Final

Emergency Management:

The American Experience

Third Edition

Edited by Claire B. Rubin

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Chapter 5

Federal Emergency Management

Comes of Age: 1979-2001

Richard T. Sylves

T his chapter begins with an overview of emergency management at the

federal level and examines the historical period between the creation of the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 and the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001. FEMA's place in the executive branch and within

the federal system is explored. This is followed by an examination of the impor­

tance of presidents in emergency management and an analysis of how presidents

have used their disaster declaration authority to shape federal emergency man­

agement and, indirectly, the profession of emergency management. One section

takes up the science and technology of disaster; a second describes the growing

importance of public infrastructure in emergency management; a third furnishes an

overview of federal disaster laws from 1979 to 2001; and a fourth acknowledges

bow the profession of emergency management has advanced. The chapter offers

an overview of the major disaster-focusing events that transpired during the period

and ends with a summary and set of observations.

The· Creation and Maturation of FEMA

In 1979, President Jimmy Carter issued two executive orders (E.O. 12127 and E.O.

12148) to implement Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, which merged disparate

disaster-related responsibilities into the new Federal Emergency Management

Agency. 1 FEMA absorbed several other agencies, including the Federal Insur­

ance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the

National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program,2 the Federal Pre­

paredness Agency of the General Services Administration, and the Federal Disas­

ter Assistance Administration activities from the U.S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development (HUD). The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency within the

U.S. Department of Defense was also transferred to FEMA, thus assigning FEMA

major civil defense duties.3

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114 Richard T. Sylves

From its inception, FEMA has addressed all phases of emerg_ency manage­

ment: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, a paradigm developed by

the National Governors' Association in the late 1970s.• In so doing, it has worked

with a host of agencies and organizations, including state and local emergency

management agencies, the American Red Cross and other vo.luntary organizations,

and private corporations, particularly its contractors. It has also worked with vari­

ous federal agencies that have statutory authorities for emergency management

duties or have people or resources for response and recovery operations.

Until it became part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on

March I, �003, FEMA was an independent federal administrative agency with

no commerce clause regulatory powers.5 Over the years, it proved to be espe­

cially adept at mobilizing contractors and temporary workers to meet most of the nation's disaster management needs. While its full-time 1979-2001 workforce

never exceeded four thousand, the agency relied on paid reservists and trained

volunteers. private contractors with disaster knowledge, and nonprofit organi­

zations as circumstances dictated. FEMA's emergency response and recovery

capabilities relied heavily on the ageocy·s ability to mobilize and work coop­

eratively with the people of other federal agencies working under the various

emergency response plans in effect between l 979 and 200 I, most particularly

the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP emerged in 1989 and was used well into the 1990s.6

FEMA's duties gradually broadened as the agency came to address a growing

range of natural and human-caused disasters. From 1979 to 1992, FEMA assisted

state and local governments in their response to several major hurricanes, earth­

quakes, a great many floods, severe storms, and winter blizzards, as well as a vol­

canic eruption (1980) in Washington State. During this period, FEMA also assumed

primary responsibility for the Cold War federal civil defense preparedness initia­

tives of Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush.7

In the mid- to late l 990s, several major disasters-including the Great Mid­

west Flood (1993), California' s Northridge earthquake (1994), and a series of

highly destructive hurricanes-as well as a host of smaller-scale disasters tasked

emergency managers and response organizations. Moreover, the World Trade

Center truck bombing of 1993 and the Murrah Federal Building truck bombing

in Oklahoma City in 1995 signaled an escalation of terrorist activity inside the

United States.

Nonetheless, 1993-2000 were "golden years" for FEMA. By the mid-1990s, FEMA's performance and image had improved to such an extent that both the

public and many members of Congress, whether Democrat or Republican, came to

hold a positive image of the agency.8 FEMA was judged by many to be successful

during President William J. Clinton 's administration, owing much to the leadership of its appointed director, James Lee Witt. Although Witt was a close friend of the

president, having served

in Clinton 's gubernato­ rial administration in

Arkansas, his appoint­

ment was not merely one of political patronage;

Witt had experience in

county emergency man­ agement and as a local

elected official. This

made him an ideal can­ didate for the job.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 115

Terrorism emerged as a major concern of federal emll!QenCy management in the twen.lielh century. Shown hers, searct, and rescue crews hunt through the debris following the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995. Photo courtesy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

In 1996, President

Clinton extended ex offi­

cio cabinet m embership

to Witt, thus underscor­

ing Clinton's high regard

for Witt and his recogni­ tion of the importance

of disaster management. FEMA, though a small,

independent agency out­

side of the White House,

came to carry "the flag" for emergency managers

throughout the United

States. Indeed, the posi­ tive publicity and con­

comitant presidential promotion of the agency even enticed officials from several nations to seek advice

from FEMA administrators about how their nations could form or improve their

own emergency management.

FEMA's Place in ·Policy, Intergovernmental

Relations, and the Presidency

FEMA has alway s been very much an instrument of presidential power. Presidents

often call on the agency to address calamities that may escalate to become disas­

ters.9 The President's Disaster Relief Fund, administered by FEMA, provides the

president with an emergency spending account, subject to fiscal-y ear limitations, to address federal disaster spending needs. The fund also helps pay for expenses

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116 Richard T. Sylves

incurred in coping with unusual or acute problems not funded adequately, or at all, by other federal programs.' 0

One chief reason why FEMA remai.ns deeply beholden to the OvaJ Office is

that the agency has always had a small, politically weak, and sometimes feud­

ing clientele. Meeting the needs of a constituency that includes emergency man­ agement professionals, first-responder o'rganizations, state and .local government

agencies. relief organizations, private insurance companies. and individual disaster

victims is a monumental job. These groups tend to perceive FEMAs mjssion dif­ feren1Jy and thus do not always agree on what FEMA.'s priorities should be:

1he nation·s emergency managers, public safety directors, and firefighters,

working mostly at the stare or local level. strongly support FEMA in almost every case,11 as do nooprofii organizations that quaLlfy for FEMA fund:j11g in

declared disasters or emergencies or that work closely with FEMA personnel

Governors, mayors, city managers, and county executives typically cham­ pion federal emergency management but at times tend to be critical of

FEMA as well.

Property insurance corporate officials are generally enthusiastic about fed­

eral efforts in disaster loss reduction, but they tend to be suspicious that

the federal government, perhaps with FEMA's encouragement, wiU

nationalize certain lines of the insurance they sell and maintain. insurers and FEMA generally agree on the need to promote disaster mitigation, but each sometimes disagrees on what and how this should be done.

Major construction firms., the building trades. and economic development interests benefit from post-disaster. federally subsidized reconstruction, bur

between disasters, these groups often perceive FEMA as a de facto regula­

tor that sometimes impedes economic development in the interest of public

safety,

Althougb these sources of agency clientele support are critical to maintain­

ing FEMA's organizational and political life, their collective political power is far less than that of interest groups working in many other federal policy arenas. For

example, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services clie!ltele, such as the

American Medical Association. the American Hospital Association, bealth main­ tenance organizations, and similar interest groups, have vastly greater political

influence in Congress than do FEMA clientele.12 Many ofFEMA's clientele are

prevented from lobbying Congress by conflict-of-interest laws, tax rules that pm

nonprofit contributions in jeopardy of losing deductibility if the organization l.ob­

bies, and laws that restrict lobbying by public employees. Disasters are. by defin itjon. phenomena that cause widespread destruction and

distress. They are assumed to be infrequent, and rhis is often so for any specific

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 11 7

locality. People who survive disasters and who receive aid from FEMA-or from

any government agency at any level-seldom go on to champion emergency management. Although disasters unquestionably affect the perceptions of voters,

regardless of whether they have directly experienced a disaster. disasters rarely affect how people vote in elections.13 According to Kevin Arceneaux and Robert Stein, "Whether citizens blame the government depends on their level of political

knowledge .... Although many individuals attribute blame to the government,

it does not affect their voting decision for mayor unless they blame the city in particular."14 Yet there have been some notable exceptions in which elected or

appointed officials bungled the preparation for, or response to, a disaster, and they

later suffered negative electoral or political consequences owing to their disaster mismanagement. The key takeaway here is that grassroots public support for emer­

gency management, even among fonner disaster victims who received government relief in some form, is temporary, vacillating, and politically diffuse.

Intergovernmental Relations in Disaster Response

From 1979 through 200 l, emergency management in the United States was largely

based on shared authority, not on a top-down, command-and-control system. In the

U.S. federal system of government, national and state governments have different

but often overlapping responsibilities. Most federal agencies, including the Depart­

ment of Defense, cannot simply dictate what state or local officials must do in the emergency management arena. American federalism entrusts state government

with "reserved powers" and spheres of jurisdiction. States shoulder considerable emergency management duties and responsibilities in their own right.

FEMA's mission and the federal government's involvement in emergency management have always been complicated further by the role that local gov­

ernments play. It is local govemments--cities, towns, counties, etc.-that have

primary responsibility for preparing for disasters and the evacuation of residents. Many mitigation activities, including zoning and building codes, remain under

the purview of municipal and county governments. In addition, local governments manage the response to, and recovery from, a disaster. Localities are sometimes aided by their state governments. In tum, states and localities are sometimes aided

by the federal government, but only under certain emergency conditions. This federal assistance is conditioned on the expectation that state and local authorities

are overwhelmed by the disaster. Considerable controversy has arisen over what

"overwhelmed" actually means when a disaster condition is alleged.

The typical process for federal government involvement in response opera­

tions is for the governor of the disaster-stricken state to ask the president to declare

a major disaster or emergency for the state and its affected counties. The presi­

dent considers infonnation about the damage zones within counties and localities affected by the disaster and within the state as a whole, as well as ongoing human

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118 Richard T. Sylves

suffering and loss, before approving or turning down the govem·or's request.15

FEMA is a major channel through which such information is supplied to the presi­

dent. Under customary policy, the federal govemrnent comes to the assistance of

a state government only when the president determines that the state and local

resources are overwhelmed by, or incapable of addressing, a disaster. The policy

has long been open to interpretation by successive presidents such that each presi­

dent has been free to judge whether the criteria have been met.

Thus, emergency management in the United States requires coordination and

cooperation among local, state, and federal govemmentagencies as welJ as among

the maqy private organizations involved in preparing for and responding to a disas­

ter. It also sometimes involves a presidential determination that events warrant

presidential declarations of major disaster or emergency.

FEMA's Role in Intergovernmental Partnerships

FEMA's intergovernmental relationship with states and localities through the

1990s was primarily through Performance P-artnersbip Agreements/Cooperative

Agreements (PPA/CAs) with state offices of emergency management, an initia­

tive that gained momentum mid-decade. In 1995 then FEMA director James Lee

Witt declared, "A centerpiece of our reinvention is changing the way in which we

do business with the states by empowering them through Performance Partner­

ships. "16 A PPA/CA is analogous to a contract between FEMA and state officials

regarding the outcomes expected from funding support. Such agreements provided

a way to pass funds through state offices of emergency management to local offices

of emergency management.

FEMA asked each state to integrate disparate programs into a multiyear, risk­

based agreement that would be signed by the president and the governor. With

these performance partnerships, FEMA and state officials hoped to achieve mutu­

ally agreed-upon perfonnance outcomes while building emergency management

capacity. Witt envisioned these agreements as a method for creating "more objec­

tive Disaster Declaration criteria based on each state's unique capabilities."17

The political relevance of PPA/C As resides in how effectively these agree­

ments were originally negotiated and implemented. Because states could afford

to commit only limited resources to emergency management, governors and state

emergency managers needed federal government support, particularly after a disaster. Correspondingly, although FEMA's resources were meager and subject

to considerable fluctuation from one administration to the next, the agency could

leverage those limited resources in modest ways. In some respects, FEMA guid­

ance and resources encouraged commitment to emergency management from the

governor, state legislature, and local community. FEMA was thus credited with

helping to build up or improve state and local emergency management capacity.

Federal Emergency Management: l 97&--2001 119

During the Clinton administration, at a time when FEMA's funding and per­

sonnel grew, the agency sought to reduce the administrative burden imposed on

state programs and officials by simplifying procedures for requesting aid and by

offering states more flexibility. For example, to quickly facilitate FEMA-state

coordinative relations when disasters were imminent or transpiring, the agency

routinely dispatched a representative to the staff of the governor whose state was,

or was likely to be, affected. FEMA also worked out a new memorandum of understanding with each

state emergency management agency. Government officials usually negotiate

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact

In 1992, when Hurricane Andrew devastated Florida, it became apparent that even with federal resources, states would need to call upon one another in times of emer­ gencies. As a result. the Southern Governors' Association cooperated with Virginia's Department of Emergency Services to develop and adopt a state-to-state mutual aid agreement.

In 1995, the EMAC member-state governors voted to open membership to the mutual aid agreement to any state or territory that wished to join. The broadened agreement. the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), was administered by the National Emergency Management Association. In 1996, EMAC became national law (P.L. 104-321), making it the first national disaster compact since the Civil Defense Compact of 1950 to be ratified by Congress.

EMAC is a mutual aid agreement and partnership among states designed to help them collectively and cooperatively address the constant threat of disaster. Participat­ ing states join forces to help one another when they need it most, whenever disaster threatens. Through EMAC, a disaster-stricken state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two previously conten­ tious issues: liability and reimbursement. States are not required to assist other states if they are unable to do so.

Since being approved in law, EMAC has been ratified by fifty states, Puerto Rico, the

U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The only requirement for joining is that a state's legislature ratifies the language of the compact.

In 2004, EMAC proved its worth during the response to Hurricanes Charley, Fran­ ces, Ivan, and Jeanne, deploying more than 800 state and local personnel from thirty-eight states (including one nonmember state, California). The cost was

approximately $ l 5 million in personnel. equipment, and National Guard expendi­ tures. In 2005, in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, EMAC member states deployed a total of 65,929 personnel to Alabama, Florida, Louisiana. Mississippi. and Texas.

Source: Emergency Management Assistance Compact website, www.emacweb.org.

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120 Richard T. Sylves

memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and although they usually abide by such

agreements, the agreements are considered voluntary and so lack the force of law. Nonetheless, MOUs helped clarify for emergency circumstances who would do

what, how it would be paid for, and how liability and responsibility would be

apportioned.

Mutual aid agreements (MAAs) are another tool of intergovernmental rela­

tions. When governments and their agencies set forth MAAs, the agreements are

negotiated as legal contracts. Agencies may draw up agreements for reciprocal

assistance under certain conditions or may set out contingent acquisition agree­

ments _between providers, vendors, and contractors. From 1979 to 2001, MAAs

among public, private, and nonprofit organization officials became a common

instrument for coordinating disaster response. MAAs between government agen­

cies and between governments themselves proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s.

Among the most influential MAAs in disaster response is the Emergency Manage­

ment Assistance Compact (EMAC), by which states have pledged their support for

one another (see text box). In 1996, EMAC gained the force oflaw (P.L. 104-321)

when it was ratified by Congress.

Presidential Disaster Declarations

Presidential declarations matter. They stand as milestones in American history

because they demonstrate how the federal government relates to its people and

governments in times of emergency or disaster. Presidential declarations of major

disaster or emergency unlock a host ofresources, most importantly money, which

aid in disaster relief and rebuilding. In a sense, the record of declarations demon­

strates the resilience of the nation to a host of calamities, some foreseeable and

others impossible to anticipate. Presidential declarations also perform metaphori­

cally as "national shock absorbers," helping federal, state, and local governments

cope with rapid-onset calamities that are greatly unforeseen or unprecedented, that

may produce massive primary and secondary consequences, or that may produce

national and international repercussions.

U.S. presidents since Harry S. Truman have made decisions regarding the

declaration of major disasters (beginning in 1951) and emergencies (beginning

in 1974). Each president's declarations reveal something about that president as a

person, as a public executive, and as a politician. The record of disaster declara­

tions also says something about each president's view of federal-state relations.

policy position on disasters, use of declarations as an instrument of political power,

and view of disasters within the broader context in which he governed. Because

FEMA begins its primary and most visible work only at the initiative of the presi­

dent, understanding much of the history of emergency management requires exam­

ining presidential disaster declarations.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 121

Declaration Types

There are two types of federal disaster declarations that state governors may seek: major disaster declarations and emergency declarations. Both require presidential approval. and both authorize the president to provide federal disaster assistance. However, the cause of the declaration and type and amount of assistance differ.

'\1ajor disaster declaration: The president can make a major disaster declaration for any natural event-including any hurricane, tornado, storm. high water. wind­ driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide. mudslide. snowstorm, or drought, or, regardless of cause. fire, flood, or explosion-that the president believes has caused damage of such severity that it is beyond the combined capabilities of state and local governments to respond. This type of declaration may also apply to human-caused or technological disasters, including acts of terrorism or war. A major disaster declaration provides a wide range of federal assistance pro­ gran1s for individuals and public infi-astructure. including funds for both emergency and permanent work.

Emergency declaration: An emergency declaration can be made for any occasion or instance when the president determines that federal assistance is needed. Emergency declarations usually supplement state and local efforts in providing emergency ser­ vices, such as the protection of lives, property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. The amount of emergency assistance is. by law, not to exceed $5 million per single event unless the president reports to Congress that more than $5 million will be spent, as has often happened under a great many emergency declarations in recent decades.'

Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, fema.gov/media/factsheets/declarations.shtm.

1 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Acr, as amended, and Related Authorities, FEMA 592, June 2007, Section 502 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5192, fema,gov/pdf/abouVstafford_act pdf. The key provision is as follows: "Except as provided in paragraph (2), total assistance provided under this title for a single emergency shall not exceed $5,000,000." Paragraph 2 stipulates, "The limitation described in paragraph (1) may be exceeded when the President determines that-IA) continued emergency assistance is immediately required; (B) there is a continuing and immediate risk to lives, property, public health or safety; and (C) necessary assistance will not otherwise be provided on a timely basis." Paragraph 3 covers the presidential reporting requirement: uwhenever the limitation described in paragraph (1) is exceeded, the President shall report to the Congress on the nature and extent of emergency assistance requirements and shall propose additional legislation if necessary" (53)

Disaster Declarations and Presidents

Presidential declarations constitute a record-albeit a crude one subject to influ­

ence by political factors-of human suffering and losses attributable to various

natural and human-caused forces. The growth in the number and types of declara­

tions during the latter pai1 of the twentieth century reflects increasing human and

physical property losses and costs. Generally, natural disasters in the United States

seem to be killing or injuring fewer people, perhaps because of improved mitiga­

tion and warning, while damaging more property and public infrastructure, which

is increasingly expensive to repair or replace.18 Conversely. from 1979 through

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122 Richard T. Sylves '•·.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979--2001 123

1j:

T"� 200 I, human-caused disasters, especially those caused by terrorism, increased in

;.11. requests, with the sole exception of Carter, who rejected 45 percent of the requests

frequency, number of deaths produced, and degree of devastation. I '

for major disaster declarations and 39 percent of those for emergency declarations.

Table 5-1 provides information about presidential declarations of major disas- ; ';, It is ironic that Carter, who was a former governor and the leader who officially

ters and emergencies for ten presidents, from May 1953 to September 2005. While ◄ made FEMA a reality, turned down more requests than any other p resident from

the table does not include information about the nature of the declared disasters ; .I

1953 to 2011.

and emergencies, or about how they differed from those events leading to requests :.:

Richard Nixon was the first president to make a declaration of emergency, but

that were turned down, it illustrates the pattern of gubernatorial requests and, in ,,. he did this only once-for the effects of a drought that occurred in the U.S. Vir-

broad terms, presidential decision making. gin Islands. Before he resigned in 1974, Nixon had rejected fifteen of the sixteen

Stated simply, from 1953 to 1969, Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John F. L requests for emergency declarations. Most of these rejections occurred because ,, '

Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson averaged about 1.3 major disaster declarations per Ii"

the requesting governors sought them to cover marginal or ineligible events. Later

month; from 1989 to 2005, Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George I presidents were more disposed to granting gubernatorial requests for emergency I ',

W. Bush averaged 3.9 major disaster declarations per month. Between these two I declarations, perhaps because governors eventually learned how to make more

periods, the average number of major disaster declarations tripled. The increase in appropriate and qualifying requests.

major disaster declarations after 1989 appears to be unrelated to the political party Perhaps the most striking aspect of the data shown in Table 5-l is the tremen-

of the president; there is also no statistical evidence that presidents of one political i dous decline in rejection rates for both major disaster and emergency requests after party accept a greater percentage of gubernatorial requests than those of another. 1989. Presidents G.H.W. Bush and Clinton each turned down roughly 21 percent

The number of disaster declaration requests that presidents turned down is •' of the requests for major disaster declarations they received. G.W. Bush has a

also an important consideration. As shown in the table, presidents from Eisen- 16 percent turndown rate for major disasters; both he and Clinton (and President

hower through Reagan turned down between 30 and 37 percent of the gubernatorial Barack Obama) rejected even fewer of the requests for an emergency declaration. ·,

.,

i

Number of Requests Turned Down Percentage of Requests Turned Down Number of Presidential Disaster Declarations Presidential

Administration Dates Major Disaster' Emergency Total . Major Disaster Emergency Total Major Disaster Emergency Total

Eisenhower 5/2/53-1 /21 /61 106 N/A 106 55 N/A 55 34.2 N/A 34 2

Kennedy 1/21/61-11/20/63 52 N/A 52 22 N/A 22 29.7 N/A 29.7

Johnson 11 /20/63-1 /21 /69 93 N/A 93 49 N/A 49 34.5 N/A 34.5

Nixon 1 /21/69-8/5/74 195 1 196 102 15 117 34.3 93.8 37.4

Ford 8/5/7 4-1 /21 /77 76 23 99 35 7 42 31.5 23.3 29.8

Carter 1/21/77-1/21/81 112 59 171 91 37 128 44.8 38.5 42.8

Reagan 1/21/81-1/21/89 184 9 193 96 16 112 34.3 64.0 36.7

G.H.W. Bush 1 /21 /89-1 /21 /93 158 2 160 43 3 46 21.4 60.0 22.3

Clinton 1/21/93-1/21/01 380 68 448 103 .13 116 21.3 16.0 20.6

G.W. Bush 1/21/01 9/22/05 247 98 345 46 12 58 15.7 10.9 14.4

All 5/2/53-9/22/05 1,603 260 1,863 642 103 745 28.6 28.4 28.6

-

Table 5-1. A pprovals and Turndowns: Gubernatorial Requests for Presidential Disaster Preparedness and Response Directorate, Justification of Estimates FY04 M arch 2003; 9/11 /01-9/22/05

Declarations, 1953-2005. : turndown data from a letter to author from Sen. Carper re: OHS Freedom of Information (FOi) ReQuest 9/22/05.

Sources: Data regarding the number of presidential declarations: Federal Emergency Management Agency, .... Date of declaration checked for each administration to the day . '

1 Presidential declarations of major disasters began in 1953. at fema.gov: Declaration Assistance Records and Information System, June 1997, Federal Emergency . " Management Information System, December. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (OHS). Emergency :•, ..

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124 Richard T. Sylves

The accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, helped to convince President Carter to launch the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which consolidated the functions of several existing federal agencies and programs. Photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration.

Over the fifty-two years depicted in the table, 44 percent of all the requests made

for a presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency came in the last

sixteen years. Clearly, for governors, seeking presidential disaster and emergency

declarations has become a "growth industry."

Some disasters, particularly those that are truly catastrophic, profoundly affect

presidents and often impel them to transform disaster-related rules and policy.

Hurricane Andrew in 1992 challenged both G.H.W. Bush (at the close of his term)

and Cl in ton (in l 993 and beyond) to make major reforms in federal emergency

management. The 9/11 terrorist attacks exhorted G. W. Bush to quickly redirect his

administration's primary mission to one of countering terrorism. As discussed in

the next chapter, a major result of this policy change was that federal emergency

management became enmeshed with and dominated by the primacy of terrorism

consequence management.

The 1979 nuclear accident at Metropolitan Edison's Three Mile Island nuclear

power plant, located just south of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, is another example of

an event that changed policy. Although the incident did not warrant a presidential

declaration of a major disaster, it did convince Carter to expedite FEMA's forma­

tion and operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission had managed public

warning and evacuation so badly during the crisis that the president reassigned some

of the commission's off-site radiological emergency preparedness duties to FEMA_19

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 125

Disaster Declarations for New and Old

Hazards or Problems

Presidents sometimes redefine and broaden the types of events that officially con­

stitute a disaster. Carter's 1979 presidential declaration of a major disaster in and

around Love Canal, a neighborhood of Niagara Falls, New York, was not only

unprecedented but also controversial. Using FEMA to buy out homes in the con­

tamination zone and, in tum, pay for relocation costs of those displaced was a

novel action.

Similarly, the 1982 news report that residents of the small town of Times

Beach, Missouri, might be suffering ill effects from the spraying of dioxin on local

roads-spraying authorized by the state transportation department--contributed to

changes in the nation's policy on abandoned hazardous waste.20 Just as he did in

the toxic waste incident that had occurred in Love Canal, President Carter asked

FEMA to provide help and resources to affected Missourians.

In 1984, when a hazardous chemical accident at an American company in

Bhopal, India, killed several thousand people, President Reagan and Congress worked to reduce the risk of a similar chemical plant disaster in the United States.

The resulting statute, SARA Title Ill,21 called for the provision of appropriate

emergency public warning, evacuation planning, community preparedness, and

emergency medical and public health response. All of this added to FEMA's emer­

gency management portfolio.

In April 1986, the explosion of and radiation release from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Republic of Ukraine-an event that, accord­

ing to a UN agency, killed twenty-eight in the first three months22 and exposed

thousands more to potential cancer-inducing radiation doses over a broad expanse

of northern and eastern Europe-again impelled the United States to take heed.

The Chernobyl disaster pressed policy makers to ask the U.S. Nuclear Regula­

tory Commission to reexamine the adequacy of U.S. nuclear power plant reactor

design and, along with FEMA, investigate the adequacy of nuclear power plant

emergency preparedness.23

Beyond these cases, presidents sometimes use th.eir disaster declaration

powers to address certain anomalous events or problems. For example, in 1980,

when Cuban president Fidel Castro launched the Mariel "boatlift" that allowed

thousands of Cubans to· escape to the United States, President Carter issued an

emergency declaration to reimburse Florida for the costs incurred in serving and

processing the refugees.24 This action assigned FEMA a unique management task

that required cooperation with various state and federal agencies-among them,

the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and federal investigative agen­

cies, both responsible for separating Cuban incarcerated criminals from innocent

Cuban refugees.

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126 Richard T. Sylves

Some twenty years later, President Clinton approved New York State governor George Patak i's request for a presidential declaration of a major disaster following discovery of an outbreak of the West Nile Virus in neighborhoods sunounding New York City's Kennedy Airport. The federal funds were to help cover pesticide spraying and public health costs. This action created another new category of presi­ dentially declarable disaster. 25 It was also a precursor of how emergency managers might be asked to address biological and bioterrorism incidents in the future.

Declarations for immigration emergencies, abandoned hazardous waste threats, and fast-spreading invasive insect-borne diseases set precedents that led governors to conclude that they could legitimately seek presidential declarations to cov�r these types of calamities in the future. Repeated gubernatorial requests for presidential declarations to cover relatively small, mundane, marginal, or seem­ ingly localized emergencies sometimes convinced presidents to declare certain types of incidents that had not usually warranted such declarations before. Indeed. repeated requests for presidential declarations to cover unremarkable snowstorms. severe storms, and minor tornado damage, as well as minor hazardous materials emergencies and urban-wildland intermix fires that destroy few homes or struc­ tures, all pressed Presidents Clinton, G.W. Bush, and, later, Obama to accede. They each routinely issued declarations for seasonal blizzards, localized flooding, zero-fatality tornadoes that damaged fractions of neighborhoods, wildfires that burned into sparsely settled areas, and more-events that their predecessors from Eisenhower to Reagan had seldom declared major disasters.

Terrorism Declarations

As mentioned, tenorism gradually emerged as a major new concern of federal emergency management in the latter part of the twentieth century. The United States has a long history of dealing with terrorists and terrorism, but the first presi­ dential disaster declaration for a terror-caused incident occurred after the 1993 truck bomb attack on the World Trade Center. Two years later, another presidential disaster declaration went to the State of Oklahoma and Oklahoma City for a terror bombing committed by American Timothy McVeigh and an accomplice. This was the first disaster in which FEMA officials had to work closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which was assigned responsibility for apprehending the perpetrators.

Disaster Declarations and Presidential Philosophy

The trend toward "nationalizing" disaster management functions and creating a national response plan in which federal, state, and local authorities work in tandem was under way well before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200 I, and the era of hom eland security. Disaster declarations were becoming increasingly frequent

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 127

before President Reagan took office in 1981, but the upward trend was suspended

during Reagan's tenure. During the sixteen years that Presidents Eisenhower, Ken­

nedy, and Johnson were in office, there was an average of 15.6 disaster declarations

per year: during the next twelve years and the administrations of Nixon, Ford, and

Carter, this average jumped to 31.9 declarations. However, the Reagan administra­

tion averaged only 23.0 disaster declarations per year.

So why did this change occur? What caused the average number of disaster

declarations to decrease during the Reagan years? While this may have been the

result of an unusual period of quiescence and good fortune, it is difficult to dis­

cern any highly significant disaster event during this period. The decrease may

also have stemmed from the Reagan administration's attitudes toward gover­

nance. Reagan's political ideology held that states too often relied on the federal

government for help in matters they could easily address on their own and that

the federal government needed to be less intrusive in matters traditionally left

to state and local government. This "new federalism" may have discouraged

governors from requesting federal government assistance. A catchword of the

Reagan era was "devolution" of certain federal responsibilities back to the states

and localities. President George H.W. Bush, serving from 1989 through 1992 and a Reagan

conservative himself (he was Reagan's vice president for two tem1s), issued many

more presidential disaster declarations on average than did his predecessor. Decla­

ration numbers escalated from 1993 through 2000, when President Clinton occu­

pied the Oval Office. During this interval, federal activity in disaster management

grew in almost every respect. Natural and human-caused disasters-many routine

but several others catastrophically large-challenged the government's system o f

disaster management. Governors grew accustomed to receiving assistance from

the federal government for major and minor disasters and emergencies. In add ition,

Presidents G.H.W. Bush and Clinton, as well as Congress, seemed more recept ive

to greater federal involvement in emergency management, a realm that had not

long before been perceived as the responsibility of local and state governmen t.

Presidential Discretion, Public Money, and

Disaster Declarations

The flexibility to decide what constitutes a disaster is essential in an era when the nation faces new threats, some of which are ne arly impossible to predict. ln his work on presidential character, James David Barber observes, "People look to the President for reassurance, a feeling that things will be all right, that the President will take care of his people."16 Having the authority to declare a major disaster or emergency allows the president to reassure the nation that steps are being taken and to provide significant disaster assistance. Yet it is the president's ability to use

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128 Richard T. Sylves

discretion in making disaster declarations that leads some people to allege that

such decisions are made on politically expedient grounds.

When a president issues approval for unique primary incidents, a precedent

is set. States take notice. If there are events or circumstances that approximate

the new "disaster" type, governors then look for opportunities to request a presi­

dential declaration. Thus, presidential administrations must be careful to consider

the long-term fiscal and administrative implications of adding new categories of

disaster or emergency to the I ist of approved declarations.

When major disaster declaration requests are considered, it appears that gov­

ernors .since 1988 have had a much better chance of securing approval of their

requests than governors who served from 1953 through 1988. What explains the

higher rates of approval for these requests? Clearly, that would be the broad range

of declaration authority given to presidents, particularly in the November 1988

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 100-707)

as well as the Homeland Security Act of2002 (P.L. 107-296).:!7

Some experts contend that the lack of clear and meaningful criteria for recom­

mending disaster declarations has resulted in presidents directing "federal funds

to ... states that do not need assistance, while ignoring the legitimate needs of

others.":!8 This is not to suggest that presidents are intentionally denying federal

disaster relief to deserving states, but rather that disasters are becoming "politi­

cally constructed" phenomena. FEMA's efforts to establish firm criteria for recom­

mending the approval or denial of a presidential disaster declaration request have

been thwarted on several occasions. Congress specifically prohibits FEMA from

denying federal assistance solely by virtue of an arithmetic formula or sliding

scale, such as one based on state income and population.:!0 However, FEMA has

published in the Code of Federal Regulations factors that are considered in evalu­

ating declaration requests: while Congress hoped such indicators might discourage

excessive gubernatorial requests, they may have instead set forth thresholds that,

when met or passed, constitute the disaster entitlement that some have posited.30

Since the late 1980s, immense news media disaster and emergency coverage,

as well as a new governmental emphasis on pre-event mobilization, may also

have encouraged presidents to issue both major disaster and emergency declara­

tions with less hesitation. A president's declaration of emergency mobilizes federal

emergency managers and makes assistance available in the event of a disaster.

Presidents thus use emergency declarations to demonstrate their leadership skills.

Immediately before and during a disaster, emergency declarations put the federal

government in the business of saving lives, conducting search and rescue, protect­

ing property, and more. Emergency declarations also authorize federal spending

prior to the approval of a declaration of major disaster. Table 5-2 displays the most expensive major disasters by year for FEMA

from 1979 to 200 L and Table 5-3 shows overall FEMA expenditures. Despite

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 129

considerable year-to-year fluctuation, FEMA's spending in tenns of the most costly disasters per year shows a marked upward trend. During the Reagan admin­ istration, no single major disaster declaration exceeded $215 million in 2003 con­ stant dollars. During the first Bush's presidency, however, California received

more than $1.2 billion from FEMA following the Loma Prieta earthquake and Florida received almost $2.2 billion following Hurricane Andrew.

P resident Clinton's most expensive disaster declarations by year were the

Northridge earthquake in 1994 (almost $7 billion to California in 2003); Hur­

ricane Georges in 1998, an event that raked Puerto Rico and resulted in more

than $2 billion in FEMA 2003 constant dollar funding; and Hurricane Floyd in

1999 (discussed below). The FEMA disaster declaration cost grouping for the

The News Media and Disasters

In the late Lwentieth century, television news-gathering capabilities mushroomed. Smaller cameras. satellite uplinks that allow remote broadcasts, trucks equipped for live filming and editing. and massive growth in local news broadcasting capacity combined to revolutionize television news. Moreover. the proliferation of camcorders and the ubiquity (in both time and space) of CNN made television news a twenty­ four-hour-a-day. seven-day-a-week phenomenon. Indeed. in 1993 a report of the National Academy of Public Administration referred to the rise of '·camcorder poli­ tics·' and the '·CNN Syndrome:''

News media coverage has played a major role in shaping the ·'social construct"" of disaster. Disasters are immensely news,\orthy. and many are epically \'isual. Disas­ ters and emergencies almost invariably qualify as "breaking news." They often embody high drama with almost universal viewer interest, and many newscasters have built their careers covering disaster events. Some of the increase in presidential disaster declarations may be directly attributable to television news coverage: this is because media coverage of disasters and emergencies imposes political pressure on the president to demonstrate concern and offers a unique opportunity to demonstrate assertiveness. compassion. and strong decision-making skills. Public officials tend to use the news media to demonstrate their sympathy for disaster victims and to decry slow emergency response and relief efforts.

The power of television news images is so great that disaster managers have been knov.-n to deploy emergency people and resources to areas filmed by television news teams. Disaster sociologists point out that for many people, the social construct of what a specific disaster is comes fi-om the images they witness as television viewers. The negative is that tod<1y's news media is driven by snapshot images and attention­ getting headlines. As a result, most stories focus on highly dramatic incidents like looting. Viewers may get the impression of complete mayhem, where such chaos is in fact the exception to an otherwise orderly response and recovery operation.

1 Gary L. Wamsley e1 al., Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People's Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters (Washington. D,C.: National Academy of Public Administration. 1993).

130 Richard T. Sylves

�-"-' Declaration Date of

Number Declaration State/Territory Event

598 9/13179 Alabama Hurricane Frederic

615 2/21/80 California Severe storms, mudslides, and flooding

640 5/27/81 Montana Severe storms and flooding

651 117/82 California Severe storms, flood, mudslides

677 2/9/83 California Coastal storms, floods, slides

705 5/15/84 Kentucky High winds, tornadoes, and flooding

753 11 /7 /85 West Virginia Severe storms and flooding

758 2/21/86 California Severe storms and flooding

799 10/7/87 California Earthquake and aftershocks

808 1/8/88 Hawaii Severe storms, mudslides, and flooding

845 10/18/89 California Loma Prieta Earthquake

883 11/26/90 Washington Severe storms and flooding

927 12/13/91 American Samoa Hurricane Val

955 8/24/92 Florida Hurricane Andrew

995 7/9/93 Missouri Severe storms and flooding

1,008 1/17/94 California Northridge Earthquake

1,067 9/16/95 Virgin Islands Hurricane Marilyn

1,134 9/6/96 North Carolina Hurricane Fran

1,193 12/17/97 Guam Typhoon Paka, torrential rains, wind

1,247 9/24/98 Puerto Rico Hurricane Georges

1,292 9/16/99 North Carolina Hurricane Floyd

1,345 10/4/00 Florida Severe storms and flooding

1,391 9/11/01 New York Fires and explosions, terrorist attack

Table 5-2. Most Expensive Major Disaster Declarations, 1979-2001.

1 FEMA spending. This number represents the money spent from the Disaster Trust Fund, which includes spending under FEMA-approved mission assignment by other federal agencies but does not include monies spent from non-FEMA federal agency accounts. State and local government expenditures (including matching funds) and private and insurance costs (including claims paid under federal insurance as part of the National Flood Insurance Program) are also not included in this figure.

Great Midwest Flood of I 993 (which combines payouts to all states granted major disaster declarations for the flood) stands at about $ I .33 billion in 2003 constant dollars.31 (These disasters are discussed furiher beginning on page 142.) More recent disasters, such as the 9/11 terror attacks and Hurricane Katrina, have cost the federal government even more.

From the mid-l 980s to the present, the growth in declarations and the result- ing larger federal disaster expenditures have parily been a result of presidential

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Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 131

FEMA Relief, FEMA Relief, Constant Current Dollars' (2003) Dollars' President Issuing Declaration

186,058,159 470,727,142 Carter

89,802,346 200,259,232 Carter

4,491,650 9,073,133 Reagan

29,168,478 55,420,108 Reagan

115,982,094 214,566,874 Reagan

17,455,772 30,896,716 Reagan

110,119.852 188,304,947 Reagan

54,912,707 92,253,348 Reagan

44,944.829 72,810,623 Reagan

5,303,893 8,221,034 Reagan

836,483,340 1.237,995,343 G.H.W. Bush

50,215,305 70,803,580 G.H.W. Bush

96,729,580 130,584,933 G.H.W. Bush

1,654,328,135 2,167,169,856 G,H.W. Bush

279,903,635 355,477,616 Clinton

5,584,845,418 6,925,208,318 Clinton

493,757,789 597,446,925 Clinton

431,390,378 504,726,742 Clinton

148,496,747 170,771,259 Clinton

1,915,593,338 2,164,518,771 Clinton

689,564,680 758,521,148 Clinton

602,937,350 645,142,964 Clinton

8,616,595,410 8,961,259,226 G.W. Bush

2 Assistance made to state and county governments,

decisions to expand the definition of what constitutes a disaster or an emergency. It is also true that traditional types of disasters have increased in number and in magnitude of loss ave; the same period. Many factors account for this. First, urban sprawl often leads to development in hazard zones; throughout the country, the numbers of people and structures situated along coastlines and estuaries vulner- able to flooding and hurricane devastation have increased significantly.Ji Second, changes in natural forces-for example, patterns of temperature extremes and precipitation changes, effects from high-density human settlement and deforesta- tion, and the vagaries of change in weather patterns-may also increase human

132 Richard T. Sylves

Year FEMA Spending (in millions of dollars)

1989 1,436

1990 1,194

1991 410

1992 2,805

1993 1,910

1994 8,145

1995 1,463

1996 2,453

1997 1,869

1998 4,014

1999 1,982

2000 786

2001 12,470

Table 5-3. FEMA Total Disaster Declaration Spending, All Types and Categories, 1989--2001.

Source: PERI, DHS-FEMA spending totals by year as of 7/31/06; see peripresdecusa.org (last accessed January 14, 2012).

vulnerability to disaster as well as levels of disaster damage. Finally, many struc­

tural mitigation works built in the last century. such as dams, bridges, and levees,

have not been properly funded or maintained, putting them at increased risk of

failing.

From Civil Defense to Homeland Security

Civil defense against nuclear attack was a significant part of Carter's and Rea­

gan's Cold War foreign policy. T he Reagan administration convinced Congress

to increase defense spending, particularly for new generations of nuclear weap­

onry and an antiballistic missile defense system. Dual-use requirements man­

dated that to receive federal civil defense funding for civilian use, federal, state,

and local emergency managers must supply an acceptable civil defense justifi­

cation, Consequently, FEMA was drawn into national security matters through

its civil relocation program, sheltering programs, and continuity-of-government

program.

In early 1989, as the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War came to a

close, civil defense Jost its support in Congress, in the Department of Defense, and in the National Security Council. State and local governments were gradually

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 133

freed of the restraints imposed by dual-use requirements of federal disaster fund­

ing. These conditions had often frustrated and confounded emergency managers,

who recognized that natural and technological disasters unrelated to superpower conflict deserved more of their attention and expertise.

Between the end of the Cold War in 1989-1990 and the beginning of the War on Terrorism, initiated by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the P entagon

in 2001, terror attacks in the United States were addressed domestically as crimes

and internationally as surgical military strikes on terrorist compounds. In 1993,

Arab Islamist terrorists ignited a car bomb with 1,500 pounds of nitrate fuel in the

World Trade Center's parking garage, killing six people and injuring more than a thousand. The devastation could have been far worse because the bombers had

intended to bring down both the North and South Towers. In 1995, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, planned

and carried out by Americans Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, resulted in 168

deaths and more than 800 injuries, becoming at that time the deadliest domestic

terrorist attack in U.S. history. Terrorist attacks outside the United States further fueled concerns about

the nation's preparedness. In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese religious group.

released sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway in five coordinated attacks. killing

twelve people and injuring nearly a thousand others. The 1996 bombing of U.S. barracks in the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the 1998 bombings of U.S.

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania reignited public fears about the threat of terrorist

attack. For the first time also, emergency management began to consider in earnest

weapons of mass destruction . .n

Clearly, even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, domestic disaster management

began to be displaced by the nation's growing concerns about terrorism.34 When

in 1996 the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Weapons of Mass Destruction Act became law.

its principal aim was to reduce domestically and internationally the threat of new

and old weapons of mass destruction. Some policy makers and emergency management professionals argued

that the devastation from human-made disasters, particularly those inflicted to instill terror, would far exceed the damage wreaked by natural disasters. At

the same time, disaster researchers increased their emphasfs on the need for improved disaster mitigation and reduced vulnerability-an idea that found

receptive audiences among the public and various political leaders.3s Federal

efforts aimed at encouraging states and communities to mitigate or prevent

disasters and thus to identify and reduce di saster vulnerability \VOuld later

provide a gateway for federal pol icy makers and home land security authori­

ties to draw state and local officials into the business of terrorism awareness

and prevention.

134 Richard T. Sy!ves

The Science and Business of Disasters

During the last several decades of the twentieth century, emergency management

grew as an intellectual and multidisciplinary enterprise. Significant advances in

hazards research-most particularly in meteorology, seismologic studies, and

physical geography, as well as in the building sciences, climate change research,

and environmental studies-gave credibility to disaster research.36 These advances

coincided with, and often were made possible by, a number of major technologi­

cal innovations: advances in high-speed computing and massive data storage, the

development of personal computers and sophisticated computer software, civilian

use of satellite telemetry of data about the atmosphere and surface of the Earth,

and geographic information system (GIS) technology. John C. Pine's Technology

in Emergency Management deftly explores the role of technology in emergency

planning, response, recovery, and mitigation, covering GIS and global positioning

system tools, including remote sensing.-'7

The social sciences also made major contributions to the field through the

work of disaster sociologists, political scientists, economists, social geographers.

demographers, and urban planners. The National Research Council's Facing

Hawrds and Disasters: Understanding Human Dimensions is an excellent edited

compilation of the social scientific research produced in the last thirty-five years.33

In the 1990s, FEMA developed HAZUS, a computer-based earthquake simu­

lation applicable and adaptable to most of the nation, and distributed it free of

charge through its website. HAZUS and its successor, HAZUS-MH, are powerful

risk assessment software programs for analyzing potential losses from earthquake.

HAZUS-MH also models loss from wind and flood disaster agents.39 The results of

HAZUS research have been used to mitigate the effects of disasters and improve

preparation for, response to, and recovery from such events.

Indeed, many segments of the nation's academic community, often in coop­

eration with scholars outside the United States, received government support for

disaster research through the National Science Foundation, the National Oce­

anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Environmental Protec­

tion Agency, the U.S. Geological Survey, the National Institute of Standards and

Technology, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, and others. FEMA also

made a significant contribution to the expansion of seismic engineering science

and disaster loss estimation. This intellectual maturation of the field has helped

advance emergency management from an occupation to a profession.4°

The intellectual and technological advances of the 1980s and 1990s gave

rise to a disaster services business sector composed of consultants, contractors,

for-profit businesses, and nonprofit organizations. The development of emer­

gency management as a profession also meant greater dependence on a skilled

and educated workforce, thus diminishing the need for the large numbers of

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 135

untrained volunteers who had performed disaster response and recovery opera­

tions in the past.

As state emergency management agencies, in conjunction with their local

government counterparts, became adept at skillfully designing requests for presi­

dential disaster declarations, federal involvement in state and local emergency

management expanded. State and local governments often lacked the full capac­

ity to meet the physical and social demands of disaster recovery and so used

federal disaster funding to pay for-profit and nonprofit contractors to serve many

of these functions. Private sector firms were retained to repair or replace public

infrastructure, and nonprofits endeavored to meet a host of other disaster-related

human needs, including emergency housing, employment counseling, and short­

term health and family services.

Public Infrastructure and Disasters

From 1979 through 2001, questions like these emerged: How is public infra­

structure defined in disaster-related legislation9 Who pays for the repair of infra­

structure following a disaster? Are buyouts and relocations replacing engineered

disaster mitigation, such as flood levees and flood control works?

Since 1979, emergency management in the United States has become increas­

ingly involved in issues related to public infrastructure: highways and roads:

bridges; ports; airports; flood control works; water, sewer, and other utility sys­

tems; electrical systems; natural gas distribution networks; telephone and cable

systems; and public buildings and facilities. With the astounding growth of the

Internet and the World Wide Web, and the resulting advances in the range and

depth of information technology, communications infrastructure has also become

a major new concern for emergency managers. The maintenance of routers and

hubs, and the protection of transmission devices ranging from hard lines to fiber­

optic cables, cell towers, and wireless instruments, are now emergency manage­

ment priorities. The perpetuation of connectivity has become a paramount concern,

particularly as public and private emergency managers have grown dependent on

the availability of the Internet and communications nenvorks before, during, and

after disasters. Economic and social dependence on these communications and

information pathways has convinced political leaders of the importance of"cyber

security." Computer hackers who disrupt Internet usage are recognized as potential

tenorists and purveyors of disaster. Since the early 1990s, disasters or emergencies

that damaged-or threatened to damage-any of these critical systems have been

a new area of responsibility for FEMA.

In many respects, FEMA's effectiveness in disaster management has been

judged in tenns of how quickly public infrastructure is restored after a disas­

ter. Americans have become accustomed to virtually uninterrupted delivety of

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136 Richard T. Sylves

services; a power outage, even for just a few hours, is considered by those affected

to be a "disaster" or "emergency." TI1e loss of Internet availability and connectivity

has serious economic and social implications. As a result, federal agencies, as well

as state and local politicians, have come to recognize FEMA's role in addressing

infrastructure needs following a disaster.

While disaster mitigation had become a mandate set forth in law in 1974,

it was not until the Northridge earthquake in January 1994 that FEMA was

authorized to fund public infrastructure repairs beyond the restoration of the

original structures. Repairing or replacing infrastructure often costs millions­

even biJlions-of dollars. Following the devastation of the earthquake and its

aftershocks, the California Freeway overpasses were rebuilt at great public

expense to be able to withstand far more powerful seismic shocks in the future.41

FEMA was not the only federal agency with a growing role in meeting disas­

ter-related public infrastructure needs. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has

a long history in the construction, operation, and maintenance of dams, levees,

revetments, and nonstructural disaster mitigation works. It also owns, operates,

and maintains other massive infrastructure, including lock systems, navigable

waterways, bridges, and ports. Consequently, it has played an important role in the

nation's emergency management system, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s.

The Rise of Disaster Mitigation

From 1979 through 200 l , emergency management took on the challenge of pre­

venting or reducing disaster-related losses by identifying hazard risks capable of

producing disasters or emergencies and by attempting to address these risks. Proj­

ect Impact (discussed beginning on page 139) represented a high point in federal

disaster mitigation. By law. policy, and custom, however, land use control in the

United States is a responsibility of local government, and such activity sometimes

generated local political opposition because it portended "federal zoning."4"

Nonetheless, disaster mitigation-emergency management work between

disasters--came to assume an increasing and enduring importance in emergency

management at all levels of government. Emergency management officials of the

period stressed that disaster mitigation and prevention is everyone's responsibility,

something to be practiced in homes, schools, and workplaces. In many ways, the

diffusion of disaster mitigation knowledge did much to advance public awareness

of emergency management and catalyze public action.

ln the I 980s and 1990s, FEMA led efforts to reduce recurring disaster losses. Its

Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) managed the National Flood Insurance Pro­

gram (NFIP), which Congress had established in I 968. The FIA's Unified Program

for Floodplain Management established national goals and set strategies to reduce

losses and protect natural resources. The NFIP worked with local governments to

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 137

design programs and pass legislation and ordinances to discourage unsafe construc­

tion in flood zones. Local governments had to agree to participate in the program in

order for property owners to qualify for NFIP's low-cost flood insurance. ln essence,

the NFIP was an early FEMA mitigation program. Homeowners whose domiciles

were subject to recurring flood loss sometimes petitioned FEMA to buy their proper­

ties or to relocate them (at government expense) to safer locations. The subsequent

era of FEMA residential home buyouts may have had its origins in the assistance pro­

vided to those who were displaced by the abandoned waste contamination of Love

Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, and to residents of the small Missouri community

ofTimes Beach (both mentioned previously), which was relocated with FEMA funds

following its contamination by the hazardous substance dioxin.43

The Law and Policy of Disaster Management

As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-875)

provided "an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the federal govern­

ment to states and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to allevi­

ate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters."44 This 1950 law and the

Stafford Act of 1988 stipulate that the governor of an affected state must formally

ask the president to declare a major disaster or emergency. If the request is granted,

the federal government will then provide disaster assistance ''to supplement the

efforts and available resources of state and local governments in alleviating the

disaster."45 The governor must provide specific infonnation on the severity and

magnitude of the disaster and on the amount of state and local resources that will

be committed. The president bas significant discretion over whether the disaster

or emergency is of sufficient severity and size to warrant federal disaster or emer­

gency assistance. Since enactment of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, presidents

have always guarded their authority to declare a major disaster or emergency and

have never delegated it to FEMA or any other federal agency.

Any funds appropriated by Congress for disaster relief supplement the eff011s

and resources of state and local governments. The portion paid by the federal

government can vary from 75 percent to l 00 percent, depending on whether the

president elects to waive all or most of the state's matching requirement. Such

a determination rests on the circumstances of the state and local governments

affected. From 1979 to 2001, federal disaster outlays spiraled upwards as disas­

ter declarations tended to grow in number and cost and the federal government

increased its funding of state and local disaster response and recovery costs.46

The president's Disaster Relief Fund is imp011ant because it allows the presi­

dent to provide immediate assistance to cover the expense of deploying federal

personnel, equipment, and resources to a disaster-stricken area. It also provides

direct assistance to state and local governments and to victims and their families,

138 Richard T. Sylves

pays a share of the cost of food and shelter, and frees funds to begin debris clear­

ance and otherwise restore life to norrnal.47

The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-288) empowered presidents to issue

declarations of emergency, "defined as any event determined by the president to

require federal assistance,"48 as stipulated by the Stafford Act. Emergencies tend to

be of less magnitude and scope than major disasters. Emergencies involve a federal

government response to protect lives and property when a disaster i s imminent,

ongoing, or immediately past-often before or during the period in which a major

disaster declaration request is being considered. Many emergency declarations

apply for a period of hours or days, and they may precede the issuance of major

disaster declarations. Thus, presidents sometimes issue emergency declarations to

facilitate pre-disaster mobilizations for events that could become major disasters."9

Emergency declarations differ from major disaster declarations in several

significant ways. When requesting a major disaster declaration, governors are

required to prove need and submit estimated disaster loss information, but this

is not required for an emergency declaration request. As a result, a declaration

of emergency tends to be more subjective than a declaration of disaster. Emer­

gency declarations sometimes stretch the rule that states must lack the capacity to

recover on their own to qualify for a presidential declaration. In times when state

and local budgets are tight, an emergency designation offers a flexible path for

states to secure help from the federal government for less than catastrophic occur­

rences. Snowstotms, windstorms, and minor flooding are the most common types

of events that receive emergency declarations.50

In April 1986, FEMA proposed changing both the process for declaring major

disasters and the criteria for eligibility for federal assistance. These proposed

changes would have decreased the federal share of disaster costs from 75 percent

to 50 percent, and states would have been required to meet more stringent eco­

nomic criteria to receive federal aid. These proposals were withdrawn after they

were strongly opposed in Congress, and they were not reflected in the adoption of

the Stafford Act in I 988. 51

In September l 993, a Clinton administration National Performance Review

report concluded that federal disaster assistance was too generous and too frequent.

and conjectured that states might perceive the federal government as their "first-line

resource in every emergency."5" Echoing past recommendations, the report urged the

development of objective criteria that could be used to make decisions about disaster

declarations; however, both the administration and Congress took no action on this.

Hazard Mitigation Law and Policy

Mitigation consists of pre-disaster activities that involve the assessment of tisk and

lessen the potential effects of disasters; increasingly, it also involves post-disaster

activities to reduce potential damage from future disasters.53 The 1988 Stafford

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 139

Act authorized disaster mitigation in the form of post-disaster federal assistance

dedicated directly to proposed disaster mitigation projects on both the state and

local levels. Federal funds could be used to acquire destroyed or damaged proper­

ties. Rebuilding in high-hazard zones was to be discouraged, and reconstruction

was to include measures to reduce exposure to hazard risks. The Stafford Act also

authorized the allocation of up to IO percent of FEMA's public assistance grants

for hazard mitigation projects that were cost-effective (as determined through a

cost-benefit analysis) and that would substantially reduce the risk of future dam­

age, hardship, loss, and suffering. The act established FEMA's Hazard Mitigation

Grant Program, which would make grants to state and local governments and to

certain nonprofit organizations to implement long-term hazard mitigation mea­

sures following a president declared disaster.'�

In a 1993 National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) report titled

Coping with Catastrophe, the authors reviewed the devastation caused by Hurricane

Andrew in South Florida and concluded that FEMA had not successfully integrated

disaster mitigation into its mission. The report asserts, "FEMA has been ill-served

by congressional and White House neglect, a fragmented statutory charter, irregular

funding, and the uneven quality of its political executives appointed by past presi­

dents."'' In response, Witt undertook a major reorganization of FEMA and its five

directorates, the F[A, and the U.S. Fire Administration and its ten regional offices.

ln 1993, major flooding of the Mississippi River pointed out lapses in disaster

mitigation policy for flood disasters. To address this need, Congress amended the

Stafford Act to increase federal support for relocating flood-prone properties and

increased the amount of hazard mitigation funds available post-disaster from I 0

to 15 percent of all of FEMA's disaster spending on each major disaster declara­

tion that a state received.56 In addition, the act increased from 50 to 75 percent the

federal share of state and local costs of mitigation activities approved by FEMA

as eligible; clarified acceptable conditions for the purchase of damaged homes and

businesses; required the complete removal of such structures; and dictated that the

purchased land be dedicated "in perpetuity for a use that is compatible with open

space, recreational, or wetlands management practices."57

The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 included the first explicit congressional

requirement for hazard mitigation as a prerequisite for disaster assistance. Sec­

tion 406 (which remains in effect today as Section 409 of the 1988 Stafford Act)

requires state and local governments receiving aid to agree that "the natural haz­

ards in the areas in which the proceeds of the grants or loans are to be used be

evaluated and appropriate action taken to mitigate such hazards, including safe

land use and construction practices, in accordance with [federal] standards."58

In October 1997, FEMA launched Project Impact to protect against and reduce

the impacts of natural disasters before they happen. The project sought to build disaster-resistant communities through public-private partnerships, and it included

a national public awareness can1paign and outreach to community leaders. FEMA

�""

140 Richard T. Sylves

encouraged localities to assess the risks they face, identify vulnerabilities, and take

steps to prevent disasters and reduce disaster-related losses. Congress appropriated

$30 million for Project impact for fiscal year (FY) 1998 and $25 million for FY 1999.

With the goal of having at least one Project Impact community in every state

by September 30, 1998, Project Impact was piloted in Deerfield Beach, Florida:

Pascagoula. Mississippi; and Wilmington, No11h Carolina. By December 2000,

roughly two hundred localities had joined the program. The program was then

canceled in 2001 by the G.W. Bush administration.

In support ofFEMA's growing emphasis on mitigation, Congress approved

and President Clinton signed the Disaster Mitigation Act of2000 (P.L. l 06-390),

giving FEMA authority to establish a program of technical and financial assis­

tance for enhanced pre-disaster mitigation to state and local governments. FEMA

was to help state and local governments develop and carry out pre-disaster

hazard mitigation measures designed to reduce injuries, loss of life, and dam­

age and destruction of property, including damage to critical public services

and facilities. To be eligible for pre- and post-disaster federal funding, the act

required "local governments to identify potential mitigation measures that could

be incorporated into the repair of damaged facilities. "59 Local governments were

encouraged to engage in hazard mapping, planning, the development of land use

regulations and building codes, and other mitigation activities.60 The law also

upgraded the 1974 requirement for post-disaster mitigation plans by requiring

that states prepare a comprehensive program for pre-disaster emergency and

disaster mitigation before they could receive post-disaster declaration funds

from FEMA.

Focusing Events of the Era 1979-2001

As in previous decades, several very major disasters occurred between 1979 and

2001 that altered federal emergency management and the laws empowering FEMA

and other disaster management agencies. Earthquakes, including those in northern

(1989) and southern (1992) California; several hurricanes; and the Great Mid­

west Flood of 1993 all generated new or amended federal, state, and local laws.

These cumulative experiences constantly underscored the need for improvements

in disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

Earthquakes

Earthquakes, like other sudden-onset/no-notice disasters, often temporar­

ily overwhelm the emergency response and recovery capacity of state and

local governments, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals. The

human and economic losses inflicted by an earthquake and its consequences

sometimes require a great deal of help from governments, organizations, and

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 141

people outside the affected area. As a result, dealing with earthquake threat

and destruction has been addressed in national policy and federal law. The

federal government is expected to step in to provide basic humanitarian aid to

the devastated areas.

Generally speaking, California is a heavily populated and political\y powerful

state that is highly prone to damaging earthquakes, so the history offederal earth­

quake policy is very much intertwined with California's earthquake experience.

Because it is the most populous state, California has a very large congressional

delegation and commensurate political influence, something that has helped it to

shape the nation 's earthquake policy.

The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program

Since its creation in 1977, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) has been an integral part of the federal government's approach to earth­ quake mitigation and preparedness, supporting research, planning, and response activities. NEHRP works through four participating agencies-FEMA, the U.S. Geo­ logical Survey (USGS). the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NJST}-as well as with state governments. academia, and the private sector to minimize risk to life and property from future earthquakes. It also sets forth external grant programs funded through FEMA. the USGS, and NSF. NEHRP's primary goals are to make strnctures safer, to inform the public more effectively, and to advance seismic mitigation. This entails

Understanding. characterizing. and predicting seismic hazards

Improving model building codes and land use practices

Leaming risk reduction through post-earthquake investigation and analysis

Developing improved design and construction techniques

Promoting the dissemination and application of research results.

From the program's inception until 2004. when leadership was assumed by NIST. FEMA was the lead agency. Each year, FEMA provided project grants through its state cooperative agreements program. The state matching requirement ultimately rose to 50 percent, and, as mentioned in the mitigation section above, a share of federal-state funding had to be used for mitigation activities.

Two of NEHRP's significant accomplishments have been the development of seismic resistance standards for new construction and for strengthening existing buildings in earthquake-prone areas. FEM A's work Lmder NEHRP facilitated the creation of the Federal Response Plan. which, until its replacement by the National Response Plan in December 2004, provided the basic fran1ework for coordination of federal disaster relief work among federal departments and agencies.

Source: Richard T. Sylves, "EarthQuakes," in Handbook of Emergency Management. ed. William L. Waugh Jr. and Ronald J. Hy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991).

142 Richard T. Sylves

�Jlw ln 1977, Congress determined that many states are vulnerable to earthquake

hazards and that a national policy was needed to address earthquake as a major

natural hazard.6' As a result, Congress passed the National Earthquake Hazards

Reduction Act of 1977 (P.L. 95- I 24). This act and its implementing program, the

National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), support federal, state.

local, and private research and planning to reduce the risks to life and property

resulting from earthquakes in seismic risk areas.62

NEHRP has provided the framework for a national earthquake policy. When

FEMA was created in 1979, it was charged with coordinating that program. In

1990, after the Loma Prieta quake of the previous year, Congress reauthorized

the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act and called for seismological risk

assessments to be used in emergency planning, public regulations, building design,

insurance ratings, and more.63

Before its absorption into OHS in March 2003, FEMA had a National Earth-

quake Mitigation Program Office within its Mitigation Directorate, producing

Declaration FEMA Disaster Date Event Number Relief Program State Began Event

682 Public Assistance, California 5/5/83 Coalinga Individual Assistance Earthquake

694 Public Assistance, Idaho 10/28/83 Earthquake Individual Assistance

799 Public Assistance, California 10/1/87 Earthquake and Individual Assistance aftershocks

845 Public Assistance, California 10/17/89 Loma Prieta Individual Assistance Earthquake

943 Public Assistance, California 4/25/92 Earthquake and Individual Assistance aftershocks

947 Public Assistance, California 6/28/92 Earthquake and Individual Assistance aftershocks

985 Public Assistance Oregon 3/25/93 Earthquake

1,004 Public Assistance Oregon 9/20/93 Earthquakes

1,008 Public Assistance, California 1/17/94 Northridge Individual Assistance Earthquake

1,342 Public Assistance, California 9/3/00 Earthquake Individual Assistance Mitigation Assistance

1,361 Public Assistance, Washington 2/28/01 Nasqualie Mitigation Assistance Earthquake

Table 5-4. Presidential Declarations of Major Disaster for Earthquakes, 1983-2001.

1 FEMA spending. This number represents the money spent from the Disaster Trust Fund, which includes spending under FEMA-approved mission assignment by other federal agencies but does not include monies spent from non-FEMA federal agency accounts. State and local government expenditures (including matching

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Federal Emergency Management: 1979---2001 143

manuals and guidance documents that continue to serve as the basis for seis-

mic safety codes. Several other federal government agencies also played critical

roles in earthquake mitigation. The U.S. Geological Survey has long been in the

business of producing earth science data, calculating earthquake probabilities.

and supporting land use planning and engineering design as well as emergency

preparedness. For many years, the National Science Foundation has promoted

construction siting, fundamental geotechnical engineering design, and structural

analysis, in part through its Centers for Earthquake Engineerjng Research. FEMA

worked with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and state

and local officials, model building code groups, architects, engineers, and others

to ensure that the latest advances in scientific and engineering research were incor-

porated into building codes, standards, and practices. (In 2004. the NIST became

the lead agency for NEHRP.)64

Table 5-4 lists presidential disaster declarations issued for earthquakes between

1983 and 200 I. President Reagan made just three earthquake declarations, the

Number of President

Date of Disaster Costs, Current Cost, Constant Counties Issuing

Declaration Dollars' (2003) Dollars' Covered Declaration

5/5/83 3,716,909 6,876.281 2 Reagan

11/18/83 975,902 1,805,418 3 Reagan

10/7/87 44,944,829 72,810,622 2 Reagan

10/18/89 836,483,340 1,237,995,343 12 G.H.W. Bush

5/4/92 13,088,116 17,145,431 1 G.H.W. Bush

7/2/92 19,827,277 25,973,732 2 G.H.W. Bush

4/26/93 9,275,832 11,780,306 4 Clinton

10/15/93 2,877,056 3,653,861 1 Clinton

1/17/94 5,584,845,418 6,925,208,318 3 Clinton

9/14/00 8,939,407 9,565,165 Clinton

3/1/01 177,656,954 184,763,232 G.W. Bush

funds) and private and insurance costs (including claims paid under federal insurance as part of the NFIP) are

also not included in this figure.

2 Assistance made to state and county governments.

144 Richard T. Sylves

first for a highly publicized but only moderately destructive seismic event in and around Coalinga, California, in 1983. The Coalinga earthquake caused extensive local property damage but no loss of life. Due in part to the media attention the event received, Coalinga's mayor was successful in convincing California gover­ nor George Deukmejian, who, in turn, convinced President Reagan, to grant Coal­ inga state and presidential disaster declarations, respectively.65 President G.H.W. Bush also issued three major disaster declarations for earthquakes, including one for the state of California following the Loma Prieta earthquake. President Clin­ ton provided California with a major disaster declaration for the Northridge trem­ bler in 1994.

The Loma Prieta Earthquake

The earthquake struck northern California over an area stretching from Monterrey

Bay to points north of San Francisco on October I 7, 1989; it caused widespread

damage as far as fifty miles away from its epicenter. In Oakland, a major segment

of the Admiral Nimitz Freeway collapsed, crushing vehicles and killing forty-one

motorists; a fifty-foot span of the upper deck of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay

Bridge also collapsed, interrupting a major corridor between San Francisco and

the East Bay; gas lines were severed, and fires erupted in residential buildings.66

Loma Prieta was the first earthquake to result in more than $ 1 billion in FEMA

spending.

The Loma Prieta earthquake of October 17, 1989, resulted in extensive damage to infrastructure­ particularly elevated highways and bridges-and was the first earthquake to result in more than $1 billion in FEMA spending. This photo shows a collapsed building and burned area in San Francisco's Marina District. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey/C.E. Meyer.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 145

The Loma Prieta quake, named for its epicenter, occurred just before the third

game of the 1989 World Series between the Oakland Athletics and the San Fran­

cisco Giants. Because the television crews assigned to cover the game instantly

turned their attention to the quake and its immediate aftermath, the Loma Prieta

quake became the first earthquake to be, in effect, televised live. In some respects,

the television coverage of the damage in the Bay Area influenced the federal and

state response to the disaster: some analysts concluded that state disaster manag­

ers sent their first response personnel and resources to areas that had received

immediate and sustained coverage. For this reason, some believe that the federal

and state disaster response may have been slower to Watsonville, Santa Cruz.

and other communities south of San Francisco, which had sustained heavy loss

of life and major property damage but did not have the benefit of early television

coverage.

The government response to the Loma Prieta earthquake was generally

lauded, but controversy continued regarding how to provide appropriate and rea­

sonably priced residential earthquake insurance to Califomians.67 The disaster also

raised issues of mitigation and underscored the importance of protecting bridges,

elevated roads, and other infrastructure. The collapse of the bridge in Oakland

demonstrated the urgency of retrofitting highway structures to witl1stand seismic

shaking.

For the G.H.W. Bush administration, the devastation wrought b) the earth­

quake in the Bay Area and along the coast demonstrated some lessons learned.

Owing largely to television news coverage, federal emergency management had

become highly visible, exhaustively critiqued, and immensely newsworthy. Vice

President Dan Quayle's visit to damaged areas of San Francisco revealed that it

was politically counterproductive to visit disaster areas before adequate federal

disaster relief had arrived.

The Northridge Earthquake

The Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994, owing to its impact on the

massively developed and densely populated greater Los Angeles area, was the

most destructive U.S. earthquake in the 1983-2001 period. It stood as FEMA's

most expensive disaster until the terror attacks of September 11. 200 I. As

of July 31, 2006, FEMA funding in all categories for the Northridge quake

totaled $6.97 billion-almost three times as much as FEMA spent on Hurricane

Andrew ($1.66 billion for Florida and $147 million for Louisiana).6s Prior to

the Loma Prieta quake, no single disaster had cost more than $1 billion (even

with control for inflation) of Disaster Relief Fund monies, but the Northridge

earthquake began an era of intermittent multibillion-dollar federal disaster

payouts.60

�..,

146 Richard T. Sylves

The Northridge earthquake occurred along a thrust fault and did most of

its damage in the San Fernando Valley and other areas of Los Angeles. As with

Loma Prieta, the Northridge event drew protracted national news coverage, often

broadcast live with the anchorperson in the disaster-affected area. Political and

partisan differences between President Clinton and Governor Pete Wilson were

overcome quickly, and cooperation between FEMA and California's Office of

Emergency Services (OES) in the response and recovery was generally efficient

and effective.

Federal response to the 1994 Northridge earthquake was remarkable also

because it introduced many new applications of information technology. For the

first time, FEMA's inspectors used handheld computers to send and receive reports,

which allowed them to instantly communicate information gathered on field visits

to homes and other damaged structures whose owners or occupants sought federal

assistance. FEMA and California's OES officials generated prodigious numbers

of GIS-produced maps, which helped them to survey their progress in building

inspection. Such maps provided multiple information layers showing damage pat­

terns and infrastructure problems. Use of cell phone technology further facilitated

field operations and did so in unprecedented ways.70

A post-disaster rebuilding controversy arose over the costs of rebuilding Los

Angeles-area hospitals. In March 1996, FEMA announced that it would provide

The Northridge earthquake was the first seismic event to strike directly under a major U.S. city since the 1933 Long Beach quake. The quake caused widespread damage, including the collapse of major freeways, parking structures, and office and residential buildings. Retrofits of masonry buildings helped reduce loss of life, however, and hospitals suffered less structural damage than in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. Photo courtesy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979--2001 147

nearly$ l billion in a new mitigation effort to strengthen the structural integrity of

four local hospitals damaged by the Northridge earthquake. This decision came

after a heated dispute between FEMA and California officials. \\/hen thousands

of large, medium, and small businesses objected to the high cost of rebuild­

ing under the new, tougher codes, California relented and waived the new code

requirements for private sector entities, but the state kept the new requirements

for public structures-those that would be built with a 90/10 federal/state cost­

sharing scheme. President Clinton had waived the 75/25 federal/state match in

favor of the 90/10 federal/state match.;1 The hospitals and other government and

nonprofit enterprises eligible for federal funding would have to comply with the

new, tougher building codes.

At first FEMA complained that California's post-quake building code

changes were unfair to the federal government. FEMA officials argued that most

of the hospitals required less rebuilding and structural upgrades than specified in

the new codes. But FEMA director James Lee Witt quickly realized the poten­

tially serious nature of this stance. Facing strong political opposition from top

state officials and the embarrassment of opposing an admittedly expensive but

strong mitigation effort, Witt agreed that FEMA would pay its share-amounting

to $831 million-to rebuild the hospitals.72 A press release offered FEMA's new

take on the issue:

[T]hrough comprehensive consultation with the state and the hospitals. FEMA provided the most cost-effective funding package that would ensure that these buildings will be able to operate after another major earthquake. This new mitigation effort is providing the means to repair or replace damaged buildings. More importantl). these funds will enable hospitals to build their facilities to stronger structural standards to with­ stand future earthquakes. 73

Improving the ability of hospitals to withstand an earthquake would not only

reduce the need to evacuate patients but also improve post-disaster operation by

enabling these facilities to continue operation at a time when victims are in most

need of help.

Hurricanes

Many nations are vulnerable to tropical windstorms. In the Pacific, these weather

disturbances are most often called typhoons: in South Asia, they are called

cyclones; in the North Atlantic, they are hurricanes. Hurricanes are huge, cyclonic,

low-pressure storms.

Hurricanes are perhaps the type of disaster most familiar to Arne1icans. Hur­

ricane Andrew (1992) taught Florida residents "that hurricanes were not freak

instances or random acts of nature: Floridians learned that humans and their insti­

tutions made decisions that had an important influence on whether a community

148 Richard T. Sylves

did or did not suffer substantial damage from hurricanes."74 Hurricanes also have helped to shape federal, state, and local emergency management, particularly in states along the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic seaboard.75

Before the mid-twentieth century, it was difficult to forecast or track hur­ ricanes. The limits of meteorological analysis and technology also limited hurricane preparedness and response efforts. Since the early 1980s, coastal communities have come to benefit from ever-improving hurricane tracking and landfall projections, as well as from increasingly better scientific information and advice provided to emergency managers. These advances are the result of many factors, including major advances in weather forecasting due in large part to ever-expanding computing capacity; and an improved ability to fol low tropi­ cal weather systems using satellites, radar, long-range hurricane reconnaissance aircraft, weather reports from ships at sea, and data from mid-ocean weather­ monitoring buoys.76

But tracking the storm is just the beginning of preparedness. Emergency man­ agers must decide on, announce, and help manage public evacuation. Part of this requires that they alert people to relocate to shelters. Disaster evacuation and shel­ tering have been increasingly problematic for emergency managers.

At the local level, pre-disaster hurricane-related politics involve decisions about zoning and setback regulations, code enforcement beach preservation and dune protection, open space requirements, and a host of other concerns that affect a community's protection from or vulnerability to hurricanes. As a hurricane looms, authorities must decide whether to call for an evacuation and whether this evacuation will be voluntary or compulsory---decisions that have dramatic economic and political implications. The responsibilities of the state include pro­ moting and disseminating hurricane forecasts and tracking information, helping local jurisdictions effect evacuation and sheltering when needed, maintaining util­ ity infrastructures, conducting damage assessment, and facilitating post-hurricane reconstruction.

The Hurricane Preparedness Planning Program, as it was known prior to FY 1994, consisted mainly of support for studies of coastal areas to help state and local emergency management agencies in evacuation planning. In the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, FEMA was authorized to issue grants to state agencies to help them pay for the cost of developing emergency preparedness plans. States were to share some of this funding with their local governments, which would also use it to develop hurricane preparedness plans.77 The U.S. Army Corps of Engi­ neers played a role in managing and funding research studies, while the National Weather Service supported the development of hurricane stonn-surge models for coastal areas. Overall, the emphasis was on protecting the at-risk population from stonn surge and coastal flooding, forces that had historically produced the most hurricane-related deaths.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 149

The National Hurricane Program

The National Hurricane Program (NHP). which was established. in 1985, continues Lo provide support for hurricane research and activities. Hol!Scd under FEMA's Miti­ gation Division. NHP conducts and supports many projects and activities thal help pr-0tect ·communities and. Lhcir residcnt:s. frorn hurricane hazards. The program also conducts ao;sessments nnd provides tools !Il.1d technical assistance to state and local agencies in developing hunicane evacuation plans.

tlfHP is a multiagenc:y partnership involving FEMA. the National Oceanic and ALmospheric Administration, the National Weather Service-. th!! U.S. Department of l'ransportatlon. the O .S. Amiy Corps of Engineers, and several other fuch:ral agencies. Annual funding go� for FEMA's hurricane program activities and a grant progrmn that subsid.izes sta1e funds for hurricane prepa,redness and mitiga,. tion activities.

Source: FEMA, "National Hurricane Program," fema.gov/plan/prevent/nhp/index.shtm.

Over fifteen years, the Hurricane Preparedness Planning Program produced

hurricane evacuation studies for most of the nation's coastal areas vulnerable to

lumicanes. (Many offuese st1.1dies need to be updated to take into account popul a­

tion growth and new development.) The evacuation plans that state and localit ies

developed with suppm1 of these program funds were used inSouth Carolina w hen

Hurricane Hugo strUek in September 1989 and in Florida for Hurricane. A ndrew

in August 1992. As in other disasters, hurricanes have proven to be focusing events that have

changed public opini.on. political priorities, and public policy. For ins tance. fol­

lowing Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and.Floyd, the insurance industry and some

government officials stepped up their efforts to enact new zoning regulat ions and

strengthen building_ codes to minimize the damage wre_aked by a hurri cane. Re1-

rofitti.ng existing structures to better witbsraud wind and water. and relocating

other structures away from the most hazardous areas. conti.nue to be increasingly

attractive tools in hurricane preparedness and mitigation policy.

Hurricane Hugo

In September 1989, millions of people throughout the Caribbean and t he eastern

United States watched in amazement as Hurricane Hugo traveled thou sands of

miles without losing intensity. Late at night on September 17, the hu rricane

slammed into the islands of Guadeloupe and Montserrat with winds of 140

miles per hour, killing twenty-one people and leaving another twelve tho usand

�.,w

150 Richard T. Sylves

homeless before heading toward the U.S. Virgin Islands; there, it left thousands

more people homeless and resulted in $2 billion in damages. Widespread looting forced President G.H.W. Bush to dispatch military police to St. Croix to restore

order.

By midday of September 19, Hugo had reached Puerto Rico. High seas and

sustained winds of 125 miles per hour resulted in the death of twelve people. More

than thirty thousand Puerto Ricans lost their homes. Although Hugo was weakened

somewhat as it crossed the mountains of Puerto Rico, it gained in size and intensity

as it headed northwest over the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. By the time it hit

the U.S. mainland on September 21, it had grown into a Category 4 stonn, with

sustained winds of 135 miles per hour.

By any estimation, Hurricane Hugo was a devastating storm. But it could

have been far worse. Most residents had complied with the mandatory evacua­

tion order issued for the barrier islands. Moreover, the bulk of Hugo's devastation

was in relatively rural areas north of Charleston, South Carolina. Unfortunately,

despite all media coverage and advanced warnings, Hugo's human toll was high:

fifty-seven deaths in the mainland United States and another twenty-nine in U.S.­

owned Caribbean islands. The storm caused $7 billion of damages in the mainland

United States, making it the most costly hurricane up to that time. An additional

$3 billion in damages was reported in the Caribbean. 78

Saundra K. Schneider examined the response to and recovery from Hurricane

Hugo in the Caribbean, South Carolina, and North Carolina and the public's reac­

tion to the federal government efforts. Her review brings to light some organiza­

tional failures, most particularly for South Carolina.79

The state ofNorth Carolina had engaged in extensive emergency management

training before the disaster, employed full-time professionals trained in emergency

management, and allocated more state money for disaster management than the

other states affected by Hurricane Hugo. Emergency response procedures, which

incorporated a bottom-up approach, worked as planned, with FEMA and other

federal agencies supplementing local and state efforts, and the state government

acting as the liaison between the federal and local levels. North Carolinians gener­ ally reacted positively to the management of recovery operations in their state, and

state politicians had favorable opinions about FEMA and other federal agencies

following the hurricane.

South Carolina's experience was less positive, however. The state allocated

proportionally less money to disaster preparedness procedures and staffing than

had North Carolina, resulting in problems regarding procedures and duties in the

aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. Although a state emergency management team

was already in place, shortly before Hugo made landfall Governor Carroll Camp­

bell appointed an ad hoc emergency management team to provide additional

knowledge and experience during response and recovery operations. This led

to confusion about whom to contact at the state level and

proved frustrating for local

and federal emergency

personnel. The two state

emergency management

groups duplicated efforts

and actions. The bottom-up emer­

gency response plan failed

in South Carolina. Many

local governments had little

knowledge of emergency

management procedures. Consequently, some locali­

ties improperly reported damage, which delayed the

receipt of assistance. State and local government offi­

cials joined the public in criticizing response efforts

and directed blame to the

federal government. Hurricane Hugo also

reinforced the need for and

effectiveness of strict build-

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 151

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.. � The Atlantic House Restaurant at Folly Beach, South Carolina, before and after Hurricane Hugo. These buildings notwithstanding, structures built to National Flood Insurance Program standards performed well. Photo courtesy of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Hurricane Center.

ing requirements. In the midst of the devastation wrought by the hurricane, the

buildings that adhered to NFIP requirements held up well, demonstrating the effec­

tiveness of those requirements.

Hurricane Andrew

In August 1992, just two years after Hurricane Hugo's record-breaking devasta­

tion, Hurricane Andrew ripped through the Caribbean and into Florida's Atlantic

coast, leaving a path of destruction across South Florida. The U.S. death toll was twenty-three; three other people were killed in the Bahamas. Hurricane Andrew

caused $26.5 billion in damage in the United States, of which $1 billion occurred

in Louisiana and the rest in South Florida. The vast majority of the damage in

Florida was due to winds: NOAA's National Hurricane Center measured a peak

gust of 164 miles per hour, while a 177-mi!e-per-hour gust was measured at a

private home.80

r*

152 Richard T. Sylves

Hurricane Andrew, which was one of only three Category 5 hurricanes to strike the United States in the twentieth century, became the most costly hurricane in U.S. history. FEMA's slow response to this event was partly responsible for marked changes in the agency in the following years. Photo courtesy of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Hurricane Andrew taught emergency managers and political leaders many

lessons. In an unpublished draft paper for the International Hurricane Research

Center, Stephen Leatherman writes:

The shoddy building practices and fraudulent inspections in South Florida were fully disclosed, resulting today in Florida having the best building codes (e.g., High Velocity Hurricane Zone codes) in the nation. Arguably, the most important fallout from Hurricane Andrew was changes in the insurance industry, an industry that had previously relied upon historical payouts to set actuarial rates. Andrew was a wake-up call to an industry that absorbed catastrophic losses and often had to make full payouts for replacement of damaged houses and furnishings. Since Andrew, the insur­ ance industry has engaged in computer modeling to set insurance rates. However, hurricane insurance rates have soared by over 300 percent in South Florida since Andre1,.81

President G.H.W. Bush appointed Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card

rather than FEMA director Wallace Stickney to manage the emergency response

operations in Florida. (One explanation has been that Stickney had asked Bush not

to put him in charge for health reasons.) When political leaders make such major

changes in emergency management leadership, it indicates distrust in FEMA's

leadership and operating procedures. When Card showed up in Florida leading

the president's newly impaneled task force on Hurricane Andrew recovery, he

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 153

inadvertently slowed FEMA's response by insisting that "FEMA personnel distrib­

ute money directly to storm victims without going through the lengthy assessment

and verification processes."82

Hurricane Floyd

In October 1999, Hurricane Floyd traveled up the eastern seaboard, inflicting dam­

age in the mid-Atlantic and northeastern states. Floyd made landfall in North

Carolina and caused the worst flooding in the state's history. Over $100 million in

disaster assistance was provided to more than seventy-two thousand North Caro­

lina residents.

Floyd, at one time a Category 5 hurricane that was four times larger than Hur-

ricane Andrew, prompted the largest evacuation in U.S. history. From Miami to

North Carolina, more than three million people attempted to flee from coastal areas,

clogging highways and overwhelming other resources. Residents of Charleston,

South Carolina, many of whom remembered the twenty-foot storm surge gener­

ated by Hugo in 1989, tried to escape inland to the state's capital city, Columbia.

Cars caught up in the slow-moving, bumper-to-bumper traffic on I-26 stalled;

many families were stranded for as much as twelve hours without food, water, or

toilets in the late summer heat. The media picked up the story, blaming the state

for failing to have an adequate evacuation plan. Some analysts believe that the

As shown here, Hurricane Floyd caused extensive inland flooding, particularly in the Carolinas. Of the fifty-six people who died in the hurricane, fifty drowned in the floodwaters. Photo courtesy

of the Federal Emergency Management Agency/Dave Gatley.

��

154 Richard T. Sylves

negative coverage was a factor in Governor Jim Hodges's defeat in his 2002 bid for reelection in South Carolina.83

Although Floyd was only a Category 2 hurricane when it made landfall in North Carolina, it caused $5 billion in damage. Fifty-six people were killed out­ right, largely because of inland freshwater flooding. At the time, FEMA's flood maps were grossly out of date. The explosive development in North Carolina over the two previous decades had made the rivers vulnerable to flash flooding in areas that were perceived to be outside of hazard zones. The rain inundation in the state caused major flooding, enveloping entire towns in some places.

Again, the hurricane proved to be a focusing event that called attention to the inadequacies of the emergency preparedness system. As a result of Hurricane Floyd, FEMA finally recognized the inadequacy of its flood maps. North Carolina became the first state to embrace the new technology of airborne laser mapping, which offered far greater accuracy in mapping hurricane storm surge.3'

Floods

History demonstrates that floods have long been a major cause of property damage in the United States. Since 1950, presidents have issued more disaster declarations for floods than for any other category of disaster event. In fact, almost half ( 47 percent) of the presidential major disaster declarations between 1953 and 2001 were for floods (663 flood disaster declarations). Prior to 1990, flood disasters usually accounted for the largest component offederal disaster relief funding, but over the next decade, FEMA federal disaster fund spending on earthquakes and hurricanes each overtook the spending for floods.

The total number of gubernatorial requests for weather-related incidents steadily increased in the 1980s and I 990s. FEMA spent $25.4 billion for declared disasters during the last decade of the twentieth century; flooding resulting from severe storms cost the agency more than $7.3 billion during this time.85

NOAA estimated that the Great Midwest Flood of 1993 cost $15-$20 bil­ lion. FEMA's share of these costs was $1.17 billion, excluding claims paid out by FEMA's NFIP.

The Great Midwest Flood of 1993

In the summer of 1993, continuous rain fell across the midwestern United States. Most of the Midwest received more than 12 inches of precipitation; parts of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska got more than 24 inches ofrain; and an estimated 38.4 inches fell on East-Central Iowa-amounts that were from two to four times the average amount of rainfall. The continuous rainfall saturated the soil and engorged rivers and streams. As rivers ove1tlowed and darns and levees failed, the result was the largest and most damaging flood event in recorded U.S.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979---2001 155

history. Damages totaled $15 billion and at least forty-eight people died.86 Thou­ sands of people evacuated and many never returned to their flood-ravaged homes. Ninety-five river gages generated the highest flood crests ever recorded at their locations. The large area that was affected by flooding and the length of time over which the rainfall occurred made the flood a seminal event.

In his book covering the event, Rich Tobin writes that the Great Midwest Flood "provided evidence that the nation has not yet reached an accommodation between nature's periodic need to occupy her floodplains and the present human occupancy and use."87 Only about one in ten structures affected by the flood were covered by flood insurance policies. President Clinton declared 534 counties in nine states to be federal disaster areas. At one point, every county in the state ofiowa was covered under a presidential declaration of major disaster owing to flooding and its effects. Direct federal assistance exceeded $4.2 billion, and an additional $621 million in disaster loans was provided to individuals and businesses.88

In a comprehensive evaluation of the Great Flood, Stanley Changnon identi- fies the main issues that confronted decision makers during the recovery process:

Whether to repair or reconstruct the hundreds of damaged flood-control levees (or other structural/protective measures in future floods) and who would pay for permitted repairs

Whether to permit repair or rebuilding of thousands of substantially dam­ aged structures so they could again be inhabited

Whether to commit community planning and financial assistance to develop alternative mitigation strategies to the typical repair/rebuild scenario

Whether to use risk insurance as a type of mitigation tool.80

The Midwest floods were one of the first major challenges of Clinton's revamped FEMA, and the agency was widely praised for its management of the response. Witt made sure that FEMA proactively addressed the disaster under a

new policy that it would no longer wait for states to ask for damage assess- ment teams .... Witt sent regional staffs out before the flooding became seri­ ous to help states apply for disaster assistance: had them prepare preliminary damage assessments before President Clinton ·s fom1al disaster declaration; directed FEMA workers to respond immediately to any state requests: and anticipated rs:quests rather than waiting for the state to tell FEMA what the� needed. v\'itt's FEMA neYer lost focusi'0

The winter following the floods, the Clinton administration convened the Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee to conduct a compre­ hensive review of floodplain management. The committee's recommendations. in its report Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management into the 21st Cen­ /Ury (refetTed to as the Gal!mmy Report, after the committee's chair, Gerald E.

��

156 Richard T. Sylves

A total of 534 counties in nine states received federal disaster declarations owing to the damage caused by the Great Midwest Flood of 1993. This prompted the Clinton administration to call for a comprehensive review of floodplain management. Photo courtesy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency/Andrea Booher.

Galloway Jr.), called for shared responsibility for floodplain management among

federal, state, and local governments. It also recommended restrictions on devel­

opment in floodplains. The committee criticized the lack of national flood insur­

ance policies in communities affected by the Great Midwest Flood and noted that

overly generous federal disaster assistance has the potential to reduce individual

responsibility to self-protect against disasters.91

In September 1993, Witt issued a memo stating that the Hazard Mitigation

Grant Program would be used for property acquisition and residential relocation.

This was important for two reasons: first, few believed that homeowners would

voluntarily sell their homes and relocate on a mass scale (although, to the surprise

of many after the Great Flood, they did, for the first time in history, and some

14,000-20,000 structures moved out of the floodplain); and second, Witt was get­

ting tremendous pressure to rebuild failed levees throughout the Midwest. In the

memo he contended that levees are the purview of the U.S. Army Corps of Engi­

neers and that FEMA would "not" do levees.92

Professionalization of Emergency Management

Emergency management as a profession continued to expand and grow in knowl­

edge base and experience from 1979 to 2001. Its rise as a profession was impor­

tant: the constantly improving state and local administrative capacity to better

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 157

document disaster losses may have been a factor in the era's increased number

of presidential disaster declarations.93 This growing capacity, in addition to auto­

mated damage measurements, might have meant that the federal government was

increasingly able to validate a state's needs when the federal government's assis­

tance was requested;94 it would suggest that presidents became better able to make

decisions about disaster and emergency declarations. In August 2001, however,

the U.S. General Accounting Office cited inadequate declaration criteria and a host

ofFEMA/state information management problems, including inadequate staffing

and training.95

Owing to advances in information technology, state emergency managers at

the close of the twentieth century were likely better able to document disaster loss

than they were in the 1970s. State and local governments became more expert

in using information technology to document disaster losses and more proficient

in proving their need for federal assistance, which gave them a stronger factual

basis for requesting a presidential disaster declaration. This may have contributed

to the trend in declining turndowns of requests for federal assistance. Thus, they

enjoyed a liberal provision of federal disaster relief from a variety of federal

agencies, including FEMA. By 2001, state and local governments could count

on federal help to pay for "debris removal, repair, restoration, or replacement

of public facilities"; community disaster loans to cover shortfalls in local tax

revenue owing to a disaster; and coverage of a major share of their emergency

response costs. 96

Conclusions The president's role in emergency management grew in importance over the period

of 1979 to 2001. In 1980, President Reagan at first planned to dismantle FEMA,

viewing it as an unnecessary Carter-era organization. However, as soon as Reagan

had to confront a series of small disasters, some of them caused by humans, he

walked back his dismantlement plans, recognizing the unique role assumed by the

agency. FEMA leaders over the Reagan years ranged from capable to irresponsi­

bly poor. Regrettably, when confronted with Hurricane Andrew's devastation in

1992, President G.H.W. Bush circumvented FEMA and formed a hurricane task

force led by Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card. In 1989, he had appointed

Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner to assume the same leadership role in

managing recovery from the Northridge earthquake. Steven Daniels and Carolyn

Clark-Daniels conclude,

The bypassing of the official disaster agency by various presidents had a number of serious consequences. The first was the inevitable duplication of effort. Despite presidential intervention, FEMA and its predecessors nevertheless retained both the inclination and the statutory requirement to intercede on behalf of disaster victims. The separate presidential and agenc)

r�

158 Richard T. Sylves

response cffons unavoidably wasted resources. The second consequence was the management of disaster response and recovery b)' less qualified personnel. The White House staff invariably had much less emergency man­ agement experience than permanent agency employees. As a result, each administration that relied heaYily on presidential preemption of disaster recovery had a much longer learning curve than administrations that relied on a permanent disaster agency. such as FDAA [Federal Disaster Assistance Administration] or FEMA.r

Daniels and Clark-Daniels eloquently add, "One of the major differences

between the Bush and Clinton administrations was the level of support provided

by the president to disaster management. Bush's disaster response was largely

reactive and bypassed the existing disaster management structure. Clinton's disas­

ter management policy was more proactive and politically sensitive. Clinton also

improved FEMA's political stature by emphasizing the lead disaster role of the

agency and its director, and by raising the FEMA director to cabinet status. One

former state emergency management official argued, "'Witt's greatest impact was

the fact that he linked FEMA to the executive branch, the Executive Office of the

President, and the president. Witt had access. "'98

Some experts maintain that, in an era of devolution and decentralization of

government, U.S. disaster policy became an increasingly centralized responsibil­

ity of the federal government."'' Yet during the closing decades of the twentieth

century, emergency management was profoundly shaped by what state and local

governments did or did not do.100 Many states and localities promoted and facili­

tated their emergency management capacities and launched pre-disaster mitigation

programs.

Federal assistance for disaster victims also grew considerably from 1979 to

2001, although this growth was not substantial during the Reagan years. Grants for

individuals and families, temporary housing aid, provisions for mobile home use,

and disaster unemployment assistance became part of the disaster relief provided

after an event. The federal government also funded legal services for the poor, cri­

sis counseling. and mental health assistance programs for disaster victims. Small

Business Administration disaster loans were issued to applicant homeowners and

businesses.

The Great Midwest Flood of 1993. the nationwide increase in severe storm­

related disasters, and mounting hurricane devastation have led environmental

hazard researchers, including many in the meteorological and physical geogra­

phy communities, to contend that there have been an unusually large number of

hydrometeorological disasters. 101 Many of these researchers maintain that we are

experiencing more temperature and precipitation extremes (high and low) than

ever before, some as manifestations of climate change. Others see the escalating

costs of disasters as evidence of more expansive, expensive, and disaster-vulnerable

communities and structures. 10c

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 159

FEMA was born in an era in which civil defense against nuclear attack was

of strategic importance. As the cry for civil defense lost urgency, civilian emer­

gency management took on increased significance. In 1993, however, just as civil

defense had faded from the emergency manager's ·'radar screen," the World Trade

Center was bombed, thus renewing concern about civil defense and emergency

preparedness.

In contradistinction, the era included major advances in disaster sciences

and information technology, which both advanced and complicated emergency

management. An increasing number of researchers and politicians, along with the

public, have begun to understand that disasters emanate not simply from natu­

ral forces, but also from human causes and human-tolerated vulnerabilities. New

tools, including information technology, GIS, global positioning systems, and

advanced individual and mass communication devices, as well as portable com­

puting via laptops and palmtops, have become increasingly available. To master

their use, emergency managers have had to acquire new knowledge and skills.

further advancing their profession. 103

The era also saw strides in disaster mitigation, as public, private, and non­

profit organizations began to take disaster vulnerability and mounting disaster

losses more seriously than ever before. Major insurers, a sophisticated network

of government disaster researchers, and scientific and engineering experts within

academia are now using technological advances to study and counteract ,..,·here

possible a wide variety of hazards and disaster agents.

In both a social and political sense, Americans have become increasingly

aware of the growing range of natural and human-caused disaster agents they face.

and they are less tolerant of preventable disaster-caused losses. Elected policy

makers have grown to expect federal, state, and local emergency managers to serve

as disaster protectors, preventers, evacuation directors, shelter managers, respond­

ers, rescuers, relief distributors. restorers, and agents of government-funded post­

disaster recompense.

Media coverage of disasters and emergencies. often provided in ·'live

shots" or near real time, have made Americans (and the world) almost

instantly aware of disasters and human tragedies in other parts of the nation

and across the globe. N APA's conclusion in its 1993 report was prescient:

camcorder politics and the CNN effect have thoroughly permeated emergency

management. 10' Arguably, media coverage of disasters and emergencies did

more to change the political and managerial world of emergency management

from 1979 to 200 I than almost anything else-a trend that has escalated.

Americans watched their televisions in horror as the events of 9/1 l unfolded

before their eyes. 105

At the close of the century, communities were much better prepared for a disas­

ter than they were when FEMA was first established, but the federal government's

160 Richard T. Sylves

role has continued to evolve. Partnerships between and among federal, state, and

local governments, private sector businesses, and nonprofit organizations address

the needs that were made evident by the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes;

by Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Floyd; by the Great Midwest Flood, and by

other disasters big and small. Emergency management has become "big business"

and a growth industry in every sector.

From March 1979 until March 2003, FEMA operated as an independent fed­

eral agency. It then floated in a sea of departments and agencies, many of which

dwarfed the agency in workforce size, budget authority, and political clout. The

agency sank or, swam as a function of how it was perceived by the president in

office and how its appointed leaders managed their jobs. Subsequent chapters

explain how FEMA has, since 2003, been subsumed within the Department of

Homeland Security. According to FEMA chief of staff Jason McNamara, FEMA

remains intact, has its biggest workforce to date, and has recaptured a positive

reputation.106 In many ways, the FEMA personnel of 1979-2003 built the founda­

tion for and pioneered, with successes and failures, the world and profession of

current emergency managers.

Notes

Executive Order No. 12127 of March 31, 1979, essentially created FEMA; see 3 C.F.R.1979 Comp., 376, fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12127.htm. Executive Order No. 12148, enacted on July 20, 1979, transferred and reassigned duties to the newly formed agency; it also directed FEMA to develop a plan to outline how the agency would cooperate and respond to a nuclear emergency. In response, FEMA established the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan; see fas.erg/ irp/offdocs/EO12148.htm.

2 Although this transfer was in the plan, it was officially canceled in 1982, and FEMA never acquired the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program.

3 Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Orga­ nization: Historical Developments and Legislative Options (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service [CRS]. Library of Congress. June 1, 2006); George D. Haddow, Jane A. Bullock, and Damon P Coppola, Introduction to Emergency Management, 4th ed. (Burlington, Mass.: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2011). 6.

4 B. Wayne Blanchard, Background "Think Piece" for the Emergency Management Roundtable Meeting, EM/ March 5 -6, 2007, on What Is Emergency Management? And What Are the Prin­ ciples of Emergency Management, draft (Emmitsburg, Md.: Emergency Management Institute, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, March 2, 2007), 18.

5 "About FEMA, What We Do," fema.gov/about/.

6 Richard T. Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: CO Press, 2008), 62-63.

7 Ibid., 48--51.

8 R. Steven Daniels and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels, Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Presidential Transition Series (Arlington, Va.: PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, April 2000), fema.gov/pdf/library/danielsreport.pdf

9- Emergency management professionals differentiate between smaller-scale emergencies, which are limited in time, space, and effect, and disasters, which have a broader, more severe impact and require more response and recovery resources. The differentiation between a disaster and

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 161

an emergency stems from the enabling Stafford Act, as well as from usage among disaster professionals. A catastrophe is defined as a rare event that surpasses most expectations as well as the ability of state and local governments to respond, and hence it becomes a historic event.

10 Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics, 62. See also Francis X. McCarthy, Federal Stafford Act Disas­ ter Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, RL33053 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, Library of Congress, June 7, 2011), fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33053.pdf. McCarthy explains, "Congress appropriates money to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to ensure that . . . fed­ eral assistance ••. is available to_ help individuals and communities stricken by severe disasters. Funds appropriated to the DRF remain available until expended. Such accounts are referred to as 'no-year' accounts. Appropriations to the DRF generally evoke little controversy. Supplemental appropriations measures are generally required each fiscal year to meet the urgent needs of p a r ­ ticularly catastrophic disasters" (18).

11 Aaron Schroeder and Gary Wamsley, "The Evolution of Emergency Management in America: From a Painful Past to a Promising but Uncertain Future," in Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management, ed, Ali Farazmand (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2002).

12 Dianne Rahm, United States Public Policy: A Budgetary Approach (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2004), 97-113.

13 See David K. Twigg, The Politics of Disaster: Tracking the Political Effects of Hurricane Andrew (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2012).

14 Kevin Arceneaux and Robert M Stein, "Who Is Held Responsible When Disaster Strikes? The Attribution of Responsibility for a Natural Disaster in an Urban Election," Journal of Urban Affairs 28 (January 2006): 43.

15 Ann M. Beauchesne, A Governor's Guide to Emergency Management (Washington, D.C.: National Governors' Association, 1998); National Research Council (NRG), Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters, The Impacts of Natural Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1999)

16 FEMA Internet news release, March 23, 1995.

17 Ibid.

18 Susan L. Cutter, ed. American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of Hazards and Disasters (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 2001); Dennis S. Mileti, Disasters by Design: A Reas­ sessment of Natural Hazards in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. 1999).

19 Roy S. Popkin, "The History and Politics of Disaster Management in the United States," in Nothing to Fear: Risks and Hazards in American Society, ed. Andrew Kirby (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990).

20 Claire B Rubin, lrmak Renda-Tanali, and William Cumming, Disaster Time Line: Major Focusing Events and Their Outcomes (1979-2005) (Arlington, Va.: Claire B. Rubin & Associates, 2006), disaster-timeline.com.

21 SARA Title Ill in Superfund Revitalization Act of 1986; Title Ill in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.

22 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR}, The Cher­ nobyl Accident: UNSCEAR's Assessments of the Radiation Effects (August 3, 2011 }, unscear.org/ unscear/en/chernobyl.html.

23 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Nuclear Safety Reactor Design and Preparedness at Fort St. Vrain, RCED-88-8 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1987), archive.gao.gov/d29t5/134670.pdf.

24 Ted Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America (New York: Oxford University Press. 2000), 181.

25 This action by the federal government was a precursor of modern anti pandemic or bioterrorism preparedness initiatives.

26 James David Barber, "Presidential Character," in American Government: Readings and Cases, ed. Karen O'Connor (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), 204.

27 Nairn Kapucu et al., "U.S. Presidents and Their Roles in Emergency Management and Disaster Policy 1950-2009," Risk, Hazards, and Crisis in Public Policy 2, no. 3 (2011).

�

l1 I

162 Richard T. Sylves

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

GAO, Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures, Report to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, HUD, and Independent Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print­ ing Office, August 2001), 1.

Ibid., 2.

Personal communication with Francis X. McCarthy of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), November 2011.

See Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI), "All about Presidential Disaster Declarations," peripresdecusa.

org (no longer available online).

David R. Godschalk, David J. Brower, and Timothy Beatley, Catastrophic Coastal Storms: Hazard Mitigation and Development Management (Durham, N.C,: Duke University Press, 1989).

Rubin, Renda-Tanali, and Cumming, Disaster Time Line.

Frances L. Edwards, "Homeland Security from the Local Perspective," in Homeland Security Law and Policy, ed. William C. Nicholson (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 2005), 114.

Rutherford H. Platt and Claire B_ Rubin, "Stemming the Losses: The Quest for Hazard Mitiga­ tion," in Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events, ed. Rutherford B. Platt (Washington, D.C.: Island Prass, 1999); Mileti, Disasters by Design.

Mileti, Disasters by Design; Cutter, American Hazardscapes.

John C. Pine, Technology in Emergency Management (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2007).

NRC, Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences. Facing Hazards and Disasters: Understanding Human Dimensions (Washington, D.C : National Academies Press, 2006).

"HAZUS," fema.gov/hazus.

NRC, Facing Hazards and Disasters

Robert Bolin and Lois Stanford, The Northridge Earthquake: Vulnerability and Disaster (London: Routledge, 1998).

William L. Waugh Jr., Living with Hazards, Dealing with Disasters (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

Kathleen Tierney, Michael K. Lindell, and Ronald W. Perry, Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 2001), 146.

Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81--(175, 64 Stat. 1109 (1950).

Ibid.

Rutherford H. Platt, "Federalizing Disasters: From Compassion to Entitlement," in Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events, ed. Rutherford B. Platt (Washington, D,C.:

Island Press, 1999), 2�26.

Keith Bea, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, CRS Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: CRS, Library of Congress, April 28, 2006), 3G-32.

Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974).

Richard T. Sylves, "President Bush and Hurricane Katrina: A Presidential Leadership Study," in Shelter from the Storm: Repairing the National Emergency Management System after Hurricane Katrina, ed. William L. Waugh Jr., The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social S c i ­ ence 604 (March 2006): 26-56.

PERI, "All about Presidential Disaster Declarations."

Allen K. Settle, "Disaster Assistance: Securing Presidential Declarations," in Cities and Disaster: North American Studies in Emergency Management, ed. Richard T. Sylves and William L, Waugh Jr., 33-56 (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1990), 50.

Albert Gore, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: The Report of the National Performance Review (Washington, D.C.: u_s_ Government Printing Office, September 7, 1993), 46.

53 Waugh, Living with Hazards, 12.

54 Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola, Introduction to Emergency Management, 88.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 163

55 Gary L. Wamsley et al., Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People's Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1993), ix.

56 The Volkmer Amendment to the Hazard Mitigation and Relocation Assistance Act of 1993 (PL 103-181) amended the 1988 Stafford Act.

57 House Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Midwest Floods of 1993: Flood Control and Floodplain Policy and Pro­ posals (103-57), Statement of the Honorable Harold L. Volkmer, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., October 27, 1993, 241.

58 Platt and Aubin, "Stemming the Losses," 78.

59 Michael K. Lindell, Carla Prater, and Ronald W. Perry, Introduction to Emergency Management (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2007), 361-362.

60 Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics, 69.

61 William J. Petak and Arthur A. Atkisson, Natural Hazard Risk Assessment and Public Policy (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), 76-79.

62 Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola, Introduction to Emergency Management, 91-92.

63 Platt and Aubin, "Stemming the Losses," 84.

64 Waugh, Living with Hazards, 61.

65 See Allen K. Settle, "The Coalinga Earthquake," in Crisis Management: A Casebook, ed. Michael T. Charles and John Choon K. Kim (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1988). Settle documents how Coalinga's mayor skillfully used the media and political influence to secure substantial disas­ ter relief aid from the federal and state governments, which he then used to refashion and rebuild the downtown into a seismically safe shopping plaza.

66 Platt, "Federalizing Disasters." 251-252.

67 James F. Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006), 78; Richard J. Roth Jr., "Earthquake Insurance Protection in California," in Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance against Natural Disasters in the United States, ed. Howard Kunreuther (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 1998).

68 PERI, "All about Presidential Disaster Declarations."

69 Bea, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance.

70 Robert Klebs and Richard T. Sylves, "The North ridge Earthquake: Memoirs of a FEMA Building Inspector," in Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada, ed. Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh Jr. (Springfield, Ill : Charles C. Thomas, 1996).

71 Keith Bea, FEMA and Disaster Relief, 97-159 GOV (Washington, D.C.: CRS, Library of Con­ gress, updated March 6, 1998), hsdl.org/?view&did=15130. Bea states, "For most disasters, a threshold of $64 per capita (statewide) has been used to determine when a waiver may be granted, That is, if the damages from a declared disaster in a state exceed $64 multiplied by the entire state population, a waiver has been considered Once that threshold has been reached, FEMA has adjusted the cost-share requirements" (15). He also notes, "The Presi­ dent may waive, and has waived, some or all of the cost-sharing required for public assis­ tance after particularly destructive catastrophes. The match requirement for human services (which the Stafford Act sets at 25% of eligible costs) cannot be waived, except for insular areas" (14).

72 The bill for repairing and/or replacing the four hospitals that had been damaged totaled more than $947 million, paid for by FEMA, the state of California, and local contributors,

73 FEMA, Office of Emergency Information and Public Affairs, "FEMA to Provide Nearly $1 Billion for Earthquake-Damaged Hospitals," March 12, 1996, press release.

74 Thomas A. Birkland, "Federal Disaster Policy: Learning, Priorities, and Prospects for Resilience," in Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events, ed Louise K, Comfort, A�en Boin, and Chris C. Demchak (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 122-123.

75 William L. Waugh Jr., "Hurricanes," in Handbook of Emargency Management: Policies and Pro­ grams for Dealing with Major Hazards and Disasters, ed. William L. Waugh Jr. and Ronald J Hy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990), 61--(10.

164 Richard T. Sylves

76 Pine, Technology in Emergency Management; Jack Williams and Bob Sheets, Hurricane Watch: Forecasting the Deadliest Storms on Earth (New York: Vintage Books, 2001 ).

77 David R. Godschalk, Catastrophic Coastal Stoons: Hazard Mitigation and Development Management (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989), 100.

78 •storms of the Century: 1989 Hurricane Hugo,· weather.oom/newscenter/speclalre_ports/sotc/ honoreble/1989.fltml. The devastation or Hurricane Hugo was exceeoed by that caused by Hur­ ricane Andrew In 1992 and by several o1her storms since then. but Hugo remains one of the costliest hurricanes In U.S. history (no longer available online).

79 Saundra K. Schneider, Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

80 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), "Hurricane Andrew," nhc.noaa.gov/ 1992andrew.html.

81 Stephen P. Leatherman, "Hurricanes Make Public Policy" (unpublished draft paper for the Interna- tional Hurricane Research Center, Florida International University, Miami, Florida, 2005), 3.

82 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster, 95.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid. FEMA has recently embarked on a $1 billion Map Modernization Program to develop new maps for coastal and riverine floodplains.

85 Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola, Introduction to Emergency Management, 214-215.

86 Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics, 122.

87 American lnstiMes for Rese2.R:h, A Chronology of Ma;or Events Affecting the NaUonal Flood Insurance Program (Washington. D.C.: American Institutes for Rese.ircti. December 2005), 50, ferna.gov/medla-library-data/20130726-1602-20490-7283/nfip_eval_ct,ronology.pdi.

88 1--ioLlse Commlttee on Homeland Security, Redireoting FEMA toward Success, February 2006, 16, hsdl.org/?view&did=461850.

89 Stanley A. Changnon, The Great Flood of 1993: Causes, Impacts, and Responses (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996).

90 House Committee on Homeland Security, Redirecting FEMA toward Success, 16.

91 Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management into the 21st Century, Report of the Inter­ agency Floodplain Management Review Committee to the Administration Floodplain Man­ agement Task Force (Washington, D.C., June 1994), floods.org/PDF/Sharing_the_Challenge. pdf.

92 Personal communication with lany Larson, executive director of the Association of State Floodplain Managers, November, 2011 .

93 Louise K. Comfort, ed. Managing Disaster: Strategies and Policy Perspectives (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988).

94 Sylves and Waugh, Disaster Management, 1996.

95 GAO, Disaster Assistance, 2-3.

96 Platt, "Federalizing Disasters," 16-17.

97 Danials and Clark-Daniels, Transforming Government, 12.

98 Ibid., 8.

99 Platt. "Federalizing DisaJ;ters''; Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security.

100 See Ute J. Dymon and Rutherford H. Platt, •u.s. Federal Disaster Decl;lrations; A Geographical Analysis,' in Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Nahua/ Evr;,nrs. ed. Rutherford B. Platt (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1999), 47--66.

101 Stanley A. Cttangnon, "Factors Af!ectlng Temporal Fluctuations in Damaging Storrn Activity in the United States Based on Insurance Loss Data," Journal of Appfie(i Mereorology 6 (1999): 1-10; Changnon, Tile Great Flood of 199'3; Stl!nltty A. Changnon a.nd David Changnon, "Record-High Losses for Weather Disasters in the United States during the 1990s: How Excessive and Wr,y?• Natural Hazards 18 (1999): 287-300.

102 Roger Pielke and Christopher W. Landsea, "Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925-1995, • Weather and Forecasting 13 (January 1998): 621-631, aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/ USdmg.

Federal Emergency Management: 1979-2001 165

103 Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics, 108-128.

104 Wamsley et al., Coping with Catastrophe.

105 Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics, 61.

106 Jason McNamara, presentation to the students of the graduate course "Crisis and Emergency Management" at The George Washington University, December 5, 2011.