Fictional story

Water Flint Crisis started in the year 2014 affecting Flint City in Michigan, the United States leading to change of their water source from Lake Huron and the Detroit River to the Flint River. The change of the water source was necessitated by the need to save on costs. However, there was a failure to treat the water sufficiently and lead leached from the water pipes into the drinking water. The result was that more than 100, 000 people were exposed to elevated lead levels. After the water source was switched, residents in the city started complaining that drinking water supplied from Flint River had a foul taste, smell and appearance.

In February 2015, EPA water expert Miguel A. Del Toral suspected a potential problem with Flint's drinking water system . MDEQ is aware of the EPA's involvement, but given the federal and state jurisdictions, the EPA cannot directly intervene in this matter without Michigan's authorization. But the EPA also did not announce Flint citizens (Butler, Scammell & Benson, 2016). Between January and June 2015 , Flint City government water-related officials submitted signed and confirmed documents to the state, claiming that they had tested water quality in households exposed to high-risk areas of lead pollution, and the results showed that Flint Lead was not detected in the water treatment plant, and the lead content of the household samples was at an acceptable level . Following this, Flint Mayor Dayne Walling received online signature petitions (more than a quarter of the city's population), requiring the city government to immediately suspend the use of Flint River water supply and switch back to DWSD. In the petition, the public mentioned that the lead content in the water exceeded the standard, yellowing and other water quality problems. At this time, the public's panic has already risen. Community organizations have begun to distribute water filters and bottled water spontaneously; community leaders have criticized the decision of the state-designated emergency officer to switch water sources. On November 12, 2015, The Flint Journal reported that the Flint City government’s previous report to the state government on random inspections of high-risk households was a pure lie. The water pipes used by most households that were actually sampled were copper and plated. Zinc steel and other unknown materials. The public opinion is in vain. This is actually another violation of federal law, because federal law stipulates that in assessing the lead leakage hazard, the households with lead water pipes must be sampled, and the Flint City Council apparently fails to comply with the law, thereby underestimating the lead leakage.

On January 8, 2016, the Eastern Michigan District Attorney General announced an investigation. The impact of the incident officially rose from the state level to the federal level. A month later, the Federal Prosecutor's Office announced that the FBI, the EPA General Inspector General, the EPA Crime Investigation Department, and the United States Postal Inspection Service were involved in the joint investigation. In January 2016, Flint residents launched a class action lawsuit against the water crisis. Governor Schneider and MDEQ received a court subpoena requesting additional disclosure of all relevant e-mails since 2011. From this batch of emails, it was discovered that as early as January 2015, after the trihalomethane exceeded the incident, state officials were trucking their employees in Flint's office in batches to deliver bottled water. At that time, the Flint City Council stated that “public health is not threatened” (Masten, Davies & Mcelmurry, 2016).

The crisis was solved when the court ordered for the implementation of door-to-door delivery of bottled water to all home inclusive of correctly installed and enhanced tap filter (Katner et al 2016). As can be seen from the timeline, the whole thing is hard to blame on a single institution. Whether it is a city-level emergency officer, a state-level MDEQ, or a federal-level EPA, there are varying degrees of disability, but the paradox is that everyone is just performing their own duties. That is why the crisis took time to resolve. The official refused to switch back to the original water source because he had a responsibility for restructuring the bankrupt city. In exchange for water, the efforts to save money would be abandoned.

References

Masten, S. J., Davies, S. H., & Mcelmurry, S. P. (2016). Flint water crisis: what happened and why?. Journal‐American Water Works Association, 108(12), 22-34.

Butler, L. J., Scammell, M. K., & Benson, E. B. (2016). The Flint, Michigan, water crisis: a case study in regulatory failure and environmental injustice. Environmental Justice, 9(4), 93-97.

Katner, A., Pieper, K. J., Lambrinidou, Y., Brown, K., Hu, C. Y., Mielke, H. W., & Edwards, M. A. (2016). Weaknesses in federal drinking water regulations and public health policies that impede lead poisoning prevention and environmental justice. Environmental Justice, 9(4), 109-117.