receiving unit.

Actions to take before departing from the receiving unit.

Actions to take upon returning to the sending unit.

Figure 13-1. Example liaison officer handbook outline

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Sample questions. Liaison officers should be able to answer the following questions: Does the sending unit have a copy of the receiving unit’s latest operation plan, operation order, and fragmentary order?

Does the receiving unit’s plan support the plan of the higher headquarters? This includes sustainment as well as the tactical concept. Are main supply routes and required supply rates known?

Can the controlled supply rate support the receiving unit’s plan?

What are the receiving unit’s commander’s critical information requirements?

At what time, phase, or event are they expected to change? Are there any items the commander’s critical information requirements do not contain with which the sending unit can help?

Which sending commander decisions are critical to executing the receiving unit operation?

What are the “no-later-than” times for those decisions?

What assets does the unit need to acquire to accomplish its mission? How would the unit use them?

How do they support attaining the more senior commander’s intent? From where can the unit obtain them? Higher headquarters? Other Services? Multinational partners?

How do units use aviation assets?

How can the liaison officers communicate with the sending unit? Are telephones, radios, facsimile machines, computers, and other information systems available? Where are they located? Which communications are secure?

What terrain did the unit designate as key? Decisive?

What weather conditions would have a major impact on the operation?

What effect would a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment have on the operation?

What effect would large numbers of refugees or enemy prisoners of war have on the receiving unit’s operations?

What is the worst thing that could happen during execution of the current operation?

How would a unit handle a passage of lines by other units through the force?

What conditions would cause the unit to request operational control of a multinational force?

If the unit is placed under operational control of a larger multinational force, or given operational control of a smaller such force, what special problems would it present?

If going to a multinational force headquarters, how do the tactical principles and command concepts of that force differ from those of U.S. forces?

What host-nation support is available to the sending unit?

What are the required reports from higher and sending units’ standard operating procedures?

Figure 13-2. Examples of liaison officer questions

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5 May 2014 FM 6-0 13-5

Example recommended packing list: Credentials (including courier card, permissive jump orders, if qualified). Blank forms as required.

References.

Excerpts of higher and sending headquarters’ operation orders and plans.

Sending unit standard operating procedures.

Sending unit’s command diagrams and recapitulation of major systems.

The unit modified table of equipment, unit status report (if its classification allows), and mission briefings. The assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3 [S-3]) and the force modernization officer are excellent sources of these.

Computers and other information systems required for information and data exchange (for example, command post of the future, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, and Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network devices.)

Automated network control device.

Communications equipment.

Sending unit telephone book.

List of commanders and staff officers.

Telephone calling (credit) card.

Cell phone.

Movement table.

Administrative equipment (for example, pens, paper, scissors, tape, and hole punch).

Map and chart equipment (for example, pens, pins, protractor, straight edge, scale, distance counter, acetate, and unit markers).

Tent and accessories (camouflage net, cots, and stove, as appropriate).

Foreign phrase book and dictionary.

Local currency as required.

Rations and water.

Weapons and ammunition.

Night-vision device.

Figure 13-3. Example recommended packing list 13-12. The sending unit describes the liaison team to the receiving unit providing number and types of vehicles and personnel, equipment, call signs, and frequencies. The LNO or liaison team also requires—

Point-to-point transportation, as required. Identification and appropriate credentials for the receiving unit. Appropriate security clearance, courier orders, and information systems accredited for use on the receiving unit’s network. The standard operating procedures (SOPs) outlining the missions, functions, procedures, and duties of the sending unit’s liaison section. If the receiving unit is multinational, it may provide communications equipment and personnel.

13-13. The movement from the sending unit to the receiving unit requires careful planning and coordination. (See figure 13-4 on page 13-6 for a list of tasks for liaison personnel to perform before departing the sending unit.)

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Example liaison checklist before departure from sending unit: Understand what the sending commander wants the receiving commander to know.

Receive a briefing from operations, intelligence, and other staff elements on current and future operations.

Receive and understand the tasks from the sending unit staff.

Obtain the correct maps, traces, and overlays.

Arrange for transport, communications and cryptographic equipment, codes, signal instructions, and the challenge and password—including their protection and security. Arrange for replacement of these items, as necessary.

Complete route-reconnaissance and time-management plans so the liaison team arrives at the designated location on time.

Ensure that liaison team and interpreters have security clearances and access appropriate for the mission.

Verify that the receiving unit received the liaison team’s security clearances and will grant access to the level of information the mission requires.

Verify courier orders.

Know how to destroy classified information in case of an emergency during transit or at the receiving unit.

Inform the sending unit of the liaison officer’s departure time, route, arrival time, and, when known, the estimated time and route of return.

Pick up all correspondence designated for the receiving unit.

Conduct a radio check.

Know the impending moves of the sending and receiving units.

Bring accredited information systems needed to support liaison operations.

Pack adequate rations and water for use in transit.

Arrange for the liaison party’s departure.

Figure 13-4. Liaison checklist—before departing the sending unit

RECEIVING UNIT 13-14. The receiving unit—

Provides the sending unit with the LNO’s reporting time, place, point of contact, recognition signal, and password. Provides details of any tactical movement and logistics information relevant to the LNO’s mission, especially while the LNO is in transit. Ensures that the LNO has access to the commander, the COS (XO), and other officers, as required. Gives the LNO an initial briefing of the unit battle rhythm and allows the LNO access necessary to remain informed of current operations. Protects the LNO while at the receiving unit. Publishes an SOP outlining the missions, functions, procedures to request information, information release restrictions and clearance procedures, and duties of the LNO or team at the receiving unit. If possible, provides access to communications equipment (and operating instructions, as needed) when the LNO needs to communicate using the receiving unit’s equipment.

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Provides adequate workspace for the LNO. Provides administrative and logistic support, or agreed to host-nation support.

DURING THE TOUR 13-15. During the tour, LNOs have specific duties. LNOs inform the receiving unit’s commander or staff of the sending unit’s needs or requirements. Due to the numbers of LNOs in the headquarters, sending units guard against inundating the receiving unit with formal requests for information. By virtue of their location in the headquarters and knowledge of the situation, LNOs can rapidly answer questions from the sending unit and keep the receiving unit from wasting planning time answering requests for information. (See figure 13-5 on page 13-8 for a summary of LNO duties.) During the liaison tour, LNOs—

Arrive at the designated location on time. Promote cooperation between the sending and receiving units. Accomplish their mission without becoming overly involved in the receiving unit’s staff procedures or actions; however, they may assist higher echelon staffs in war-gaming. Follow the receiving unit’s communications procedures. Actively obtain information without interfering with the receiving unit’s operations. Facilitate understanding of the sending unit’s commander’s intent. Help the sending unit’s commander assess current and future operations. Remain informed of the sending unit’s current situation and provide that information to the receiving unit’s commander and staff. Quickly inform the sending unit of the receiving unit’s upcoming missions, tasks, and orders. Ensure the sending unit has a copy of the receiving unit’s SOP. Inform the receiving unit’s commander or COS (XO) of the content of reports transmitted to the sending unit. Keep a record of their reports, listing everyone met (including each person’s name, rank, duty position, and telephone number) as well as key staff members and their telephone numbers. Attempt to resolve issues within the receiving unit before involving the sending unit. Notify the sending unit promptly if unable to accomplish the liaison mission. Report their departure to the receiving unit’s commander at the end of their mission.

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Example liaison duties during the tour: Arrive at least two hours before any scheduled briefings.

Check in with security and complete any required documentation.

Report to and present credentials to the chief of staff (executive officer) or supervisor, as appropriate.

Arrange for an office call with the commander.

Meet coordinating and special staff officers.

Notify the sending unit of arrival (use the liaison establishment report).

Visit staff elements, brief them on the sending unit’s situation, and collect information from them.

Deliver all correspondence designated for the receiving unit.

Annotate on all overlays the security classification, title, map scale, grid intersection points, and effective date-time group, when received, and from whom received.

Pick up all correspondence for the sending unit when departing the receiving unit.

Inform the receiving unit of the liaison officer’s departure time, return route, and expected arrival time at the sending unit.

Submit a liaison disestablishment report to the sending unit when departing.

Figure 13-5. Liaison duties—during the liaison tour 13-16. Once a deploying liaison team or detachment arrives and sets up communications at the receiving unit, it submits a liaison establishment report to the sending unit. This report informs the sending unit’s command that the detachment is ready to conduct liaison, and it establishes exactly what systems are available. A re-deploying team or detachment submits a liaison disestablishment report to the sending unit as its last action prior to disconnecting its digital devices. This report informs the command that the element is leaving the network and is no longer capable of conducting liaison at any level beyond unsecure voice. (See unit SOPs for the liaison establishment report and the liaison disestablishment report formats.)

AFTER THE TOUR 13-17. After returning to the sending unit, LNOs promptly transmit the receiving unit’s requests to the sending unit’s commander or staff, as appropriate. (See figure 13-6 for a list of tasks to perform after completing a liaison tour.)

Example liaison duties after the tour: Deliver all correspondence.

Brief the chief of staff (executive officer) and appropriate staff elements.

Prepare the necessary reports.

Clearly state what they did and did not learn from the mission.

Figure 13-6. Liaison duties—after the liaison tour 13-18. Accuracy is important. Effective LNOs provide clear, concise, complete information. If the accuracy of information is in doubt, they quote the source and include the source in the report. LNOs limit their remarks to mission-related observations.

LIAISON CONSIDERATIONS 13-19. Joint, interagency, and multinational operations require greater liaison efforts than most other operations.

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JOINT OPERATIONS 13-20. Current joint information systems do not meet all operational requirements. Few U.S. military information systems are interoperable. Army liaison teams and detachments require information systems that can rapidly exchange information between commands to ensure Army force operations are synchronized with operations of the joint force and its Service components.

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS 13-21. Army forces may participate in interagency operations across the range of military operations, especially when conducting stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Frequently, Army forces conduct operations in cooperation with or in support of civilian government agencies. Relations in these operations are rarely based on standard military command and support relationships; rather, national laws or specific agreements for each situation govern the specific relationships in interagency operations. Defense support of civil authorities provides an excellent example. Federal military forces that respond to a domestic disaster will support the Federal Emergency Management Agency, while National Guard forces working in state active duty status (Title 32 United States Code) or conducting National Guard defense support of civil authorities will support that state's emergency management agency. National Guard forces federalized under Title 10 United States Code will support the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The goal is always unity of effort between military forces and civilian agencies, although unity of command may not be possible. Effective liaison and continuous coordination become keys to mission accomplishment. (See FM 3-28.)

13-22. Some missions require coordination with nongovernmental organizations. While no overarching interagency doctrine delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations, the National Response Framework provides some guidance. Effective liaison elements work toward establishing mutual trust and confidence, continuously coordinating actions to achieve cooperation and unity of effort. (See JP 3-08.) In these situations, LNOs and their teams require a broader understanding of the interagency environment, responsibilities, motivations, and limitations of nongovernmental organizations, and the relationships these organizations have with the U.S. military.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 13-23. Army units often operate as part of a multinational force. Interoperability is an essential requirement for multinational operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines interoperability as the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. Interoperability is also the condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of satisfactory communication between them and their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. Examples of interoperability include the deployment of a computer network (such as the Combined Enterprise Network Theater Information Exchange System) to facilitate inter-staff communication. Nations whose forces are interoperable can operate together effectively in numerous ways. Less interoperable forces have correspondingly fewer ways to work together. Although frequently identified with technology, important areas of interoperability include doctrine, procedures, communications, and training. Factors that enhance interoperability include planning for interoperability, conducting multinational training exercises, staff visits to assess multinational capabilities, a command atmosphere that rewards sharing information, and command emphasis on a constant effort to eliminate the sources of confusion and misunderstanding.

13-24. The multinational forces with which the U.S. operates may not have information systems that are compatible with U.S. or other systems. Some nations may lack computerized information systems. Reciprocal liaison is especially important under these conditions. Mutual trust and confidence is the key to making these multinational operations successful. Liaison during multinational operations includes explicit coordination of doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures. Effective liaison requires patience and tact during personal interactions. The liaison officer needs a thorough understanding of the strategic, operational, and tactical aims of the international effort. Foreign disclosure limitations often require special communications and liaison arrangements to address cultural differences and sensitivities as well as to

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ensure explicit understanding throughout the multinational force. Two structural enhancements that improve the coordination of multinational forces are liaison networks and coordination centers.

13-25. A multinational coordination center or coalition coordination center is a means of increasing multinational coordination. U.S. commanders routinely create such a center in the early stages of any coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. It is a proven means of integrating the participating nations’ military forces into the coalition planning and operations processes, enhancing coordination and cooperation, and supporting an open and full interaction within the coalition structure. Normally, the multinational coordination center focuses upon coordination of coalition force operations, which will most likely involve classified information. (See JP 3-16 for more information on multinational operations.)

5 May 2014 FM 6-0 14-1

Chapter 14

Decisionmaking in Execution This chapter describes the major activities of execution to include assessing, decisionmaking, and directing action. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process.

ACTIVITIES OF EXECUTION 14-1. Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if the command does not execute effectively. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission (ADRP 5-0). In execution, commanders, supported by their staffs, focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. Inherent in execution is deciding whether to execute planned actions, such as changing phases or executing a branch plan. Execution also includes adjusting the plan based on changes in the situation and an assessment of the operation’s progress. (See ADRP 5-0 for fundamentals of execution).

14-2. Throughout execution, commanders, supported by their staffs, assess the operation’s progress, make decisions, and direct the application of combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Major activities of execution include—

Assessment: Monitoring current operations and evaluating progress. Decisionmaking: Making decisions to exploit opportunities or counter treats. Directing action: Apply combat power at decisive points and times.

ASSESSMENT DURING EXECUTION 14-3. During execution, continuous assessment is essential. Assessment involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using criteria to judge operational progress towards success. The commander and staff assess the probable outcome of the operation to determine whether changes are necessary to accomplish the mission, take advantage of opportunities, or react to unexpected threats. Commanders also assess the probable outcome of current operations in terms of their impact on potential future operations in order to develop concepts for these operations early. (See ADRP 5-0 for fundamentals of assessment. See chapter 15 for details for building an assessment plan).

14-4. Assessment includes both monitoring the situation and evaluating progress. During monitoring, commanders and staffs collect and use relevant information to develop a clear understanding of the command’s current situation. Commanders and staffs also evaluate the operation’s progress in terms of measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). This evaluation helps commanders assess progress and identify variances—the difference between the actual situation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at that time or event. Identifying variances and their significance leads to determining if a decision is required during execution.

DECISIONMAKING DURING EXECUTION 14-5. When operations are progressing satisfactorily, variances are minor and within acceptable levels. Commanders who make this evaluation—explicitly or implicitly—allow operations to continue according to plan. This situation leads to execution decisions included in the plan. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order. An execution decision is normally tied to a decision point.

14-6. An assessment may determine that the operation as a whole, or one or more of its major actions, is not progressing according to expectations. Variances of this magnitude present one of two situations:

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Significant, unforeseen opportunities to achieve the commander’s intent. Significant threats to the operation’s success.

In either case, the commander makes an adjustment decision. An adjustment decision is the selection of a course of action that modifies the order to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats. An adjustment decision may include a decision to reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan.

14-7. Executing, adjusting, or abandoning the original operation is part of decisionmaking in execution. By fighting the enemy and not the plan, successful commanders balance the tendency to abandon a well-conceived plan too soon against persisting in a failing effort too long. Effective decisionmaking during execution—

Relates all actions to the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Is comprehensive, maintaining integration of combined arms rather than dealing with separate functions. Relies heavily on intuitive decisionmaking by commanders and staffs to make rapid adjustments.

DIRECTING ACTION 14-8. To implement execution or adjustment decisions, commanders direct actions that apply combat power. Based on the commander’s decision and guidance, the staff resynchronizes the operation to mass the maximum effects of combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. This involves synchronizing the operations in time, space, and purpose and issuing directives to subordinates. (See table 14-1 for a summary of a range of possible actions with respect to decisions made during execution.)

Table 14-1. Decision types and related actions

Decision types Actions

E xe

cu tio

n de

ci si

on s

Minor variances from the plan

Operation proceeding according to plan. Variances are within acceptable limits.

Execute planned actions Commander or designee decides which planned actions

best meet the situation and directs their execution. Staff issues fragmentary order. Staff completes follow-up actions.

Anticipated situation Operation encountering variances within the limits for one or more branches or sequels anticipated in the plan.

Execute a branch or sequel Commander or staff review branch or sequel plan. Commander receives assessments and recommendations

for modifications to the plan, determines the time available to refine it, and either issues guidance for further actions or directs execution of a branch or sequel.

Staff issues fragmentary order. Staff completes follow-up actions.

A dj

us tm

en t d

ec is

io ns

Unanticipated situation— friendly success

Significant, unanticipated positive variances result in opportunities to achieve the end state in ways that differ significantly from the plan.

Make an adjustment decision Commander recognizes the opportunity or threat and

determines time available for decisionmaking. Based on available planning time, commanders determine if

they want to reframe the problem and develop a new plan. In these instances, the decision initiates planning. Otherwise, the commander directs the staff to refine a single course of action or directs actions by subordinates to exploit the opportunity or counter the threat and exercise initiative within the higher commander’s intent.

Commander normally does not attempt to restore the plan. Commander issues a verbal warning or fragmentary order to

subordinate commanders. Staff resynchronizes operation, modifies measures of

effectiveness, and begins assessing the operation for progress using new measures of effectiveness.

Unanticipated situation— enemy threat

Significant, unanticipated negative variances impede mission accomplishment.

Decisionmaking in Execution

5 May 2014 FM 6-0 14-3

RAPID DECISIONMAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS 14-9. The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process is a technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution. While identified here with a specific name and method, the approach is not new; its use in the Army is well established. Commanders and staffs develop this capability through training and practice. When using this technique, the following considerations apply:

Rapid is often more important than process. Much of it may be mental rather than written. It should become a battle drill for the current operations integration cells, future operations cells, or both.

14-10. While the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) seeks the optimal solution (see chapter 9), the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. Using the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing courses of action (COAs). Operational and mission variables continually change during execution. This often invalidates or weakens COAs and decision criteria before leaders can make a decision. Under the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process, leaders combine their experience and intuition to quickly reach situational understanding. Based on this, they develop and refine workable COAs.

14-11. The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process facilitates continuously integrating and synchronizing the warfighting functions to address ever-changing situations. It meets the following criteria for making effective decisions during execution:

It is comprehensive, integrating all warfighting functions. It is not limited to any one warfighting function. It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander’s intent and concept of operations. It allows rapid changes to the order or mission. It is continuous, allowing commanders to react immediately to opportunities and threats.

14-12. The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process is based on an existing order and the commander’s priorities as expressed in the order. The most important of these control measures are the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process includes five steps. The first two may be performed in any order, including concurrently. The last three are performed interactively until commanders identify an acceptable course of action. (See figure 14-1.)

Figure 14-1. Rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process

COMPARE THE CURRENT SITUATION TO THE ORDER 14-13. Commanders and staffs identify likely variances during planning and identify options that will be present and actions that will be available when each variance occurs. During execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions. Then they ask if these changes affect the overall conduct of operations or their part in them and if the changes are significant. Finally, they identify

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if the changed conditions represent variances from the order—especially opportunities and risks. Staff members use running estimates to look for indicators of variances that affect their areas of expertise. (See table 14-2 for examples of indicators.)

14-14. Staff members are particularly alert for answers to CCIRs that support anticipated decisions. They also watch for exceptional information—information that would have answered one of the CCIRs if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the CCIRs. Exceptional information usually reveals a need for an adjustment decision.

14-15. When performing the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process, the current operations integration cell first compares the current situation to the one envisioned in the order. It may obtain assistance from the assessment section or the red team section in this analysis. If the situation requires greater analysis, the chief of staff or executive officer (COS [XO]) may task the future operations cell (where authorized) or the plans cell to perform this analysis. At echelons with no future operations cell, the plans cell or the current operations integration cell performs this function.

Table 14-2. Examples of change indicators

Types Indicators

G en

er al

Answer to a commander’s critical information requirement.

Identification of an information requirement. Change in mission. Change in organization of unit. Change in leadership of unit. Signing or implementation of peace treaty or

other key political arrangement.

Change in capabilities of subordinate unit. Change in role of host-nation military force. Climate changes or natural disasters

impacting on the population, agriculture, industry.

Upcoming local election. Changes in key civilian leadership.

In te

lli ge

nc e

Identification of enemy main effort. Identification of enemy reserves or

counterattack. Indications of unexpected enemy action or

preparation. Increase in enemy solicitation of civilians for

intelligence operations. Identification of an information requirement. Insertion of manned surveillance teams. Disruption of primary and secondary education

system. Unexplained disappearance of key members of

intelligence community.

Enemy electronic attack use. Indicators of illicit economic activity. Identification of threats from within the

population. Increased unemployment within the

population. Interference with freedom of religious worship. Identification of high-value targets. Unmanned aircraft system launch. Answer to a priority intelligence requirement. Enemy rotary-wing or unmanned aircraft

system use.

M ov

em en

t a nd

M

an eu

ve r

Success or failure in breaching or gap crossing operations.

Capture of significant numbers of enemy prisoners of war, enemy command posts, supply points, or artillery units.

Establishment of road blocks along major traffic routes.

Unexplained displacement of neighborhoods within a given sector.

Success or failure of a subordinate unit task. Modification of an airspace control measure. Numbers of dislocated civilians sufficient to

affect friendly operations. Damages to civilian infrastructure affecting

friendly mobility. Loss of one or more critical transportation

systems.

Fi re

s

Receipt of an air tasking order. Battle damage assessment results. Unplanned repositioning of firing units. Identification of high-payoff targets. Identification of an information requirement.

Execution of planned fires. Modification of a fire support coordination

measure. Effective enemy counterfire. Negative effects of fires on civilians. Destruction of any place of worship by friendly

fire.

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5 May 2014 FM 6-0 14-5

Table 14-2. Examples of change indicators (continued)

Types Indicators

P ro

te ct

io n

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear report or other indicators of enemy chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear use.

Report or other indicators of enemy improvised explosive device use.

Indicators of coordinated enemy actions against civilians or friendly forces.

Increased criminal activity in a given sector. Increase in organized protests or riots.

Identification of threats to communications or computer systems.

Reports of enemy targeting critical host-nation infrastructure.

Identification of threat to base or sustainment facilities.

Escalation of force incidents. Loss of border security.

S us

ta in

m en

t

Significant loss of capability in any class of supply.

Opening or closing of civilian businesses within a given area.

Identification of significant incidences of disease and nonbattle injury casualties.

Closing of major financial institutions. Mass casualties. Receipt of significant resupply. Disruption of one or more essential civil

services (such as water or electricity). Contact on a supply route. Answer to a friendly force information

requirement. Mass detainees.

Degradations to essential civilian infrastructure by threat actions.

Civilian mass casualty event beyond capability of host-nation resources.

Identification of significant shortage in any class of supply.

Outbreak of epidemic or famine within the civilian population.

Medical evacuation launch. Dislocated civilian event beyond capability

of host-nation resources. Disruption of key logistics lines of

communication. Changes in availability of host-nation

support.

M is

si on

C om

m an

d

Impending changes in key military leadership.

Interference with freedom of the press or news media.

Receipt of a fragmentary order or warning order from higher headquarters.

Effective adversary information efforts on civilians.

Loss of civilian communications nodes. Loss of contact with a command post or

commander. Jamming or interference.

DETERMINE THE TYPE OF DECISION REQUIRED 14-16. When a variance is identified, the commander directs action while the chief of operations leads chiefs of the current operations integration cell and selected functional cells in quickly comparing the current situation to the expected situation. This assessment accomplishes the following:

Describes the variance. Determines if the variance provides a significant opportunity or threat and examines the potential of either. Determines if a decision is needed by identifying if the variance:

Indicates an opportunity that can be exploited to accomplish the mission faster or with fewer resources.

Directly threatens the decisive operation’s success. Threatens a shaping operation such that it may threaten the decisive operation directly or in

the near future. Can be addressed within the commander’s intent and concept of operations. (If so,

determine what execution decision is needed.) Requires changing the concept of operations substantially. (If so, determine what adjustment

decision or new approach will best suit the circumstances.)

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14-17. For minor variances, the chief of operations works with other cell chiefs to determine whether changes to control measures are needed. If so, they determine how those changes affect other warfighting functions. They direct changes within their authority (execution decisions) and notify the COS (XO) and the affected command post cells and staff elements.

14-18. Commanders intervene directly in cases that affect the overall direction of the unit. They describe the situation, direct their subordinates to provide any additional information they need, and order either implementation of planned responses or development of an order to redirect the force.

DEVELOP A COURSE OF ACTION 14-19. If the variance requires an adjustment decision, the designated integrating cell and affected command post cell chiefs recommend implementation of a COA or obtain the commander’s guidance for developing one. They use the following conditions to screen possible COAs:

Mission. Commander’s intent. Current dispositions and freedom of action. CCIRs. Limiting factors, such as supply constraints, boundaries, and combat strength.

14-20. The new options must conform to the commander’s intent. Possible COAs may alter the concept of operations and CCIRs, if they remain within the commander’s intent. However, the commander approves changes to the CCIRs. Functional cell chiefs and other staff leaders identify areas that may be affected within their areas of expertise by proposed changes to the order or mission. Course of action considerations include, but are not limited to, those shown in table 14-3.

14-21. The commander is as likely as anyone else to detect the need for change and to sketch out the options. Whether the commander, COS (XO), or chief of operations does this, the future operations cell is often directed to further develop the concept and draft the order. The chief of operations and the current operations integration cell normally lead this effort, especially if the response is needed promptly or the situation is not complex. The commander or COS (XO) is usually the decisionmaking authority, depending on the commander’s delegation of authority.

14-22. Commanders may delegate authority for execution decisions to their deputies, COSs (XOs), or their operations officers. They retain personal responsibility for all decisions and normally retain the authority for approving adjustment decisions.

14-23. When reallocating resources or priorities, commanders assign only minimum essential assets to shaping operations. They use all other assets to weight the decisive operation. This applies when allocating resources for the overall operation or within a warfighting function.

14-24. Commanders normally direct the future operations cell or the current operations integration cell to prepare a fragmentary order (FRAGORD) setting conditions for executing a new COA. When lacking time to perform the MDMP, or quickness of action is desirable, commanders make an immediate adjustment decision—using intuitive decisionmaking—in the form of a focused COA. Developing the focused COA often follows mental war-gaming by commanders until they reach an acceptable COA. If time is available, commanders may direct the plans cell to develop a new COA using the MDMP, and the considerations for planning become operative. (See table 14-3.)

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5 May 2014 FM 6-0 14-7

Table 14-3. Course of action considerations

Types Actions

In te

lli ge

nc e

Modifying priority intelligence requirements and other intelligence requirements.

Updating named areas of interest and target areas of interest.

Updating the intelligence estimate.

Updating the enemy situation template and enemy course of action statements.

Modifying the information collection plan.

Confirming or denying threat course of action.

M ov

em en

t an

d M

an eu

ve r

Assigning new objectives. Assigning new tasks to subordinate

units. Adjusting terrain management. Employing obscurants.

Modifying airspace control measures. Making unit boundary changes. Emplacing obstacles. Clearing obstacles. Establishing and enforcing movement

priority.

Fi re

s

Delivering fires against targets or target sets.

Modifying the high-payoff target list and the attack guidance matrix.

Modifying radar zones. Modifying the priority of fires. Modifying fire support coordination

measures.

P ro

te ct

io n

Moving air defense weapons systems.

Establishing decontamination sites. Conducting chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance.

Establish movement corridors on critical lines of communications.

Changing air defense weapons control status.

Enhancing survivability through engineer support.

Revising and updating personnel recovery coordination.

Reassigning or repositioning response forces.

S us

ta in

m en

t Prioritizing medical evacuation assets.

Repositioning logistics assets. Positioning and prioritizing detainee

and resettlement assets.

Repositioning and prioritizing general engineering assets.

Modifying priorities. Modifying distribution.

M is

si on

C om

m an

d Moving communications nodes. Moving command posts. Modifying information priorities for employing information as combat power. Adjusting themes and messages to support the new decision. Adjusting measures for minimizing civilian interference with operations. Revising recommended protected targets. Recommending modifications of stability tasks, including employment of civil affairs

operations and other units, to perform civil affairs operations tasks.

REFINE AND VALIDATE THE COURSE OF ACTION 14-25. Once commanders describe the new COA, the current operations integration cell conducts an analysis to validate its feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. If acceptable, the COA is refined to resynchronize the warfighting functions enough to generate and apply the needed combat power. Staffs with a future operations cell may assign that cell responsibility for developing the details of the new COA and drafting a fragmentary order to implement it. The commander or COS (XO) may direct an “on-call” operations synchronization meeting to perform this task and ensure rapid resynchronization.

14-26. Validation and refinement are done quickly. Normally, the commander and staff officers conduct a mental war game of the new COA. They consider potential enemy reactions, the unit’s counteractions, and

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secondary effects that might affect the force’s synchronization. Each staff member considers the following items:

Is the new COA feasible in terms of my area of expertise? How will this action affect my area of expertise? Does it require changing my information requirements?

Should any of the information requirements be nominated as a CCIR? What actions within my area of expertise does this change require? Will this COA require changing objectives or targets nominated by staff members?

What other command post cells and elements does this action affect? What are potential enemy reactions? What are the possible friendly counteractions?

Does this counteraction affect my area of expertise? Will it require changing my information requirements? Are any of my information requirements potential CCIRs? What actions within my area of expertise does this counteraction require? Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by staff members? What other command post cells and elements does this counteraction affect?

14-27. The validation and refinement will show if the COA will solve the problem adequately. If it does not, the COS or chief of operations modifies it through additional analysis or develops a new COA. The COS (XO) informs the commander of any changes made to the COA.

IMPLEMENT 14-28. When a COA is acceptable, the COS (XO) recommends implementation to the commander or implements it directly, if the commander has delegated that authority. Implementation normally requires a FRAGORD; in exceptional circumstances, it may require a new operation order (OPORD). That order changes the concept of operations (in adjustment decisions), resynchronizes the warfighting functions, and disseminates changes to control measures. The staff uses warning orders (WARNORDs) to alert subordinates to a pending change. The staff also establishes sufficient time for the unit to implement the change without losing integration or being exposed to unnecessary tactical risk.

14-29. Commanders often issue orders to subordinates verbally in situations requiring quick reactions. At battalion and higher echelons, written FRAGORDs confirm verbal orders to ensure synchronization, integration, and notification of all parts of the force. If time permits, leaders verify that subordinates understand critical tasks. Verification methods include the confirmation brief and backbrief. These are conducted both between commanders and within staff elements to ensure mutual understanding.

14-30. After the analysis is complete, the current operations integration cell and command post cell chiefs update decision support templates and synchronization matrixes. When time is available, the operations officer or chief of operations continues this analysis to the operation’s end to complete combat power integration. Staff members begin the synchronization needed to implement the decision. This synchronization involves collaboration with other command post cells and subordinate staffs. Staff members determine how actions in their areas of expertise affect others. They coordinate those actions to eliminate undesired effects that might cause friction. The cells provide results of this synchronization to the current operations integration cell and the common operational picture.

5 May 2014 FM 6-0 15-1

Chapter 15

Assessment Plans This chapter provides information on assessment and its role in the operations process. Next, it describes the assessment process and defines key assessment terms. This chapter concludes by describing a methodology for developing formal assessment plans. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the fundamentals of assessment.)

ASSESSMENT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 15-1. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations.

15-2. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. Primary tools for assessing progress of an operation include the operation order (OPORD), the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan.

15-3. Assessment occurs at all echelons. The situation and echelon dictate the focus and methods leaders use to assess. Normally, commanders assess those specific operations or tasks that they were directed to accomplish. This properly focuses collection and assessment at each echelon, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.

15-4. For units with a staff, assessment becomes more formal at each higher echelon. Assessment resources (including staff officer expertise and time available) proportionally increase from battalion to brigade, division, corps, and theater army. The analytic resources and level of expertise of staffs available at higher echelon headquarters include a dedicated core group of analysts. This group specializes in operations research and systems analysis, formal assessment plans, and various assessment products. Division, corps, and theater army headquarters, for example, have fully resourced plans, future operations, and current operations integration cells. They have larger intelligence staffs and more staff officers trained in operations research and systems analysis. Assessment at brigade echelon and lower is usually less formal, often relying on direct observations and the judgment of commanders and their staffs.

15-5. Often, time available for detailed analysis and assessment is shorter at lower echelons. Additionally, lower echelon staffs are progressively smaller and have less analytic capability at each lower echelon. As such, assessment at these echelons focuses on the near term and relies more on direct observation and judgments than on detailed assessment plans and methods.

15-6. For small units (those without a staff), assessment is mostly informal. Small-unit leaders focus on assessing their unit’s readiness—personnel, equipment, supplies, and morale—and their unit’s ability to perform assigned tasks. Leaders also determine whether the unit has completed assigned tasks. If those tasks have not produced the desired results, leaders explore why they have not and consider what improvements could be made for unit operations. As they assess and learn, small units change their tactics, techniques, and procedures based on their experiences. In this way, even the lowest echelons in the Army follow the assessment process.

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THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS 15-7. Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of, but is not limited to, the following activities—

Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information. Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Recommending or directing action for improvement.

MONITORING 15-8. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation (ADRP 5-0). Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective decisions made, without an accurate understanding of the current situation.

15-9. Staff elements record relevant information in running estimates. Staff elements maintain a continuous assessment of current operations to determine if they are proceeding according to the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff elements use this new information and these updated facts and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.

EVALUATING 15-10. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists (ADRP 5-0). Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working and what is not working, and it helps them gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.

15-11. Criteria in the forms of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) aid in evaluating progress. MOEs help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation.

15-12. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans. MOEs help to answer the question “Are we doing the right things?”

15-13. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs help answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all echelons in execution matrixes. MOPs are also commonly used to evaluate training. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things right?” There is no direct hierarchical relationship among MOPs to MOEs. Measures of performance do not feed MOEs, or combine in any way to produce MOEs—MOPs simply measure the performance of a task.

15-14. In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance (ADRP 5-0). Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question “What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. (See table 15-1 for additional information concerning MOEs, MOPs, and indicators.)

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5 May 2014 FM 6-0 15-3

Table 15-1. Assessment measures and indicators

Measure of effectiveness (MOE)

Measure of performance (MOP)

Indicator

Used to measure attainment of an end state condition, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

Used to measure task accomplishment.

Used to provide insight into a MOE or MOP.

Answers the question: Are we doing the right things?

Answers the question: Are we doing things right?

Answers the question: What is the status of this MOE or MOP?

Measures why (purpose) in the mission statement.

Measures what (task completion) in the mission statement.

Information used to make measuring what or why possible.

No direct hierarchical relationship to MOPs.

No direct hierarchical relationship to MOEs.

Subordinate to MOEs and MOPs.

Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans.

Often formally tracked in execution matrixes.

Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans.

Typically challenging to choose the appropriate ones.

Typically simple to choose the appropriate ones.

Typically as challenging to select appropriately as the supported MOE or MOP.

RECOMMENDING OR DIRECTING ACTION 15-15. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited.

15-16. When developing recommendations, staffs draw from many sources and consider their recommendations within the larger context of the operation. While several ways to improve a particular aspect of the operation might exist, some recommendations could impact other aspects of the operation. As with all recommendations, staffs should address any future implications.

ASSESSMENT PLAN DEVELOPMENT 15-17. Critical to the assessment process is developing an assessment plan. Units use assessment working groups to develop assessment plans when appropriate. A critical element of the commander’s planning guidance is determining which assessment plans to develop. An assessment plan focused on attainment of end state conditions often works well. It is also possible, and may be desirable, to develop an entire formal assessment plan for an intermediate objective, a named operation subordinate to the base operation plan, or a named operation focused solely on a single line of operations or geographic area. The time, resources, and added complexity involved in generating an assessment plan strictly limit the number of such efforts.

15-18. Commanders and staffs integrate and develop an assessment plan within the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). As the commander and staff begin mission analysis, they also need to determine how to measure progress towards the operation’s end state.

15-19. Effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation-based) and qualitative (judgment-based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to assessment. A key aspect of any assessment is the degree to which it relies upon human judgment and the degree to which it relies upon direct observation and mathematical rigor. Rigor offsets the inevitable bias, while human judgment focuses rigor and processes on intangibles that are often key to success. The appropriate balance depends on the situation— particularly the nature of the operation and available resources for assessment—but rarely lies at the ends of the scale.

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ASSESSMENT STEPS 15-20. During planning, the assessment working group develops an assessment plan using six steps:

Step 1—Gather tools and assessment data. Step 2—Understand current and desired conditions. Step 3—Develop an assessment framework. Step 4—Develop the collection plan. Step 5—Assign responsibilities for conducting analysis and generating recommendations. Step 6—Identify feedback mechanisms.

Once the assessment working group develops the assessment plan, it applies the assessment process of monitor, evaluate, and recommend or direct continuously throughout preparation and execution.

STEP 1—GATHER TOOLS AND ASSESSMENT DATA 15-21. Planning begins with receipt of mission. The receipt of mission alerts the staffs to begin updating their running estimates and gather the tools necessary for mission analysis and continued planning. Specific tools and information gathered regarding assessment include, but are not limited to—

The higher headquarters’ plan or order, including the assessment annex if available. If replacing a unit, any current assessments and assessment products. Relevant assessment products (classified or open-source) produced by civilian and military organizations. The identification of potential data sources, including academic institutions and civilian subject matter experts.

STEP 2—UNDERSTAND CURRENT AND DESIRED CONDITIONS 15-22. Fundamentally, assessment is about measuring progress toward the desired end state. To do this, commanders and staffs compare current conditions in the area of operations against desired conditions. Army design methodology and the MDMP help commanders and staffs develop an understanding of the current situation. As planning continues, the commander identifies desired conditions that represent the operation’s end state.

15-23. Early in planning, commanders issue their initial commander’s intent, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). The end state in the initial commander’s intent describes the desired conditions the commander wants to achieve. The staff element responsible for the assessment plan identifies each specific desired condition mentioned in the commander’s intent. These specific desired conditions focus the overall assessment of the operation. Understanding current conditions and desired conditions forms the basis for building the assessment framework.

STEP 3—DEVELOP AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 15-24. All plans and orders have a general logic. This logic links tasks to subordinate units to the achievement of objectives, and the achievement of objectives to attainment of the operation’s end state. An assessment framework incorporates the logic of the plan and uses measures (MOEs, MOPs, and indicators) as tools to determine progress toward attaining desired end state conditions. (See figure 15-1.)

Assessment Plans

5 May 2014 FM 6-0 15-5

Figure 15-1. Assessment framework 15-25. Developing an assessment framework involves—

Selecting and writing measures (MOEs and MOPs). Organizing the measures into an assessment framework.

Selecting and Writing Measures 15-26. Based on their understanding of the plan, members of the staff develop specific MOEs and MOPs (with associated indicators) to evaluate the operations process. Measures of effectiveness are tools used to help measure the attainment of end state conditions, achievement of objectives, or creation of effects. Measures of performance are criteria used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment.

Selecting and Writing Measures of Effectiveness 15-27. Guidelines for selecting and writing MOEs consist of the following:

Select only MOEs that measure the degree to which the desired outcome is achieved. Choose distinct MOEs. Include MOEs from different causal chains. Use the same MOE to measure more than one condition when appropriate. Avoid overburdening subordinates with additional reporting requirements. Structure MOEs so that they have measurable, collectable, and relevant indicators. Write MOEs as statements not questions. Maximize clarity.

15-28. Commanders select only MOEs that measure the degree to which the desired outcome is achieved. There must be an expectation that a given MOE will change as the conditions being measured change.

15-29. Commanders choose MOEs for each condition as distinct from each other as possible. Using similar MOEs can skew the assessment by containing virtually the same MOE twice.

15-30. Commanders include MOEs from differing relevant causal chains for each condition whenever possible. When MOEs have a cause and effect relationship with each other, either directly or indirectly, it decreases their value in measuring a particular condition. Measuring progress towards a desired condition by multiple means adds rigor to the assessment.

15-31. In the example in figure 15-2 on page 15-6 under condition 1, both MOE 1 and MOE 3 have no apparent cause and effect relationship with each other, although both are valid measures of the condition. This adds rigor and validity to the measurement of that condition. MOE 2 does have a cause and effect

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relationship with MOE 1 and MOE 3, but it is a worthwhile addition because of the direct relevancy and mathematical rigor of that particular source of data. (See figure 15-2.)

End state condition 1: Enemy division X forces prevented from interfering with corps decisive operation. MOE 1: Enemy division X forces west of phase line blue are defeated.

Indicator 1: Friendly forces occupy objective SLAM (yes or no). Indicator 2: Number of reports of squad-sized or larger enemy forces in the division area of operations in the past 24 hours. Indicator 3: Current G-2 assessment of number of enemy division X battalions west of phase line blue.

MOE 2: Enemy division X forces indirect fire systems neutralized. Indicator 1: Number of indirect fires originating from enemy division X’s integrated fires command in the past 24 hours. Indicator 2: Current G-2 assessment of number of operational 240mm rocket launchers within enemy division X’s integrated fires command.

MOE 3: Enemy division X communications systems disrupted. Indicator 1: Number of electronic transmissions from enemy division X detected in the past 24 hours. Indicator 2: Number of enemy division X battalion and higher command posts destroyed.

G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence MOE measure of effectiveness

mm millimeter

Figure 15-2. Example end state conditions for a defense 15-32. Commanders use the same MOE to measure more than one condition when appropriate. This sort of duplication in the assessment framework does not introduce significant bias unless carried to the extreme.

15-33. Commanders avoid or minimize additional reporting requirements for subordinate units. In many cases, commanders use information requirements generated by other staff elements as MOEs and indicators in the assessment plan. With careful consideration, commanders and staffs can often find viable alternative MOEs without creating new reporting requirements. Excessive reporting requirements can render an otherwise valid assessment plan onerous and untenable.

15-34. Commanders structure MOEs so that measurable, collectable, and relevant indicators exist for them. A MOE is of no use if the staff cannot actually measure it.

15-35. Commanders write MOEs as statements, not questions. MOEs supply answers to questions rather than the questions themselves.

15-36. Commanders maximize clarity. A MOE describes the sought information precisely, including specifics on time, information, geography, or unit, if needed. Any staff member should be able to read the MOE and understand exactly what information it describes.

Selecting and Writing Measures of Performance 15-37. MOPs are criteria used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs help to answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes.

15-38. In general, operations consist of a series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. The current operations cells use MOPs in execution matrixes and running estimates to track completed tasks. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer. Examples of MOPs include:

Route X cleared. Generators delivered, are operational, and are secured at villages A, B, and C.

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$15,000 spent for schoolhouse completion. Aerial dissemination of 60,000 leaflets over village D.

Selecting and Writing Indicators 15-39. Staffs develop indicators that provide insights into MOEs and MOPs. Staffs can gauge a measurable indicator either quantitatively or qualitatively. Imprecisely defined indicators often pose a problem. For example, staffs cannot measure the indicator “Number of local nationals shopping.” The information lacks clear parameters in time or geography. Staffs can measure the revised indicator “Average daily number of local nationals visiting main street market in city X this month.” Additionally, staffs should design the indicator to minimize bias. This particularly applies when staffs only have qualitative indicators available for a given MOE. Many qualitative measures are easily biased, and Soldiers must use safeguards to protect objectivity in the assessment process. (See figure 15-3.)

15-40. A collectable indicator has reasonably obtained data associated with the indicator. In some cases, the data may not exist, or the data may be prohibitively difficult to collect. As an example, if condition 2 MOE 2 in figure 15-3 had the indicator “Host-nation medical care availability in city X this month” that indicator is not likely collectable. This number exists, but unless a trusted source tracks and reports it, Soldiers cannot collect it. The revised indicator “Battalion commander’s monthly estimate of host-nation medical care availability in city X on a scale of 1 to 5” is collectable. In this case, the staff did not have a quantitative indicator available, so they substituted a qualitative indicator.

End state condition 1: Enemy defeated in the brigade area of operations. MOE 1: Enemy kidnapping activity in the brigade area of operations disrupted.

Indicator 1: Monthly reported dollars in ransom paid as a result of kidnapping operations. Indicator 2: Monthly number of reported attempted kidnappings. Indicator 3: Monthly poll question #23: “Have any kidnappings occurred in your neighborhood in the past 30 days?” Results for provinces ABC only.

MOE 2: Public perception of security in the brigade area of operations improved. Indicator 1: Monthly poll question #34: “Have you changed your normal activities in the past month because of concerns about your safety and that of your family?” Results for provinces ABC only. Indicator 2: Monthly kindergarten through high school attendance in provinces ABC as reported by the host-nation ministry of education. Indicator 3: Monthly number of tips from local nationals reported to the brigade terrorism tips hotline.

MOE 3: Sniper events in the brigade area of operations disrupted. Indicator 1: Monthly decrease in reported sniper events in the brigade area of operations. (Note: It is acceptable to have only one indicator that directly answers a given MOE. Avoid complicating the assessment needlessly when a simple construct suffices.)

Condition 2: Role 1 medical care available to the population in city X. MOE 1: Public perception of medical care availability improved in city X.

Indicator 1: Monthly poll question #42: “Are you and your family able to visit a doctor or health clinic when you need to?” Results for provinces ABC only. Indicator 2: Monthly poll question #8: “Do you and your family have important health needs that are not being met?” Results for provinces ABC only. Indicator 3: Monthly decrease in number of requests for medical care received from local nationals by the brigade.

MOE 2: Battalion commander estimated monthly host-nation medical care availability in battalion area of operations.

Indicator 1: Monthly average of reported battalion commander’s estimates (scale of 1 to 5) of host-nation medical care availability in the battalion area of operation.

MOE measure of effectiveness

Figure 15-3. Example end state conditions for a stability operation

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15-41. An indicator is relevant if it provides insight into a supported MOE or MOP. Commanders must ask pertinent questions, such as—

Does a change in this indicator actually indicate a change in the MOE? What factors unrelated to the MOE could cause this indicator to change? How reliable is the correlation between the indicator and the MOE?

15-42. For example, the indicator “Decrease in monthly weapons caches found and cleared in the division area of operations” is not relevant to the MOE “Decrease in enemy activity in the division area of operations.”

15-43. The indicator could plausibly increase or decrease with a decrease in enemy activity. An increase in friendly patrols could result in greater numbers of caches found and cleared. Staffs may also have difficulty determining when the enemy left the weapons, raising the question of when the enemy activity actually occurred. These factors, unrelated to enemy activity, could artificially inflate the indicator, creating a false impression of increased enemy activity within the assessment framework. In this example, staffs can reliably measure enemy activity levels without considering weapons caches or using the indicator for this MOE.

Organizing the Assessment Framework 15-44. When organizing the assessment framework, MOEs and MOPs can be applied to the logic of the plan in different ways. The overall approach to using those measures is visually depicted in the assessment framework. That overall approach may be more quantitative or more qualitative, although it rarely resides at the extremes.

15-45. Regardless of the specific measures chosen and the specific ways they are used in the formal assessment plan, it is imperative that the staff explicitly records the logic it uses to create the assessment framework. Every measure used is chosen for a reason, and that reason must be recorded in a narrative form in the formal assessment plan. Specific measures are combined (or not combined) in specific ways in the formal assessment, and those reasons must be recorded explicitly in the formal assessment plan. Lessons learned have shown that the rationale involved in creating a formal assessment plan can be rapidly lost. Recording the logic in the assessment plan mitigates this risk.

15-46. One example of organizing an assessment framework is a hierarchical structure which begins with end state conditions, followed by MOEs, and finally indicators. Commanders broadly describe the operation’s end state in their commander’s intent. The assessment working group then identified specific desired conditions from the commander’s intent. Staffs measure each condition by MOEs. The MOEs are in turn informed by indicators.

15-47. Such a formal assessment framework is simply a tool to assist commanders with estimating progress. Using a formal assessment framework does not imply that commanders mathematically determine the outcomes of military operations. Commanders and staff officers apply judgment to results of mathematical assessment to assess progress holistically. For example, commanders in an enduring operation may receive a monthly formal assessment briefing from their staff. This briefing includes both the products of the formal assessment process as well as the expert opinions of members of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners. Commanders combine what they find useful in those two viewpoints with their personal assessment of the operation, consider recommendations, and direct action as needed.

15-48. A significant amount of human judgment goes into designing such an assessment framework. Choosing MOEs and indicators that accurately measure progress toward each desired condition is an art. Processing elements of the assessment framework requires establishing weights and thresholds for each MOE and indicator. Setting proper weights and thresholds requires operational expertise and judgment. Input from the relevant staff elements and subject matter experts is critical. Staffs record the logic of why the commander chose each MOE and indicator. This facilitates personnel turnover as well as an understanding of the assessment plan among all staff elements.

15-49. Another approach to organizing an assessment framework focuses on producing narrative assessments for each end state condition, using measures (MOEs, MOPs, and indicators) to argue for or

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against progress rather than combining the measures in one holistic mathematical model. Under this approach, the assessment working group builds the most convincing arguments they can for and against the achievement of a given end state condition. Significant mathematical rigor may be a part of these arguments, but a holistic mathematical model is rejected. After the for and against arguments are produced, the assessment working group applies judgment to that raw material to create the most plausible narrative assessment for that end state condition. The chair of the assessment working group determines when the collective judgment of the group is in dispute.

STEP 4—DEVELOP THE COLLECTION PLAN 15-50. Each indicator represents an information requirement. In some situations, staffs feed these information requirements into the information collection synchronization process. Then, staffs task information collection assets to collect on these information requirements. In other situations, reports in the unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) may suffice. If not, the unit may develop a new report. Staffs may collect the information requirement from organizations external to the unit. For example, a host nation’s central bank may publish a consumer price index for that nation. The assessment plan identifies the source for each indicator as well as the staff member who collects that information. Assessment information requirements compete with other information requirements for resources. When an information requirement is not resourced, staffs cannot collect the associated indicator and must remove it from the plan. Staffs then adjust the assessment framework to ensure that the MOE or MOP is properly worded.

STEP 5—ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONDUCTING ANALYSIS AND GENERATING RECOMMENDATIONS

15-51. In addition to assigning responsibility for collection, commanders assign staff members to analyze assessment data and develop recommendations. For example, the intelligence officer leads the assessment of enemy forces. The engineer officer leads the effort on assessing infrastructure development. The civil affairs operations officer leads assessment concerning the progress of local and provincial governments. The chief of staff aggressively requires staff principals and subject matter experts to participate in processing the formal assessment and in generating smart, actionable recommendations. The operations research and analysis officer assists the commander and staff with developing both assessment frameworks and the command’s assessment process.

STEP 6—IDENTIFY FEEDBACK MECHANISMS 15-52. A formal assessment with meaningful recommendations that is not presented to the appropriate decisionmaker wastes time and energy. The assessment plan identifies the who, what, when, where, and why of that presentation. The commander and staff discuss feedback leading up to and following that presentation as well. Feedback might include which assessment working groups the commander requires and how to act on and follow up on recommendations.