Final

Homeland Security & Emergency Management 2015; 12(1): 1–21

Jerome Kahan* Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics? Abstract: Throughout its history, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been subjected to periods of criticism – notably, its response to Hur- ricane Katrina – sprinkled with peaks of praise – notably, its handling of Hurri- cane Sandy. As currently articulated, FEMA’s primary purpose is to better prepare states and local entities to respond to disasters by mitigating the consequences of those disasters and helping to start the recovery process. If first responders cannot adequately handle a situation, then federal operational assistance led by FEMA would come into play. FEMA is now on the proper path toward meeting realistic expectations of its role as the federal agency in charge of leading and coordinating efforts to ensure that the nation is well prepared to cope with natural disasters, accidents, and terrorist attacks. However, political forces have always buffeted FEMA. Within the politically charged atmosphere of the forthcoming presidential election, questions of whether FEMA should once again become independent are emerging, with hints of the more extreme suggestion that the agency be abolished. FEMA’s goal of continuing to effectively meet its disaster relief responsibilities can be reached only if political influences are not allowed to complicate and perhaps even halt its progress.

Keywords: DHS; disaster relief; FEMA; homeland security; politics versus substance.

DOI 10.1515/jhsem-2014-0048

1 Introduction In discussing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), one expert opined, “Perhaps no other agency in the Federal Government has been so alternately reviled, admired, and reviled anew in such a short period of time.”1

*Corresponding author: Jerome Kahan, Independent Researcher and Analyst, Alexandria, VA, USA, Tel.: +703 765 5467, e-mail: [email protected]

1 Erik Iverson, “The Uncertain Future of FEMA,” Report of Truman Project (Washington, DC, November 14, 2012), http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/the-uncertain-future-of-fema/.

2      Jerome Kahan

2 “Republicans Introduce Bill to Abolish FEMA,” Daily Currant, May 22, 2013, http://dailycur- rant.com/2013/05/22/republicans-introduce-bill-to-abolish-fema/.

Throughout FEMA’s history, the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations have been subjected to periods of criticism sprinkled with peaks of praise. Criticisms have been that FEMA expends too much effort in responding to adverse events that do not have national consequences, reacts too slowly to large-scale adverse events, and does not sufficiently prepare local and state authorities to respond to incidents that directly affect communities. FEMA’s unfortunate response to Hur- ricane Katrina in 2005 represented a low point in its life.

On the other hand, the agency’s admirable work 7 years later in connection with Hurricane Sandy showed marked improvements in performance as FEMA continues to develop its strategy and enhance its functioning. As currently articu- lated, the primary purpose of FEMA is to better prepare state and local entities to initially respond to disasters and mitigate consequences. Only if these first responders cannot adequately handle a situation would FEMA operational assis- tance come into play.

From another perspective, FEMA has been buffeted by political forces throughout its existence. With the next presidential election 2  years away, the question of whether FEMA should become independent has arisen again, as have politically driven pressures for FEMA to be abolished.2

Under the best of circumstances, FEMA will face stormy seas in the years ahead. To examine whether the agency will manage to sustain and improve its performance, or lose its momentum and crumble under growing political pres- sure, this article addresses four key issues:

– Is FEMA on the right path in shifting to a strategy of preparing state and local responders to deal directly with the crises they face?

– How well is FEMA organizing federal operational actions if an event is truly catastrophic and first responders are at risk of becoming overwhelmed?

– Would making FEMA an independent, cabinet-level agency again help it attain its new focus and missions?

– What political factors might adversely influence FEMA’s performance?

2 Discussion With the nation reeling from a series of devastating natural disasters and acci- dents as well as facing the threat of renewed terrorist acts and evolving dangers, it is no wonder that FEMA has again become front-page news. This article records

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      3

key historical events in which the agency figured prominently, highlighting its reprehensible behavior during Hurricane Katrina and its outstanding response to Hurricane Sandy. It then delineates FEMA’s new and evolving strategy, clarifies the agency’s missions, and demonstrates how bureaucratic and political forces might affect FEMA’s future.

2.1 Historical Overview

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 was legislated into existence in November 2002 as one of the major responses to the 9/11 terrorist strikes. It created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), investing it with the primary responsibility for pro- tecting the United States and its territories from and responding to terrorist attacks, man-made accidents, and natural disasters. As one of the agencies transferred to DHS, FEMA initially became part of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate.3 Its administrator did not have direct access to the secretary of DHS except when an incident of national significance arose that required presidential authorization in response to a request from a governor for federal aid.4 However, one of the changes made under the Second Stage Review (2SR) in 2005 was to estab- lish a flat organizational structure with FEMA becoming one of seven operational components and its administrator being given direct access to the DHS secretary.5

Even before the 2SR recommendations could be operationally realized, Hurri- cane Katrina arrived with power that created a truly catastrophic event. As readers are surely aware, FEMA was roundly criticized for its abominable performance in responding to this challenge.6 Experts in the emergency management field had for years expressed concern over the degradation of FEMA’s capabilities, antici- pating that the agency would likely not be able to handle a high-consequence disaster such as Katrina. They were right!

3 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), History Office, Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security: 2001–2008 (Washington, DC, 2009), https://www.hsdl. org/?view&did = 37027. 4 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. 100-707 (1988). 5 Harold C. Relyea and Henry B. Hogue, Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative, CRS Report RL33042 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS], Li- brary of Congress, August 19, 2005), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33042.pdf. Almost two dozen DHS components, offices, and directorates were also given direct access to the secretary. 6 See the U.S. House of Representatives’ comprehensive report, A Failure of Initiative: Final Re- port of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hur- ricane Katrina (Washington, DC, February 15, 2006), http://www.uscg.mil/history/katrina/docs/ USHouseOfRepKatrina2006MainR1eport.pdf.

4      Jerome Kahan

7 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-295 (2006), http://www. gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ295/pdf/PLAW-109publ295.pdf. 8 DHS, “Surge Capacity Force,” http://www.dhs.gov/topic/surge-capacity-force. 9 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Disaster Recovery Framework: Strengthening Disaster Recovery for the Nation (Washington, DC, September 2011b), http://www. fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf. 10 Steve Vogel, “Officials and Experts Praising FEMA for its Response to Hurricane Sandy,” Washington Post, November 1, 2012, http://tinyurl.com/bcsnune. 11 DHS, Office of the Inspector General, FEMA’s Initial Response in New York to Hurricane Sandy (Washington, DC, September 2013), http://www.recovery.gov/Sandy/Documents/FEMA%20 NY%20Initial%20Response%20to%20Sandy.pdf.

In an attempt to correct FEMA’s chronic problems, Congress enacted the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). Provisions included broadening the meaning of “major disaster” to include terrorist attacks and certain high-consequence diseases and accidents; requiring FEMA to develop operational disaster response plans with strict guidelines and pre-positioned equipment; and allowing the president to provide accelerated federal relief and recovery to states and localities even if official requests for such assistance are not made. Under this legislation, FEMA is able to report directly to the president, who can designate the administrator as a cabinet member when the nation faces catastrophic disasters.7

In the 5 years following PKEMRA, FEMA did indeed institute many improve- ments in its efficiency and effectiveness. One useful initiative was the establish- ment of a DHS Surge Capacity Force (SCF), which calls on DHS components other than FEMA to become ready to assist in response to consequential disasters, offering equipment as well as personnel.8 In addition, FEMA issued the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), which offers new guidelines for disaster recovery.9

As various initiatives were being implemented, FEMA was operationally involved in hundreds of largely localized disaster response events between 2006 and 2011. However, it was soon to face a truly catastrophic event: Hurricane Sandy in October 2012.

Without retracing the details of the Sandy experience, most readers are aware that FEMA was given relatively high marks from both public and private quarters for its performance in facing that hurricane.10 A comprehensive Inspector Gen- eral’s report on Hurricane Sandy concluded that FEMA prepared well for this dis- aster, overcame operational and staffing challenges, quickly resolved resource shortfalls, made efficient disaster-sourcing decisions, and coordinated its activi- ties effectively with state and local officials.11

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12 U.S. House, Five Years Later: An Assessment of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Re- form Act, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, Committee on Homeland Security, 112 Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC, Oc- tober 25, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73740/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg73740. pdf. 13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emer- gency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Washington, DC, November 21, 2008), http://www.gao. gov/assets/100/95880.pdf. 14 John Schultz and John Vogel, “FEMA Needs a New Approach to Disaster Relief,” U.S. News & World Report, October 15, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelli- gence/2012/10/15/fema-needs-a-new-approach-to-disaster-relief. 15 FEMA, The State of FEMA: Leaning Forward: Go Big, Go Early, Go Fast, Be Smart (Washing- ton, DC, 2012), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/state_of_fema/state_of_fema.pdf. In 2013, the agency further clarified its new approach in FEMA, FEMA and Emergency Management: Looking Back, Moving Forward and Changing Outcomes (March 25, 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/ blog/2013/03/25/fema-and-emergency-management-looking-back-moving-forward-and-chang- ing-outcomes.

In 2011, a congressional hearing examined the extent to which FEMA com- plied with the provisions of PKEMRA, and numerous pointed questions were directed to FEMA administrator Craig Fugate.12 Granted that FEMA had already initiated programs to correct faults identified in PKEMRA, the hearing neverthe- less concluded that “FEMA and DHS have work remaining to implement the pro- visions of the act.”13

Despite enhancing its performance, FEMA has faced a myriad of charges that it has a pattern of acting overly bureaucratic in the midst of a crisis, thus hamper- ing the actual effectiveness of its relief activities. There are many examples of this behavior, including an instance when FEMA arrived at the scene of a disaster and acted in a way that was not welcomed by the townspeople.14

2.2 Lean Forward Strategy

The lessons of Katrina and the initial implementation of PKEMRA, as well as the successful Sandy experience, prompted FEMA to reorient its fundamental approach and adopt a new strategy. In its first State of FEMA document, issued in 2012, the agency discusses its new strategy in some detail, pointing out major accomplishments in the past year as well as future plans. The catchy phrase Leaning Forward: Go Big, Go Early, Go Fast, Be Smart tries to capture the thrust of this approach.15

6      Jerome Kahan

A fundamental driver of the new strategy is to recognize that the major- ity of disasters in the United States need not require federal intervention with operational capabilities, assuming that localized responders are first on the scene with adequate capabilities. Yet in past years, “state and local govern- ments have become accustomed to FEMA coming along and picking up the bill for “routine” disasters.”16 This has led FEMA to become “a federal financ- ing spigot, as state and local communities come to rely on federal disaster funds rather than securing the resources to aid their citizens in the event of a disaster.”17

No community can prepare independently for all such catastrophic risks, suggesting that there needs to be a division of labor. With this in mind, FEMA’s new approach operationalizes the well-documented concept that “state and local response capabilities are key to minimizing the loss of life and property.” This requires that public and private stakeholders across the country “be weaned from dependency on FEMA so that they can reassert their traditional role in respond- ing to all but the most catastrophic disasters.”18

With FEMA providing pre-event assistance, jurisdictions and states, as appropriate, would lead responses to localized disasters. FEMA would provide operational federal help only in events of national concern, such as high- impact terrorist attacks, catastrophic natural and man-made disasters, and large-scale accidents that threaten to stretch or possibly overwhelm resources of a community, many communities working together, or even a state or mul- tiple states.19

Planning for scenarios of high consequence requires more than simply “scaling up” programs and assistance developed for small-scale contingencies, but also acquiring different capabilities that can deal with consequences of

16 Eric Holdeman, “Do We Really Need FEMA? Yes and…,” Emergency Management, October 31, 2012. http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/Do-we-really-need- fema_-yes-and-103112.html. 17 Paul Rosenzweig and Jessica Zuckerman, “Napolitano Stays On: Five Key Steps for DHS in the Next Administration,” Issue Brief 3834 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, January 17, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/5-key-steps-for-homeland-security-as- napolitano-stays-on-in-dhs. 18 Matt A. Mayer, James Jay Calafano, and Jessica Zuckerman, “Homeland Security 4.0: Over- coming Centralization, Complacency, and Politics,” Special Report #97 on Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, August 23, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/ reports/2011/08/homeland-security-4-0-overcoming-centralization-complacency-and-politics. 19 Emergency management assistance compacts are developed in advance of a crisis to allow states to share capabilities and resources in an emergency.

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      7

national significance.20 This concept is exemplified by shifting the community- level focus of FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams to act as a national resource to be employed in response to disasters that start to overwhelm local and state resources.

A contemporary example of how FEMA is seeking to deal more effectively with disaster mitigation and recovery is the March 2014 passage of the Home- owner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (Pub. L. 113-89), which updates and streamlines the previous law and ensures the viability of the National Flood Insurance Program.21 The act is designed to help families obtain and maintain affordable flood insurance, with the goal of lowering the risks and consequences of flooding across the nation.

FEMA has improved its program to ensure the availability of resources needed when a federal response to disasters is called for. These resources would be employed when a disaster strikes and would then be restored for use in sub- sequent disaster relief activities. Pre-positioning of equipment as well as person- nel at strategic locations across the nation has proven to be effective. FEMA has sought to ensure that this resource management is not only cost-effective but also “flexible and scalable in order to support any incident and be adaptable to changes.”22

Resources officially encompass such items as equipment as well as person- nel. Success in improving and institutionalizing FEMA’s efforts is strongly influ- enced by the quality of its personnel. When involved in disaster relief for a major event, FEMA employs experienced personnel in such activities as running the Joint Field Office, which coordinates disaster response and recovery activities. Other FEMA personnel typically include a large number of reservists deployed only during disasters, as well as local hires from the impact location and nearby.

20 Building up to address relatively rare but extremely dangerous incidents is very challeng- ing. “These events can manifest themselves not only as ‘black swans’ – which by nature are impossible to predict – but also as known hazards such as floods, hurricanes or earthquakes, which, owing to the low likelihood of occurrence or the high cost of mitigating action, remain un- or under-prepared for.” Bernice Lee and Felix Preston, with Gemma Green, Preparing for High-Impact, Low-Probability Events: Lessons from Eyjafjallajökull, “Executive Summary and Rec- ommendations” (London, England: Royal Institute of International Affairs, January 2012), vii, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environ- ment%20and%20Development/r0112_highimpact.pdf. 21 See the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) website at https://www.floodsmart.gov/ floodsmart/. 22 FEMA, “National Information Center Resource Management: Resource Management Overview,” https://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system/national-integra- tion-center-resource-management, last updated 7/24/14.

8      Jerome Kahan

There have been complaints about the competence of FEMA’s full-time per- sonnel and reservists, as well as about the management and capabilities of local hires. FEMA has strongly countered such accusations with statements acknowl- edging that there will always be a few less-than-competent workers, while defend- ing the overall competence and commitment of its personnel.23

Debates over the performance of disaster relief personnel are to be expected when individuals are involved in the complex and dangerous job of disaster response, a job where perfection cannot realistically be expected and assessment of the situation cannot be easily made – much like the “fog of war” concept on the battlefield.24 Given continuing improvements in recruiting, training, and proce- dures, FEMA has been seeking to hire, train, and maintain competent personnel at headquarters and the 10 field offices, not only for operations but also in the planning and policy areas.

In connection with the FEMA Strategic Plan, Fugate made a point of remind- ing workers of the importance of this document:

I expect all FEMA personnel to read our strategic plan and commit to its implementation. Whether directly engaged in these initiatives or in supporting efforts, everyone working for FEMA must understand the intent and philosophy behind the initiatives and use them as a guide in the performance of their duties.25

Finally, FEMA continues to do its part in fostering the Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management. This construct “recognizes that it takes all aspects of a community,” private as well as public, “to effectively prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against any disaster. … [And it] is now prevalent in the emergency management community.”26 Perhaps most importantly, collaboration with the private sector has steadily increased, involving activities such as placing private sector representatives for 90  days at

23 John Aloysius, “An Insider’s Critique of FEMA,” Daily Kos, April 9, 2013, http://www.dailykos. com/story/2013/04/09/1200363/-An-Insider-s-Critique-of-FEMA#. 24 “Fog of war” is often used to describe the complexity of military conflicts. It is often attributed to Prussian military analyst Carl von Clausewitz but is in fact a paraphrase of his contention that “three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” See The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (2006), http://www.encyclo- pedia.com/doc/1O214-fogofwar.html. 25 FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2011–2014, “Administrator’s Foreword” (Washing- ton, DC, February 2011), 1, https://www.fema.gov/txt/about/strategic_plan11.txt. 26 FEMA, State of FEMA, 10.

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      9

positions inside FEMA, such as in the National Response Coordination Center as well as in programs of online training and exercises.27

2.3 FEMA’s Grant Program

FEMA has also moved forward to align its grant programs with its new strategic approach. As the agency no longer plays a front-line operational role in the case of localized disasters, it can pay more attention to providing assistance in the form of grants to state and local jurisdictions seeking to build up their own capa- bilities. Emphasis is placed on grants to multiple communities, states, and larger regions across the nation.28 This, in turn, “will allow FEMA to focus its finite time and resources on building [its federal level] catastrophic response capabilities.”29

Furthermore, FEMA is designing grants to support more basic capabilities that all typical communities can use. To implement such a new policy, the agen- cy’s Grant Programs Directorate has consolidated, integrated, and centralized.30 As officially presented, “Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Secu- rity (EMHS) funds are most effective when they develop and sustain [stakeholder] capabilities that are cross-jurisdictional, readily deployable, and multipurpose.”31 Priority is placed on grants that contribute to building core capabilities at differ- ent stakeholder levels, as called for by the National Preparedness Goal (NPG).32

27 FEMA, “Inside FEMA: Working Side-by-Side with the Private Sector,” http://kyem.ky.gov/ teams/Documents/06%20Private%20Sector%20Representative%20Program.PDF. 28 Various mutual aid and assistance agreements enable jurisdiction and states to rapidly ob- tain help from each other in the event of disasters that challenge individual emergency assis- tance. See http://www.fema.gov/. 29 James Jay Carafano et al., The Second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Setting Priori- ties for the Next Four Years, “4. Refocusing FEMA on Truly Catastrophic Events,” Backgrounder #2766 on Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, February 12, 2013), http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/the-second-quadrennial-homeland-security-re- view-setting-priorities-for-the-next-four-years. 30 U.S. House, The Future of FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate, Hearing before the Subcom- mittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, Committee on Homeland Security, 111 Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC, June 29, 2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-111hhrg64698/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg64698.pdf. 31 DHS, FY 2013 National Preparedness Grant Program Vision Document (Washington, DC: Grants Program Directorate, February 2012), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/ fy2013_npgp_grant_program_overview.pdf. 32 DHS, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC, February 2011), http://www.fema.gov/ media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-9470/national_preparedness_goal_2011.pdf. This doc- ument establishes a set of core competencies for all stakeholders to adapt to their needs for improved preparedness.

10      Jerome Kahan

A number of issues need to be resolved if FEMA’s grant program is to support its newly oriented strategy in a cost-effective manner. For example, a senior member of the House subcommittee investigating early improvements in FEMA’s approach to grants expressed concern that the agency had not yet “developed tools to assess the achievement and effectiveness of its grant programs,” and that it still takes too much time “to conduct reviews and release funds under certain grant programs once those funds have been awarded.”33 Issues were also raised over the fact that block grants have traditionally been provided in a fixed amount, which can limit the effectiveness of FEMA’s assistance in the event of a catastrophic event. One of the more recent steps FEMA has taken to address these and other problems has been the development of a more streamlined grant approval method with greater flexibility, less administrative delays, and lower costs.34

Finally, FEMA has modernized its ongoing programs for stakeholder involvement through use of social media. As explained in its Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) newsletter, “The LLIS.gov team participates in a weekly Social Media in Emergency Management (SMEM) chat on twitter … to connect, collaborate, contribute ideas as well as exchange lessons learned and best practices about how social media plays a role in emergency manage- ment.”35 Without overstating the use of social media in contributing to home- land security, employment of these new and evolving tools by FEMA as well as by the nationwide emergency management community has the potential of increasing preparedness awareness and strengthening public support of pre- paredness programs.

2.4 FEMA’s Missions

All organizations have missions to guide their operations by turning strategy and goals into reality. FEMA is no exception, but its mission set has evolved over the years and is worth clarifying.

33 Representative Mike Rogers of Alabama, U.S. House, Future of FEMA’s Grant Programs Direc- torate, 7. 34 DHS, Vision Document; FEMA, Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA) of 2013, Pub. L. 113-2 (2013), http://www.fema.gov/sandy-recovery-improvement-act-2013, which authorizes several significant changes to the way FEMA may deliver federal disaster assistance to survivors. 35 FEMA, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov), August 2013, 2, https://www.llis.dhs. gov/sites/default/files/LLIS%20August%202013%20Newsletter_1.pdf.

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      11

2.4.1 Preparedness

FEMA’s mission of preparedness is centered on implementing Presidential Policy Directive PPD-8 and the associated NPG.36 This encompasses an ongoing effort to help make stakeholders at all levels more prepared to meet disaster challenges. For example, FEMA offers assistance in conducting risk-informed planning and cost-effective programming for communities and businesses, as well as outreach activities for interested citizens desiring to become more prepared. The agency also strives to foster the somewhat illusive “culture of preparedness” across the entire nation at all levels.

2.4.2 Response

Expressed as a mission, response seeks to conduct emergency operations to save lives and property through positioning emergency equipment, personnel, and supplies; evacuating survivors; providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need; and restoring critical public services. The full set of spe- cific response activities is too extensive to mention here, but examples include embedding Incident Management Assistance Teams; activating national US&R teams; positioning FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support capabilities; and improving federal responses to catastrophic disasters through establishment of an SCF, as noted earlier.37 New guidelines have been formulated to help ensure speedy and relevant assistance to communities and citizens in need of immediate disaster relief.

2.4.3 Recovery

The recovery mission is to support communities in rebuilding so that individu- als, civic institutions, businesses, and governmental organizations can return to functionality. A major accomplishment, as discussed above, was the release of the NDRF. In 2011, to facilitate recovery from major disasters, “FEMA obligated $5.6 billion in assistance, primarily for Individual Assistance (including housing,

36 For summary and analysis of these initiatives, see Jerome H. Kahan, “Preparedness Revis- ited: W(h)ither PPD-8,” Homeland Security Affairs 10, Article 2 (February 2014), http://www.hsaj. org/?article = 10.1.2. 37 For more examples, see the FEMA website at http://www.fema.gov/response-recovery.

12      Jerome Kahan

crisis counseling, legal services, disaster case management, and unemploy- ment assistance, among other services) and Public Assistance (including reim- bursement to clear debris and rebuild roads, schools, libraries, and other public facilities).”38

2.4.4 Mitigation

The mitigation mission is to reduce or eliminate long-term risks to people and property from hazards and their effects. As FEMA explains, “mitigation can reduce the nation’s overall cost and vulnerability to disasters” through measures to lower vulnerability for people and critical assets, thereby providing confidence that damage from one event can be contained to better enable rebuilding.”39 There are many ways to mitigate the consequences of potential disasters, includ- ing strengthening infrastructure, improving building codes, and offering incen- tives to the population and businesses to “build back strong.” Other measures include working with communities to establish early warning programs, evacu- ation plans, and exercises, while speeding up the process of grant applications.

2.4.5 Protection

FEMA’s protection mission is to defend our nation’s constitutional form of gov- ernment and ensure that a system is in place to warn our citizens of impending hazards. To be sure, early warning of disasters is essential, and no one can deny the importance of protecting our democratic way of life – although this is a goal beyond the reach of any one agency. The accepted use of protection in home- land security, however, is to thwart terrorist attacks and minimize the impact of hazards on people and infrastructure through such actions as building barriers, spreading out assets, lowering vulnerability of key assets and resources, and ensuring cyber protection.40

38 FEMA, “FY 2013 Budget in Brief,” 144, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/budget/fema_ fy2013_bib.pdf. 39 FEMA, State of FEMA, 8. 40 FEMA does not have prevention as an official mission. As noted in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, prevention seeks to avoid, prevent, or stop threatened or actual acts of terror- ism. However, in some instances, such as measures to reduce the chance of large fires starting or rising waters engulfing communities, it might be argued that FEMA is executing a disaster prevention mission rather than protection.

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      13

It is of interest to note that FEMA’s official website has been updated to reflect ways of turning the new strategy into actionable steps for communities, busi- nesses, and citizens to enhance their homeland security. Adapting a broad view of “actions that should be taken before, during and after an event that are unique to each hazard,” it offers over 100 links that provide specific information on what to do and how to do it, organized under three informational categories – Plan, Prepare, and Mitigate; Response and Recovery; and Disaster Survival Assistance.41

2.5 FEMA and Federalism

Whatever FEMA’s ability in formulating and carrying out its missions, the agency cannot escape being caught up in the political debate on the role of the federal government in disaster relief. FEMA should be given credit for its rejuvenated post- Katrina strategy. However, “lack of political consensus around the proper role of the Federal Government in disasters threatens to unravel this progress.”42 Indeed, “recent research suggests that the single greatest challenge to FEMA’s success has been neither natural disaster nor terrorist attack, but rather fundamental political disagreement about the proper role of the Federal Government in disasters.” 43

Last year Republicans in the Senate went so far as to introduce a bill to abolish FEMA, with Sen. Ron Paul arguing that, despite the recent spate of tragic tornado strikes in Oklahoma, “disaster relief shouldn’t be the federal government’s busi- ness. ‘FEMA is just one more example of Big Government run amok.’”44 However, political analysts interpret this legislative move as evidence that Republicans realistically recognize the need for a federal role – notably FEMA – in disaster response under certain circumstances.

Not surprisingly, the issue of federalism arose in connection with Hurricane Katrina, stimulating conservatives to argue more intensely for “decentraliza- tion of those functions for routine natural disasters to states and localities to ensure that FEMA is prepared to deal [only] with truly catastrophic events that hit America.”45 This view holds that FEMA itself should not preempt the legitimate

41 FEMA website, April 2013, http://www.fema.gov/. 42 Iverson, “Uncertain Future of FEMA.” 43 Ibid. 44 “Republicans Introduce Bill to Abolish FEMA.” 45 Matt Mayer, “Sandy’s a FEMA-Sized Event,” Heritage Foundation, October 30, 2012, http:// www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/10/sandy-s-a-fema-sized-storm; see also Emily Kaiser “Does America Still Need FEMA?” Daily Circuit, November 13, 2012, http://www.mprnews. org/story/2012/11/13/daily-circuit-is-fema-outdated-program.

14      Jerome Kahan

role of the states in gaining federal funding for localized emergencies. As put by homeland security experts, “Federalism has long been the guiding principle for allocating responsibilities to meet the needs of citizens after disasters.”46 Another expert notes, “Hurricane Sandy should serve as a reminder of this principle, not an opportunity to abandon it.”47 Supporting this perspective, the Wall Street Journal wrote that the response to Hurricane Sandy “has been a model of such a division of responsibility.”48

Less ideologically driven than abolishing FEMA is the not unreasonable proposal to return the agency to the independent status it had before DHS was formed, possibly making it a cabinet-level department. It is clear that removing FEMA from DHS at this point would cause considerable upheaval to both FEMA and DHS. It is fair to say that FEMA has by this time settled relatively comfort- ably into DHS, considering that over a decade has passed since the agency was transferred to the new department. What was true in 2006 is still relevant: pulling FEMA out of DHS would mean “a difficult transition period and a re-writing of doctrine and re-design of systems …, but natural hazards and terrorists are not going to wait for us to re-organize yet again.”49

Furthermore, FEMA benefits from being part of a large organization with substantial numbers of well-trained DHS personnel in the areas of emergency response and homeland security. Tapping this resource, FEMA formed the SCF, mentioned earlier, which played a role in the agency’s response to Sandy and will continue to be part of the FEMA’s toolkit. As expressed by Michael Chert- off, “the fact that FEMA and other components of DHS have had an opportunity during times of rest to plan, train and exercise together and to build capabilities that are capable of crossing jurisdictional lines has allowed us to have the kind

46 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, “Learning from Disaster: The Role of Federalism and the Importance of Grassroots Response,” Backgrounder #1923 on Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, March 21, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/re- search/reports/2006/03/learning-from-disaster-the-role-of-federalism-and-the-importance-of- grassroots-response. 47 Jessica Zuckerman, “Debate over FEMA Disaster Aid: Federal vs. State and Local,” Daily Signal, November 1, 2012, http://dailysignal.com/2012/11/01/wall-street-journal-a-big-storm-re- quires-federalism-not-opportunism/. 48 “Big Storm Opportunism,” Editorial, Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2012, http://online.wsj. com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203880704578088832078561060. 49 John R. Harrald, “National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong?” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Washington, DC, June 8, 2006), 3, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/national-emergency-management- where-does-fema-belong.

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      15

of capabilities to support an emergency that would not be the case if we were in different departments.”50

As a final point, even supporters of FEMA recognize that returning the agency to independent agency status is not a cure for all its problems. Recall that FEMA often performed poorly even when it was an independent agency. Many other factors, such as leadership, organization, resources, personnel, and morale, con- tribute to effectiveness.

2.6 Political Factors

FEMA has enhanced its performance under its new approach and should be able to remain on this productive path in the future. Standing in the way of sustaining and enhancing FEMA’s function, however, are the prevailing political and public policy issues that surround the agency. As put by a local-level emergency manager, “All disasters are political: Whether we want to believe it or not, political consid- erations are a significant factor in the preparation for, response to, recovery from and mitigation of disaster events.”51 Elected officials – from presidents, to gov- ernors, to mayors – invariably wonder how their response to disasters might be seen by voting constituents, especially when there are serious consequences for people’s lives and property. Indeed, studies have shown that “natural disasters occur in a political space” in which the preparedness and responsiveness of gov- ernments to safeguard communities and citizens vary to a wide extent.52

After the Katrina experience, a blistering piece in the New York Times made the following assessment:

Research on the spending patterns of the emergency management agency shows that, to a significant degree, the agency is influenced by political concerns that are distinct from the suffering and destruction wrought by natural disasters, under both Democratic and Repu- blican administrations. … [D]isaster requests are not evaluated based on standard quan- titative evidence; instead, declarations involve subjective judgment. … [For example], the

50 DHS, “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at Johns Hopkins Uni- versity,” December 3, 2008, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did = 233184; see also Peter Bergen, “Safe at Home,” New York Times, December 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/ opinion/14bergen.html. 51 Michael D. Selves, The Politics of Disaster (Principles for Local Emergency Managers and Elect- ed Officials), http://tinyurl.com/n5kfqa7. 52 Charles Cohen and Eric Werker, The Political Economy of “Natural”’ Disasters (Cambridge: Harvard Business School, June 2014), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/08-040. pdf.

16      Jerome Kahan

amount of disaster relief provided per incident increases with the number of representatives a state has on one of the FEMA oversight committees in the House of Representatives… independent of the disaster’s severity. … Long before Hurricane Katrina, it should have been apparent that FEMA needed to focus more on alleviating and preventing suffering from major catastrophes and less on delivering pork to voters at election time.53

FEMA’s laudable performance in dealing with Hurricane Sandy did much to depo- liticize discussions about its performance and future.54 Nevertheless, assuming that the dangers of terrorism do not abate and that significant natural disasters and accidents continue to plague the nation, the approaching presidential elec- tion will undoubtedly provide a new opportunity for criticizing FEMA and the administration as a whole for not properly doing its job of protecting the home- land security of the nation.

These attacks need to be countered by FEMA closely following its response and recovery criteria and not being swayed by the politics of the moment. Pundits, politicians, and the press need to turn any debate about FEMA into a discussion of performance rather than politics. Not to do so can endanger the security of the nation by diverting attention away from substantive issues to endless sets of congressional hearings and countless speeches from supporters of different presidential candidates, particularly those seeking reelection in 2016 and their opponents seeking to take their seats.

3 Conclusions Many articles dealing with how the federal government is handling its homeland security responsibilities, including some of those published by this author, end up with negative conclusions and a list of recommendations for improvement. That is not the case here!

FEMA today is much more of an effective, efficient, and responsive organiza- tion than at any time in its history. It has developed a forward-looking strategy that shapes the way it leads federal operational responses to high-consequence

53 Alan B. Krueger, “At FEMA, Disasters and Politics Go Hand in Hand,” New York Times, September 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/business/15scene.html?pagewanted = all&_r = 0. 54 Dina Rasor, “Forget the Election and the Politics: What Will Make FEMA Work for the Peo- ple?,” Truthout, November 1, 2012, http://truth-out.org/news/item/12444-forget-the-election- and-the-politics-what-will-make-fema-work-for-the-people. The author presents a proposal by a retired agency employee with years of experience on how “the FEMA bureaucracy can work despite … political winds as long as it has a resolute director.”

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      17

disasters and guides its plans for assisting and engaging stakeholders at all levels to enhance their preparedness. It sees its ultimate goal as covering more than response, with the responsibility “to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.”55

The actual test of FEMA’s new strategy in terms of strategic preparedness across the nation will be how well it executes its front-line responsibilities for on- the-ground implementation of PPD-8. This demanding program entails provid- ing all stakeholders with the ability to conduct risk-based planning that results in cost-effective deployment of relevant preparedness capabilities to meet perti- nent threats and also contributes to the ultimate goal of strengthening of national preparedness. The formation of the Program Analysis and Evaluation Division provides FEMA with more independent and credible analytic capabilities, which can not only support internal agency needs but also be used to assist and train stakeholders at the community level as well as state and local governments.56

Executing and assessing progress first at the local and state levels and then at the national level represents a complex analytic problem that is so demand- ing that success may not be definable, let alone realizable. Nevertheless, every positive step to improve how well the nation is ready to deal with expected and unanticipated dangers facing critical infrastructure, small and large businesses, communities across the country, and concerned citizens is worthwhile – if done in a relevant and cost-effective manner with a minimum of bureaucratic battles and barriers and with respect for our federalist system.

Expectations of FEMA’s mission success need to be realistic. No response to a major disaster will ever be perfect, and no mitigation efforts will able to totally eliminate the risk of lives lost and property destroyed. Significant reductions in consequences represent a realizable goal. Such outcomes can be reached, however, only if political influences are not allowed to complicate or even halt FEMA’s progress.

In sum, it is fair to say that FEMA is now on the proper path toward meeting realistic expectations of its role as the federal agency in charge of managing and leading efforts to ensure that the nation is well prepared to cope with naturally caused disasters, significant accidents, and potential terrorist actions.

55 “About FEMA,” http://www.fema.gov/about-fema, last updated April 30, 2012. 56 FEMA, Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E) Division, June 2012, https://www.fema.gov/ program-analysis-evaluation-pae-division.

18      Jerome Kahan

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www.dailykos.com/story/2013/04/09/1200363/-An-Insider-s-Critique-of-FEMA#. Bergen, Peter (2008) “Safe at Home.” New York Times, December 14. Available at: http://www.

nytimes.com/2008/12/14/opinion/14bergen.html. Carafano, James J. and Richard Weitz (2006) “Learning from Disaster: The Role of Federalism

and the Importance of Grassroots Response.” Backgrounder #1923 on Department of Homeland Security. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, March 21. Available at: http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/03/learning-from-disaster-the-role-of- federalism-and-the-importance-of-grassroots-response.

Carafano, James J., Jessica Zuckerman, Matt A. Mayer, Paul Rosenzweig, and Brian Slattery (2013) The Second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Setting Priorities for the Next Four Years. “4. Refocusing FEMA on Truly Catastrophic Events.” Backgrounder #2766 on Homeland Security. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, February 12. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/the-second-quadrennial-homeland- security-review-setting-priorities-for-the-next-four-years.

Cohen, Charles and Eric Werker (2014) The Political Economy of “Natural” Disasters. Cambridge: Harvard Business School, June 2014. Available at: http://www.hbs.edu/ faculty/Publication%20Files/08-040.pdf.

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Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      19

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2011b) National Disaster Recovery Framework: Strengthening Disaster Recovery for the Nation. Washington, DC, September 2011. Available at: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2012) The State of FEMA: Leaning Forward: Go Big, Go Early, Go Fast, Be Smart. Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.fema.gov/ pdf/about/state_of_fema/state_of_fema.pdf.

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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2013b) Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov). August 2013. Available at: https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ LLIS%20August%202013%20Newsletter_1.pdf.

Harrald, John R. (2006) “National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong?” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington, DC, June 8. Available at: http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/ national-emergency-management-where-does-fema-belong.

Holdeman, Eric (2012) “Do We Really Need FEMA? Yes and….” Emergency Management, October 31. Available at: http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/ Do-we-really-need-fema_-yes-and-103112.html.

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Mayer, Matt A., James Jay Calafano, and Jessica Zuckerman (2011) “Homeland Security 4.0: Overcoming Centralization, Complacency, and Politics.” Special Report #97 on Homeland Security. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, August 23. Available at: http://www. heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/homeland-security-4-0-overcoming-central- ization-complacency-and-politics.

Rasor, Dina (2012) “Forget the Election and the Politics: What Will Make FEMA Work for the People?” Truthout, November 1. Available at: http://truth-out.org/news/item/12444- forget-the-election-and-the-politics-what-will-make-fema-work-for-the-people.

20      Jerome Kahan

Relyea, Harold C. and Henry B. Hogue (2005) Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative. CRS Report RL33042. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. August 19. Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/ RL33042.pdf.

Rosenzweig, Paul and Jessica Zuckerman (2013) “Napolitano Stays On: Five Key Steps for DHS in the Next Administration,” Issue Brief 3834. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, January 17. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/5-key-steps- for-homeland-security-as-napolitano-stays-on-in-dhs.

Schultz, John and John Vogel (2012) “FEMA Needs a New Approach to Disaster Relief.” U.S. News & World Report, October 15. Available at: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/ economic-intelligence/2012/10/15/fema-needs-a-new-approach-to-disaster-relief.

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Zuckerman, Jessica (2012) “Debate over FEMA Disaster Aid: Federal vs. State and Local.” Daily Signal, November 1. Available at: http://dailysignal.com/2012/11/01/wall-street-journal- a-big-storm-requires-federalism-not-opportunism/.

Jerome Kahan is currently an independent writer and analyst. He was formerly a Distinguished Analyst at the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute in Arlington, VA. Mr. Kahan has been in the national security, arms control, and homeland security fields for over 40 years – including 20 years with the Department of State, where he held positions on the Policy Planning Staff and as Deputy Assistant Secretary with the Political-Military and Intelligence Bureaus and served as Counselor at the American Embassy in Turkey. He worked for many years with non-governmental research organizations, including the Brookings Institution, the Center for Naval Analyses, and Systems Planning and Analysis. He has written and/or contributed to a number of books, published articles in a variety of journals, taught at the Air Force Academy, and served as an Adjunct Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Future of FEMA – Preparedness or Politics?      21

Mr. Kahan holds a Masters Degree in Electrical Engineering from Columbia University, with Bachelor’s Degrees from Queens as well as Columbia College. He has also been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies.