Active and Reserve

Correspondence: James Griffi th, PhD, Medical Service Corps., Maryland Army National Guard, 10956 Bellehaven Boulevard, MD 20872, Damascus, USA. Tel: 301-452-6026. E-mail: james.e.griffi [email protected]

(Received 29 August 2010 ; accepted 17 November 2010 )

Decades of transition for the US reserves: Changing demands on reserve identity and mental well-being

JAMES GRIFFITH

Joint Forces Headquarters, Maryland Army National Guard, Baltimore, Maryland

Abstract The US strategic defence policy has undergone dramatic changes in the last two decades, with more recent changes having placed increased demands on members of the reserve components. Rapid and often unexpected call-ups of reserves for operational missions, both domestic and international, required meeting standards for mobilization and deployment. Stand- ards were in place but not necessarily met. Mobilizations pointed to several areas of unpreparedness; at fi rst, obvious areas, such as members being physically unfi t, inadequately trained and improperly equipped and less than competent unit lead- ers; and later, less obvious areas, in particular, emergent personal adjustment problems. During these mobilizations, unique consequences of stressors on individual reservists were evident, including worries about family and civilian job during deployment, adjustments to returning and reintegration, post-deployment post-traumatic stress disorder and related symp- toms, and now suicide. Some have explained these fi ndings, though lacking is a broad explanatory framework. Reserve identity is offered as a preliminary concept to interpret reservists ’ deployment experiences, post-deployment adjustment, and associated mental health needs, providing a basis for preventive intervention strategies.

Introduction

Since World War II and its aftermath, US reservists have largely served intermittently in garrison units for one weekend a month and 15 days annual train- ing a year. This situation contrasted with events since the First Gulf War, during which reservists served much like their active duty counterparts, being deployed for frequent and lengthy periods. This shift of events had much to do with the ‘ Total Force ’ policy, introduced in 1970 by the then- Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (Carafono, 2005). This policy reduced the costs of maintaining a large active duty force by placing combat support and combat service support functions in the Army Reserve, and additional combat units in the Army National Guard. The result was that for any large- scale military operation reservists would have to be called to active duty, though it was not until the First Gulf War or Operation Desert Storm (ODS) that this policy was tested.

The Gulf War marked the fi rst major call-ups of US reservists for wartime missions since the Korean War. Such call-ups continued during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) during which nearly half a million US reservists have been deployed (Bonds et al.,

2010). Call-ups have not been without problems of availability of personnel, being ready for deploy- ments, and adjustments during and after deploy- ments. In this article I summarize the experiences of US reservists 1 during these more recent mobiliza- tions and deployments, focusing on preparatory inadequacies related to the health and well-being of reservists and subsequent personal adjustment. Identity theory 2 (Haslam et al., 2009; Hogg, 1992; Stryker & Burke, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) pro- vides an understanding of conditions leading to these inadequacies as well as individual adaptation to the increased demands of reserve military ser- vice. I propose that identities of reservists relate to the readiness, deployment experiences, and post- deployment life of reservists, including personal adjustment and mental health needs. I conclude by offering implications of identities for reservists ’ readiness and effectiveness.

Reserve experiences in the First Gulf War

In ODS, approximately 230,000 Guard and Army Reserve personnel were mobilized for active duty military service. More than 100,000 of these part- time soldiers were sent to the Persian Gulf, and the

International Review of Psychiatry, April 2011; 23: 181–191

ISSN 0954–0261 print/ISSN 1369–1627 online © 2011 Institute of Psychiatry DOI: 10.3109/09540261.2010.541904

182 J. Griffi th

remainder served stateside to replace departing regu- lar forces (Nelson et al., 2001). Call-ups were not without problems. By some accounts (Kirby & Buddin, 1996; Orvis et al., 1996), many Army Reserve component units could not be mobilized in a timely manner owing to several shortcomings. Personnel in units had remained on unit rosters, even though they had not been attending drill (referred to as ‘ ghosts ’ ). Many units followed this practice to keep units staffed in order to meet end-strength requirements and avoid losing federal funding and unit allocations. According to military regulation, personnel are to be dropped from unit rosters after not attending nine drills (i.e. slightly over two monthly weekend drill assemblies). Moreover, personnel who were present in units had yet to be trained (e.g. attend basic training or advanced military occupational specialty training) or had not met physical fi tness and medical require- ments (e.g. overweight, unable to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test, had dental problems, etc.). These and other inadequacies were subsequently documented, including shortcomings in individual job skills and combat preparation, utilization during weekend drills (having received task assignments), non-commissioned offi cer (NCO) and offi cer leader- ship, and collective training (Allen, 1992; General Accounting Offi ce, 1992). These observations were validated by responses of reservists concerning their mobilization experiences. Griffi th (1995) compared junior-ranking enlisted, some of whom had been deployed and others not, before and after ODS. Sol- diers reported shortcomings in individual job skill and combat preparation, job task assignments during weekend drills, unit leadership, and collective train- ing. While there were improvements in these areas after ODS, substantial percentages of soldiers still perceived such inadequacies. Perhaps the most bothersome fi nding, further substantiated by fi eld visits and interviews, was junior-ranking enlisted perceptions of needed improvements in both NCO and offi cer leadership. Unit leaders, specifi cally offi cers, were not trusted, did not have soldiers ’ confi dence, and were not seen as caring about the soldiers. After ODS, in particular for the deployed group, almost twice as many of the deployed soldiers as the non- deployed soldiers reported these problems in unit leadership. Similar observations regarding the inad- equacies of NCO leadership skills, tactical and technical competencies, and the ability to train their squads and platoons were noted by the General Accounting Offi ce (GAO, 1992). The GAO report concluded shortcomings in unit leadership were among the most serious problem, rendering the unit ineffective (p. 3).

Another area of concern was reservists ’ expecta- tion, or better, lack of expectation, for being activated and deployed. For many, reserve military service did

not include long-term active duty military service. Reservists, mainly, younger reservists had joined for educational benefi ts and money for college and never expected to be deployed (Schmitz, 1990). Before ODS (1991), 19% of the junior-ranking, fi rst-term enlistees believed they would be deployed during their current enlistment (Griffi th & Perry, 1993). After ODS (1992), the percentage increased only by 9%, even though much of the reserve force had been prepared for mobilization during ODS. Extended call-ups and separation from family and civilian employer also posed signifi cant prob- lems for reservists. Junior-ranking enlisted reserv- ists who reported problems for their employer and family because of extended periods of mobilizations also reported unfavourable attitudes of spouses and employers (Griffi th, 1995). Employer and family characteristics were unrelated to soldier perceptions of combat readiness, but employer and spouse atti- tudes toward reserve service were related to the reservist ’ s intent to stay in the Army Reserve. Indeed, after ODS, proportionately fewer soldiers remained in reserve military service (Kirby, 1997). What fur- ther exacerbated these separations was that reserv- ists, due to the support functions of reserve units, often had to remain deployed after other personnel had returned to the USA.

Well-being among reservists in the First Gulf War

Experiences of reservists in the First Gulf War pointed to inadequacies of readying reservists for deploy- ment; namely, medically unfi t, not trained for mili- tary occupations, not competent in soldier skills, with poor collective training and leadership. Many of these understandably related to the posture of the reserve force as a strategic force rather than an oper- ational force (Whitlock, 2006). During and after the First Gulf War, attempts to relate more objective aspects of individual and unit readiness with the mental well-being of reservists were lacking. This comes as little surprise, given the short duration of the war and involvement of fewer reservists than more recent engagements. Nonetheless, shortcomings in individual and unit readiness likely affected combat readiness, and thus likely exacerbated stress experi- ence by reservists during ODS. Studies such as Solomon et al. (1986) have shown quality leadership is associated with more effective adaptation to combat stress than non-quality leadership. Other empirical studies in addition to historical accounts have docu- mented the importance of several factors motivat- ing and sustaining soldiers in combat, including soldiers ’ trust of small unit leaders and confi dence in their competencies, confi dence in their skills and those of others, and positive relationships with other soldiers and with their unit leaders (Kellett, 1987;

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Manning & Ingraham, 1987; Stouffer et al., 1949; Traversa, 1995; Vaugh & Schum, 2001; Wong et al., 2003). Lacking in these factors, it is likely that reservists experience deployment stressors more negatively, resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and related symptoms. Studies of Gulf War veterans have reported PTSD and related symptoms among Guard and Reserve personnel. Overall, deployed personnel, whether active duty or reserve, reported more symptoms than non-deployed, though differences were greatest between deployed and non-deployed reservists (Iowa Persian Gulf Study, 1997; Stretch et al., 1996). Studies also suggest that reservists were most vulnerable during the months after having returned from deployment. These studies include Kang et al. (1996), who compared Gulf War and non-Gulf War veteran active duty and Guard/Reserve soldiers, and found higher rates of PTSD symptoms for deployed Guard/Reserve than for deployed active duty sol- diers. Similarly, Wolfe et al. (1999) identifi ed reserve status as a risk factor for PTSD and related symp- toms two years after deployment but not right after deployment.

Reserve experiences in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom

Reserve involvement in OEF and OIF was different from that in the First Gulf War. Many more reservists were called to active duty. To date, about 460,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Army Reserve were mobilized and deployed for OEF and OIF (Bonds et al., 2010). For these more recent opera- tions there was more time for preparation, and the initial stages involved small contingencies of special operations units rather than a large force requiring substantial support. The World Trade Center was attacked in September 2001, and later that year, the US military deployed special operations throughout Afghanistan to muster and coordinate support among locals to rebel against the Taliban. Large-scale mili- tary operations did not begin in Iraq until March 2003. Many inadequacies in reserve mobilization and deployment were noted in the First Gulf War both in individual and unit preparation, and were subsequently remedied by the time of OEF/OIF. Indeed, survey data obtained from Army National Guard soldiers in late 2003 indicated that greater percentages of soldiers were duty qualifi ed than during ODS, and proportionately more deployed than non-deployed soldiers were qualifi ed for their duty positions (Griffi th, 2005). The same study reported that deployed soldiers perceived themselves better prepared for combat than non-deployed soldiers. Other studies, however, pointed to persistent prob- lems in the number of soldiers having been adequately

trained and available for mobilizations (General Accounting Offi ce, 2003; St Laurent, 2004). These problems, in particular small unit leadership in reserve units, resulted in the practice of ‘ cross-leveling ’ where reserve soldiers would be reassigned in small groups or as individuals to other units often led by active duty cadre. This practice likely negatively affected unit cohesion ’ s enhancing and stress-buffering effects on individual and group functioning (Griffi th, 1989). Personnel shortages also contributed to cross- leveling. In 2002, National Guard divisions and separate brigades were authorized almost 195,000 personnel, although only 172,000 personnel were assigned, representing 88% staffi ng of the authorized level (Gilmore, 2007).

Emergent issues related to mental health differed between the First Gulf War and more recent opera- tions. In the First Gulf War most issues pertained to the preparation and deployment process, due to hav- ing not implemented the Total Force policy on any large scale and the short duration of the confl ict 3 . In OEF and OIF, the unanticipated duration of both confl icts introduced uncertainty of deployment length and number of deployments. Sustained oper- ations in both Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated more frequent call-ups of reserve with unnamed end dates or deployment durations more than expected (Gilmore, 2007). At various stages of the confl icts, forces needed were greater than those available. During the initial invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, relatively few National Guard combat brigades had been deployed. This was also the case during the 2006 rotation. However, during the 2004 and 2005 rotations, National Guard combat units were more widely used. From mid 2003 to mid 2006 deployment rates of Army National Guard combat brigades were nearly twice that of the Army standard of 4.3 units at home station for every unit deployed (Gilmore, 2007). In fact, higher rates nearly matched rates of active Army brigades, which had a rotation ratio of about 1.2 units at home station for every unit deployed.

Well-being among reservists in OEF/OIF

Experiences of the First Gulf War and noted inade- quacies resulted in several initiatives to improve indi- vidual and unit readiness, including the Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan aimed at improving individual soldier skills and leader effectiveness; the Leader Development Action Plan (US Department of the Army, 1997) to better select, educate, and assess leaders; the ‘ Bold Shift ’ initiative (Sortor et al., 1994) prescribing policies and procedures for combat manoeuvres during peace- time, and Title XI (US House of Representatives, 1993) to better prepare individual and unit readiness

184 J. Griffi th

for mobilization and deployment. Also, reservists saw themselves more as ‘ soldier warriors ’ , due to changes in the Soldier ’ s Creed 4 and day-to-day lexicon. To better mentally prepare soldiers for warfare, the US Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, called for the re-writing of the Soldier ’ s Creed (Washington Post, 2003; Wong, 2005). The Creed redefi ned the modern soldier as a ‘ warfi ghter ’ , adequately equipped, trained and ready to fi ght, having complete confi - dence in him(her)self and fellow soldiers, committed totally to the mission, and selfl ess and courageous (US Department of Army, 2002). Even so, reservists were essentially part-time soldiers who were not accustomed to lengthy periods of active military duty, especially deployments necessitating separation from civilian employers and families. The handful of studies examining stress symptoms among reservists point to unique deployment stress, such as worries about spouse, children, household chores, fi nances, etc. (Castenada et al., 2010; Erbes et al., 2008). Stud- ies have shown, however, that during deployment reserve and active duty soldiers generally do not dif- fer in PSTD and related symptoms (US Department of Army, 2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). During post-deployment, deployed reservists reported higher rates of PTSD and related symptoms (1) when com- pared to deployed active duty personnel (Hoge et al., 2006; Hourani et al., 2007; Martin, 2007; Schell & Marshall, 2008); and (2) when examining differences between deployed and non-deployed personnel by component (Hotopf et al., 2006). Rates of PSTD and related symptoms (or changes in symptoms of cohorts across time, immediately after deployment and later) are greater for deployed reservists than for deployed active duty soldiers (Milliken et al., 2007), in particular, for those who reported stress conditions right after deployment (Jacobson et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2008). Higher rates of PTSD and related symptoms among reservists appeared later after returning from deployment, 3 to 6 months later (Milliken et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2010), and up to four years later (Jacobson et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2008).

Various explanations of higher rates of mental health need among reservists during post-deployment have been offered (see Griffi th, 2010). One explanation is that reservists are unaccustomed to extended family separations and long-term absence from civilian employment. Detrimental effects of extended train- ing and deployments on attitudes of family members and employers of reservists are well-documented (Grissmer et al., 1992; Kirby, 1997, 2000). Such atti- tudes may be indicative of more serious family rela- tionship issues. Among Gulf War veterans, Vogt et al. (2008) reported that Guard/Reserve soldiers reported more concerns about family/relationship disruptions than did active duty soldiers, and that these concerns

related more strongly to perceived threats among Guard/Reserve than among active duty soldiers. Consistent with this explanation, Erbes et al. (2008) reported results that suggest pre-deployment stres- sors, such as anticipated and actual family and civil- ian job disruptions and prior adjustment problems, are likely exacerbated by deployment and cause greater post-deployment stress levels and symptoms among reservists than active duty personnel (similar to Vogt et al. ’ s (2010) observations in the First Gulf War). Most recently, Castaneda et al. (2009) inter- viewed 600 Guard and Reserve families who had experienced at least one overseas deployment since September 2001. Service members were more likely to name arranging for household responsibilities as a major consideration for being prepared for deploy- ments, whereas spouses were more likely to name social and emotional well-being, with spouses of Army Guard soldiers describing themselves as least prepared among reserve spouses. Those service members and spouses who received little notice of deployments were more likely to name household responsibilities, fi nancial and legal concerns, and continuation of civilian employment as problems during deployment. Civilian employment is the pri- mary livelihood of reservists and introduces another unique aspect of reserve military duty. After deploy- ment, reservists have to re-establish relationships with their civilian employers and work, unlike active duty personnel. While there are numerous examples of this being done without problems, there are also examples where reservists have been given lesser jobs, laid-off, etc., even when contrary to federal law (Castaneda et al., 2009; CBS News, 2009), causing reservists additional worries. These observations resulted in several initiatives to provide more certainty to reserve deployments and support for reservists, their families, and civilian employers. The ‘ Army Force Generation ’ (ARFORGEN) policy (Whitlock, 2006) provides realistic expectations and more pre- dictable time periods for deployments. The policy specifi es phases during a 5-year cycle, roughly divided into equal time periods, during which units ‘ reset ’ , ‘ train and achieve mission readiness ’ , and are ‘ avail- able for deployment ’ . Thus, reservists, their families, and employers know when unit deployments are most likely to occur and can plan accordingly. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (US Department of Defense, 2008) bolsters both Family Support Groups (FSG) and Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) programmes, providing reservists and their families with the necessary support before, during, and after deployment. The programme funds activities at 30-day, 60-day, and 90-day intervals after deployment, furnishing information sessions on stresses associated with separation and deploy- ment, and offering counseling and other support

International Review of Psychiatry 185

services. And most recently, the Army has developed widespread training to promote recognition and treatment of personnel who show suicide risk (US Department of Army, 2010).

Identities of reservists, binding theme of reserve experiences and well-being

Explanations of higher prevalence of PTSD and related symptoms among reservists have been offered (Griffi th, 2010; Thomas et al., 2010). However, lack- ing is a conceptual framework that integrates and provides a basis to explicate the underlying processes of the relationship of stressors to strain. In this paper, individual identity is offered as a preliminary concept to interpret reservists ’ deployment experiences, post- deployment adjustment, and associated mental health needs, providing a basis for preventive inter- vention strategies. Various elements of identity theory (Hogg & Abram, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) have been applied to reservists to describe the social- psychological nature of part-time military service (Ben-Dor et al., 2008; Griffi th, 2008; Lomsky-Feder et al., 2008; Lykhani & Fugita, 1993; Zurcher, 1977). Even so, few have used identity to explain reservists ’ adaptations to current operational demands.

Identity theory has much to offer to the literature examining PTSD and related symptoms among reservists. First, broadening identity theory to stress adaptation among reservists has intuitive appeal and provides understanding to current experiences of war veterans. This is evident from several recent reports: Sugar ’ s (2005) ‘ warrior identity ’ explaining dis- charged soldiers ’ diffi culties in post-service life; Musheno and Ross ’ s (2011) ‘ adaptive ’ , ‘ struggling ’ , and ‘ resistant ’ reservists explaining differences in post- deployment adjustment; and the Army ’ s new suicide report concerning ‘ risk-takers ’ (US Department of Army, 2010). Second, mechanisms of identity theory explicate underlying individual level processes of concepts often associated with effective individual and group functioning, such as cohesion, social sup- port, and leadership. For example, Hogg and others (1992) have argued that the basis of cohesion lies in self-identity. That is, the extent to which group members ’ identities coincide with the attributes of the group ’ s ideal or prototypic member, the more members feel united and are cooperative and mutu- ally supportive. Reicher et al. (2007) explained effec- tive leadership as shared identity among group members. The member who best represents the group member ’ s shared identity has the greatest infl uence over group members ’ behaviours and atti- tudes, and thus, can best shape the agenda and goals of the group and the member. Third, identity theory relates to the individual ’ s experience of stressors and subsequent adaptation. Identity intervenes in

the relationship of potential stressors to strain. Haslam et al. (2008) have described how identity can determine symptom appraisal and response, health- related norms and behaviours, social support, coping resources, and clinical outcomes (pp. 9 – 14). Social identity infl uences positive or negative health out- comes by focusing on the way in which individuals understand and respond to potential stressors (Haslam & Reicher, 2007). Other studies show that anticipated events having positive or negative conse- quences often generate imagined selves prior to the events (Cross & Markus, 1991), which serve to defi ne the future context, provide behavioural motivations, and ‘ an evaluative and interpretative context for the now self ’ (Markus & Nurius, 1986, p. 962). Indeed, evidence suggests that how veterans view combat experiences often determine later adjustment. Aldwin et al. (1994), for example, reported that World War II and Korean War veterans who perceived their military experiences positively and as having had desired effects (e.g. teaching them to cooperate, cope with adversity) expressed fewer PSTD symptoms than those who did not see military experiences as having positive effects. Broad, culturally based identi- ties also likely affect post-war adjustment. Freidman (1998) reported the lowest lifetime prevalence rates of PTSD among veterans who came from cultures having collective identity, Japanese American.

Previously, I have proposed several reserve identi- ties evident since World War II (Griffi th, 2011). Table I displays various reserve identities and their associated geopolitical events, how the military serves the individual, most adapted role for the identity, and hypothesized relationship to meeting current demands of reserve military service.

Each identity (fi rst column) may be considered distinctive for a particular time period (second col- umn), although the identity may persist over time based on reservists ’ longevity of service 5 . An identity for a given time period can be conceived as a mental image of a group member who embodies character- istics that make in-group members distinct from out- group members (Van Dick et al., 2005) and often denotes attributes of the ideal group member to which members aspire to have (Hogg, 1992). Each identity corresponds to a set of expectations for reserve military service (third column), and thus, determine actual roles for which reservists are most adapted (fourth column). Some identities are con- gruent with the demands of reserve military service (e.g. in modern times, ‘ soldier warrior ’ , versus in less modern times, ‘ weekend warrior ’ ), and thus are more likely than others to be able to better meet current and emerging demands and to cope with deploy- ment stressors. Conversely, identities incongruous with the demands of reserve military are less able to meet demands and to cope with deployment stressors

186 J. Griffi th

(e.g. ‘ instrumental volunteer ’ who joins for money for college but instead is deployed for extended periods). In sum, identity has implications for readiness and can dictate how reservists will defi ne and cope with stressors and subsequent personal adjustment. Figure 1 portrays these processes.

Individual identity intervenes between stressors and strain. Some identities decrease the negative experience of stressors, whereas other identities increase experienced stress. Attributes of a specifi c identity that meet the demands of reserve military service would likely lead to lower levels of perceived threats and experienced stress (Haslam et al., 2009). For example, deployment can provide a practical way for a ‘ soldier warrior ’ , ‘ identity seeker ’ , and ‘ conser- vative ideologue ’ to have meaning and purpose in reserve military duty, which otherwise historically is often not meaningful, not worthwhile, and a waste of time (Griffi th, 2009). Conversely, attributes of a specifi c identity that diverge with the demands of reserve military service would likely lead to higher levels of perceived threats and experienced stress. An ‘ instrumental volunteer who joined for educational benefi ts and attends college would fi nd deployment more stressful owing to its interference with career plans than a ‘ solder warrior ’ who joined to become a professional soldier. Yet another example is a ‘ weekend warrior ’ who would experience deploy- ment more stressful than ‘ soldier warrior ’ due to expectations regarding reserve military service and likely unpreparedness. Indeed, reservists ’ concerns about being inadequately prepared for deployments (lacking soldier warrior identity) have been associ- ated with post-deployment post-traumatic stress

symptoms (Erbes et al., 2008; Griffi th, 2010; Vogt et al., 2009). Individual identity and its salience depend on many factors, including characteristics of the immediate group, such as the group prototype and group members ’ shared perceptions of the group prototype, and geopolitical events associated with threats to national security and military plans incor- porating the reserve force.

Summary and implications of reserve identities

In the last two decades, reservists have been called regularly to active duty to provide support to over- seas combat missions. Mobilization and deployment revealed preparatory inadequacies and unique cir- cumstances of reservists having relevance to their adjustment during deployment and post-deployment. Initially, inadequacies emerged in obvious areas, such as reservists being physically unfi t, inadequately trained and improperly equipped and incompetent unit leaders, and later, in less obvious areas, such as characteristics of reserve military service related to personal adjustment including worries about family and civilian job during deployment, diffi culties in returning and reintegrating with family and civilian employment, post-deployment PTSD and related symptoms, and now suicide.

Drawing on identity theory, I proposed that prev- alent expectations of what constitutes reserve mili- tary service or identities are consequential in how the individual appraises potential stressors, such as these inadequacies and unique circumstances, and subsequently develops coping and effectively adapts.

Table I. Reserve identities and their associated geopolitical events, view of military service, most adapted role, and meeting current demands of reserve service.

Identity Associated

geopolitical events How military serves the

individual Most adapted reserve role Meeting current demands

of reserve service

Weekend warrior

Post WWII through Cold War era

Part-time weekend activity, alternative to leisure activity requiring less involvement and commitment

Part-time service, serve primarily as symbolic threat in national defence

Unlikely

Instrumental volunteer

All-volunteer force, 1973

Means to ends, provides needed benefi ts, e.g. bonus money, part-time pay, educational benefi ts

Short-term temporary service to gain benefi ts

Unlikely

Identity seeker

Collapse of Soviet Union, 1990

Sense of purpose and meaning to life

Purposeful and meaningful service through assigned missions in military strategy

Variable, insofar as role provides purpose and meaning

Soldier warrior

Redesign of Soldier Creed, 2002

Develop war fi ghter, adequately equipping, training, and readying for combat

Service that uses war fi ghting skills

Likely

Conservative ideologue

Beginning of extreme partisanship, 1992

Means to end, provides context (military) to fulfi l conservative agenda

Service that allows carrying out conservative agenda

Likely, insofar as role is consistent with agenda

International Review of Psychiatry 187

Identity in the context of group membership has been linked to symptom appraisal and response; stressors pertinent to group identity are more care- fully attended to, and at times lead to worsening manifestations of stressors (Levine & Reicher, 1996). Shared identity has been associated with resisting stressors and increased well-being (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Identity in groups gives access to coping strategies and social support to reduce the negative effects of stressful events. External stressors can often be identity-affi rming, drawing group members closer and rallying to provide support for

those members in need. Individuals having shared identity often feel more comfortable talking about stressful events (Kallezi et al., 2009). In sum, identity can intervene in the stressor-strain relationship, with particular attention paid to its stress-reducing and stress-buffering capacity.

What then are the next steps when viewing reserve military service as a matter of social identity? I have argued that identities do have signifi cant conse- quences. Identities relate to (1) stressor appraisal and symptom response, (2) norms of health, (3) social support, (4) coping resources, and (5) context for

Stress Strain

Identity

WHAT? (content)

• Obliged citizen soldier

• Weekend warrior

• Instrumental volunteer

• Identity seeker

• Soldier warrior

• Conservative ideologue

HOW? (process)

Identity mediates the stressor–

strain relationship through:

• Stressor appraisal and

symptom response

• Health-related norms

• Social support

• Coping resources

• Context for sustaining

healthy change symptom

response

Individual identity

Acts recursively with group prototype and individual

Group prototype

Shared attributes of ideal group member

Time period

and geopolitical situation, national defence threats, need for

reserve force

Figure 1. Identity associated with group prototype and time period and its mediating effect on the stress-strain relationship.

188 J. Griffi th

sustaining healthy change symptom response (Haslam et al., 2005). I have proposed that problems and subsequent adaptations of reservists to being mobilized and deployed relate to their identities, some better suited to increase demands of reserve military service than others. Normative expectations defi ne reserve military service for reservists and for their families and employers. And while these expectations are often derived from military leadership and struc- tural supports, they also serve to reinforce external views and expectations of the reserve force. Reservists are trained and equipped consistent with their expected role. Reservists then came to defi ne themselves accordingly. Identity of reservists then becomes para- mount in combat readiness and effectiveness, and thus has several implications for reserve preparation.

First, there needs to be a better understanding of how geopolitical events and subsequent national defence policy concerning the reserve force is pro- mulgated and understood by reservists themselves. For example, the static, strategic reserve of post World War II developed expectations that reservists would be mobilized only short of Armageddon, a likely nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Understanding their role as largely symbolic, reserv- ists saw less of a need to be combat ready – like a ‘ weekend warrior ’ , realizing mobilization would allow for suffi cient time to train to the assigned missions. Despite signifi cant changes in policy and force struc- ture in the 1970s and 1980s, reservists continued to view their military service as a part-time, past-time activity up to the First Gulf War and likely to the large-scale mobilizations in 2003. Second, there needs to be more awareness of developed identities and their implications for shifts in operational emphases. After the start of large scale mobilizations of reserv- ists in 2003, the military recognized a need to better inform reservists of their changed role. Responding to this need, the ARFORGEN policy informed reserv- ists of operational plans and preparatory activities in their probable use as ‘ soldier warriors ’ . The policy has developed realistic expectations among reservists, their families, and employers concerning reservists ’ operational use. Third, there is a need to better under- standing the relationship of recruitment motives and incentives and implicit expectations regarding the role of reservist (as in the case of the instrumental volunteer). Recruitment of youths based solely on short-term material benefi ts to fulfi l recruits ’ needs outside the military incentives would seem to per- petuate the instrumental volunteer identity. It seems then that benefi t would be gained by developing identities that correspond to new and emerging demands and requirements made of reservists.

The analysis here implies more active construction of identities for reservists. Identities have evolved over time, largely because of adjustments made by

the US military to world events, which, in turn, have affected the nature of reserve military service. Rather than having a retrospective understanding of reserv- ists ’ identities as irrelevant or happenstance occur- rences, the military can actively shape reservists ’ identities to meet the current and future demands of reserve military service, such as the case of soldier warrior, and to anticipate identities of ambiguous consequences, such as the instrumental volunteer ’ s likely unenthusiastic response to being deployed. Evident in the US military are several examples of the successful manipulation of identities, including special forces, paratroopers, air assault soldiers, and rangers. Studies support the notion that identities increase individual and unit combat effectiveness either directly or indirectly through stress-buffering (Manning & Fullerton, 1986; Vaitkus & Griffi th, 1990). Identities were established not only through distinctive selection and training but also symboli- cally through the wearing of berets, unit patches, and footwear. It seems appropriate to extend such manipulations to identities of reservists, given the increased reliance on the reserve component in US national defence. Identities, once defi ned, can be changed by policy, evident in General Shinseki ’ s altering of the Soldier ’ s Creed. Identities, whether purposefully planned or not, instruct military scholars, social scientists, and policymakers about the reserv- ist: why the citizen joins, why the reservist stays and deploys wontedly, and therefore identities have enormous policy and practical signifi cance. It seems that the greater the match between attributes of indi- vidual identity with those perceived of group mem- bers, the more likely the individual will join reserve military service, will remain in reserve military service, and will form cohesive bonds with group members, contributing to readiness and offering a buffer against combat stressors (Haslam et al., 2005).

Declaration of interest: Views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the US Department of the Army. The author alone is responsible for the content and writing of this paper.

Notes

In this article, the use of the term ‘ US reservists ’ [1] applies primarily to the US Army Reserve com- ponent and not necessarily to other reserves, such as Marine, Navy, and Air Force, though issues may be similar. The US Army is the largest, in personnel and equipment, of the US military. Two components comprise the US Army – active and reserve. The reserve component consists of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

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Both consist primarily of part-time ‘ citizen sol- diers ’ , who perform military duties one weekend a month and 15 days annual training. Throughout the discussion, ‘ identity theory ’ [2] draws on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and identity theory (Stryker & Burke, 2000). Each theory explains the individual ’ s rela- tionship to others and the larger society in terms of a socially constructed self, yet the perspectives have subtle differences. Originating from the dis- cipline of sociology, identity theory (Stryker & Burke, 2000) relies on the concepts of role iden- tifi cation and salience (contexts that determine more self-relevance of a role) to explain indi- vidual identity. Originating from the discipline of social psychology, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) focuses on processes in the developmental of self-identity in the context of groups, and thus elaborates on the social- cognitive processes underlying self-identity, such as self-categorization and attributes of the idealized, prototypical group member. For a more extended discussion of the similarities and inferences, see Hogg et al. (1995). In terms of individual adjustment, veterans of [3] the First Gulf War reported greater occurrence and severity of post-war symptoms and distress than did non-veterans (Gray et al., 1998; Iowa Persian Gulf Study, 1997; Unwin et al., 1999). Many were categorized as formal psychiatric symptoms of war trauma but other symptoms such as fatigue, headaches, muscle and limb numbness, loss of concentration and memory problems came to be referred to as the Gulf War syndrome. Studies have since reported no plausible etiolo-gical explanation of these symp- toms and no actual new syndrome has yet to be determined (Iverson et al., 2007). The current Soldier ’ s Creed is available at [4] http://www .army.mil/soldierscreed/fl ash_version/ index.html (accessed 10 May 2010). As time progresses, those who ascribed to past [5] identities likely become fewer, and those who ascribe to emergent identities become more prevalent, especially when considering the turn- over rates among personnel serving in the Reserve, estimated permanent loss range from 12% to 22% annually (depending on unit type and deployment status), most of whom are the most recent serving, i.e. junior ranking enlisted (Lippiatt & Polich, 2010).

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