Final

ASP A Series in Public Administration and Public Policy

David H. Rosenbloom, Ph.D.

Editor-in-Chief

Mission: Throughout its history, ASP A has sought to be true to its founding principles of promoting scholarship and professionalism within the public service. The ASP A Book Series on Public Administration and Public Policy publishes books that increase national and international interest for public administration and which discuss practical or cutting edge topics in enga­ ging ways of interest to practitioners, policy makers, and those concerned with bringing scholarship to the practice of public administration.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Case Studies in Disaster Response and Emergency Management, Second Edition Nicolas A. Valcik and Paul E. Tracy

Researcher-Policymaker Partnerships Strategies for Launching and Sustaining Successful Collaborations Jenni W. Owen and Anita M. Larson

Advances in £-Governance Theory and Application of Technological Initiatives Anthony Trotta

The Fracking Debate Intergovernmental Politics of the Oil and Gas Renaissance, Second Edition Jonathan M. Fisk

City Planning for the Public Manager Nicolas A. Valcik, Teodoro J. Benavides, Todd A. Jordan, and Andrea D. Stigdon

Transforming Disaster Response Federalism and Leadership William Lester

Transforming Disaster Response Federalism and Leadership

William Lester with Robert Wright, Michael Kemp, Michael A. Brown, and Jacob J. Dickman

I� �?ia�!�!n���u� NEW YORK AND LONDON

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2 Visions of a Better Disaster Response System

The changes necessary to transform American disaster response involve fundamental shifts in relationships and operations. Reforms have been dis­ cussed for quite some time with many of the critiques and proposals pre­ dating both 9/11 and Katrina. A major reason that reform has been slow, even after a catalytic event like Katrina, is a lack of leadership. However, leadership should not be confused with a command and control, top-down approach where orders are dictated from on high. There is often a tendency to confuse authority with leadership. Many individuals are given authority through their job titles or due to their position in an organizational pyr­ amid. This "authority," though important, is not leadership. People can lead, and often do, who have little or no formal authority. An excellent example of leadership that was effective yet -mostly devoid of formal authority can be found in the Civil Rights Movement. Despite lacking formal authority, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and many others exercised leadership over a movement that impacted the nation and brought about momentous change. The leadership of Dr. King could not be ignored by those in authority.

Though transforming American disaster response differs in countless important ways from the Civil Rights Movement, a common thread can be found around the issue of leadership. The disaster response professional (both practitioner and theorist) often finds themselves lacking formal authority. Yet, the disaster response professional possesses authority that is based in experience, technical know-how, and the recognized need to improve the system. This type of authority, however, has currency and commands respect. Of course, many disaster response professionals have formal authority within their various organizations, but may lack authority over basic policy decisions and direction. Policymakers do listen to disaster response professionals. Leadership needs to come from those who have an understanding of what needs to be done in order to fashion a better system. In fact, the call for systemic change was issued by those in authority as a r�sult of interactions with disaster response professionals. There is no denying chat even today, the Katrina response remains the line of demarca­ tion for needed changes in the system. The post-Katrina reports were clear

A Better Disaster Response System 25

about this (White House, 2006; U.S. Senate, 2006; U.S. House, 2005; 2006); all called for basic and fundamental change as a result of input from disaster response professionals. Much progress has been made, but more needs to he accomplished as the recent responses to the hurricanes of 2017 demonstrate.

The reports mentioned above along with many others were issued by those in authority. The ability to command someone or some organization to perform a task or develop a plan is quite important and if we were dealing with a hierarchical, centralized, and all-encompassing organization, much of the transformation needed in disaster response could simply be commanded. But in reality, we are not dealing with any kind of monolithic disaster response organization or system. We actually are dealing with a dispersed, decentralized, and limited system when it comes to disaster response. Donald F. Kettl calls the hierarchical, pyramid-like command and control structure a "vending machine" (Kettl, 2009). The "vending machine" is very good at dispensing routine and predictable outputs, outcomes, or services. Basically, you put in the data and the predictable output occurs. For example, this type of authority and capability is great for distributing Social Security checks in a routine fashion. In fact, government would soon break down without the ability to perform these routine functions in a pre­ dictable manner. We absolutely need this capability to function effectively. However, difficulties arise when problems resist routine, are very complex, and defy prearranged boundaries of action. This accurately describes many of the challenges facing the U.S. and the world in the 21" century. Disasters by definition do not fir into routine and offer up large doses of ambiguity. A "vending machine" way of solving these problems exacerbates the situation by attempting to force events on the ground into a predetermined structure that often cannot contain it. Too often we have tried to solve problems by redesigning the "vending machine" when much of the problem can be the "vending machine" itself. Redesigning failed systems is not the same as transforming them. The need in disaster response is for transformation. Transformation will not occur without leadership. This leadership will need to be exercised at all levels of the system.

American disaster response functions in an environment that includes numerous actors with federal, state, and local governments central to the system with large numbers of NGOs contributing vital capabilities and resources to the response. Further, the governments all have sovereignty claims in the system _and these claims may conflict with one another. In other words, this is not a system that lends itself to command and control, top-down approaches based in authoritative hierarchical relationships. In fact, establishing just who possesses authority in the current system can be quite problematic. This means that authority alone cannot bring about the transformation so desperately needed in disaster response. This is where leadership is indispensable. Disaster management professionals can and should offer leadership. Their practical experience, training, and know-how need to significantly impact what a transformed system will look like.

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26 A Better Disaster Response System

Ultimately, formal authority and leadership must come together if any fundamental change is to take place.

Networks, Collaboration, and Leadership: Charting a Course

The changes to American disaster response up to this point have been pri­ marily peripheral with important progress being made but without systemic change. The current NRF and NIMS are in reality new and improved ver­ sions of previous plans. They are improved "vending machines." Is NRF better than earlier plans? The answer is a qualified "yes." Does NRF repre­ sent fundamental '(transformational) change? The answer is "no." So, this begs the question: How do we achieve transformation of the current system? First, leadership must be on board for change. Leadership at both the federal and state government levels must be committed to transformation of the system. The rhetoric coming from both national and state leadership is that they are committed to fundamental change. Arguably, the commitment is at least present in an embryonic form. What is largely missing is a way to take this nascent commitment to a new level. This is where leadership is absolutely essential.

As discussed earlier, too often leadership has been confused with an "overlord" type of leadership where orders emanate from on high (federal government) to underlings (state and local government) below. This creates too much confusion as to roles and authority while in the midst of a crisis. What eventually happens (to stay with Ketti's "vending machine" analogy) is that an order comes down to redesign the machine that did not work well during the crisis. Yet, it could be that much of the problem is the machine itself. Disasters do not fit neatly into predesigned machines. The response to a disaster typically consists of overlapping jurisdictions, multiple agencies and departments even within governments, numerous NGOs, and ad hoc groups all coming together to respond to the event. In reality, this is a network of responders.

Networks Respond to Disasters

First, there is a need to recognize that networks are responding to disasters and that these networks do not fit neatly into a top-down command-and­ control system. Networks are composed of web-like relationships that con­ nect organizations and even individuals. These relationships can be in support of basic and routine functions but can also support non-routine and unpre­ dictable tasks quite well due to the flexible nature of the relationships. Networks can be both formal and informal (Anklam, 2007). The formal portions can be set up through official channels and become quite inten­ tional. However, networks can also be informal. These can even be down to the relationships established between individuals across organizational boundaries. These informal relationships can be very important, especially

A Better Disaster Response System 27

in a disaster. As we will see later in rhe chapter, informal networks can result in very important accomplishments. Networks allow organizations to seek resources outside the organization. This can result in a much more efficient use of resources. Creativity and innovation can then flow more easily across organizational boundaries. Networks are an essential part of effective disaster response. Networks also tend toward information and resource flows that are reciprocal and collaborative. They do not fir well into a top-down hierarchical situation. Also, the ability to form and function within networks is an essential pare of organizational learning. An organi­ zation that is involved in networks is better able to form new networked relationships and do so more quickly.

Attempts to force networks into a preconceived command and control system will fail. The responding network will overwhelm rhe designed machine and spill outside of its borders and clog the designed inner mechanisms of the machine or portions of the network will shut down or break. The reaction of government when confronted with a problem is often to tinker with the machine rather than to look at the machine itself. This is not only true in disaster response, bur in many areas of 21st century life. Our problems in many instances have outgrown bounded, machine-like, and predictable ways of responding to them. Issues like taking care of the environment, health care, and many others confound solutions offered up by even the most powerful and authoritative hierarchical organizations. Solu­ tions to these wicked problems will require collaboration across many boundaries of sovereignty, authority, and comfort.

Wicked problems are real. These are problems that have a great deal of complexity paired with uncertainty. Traditional methods (vending machine) over rime are not sufficient to solve or deal with these problems. Further, a wicked problem is rife with political challenges and economic concerns (Head, 2008). We could discuss numerous problems and challenges that could be defined as wicked problems, but does disaster response qualify? Obviously, a disaster is complex. When a hurricane hits the situation created is complex and uncertain. No two hurricane strikes or disasters are alike. The standard of complexity and uncertainty is unquestionably met. Political and economic concerns are part of the mix as well. Leaders are faced with important decisions regarding how to best set up a pro­ gram for response in the midst of economic scarcity. Disasters also open policy windows that political actors must address. Disasters meet the definition of a wicked problem. Wicked problems cannot be met with simple solutions. We must meet rhe complexity and uncertainty in dis­ aster response with our best capabilities. This can be accomplished through collaborative networks.

Much of the language related to changing disaster response up to this point has focused on the need for cooperation. While cooperation is good, it is not enough. Simply having different governments cooperate with one another and having governments cooperate with NGOs leaves too much

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28 A Better Disaster Response System

ambiguity. Collaboration is necessary if the response to disaster is to be coordinated and effective.

Cooperation versus Collaboration

It is the consensus among most practitioners and scholars that a decen­ tralized approach better matches the history and needs of disaster response. In other words, a more decentralized approach will be most effective (Kettl, 2006). There are approximately 90,000 governments (Turner et al., 2017) in our federal system and numerous NGOs that are involved in disaster response. Centralized response just cannot control such a group nor can it supply the needed flexibility and on-the-ground decision-making necessary in a disaster environment. "Cooperation" and "collaboration" have become buzzwords for describing what needs to occur in disaster response to bring about needed changes. While cooperation is a good starting point, coop­ eration needs to be supplanted by collaboration, which connotes a firmer commitment to decentralization and to real working relationships. The two words while related are not necessarily the same thing. The distinctions are important.

Currently, NRF and NIMS provide for cooperation between governments and various disaster response organizations, but cooperation is a lower form of interaction on a continuum that has collaboration at the higher end of the continuum (Alter & Hage, 1993; Himmelman, 1996; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Mattessich et al., 2001). NRF is the result of reforms designed to improve the disaster response system. NRF puts more emphasis on coop­ eration and collaboration than did its predecessor. Basically, NRF stresses more interaction with the other disaster response actors than did NRP. While NRF is a step in the right direction, it provides insufficient systemic change. At its core, it remains anchored to a centralized command and control system. The changes from NRP to NRF are a recalibrating of the "vending machine."

As Sylves (2008) states in Disaster Policy & Politics,

each level of government has a diminishing proportion of responsi­ bilities, from the national to the state to the local government level. Under the inclusive-authority model the federal government plays a key coordinating role as the states and federal government cooperate and interact in certain critical areas ... The model also conveys the essential hierarchical nature of authority. In some respects, the new homeland security paradigm has made states and localities "mere minions" of the national government.

(p. 41)

Despite the language in NRF and NIMS describing partnership and coop­ eration, directives have a tendency to head down to state and local

A Better Disaster Response System 29

governments with meaningful changes seldom heading upward. Minions do not have authority and do not perform as full partners in a relationship. When state and local governments are treated this way, their incredible and growing capabilities are being squandered under a system that marginalizes their potential contributions. State and local governments have significantly increased their capability and capacity over the last few decades and are gaining more capability and capacity with each passing year. State and local government professionals are not as likely as their predecessors to accept federal government dominance. Imposition of a "federal government knows best" approach misses out on the considerable amounts of expertise and experience that is presently on the ground in state and local governments. State and local governments have never been in a better position to colla­ borate as full partners with the federal government in disaster response (Bowman & Kearney, 2017).

Collaboration can be defined as:

a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions.

(Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 23)

While not dealing directly with the term "cooperation," this definition cat­ ches a great deal that is important in harnessing collaboration for the transformational change necessary in disaster response. The idea that colla­ boration is an ongoing process is important. Disasters are by definition messy events that will require constant adjustments as events unfold. Because of the ever-present need for adjustment, there will never be a day when collaboration on disaster response is complete. The collaborative process will be ongoing. While new technical capabilities are put in place alongside new systems of response, the common denominator will be that each change will have been arrived at in a collaborative fashion. The network of responders will collaboratively design the system of response.

The interaction of autonomous actors through formal and informal structures as found in the definition of collaboration is vital. As Lester (2012) states:

Not only does collaboration require formal structure (like NIMS has the potential to fulfill), but it also has the more intangible offering of less formal relationships that can be vital in an emergency situation. Waugh and Streib (2006) state, "Part of the common wisdom of emer­ gency management is that communication and collaboration are facilitated by personal familiarity, not just institutional contact" (pp. 136-137). As is often stated, "A disaster is not a good time to be exchanging business

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30 A Better Disaster Response System

cards." Collaboration fosters real relationships and trust, which are vital currency in a disaster situation.

(p. 155)

Collaboration is not one entity telling another what to do. However, through the collaborative process, it can be true and in fact must be true that a system is put into place where issues of authority and command are discussed and decisions are made. NRF and NIMS tout just such a system, but it is a system that is dominated and often dictated by the federal gov­ ernment, which is antithetical to what NRF and NIMS claim to want. NRF and NIMS hold 'great potential as a collaborative system if the rhetoric can become reality. Unfortunately, NRF and NIMS are currently used as instruments of federal government domination of the system. This domina­ tion makes the use of words like "joint," "cooperation," and "collaboration" in NRF and NIMS to be of questionable meaning. Even with all of this, if led, NRF and NIMS hold promise as valuable instruments of collaboration (Lester, 2012).

Leading Change

The relationship between federal and state government can be conflictual, cooperative, or collaborative, depending upon the degree to which the two governments want to interact. However, when one side claims dominion over the issue as the federal government has done with disaster response, conflict is bound to arise as borders of jurisdiction and authority are crossed. And, with conflict comes confusion and confusion is dangerous to life and property in a disaster situation. The basic conflict between the federal government and state governments must be confronted and not swept under the rug, as is often the case in training exercises and in orga­ nizational documents. If the hard choices of authority and leadership are not confronted, the system cannot transform.

Pretending that basic and fundamental conflict over authority is not pre­ sent is actually dangerous because it foments confusion precisely when con­ fusion needs to be minimized. The conflictual relationship between federal and state government does not melt away during disasters because each side recognizes that ceding authority to the other side can set the precedence for the long-term relationship. For example, when New Orleans Mayor Ray

Naggin left for a few days and then returned, he stated of U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Thad Allen (the chief federal officer assigned to response and recovery), "Since I have been away a day or two, maybe he's the new crowned federal mayor of New Orleans" (Connolly, 2005). It would seem that even in the midst of a disaster, it matters who has authority. This fun­ damental truth must be recognized and addressed before disasters strike or it will manifest itself during the disaster. These relationships can be worked out ahead of time if placed within the proper system.

A Better Disaster Response System 31

There are two ways to overcome the basic conflictual nature of feder­ alism. The first is to impose the federal government's will on the states. The move to federalize disasters at the outset would create a more unified and centralized command, but at what price? This approach would certainly undermine valuable and insightful leadership at the state and local level. These state and local leaders would have better understanding of their par­ ticular needs and capabilities in a disaster. In addition, placing rhe federal government in charge at the outset of a disaster would have the tendency to freeze local responders in their tracks when it comes to decision-making. This type of "frozen" behavior was seen during the Hurricane Katrina response, as state and local organizations and responders did not know who possessed the authority to act. This translated into many federal, state, and local organizations and people feeling that they lacked the authority to respond on the ground. It is quite interesting that NGOs often responded very quickly to the Katrina disaster and at times were the only responders. For example, when Washington Parish in Louisiana was left isolated and not receiving governmental attention due to the need to focus more on New Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina, it was NGOs that essentially saved them without government direction. After repeated attempts by city officials to get help and after seven days of waiting, Washington Parish President Toye Taylor went on the radio to appeal for help. The immediate response came from NGOs. Food, water, ice, and sanitation arrived almost instantly from nongovernmental sources and without governmental coordination. A Southern Baptist disaster relief team came in and began serving 14,000 meals a day. Some of the residents said that church groups saved them (Helyar, 2005). Did the more decentralized approach allow for a more nimble response from NGOs? The importance of NGOs and how to best involve them in a collaborative process is discussed in a subsequent chapter.

The second way to overcome the conflictual nature of the federal rela­ tionship is to diffuse authority and leadership capabilities throughout the system. The process begins with collaborative relationships between the involved governments. Instead of the federal government dictating response to the state governments, there is a truly collaborative relationship that leads to jointly developed systems. Within jointly developed systems, those involved in the development would know better how to act and react since they had been intimately involved in the process. Basically, they know the plan and how to _act or react because they are the co-creators of the plan. This also makes independent action on the battlefield of a disaster much more likely since they have a deeper understanding of their place in the system and of their own capabilities and those of their partners. With deeper involvement and understanding, more leadership capability must come to the forefront as organizational members are freer to act. The current system can cause confused lines of authority. In such a situation, it is unlikely that responding organizations would be able to act quickly. The relationships necessary to build trust and to develop diffused leadership capability and the

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32 A Better Disaster Response System

confidence to use it would need to be developed beforehand. For this to happen, the disaster management system must be transformed.

The Example of the U.S. Military

There are several reasons why the U.S. military often performs well when given jobs to accomplish. First, they have a centralized command. As dis­ cussed earlier, a centralized command can be quite problematic in an inter­ governmental environment. Still, some form of command is necessary in order to fulfill a mission. The problem with American disaster response is not so much a lack of command as it is command absent a collaborative process to put a command system together. Unlike the U.S. military, those collaborating in disaster response are not locked into ranks of authority. It would be virtually impossible to lock the system into such an authority model without fundamentally changing basic relationships of sovereignty. The decentralized nature of the American disaster response system is not something that can be easily centralized. Attempts to centralize the system will only cause confusion as a square peg is forced into a round hole. The American governing system is just not designed this way. Still, the decen­ tralized nature of the system should not be decried. It is actually a strength of the system because disasters strike locally and require immediate local response. What needs to happen is that a system of command should be set­ up that relies on collaborative structures that are constructed and main­ tained beforehand. In this way, a collaborative command structure can be developed and a command structure must be developed if actions are to be coordinated. The only reasonable option given all of the sovereign actors and NGOs is to collaboratively arrive at a command solution. Forcing a solution from on high will not work well and fosters confusion, as has been demonstrated in numerous responses. The military sets up a workable command structure with many elements that can be emulated in a trans­ formed disaster response system.

Second, the military constantly trains. This is training that usually simu­ lates "real world" scenarios and these scenarios attempt to put the units under stress similar to real world combat. After all is said and done, there is no substitute for training and training takes time and costs money. Training that puts disaster management personnel in real world scenarios is essential to success. Much of this is being done, but as was seen during the Hurricane Pam exercises, too often potential problems are "glossed over" to make things appear to run smoothly and important leaders are not adequately involved in training. And make no mistake, these leaders do assert them­ selves during a significant disaster. Disaster management professionals need to push for training exercises that simulate real world scenarios and pro­ blems as much as possible with all relevant actors involved. To do this, even the design of the training exercises should be arrived at collaboratively. Much of the success of the U.S. military can be attributed to constant

A Better Disaster Response System 33

trammg. This commitment to training is necessary if American disaster management is to achieve success (Lester & Krejci, 2007).

Third, and perhaps most importantly, leadership is stressed at all levels of the military down to even the most basic organizational units. The basic mission is defined and each member has responsibility to fulfill the mission. In the absence of designated leadership, subordinate leadership will act in accordance with the mission. For example, if someone in the chain of com­ mand is killed or incapacitated or is unavailable, the next person in the chain of command takes over with everyone focusing on completion of the mission. There is a recognized chain of command, but the mission is para­ mount. Absent communication or even when missing a commander, the unit can move toward fulfillment of the mission even when faced with unforeseen obstacles and the chaos that occurs on the battlefield (Hughes, 1993). The old saying from von Moltke that "no plan survives contact with the enemy" (Lester & Krejci, 2007) is certainly applicable in a disaster situation. The kind of organizational capability that can adapt to rapidly changing condi­ tions and still be focused on mission completion is essential to disaster response (Lester & Krejci, 2007).

Every responding government and NGO should have mission execution as the primary goal. This cannot be accomplished without collaborative struc­ tures for planning and execution. The military offers an excellent example of having a structure and then having all within the strucrure focused on mis­ sion accomplishment. Often, the military is accused of being an overly bureaucratic and centralized command. Yet, the military stresses leadership at all levels of the organization. This diffusion of leadership is what grants others the authority to act in a given situation. Since they all have mission accomplishment as a primary goal, military units have freedom to accomplish the mission in ways that seem best to them while operating in the field. This is not carte blanche to do whatever they like, but lea­ ders can and do make battlefield decisions or else the mission could fail. By granting authority to act, the military decentralizes authority because it is the best way to achieve completion of the mission. Likewise, federal and state authorities must empower others to act toward completion of the overall mission. This commitment to mission in the face of disaster can be starkly seen in the example of the U.S. Coast Guard response to Hurricane Katrina.

The U.S. Coast Guard Learns Some Lessons

In the midst of the Katrina disaster, the response of the U.S. Coast Guard was exemplary. It was not that the women and men of the Coast Guard were more courageous or that they were superior in any way to ocher responders, but the Coast Guard had learned lessons from previous events that improved response during the Katrina disaster. These lessons are ingrained into their training and culture.

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34 A Better Disaster Response System

Examples of U.S. Coast Guard Responses

The Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989 caught responders to the disaster flat footed. Years without a disaster had created a false sense of security. Fur­ ther, responders lacked coordination with each other, lacked equipment, and lacked effective common training to cope with the situation. There had been larger spills, but this spill required a solution involving action across many different organizations from governments and NGOs. At best, action across organizations was chaotic during the spill. President George H.W. Bush eventually sent the Coast Guard's most senior official to take over the response as the previous Coast Guard commander had proven to be inef­ fective due to vacillation, second-guessing, and politics. After perusing the scene and taking stock of the situation, Coast Guard Rear Admiral Joel D. Sipes found the response to be almost non-existent. A subsequent federal investigation into the failed response found that contingency plans from the various organizations had not even referred to one another and that there was no workable command hierarchy (Kettl, 2009).

The Coast Guard learned from the failed Exxon Valdez response. With the realization that the next disaster could not be predicted, preparations were made to enhance general capability and flexibility. The Coast Guard trained based upon a commitment to mission fulfillment and leadership that could be applied generally and in all situations. Situational awareness became central to the Coast Guard's concerns. Reponses needed to be dic­ tated by the needs of the situation. (This topic will be revisited in more detail in a subsequent chapter.) The only way to �ffectively respond was to have leadership on the ground make decisions that fulfill a mission's goal. Going up and down a chain of command could actually compromise the success of the mission when time is critical.

When the towers of the World Trade Center collapsed on September 11, 2001, the Hudson and East rivers became an important evacuation route. People attempting to evacuate were boarding ships, ferries, and barges to escape. There was a distinct possibility of another disaster on either of the rivers. One of the major lessons that the Coast Guard had attempted to instill in its members was the need to be innovative on the ground as events unfold. The Coast Guard's Kenneth Concepcion would apply the lessons learned in a tangible way. Upon his arrival at Manhattan's Pier 11, he quickly organized police and transportation officials to sort through the crowds that had gathered. People were put into evacuation priority and destination zones. Concepcion also helped to coordinate the arrival of the vessels that had gathered to help by becoming a conduit to the Coast Guard command ship offshore. Ultimately, more than 70,000 people were evac­ uated successfully by 4:00 p.m. that afternoon. Kenneth Concepcion had been trained to address problems as they arose and had developed relation­ ships with many of the agencies and individuals responding to the event in his position as chief of the U.S. Flag Deepdraft Vessels and Plan Review. He

A Better Disaster Response System 35

was the epitome of what the Coast Guard had been encouraging from its officers. He quickly sized up the situation and used his training to solve a pressing problem without waiting for approval from superiors. Vacillation would have cost lives. Instead, Concepcion focused on completion of the mission with the resources available at the moment. Kenneth Concepcion was later awarded the 2002 Service to America Medal for his actions on that day (Kettl, 2009).

On a larger scale, Vice Admiral Thad Allen oversaw the Coast Guard's response to the situation on 9/11 as commander of the Coast Guard's Atlantic area. This response involved putting together a command structure that would tie together all of the different pieces to the puzzle. Allen ordered Coast Guard cutters to all of the major ports and set-up a cutter as a float­ ing command post with communications capability since communications in and around New York were severely compromised due to many of the tele­ phone switches being routed under the World Trade Center. The situation on the ground was very fluid and required an ability to change with varying circumstances. During the 24 hours after the terrorists struck on 9/11, Allen had coordinated the evacuation of 700,000 to 1,000,000 people out of Lower Manhattan (Kettl, 2009). The Coast Guard met the challenges of 9/11 by focusing on situational awareness and meeting challenges while they arose. It should be noted that Concepcion's ability to direct 70,000 people out of Lower Manhattan could not have been accomplished without Allen's understanding of situational awareness. Allen not only "talked the talk" when it came to granting authority to others, he "walked the walk." Situa­ tional awareness had been learned by the women and men of the Coast Guard and had been applied to the 9/11 response as the focus stayed on mission accomplishment. However, an even greater challenge lay ahead.

When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August 29, 2005, New Orleans, the surrounding area, and Mississippi took the brunt of a major hurricane. Damage was widespread but when the levees protecting New Orleans failed, a significant disaster quickly turned catastrophic. The magnitude of the devastation required a quick and coordinated response from all responders. Unfortunately, neither would be the case in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Plans that looked good on paper failed. However, in the midst of the devastation, the U.S. Coast Guard performed admirably. Even before Vice Admiral Allen had taken command of the situation, members of the Coast Guard were per.forming their mission according to their training. If a need arose, Coast Guard members had been trained to act. Coast Guard helicopters moved in to pluck people off of roofs. Individuals within the Coast Guard units had been given authority to act. At the same time, a C-130 aircraft pilot was given the task of overflying New Orleans to conduct an assessment of environmental damage. Upon arrival, the pilot noticed that the responding helicopters had no way to coordinate with officials on the ground. The pilot abandoned the first mission in favor of the more urgent need to coordinate communications. She effectively set-up the first airborne

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36 A Better Disaster Response System

communications system because she recognized the immediate need to act within the more important confines of the overall mission (Kettl, 2009). The need of the moment trumped her orders. The pilot obviously felt like she had the auchority to act. The Coast Guard rescued 33,500 of the 60,000 people stranded in New Orleans (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006). In contrast, FEMA had held up shipments of ice into the region because trucks carrying the ice lacked tasker numbers. Additionally, firefighters from other states were redirected to sexual harassment training while the disaster unfolded because they had to follow tight rules instead of focusing on mission accomplishment.

With the conditions in New Orleans deteriorating, President Bush ordered Coast Guard Vice Admiral Thad Allen to New Orleans to take command of the federal response. Applying lessons learned from previous Coast Guard responses, Allen developed a plan of action based in situa­ tional awareness. Basically, Allen used his position to bring together fed­ eral, state, and local officials so that the focus could be on accomplishing the mission, which was to immediately alleviate suffering and to provide for immediate needs and to plan for longer term solutions. All of these were things that should have taken place before the event, but Allen had to do the best that he could given the situation, which is precisely one of the important lessons of situational awareness. The military, and the Coast Guard in this instance, must deal with situations that require a great deal of flexibility while at the same time focusing on mission. Without flex­ ibility in the form of allowing those trained to- exercise authority, the overall mission can be jeopardized as paralysis sets in. Leadership must be exercised that allows others to act in fulfillment of the mission. Authority to act must be diffused.

When Vice Admiral Allen took over the federal response to Katrina, he was faced with what he described as "the equivalent of having a weapon of mass effect used on the city of New Orleans without criminality" (Eblin, 2014, p. 16). There is no doubt that the situation was catastrophic and required the system to work beyond the previous direct experience of many of those involved. Still, there was the Hurricane Pam exercise from a year earlier. There were plans drawn up that did not work. Yet, the previous exercise and the plans did not provide a foundation for success while the Coast Guard was successful. What was it about the military response that was effective and more particularly about the Coast Guard response that was effective? First and foremost, the Coast Guard had created a culture of leadership. This culture rested on seven principles of leadership (U.S. Coast Guard, 2014), which can be seen in the Coast Guard's response to Katrina:

1 Clear objectives. There were operational objectives that were well thought out and attainable given the useable resources. Of course, this could change as more resource was introduced, bur what needed to be done was understood.

A Better Disaster Response System 37

2 Effective presence. This involves deployment of available forces in the right amount and at the right time. This cannot be accomplished without a thorough understanding of capability.

3 Unity of effort. This involves optimizing the use of available resources beyond any one organization's capability. In essence, it is coordination. This requires centralized leadership. This centralized leadership aids in coordinating resources from diverse groups that can span intragovern­ mental and intergovernmental sources. It can also include NGOs. This is where collaborative efforts between the organizations before an event are absolutely necessary to insure unity of effort.

4 On-scene effort. This is an understanding by those in authority that leaders on the ground should make decisions about what needs to be done when faced with a problem that needs to be swiftly addressed. This is nor carte blanche to flout the mission, but it is recognition that the trained leaders know what to do and will make good decisions in fulfilling the mission.

5 Flexibility. This is a commitment to adaptation. There will be times when the environment will call for changes to be made to procedures and/or equipment to fulfill the mission. Flexibility can only be accomplished when authority is diffused.

6 Managed risk. An understanding of capabilities and limits is quite important. This is best understood through experience and training. The Coast Guard has trained about when and how to move assets and to deploy assets for maximum advantage.

7 Restraint. This is an understanding of the great power wielded by these military units. They are often dealing with civilians in a stressful envir­ onment. It is important to wield power and authority in an under­ standing fashion. This also promotes a spirit of cooperation and makes the task easier in the long term.

Can a culture of leadership and these associated principles be replicated? The answer is "yes," if the policies and procedures are approximated. Recall FEMA under James Lee Witt (1993-2001); the organization had been devel­ oping and indeed had been implementing much of what the Coast Guard had succeeded with in Hurricane Katrina. This kind of planning and orga­ nizational design is not the unique purview of the Coast Guard. Kettl (2009) has come up with seven strategies necessary to confront the many difficult problems of the 21s' century. These can and should be applied to any transformed disaster response system.

1 Focus on results. The most important thing is the accomplishment of the mission. As Kettl puts it, "Rocket science requires building rockets that fly" (Kettl, 2009, p. 210). The response cannot ignore operational reality. If everyone is concentrated on accomplishing the mission, then this will result in a focus on mission fulfillment. This does not happen

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38 A Better Disaster Response System

without collaboration. This also does not happen just because everyone is committed. We already have people committed to doing their best. The focus on mission fulfillment must be systemically supported with real authority.

2 Seek results through interrelated partnerships. The problems confronting us are simply too big for one government or organization to handle. A collaborative effort is necessary to marshal all available forces for effec­ tive response. Partnerships are by their very nature collaborative. Devel­ opment and maintenance of these important collaborative relationships needs to be central. Placing organizational partners into relationships must be designed and is intentionally accomplished.

3 Use information to fuel communication. Each entity involved in dis­ aster response has important information and also needs information. No one entity has it all. The free flow of information will aid immeasurably in the fostering of partnerships and communication. The organizations will strive to improve their communication struc­ tures so that necessary information flows. This inexorably leads to greater degrees of collaboration.

4 Rely on bureaucracies as holding companies for expertise. This is per­ haps one of Ketti's most interesting points. He calls for the use of existing bureaucracies as storehouses of vital resources. When organi­ zations are collaborating, they will be much more likely to realize the capabilities and weaknesses of not only themselves, but the other orga­ nizations as well. This will allow an assembling together of available resources that are housed in existing bureaucracies. This also provides the seeds for mutual accountability.

5 Create relationships of trust before the relationships are needed. Kettl deftly points out that training is not just about technical matters, bur that perhaps most importantly, it is about relational matters. It is about getting to know those with whom you will be interacting. The genuine disaster is not likely to be exactly what was planned for in the first place, so the relationships and the subsequent collaboration are of paramount importance in the ensuing chaos. The importance of the trust factor cannot be overemphasized. This was clearly understood by some of those who have been effective in responses like former FEMA Director James Lee Witt and Vice Admiral Thad Allen.

6 Steer resources. Finite resources must be used effectively. In order to do this, it is important to have collaboratively developed a leadership system. This allows for resources to be directed to the right place at the right time. The right place is more likely when the system deals with a collaborative flow of information. The right time is more likely when issues of authority and trust have been dealt with beforehand.

7 Lead by making the public interest drive complex partnerships. The relationships between the various actors in disaster response are indeed complex and often encompass issues of sovereignty and overlapping

A Better Disaster Response System 39

concerns. In order to have collaborative relationships, there needs to be something that encourages relationships when it is difficult.

All of this is seemingly difficult but doable. It will take a commitment from leadership. Ir might even result in command structures that look a lot like what we have today. The difference will be the collaborative formation of the system and the continued development and maintenance of colla­ borative relationships. The result would be a new system that maximizes resource and capability.

Transformational Leadership in Disaster Response: How to Bring About Change

"And let it be noted that there is no more delicate matter to take in hand, nor more dangerous to conduct, nor more doubtful in success, than to set up as leader in the introduction of changes" (Machiavelli, 1999, pp. 20-21). Though this quote from Machiavelli seems somewhat pessimistic about leading change, it does capture the difficulty of promoting and institutiona­ lizing change. Transformative leadership is a form of leadership that deals directly with effectuating fundamental change. Its application to the disaster response system could be useful. In essence, transformative leadership seeks to imbue an organization with a sense of vision and mission for the purpose of the organization. It also presses for the continued development of all organizational members into higher levels of ability. Organizational mem­ bers thus exercise more authority and ability. Organizational members thus exercise more authority and competence. Transformative leadership also calls upon organizational members to put the greater good ahead of other concerns (Bass, 1994). This puts a premium on the development of a maximum disaster response and away from maintaining one's "turf" in intergovernmental and interorganizational struggles.

During the Hurricane Katrina response, one of-the problems was the lack of action and initiative when minutes mattered. Many organizations and people with authority seemed confused while events unfolded around them. Some of those responding to the disaster saw problems developing but did not know the proper procedure for moving forward even with some of the resources in place. Had these organizations and individuals in government been given authority tc;, use resources more proactively, the response could have been much more effective. Better training and diffused leadership skills, both of which can be acquired, would have improved the response. Achievement of a more diffused system will require a system much different than the federal government-centered approach used thus far.

Transformational leadership begins with the recognition of the need for change. Recognition of the need for change has been a constant theme throughout governmental reports regarding disaster response since Katrina. While this recognition needs to be pervasive throughout the system, the

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40 A Better Disaster Response System

President and the fifty state governors are crucial. The chief executives per­ form central functions of leadership that only they can perform in the midst of disaster. Congress and the state legislatures are very important in setting the stage for transformation with statutory and budgeting authority, but day-to-day operations flow through the chief executives. Therefore, it is essential that chief executives, and primarily the President, be supportive of transformational change. The rhetoric found in the abovementioned reports leaves the impression that the need for transformation of the system is recognized. Putting a transformed system into practice will take the com­ mitment of elected officials. But, information does not only flow from the top down. The disaster response community can work to place a transfor­ mative culture into place that invites future elected officials to join. Ulti­ mately, all of the actors join a pre-existing and self-perpetuating system, even elected officials.

In order to put this system into place, NRF and NIMS will be crucial. Though cooperation is touted in NRF and NIMS, there is a breakdown when real authority and leadership is exercised in an actual disaster situa­ tion. Too often, chief executives are not realistically included in training exercises. Yet, if a real disaster occurs, these chief executives will insert themselves forcefully into the situation. Ir is quite important that these training exercises be inclusive of national, state, and local officials encom­ passing all levels of authority. Collaborative efforts that do not include the top leadership of the responding governments and their organizations will be nearly useless in a real situation. Leaders that are collaboratively involved will develop confidence in the organizational structures, plans, and persons responding to the crisis. The involvement of top leadership in the colla­ borative process is unquestionably essential. Familiarity with the processes and persons involved breeds confidence. This confidence leads to trust and to the willingness to share more authority.

Absent better training and more collaboration, when disasters occur, the automatic response rends toward hierarchy as those in authority favor familiar people and processes. The only way to overcome this is to ensconce familiarity through collaboration. If chief executives are not involved in collaborative processes, there will be no familiarity and the attempt at transformation will fail as the fallback position will be hierarchy and tighter command and control, which on the outside can seem to be effective, but in reality can squander valuable time, resources, and capability (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).

On the state side of the equation, governors must be involved in trans­ formation. On the federal side, commitment from the President is key. The dominance of the federal government must be tempered, as plans are devel­ oped jointly to prepare for disaster response. This does not mean that the federal government cannot be the facilitator of the discussion or even set much of the agenda, but it does mean that there will be a real partnership that exists at the level of collaboration. Thus far, the rhetoric of the federal

A Better Disaster Response System 41

government as seen in NRF and NIMS is supportive of just such an approach. So, it is not farfetched to assume that this can be the direction char the federal government decides to go in preparing for disasters. His­ torically, the federal government approach to partnership where information flows from the bottom up in tangible ways was demonstrated in the past. For example, James Lee Witt, the former director of FEMA during the Clinton years ran an agency that was more in tune with a relational approach than we see today. Granted, FEMA at that time was not part of the much larger Department of Homeland Security, but the leadership of Director Witt made a difference in the environment of the time. Leadership matters, but the key will be to transform the system so that there can be a lasting impact and a continual system of transformation as the system encounters its changing environment. This will need to exist beyond an individual leader. A changed system can occur as we see when leaders make a difference in their organizations. Federal and state leaders must be willing to set up and then participate (nor as the schoolmaster) in a collaborative system. If not, we will squander much of the massive capability possessed in state and local governments and in numerous NGOs.

Assuming that the federal and state governments can agree that transfor­ mation and collaboration are necessary, as they have all stated, the process can proceed. Second, transformation begins with the development of a shared vision and mission for the team (Bass, 1994). The federal government and state governments must see themselves as a team and not as competi­ tors. This will take more than just mentioning "cooperation" or "colla­ boration" in numerous reports and documents. The federal government, through the President and Congress, must recognize that the federal gov­ ernment will provide important resources largely to be directed in colla­ borative fashion with state governments in the event of a disaster. This already happens to a large degree. The difference will be that this will be collaborative instead of being cooperatively based. Fundamentally, colla­ boration is the stated policy of the federal government, but making colla­ boration a reality has been much more challenging. In truth, the relationship has been more a version of forced cooperation than collaboration. Diffusion of authority and leadership in such an environment will require a change in organizational practice and organizational culture in both the federal and state governments.

Diffusion of author_ity and leadership will require a change in organiza­ tional culture that must be consistently communicated by those in authority. This will take a great deal of sustained work, but it is necessary if the system is to develop more points from which leadership and authority can be exercised. This cannot be confined to governmental reports without

follow-up. It is vital that the leaders of each government grant others the authority to act. This requires a change of attitude toward empowering associates to act. Yet, once empowered, this does not mean that an organi­ zation or leader has carte blanche to act as they wish. The transformed

--·- --- - - - -- --- - - -- - -- - -- ---- ------------ --·-

42 A Better Disaster Response System

system has, after all, included more of the organizations and leaders in the genuine development of the system and infused them with the sense of mis­ sion. Their collaboratively developed sense of mission should place them in sync with the overarching goals of disaster response. Thus, they are very likely to make decisions that support the group's goals. Put differently, this means that qualified and professional leaders are found throughout the dis­ aster response system. These leaders should be trusted to make decisions in a crisis much as the U.S. Coast Guard has achieved success. It is about well­ trained and professional people functioning within their training, but also with an independent ability to function in potentially chaotic and cata­ strophic situations. There are times when organizations and groups are cut off from the larger response system in a disaster. During these times, con­ tinued operation is necessary. The ability to function independently but still moving toward the collaboratively defined goals is nothing short of golden in a crisis situation. In a later chapter, we will examine how the military performs similar functions.

Transformational leadership requires that leaders begin to see other organizational members as being competent and capable of action (Koehler & Pankowski, 1997). Once recognized, the authority to act is diffused and the entire system must be institutionalized. It is important that the govern­ ments and organizations involved understand that transforming the disaster response system is not something that is ever completed. There will not be a day when one looks back at what has been accomplished and says, "We have now transformed American disaster response:" Instead, what has hap­ pened is that a transformational process has been put into place that will be constantly evolving and adapting. The transformational process is put into place initially by leaders who see the need for changes to the current system. This is followed by the creation of a shared vision of mission based upon intergovernmental and interorganizational collaboration. The result of this collaboration is a system where all of the relevant actors have significant input into crafting the system and into defining roles. An important outcome of collaboration is that authority to act in disaster response is diffused as all of the relevant actors have a greater understanding of the ultimate mission and their place in achieving the mission. Confidence is gained both organi­ zationally and individually to act in a given situation. If the leadership believes the rhetoric of transformation and initiative, leaders will have changed behavior toward organizational subordinates, which will be demonstrated by more trust and authority being diffused throughout the organization. The modeling of transformed behavior by leaders will do a great deal to effectuate change. Transformational leadership requires that recognized leaders (those holding positions of authority) be models of collaboration. As seen in Figure 2.1, the process is ongoing.

In contrast to the transformational process discussed above, the current disaster response system is a top-down, command and control approach that dictates to the states how things will work. Much of this is based upon the

A Better Disaster Response System 43

Recognition of the need for change

Development of a shared vision

Figure 2.1 The Transformation Process

Diffusion of authority to act

Accountability and outcome

power of federal funding. While the approach below appears to be appeal­ ing, it lacks the collaboration necessary to maximize the strengths of a fed­ eral system (Waugh & Streib, 2006). The current system is hierarchical despite declarations to the contrary from the federal government. The fed­ eral government has set the rules for engagement and has in essence set the stage upon which other actors must act. Yes, there is some interaction between the actors, but only within the context of a set stage and previously defined roles. Consequential input from state and local governments varies at best. It sets up a situation where those further down in the hierarchy do not feel that they lack authority to act. Even with all of the reports calling for systemic change and the pronouncements in NRF supporting of such change, Figure 2.2 remains the basic set-up of the disaster response system.

Yet, NRF and NIMS hold great promise for facilitating the collaboration necessary co transform the American disaster response system. Unfortu­ nately, NIMS has often been used as a tool to insure federal government dominance. Much more will be said about the potential that NRF and NIMS hold for systemic transformation in the next chapter. At this point, "collaboration" has been mentioned quite often. Collaboration is key co any successful transformation, but many have misunderstood the meaning of collaboration. If collaboration is fundamental to transformation, its meaning muse be understood. This work falls to the next chapter.

Leadership Tasks: What Must a Leader Do?

Transforming American disaster response certainly must begin with the top leaders. However, as has been discussed, for the system to transform, there

fodeml

government sets the

standards with

NRF/NIMS

1 State and local

governments respond within

the dictated

NRF/NIMS

framework

Figure 2.2 The Current Top-down System

·---- - - . - �--- - - --- -.. ---- - - ---·- ···- --------- ------ --

44 A Better Disaster Response System

must be a diffusion of leadership capability throughout an organization. An edict from above to transform will be useless if not followed by leadership throughout the organization taking the lessons to heart and applying them. So far in this chapter, changes to disaster response have been looked at in macro fashion. In other words, what needs to happen to effectuate a system­ wide transformation has been presented on a large scale. To reiterate, there is much agreement between federal and state government and among dis­ aster response experts that change is necessary. That many acknowledged experts (practitioner and academic) are calling for change is beyond debate. The need for a commitment to change at the system-wide level cannot be underestimated and is absolutely essential. The need to transform is estab­ lished; it may ultimately be the will to transform that is lacking. This is the foundation upon which the infrastructure discussed in the next chapter must be built. Perhaps the hurricanes of 2017 have provided another opportunity to effectuate systemic change. However, once the commitment to transform the system has been embarked upon, and an argument can be made that there have been at least some steps in this direction, the possibly harder work will be transforming the disaster response system at the organizational level. In fact, using transformative leadership principles at a micro level will be essential to system-wide transformation.

Concluding Thoughts

There seems to be a consensus around the fact· that American disaster response needs to experience some systemic change. The debacle that was the Hurricane Katrina response uncovered a system that was confused and overly centralized and dominated by a command and control system that stressed federal government dominance. The system that was set-up post-9/ 11 was designed to centralize authority. Despite warnings from many dis­ aster management professionals and experts that a more decentralized and collaborative approach would be better, systems were set up that positioned the federal government at the hub of more disaster management activity than the nation had ever seen. This centralized approach left state and local governments often confused about their own authority and capability. Confusion is about the worst thing that can happen in a disaster situation. The overreliance on centralization continues to plague us in the responses to the hurricanes of 2017 explored lacer in the book.

This confusion can be alleviated in one of two ways. First, American disaster response can become even more centralized with resources and decisions as to how response will occur basically coming from Washington. This would streamline the process and make who was in charge of disaster response quite clear. Orders would come down the chain of command and requests would go up the chain of command. This is deceptively clean and simple. There is a straightforwardness to this set-up that is illusorily attractive and dangerous. As will be explored later there is nothing wrong

A Better Disaster Response System 45

with chains of command and centralization as long as they are collabora­ tively set up and maintained. This can make a world of difference.

The second way to alleviate the confusion that is currently present in a system that cannot seem to decide which direction to go is to put together a decentralized system that plays to the strengths of federalism by allowing state and local governments to have greater freedom to craft disaster responses that are unique to their particular situations. Also, the system could be collaborative and not just cooperative. Once engaged and part of the real give and take of a collaborative process, the federal and state gov­ ernments would arrive at unified solutions to the betterment of the system. The solutions would certainly involve a form of command and control that is always arrived at collaboratively.

Most in the field of disaster response favor an approach chat is collaborative. Unfortunately, the current state of American disaster response is neither one of the two solutions offered above. The current system is a top-down, command and control, federal government-dominated system that recognizes in its own post-Katrina reports that this is not how the system should work. So, the system attempts to "sort of collaborate." The language of potential collabora­ tion is present along with some potential vehicles for collaboration (NRF and NIMS). Basically, the federal government is telling the state and local govern­ ments what the process will be for collaboration and what the outcomes of collaboration should be, which is antithetical to collaboration! If the rhetoric of NRF and NIMS is lived up to, it can be the basis of a collaborative system. It can be done, but only if there is the will to transform.

Since all the primary players in disaster response are claiming to support transformation of the system, it is not our of the question that it can happen. This chapter has offered transformational leadership principles and practices as a way to make this happen. A better system can be developed if we work together in a collaborative fashion. This will require a change (transformation) in how things are done and leadership to get us there. The elements necessary to arrive at the desired changes have been submitted. This chapter represents in part the theory for how we can overcome the challenges of transforming the disaster response system. The next chapter will deal with how NRF and NIMS can be used as vehicles for transforma­ tive change alongside further exploration of how theory can help to set things up. Other chapters will apply transformative leadership and colla­ borative principles to disaster management issues so that the system can change. There can be no fundamental change without transformation and collaboration at the everyday level of operation. If we really do want to fashion a better system, there is a way to proceed.

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