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American Democracy The 19th-century view from Albion of the shortcomings of the ToúiúysHistovy US Constitution was remarkably astute, says Frank Prochaska. Flaws Across the Pond ' n assessing the character of American government, one recalls the observation by the historian Henry Adams that politics is 'the systematic organization of hatreds'. As the next presidential election looms the United States . seems to have entered another round of partisan deadlock. The Founding Fathers, it is sometimes forgotten, designed the US Constitution in a pre-democratic age before the emergence ofa party system, which they feared could lead, in George Washington's words, to the 'unjust dominion' of 'unprincipled men'. If they were alive today - and as wise as assumed - they might wish to amend the ageing text that has failed to stem the tide of faction and has become an obstacle to good governance. American party politics is combative. Belligerence is its essence. In Popular Government (\SS5) Sir Henry Maine, the Victorian jurist and historian, argued that the best justification for the American party system was that it inhibited rivals from killing one another. Maine was just one of a succession of eminent Victorian Signing the Declaration of Independence, July 4th 1776 byJohnTrumbuli. writers, including lohn Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot, lames Bryce and William Lecky, for whom American politics and the LIS Constitution raised universal questions about political behaviour. Their critical analyses, ff'ee of American piety, provided trenchant appraisals of that country's electoral process. Distance lent perspective and much of their criticism remains remarkably prescient today, if only because the US government retains so much of its 18th-century character. Maine -a Tory hostile to democracy - admired the Founding Fathers for their conservatism but believed they were unprepared for the rapid development of parties and expected the contrivances of the Federal Constitution to defeat any evil influences that might arise. But the electoral provisions they created in Philadelphia in 1787 encouraged party strife and political corruption, which sprang into vigorous life with greater prosperity, population growth and the diffusion of power with the extension of the suffrage. In America, as lohn Stuart Mill noted in Considerations on Representative Government ( 1861 ), all selfish ambition gravitated 12 Histo | March 2012 www.historytoday.com � American Democracy towards tbe demos. Like most British commentators be lamented tbe corruption and conformity in American democracy, wbicb tbe electoral process promoted. As be saw it, a lack of critical, independent thought led to a passive citizenry tbat followed tbe received wisdom 'with tbe most servile adulation and sycopbancy'. As tbe voting public expanded, tbe American political system perfected party loyalty and organisation. In The American Commonwealth (1888) James Bryce, tbe Britisb ambassador to tbe United States a century ago, observed tbat patronage, not governance, was tbe first purpose of tbe competing parties. Tbey created an artificial selection process tbat encouraged mediocrity, wbile dissuading tbe talented from running for office. Tbey rarely put forward tbeir strongest candidates, because tbey bad made themselves objectionable to a group of voters or a section of tbe country. It was more important tbat party nominees sbould be taitbful partisans tban that tbey should turn out to be effective legislators. It was regrettable if a president or congressman turned out to be a failure, but it was a disaster for tbe party if it lost an election and was deprived of tbe cbance to enjoy tbe spoils of office. In tbe 19tb century the American party system produced a succession of presidents wbo were, in Bryce's words, 'intellectual pigmies'. Tbe Victorians believed tbat it was tbe specific nature of tbe American party system tbat discouraged men of genius from entering tbe political arena. To tbem, tbe United States did not bave tbe Constitution to tbank for its few great presidents. Witb the rise of Jacksonian democracy corrupt practices and lower standards of probity evolved, witb damaging results for tbe political process. To Mill America was a 'false democracy' tbat favoured local majorities, in wbicb tbe voice of tbe instructed minority bad no organs in tbe representative body. In tbis flawed polity, cultivated individuals, certain of defeat, avoided running for office. As a consequence, tbey became, as Mill put it, 'tbe servile moutb-pieces of tbeir inferiors in knowledge'. Britisb writers generally disapproved of America's cumbersome Federal system, in wbicb elected officials, whose cbief loyalty was to their local partisans, benefited from opposing tbe government in Washington, wbile exploiting its privileges and perquisites. Politicians were content to eat pork and give it away. As a consequence of corruption many candidates saw tbe enemy in tbe mirror and ran on an anti-government platform, wbicb tbe political structure witb its divided powers and incessant campaigning invigorated. As tbe nation expanded, tbe number of public offices grew and elections proliferated, wbicb opened up greater possibilities for patronage and lobbying. Tbe American moneyed class, as Bryce and Maine observed, bad a great affinity for democratic institutions and tbe wealthy witb an interest in government policy spent increasing sums in tbe wbolesale bribery of officialdom. Alexis de Tocqueville noted tbat America was a materialistic society tbat bad many ambitious men but few loffy ambitions and that political power bad become concentrated in tbeir bands. Arguably bis 'tyranny of tbe majority' has proved less dangerous to American progress tban wbat Bryce saw as tbe www.historytoday.com A lack of critical, independent thought led to a passive citizenry that followed the received wisdom 'with the most servile adulation and sycophancy'. incapacity of useless politicians elected by a citizenry witb low expectations of government. In a country tbat sees itself as tbe world's most advanced democracy one migbt assume tbat it would be tbougbt scandalous tbat a bandful of senators from states witb modest populations can block tbe will of tbe national majority. Today tbe 20 least populous states witb 40 senators bave between tbem just 10 per cent of tbe nation's population. Under tbe arcane rules of tbe Senate it now takes 60 votes to avoid a filibuster. Given tbe influence of party donors and lobbyists, Americans bave come to assume tbat tbeir political system turns on tbe corrupting power of money. Tbeir tolerance of patronage and political cbicanery is reminiscent of 18tb-century Englisb politics, wben an oligarcby ruled and votes and parliamentary seats were bougbt and sold. (As tbe Victorians recognised, tbe US Constitution bas many ballmarks of tbe Englisb constitution in tbe reign of George III.) But unlike America Britain bas a more malleable political system and long ago instituted reforms by banding over patronage to tbe Civil Service Commissioners and passed measures tbat restrained electoral corruption. Keeping party corruption in cbeck is a tall order in a nation witb a distracted citizenry and an electoral process tbat propels mediocrity. It is not belped by tbe distrust of government tbat tbe Victorians found deeply ingrained in American culture. Nor is it belped by a Federal system, wbicb in tbeir view undermined tbe central government's ability to respond effectively to a crisis, wbetber man-made or natural. A constitution predicated on competing sovereignties, wbicb is itself immune to criticism and bard to amend, impedes decisive action. As Walter Bagebot noted in The English Constitution (1867), tbe dignified and executive elements of tbe presidency do not mesh witb the legislative elements of tbe Congress and tbe disparate states. Those much admired checks and balances consequently lead to political stalemate, wbile increasing tbe antagonism and resentment of tbe rival parties. Bagebot, wbo wrote nearly 40 articles on tbe United States in tbe 1860s, tbougbt tbe division of powers induced paralysis. American political debates, as be put it, were 'prologues witbout a play', wbich did not'stir a noble ambition'. He preferred the Britisb Cabinet system, in wbicb tbere was a greater concentration of effective power. He compared tbe US Constitution to a 'badly drawn will', wbicb was subject to endless legal wrangling. No Englisbman, be wrote, would be mucb impressed witb arguments tbat assumed 'tbat tbe limited clauses of an old state-paper can provide for all coming cases, and forever regulate tbe future'. Ageing countries, be believed, outgrow tbe constitutional clotbes of tbeir youtb. American 'exceptionalists', wbo believe tbe United States has a unique providential destiny, see tbeir constitution as fitting all sizes. But tbeir reverence for tbe document is arguably a triumpb of faith over experience. Contrary to popular belief tbe framers did not seek to create a democracy, wbicb tbey associated witb anarcby and corruption, but to secure tbe Union. They fasbioned an 18tb-century republic tbat required the expression of civic virtue and restraints on party March 2012 | History7b(ifl>' 43 � American Democracy factionalism in order to flourish politically. As the nation became a'democratic republic' in the 19th century history justified their anxieties about popular government and the perils of partisanship. But devotion at the constitutional altar discouraged normal 'observational' methods and a priesthood of lawyers took charge ofthe Sibylline Book. The Gonstitution has satisfied the desire of Americans for union. It has served as a binding force, encouraged commerce, protected property and provided the wherewithal for the orderly transition of power; but it has failed to provide political contentment. Treating it like scripture has blinded the citizenry to its defects, which were more apparent to dispassionate foreigners. In the early republic few Americans took the Gonstitufion to task for tolerafing slavery. Few complained ofthe difliculty in amending a document that was designed to favour the status quo over reform. Fewer still made distinc tions between an abstract, idealised constitution and the practical realities of governance. As long as tlie Gonstitution remained a sacred text above polifics it discouraged analysis of American government as it actually functioned. Bryce argued in the 1880s that reverence for the American Gonstitution had 'become so potent a con.servative influence that no proposal of fundamental change seems likely to be entertained'. Nor is there any likelihood of elementary change today. Even the Electoral GoUege, which every Victorian commcmaior inoiigni obsolete, appears beyond reform. Americans have a remarkable attachment to the doctrines of'Strict Gonstructionism' and 'Gonstitutional Originalism'. But can they be called democrats when they are defending the rectitude of a pre-democratic document, ratified by members ofthe conventions ofthe original 13 states, which excluded the great majority ofthe population fi-om the vote? Historians, who judge from past examples, might be pessimistic about the future of a country where corruption is rampant and reform problematic. Still, as the historian William Lecky observed in Democracy and Liberty (1896), the American people often greet the profligacy of political life with equanimity. Life is elsewhere in a nation where the best and brightest remain apart from politics. There is a prevailing optimism that enables Americans to have hope for the future even when they are anxious about the present. As Lecky saw it, Americans had a naive belief that for all the nation's miseries the 'survival ofthe fittest' would eventually come into play and 'the turbid element of corruption will clarify, and its worst constituents sink like sediment to the bottom'. To the British, who do not treat constitutions as I he Minority :L.M. Glackens' cover for Puck, April 14th 1909, shows congressmen engaged in a brawl onthe floor of the House of Representatives. sacred creations, it seems surprising that Americans, who vote on virtually every conceivable issue, from gay marriage to the legalisation of marijuana, have never had an opportunity to reconsider their 18th-century constitution in a referendum. The great paradox of America is its simultaneous belief in the future and its veneration ofthe past. A restless, pragmatic people has sanctified a rigid, pre-democratic constitution, which, as Bryce put it, was built for 'safety' not for 'action'. This suits conservatives, who are wary of democratic change, better than liberals, who believe democracy necessitates legislative reform. The deeply conservative Maine, who once compared 'democracy' to 'death', applauded the US Gonstitution because it suppressed the popular will. Like a constitutional monarch, the US Gonstitution is arguably more valuable as a source of national unity and a symbol of a distinctive political culture than as an instrument of governance. The Founding Fathers would perhaps be surprised by the veneration with which it is treated today. They recognised that they had produced an imperfect tool, beset by compromise and unresolved issues. Less than a century later it failed to prevent the bloodiest war in American history - against fellow Americans. It also fostered the political factionalism dreaded by its framers, in which hatreds and prejudices became so ingrained that the party mills operate even when, as Bryce put it, there is little grist to grind. One might see the Victorian critics ofthe American party system as carrying forward the arguments of Madison and Washington, who had depicted factionalism as an endemic threat to representative government. Americans have failed to still the anxieties of The Federalist essays ( 1788) about the inherent dangers of organised parties. The Victorians observed that uncritical veneration ofthe Gonstitution left the United States politically immobilised at important moments in its history, unable to remedy the faults in its electoral structure. Ghecks and balances in a system of multiple sovereignties induced a constipated politics of entrenched, combative partisanship. Gonsequently Americans have evaded the constraints on governance less by amendment than through the courts - and by stealth. It is worth recalling that when it has suited them most ofthe more memorable US presidents, including lackson, Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, disregarded the Gonstitution that they professed to revere. For no politician in America has the courage to say ofthe Gonstitution, as it is said of kings: 'the King is dead, long live the King.' Frank Prochaska is the author of Eminent Victorians on American Democracy: The View from Aibion newly published by Oxford University Press. HistoryToday I March 2012 www.historytoday.com � Copyright of History Today is the property of History Today Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. �