Final

Emergency Management:

The American Experience

Third Edition

Edited by Claire B. Rubin

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80 DaVid Butler

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58

59

60

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62

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Gunn provides succinct analyses of thirty-four such disasters in Unnatural Disasters_ Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents.- Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 4.

Ibid., 11-12.

Ibid., 4.

E.L. Ouarantelli, "Disaster Plann1ng, Emergency Management, and Civil Protection: The 1--fistori­cal Development and Current Characteristics of Organized Efforts to Prevent and to Respond to Disasters," Disaster Research Center Preliminary Paper 227 (Newark. University of Delaware, 1995), 22_

Ibid_

ASFPM has grown steadily and, as of 2011, !lad 14,000 members and thirty-two state chapters. See Claire B Aubin. lrmak Renda• Tanafl, and WIiiiam Cumming, Disaster Time Line: Major Focus­ing EventsandTheir Outc-0mes (1979-2005) (Arlington, Va.: Claire B_ Rubin & Associates, 2006), dlsaster-timellne.com_

Chapter 4

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Keith Bea

1950-1978

· p

rior to World War II, reactive disaster relief and response generally con­ stituted the primary approach to emergencies and their consequences. Tbe decentralized and largely uncoordinated activities described in the preced­

ing chapters depended on voluntary private and local efforts to meet the immediate needs of disaster victims and communities. When the threats of that war ceased, academicians and policy makers recognized a wealth of interdisciplinary knowl­ edge that could provide the basis for establishing policies to manage both the consequences of disasters and the conditions that might ease their impacts. Part of this process involved sorting out the complex responsibilities of federal and nonfederal entities before and after catastrophes.

Over nearly three decades, from 1950 to 1978, the nature of emergency man­ agement changed significantly. During those years, policy makers and adminis­ trators addressed several parallel concerns, including civil defense readiness for enemy attacks, hazard reduction before and recove1y from natural disasters, the identification and typing of different threats, and the management of technologi­ cal and environmental disasters stemming from human-caused events. (A fourth concern, public health emergencies associated with diseases, remained outside the developing policy field of emergency management.) By the end of the 1970s, as federal policy makers and administrators assumed a dominant role that could not have been imagined in 1950, emergency management had become the primary responsibility of a single federal agency.

1950-1963: Civil Defense and Natural Disasters

Natural disasters have always challenged societies. While World War 11 dominated governmental efforts prior to 1945, floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes continued to take lives and destroy property. In 1950, with the advent of the Cold War, some of the tools used to manage "acts ofGod"-for example, sheltering in safe havens.

81

82 Keith Bea

providing essential goods, and evacuating civilians at risk-were found to be

applicable to events of a less celestial nature, such as air raids and enemy attacks.

Civil defense-the protection of civilian centers in case of enemy attack­

has an erratic history of popular and governmental support in the United States.

State and local civil defense organizations developed during World War II largely

to involve civilians in the war effort. Concerns regarding air attacks led federal

civil defense administrators and state officials to develop civil protection policies

and plans as well as a loose network of organizations. Nationwide, civil defense

involved as many as 800,000 individuals in the Ground Observer Corps, whose

participants watched the skies from 16,000 observation posts.1

S6me states subsequently enacted legislation to expand civil defense

responsibilities to include all disasters, regardless of their cause. For example,

the California Disaster Act added and amended provisions in 1943, 1945, 1950,

and 1951 that authorized the state Office of Civil Defense to undertake broad

preparedness functions. The statute, as amended, noted, "The state has long

recognized its responsibility to provide for preparedness against disasters that

may result from such calamities as flood, fire, earthquake, pestilence, war, sabo­

tage, and riot. "2

In the early 1950s, the threat of nuclear attack by the Soviet Union built upon

previous concerns that coastal states might be vulnerable to enemy strikes by air

or sea (from Germany on the East Coast or from Japan on the West Coast, includ­

ing Alaska). Congress developed national security policies that augmented federal

powers but did not specifically address concerns of the home front. To fill this gap,

many states adopted civil defense laws, developed mutual aid agreements, and

designated civil defense directors to develop plans for civilian protection and shel­

tering. However, many people argued that without assistance and guidance from

the federal government, they could not be expected to address the nuclear threats

associated with enemy attack. The outbreak of military action in Korea in June

1950, frustration with a dearth of federal activity, and other factors led President

Harry Truman and the 81st Congress to act. After extensive hearings, Congress

passed the Civil Defense Act of 1950 (CDA), which President Truman signed into

law on January 12, 1951 (P.L. 81-920).3

In keeping with the assumption that primary responsibility for civil defense

rests with individuals and communities supported and guided by plans developed

by local governments and tbeir states, the CDA continued past practices that recog­

nized stare sovereignty and historical limitations on federal intervention in domes­

tic security matters. Among the principal features of the CDA were the following:

The definition of civil defense, which included emergency repairs to or

restoration of "vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any

such attack" as well as preparation for an attack.

The Formative Years: 1950--1978 83

Establishment of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and a

Civil Defense Advisory Council composed of state, local, and citizen

representatives.

Authority for the FCDA administrator to prepare civil defense plans and

programs for the nation, coordinate federal activities with states and bor­

der countries, encourage states to develop interstate mutual aid compacts,

and provide grants to states for civil defense activities.

Authority for the president to proclaim, or Congress to establish by con­

current resolution, the existence of a "state of civil defense emergency" in

response to an attack or threatened attack upon the United States. During

such an emergency, the president could direct federal agencies to provide

personnel and other aid to the states, including work essential to save

lives and property. Such an emergency declaration would terminate when

the president by proclamation, or Congress by concurrent resolution,

noted the end of the emergency.

ln 1950, President Truman established the FCDA in the Office of Emergency

Management to create the means to "promote and facilitate" civil defense and

encourage mutual aid compacts "to meet emergencies or disasters from enemy

attacks which cannot be adequately met or controlled by the local forces."4

Civil Defense

As ultimately defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, civil defense is a function directly associated with wartime threats, not natural disasters. The Office of Civil Defense defines civil defense as "all activities and measures designed or undertaken (I) to minimize the effects upon the civilian population and Government caused, or which would be caused by an attack on the United States, (2) to deal with the imme­ diate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack, and (3) to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack."

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, "Abbreviations and Definitions ofTerrns Used In Civil Defense Training" (January 1971), as cited In Amanda Dory, Civil Security: Americans snd the Challenge of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 10.

The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950

In 1950 Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act (P.L. 81-875), the most

significant general federal disaster assistance policy adopted in the nation's

history to that date.5 Whereas concerns with nuclear attack and the escalation

of the war in Korea were obvious triggers for action on civil defense, no single

84 Keith Bea

catastrophic disaster served as the catalyst for this legislation. Debating the bil 1, members of Congress noted that the acceptance of the proposal reflecteda recognition that more than $3 million had been appropriated since 1948 for"emergency purposes" to help victims of floading along the Columbia and RedRivers. One congressman noted, "The primary purpose of the pending legisla­tion is to provide a general congressional policy in respect to federal disasterrelief." 6

Enactment of the Federal Disaster Relief Act is notable for three reasons.First, it established ongoing (permanent) authority for federal action. Victimsof floods, along with state and local governments. no longer bad to wait untilCongress met. debated. and acted upon a reported need. Rather, Congress autho­rized federal assistance for future events so thar just one person-not hundredsof lawmakers-could decide that a disaster warranted the distribution of funds.Second, the statute shifted responsibility from Capitol Hill to the White House.The president had authority for deciding when the federal government wouldprovide assistance and which agencies would be involved. (President Trumanassigned the task of implementing the new disaster relief policy to the Hous­ing and Home Finance Administration [HHFA], which had been establishedin 1947.) Third, the legislation committed the federal government to providespecific types of limited assistance following a disaster, as well as certain helpbefore a disaster occurred, including actions to foster the development of stateand local disaster plans. The 1950 Federal Disaster Relief Act maintained that the federal govern­ment was not responsible for disaster relief and that federal aid would be limitedto temporary, emergency repairs. It specified, for instance, that federal fundingcould be available for the emergency repair of state and local buildings but notfor their replacement. The legislation authorized the availability of federal aidin a "coordinated" fashion-both internally as well as with nonfederal enti­ties, such as the American Red Cross and state and local governments. Thepresident had discretion over federal funding for disaster relief, but the federalgovernment would maintain an arm's-length stance and defer to state authority,responding only to gubernatorial requests for assistance. The act continued apolicy that had been established in 1949, whereby a governor requesting federalaid had to certify that "reasonable" amounts of non federal resources had beendedicated to the response effort.

The record of debate on the bill indicates that the legislation was not politi­cally controversial. The bill "is directed to every state in the Union," declaredone legislator. "There is no danger of this bill not passing."7 A prescient memberof Congress might have added as well that any appropriations that the legislationauthorized were in no danger of congressional rejection. Disasters, then and now,have broad constituencies.

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 85

Administration of Civil Defense and Disaster

Relief Policies

In one year. throtigh enactment of the CDA and the Federal Disaster Relief Act, Congress and President Truman agreed to establish two parallel tracks for the management of emergencies. By 1953, however, the split between civil defense and disaster reliefhad closedadministratively (and temporarily), as the FCDA bore responsibility for administering policies for both functions.8 To fitlfi LI its primary mission of providing limited federal assistance for the repair ai1d replac.ement of public facilities damaged in disasters. the FCDA reached a fonnal understanding with the American Red Cross to set out joint responsibilities for disaster relief.

In addition to delegating responsibility to the FCDA for administering the poli­ cies prescribed by the two acts, President Truman assigned emergency functions to six federal agencies: the Departments of Defense. Commerce, A.,,oriculture. and Health, Education and Welfare, along with the General Services Administration and HHFA. The administrative complex at the federal level then grew when he estab­ lished the Office of Defense Mobilization to take on responsibility for "coordinating alt major federal emergency preparedness programs except civil defense."9

The administrative structure at the federal level continued to change in sub­ sequent years. In 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower opted "for coordinating and conducting the interrelated defense mobilization and civil defense functions'· by consolidating various relevant functions into the Office of Defense and Civil­ ian Mobilization. later renamed the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). 10 ln 1961, President John F. Kennedy separated civil defense from disaster relief functions through an executive order that transferred civil defense functions to the Department of Defense. which established the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) to administer those functions. The following year. he made the Office of Emergency-Planning (OEP). located in the executive office of the White House. responsible for emergency planning and preparedness, coordination offed­ eml emergency functions, dispersal of essential facilities in the event of enemy attack, and disaster relief.

Intergovernmental Relationships in Civil Defense

During World War JI the federal government had become increasingly involved in mobilization, resource allocation, and crisis planning activities. Enactment of the CDA in I 950 built on that trend by establishing federal authority over certain aspects of the task of protecting the civilian population from emergen­ cies. Implementation of the new authority, however. proceeded in haJJsteps. The federal government was criticized "for its seeming evasion of responsibility for civil defense;· wrote historia11 Hany B. Yosbpe: ·'Milwaukee Mayor Frank P. Zeidler voiced the belief of many mayors that 'it is the basic philosophy of the

86 Keith Bea

defenders of the nation to consider the people .in the cities as indefensible, and to write them off."'11 Other local and state officials, however, decried the involve­ ment of Washington in matters that historically were the responsibility of the states. Perhaps because of this struggle to strike a balance between federal and state authority, the CDA remained unchanged for eight years and civil defense remained on the back burner of policy implementation. That the threat of any enemy attacks, while widely discussed in the media and popular culture .. never materialized also contributed to the inertia.

By comparison, natural disasters continued to strike, and administrators and policy makers at all levels of government recognized that the manage­ ment of emergencies required action. Some states, such as California and New York, had a long hi.story of prepari.ng for and responding to disasters as pan of their civil defense mission, largely perhaps because of their open borders and potential vulnerability to enemy attacks by arr or sea. Other states conti11ued to rely primarily on vol untary and charitable organizations, religious institu­ tions, and private resolve without modifying their policies.11 All recogni2-ed the need for emergency man agement, but the underlying policy remained a matter to be resolved.

In I 958. seeking to resolve the federalism dilemma, Congress enacted Public Law 85-606. The statute vested responsibility for civil defense jointly in the fed­ eral government, the states, and local governments, with the federal government providing "necessary direction, coordination, and guidance." State plans funded through federal grants would be consistent with the "national plan." With the urg­ ing of the FCDA. most states gradually enacted civil defense legislation largely based on mode.ls developed by the federal agency or the changes enacted by other legislatures.

The federal government's reliance on the plan s of nonfederal entities pre­ sented an interesting paradox: a national policy built upon decentralized actions. The question remained whether a confederated approach would be the most effec­ tive way to carry out the federal government's policies. At the request of the FCDA, a research team associated with the Disaster Research Center located at Ohio State University (now at the University of Delaware) looked into the capabilities, authorities, and resources of nonfederal civil defense agencies and found wide variance among them. By the late 1960s, the researchers concluded, local civil defense organizations ·'had little or no legitimacy among other com­ munity emergency groups" and had little impact on missions associated with enemy attacks. 13 Of greater significance were the activities of those organizations concerned with preparation for natural disasters. While the parallel tracks of civil defense and disaster relief often did not intersect at the federal level, community organizations recognized the need for convergence in their approaches to these two types of risk.

The Formative Years: 195 0-1978 8'7

The Federal Government's R ole in Disaster Response

Within a year of enactment of the 19 50 Federal Disaster Relief Act, Congr

ess

began a decades-long process of restr ucturing and expanding its policies reg

arding

disaster assistance.14 Following floodin g in the Midwest, it amended the legisl

ation

to include authority for the president to provide temporary housing or eme

rgency

shelter for disaster victims. lt also in creased the mortgage insurance limit

for the

reconstruction of a home after a disast er. Other changes to the 1950 legislati

on that

were made during the next decade i ncluded authorization for the federal

govern­

ment to distribute surplus Korean Wa r equipment and supplies to disaster

areas,

and expansion of federal disaster r elief assistance to state governments a

nd U.S.

protectorates and territories.

In conjunction with President Trum an, Congress also broadened federa

l

involvement by addressing the disaste r relief needs of the private sector. Th

rough

the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163), the newly established Small

Business

Administration (SBA) was authorize d to provide loans to help vi ctims of

floods

and other disasters. Like the Fede ral Disaster Relief Act, the 1953 law

delegated

to the executive branch-in this case, the SBA administrator-respon

sibility for

determining whether assistance would be provided. The funding made loans

avail­

able not only for small businesses b ut also for individuals for "housing fo

r personal

occupancy by the borrower." 15

Disaster Declaration and Funding

Relatively few significant di saster s occurred in the years following t

he Federal

Disaster Relief Act, and no civil d efense emergencies were declared

. In 1952,

President Truman issued a report to Congress summarizing the funding

provided

under authority of the 1950 law. T he initial $31 million appropriated i

n 1952 more

than met the needs created by flo ods in Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, an

d Oklahoma

and by a blizzard in South Dakot a.

The federal government also provi ded assistance through other mean

s . After

a 1952 flood, for instance, it p rovided temporary housing assista

nce in Kansas

through the HHFA's statutory aut hority. lt spent more than $4 milli

on on the pur­

chase of 1,515 trailers, the develo pment of sites, and disposal of the

trailers when

they were no longer needed. ln his report to Congress, President

Truman wrote,

"Temporary stop-gap housing op erations will continue until the n

eed has been

met, and until the families so hou sed have found other means of mo

re permanent

housing."1 6 This report marks one of the first

incidences in which the presiden t

exercised the discretionary authori ty for disaster relief that Congress

had granted

in the 1950 legislation.

From \ 953 to 1964, the federal gov ernment issued 174 disaster declara

tions,

resulting in total expenditures of alm ost $275 million (Table 4-1 ). By co

mparison,

lN

88 Keith Bea

Number of

Presidential Types of Disasters Expenditures, Expenditures, in Disaster Resulting in a Presidential in Current Constant (2005)

Year Declarations Declaration Dollars Dollars

1953 13 Tornadoes, floods, a forest $2,634,677 $15,945,210 fire, and salmon industry failure in Alaska

1954 16 Tornado, floods, hurricanes, $9,243,419 $55,305,289 an earthquake, and salmon industry failure in Alaska

1955 17 Tornadoes, floods, $16,778,942 $99,529,224 hurricanes, a volcanic

-

eruption, and salmon industry failure in Alaska

1956 15 Tornadoes, floods, $4,528,272 $26,172,038 hurricanes, a wind storm, and a forest fire

1957 15 Tornadoes, floods, a $13,272,808 $73,927,466 hurricane, and a tidal wave

1958 6 Tornadoes, floods, and a $4,900,749 $26,494,749 hurricane

1959 6 Floods and Hurricane Dot $5,071,637 $26,995,774

1960 11 Tornadoes, floods, $8,939,326 $47,016,598 earthquake and volcanic eruption, tidal waves, fires, and Hurricane Donna

1961 11 Tornadoes, floods, fire, and $12,735,062 $66,036,976 Hurricane Carla

1962 21 Tornadoes, floods, storms, $50,851,736 $260,750,893 two chlorine barge accidents, high tides, and Typhoon Karen

1963 19 Floods, storms, drought and $11,438,070 $57,924,568 impending freeze, Typhoon Olive, and Hurricane Cindy

1964 24 Floods, droughts, $134,387,260 $672,545,214 earthquake, seismic sea wave, Typhoon Louise, and Hurricanes Cleo, Dora, and Hilda

Total 174 $274,781,958 $1,428,643,999

Table 4-1. Annual Major Disaster Statistics and Incidents, 1953-1964.

Source: Nominal expenditure data from U.S. House of Representatives (1974), 23, femagov/news/disasters.fema. A more recent source of information about presidential declaration details is at peripresdecusa.org/mainframe.htm

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 89

Congress had appropriated more than $450 million for civil defense planning

from fiscal y ear (FY) 1951 through 1958.17 Of significant note. neither disaster declarations nor separate congressional appropriations were issued for the 1957

Asian flu pandemic, an emergency outside the realm of other natural disasters.

The tunnel vision that went into the classification of emergencies (human caused, acts of God, diseases) resulted in specialization and, unfortunately, inaction when

certain catastrophes fell through the bureaucratic cracks. The pandemic, which was one of the deadliest catas trophes of its time, causing almost 70, 000 deaths in the United States, was one of thos e oversights. Still, even without federal ini­ tiatives, aid was forthcoming from Washington. Throughout the nation, federal and nonfederal health officials provided limited supplies of vaccines available to

prevent the spread of the disease. 18

Consideration of the third appropriation for the emergency fund (P.L. 82-326) in 1952 gave rise to debate about whether Congress could dedicate funds for spe­

cific disasters or whether this authority should remain with the executive office.

ln the end, Congress rej ected an attempt to target the appropriated funds, setting

a precedent that has lasted throughout the decades. Today, if Congress wants to

specify catastrophe assistance to a particular area or need, funds are appropriated

to specific departments or agencies, such as the Departments of Agriculture, Trans­

portation, or Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in addition to the entity

responsible for administering the Disaster ReliefFund.19

The Alaska Earthquake of 1964

For years, federal lawmakers and administrators could not reach agreement on the scope of the civil defense program. By the mid-1960s, federal civil defense was

perceived primarily as a warning and shelter program, wi th the costs of sheltering proving too expensive for Congress. Advocates of a strong civil defense program claimed that it was grossly un derfunded and contended that it would be of little help in the event of an attack. Protests against nuclear proliferation and the Viet­ nam War combined to keep civil defense and preparedness on the back burner. ln

a 1969 directive, Presiden t Richard Nixon called for federally funded construction to include shelters. Other than that modification, civil defense policy remained

unchanged and the program continued to be funde d at low levels.

On March 27, 196 4, an event occurred that changed federal disaster relief pol­ icy radically. When seismographs in the relatively new state of Alaska registered

an earthquake measuring a record 8.4 on the Richter scale, all sectors of the state

were seriously disrupted. Within minutes, thousands of people lost their homes and

l 14 people lost their lives. According to a field report, "Seismic sea waves swept the Pacific Ocean from the Gulf of Alaska to Antarctica; they caused extensive

damage in British Columbia and California and took 12 lives in Crescent City,

California, and 4 in Oregon .... The entire earth vibrated like a tuning fork.""0

90 Keith Bea

A few days after the quake, President Lyndon Johnson established the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska. He charged the commission with developing "coordinated plans for federal programs which contribute to reconstruction and to economic and resources development in Alaska and ... appropriate action by the federal government to carry out such plans."21

Two features of the Alaska Commission bear noting. First, although it did not include state or l ocal representatives, it was charged with cooperating with the state to develop reconstruction plans and make recommendations for programs, proj­ ects, and legislation. Second, President Johnson took the unusual step of appoint­ ing a �enator, Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico, as the commission chair. This link between the legislative and executive branches facilitated action on legislation (notably, appropriations) and ensured that Congress was actively involved in the reconstruction and planning process.

The Johnson administration's prompt action led to significant results. Con­ gress appropriated $23.5 million to help the new state rebuild essential facilities and, in precedent-setting fashion, to replace lost tax revenue (P.L. 88-451).22 The 1964 statute also changed the cost share normally applied to the reconstruction

Downtown Anchorage after the 1964 earthquake. Before the earthquake the sidewalk on the left was at street level on the right. The Alaska earthquake resulted in an unprecedented federal government response. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey.

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 91

of federal-aid highways by authorizing the forgiveness of loans. In short, a host of federal agencies-the SBA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Aviation Agency, Departm ent of the Interior, and the Federal Housing Administration, among others-were engaged in Alaska's recovery. This approach-using existing funding streams and programs to expedite the delivery of assistance--{;ontinues to be used today. The urgent needs that must be met in a disaster do not allow for lengthy debate or consideration of administrative options.

Six months later, President Johnson furthered the work of the Alaska Commis­ sion through the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska. Like the commission, the field committee was composed of federal officials in Alaska. Congress charged the committee with cooperating with state representa­ tives, overseeing Alaska's, and ensuring that the economic and resource develop­ ment plans reflected federal, state, and local policies. President Johnson and the administration officials strove to respect the sovereignty of the new state and the prerogatives of its elected representatives.

Hurricane Betsy, 1965

Less than a year after the earthquake in Alaska, disaster struck across the conti­ nent. After bedeviling forecasters with unpredictable travel plans, Hurricane Betsy crossed the Florida Keys and southern Florida, entered the Gulf of M exico, and sped toward New Orleans. The limited technology of the 1960s made tracking the storm challenging. As reported by one federal official, "Because of the storm's erratic behavior, prepositioning of regional staffers in the fi eld became a guessing game."23 The peripatetic path of the hurricane as graphed in 1965 (precomputer graphics) is presented in Figure 4-1.

Hurricane Betsy had long-lasting and record-breaking impacts. It resulted in seventy-six deaths and destroyed much property in the southeastern United States. Causing more than $1 billion in damage (roughly $8 billion in 2005 dollars), it established a new benchmark for catastrophic destruction.

However, familiarity with the consequences of the Alaska earthquake and an awareness of the reach of the hurricane had led to greater disaster wisdom. Members of Congress and others recognized that the policy framework for disaster relief that had been buHt in 1950 could be expanded to accommodate more com­ plex emergencies and situations. Thus, more than 138,000 Red Cross and federal government representatives were assigned to provide relief to hurricane-stricken areas.24 Federal agencies, including the OCD and the OEP, worked with state and local civil defense agencies, the media, and nonprofit organizations to meet the needs of disaster victims. But perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the response to Hurricane Betsy was the direct invo lvement of President Johnson, who took it upon himself to monitor the acti ons of federal agencies and mandated that federal

J;A,

92 Keith Bea

,/ 4J,V'\ //

Figure 4-1. The track of Hurricane Betsy, which made landfall in South Florida on September 8 and in Louisiana on September 9, 1965. Courtesy of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Environmental Science Services Administration, Weather Bureau, "Hurricane Betsy, Preliminary Report w�h Advisories and Bulletins Issued," September 15, 1965.

personnel (including the director of OEP) remain in the stricken area to oversee

relief operations. Thus, President Johnson modeled a new role for the president as

an active and engaged emergency manager.

To help address the needs of victims, Congress passed the Southeast Hur­

ricane Disaster Relief Act (P.L. 89-339). This legislation realized the need for

assistance beyond that authorized in the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 and

provided longer-term assistance than previous legislation had offered, in part by

authorizing the sale of temporary housing directly to victims. Yet another impor­

tant component of the relief act required HUD to examine the need for a national

flood insurance policy. The 1964 law also expanded upon loan forgiveness provi­

sions that had been enacted for Alaska by allowing business or property owners to

cancel up to $1,800 of loans provided to restore or replace damaged or destroyed

property. The loan forgiveness measure was continued in additional disaster relief

legislation over the next five-year period.25

Policy Revisions

Again, the lessons from the Alaska earthquake, Hurricane Betsy, and other disas­ ters in the mid-1960s were not lost on policy makers in Washington. Judging from the number of presidentially declared disasters, the risks from major emergencies appeared to be mounting. The basic assistance provided through the authority of the 1950 statute appeared sufficient for "normal" disasters. However, blockbuster

catastrophes like the Alaska

earthquake and Hurricane

Betsy, especially in light of such trends as the develop-

ment of larger and more

expensive urban centers, the

growing development of

flood-prone areas (notably the

shores), and enhanced expec­

tations for government action,

contributed to public calls and

support for an increased fed­

eral role-an important indi­

cator that disaster relief was

a win-win option for policy

makers. Photo opportunities,

federal largess to victims

(sometimes regardless of

need), and an awareness that

suffering could be alleviated

brought significant changes

to federal law.

As a result, Congress

renewed its interest in the

federal government's role in

disaster relief. In two impor-

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 93

New Orleans following Hurricane Betsy. The 1965 hurricane prompted Congress to pass legislation addressing the long­ term needs of victims and calling for HUD to examine the need for a national flood insurance policy. Photo courtesy of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/A. Vetter, American Red Cross.

tant measures, lawmakers established new categories of assistance to individual

victims of disasters and to state and local governments. Through the Disaster

Relief Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-796), Congress made the most significant c hanges in

policy in sixteen years. The statute authorized federal agencies to provide loans at

below-market rates for as long as forty years, extended aid to unincorporated com­

munities in rural areas, and created a new category of eligibility for public colleges

and universities damaged by disasters. In addition, the 89th Congress took steps

to improve administrative issues associated with federal disaster relief by linking

civil defense warning systems with threats from natural disasters (a forerunner

of the "dual-use" or "all-hazards" concepts developed later) and authorizing the

president to coordinate federal assistance efforts.

The second major piece of legislation that passed at this time was the National

Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA; P.L. 90-448). While federal flood insurance

had been discussed several times in the past, studies had been completed-including

one undertaken by HUD in l 966--that measured the viability of a federal insurance

94 Keith Bea

program based on a federal subsidy in high -risk flood zones . The NFIA authorized

the federal government to provide flood insurance to property owners on the condi­ tion that local governments adopt regulations specifying that the insurance would be provided only if the applicant communities adopted land use regulations . With

the NFIA, the federal government's role expanded through a back door into land use

regulation and policy, an area nonnally vested in local governm ent. The 1968 legislation led to the creation of the National Flood Insurance Pro­

gram (NFli'), a program based on the premise that private property owners would pay for future disaster losses (at least partially) through premiums. Significant changes to the NFlA were subsequently adopted, including a 1973 requirement that federally backed mortgages include flood insurance coverage (Flood Dis.aster Protection Act of 1973, P.L. 93-234).

In 1969, Congress broadened the Disaster Relief Act of 1966 with Public Law 91-79. This legislation

Allowed disaster victims to use unoccupied federal housing and units held by local public housing authorities

Authorized the president to \ease manufactured homes and to make food coupon allotments available

Provided unemployment assistance related to a disaster for up to one year

Provided funding to states and localities for the removal of debris from

private property when removal was in the public interest

Expanded eligibility for public assistance, including the repair of state and county roads and the suppression of fires that could turn into major disas­

ter conflagrations

Provided authorizing grants to states for the improvement of comprehensive

disaster relief plans and the establishment of agencies for that purpose . 26

The far-reaching changes authorized by the 1969 legislation were scheduled

to expire in 1970, leaving the 91 st Congress to scramble for a more permanent

solution. For the first time , Congress considered replacing the foundation laid by the 1950 Federal Disaster Relief Act with a more complex system. President Nixon

summarized his concerns in a special message to Congress:

The last Presidential special message on the subject of disaster assistance was written 18 years ago. Since that time, this program has grown in a piece­ meal and often haphazard manner, involving over 50 separate congressional enactments and executive actions. This slow development process has cre­ ated a complex program. one which has a number of gaps and overlaps and needs increased coordination. It is time for new legislation and executive action to make our federal disaster assistance program more effective and efficient. 27

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 95

Renewed concerns led to the first om nibus legislation on disaster relief. T

he

Disaster Relief Act of 1970 (P.L . 91-606), which superseded the \ 9

50 statute,

established a "superstructure'' of po licy and administrative guidance, wi

th a grow­

ing emphasis on aid to individuals . It continued some of the policies that ha

d been

in place since \ 950, including

Maintenance of lead coordination b y a federal officer to ensure the coo

p­

eration of federal agencies

Delegation to the president of auth ority for disaster determination

Provision of federal equipment, sup plies, and personnel

Funding for state planning assista nce

Prohibition of the duplication of federal disaster assistance (such as

through insurance payments )

Specification of disaster loan intere st rates

Unemployment assistance

Assistance in debris removal

Funding for the suppression of fir es that could become major disa

sters

Funding for the repair or replacem ent of state and local public facili

ties.

However, the Disaster Relief Ac t of 1970 might be considered almo

st revolu-

tionary in that it dramatically exp anded the federal role in both the p

re- and post­

disaster time periods , adding suc h new authorities and limitations

as

Detailing federal personnel to d isaster areas through "emergency

support

teams"

Recognizing the role of nongove rnmental organizations

Restricting the use of federal aid for the reconstruction of public

facilities

to conditions that existed imme diately before the disaster struc

k

Giving reconstruction work and contract preference to firms and

individu­

als based in the stricken area

Authorizing federal agency head s to waive procedures (but not c

onditions)

for assistance

Ensuring that disaster aid be pro vided in a nondiscriminatory ma

nner

Providing assistance before a dan gerous condition reaches catastrop

hic levels

Augmenting emergency commun ication and transportation system

s

96 Keith Bea

Repairing or replacing damaged or destroyed federal facilities

Providing temporary housing assistance of a general nature, at no charge, for a year after the disaster (not solely through the provision of leased

manufactured homes) and providing mortgage and rental payments for

individuals facing evi ction or foreclosure

Providing legal assistance to lower-income families

Authorizing grants to local governments to replace revenue streams dis­

rupted by the disaster.

'The Disaster Relief Act of 1970 also implicitly addressed pre-disaster mitiga­

tion and preparedness needs by ordering the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness

(previously the Offi ce of Emergency Planning, but renamed by President Johnson

in 1968) to investigate "additional or improved plans, procedures, and facilities ...

necessary to provide immediate effective action to prevent or minimize losses of

publicly or privately owned property and personal injuries or deaths which could

result from fires (forest and grass), earthquakes, tornadoes, freezes and frosts,

tsunamis, storm surges and tides, and floods, which are or threaten to become

major disasters."

Administrative Changes

From I 966 through 1970, Congress evaluated legislative options concerning the

scope of federal assistance. The debate did not explicitly raise questions about

which level ofgovemmem-federa1 or state--should have primary adminisn-ative

responsibilities. Despite the presumption that federal aid supplemented state and

local efforts, federal officials made decisions in .many critical areas concernihg

how resources would be allocated and what commitments the states would need

to make. Moreover, to ensure that federal officials coordinated activities after each

disaster. Congress required the president to appoint a federal coorclinating officer,

who would be responsible for establishing field offices and working with state

local. anci nongovernmental entities to ensure that disaster victims obtained the

assistance to which they were entitled. Administrative "ownership'" of the emer­

gency management process shifted from Congress and the Capitol to the president

and the OEP staff. As was the case in other policy areas. state and local officials eiqJressed dis­

satisfaction with the federal bureaucracy and the complexities of the emergency

management process. 1.n 1972, federal and state officials reviewed administrative

procedures to detennine how the complex mix of federal, state, local, and private

responsibilities would converge at the scene of a disaster. In general, review of

The Formative Years: 1950--1 978 97

the responses to major catastr ophes indicated that constrain

ts on state and local

authorities often hampered the ability of those authorities to re

spond.

Administrative responsibility f or the Disaster Relief Act in its

various forms

rotated over the decades fro m one entity to another. From

its establishment in

1961, the OEP (both before an d after its-o.ame change) had r

esponsibility for car­

rying out the provisions of th e l 950 Federal Disaster Reli

ef Act and subsequenr

legislation. ln 1973. however. as part of a larger effort to red

uce the centralization

of authority in the White Hou se, President Nixon abolishe

d the OEP and trans­

ferred the responsibility for d isaster relief administration

to HUD, the General

Services Administration. and the Department of1he Treasu

ry, thereby limiting the

involvement of the president a nd bis immediate staff.!ll

The decisior1 to move prim ary authority from the Whi

te House into the

domain of administrative agen cies has been the focus of ext

ensive analysis.::!> For

example, an investigation con ducted in response to coordin

ation difficulties after

Hurricane Andrew struck the U.S. coast in 1992 conclude

s that "the location and

relationship of a n _ emergency management agency to tl1e i

nstitutional presidenc)

and the President have atwa ys been variable and problem.

atic.",o While there is

no definitive answer as to the extent to which the pres

ident should be involved

in emergency management fu nctions, events have shown

that when responses

to catastrophic disasters inv olve decisions made by, or w

ith the support of. the

president, their outcomes ten d to be superior to those of r

esponses handled solely

by administrative channels.

Disaster Declaration s and Funding

Federal funding data clearly indicate the federal governm

ent's increasing commit­

ment to disaster assistance. A comparison of the figures

in Table 4-2 with those

in Table 4-1 illustrates the g rowth in federal expenditur

es over the two decades

since the 1950 Federal Disa ster Relief Act. This growth

may be associated with

an increase in the number of catastrophic disasters that

occurred over this period,

as well as with the states' gr owing realization that feder

al funds were a relatively

low-cost resource. T he data arguably support the form

er perspective: although

there were fewer disasters from 1965 to 1970 than th

ere were during the twelve

years prior to 1965, federa l expenditures doubled, a r

esult that is to be expected

after large-scale events.

Despite the expenditures fo r the largest, most severe di

sasters, funds were not

always allocated for catastro phic losses. As in the previo

us decade, the most deadly

catastrophe to occur betwe en l 965 and 1970 did not r

esult in a major disaster de c­

laration. lt occurred in Dece mber 1968 when a pandemi

c associated with the Hong

Kong flu spread throughou t the United States, resulting

in almost 34,000 deaths. 31

I J.IV

98 Keith Bea

Number of Presidential Types of Disasters Expenditures, Expenditures, in

Disaster Resulting in a Presidential in Current Constant (2005) Year Declarations Declaration Dollars Dollars

1965 24 Tornadoes, floods, storms, $88,378,156 $434,804,781 water shortage, earthquake, and Hurricane Betsy

1966 10 Tornadoes, floods, storms, $10,765,330 $51,854,806 typhoon, and high tides

1967 10 Tornadoes, floods, storms, $28,826,139 $134,509,804 forest fires, Typhoon Sally, and Hurricane Beulah

1968 18 Tornadoes, floods, storms, $14,219,629 $64,078,255 ice storm, Typhoon Jean, and Hurricane Gladys

1969 28 Tornadoes, floods, storms, $231,666,874 $998,345,932 landslide, and Hurricane Camille

1970 16 Tornadoes, floods, firns, ice $94,062,792 $384,359,429 jams, and Hurricane Celia

Total 106 $467,918,920 $2,067,953,007

Table 4-2. Annual Disaster Statistics and Incidents, 1965-1970.

Source: Nominal expenditure data from U.S. House of Representatives (1974), 23, fema.gov/news/disasters.fema.

Focusing Events of the Early l 970s

Like Hurricane Betsy and the Alaska earthquake in the I 960s, other events in the l 970s served to focus attention on federal policy gaps. On February 9, 1971, in California's

San Fernando Valley area, an earthquake measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale resulted

in sixty-five deaths and roughly $500 million in damage. The earthquake also wreaked

significant damage on public and private nonprofit hospitals. Congress responded with

legislation that expanded the disaster relief structure (P.L. 92-209), making private

nonprofit hospitals eligible for repair and reconstruction grants (not loans).

In mid-June 1972, Hurricane Agnes made landfall on the Gulf Coast and moved

north aiong the East Coast to North Carolina, where it traveled back over water into

the Atlantic, recharged its batteries, and then struck the United States again, caus­

ing severe flooding in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania (Figure 4-2). The stonn

resulted in fifty deaths, caused more than $2 billion in property damage, an<!-like the earthquake in 1971-forced policy makers to address gaps in disaster relief cov­

erage. By August, Congress and President Nixon agreed that the federal government

would play a greater role in disaster response and recovery, thereby further involving it in what had been state responsibilities. One fonner official of the American Red

Cross noted that federal aid provided after Hurricane Agnes resulted in a decrease

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 99

Figure 4-2. The track of Hurricane Agnes, 1972. This hurricane caused severe inland flooding in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and neighboring states. Two months later, the federal government passed new disaster legislation.

in individual and family assistance provided by that nonp rofit organization.

32 The

federal government passed legislation (P.L. 92-385) that increased the practice of

partial loan forgiveness (including an increase in the cap o n forgiveness to $5,000

and an interest rate of I percent) and expanded the purpo ses for which loans could be

provided to include refinancing mortgages on affected pr operty at subsidized rates.

In addition, following the pattern established by the p revious year's legislation, the

1972 act authorized the provision of grants to private non profit educational institu­

tions that had been damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Agnes.

The 1972 legislation is notable not only because it ex panded the federal gov­

ernment's role, but also because it included a congre ssional mandate for a study

of federal disaster policies:

The President shall conduct a thorough review of existin g disaster relief

legislation as it relates to emergency loans.and housing lonn s ad.ministered

by the Fam1ers I-tome Administration of the U11ited Suite s Department of

Agricult1rre. and not later than January 3 \. 19i3. he sha U transmit to the

Committee on Agriculture and Forestry of the Senate and the Committee

on Agriculture of the House of Representatives a report co ntaining. specific

legislative proposals for the comprehensive rev-is ion of suc h legislation in

or to ( l) adjust the benefits and the coverage available to persons affected

by disasters: (2) improve the execution of the progrum by simpli iYing and

eliminating unnecessary administrative procedures: and (3) preve nt tile 1'nis­

use of benefits made available under the program (86 Stat. 559).

I /i.n,

100 Keith Bea

The 1971 earthquake that struck the San Fernando Valley caused over $500 million in property damage, such as that which occurred when the Veterans Administration Hospital collapsed, as shown here. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey.

By enacting this legislation. Congress aimed ro construct a continuing omni­

bus disaster relief program based on systematic procedures that would not require

significant policy changes from one ··unparalleled" or "truly devastating" disas­

ter to another. l11e charge to improve the delivery of federal disaster assistance

brought attention to the-administration of disaster aid, which had received rela­

tively Little attention prior ro this. This mandate laid the groundwork for the most

extensive revision of federal poJicy to date in 1974 and, of great importance to

those con.cemed with administration, presaged the establishment of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in l 979.

An Expanding Federal Mission In 1973, President Nixon submitted a report to Congress that sought to reorientfederal disaster policy to ensure that state and local governments, not the federalgovernment, would exercise the lead role in emergency management. The Nixonadministration sought a new policy direction, including greater reliance on insur­ance and hazard mitigation, but Congress disagreed. The Disaster Relief Act of1974 (P.L. 93-288) was not a radical departure from past legislation; it continuedto expand the range of federal disaster assistance and preparedness authority. Itrequired communities receiving federal disaster assistance to create mitigationplans. It also removed the flood insurance mandate.

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 101

Even more than past statutory additions to the 1950 authority, the 1974 leg­

islation vested greater authority in the president. It authorized the president to

establish a federal program of disaster preparedness that cut across agency bound­

aries and to build an emergency communications system with federal and private

resources. In addition, the statute authorized the president to provide federal assis­

tance to repair public facilities and provide limited assistance to individuals. While

it strengthened the premise that federal aid supplemented, not replaced, state and

local authority resources (by establishing requirements that gubernatorial requests

had to provide details on state resource commitments), this point was a policy

pronouncement with little teeth.

Many of the categories of assistance that had been adopted in earlier legisla­

tion were carried over in 1974, but some important changes were made. These

included

Addition of a new classification, "emergency," allowing a lower level of

federal assistance when the president determined that, although over­

whelmed, state and local governments did not require a "major disaster"

declaration

Removal of references to specific administration officials (notably the

administrator of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration), replacing

them with authorization for presidential action

Removal of the requirement that applicant states commit an equal share

of the costs to receive federal assistance for preparedness grant develop­

ment, and inclusion of a new emphasis on disaster prevention (precursor

to the hazard mitigation authority enacted in 1988)

Consolidation of all disaster administration provisions into one title (Title lll)

An added requirement that state contributions be a "significant propor­

tion" of the "reasonable expenditures" requirement to ensure that federal

aid supplemented, rather than supplanted, state resources

Addition of a section that imposed civil and criminal penalties on those

who defrauded the government or misapplied funds

Authorization for the president to ensure that supplies and material

needed for reconstruction would be available in the disaster area

Exemption of public facility restoration activities from environmental

review requirements established in the National Environmental P olicy Act

of 1969

Enhancement of provisions requiring that restored public and private

structures be repaired or rebuilt pursuant to building codes and standards

102 Keith Bea

Expansion of federal assistance for the repair of public facilities, includ­

ing recreational facilities (previously excluded from eligibility), and

allowance for "in-lieu" grants to be provided so that communities could

elect to rebuild new facilities to replace destroyed facilities that were no

longer desired

Replacement of grants with loans to provide funds to communities that

lost revenue streams, but with authority granted to the president to cancel loan repayment requirements should communities be unable to meet oper­

ating budgets within three years

Expansion of housing assistance for minimal repairs to make damaged

housing habitable, along with authority to authorize the transfer of manu­

factured homes to disaster victims

A new individual and family grant program to replace loan forgiveness

provisions enacted in previous years

New crisis counseling authority to ensure that mental health assistance

would be available to disaster victims

Authorization for the president to establish a disaster preparedness pro­

gram, provide technical assistance to the states for the development of

"comprehensive plans and practicable programs for preparation against

disasters," and award grants to states for the development and mainte­

nance of disaster plans.

The need for the 1974 legislation became apparent the very month that it was

signed into law. On April 3 and 4, a series of 148 tornadoes struck thirteen states,

resulting in more than three hundred deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars

in property losses.33 The new and expanded categories of individual and family

assistance that had been included in the 1974 legislation were put to use in the states that had been affected by this record-setting tornado event.

Civil Defense in the Early l 970s

Federal civil defense policy remained on the back burner throughout the 1970s. In

1973, the Department of Defense adopted a dual-use policy, whereby civil defense

activities could also be used to prepare for natural disasters, and the parallel tracks

of civil defense and natural disaster management began to merge into the broader

concept of emergency management. This policy led to new responsibilities for

the Defense Department, such as funding emergency preparedness applications

submitted by state and local governments, administering emergency warning and

communications systems, and building an intergovernmental network to reduce

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 103

The tornado that struck Xenia, Ohio, on Ap ril 3 was the deadliest and most destructive o

f the

series of 197 4 storms that resulted in more than three hundred deaths in thirteen states. T

his

was the first major disaster to fall under the D isaster Relief Act of 197 4. Photo courtesy of t

he

Department of Homeland Security.

catastrophic losses. These responsibilities differed from the department's central

military mission, and the funding requests subm itted to Congress suggest that the

Defense Department was an unwilling guardian o f civil disaster preparedness. ln

1976, the department recommended a reduction i n aid to local governments and

encouraged Congress to amend the Civil Defen se Act (CDA) to require that state

and local governments use federal civil defense funding only to prepare for nuclear

attacks. Congress rejected that recommendatio n and instead amended the CDA

to allow the use of the civil defense "structur e" for disasters "other than disasters

caused by enemy attack" (P.L. 94-36 I).

Despite the urging of Congress, funding for c ivil defense and administra-

tive authority languished; however, the pro tection of tbe civilian population from

nuclear attack took a new direction. The Nucle ar Civil Protection Planning effort,

also known as crisis relocation planning (CRP ), emphasized disaster preparedness

by establishing plans to quickly relocate civilia ns (given sufficient warning) from

high-risk areas and to shelter them in place when they could not be evacuated.

34

But by this time, policy administrators had a hard time "selling" the concept of

nuclear threats to a jaded public. CRP suffered from unrealistic expectations and

lack of public (and congressional) support, an d it faded from practice.

I ,:I� -•�,-....

104 Keith Bea

Carter Administration Initiatives

While much of the emphasis since 1950 had been on the substance of legisla­

tion and the type of assistance to be provided in the case of emergencies, federal

officials continued to wrestle with the question of leadership. Concern about the

adequacy of emergency preparedness spuned a joint congressional committee to

undertake a comprehensive survey offederal activities. From results of the survey

sent to federal agencies in July 1976, a joint congressional committee came to the

following conclusion:

As regards civi I emergency preparedness for natural and man-made disasters • or economic disrup,ions. analysis disclosed that go\,emment activity in this area is far more substantial than is generaliy realized but also Sttffers from the lack of bigh-Ievel a ttention. organi7.ational diffusion, inadequate foresight and coordination, weak or misdirected fundj.ng, and the absence of a compre­ hensive approach to what is basically a homog_enous group of planning and programmatic functions. The delegation of authorities. i.n particular, has led to a situation in which authority is not commensurate with responsibil.ities. !-Jere the problem is still further complicated by the fact that. unlit...-e industrial mobilization. government atall levels-fudcral. regiorutL state and local-is involved. placing adequate coord.ination at a premium, if measures arc robe useful ir1 cerms of protecting Hfc and propert).3�

State and local officials also evinced displeasure with the mix of federal

emergency management authorities, arguing that their policies and practices were

confusing and cumbersome. As a result, _the Council of State Governments and

the National Governors' Association (NGA) developed a new policy framework

that included a "comprehensive approach to emergency preparedness planning."36

Through these organizations, as well as other channels, the states asked Presi­

dent Jimmy Carter to establish a more centralized federal emergency manage­

ment administrative mechanism. In a multivolume study released by the NGA

concerning the status of emergency management among the states and territories,

the authors ex.pressed concern about a "lack of a national policy for the manage­

ment of natural, man-made, and attack emergenci.es."37 In their view, the lack of an

overarching federal policy regarding disaster mitigation, preparedness, response,

and recovery, when coupled with the dispersion of responsibilities among numer­ ous federal agencies, hampered the ability of states to manage disaster situations.

Having multiple agencies involved also made it more difficult for states to access

the wide range of federal assistance that was available.38

In August 1977, President Carter mandated a study of federal preparedness

and response to natural, accidental, and wartime emergencies. The problems iden­

tified by the study's authors included redundancy, a lack of clarity about federal

emergency preparedness programs and planning efforts, confusion about jurisdic­ tions and boundaries of responsibiJlties, and lack of accountability. The report's

main recommendation focused on the need for a new federal entity to administer

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 105

many of the federal emergency management authorities.39 (Certain authorities

would remain with the SBA and Department of Agriculture because their services

were targeted to the clients helped by those federal entities on a continual basis.)

President Carter responded by establishing FEMA, under Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1978, giving it responsibility over a wide range of functions, includ­

ing emergency preparedness, civil defense, disaster relief, emergency communica­

tions, flood and crime insurance, fire prevention, and continuity of government.

The agency was created on April 1, 1979, with four main components: the Federal

Disaster Assistance Administration and the Federal Insurance Administration, both

transferred from HUD; the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, transferred from

the Department of Defense; and the U.S. Fire Administration, transferred from the

Department ofCommerce.40

During the Carter presidency, the Disaster ReliefFund continued to be a grow­

ing source of assistance and cost to the federal treasury. Table 4-3 presents infor­

mation on the major disaster declarations issued from 1971 through 1978. By the

Number of Presidential Expenditures, in

Disaster Types of Disasters Resulting Expenditures, in Constant (2005) Year Declarations in a Presidential Declaration Current Dollars Dollars

1971 16 San Fernando earthquake, $214,436,787 $834,550,498 floods, and Hurricane Edith

1972 47 Storms, floods, Tropical $713,889,127 $2,653,063,731 Storm Agnes. and toxic algae in coastal waters

1973 4� Storms, urban fire, dam $173,800,498 $618,635,675 collapse, tornadoes, and landslides

1974 45 Floods, tornadoes, freeze $250,000,000 $829,951,909 in salmon spawning area, and Hurricane Carmen

1975 37 Storms, tornadoes. floods, $206,000.000 $619,458,209 and Tropical Storm Eloise

1976 29 Storms, floods, and $362,000,000 $1,015,309,802 Typhoons Marie, Pamela, and T herese

1977 21 Ice conditions, shrimp loss, $294,000,000 $767,122,608 dam collapse, storms, and floods

1978 24 Storms, flooding, and $461,000,000 $1,126,990,925 Tropical Storm Carmen

Total 264 $2,675,126,412 $8,465,083,357

Table 4-3. Annual Major Disaster Statistics and Incidents, 1971-1978.

Source: Nominal expend�ure data from U.S. House of Representatives (1974). 23, fema_gov/news/disasters/fema.

106 Keith Bea

end of that period, the federal role in emergency management had reached even

higher levels of funding than those previously summarized.

The Downside of Technology

TI1is book deals onJ.y briefly with environmental hazards and disasters. yet these

are an important element of emergency management history.41 Th.e greater interest in scienrific progress and the answers found in technological innovation presented the nation with opportunities and risks. f n- the 1970s. new categories of catastro­

phes became evident-those caused by human error or malfeasance and involving

chemicals or other toxic agents. The·first major event occurred in the Midwest in the early 1970s, when a contractor sprayed waste oil containing hazardous chemi­

cals, including dioxin, on roads around Times Beach, Missouri. Flooding raised awareness that there were serious environmental consequences of this action. Fol­ lowing years of invesrigarion, Congress ultimately enacted legislation to provide relocation and other aid after environment.a] emergencies.

The second major human-caused disaster of the I 970s was a chemical disaster

ar.ound Love Canal, in upstate New York., Love Canal brought the dangers of an environmental catastrophe to the nation's attention. 1l1e disaster was years in the

making, as a chemical company had used an old canal as a dumping ground for

waste products. The 11eighborhood had an extremely high rate of cancer and an alarming number of birth defects. Children at the neighborhood 99th Street School

were constantly ill. Beginning in 1978, Lois Gibbs, president of the Love Canal Homeowners' Association, led an effort to investigate community concerns about the health of its residents. Her discovery of chemicals i,n the adjacent canal began

a three-year fight to prove that the toxins buried by Hooker Chemical, a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum, were responsible for the environmental disaster.

TI1is was a new type of disaster as the homeowners were opposed not on!)• by Occidental Petroleum but also by govemmenr officials, who argued that the chemicals had been successfully contained within the fonner landfill. Since resi­

dents could not prove that the chemicals on their property had come from Hooker's

disposal site, they could not prove liability. Throughout the legal battle, home­ owners continued to ail, but they were unable to sell their property to move away

from the land they believed was poisoning them. The 99th Street Schoo.I, which was located within the fonner boundary of the Hooker Chemical landfi 1l site. was closed and demolished. bur neither the school board nor the chemical company

would accept liability. The media picked up the story, ma.king it national news. This made it even

more difficult for public officials to deny that toxic chemicals were affecting the

health of Love Canal's residents. President Carter used the emergency authority granted in the 1974 disaster relief legislation to relocate families from the area.

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 107

The Environmental Protection Agency sued Occidental Pe troleum, and in 1995

Occidental's officials agreed to provide financial restitu tion ($ 129 million). In

all, the event made it clear to emergency management pr ofessionals and policy

makers that additional policies were needed to prepare fo r and respond to such

environmental emergencies.

Conclusion: The Emergence of Disaster Policy

During the nineteen years covered by this chapter, th e federal government expanded

its involvement in a number of domestic policy are as, including education, hous­

ing, health care, and income support. N ational goals in these and other areas were

established; new policies and programs directed billion s of dollars toward state and

local governments; and federal policy makers realiz ed that such actions resulted in

public support. In general, more federal governmen t assistance and involvement

served as the mantra for the nation. Measured in co nstant dollars, federal appro­

pri ations for disaster relief were seventy times m ore in I 978 ($1. I billion) than

in 1953 ($ 16 million). Over this period, federal dis aster relief legislation became

more complex and targeted a greater number of com munities, organizations, and

people. More types of assistance were authorized, greater discretion was granted

to the executive branch, and more organizations were chartered to conduct emer-

gency management activities.

Several specific areas of disaster response are wort h noting:

Response capabilities and requirements. There we re no federal require­

ments to ensure that disaster response and relief efforts would be coordi­

nated or delivered in accordance with specified s tandards. Rather, the 1950

Federal Disaster Relief Act required merely that federal agency officials

"cooperate to the fullest extent possible" with on e another, with state and

local governments, and with the Red Cross. By 1978, Congress required

that the president "coordinate" the response acti vities of federal agencies

and form emergency support teams to be depl oyed to a major disaster area.

Public facilities. In 1950, Congress authorize d the president to help local

governments by "making emergency repairs to and temporary replace­

ments of' public facilities. By 1978, legislati on had been enacted to

(l) pay for the repair of transportation infrast ructure; (2) replace, repair,

restore, or reconstruct state and local govern ment public facilities (includ­

ing airports, recreational facilities, and parks) ; (3) replace, repair, restore,

or reconstruct private nonprofit facilities that provided specifi ed services,

such as hospitals; and (4) provide cash grants in lieu of restoring, replac­

ing, repairing, or rebuilding state and local faci lities. The federal govern­

ment could-and did-use this authority to re place municipal and state

108 Keith Bea

structures destroyed during a disaster. Local governments also could

receive loans for the loss of taxes and other revenues, and loan forgive­

ness policies protected localities from defaulting on these loans.

Aid to individuals. A much wider range of federal government assistance

was available to individuals and families in 1978 than in 1950. The 1950

Federal Disaster Relief Act authorized federal agencies to provide equip­

ment, supplies, and personnel to state and local governments, and,

through the American Red Cross, to distribute food and medicine to indi­

vidual victims; however, it did not expressly authorize direct assistance to

victims of a disaster. By 1978, federal temporary housing assistance was

available for individuals and families affected by a disaster. The federal

government also covered the costs of installing essential utilities to tem­

porary mobile homes when it was in the public interest. 1n addition, the

federal government was authorized to provide unemployment assistance

to people put out of work by a disaster, grants (of up to $5,000) to vic­

tims to help them meet immediate needs, food coupons and surplus food,

legal services for low-income victims, and crisis counseling assistance.

Regarding the federal government's approach to hazard mitigation and disas-

ter prevention, the following areas had been strengthened between 1950 and 1978:

Preparedness. Although the 1950 Disaster Relief Assistance Act specified

the intent of Congress "to foster the development of such state and local

organizations and plans to cope with major disasters," the legislation did

not authorize or appropriate funding for that purpose. The CDA of 1950,

by comparison, did provide funding for a federal preparedness infrastruc­

ture (the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Civil Defense

Advisory Council), the construction of facilities, and the purchase of nec­

essary material, but this funding was targeted at preparing for an enemy

attack, not natural disasters. By 1978, Congress had amended the CDA to

authorize the use of such funds on a dual-use basis: to prepare for the

threat of enemy attack and for natural disasters.

Mitigation. Prior to 1950, the term hazard mitigation was rarely, if ever,

used, and mitigation activities were not a focus of federal policy. By

1978, however, Congress had specified that federal disaster preparedness

programs should include mitigation; allowed technical assistance to be

used for "hazard reduction, avoidance, and mitigation"; required that pub­

lic facilities that were replaced or repaired be compliant with building

codes and standards; and required that state and local governments receiv­

ing funds assess "natural hazards" in their jurisdiction and act to "miti­

gate such hazards, including safe land-use and construction practices" in

accordance with federal standards.

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 109

For almost thirty years the federal government had, at different times, inched

toward a policy that gave administrators a superior and _ determinative role in emer­

gency management. At times during that period, federal policy received a hard

push from nature, such as the Alaska earthquake or Hurricane Betsy. Periodically.

members of Congress or administration officials nudged federal policy in a differ­

ent direction. By 197 8, however, experience had shown that coordination of federal

and nonfederal action, not dispersion, was the best approach . Increasing presidential

grants of authority and discretion was one element of this approach. The institu­

tionalization of policy in one entity, as discussed in the next chapter, was another.

Notes Bruce D. Callander, "The Ground Observer Corps," Air Force Magazine 89 (February 2006): 80---83, afa.org/magazine/feb2006/0206GOC.pdf.

2 Earl Warren, Legislation Affecting Civil Defense and Disaster (Sacramento: State of California, 1951 ).

3 Congress also enacted the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81 -932) to ensure that the nation's industrial production would be allocated to meet military and civilian needs in the event of threats to national security

4 Executive Order no. 10186, Federal Register 15 (December 5, 1950): 8557.

Precedents to this legislation included P.L. 80-233, which authorized the president to transfer sur­ plus federal property to the Federal Works Agency to alleviate suffering and damage from floods: P.L. 80-785, the first law to appropriate funding for disaster relief without specifying a specific disaster; and P.L. 81-266, which established an emergency fund to help state and local govern­ ments and other agencies provide relief following a natural disaster.

6 The debate on the legislation is set forth in the Congressional Record (August 7, 1950), 11895-11915.

7 Ibid., 11905

8 While the FCDA was charged with administrative responsibilities for civil defense in the CDA, the 1950 disaster relief statute referred solely to presidential authority. President Truman delegated responsibility for administering P.L. 81-875 to the FCDA by executive orders (10346 and 10427). The FCDA was charged with preparing federal emergency plans and given authority for disaster relief administration.

9 Gary A. Kreps, "The Federal Emergency Management System in the United States: Past and Present," International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 8, no, 3 (1990): 277.

1 o Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Message of the President, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958," U.S. Code Home, law.justia.com/codes/us/title5a/5a_ 4_62_2_.html.

11 Harry Beller Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective. Contract No. DCPA 01-79-C-0294 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1981), 27, fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/civildef-1981.pdf,

12 Note, for example, the confluence of organizations involved in the response to the 1927 Missis­ sippi River floods.

13 E.L. Quarantelli, Local Emergency Management Agencies: Research Findings on Their Progress and Problems in the Last Two Decades (Newark: Disaster Research Center, Uni­ versity of Delaware, 1988), 2, http://dspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/498/PP126. pdf?sequence=3&isAl/owed=y.

14 See Roy S. Popkin, "The History and Politics of Disaster Management in the United States." in Nothing to Fear: Risks and Hazards in American Society, ed. Andrew Kirby (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990), 109-113.

15 While the Federal Disaster Relief Act and the Small Business Act marked the development of a new, expanded federal role, not all federal disaster relief legislation of the early 1950s proved to be successful. Congress passed the Federal Flood Insurance Act (P.L, 84-1016) in 1956 but never appropriated funds for its implementation. The act would have established the first federally backed disaster insurance program, but its implementation failed, largely because costs were not identified and it also had no mitigation provisions.

1 10 Keith Bea

16

17

18

19

20

Information derived from the U.S. House of Representatives, "Message from the President of the United States, Report Covering Expenditures Appropriated to the President for Federal Assis­ tance in Major Disaster Areas," House Document 434, April 22, 1952. Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield, 164,

See "Pandemics and Pandemic Threats since 1900," pandemicflu,gov/general/historicaloverview. html.

In 1992, for examp!e, Congress approprta;ted S45 mllllc;m to HUD ''for community development activities in areas Impacted by HI.Jmcane Aridrew, Hurricane l�lki, or Typhoon Omar" (P.L 103-50); the nearly $3 bOllon a_pp10pilated to FEMA for disaster relief and the 5432 million appropriated to the SBA for disaster loans were to bi! used more generically "for dfsas18f relief' (P.L 102-368) and "for the cost of dlsas!er ass.istarice loans" (P.L 1 02-368), respectively. Wallace R. Hansen, The Alaska Earthquake, March 27, 1964: Field Investigations and Reconstruc­ tion Effort, Geological Survey Professional Paper 541 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1.

21 Executive Order 11150, Federal Register 29 (April 4, 1964): 4789. Congress supported the presi­ dential directives by appropriating fun�. farglvlng lo.en repayment requirements, and authorizing federal assistance for the repayment of mortgages In legislation (P.l. 88-451).

22 In the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Congress followed this precedent by including a provision for grants to local communities to replace taxes and other funding streams that were disrupted by a major disaster.

23 From a report by Pete Craig, public information officer for OCD Region 3 (undated, available in Tab D, file 397-HB, National Archives holdings).

24 Office of Emergency Planning, Hurncane Betsy: Federal Action in Disaster (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 1966), inside front cover.

25 "In 1965, the 30-year maturity was made standard for all SBA d1sesler loans-. and, In addition, SBA was au1hori-zed to suspend payment oi principal and interest-for 5 years. A 117a]or turning Point occurred ,n 1965 with the establishment of an $1.800 forgiveness provlslon for victims of Hurricane Betsy, Toe cancelat1on feature was made permanent in 1969 and was increased to 52,500 1n the Dlsas!er Reflef Act or 1970." U.S. House of Representatives, After Disaster strikes: Federal Programs BI1d Organizations. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., i974, 18.

26 This provision is the first hazard mitigation mandate authorized by Congress in disaster relief leg­ islation, outside of flood prevention legislation. T he first use of the term mitigation occurred in the Disaster Relief Act of 197 4 (P.l. 93-288).

27 Richard Nixon, "Special Message to the Congress on Federal Disaster Assistance, April 22, 1970," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 129.

28 In 1996, President Clinton extended ex officio cabinet membership to James Lee Witt, director of FEMA. However, primary administrative authority remained In FEMA, an independent agency out­ side of the While House. See "Telephone Remari<s to the National Em�ency Management Asso­ ciation Meeting," Weekly Compllation of Presidential Dow,rrem.s 32 (Febru!II)' 26, 1996), 380-381.

29 For example, see RrchardT. Sylves and W!lllam L. Waugh Jr., eds., Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada: Tile Politics, Poflcymaking, Administration and Analysis of Emergency Manage­ ment (Springfield, Ill,; Charles C. TnomasPublisher, 1996).

30 Gary L. Wamsley et al., Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People's Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1993), 22.

31 "Pandemics and Pandemic Threats since 1900,"

32 Popkin, "History and Politics of Disaster Management."

33 '·Tornado Super Outbreak, April 3, 1974," april31974.com. 34 See Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Protection in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Defense, 1977).

35 U.S. Joint Committee on Defense Production, Annual Report 1976, vol. 1, 95th Cong., 1st sess., House Report 95-352 (1977), 20.

36 See Council of State Governments, Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Planning in State Government (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1976); and National Governors'

37

38

39

40 41

The Formative Years: 1950-1978 111

Association (NGA), 19 78 Emergency Preparedness Project and Comprehensive Emergency Man­ agement: A Governor's Guide (Washington, D.C.: NGA, 1978}

NGA, Emergency Preparedness Project Final Report (Washington, D.C.: NGA, 1978), xi. As part of the project, the NGA issued summary information on federal policies; it also took the lead in identifying policies at the state and federal levels on domestic terrorism, a topic that few people had on their radar.

President's Recrganization Project, Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response Historical Survey (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Office of Management and Budget, 1978)

Executive Order 12127, 44 Federal Register (March 31, 1979): 19367. For an example, see Susan L. Cutter, Living with Risk (London: Edward Arnold, 1995), which addresses the history and impact of chemical accidents and policy responses.