Civil War Essay

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References BRADLEY, P. F. (2016). Five up Five Down. Civil War Times, 55(2), 26–32. Retrieved from

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FIVE UP FIVE DOWN A HANDFUL OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL TIPPING POINTS LED TO UNION VICTORY AND CONFEDERATE DEFEAT Simple or complex decisions can change the tides of war in any conflict. The significant choices made during the Civil War were typically military in nature, but some occurred in the political realm. Here are five decisions made by the Union, and five made by the Confederacy, that ultimately decided the war's outcome.

FIVE DECISIONS THAT LED TO UNION VICTORY

1 GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT'S ANACONDA PLAN Though it was criticized at first, General Winfield Scott's plan helped force the Confederacy into submission. By blockading Southern ports and closing the Mississippi, the Union secured victory in the way Scott had envisioned -- albeit with a much larger toll of casualties. Forward-minded commanders, including Ulysses S. Grant, Andrew Foote, David Dixon Porter and David Farragut, believed in the merits of Scott's strategy and executed it with precision.

Soon after Vicksburg's fall on July 4, 1863, the Anaconda's constrictions resulted in increasing

Confederate supply problems. Stockpiled stores in the Trans-Mississippi states went unused. Inflation rose, the value of Confederate currency plummeted and the influx of goods from foreign sources was reduced to what blockade runners could provision. By 1865, the Confederate armies were determined to fight on; too bad they were starving. Napoleon once said, "an army marches on its stomach." Widespread privation in the Confederacy during the war's later years, the result in great measure of the Anaconda Plan, is Exhibit A of the proof of that maxim.

2 Montgomery C. Meigs becomes Union Quartermaster General IT IS PROBABLY UNFAIR to compare Union and Confederate supply. One could argue that the Confederacy achieved more with less. Although the Federals may have been blessed with abundance, Quartermaster General Meigs (left) ably managed the mammoth task of keeping the hastily assembled Union volunteer armies fed, clothed and equipped for combat.

Born in Georgia, Meigs was nonetheless a committed Union man who hated the Confederacy. He created a logistics system that maintained its efficiency even as the Union Army and Navy- advanced deep into Southern territory. He instituted contracts with private vendors and manufacturers and the system of obtaining those often lucrative government contracts via bids. He also put in place quality control measures and centralized depots to distribute the vast stores of supplies.

When Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's forces reached Savannah after subsisting off the land during their March to the Sea, they found fresh uniforms, blankets, tents, pots and pans, provender and other essentials waiting for them. As an example of his foresight, Meigs had stockpiled those supplies on nearby Hilton Head Island, which was already under Union control, in readiness for the next phase of Sherman's operations -- the march through the Carolinas.

Perhaps Meigs' most enduring legacy was Arlington National Cemetery. Faced with increasing casualties and with existing cemeteries near or over capacity, he authorized burials on the grounds of Arlington House, Robert E. Lee's prewar home, on June 15, 1864. Created equally from necessity and to deny its former resident future use, Arlington is today among the most hallowed grounds in the United States. Meigs was inducted into the Quartermaster Hall of Fame in 1986, during its inaugural year.

3 THE SCOPE OF THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION The Emancipation Proclamation was the first official document to free American slaves, but scrutiny of its scope reveals a multifaceted executive order that clarified the Union's war aim. ï If the proclamation had required Congressional approval, its ratification would have been uncertain at best, especially considering gains by Democrats in the 1862 elections. But Lincoln issued it based on his authority as commander in chief of the armed forces, and it affected only those areas under rebellion. î For states in rebellion, the Proclamation subtracted from the Rebel labor force while adding to the Union's labor and armed forces. More than 200,000 former slaves would serve in the Union Army and Navy. The Proclamation clarified the Union's war aims, securing the moral high ground and essentially eliminating the possibility of intervention by England, France and other

countries that would fear siding with a rebellion defined by its support of slavery. It was a masterful decree crafted by a president who understood the military, economic, legal and human-rights components of his country's civil war.

4 George Meade choosing not to attack on July 4, 1863 Maj. Gen. George G. Meade was sharply criticized for his failure to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia after defeating it on the third day of fighting at Gettysburg. But the Army of the Potomac lost more than 23,000 men in the battle and was exhausted after weeks of forced marches and three brutal days of combat. The Union corps and division command structure had been decimated, and Meade -- who had been in command for less than a week -- did not have current reports of unit strengths. Ammunition was limited, the supply trains were in disorder and communications were frayed. 1 Lee spent the Fourth of July waiting for Meade to strike, but the casualties lying in front of Cemetery Ridge proved the fallacy of launching an attack against a prepared enemy over open ground. Was Meade dilatory in his pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia during the retreat from Pennsylvania and in his campaigns in the late summer and fall of 1863? Yes, but Meade acted for the best when he chose not to attack on July 4, assuring that the Union's tremendous victory would be retained.

5 BRINGING ULYSSES S. GRANT EAST IT SEEMS TERRIBLY OBVIOUS in retrospect, but promoting Grant (above) to overall command was a brilliant move. Grant had been identified early on as a rising star thanks to his demand for unconditional surrender at Forts Henry and Donelson, but even after Vicksburg Grant had declined an offer from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to take command in the East. Once he broke the siege of Chattanooga, however, he had little choice.

Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and command of all Union armies on March 4, 1864. That spring Grant (through Meade) would attack Lee, Sherman would press Johnston, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel (and later Philip Sheridan) would move to secure the Shenandoah Valley, and Maj. Gens. Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel Banks would advance along the James and Red Rivers, respectively.

Grant also pushed his subordinates to destroy Confederate-held farms, factories, railroads and warehouses, a comprehensive strategy Lincoln had desired since 1861. As a result, the president and his commanding general were in lockstep for the first time since the war commenced. There were setbacks, notably at Cold Harbor and in the Red River Campaign, and an increase in casualties, but Grant's plan worked. Thirteen months after Grant took overall command, Lee surrendered at Appomattox, and the rebellion began to capitulate.

FIVE DECISIONS THAT LED TO CONFEDERATE DEFEAT

1 Electing Jefferson Davis President DUE TO HIS experience as a soldier in the Mexican War, as a congressman and senator, as a successful planter and as secretary of War, Jefferson Davis seemed eminently qualified to lead the

Confederacy. He secretly hoped to command the Confederate armies instead, and perhaps that would have been a better fit.

Davis held public grudges, and also quarreled with members of the Confederate Congress and his own cabinet. He was overly meddlesome in military affairs, disagreed with many of his senior commanders and went through a succession of secretaries of war. Davis' loyalty and peculiar trust in generals like Braxton Bragg, whom he admired due to their service together during the Mexican War, and John Bell Hood, with whom he shared a quixotic view of warfare, derailed the South's war effort. He gave carte blanche to the Richmond front while paying scant notice to other critical areas (New Orleans, Vicksburg and Atlanta). Davis not only downplayed the complaints of the Southern people but questioned their loyalties, precluding a cohesive sense of nationhood. He was intolerant of dissent in any form.

After serving as the de facto general-in-chief for the war's duration, Davis finally relented and promoted Robert E. Lee to that position in January 1865, when it was far too late. The South had been challenged from day one by manpower and materiel deficiencies, made worse by states' rights fragmentation and internal rivalries, and the Confederacy needed a patient, compromising, inspiring leader to orchestrate a multi-theater strategy. Unfortunately, Abraham Lincoln was already leading the opposition.

2 FIRING ON FORT SUMTER The United States had significant advantages in population (21 million vs. 9 million in the seceded states, 4 million of those enslaved), manufacturing, railroads, food production, standing armies and navies, and a working government with four and a quarter score years of experience. A war of aggression was a huge gamble.

The South could have allowed Fort Sumter to be resupplied. For even if the fort remained in Federal hands, the surrounding batteries could have neutralized it at any time. The decision to fire on the fort, after months of anticipation, was harmful for both diplomatic and sympathetic reasons. Despite the Confederacy's billing the conflict as the Second American Revolution, it would prove impossible to gain international intervention for a struggle purported to be about states' rights when the rebelling Confederacy was not only a slave- holding nation, but was now also the belligerent party.

The South's aggression at Sumter gave Lincoln the rationale to call for volunteers to suppress the rebellion. While it took several years for the North to maximize its logistical and military superiority, devise a cohesive strategy and assign commanders to bring victory to fruition, the attack on Fort Sumter served as the rallying point to galvanize the North.

3 The Joseph E, Johnston Revolving Door IF GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON had died in 1862 of his Seven Pines wounds, his legacy likely would be as a general who was killed before he could showcase his talents. Unfortunately for the South, Johnston survived, and his fingerprints are all over Confederate disasters at Vicksburg,

Chattanooga and Atlanta. As Department of the West commander, he reacted too late to the threat against Vicksburg and later vacillated on removing Braxton Bragg from Army of Tennessee command while his leadership disintegrated and the fight to hold Tennessee evaporated.

Once in command of that same army, he squandered more than 100 miles of mountainous, defensible terrain during his retreat toward Atlanta. His strategy mimicked that of his Peninsula Campaign, ceding territory and seemingly waiting for strategically perfect conditions or for divine inspiration to strike.

Back in command of the same army toward the war's end, Johnston devised an attack plan and finally showed his teeth at the Battle of Bentonville, but it was two years late and three corps short.

4 THE PROMOTION OF JOHN BELL HOOD AS ARMY OF TENNESSEE COMMANDER Joseph E. Johnston's retreat through Georgia left the Array of Tennessee with its back to the gates of Atlanta. There was no assurance that Johnston was going to reverse the situation, so Davis relieved him. The decision to promote John Bell Hood was one of Davis' worst.

Hood was brave and a superb division commander. His amputated leg and disabled arm were ample testimony to his battlefield courage. Influenced by Hood's pugnacious reputation and their personal correspondence, Davis promoted him to Army of Tennessee command.

All Hood needed to do was stagnate the situation. If he could have held Atlanta for a few more months, he might have derailed faith in the Union war effort and stymied Lincoln's reelection. Passion beat prudence. Hood depleted his army with a series of hasty attacks. He blamed their failure on his subordinates, a pattern he employed throughout his time as army commander.

After Atlanta fell, Hood next promised to return the army to its namesake state. He wrecked it in the process, at Franklin and Nashville, with no shortage of bitter scape-goating. With Hood's promotion, the South's slim hopes against Sherman in the Western Theater were dashed.

5 IGNORING THE MILITARY GENIUS OE NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST It is doubtful that Nathan Bedford Forrest knew of Sun Tzu, yet he executed the Chinese general-philosopher's military maxims, including "speed is the essence of war" and "attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected," as if he had written them himself. Forrest was a proponent of mobile warfare, later espoused by 20th-century generals such as George S. Patton and Irwin Rommel. His modified guerrilla warfare and deceptive tactics could have been the blueprint for Confederate success. His objectives were simple, yet had profound effect: disrupt supply, introduce fear and confusion among enemy forces, cut telegraph lines, harass the enemy with swift raids, destroy railroad track and generally malee war abhorrent. ¶ For most of the conflict, despite his successes as a cavalry commander, Forrest served under weak superiors who misunderstood his tactics and misapplied his skills. In an era when the prevailing military minds continued to launch headlong attacks against entrenched opponents, Forrest lived on the enemy's flanks and rear. He grasped the fact that intimidation, deception, use of terrain and

numbers properly deployed would reap the greatest advantages. His escape from Fort Donelson and victory at Brice's Cross Roads were career highlights, but his raids also reaped benefits. ¶ Both Jefferson Davis and General Lee recognized postwar that the Confederacy had failed to fully employ Forrest's talents. Had the Confederacy adopted Forrest's tactics, along with the hope that the North would grow tired of a long and bloody struggle that those tactics would enable, it is not difficult to imagine a more protracted war. It might have been the Confederacy's only chance at victory.

MAP: An 1861 editorial cartoon poked fun at General Winfield Scott's concept of choking off Confederate ports and invading the Rebel heartland.

PHOTO (COLOR): A 1909 postcard celebrates the 100th birthday of "Martyred President" Abraham Lincoln and his Emancipation Proclamation, which liberated "Four Millions of Slaves" in 1863.

PHOTO (COLOR): Major General George Meade's equestrian statue on Gettysburg's Cemetery Ridge.

PHOTO (COLOR): A wartime lithograph based on a photograph of Jefferson Davis' February 18, 1861, inauguration in Montgomery, Ala.

PHOTO (COLOR): Shot and shell rain down on Fort Sumter. This lithograph was distributed throughout the North to rally support for the war effort

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): Atlanta burned as John Bell Hood evacuated his army. Federals entered a city full of smoking ruins.

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE)

~~~~~~~~ By PAUL F. BRADLEY

Paul F. Bradley, who lives in Yardley, Pa., not far from where Washington crossed the Delaware River in 1776, has previously contributed articles to the magazine. His Civil War novel, War Within War Without, is scheduled for release in 2016.

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