

realists will need to re-evaluate the model's relationship to 'idealism' and cultural analysis, and to delve more deeply into the questions of how can we construct viable, democratic political-economic systems — not just crime control systems — that empower all people.

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PART II: FEMINISM

CHAPTER 7

INTRODUCTION

Feminism, Criminology and Complex Variations

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Julia Schwendinger

Though more than a century old, feminism has influenced criminology significantly only in the last two and a half decades. In the late 1960s, feminist ideas began to be expressed in classrooms and in papers and articles in such North American and European institutions as the University of California School of Criminology in Berkeley, and the National Deviancy Conferences in Great Britain. Also, in the early 1970s, several members of Bay Area Women Against Rape, the first anti-rape group in the world, were criminology students expressing feminist ideas in action. Employing their expertise in fighting violence against women, these and other students and community women alerted the community about rape cases and debunked pernicious myths about victims. They influenced police training programs, reformed hospital emergency room treatment for victims, and introduced a victim-advocacy program with prosecutors and courts. Along with other students and a few faculty members, they also supported affirmative action programs for women and minorities, as well as movements against police brutality, correctional injustice and the Vietnam War.

But a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Feminism has undergone many changes, some of which are due to its multifaceted character. Feminists can be found among trade unionists, professionals and businesspeople, and within racial movements, religious denominations and political parties. Their objectives range from striving for equal pay for equal jobs and setting-up shelters for abused women, to fighting stereotypes in language and the media. Despite agreement on issues, their groups may not be convinced that specific measures such as a woman's right to abortion, affirmative action at work or representation in government are of equal importance. Variations in women's interests and attitudes toward these interests, make a heterogeneous feminist movement inevitable.

Still, whatever their differences, most feminists find common ground in opposing the power relationships that re-produce female subordination. This opposition has been particularly evident in feminist challenges to the harassment, extortion and violence inflicted in public and private life by individual men, groups of men, or male-dominated institutions.

These challenges have introduced significant innovations in legal discourse. For example, in certain instances, feminists have helped universal-

ize rape laws so that they refer to rapists without regard to such social statuses as husbands who rape their wives. Feminists have also insisted on redefining gender crimes. They have observed that more than half the people of the world are being raped, battered, murdered, harassed, mutilated, extorted, burned alive, enslaved or forced into prostitution or child marriages because of their inferior social status and the structural inequalities that determine this status. With this linkage between social harm, social status and structural inequality in mind, feminists have proposed that rape of women should be defined as a civil liberties violation (as well as a violent crime) and that international law should distinguish crimes against women as human rights violations.

Feminists also have addressed the subject of gender relations in criminology. Conventional criminology is notoriously dominated by 'malestream' points of view; yet, self-conscious awareness of androcentric bias is hardly evident, even in studies of violent men who have shaped male identities around the sexual fetishism of violence. To rectify this bias, feminists have asserted the importance of women, gender relations and feminist standpoints for penal philosophy, criminal justice institutions and the state as a whole. And, since criminal justice is influenced by gender-specific interactions in families, schools, labor markets, community, culture and society, feminists have also challenged conventional theory and research in these social spheres.

In this process, feminists have begun to move beyond reliance on simple interactionist models and social-control mechanisms which depict women as passive when confronted with patriarchal domination. Women are now considered as genuine social actors, individuals who possess their own subjective qualities and logics of rationality. Women are active participants in the social construction of their identities, although they do not make history just as they please. Significant aspects of their status are negotiable; furthermore, this negotiation is partly dependent on interests shared with men who are also affected by similar gender, class, racial, national and global relationships.

In making women a central subject, North American feminists have also widened their awareness of the very different ways that other women regard their struggle for social justice. For example, wherever political and economic individualism dominates social consciousness, women generally mobilize their struggles for justice around individual rights and equality. But women infused with this ethos of individualism are puzzled by the essentialist and communalist attitudes shared by most women in other parts of the world. There are women who are activist but not feminist.

The latter attitudes also show significant variations. On one hand, militant female members of oppressed races or ethnic groups frequently define their womanhood and sense of justice as a natural extension of their racial identities. Giving greater priority in women's movements to racial goals is, in this essentialist framework, consistent with the way these women see themselves. In Latin America, on the other hand, women, often from communities of the poor, express the most common forms of female collective action differently. They define their struggles for food, civil rights and democracy as natural and altruistic extensions of femininity and motherhood.

Because such essentialist attitudes toward femininity and motherhood seem to take patriarchal family relations for granted, they appear paradoxical to some feminists. Yet these attitudes need not imply that every form of patriarchal subjugation is acceptable to women. Latin American mothers and daughters who have stood up publicly in silent condemnation, defying the government and death squads that have killed or abducted their husbands, sons, daughters, parents or siblings, identify their interests with the household, the welfare of its members, and its conditions of life in the community and nation. Their essentialist concepts of motherhood and femininity give them the strength to take independent and courageous actions against oppression when the relationships between family life, whatever its organization, and the state are contradictory. Though it may seem paradoxical, even patriarchal families, because of their collective interest, provide ideological grounds for mobilizing women against other forms of social, economic and political oppression.

The challenge to violence against women in public and private life by individual men, groups of men, or male-dominated institutions have also impacted upon moral and political discourse, especially among educated people. Take the frequent use of the word 'patriarchy' in modern political and moral rhetoric. Previously this word was used as an adjective modifying particular kinds of male-dominated institutions or normative practices, such as patriarchal families, peasant communes or traditions. Modern feminists, however, have extended the meaning of patriarchy to all possible relationships and structures that oppress women. This general reference has made patriarchy a political metaphor, a superordinate for a variety of unspecified power relationships that share a common oppressive function.

But, whether this political metaphor is useful depends upon its social and linguistic contexts. Among women's rights advocates, for instance, this metaphor finds ample justification. It is also justified when social scientists use the metaphor to make sweeping references

to institutional sources of male oppression without necessarily distinguishing concretely what socially organized form these sources take or how they operate. However, in theory and research, this metaphor can only be a sensitizing concept because it denotes too little empirical information about too many things. When used in highly general feminist theories, it suggests that class-like groups of males oppress women, but glosses over real variations in male behavior and the contradictions in patriarchal institutions. It pays too little attention to significant variations in patriarchal relationships among men.

The application of patriarchal concepts in research is especially problematic when it embeds male oppression within communal relations, informal network relations and cultural traditions whose structures, boundaries and locus of causality are difficult to identify. For instance, conventional feminist usage of patriarchy has usually solved the causal locus problem by pointing to the entire collectivity of men ('men-as-a-group', 'men as a class', or 'all men') even though this solution is contradicted by empirical findings. In this scenario, some feminists insist that rapists victimize women because they are men, and that their male status completely overrides the importance of any other causal factor. Yet proof of this basic theoretical assumption cannot be found. Using an extremely broad definition of rape, Diana Russell's (1982) study of rape in marriage found that only 14 percent of the women in her sample were raped by their husbands during all their years of marriage. While accounting for many raped women, were criminologists actually to use this assumption in predicting rape in marriage, they would be wrong 86 percent of the time, even though marriage is the one institution wherein legal traditions have allowed men to rape women with impunity. There must be other causal factors if the vast majority of men are not raping their wives.

Making women victims central subjects necessarily implicates male offenders for the most part; but, rather than blaming all men, patriarchy, to be useful in criminology, urgently needs to be informed about how men vary in regard to women. It needs to be informed concretely about what kind of males, interest groups and structures promote patriarchal relations or undermine them.

Attempts to explicate how women are oppressed have understandably focused on formal patriarchal institutions such as the state. But, here, too, theory and research are confronted with complex variations. State institutions are not all the same and, in countries with democratic states, feminists are searching for more sophisticated explanations of how states maintain male domination or, for that matter, how this domination can be undermined politically. Democratic

states represent social relations in which legal patriarchal control in many areas is not a settled issue. Also, democratic governments show sizable differences when confronted with feminist movements. Like anti-abortion laws and property rights, patriarchal policies have been fought successfully under some governments but not others, and under some democratic political regimes but not others. Contradictory differences can also be found in totalitarian and authoritarian governments. As state socialism evolved in the Soviet Union, women's lives were shackled to forced collectivization and industrialization policies which improved women's educational and occupational status but at a very great cost in other respects.

The following articles exemplify a variety of sophisticated feminist approaches in studying patriarchal relations. Dawn H. Currie observes that an overriding focus on the plight of women victims can have questionable consequences. It has already reinforced conservative law-and-order trends that attempt to curb patriarchal control of women, but by employing retribution rather than prevention and rehabilitation. Currie suggests that a greater understanding of state relations could lead to improved strategies for achieving feminist goals.

Currie's article evaluates adaptations and modifications of theories about the state produced by feminists. She describes two main approaches to state theory, the instrumental theory and structural theory. She prefers structural theory in which the state is fairly autonomous and beset with contradictions. In the long run, on the other hand, the state must protect the system based on patriarchal capitalism as a whole.

Currie wisely notes that these functional approaches are used by feminists but that they have limitations. She urges further development of feminist perspectives on the state based on the analysis of concrete events and a comparative historical method of inquiry.

Mona J. E. Danner notes the importance in feminist thought of women-centered descriptions and explanations of personal and social experience. Yet, she also observes that feminists have adopted assumptions from a variety of theoretical schools of thought including liberal, radical, Marxist, psychoanalytic, existentialist and post-modern feminism. Her article shows that feminist theory is evolving from creative mergers of both old and new intellectual currents.

Socialist feminism is another perspective created from the interaction between intellectual currents. Danner indicates this feminist current is a hybrid that integrates the concept of patriarchy in radical feminist theory with the notion of production and reproduction

from Marxist theory. She describes other socialist feminist ideas that strengthen critical criminology.

Seema Ahluwalia addresses different issues. She urges that feminist analysis pay more attention to male aggression rather than arguing about whether female or male oppression is worse. Feminists should also demystify "power and its components, one of which is the production of 'masculinity' and 'masculine behavior'." This demystification should recognize that black women are often skeptical about equating only masculinity with violence. They note that white women also perpetuate violence by supporting racism against black people. The other authors also mention complications concerning the relations between gender and violence in racist societies.

Ahluwalia feels feminists should focus on the sexual continuum of violence, composed of an array of violent acts that control women such as flashing, harassment, sexual assault and rape. A continuum would help feminists move beyond individualistic crime to an exploration of male violence in structural contexts such as corporations and state institutions. Also, since it is typically men who are trained to use violence, not women, feminists should study state violence in the hands of men rather than male violence in the hands of the state.

Robert Menzies and Dorothy E. Chunn also criticize traditional androcentric criminology; but, they primarily focus on dilemmas and difficulties confronting feminists who teach criminology. This confrontation, of course, is not limited to feminists in criminology. Alternative feminist academic perspectives have generally evolved in universities at a high cost to their proponents because male faculty and administrators have fought against gender equality and feminist studies for more than a quarter century.

Menzies and Chunn write about the need for a feminist pedagogy in criminology despite the generalized backlash from management, faculty and students against feminist instruction. They suggest that observations and responses of feminist teachers in other disciplines can contribute some guidelines to the development of such a pedagogy. The authors describe these guidelines and remind the reader that feminist commitments to political praxis should aid not just women but all "subjects of subordination," even beyond the halls of ivy.

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CHAPTER 8

Women and The State: A Statement on Feminist Theory

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The diversity of analyses concerning the oppression of women means that the Women's Movement historically has been ambivalent towards the state. However, a number of recent writers are expressing alarm about a growing alliance between feminism and the state. This new partnership is rooted in the criminological focus upon women as victims of sexual and domestic violence and the patriarchal complicity represented by state non-intervention. Within this context, the feminist struggle is against the patriarchal control of women through the creation of new criminal offences, accelerated arrest and convictions, and increased sentencing of male offenders. These *law and order* demands are defended on a number of grounds: women only want the justice that has been provided for other victims of crime; feminism is not responsible for the current form of male justice, it is only asking for it to be applied consistently; the use of criminal legislation against violence against women fosters the principle of women's dignity as people; and, although legislation and sentencing may not diminish crimes, they present occasions for debates which increase political awareness of the concerns of women. As reasoned as these arguments may appear, this appeal for *law and order* is problematic for those committed to both feminism and critical criminology. Pitch (1985) notes that this position accepts liberal guarantees of formal safeguards in the justice system; emphasizes retribution rather than rehabilitation; abandons prevention as a way of eliminating at least some of the contradictions which foster crime and criminalization; and analytically collapses together 'needs', interests, demands and institutional responses so that demands for more repression are seen as evidence of real needs. Sharing these concerns, I would like to raise some questions about current feminist analyses of the state, recognizing that theoretical work links up eventually with practical issues.

While undoubtedly an over-simplification, it is nevertheless fair to identify two theoretical approaches to "state theory." The first approach, characterized by the work of MacKinnon (1989) and Greschner (1986), follows the tradition of Miliband (1973). Whether disillusioned liberals or radical feminists, these writers view the state as inherently neutral, used in its own right to advance the interests of the powerful. From this position, Dworkin's and MacKinnon's *Pornography Ordinance* represents an attempt to make the state responsive to feminists demands. On the whole, however, this position shares the assumption with radical feminists that the state

currently reflects the interest which men as a group share in the subordination of women. While seldom explicated, this interest is usually equated with the control of women's sexuality and/or capacities for procreation. Clark and Lewis (1977), for example, characterize law as the regulation of women as male property.

It is perhaps ironic that instrumentalism has emerged in feminist debate long after its demise in more traditional circles. While the problems of instrumentalism generally are far too many to reiterate here, the feminist propositions of women as male property and the existence of universal male interests have been roundly denounced. Practically, while engagement with the state is an implicit goal, apart from the questionable assumption that the increased representation of feminist interests will necessarily make a difference, specific concrete strategies are not readily apparent. For these and other reasons, this position has been rejected by socialist feminists. Instead, a number of writers maintain that the state will maintain social cohesiveness and reproduce the conditions necessary for production and procreation regardless of the individuals in charge. This follows from analyses of writers like Poulantzas (1972, 1973, 1975) and two senses to the meaning of "structuralism": because individual actors who make up the state are determined by structures, they are not themselves agents of history; and that the state is externally constrained because of its relationship to capital. Thus the inclusion of women in the state apparatus has not — because it necessarily cannot — produced radical change in terms of the long-term operation of the state.

Overall, a structural approach is an analytical advance in my opinion. Analyzing the state in terms of social relationships, both gender and class — as well as race — are subject to investigation. Characterizing the state as active in its own right, it is seen to 'mediate', 'transform' and 'reconstitute' *relations of reproduction*, specifically those between women and men as well as the family and the workplace. In this regard, the relationship between capital and patriarchy is a central analytical concern, addressed by two distinct but related approaches. Eisenstein (1979) and Hartmann (1981), in particular, explore the neo-Marxist question of the autonomy of the state in the oppression of women. For Eisenstein (1979), the state institutionalizes women's oppression through the real separation of public (male) and private (female) life and through the ideological separation of men and women through symbols, signs, and language. However, this process is fraught with contradictions. The state must mediate competing needs, particularly those between "the capitalist need for waged laborers, the patriarchal need for the institution of

motherhood ... and the ideology of liberalism" which generates the need for equal rights. Within this context, the struggle is over the appropriation of women's sexuality, procreative capacities, and re/productive labour as a benefit to individual men as well as men as a class and society as a whole. Because the state must orchestrate long-term rather than immediate interests, Eisenstein concludes that it is 'relatively' autonomous. This autonomy appears to account for those historical instances when the state acts in ways which are contrary to the interests of particular capitals or which favor women's interests against those of men. Despite recent changes which appear to benefit women, however, the appropriation of women's re/productive labours remains constant. Overall, the state is seen to mediate between "two separate but interlocking sets of social relations, capitalism and patriarchy, each with a material base, each with its own dynamic" (Hartmann, 1981: 364). In the final analysis, however, although relatively autonomous the state must protect the capitalist patriarchal system as a whole.

By thus expanding Poulantzas' framework to include patriarchy, Eisenstein inherits limitations of his approach, as well as adding a few new ones. In particular, while the relative autonomy of the state can be analytically defended by differentiating the capitalist class from the state, no such distinction is made between patriarchy and the state: "the governing or ruling class is made up of men who represent the sexual-class needs of men". The state is autonomous from patriarchy only to the extent that various factions within this sex class differ on how to best protect and reconstitute patriarchy. This lack of consensus provides a moment at which the state is vulnerable to pressure from social movements. While Eisenstein agrees that reform is not revolution, she argues that by challenging the state, the sex/class position of women and the patriarchal nature of the state can be unveiled.

Ursel (1986, 1984) likewise equates patriarchy with the control of women's re/productive labours. However, she identifies three modes of reproduction which each correspond to communal, familial, and social patriarchy. The state's role in maintaining patriarchy was consolidated during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. This is because the centralization of production and the creation of individual wage earners meant that husbands and fathers no longer directly benefitted from the labour of wives and children. In fact, men found themselves in direct competition with women and children in the labour market. Further, since individual capitalists are interested primarily in the immediate extraction of surplus labour, Ursel claims that "class

interests under capitalism were now structurally incompatible with patriarchal interests." The state "stands alone as the only entity which has the interest in preserving patriarchy and the material resources to do so" (1986: 157). During the present period, the state is being forced to take over many of the functions of the family in order to prevent capitalism's complete erosion of the familial unit of reproduction. Thus activities of the state can appear contradictory *viz* the interests of women: while the state may restrict access to birth control and abortion, for example, at other times it has liberalized family law. From this position Ursel draws a much more pessimistic conclusion: legal reforms which appear to favour women do not signify the demise of patriarchy; rather they represent the restructuring of patriarchy from its familial to its current social form. In this way, Ursel's approach posits a unitary system of women's oppression and implicitly argues against feminist engagement with the state. As feminists engaged in political battle, what are we to make of these competing claims?

Paradoxically, these attempts to develop a structural theory of women's oppression replicate many of the problems which plague 'malestream' practice and theory by the left. Politically, these analyses tend to result in monolithic prescriptions for politically correct practice. Theoretically, current debates represent a non-Marxist transformation of the question of women's oppression from an historical to a theoretical inquiry. For the large part, this follows from the analytical privilege which feminist theory gives to the concept patriarchy. Asking *how the state reproduces or resists the patriarchal control of women* results in answers which merely reflect presuppositions upon which the question is based. For this reason, both instrumentalist and structuralist approaches are teleological explanations (and often tautologous ones as well). Clearly, what we need from both a practical and theoretical perspective is an approach which avoids the pitfalls outlined here. To date, writers simply equate 'the state/patriarchy with either 'interests' or the 'needs' of reproduction: for the 'nation state', historically they have concerned warfare and more recently a growing pool of unemployed labour; for capitalists an *under* rather than *over* abundance of labourers; for men, historically, the legitimacy of children and, currently, rights of custody; for women, both in the past and the present, control over fertility. However, it is not clear specifically which *relations of reproduction* will coincide with which interests. What may be easier to identify in my opinion are ways in which the *conditions — ideological and material — of reproduction* are the site of ongoing struggle. While the current struggle over abortion rights, for example, may be seen in terms of the

control of women's fertility, the *real* struggle for North American women is not whether abortion will be practiced, but whether safe abortion will be universally available through socialized medicine or only according to the ability to pay (Currie, 1991). By identifying concrete processes accessible to empirical investigation, analytically we are no longer trapped in the 'patriarchy gives rise to state gives rise to patriarchy' argument. From a practical perspective, where and how we might want to engage ourselves in struggles against/with the state may be easier to identify. This does not mean that I endorse a purely experiential explanation of the operation of patriarchy and the state; rather merely that we open the door to a comparative historical method of inquiry which will allow us to build feminist theory 'from the ground up.'

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CHAPTER 9

Socialist Feminism: A Brief Introduction

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In the Spring, 1989 issue of *The Critical Criminologist* socialist feminism is highlighted in two excellent pieces. Dawn Currie discusses feminist theoretical analyses of gender and the state and categorizes socialist feminism as situated in the structuralist approach, in contrast to the instrumentalist approach that many liberal and radical feminists favor. Marty Schwartz identifies socialist feminism as one of the "top theoretical orientations attempting to break into the big leagues of critical criminology today" and states that it has "perhaps the best potential to change the entire direction of critical criminology."

My concern is that while many *CC* readers are familiar with feminist theory and so know what Schwartz and Currie are talking about, many more know only that feminism as a social movement has impacted upon their personal lives. The lack of even a passing acquaintance with feminist theory, let alone socialist feminism, is evidenced by the failure of much mainstream and critical criminology to identify and to incorporate gender into their analysis (Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1988:231-233; Messerschmidt, 1986:9). Thus, this essay is a very brief introduction to socialist feminist theory.

Feminist theory is a woman-centered description and explanation of human experience and the social world. It asserts that gender governs every aspect of personal and social life. Women's inner lives and daily experiences are considered to be the focus of inquiry. This is true whether or not the situation specifically concerns 'women's issues.' Women are not ignored in any situation, and the discovery, understanding and explanation of their presence and their experience is considered crucial in feminist studies. Also, feminist theory is activist and seeks social change to end the neglect and subordination of women. The goals of feminist studies are to describe, to understand, to explain, and to change.

Daly's and Chesney-Lind's (1988) 'required reading' on feminism and criminology use Jaggar's (1983) typology of feminist theory and identify four varieties of feminist theory: liberal, radical, Marxist, and socialist feminism. (In addition to these four, Rosemarie Tong, 1989 identifies psychoanalytic, existentialist, and postmodern feminism.) Liberal feminism is the most widely recognized in the U.S. and is the basis for the contemporary women's movement. Its principal concept of equal rights seeks gender equality by ending discrimination based on sex in order to ensure equal opportunity.

Socialist feminism unites the primary concepts in radical and Marxist feminism to identify women's oppression as based in capitalist patriarchy (Eisenstein's term) or patriarchal capitalism (Messerschmidt's term). Socialist feminists recognize the inadequacies and the strengths in Marxist and radical feminism. Marxism often ignores the importance of sex, gender, and race, in many critical conceptualizations and in its explanations of workers' exploitation in capitalism. Marxism usually ignores gender in discussions of the mode of production or in the composition of classes in capitalism. Yet, capital logic makes use of workers' sex and race and exploits the subordinate groups to its advantage in the labor market. And gender, as a segregating and subordinating force, has not disappeared in non-market nations. Marxism does provide many of the essential concepts used in socialist feminism, although they are enlarged to attend to the different life experiences of women and people of color. Marxism also provides the method of historical materialism which directs much socialist feminist research.

Radical feminism is the other developmental half of socialist feminism. The weakness in radical feminism is its assumption of gender as a sex-caste. It assumes a universality and commonality of women's subordination that does not exist. Important power differentials among women are ignored. Radical feminism's indispensable contribution is its identification of the important concept of patriarchy in questions of gender and power. Patriarchy is the subordination and domination of women by men, in the public and private domains, in all social institutions. While patriarchy is a powerful force, radical and socialist feminism do not consider it to be deterministic. Feminists in both of these orientations recognize the value of the standpoint of the human subject.

The essence of socialist feminism is two-fold. Firstly, the mode and relations of production and reproduction are inter-connected, indeed, inseparable. And secondly, gender, class, and race intersect in ways that result in important differences in life experiences in both the productive and reproductive realms for persons.

Socialist feminists understand the mode and relations of production in the usual Marxian way: as the instruments and tools used, and the reciprocal relations established between people, in the production process of material goods. Feminist analyses of the productive sphere emphasize the presence and awareness of gender in the economy, as in the analysis of gender segregation in the labor market, the use of women as a secondary labor force, and comparable worth. It is reproduction that is generally highlighted in socialist feminist analysis.

The mode and relations of reproduction focus on sexuality, childbearing, childrearing, and daily personal maintenance. Socialist feminists study how these activities are constructed, organized, and understood in society. Special attention is paid to who performs them and how they are valued. Thus, we see studies of homework, housework, sex and sexuality, sexual and domestic violence, divorce, abortion, and many other areas not previously considered in Marxist work.

Both production and reproduction are part of the economic base of society and exist in a dialectical relationship which heavily influences, and is influenced by, the superstructure. Socialist feminists will not accord the economic, political or public life primacy over the home, personal or private life. In fact, socialist feminists demand that these two areas be considered together and not separated. "Patriarchy shapes the form modern capitalism takes, just as the development of capitalism has transformed patriarchal institutions" (Hartmann, 1979:208). Both the capitalist class and individual men benefit from patriarchy. The well-known feminist phrase "the personal is political" can be extended to better reflect socialist feminist analysis as: the personal is political and economic and the political and economic is personal.

Socialist feminists regard the intersection of class, gender, and race as crucial to understanding difference. In reality, much analysis still focuses on gender and class and separates out race. Authors typically note that while they know they should include race in their analysis they do not because race is a complicating factor. This is not news to persons of racially subordinate groups. We cannot continue to fall into that trap.

Socialist feminists understand that class and race intersect to influence the experience of women and men in capitalist societies. There is no universal woman or man, or African-American or white, or working-class person. There are differences between working-class and middle-class women and these differences are compounded by differences in race. Thus, the crux of socialist feminists' concern with the intersection of gender, class, and race is the recognition of difference. This does complicate theory and research but it is a reality that cannot be ignored. Patriarchy cannot be separated from capitalism, neither can racism, imperialism, or any oppression based on 'otherness.' All are related dialectically. While we often separate them for analytical purposes, none can be separated in reality, and it is increasingly questionable whether they should be separated in analyses.

Finally, a comment on socialist feminism and critical criminology. I am wary of Schwartz's statement that socialist feminism is trying to "break into the big leagues of critical criminology." The feminist project extends beyond any one discipline or perspective. It is critical and radical; however, it is not seeking a home in any existing division in academia. The feminist perspective is contributing in significant ways to all of the academic disciplines. Socialist feminism can certainly strengthen, and be strengthened by, the orientation of critical thought in criminology. The challenge is to develop and gain acceptance of this joint project.

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CHAPTER 10

Currents in British Feminist Thought: The Study of Male Violence

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The victimization of women has been the subject of some preoccupation within criminology in recent years. Traditionally, criminologists have helped to perpetuate the myth of the 'dark stranger' as women's nemesis. Meanwhile, the British left criminological community, be it of the 'realist' or 'idealist' persuasion, have brought race and urban problems into the equation with little more than a cursory glance at the work and concerns of feminist activists and writers.

The marginalistic and tokenistic inclusions of women into old formulations has led some feminists to note the political expediency of the 'malestream'; meanwhile, the emergence of an integrated gender analysis in the study of crime has yet to appear. In its absence, feminists have turned their attention away from criminology, indeed eschewing the narrow parameters of this discourse, and begun to explore broader questions about violence against women. In focussing on the nature and manifestations of male violence, feminists are formulating important research questions which deserve further exploration.

THE CONTINUUM OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

The concept of a continuum of sexual violence has been most recently developed by Liz Kelly (1988) but the idea has been germinating over the last twenty years of British feminist thought. The study of violence against women in terms of discrete and separate forms of behaviour such as domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape, and incest has evolved into the view that such forms of male violence comprise different aspects of the general phenomenon of sexual violence against women (Hanmer *et al*, 1989). Such behaviour is therefore better conceived in terms of a 'continuum' of violence against women which can begin in childhood and continue throughout our lives. This continuum should not be conceived of as a method of recording incidence mapped over a set period of time. Instead it is a conceptual tool, a way of understanding the totality of women's experience in sexist societies, indicating the range and extent of violent behaviour that women experience throughout their lives.

Methodologically speaking, this represents the recognition that the law and criminology have traditionally provided male accounts of 'reality' which need to be de-centred in order for women, not men, to be able to describe and name their experiences. Such an approach achieves several aims of feminist

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research. Firstly, it allows for an exploration of the 'hidden violence' that exists in so many women's lives and points to the patriarchal formulation of official statistics and surveys (Stanko, 1985;1988). Secondly, it opens up questions of how and why women are not protected from such exposure. Finally, the continuum is a move to eradicate what feminists believe to be a false dichotomy between victims and non-victims, a duality that characterizes traditional exploits of victimology and reinforces mythologies of 'deserving' and 'innocent' victims (Walklate, 1989). Instead, the focus is on the commonality of women's experience, typified as it is by the experience of violence at the hands of an often known and trusted male.

At the center of this development is the recognition that violence against women is normalized in Western societies. The sexual continuum of violence makes clear the range and extent of violent behaviour that is committed against women on a daily basis. By locating various forms of male violence on this continuum we come to an understanding of the routinized form of coercion that exists in women's lives.

The notion of a sexual continuum of violence problematizes the distinction that is typically made between 'normal' and 'aberrant' behaviour and as such, is a critical departure from both traditional and 'radical' criminology. This tenuous distinction is not sustainable in light of recent feminist research in Britain. The work of Ruth Hall (1985), Hanmer and Saunders (1984), and Stanko (1989), for example, has indicated that, far from being rare and atypical, sexual harassment in the workplace, rape and domestic violence are a frighteningly common experience. Further to this, this body of work has made clear that the culprit is not always that 'dark stranger', that psychopath lurking in the shadows — too often women are abused by men they know, trust and love. While such a distinction might speak to the social control mechanisms used against men whose behaviour is formally labelled 'pathological', it says little about the way women experience men's behaviour since, for many women, violence is a 'typical' aspect of their daily lives.

Feminists have cynically noted that any discussion of violence against women has focussed on only the most bizarre or most violent forms of abuse such as rape. However, through the use of interview data, women are beginning to reveal how the threat of violence and more subtle forms of repression have created great fear in their lives, thereby reducing their participation in public life. Women's fear has traditionally been equated to fear of rape, but new research indicates that many women are equally fearful of other forms of public male

violence like flashing and sexual assault (Kelly, 1988). Again the continuum has been useful in drawing out women's experiences and demonstrating that other forms of threatening and/or violent male behaviour has achieved the result of social control of women.

Noting that the threat of violence, not just violence itself, has served as a potent aspect of social control of women, some feminist researchers have moved to study behaviours not typically included in the criminologist's repertoire, including 'kerb crawling', 'wolf whistling' and other forms of street harassment. Feminists have charted the range and extent of such behaviour and how it has managed to avail women of their feelings of personal safety, even in the open, in broad daylight, at the heart of their 'community'.

While much work remains to be done, the most important aspect of the sexual continuum of violence is the effort by feminists to disengage from limiting and individualistic questions of criminality and to explore male agency in its structural context. Questions of why some men are violent have been replaced with questions of how different institutions interact to produce, condone, and exacerbate violence against women (Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1990).

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MASCULINITY

Needless to say, all men are not violent; however, criticism of feminist theory and research has often pointed to the monolithic and one-dimensional presentation of male agency that emerges from feminist work (see, for example, Liddle, 1989). There is a need to reject conceptions of men as innately violent, to define the structural nature of men's power to choose violence as an option. These concerns are evidenced in recent work in Britain which explores the social construction of masculinity. It should be noted that 'men's studies' seems to be as contentious in the British context as it is in North America. While some welcome this area of study as a natural extension of the feminist project to deconstruct gender, others express concern that this new area of research is intended to usurp feminist areas of inquiry, and the accompanying funding which would be allocated, along traditional lines, to men.

According to many feminist researchers, research that is feminist is so because of its subject matter being exclusively about women (Stanley and Wise, 1983; Kelly, 1988). Others, including myself, vehemently disagree with a definition that so narrowly defines the research agenda. As Joyce Layland points out "the latent effect of seeing feminist research as exclusively about women's lives is that it allows things male to go uninvestigated, almost as though the idea of

the male-as-norm were not being questioned any more...we must demystify power and its components, one of which is the production of 'masculinity' and 'masculine' behaviour" (1990:129).

Despite controversy, the field is opening up some interesting research. Feminists are exploring the social construction of historically specific forms of masculinity in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of gender construction. The point here is to problematize 'men' and 'masculinity' as given and instead, to explore the current range of masculinities, noting how they are socially and politically constructed (Hearn and Morgan, 1990; Segal, 1990). For example, Layland's (1989) research is a careful observation of the ways that gay men are often subject to the same censure as women, even while some continue to caricature and perpetuate stereotypes of femininity.

The study of masculinities has yielded important information regarding so-called male aggressivity and female passivity. Segal (1990) undermines the deterministic linkage between violence and masculinity, pointing out that it is typically men, not women, who are trained to use violence, thus the linkage is derived from their systematic and socially determined involvement in various forms of violence. This shifts the analysis to a study of state violence in the hands of men rather than, as many feminists contend, male violence in the hands of the state (Segal, 1990). For black people, this distinction is terribly important, and has provided the basis for much of the current work of black feminists.

RACISM IN FEMINISM AND CRIMINOLOGY

In order to lose the banner of 'malestream', feminists have called for a reconstruction of knowledge that no longer reflects exclusively a male social reality. However, black women within and out of criminology have noted that the sexism of deducing the experience of all from the experience of men is rivalled only by the racism of asserting white, middle class experience as normal, and designating black people's experience to the category of 'other'.

Contributions by black women have provided much impetus to re-examining criminology. They suggest that racism, as much as sexism lies at the heart of criminology's paradigmatic constructions of femininity and, of course, masculinity. These paradigms, so long criticized in feminist discourse for excluding a far-ranging analysis of gender, have in fact been replicated in feminist work itself, ignoring the simple fact that black women's experience is different from that of white women. Central to feminist arguments is the belief that

'femininity' and 'sexuality' are not given, but are social constructs. Yet despite this recognition, there is a continuing paucity of references to the different cultural experiences and socialization patterns of black women. Thus gender differences are assumed to be universal. For example, Rice (1990) notes that feminist criminology has almost exclusively focussed on white female offenders. No research in Britain has compared sentencing patterns of black and white women and little consideration has been given to the special problems of isolation and discrimination that black women face in prison (Rice, 1990).

Black feminist thought has been particularly skeptical about the traditional equating of masculinity with violence. Understanding men as the bearers of power and the perpetrators of all evil denies the privilege that white women have over black men and also neglects to implicate white women in perpetuating racism and using violence against black people. But it also denies the violent resistance of men and women, black and white, against state violence so evident in British history (Bhavnani, 1987).

Whilst sexism has been challenged by feminists, racist stereotypes have remained intact. Furthermore, "in assuming a universal dimension of men's power, this approach has ignored the fact that race significantly affects black women's experiences in the home, in the labour market, of crime and in the criminal justice system" (Rice, 1990: 62). While white women have struggled to make careers for themselves in a (white) male-dominated labour market, Black women have often found themselves providing the domestic labour. Surely then, black women could be excused for their early dismissal of feminism as a racist and bourgeois project.

Feminist agendas have developed without sensitivity to the concerns of black women, and in Britain, this is particularly relevant to the issue of policing. Susan Edwards encourages us to note that "when black people are the subject, the law is extremely oppressive" (1990:148), yet in the next breath she condones the cry from white feminists for "more intensive policing, stricter laws, more control of men's power and the regulation of men's violence" (1990:149). Considering the racist application of the law as she has so well noted, Edwards must realize the weight of these new policies will come down on black communities. Such policies will give *carte blanche* to the London Metropolitan police to further harass their favourite targets: young black men. Such policies will provide excuses to harass black women further, for example, Mama (1990) has described how police will discourage black citizens from reporting 'domestics' by using a call for help as a springboard for immigration or housing checks. In light of

these considerations, I could refer to such policies as racist; the best I can offer is to point out the naivety of such initiatives for they will create a new set of hardships that will drive black women deeper into silence. For what choice is a woman to make between protecting herself from the ravages of sexism and protecting her community from the incursions of racism?

And what of the realities of everyday experience for women in colonial Britain and North America which make it impossible to do what some feminists seem to manage with a single stroke of the pen, that is, separate race and gender. Mama's (1990) research demonstrates how race complicates women's struggles within and outside the family. Whilst accepting the oppression of black females at the hands of black males, the historical experiences of slavery and colonialism have left a legacy of racism which black men and women struggle against together. In order to understand the experience of black women, our experience as black people must be considered.

CONCLUSION

Liddle (1989) has suggested that feminists have caricatured malehood, even while decrying the stereotypical portrayal of women. Feminist attempts to expose the hidden violence in women's lives have been met with the cynical response of critics who point to the vast amount of hidden violence in the lives of men. The media have recently provided extensive coverage of incident after incident of young males who, like women, are victims of crimes at the hands of men who are in more powerful positions than they, including parents, teachers, priests, and others. While some feminists have engaged in ridiculous and unwinnable arguments of whose oppression is the worst, it is perhaps more useful to focus on the unavoidable conclusion: that the aggressor is male.

Whilst suggesting that feminist research promises a more democratic research agenda, there is a further note on the limitations of the directions this agenda is taking. The political space that is presently being patrolled by feminists still reflects certain class and racial biases. An important part of the agenda that continues to be overlooked is the violence committed against women by corporations and institutions. Why not address institutionally-enforced poverty in the context of violence against working class and under class people? For example, health hazards and unsafe work conditions are of grave concern to black working women who are more likely to find themselves in the most ghettoized areas of the labour force.

It is true that feminists will be criticized for the shoddiness of their conceptual formulations, for their ill-conceived categories, for their less than rigorous methodology. Feminists need not be deterred by the slings and arrows. We might construe it as an indication of established discourses having to have to take us on board, a matter that is evident in attempts to normalize and incorporate feminist work within existing criminological paradigms rather than providing a gendered analysis of crime. Despite attempts at co-optation and outright hostility from the establishment, feminists continue their struggles in the workplace, in the community, and in the home.

I would like to end on a positive note. Whilst feminists have many theoretical disagreements, there is unity in terms of the goals: feminist research must move beyond the process of merely documenting women's experience of violence and include a strategy for changing the conditions under which women are forced to live. At the end of the day, we should take pride and strength in the resistance shown by so many women to the violence and oppression meted out against them.

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CHAPTER 11

Kicking Against The Pricks: The Dilemmas of Feminist Teaching in Criminology

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The pathways toward a genuine feminization of criminology are littered with obstacles. This business of ours is profoundly malestream in its politics and preoccupations, and after all these years it is scarcely a revelation to recite the androcentric impulses that drive the discipline — or to underscore the structured silencing of women's voices in virtually every corner of the criminological landscape. Moreover, despite the emergence of a compelling and articulate feminist challenge over the past decade and more, the heart of conventional criminology beats on relentlessly and without interruption. Like the wider academic enterprise that contains, constrains and largely defines it, criminology was built "by men and for men" (McCormack, 1987: 291). The theories and practices of institutionalized correctionalism remain a male monopoly. The very epistemological core of the field continues to be intensely gendered. As both authorities and subjects, women are outsiders to the orthodoxy. And to adopt a feminist approach to crime, law and justice means *by definition* to be marginal and oppositional, deconstructive and progressive, dangerous and endangered.

For women feminists working in departments, centres, schools and institutes of criminology and criminal justice, the implications are immense. The active commitment to feminist critique and praxis affects every dimension of a woman's political, professional and personal life. And criminology parallels other bastions of the academy in presenting far from an inviting environment. Much research is now available to document the patriarchal power structures and phallogocentric cultural climate that dominate the modern university (Dagg and Thompson, 1988; Eichler, Tite, Lenton with Vandelac, 1990; Hartung, 1990; Gaskell and McLaren, 1987; O'Brien and McIntyre, 1986; Sandler with Hall, 1986; Spender, 1981, 1982). Everywhere women are under-represented, under-employed and under-paid (Dagg and Thompson, 1989; Eichler, Tite, Lenton with Vandelac, 1990; Gaskell and McLaren, 1987; Guppy, 1989). The disproportionate male presence systematically bloats as one ascends the academic hierarchy of authority and rewards. Feminist scholars are subjected to discriminatory hiring practices and tenure decisions (Dagg and Thompson, 1988; McCormack, 1987). Sexual, physical and psychological harassment are commonplace (Boyle, 1986; Osgoode Hall Law School, 1989; McIntyre, 1987-88).

The development of women's studies centres has often been slow and sporadic — in fact, as Eichler observes, “by and large, the sociology of women's studies needs as yet to be written” (1990, Vol.3: 1). Programmes and courses encounter resistance from condescending administrators, from right-wing academics, and (most depressingly) from men of the ‘left’ on whose inventory of oppressions gender is subordinate and social class is king (McIntyre, 1987-88; Veila, 1990). Each step forward has come painfully and at a high cost. The progress — in confronting the maleist hegemony, offering a structural and ideological alternative, forging alliances of women within and without the university, carving out political openings — has of course been real and significant. But still, more than a quarter century into its second wave, the women's movement has yet to ignite a revolution in what is allegedly our most enlightened and ‘advanced’ institution.

These conflicts and contradictions are nowhere more virulent than in efforts to constitute a feminist pedagogy for the university. Research and writing in various disciplines, including women's studies (Eichler, Tite, Lenton with Vandelac, 1990; Gaskell and McLaren, 1987; Klein, 1983), law (Boyd and Sheehy, 1986; Boyle, 1986; McIntyre, 1987-88; O'Brien and McIntyre, 1986; Veila, 1990), sociology (Spender, 1981; Smith, 1987) and history (Sangster, 1989), have charted some of the many barriers and dilemmas that plague the feminist teacher. Recurrently and in a range of contexts, women have witnessed a misogynist backlash emanating from the ranks of management, faculty and students alike. The assault is fuelled by an appalling ignorance about the character and content of feminist studies; by the tendency to equate feminist epistemology with subjectivity, political partisanship and muddled thinking; by the misconception that feminism is simply one theoretical option among many for approaching substantive problems; by the urge to ghettoize ‘troublesome’ women academics in anodyne enclaves; and by a frankly retrograde and sexist rebellion against any woman who commands authority within an institution where male worldviews have historically prevailed.

The observations and responses of feminist teachers in other disciplines comprise a potentially useful set of resources for women criminologists. And it is absolutely imperative that a similar pedagogy develop in criminology, where feminist scholars, activists and instructors are doubly caught up in the patriarchal entanglements of both the criminal justice machinery and the academic knowledge mill. Feminist criminology, along with progressive criminology and critical socio-legal studies more generally (Cassels and Maloney, 1989; Hinch, 1989; Pfohl, 1980), is sorely in need of such a critical pedagogy.

Women must begin writing about, theorizing, and harnessing their experiences in the classroom, developing strategies for bringing a women's criminology to their students, for overcoming sexist reactionism, for integrating their teaching with research and other political and personal activities, for organizing these in concert with the activities of sisters in other disciplines and in the wider framework of the women's movement outside the university.

Given what we know about the rampant masculinism of academic formations and politics, and given the inherently conservative character of male-mainstream ‘liberal’ criminology, the effort to systematize a criminological feminist pedagogy could well pay dividends far beyond the lecture hall and seminar room. The point is not simply to ‘add women and stir,’ but to feminize the field and in the process to empower women in every aspect of criminology, as teachers, researchers, authors, students, practitioners and subjects. This project can be greatly enhanced by drawing from the experience of instructors inside the discipline, but also by incorporating the lessons of feminist teachers in feminist and women's studies programmes, law faculties, social science and humanities departments, and various other sites within the university. The literature that distills out of this work, while hardly homogeneous, offers a number of recurring principles and themes that simply resonate with relevance for a feminist pedagogy of crime, law and justice. What follows is a rough, tentative, and crudely condensed review of just a few guidelines extracted from the writings of feminist teachers. Some of these seem to translate acutely well into criminological discourse and practice. Some may strike a familiar chord.

First, the backlash against feminist instruction is real and mounting, and it must be taken seriously. In a recently published article Hartung describes the ‘selective rejection’ of women faculty members by students at her university. She finds that “women's studies courses earn high evaluations but [female] instructors of those courses are harshly and even cruelly assessed” (1990: 262-3). In law schools, feminist professors and instructors have been targeted for an avalanche of abuse by resistant students, often calculated and well-organized, and at least tacitly endorsed by some male colleagues. And as Boyle points out, “students possess a great deal of power to generate fear, because a teacher's self-image depends at least to some extent on her students' respect. Student resistance to teaching as if women mattered may be part of a larger resistance to overt teaching of values at all” (1986: 111). Anti-feminist classroom swarming is but one feature of a wider misogynist new wave in the university, and it is

typically couched in an inarticulate reference to 'quality of education' and 'men's rights.' Feminist pedagogy must be organized around the defusion, deconstruction and conversion of this kind of odious reactionism. The exchanges between feminist instructors and non- and anti-feminist students and colleagues must be recognized to be imminently political and gendered in their content and consequence.

Second, it is critically important to underscore the patriarchal structures and sexist ideologies that are at the roots of anti-feminist rebellion. Efforts by the advantaged and the disinterested (usually men) to reinterpret first-hand experience must be resisted. As McIntyre observes: "...often, another interpretation prevails: that it is not sexism or anti-feminism, that is just students' typical resistance to professors with a theoretical approach; or that is just the discrimination (gender-neutral) experienced by all junior faculty; or that it is just first-year teaching; or that is just the proxy for students' discontent that we did not hire someone to buttress our offerings in X area; or that is just another example of the swing to the Right in this generation of students. My position is rarely that these other causal factors are not operating at all; it is that gender is operating too" (1987-88: 388-389).

Third, feminist teaching in criminology, as elsewhere, is subversive activity. To bring women into a traditionally gender-blind and gender-biased discipline like criminology is to present a fundamental threat to entrenched epistemologies and power structures. To be a feminist teacher is to be an anti-criminologist. It is to seek out and confront the sources of women's oppression beyond preconceived structural and substantive boundaries, and in so doing to contribute to the deconstruction and reconstruction of criminology and criminal justice more generally. It is also to open up the struggle against the patriarchal *status quo*, and to link feminist teaching with other movements against hierarchies of dominance and subordination based on social class, race, ethnicity, and so forth. Feminists should be aware of what they represent, namely a multiple peril, potentially inciting a frenetic and violent response on behalf of established institutions and ideas. Feminism currently offers by far the most compelling and vigorous challenge to conventional correctional criminology, and it should come as no surprise that its introduction to the classroom has spawned a new epidemic of gynophobia.

Fourth, criminology teachers must adopt and project overt and self-conscious feminist ideologies; they must vigilantly guard against the androgynous backslide into politically inoffensive 'women's courses' and 'gender studies'; and they must at all costs break out of the ghetto. The aim of feminist criminologists is not tolerance but transformation.

Women's studies courses and programmes, criminological and otherwise, accomplish little if they are bracketed into authorized pockets of progress condoned by the mainstream. The point is rather *to become* the mainstream. In this sense, the 'integrationist-separationist' debate is a false issue that needs to be transcended. Feminist criminologists should not find much solace in the addition of one or two women and crime courses to a department's undergraduate offerings, if nothing else changes. Women need to be acknowledged and included as authors and subjects throughout the curriculum: in graduate and undergraduate courses, in first-year assembly line lectures and upper division seminars, across all substantive areas and subdisciplinary domains.

And it is at this stage of expansion and extension where the most bellicose kind of resistance can be expected. For one thing, in most criminology departments there is simply not the critical mass of women, and especially politically committed women, to feminize more than a fragment of the curriculum. For another, the introduction of feminist content into traditional male sanctuaries is interpreted by many as the most insidious invasion of all. It necessarily reveals the masculinist criminological imagination to be what it is: a subjective apologia for *status quo* politics and repressive practice that disguises itself as objective knowledge (see Spender, 1981). In opening up traditional courses to feminist critique, women are almost guaranteed to inflame preservationist sentiments. The first-year 'Introduction to Criminology' and 'Theories of Deviance' lectures, and not the upper-level 'Women and Crime' seminar, comprise the real front line for feminist pedagogy.

Fifth, as a number of writers have remarked, a principal didactic objective is to dissect the many misunderstandings about feminism that occasion belligerence and blocking among the unconverted. From the very outset it is incumbent on the feminist teacher to confront ignorance and mythology — the belief that feminism is less professional, less neutral, less valuable, less important, less real than malestream thoughts, words and deeds — and to demonstrate the everyday relevance of feminist thought and action for the lives of students. Here again, it is vital to convey the understanding that feminism is not merely one item among a shopping list of criminological theories (Eichler, Tite, Lenton with Vandelac, 1990), but is rather an overarching and paradigmatic way of seeing and overcoming the subjugation of women. Students must learn that *all* criminological and other knowledge is gendered, just as it is constituted and empowered through relations of class, race and ethnicity. Absent this insight, no

feminist teaching agenda can resist relegation to the curricular sidelines.

Sixth, men are a problem. They can also be a prospective part of the solution. On the one hand, to court coalitions with men is to risk exacerbating "male dominance in the construction of knowledge" (Spender, 1981: 2). The academic world is replete with male "experts, ignoramuses and poor dears" (Klein, 1983) who, wittingly or no, are prepared to co-opt, corrupt and capitalize on feminist issues to their own professional and personal advantage. Not surprisingly, men who teach women's studies courses are more likely than their women colleagues to characterize the experience as positive, and to encounter little opposition (and even adulation) from students (Eichler, Tite, Lenton with Vandelac, 1990, Vol.6). A demonstration of one's feminist inclinations has become a fast track to political correctness (not to mention research funds, along with sundry other credits and kudos) for male academics over the past decade, as it has for conservative women. And however genuine the motivation and progressive the man, the dangers of colonization are obvious — it clearly contributes to the reinforcement of existing patriarchal authority relations and the perpetuation of women's exclusion.

On the other hand, and reflexively, politically committed (and feminist) male criminologists can contribute immeasurably to the movement through their writing and teaching, and through the fashioning of alliances with other communities engaged in political conflict. As a bottom line, the critically conscious man must be prepared to acknowledge the frontiers of his own competencies in feminist issues, and failing this, progressive women should not be hesitant to make these known. And women should be continuously prodding, prompting, and if necessary embarrassing their male colleagues into acquiring a basic literacy in the prevailing feminist literature, and refusing to tender referral services when students are sent down the hall for a quick bibliographic fix. That too is part of a feminist pedagogy.

Seventh and last, feminist criminology in the classroom needs to be buttressed by institutional support systems both within and beyond the university walls. The lecture podium can be a lonely place at the best of times, and anti-feminist resistance can be devastating when there are no alliances or organizations to counterbalance the turmoil of teaching. For marginal, short-term, part-time, untenured and 'junior' women academics, who are "an administrator's dream" (Dagg and Thompson, 1988: 74) and who spend such a significant proportion of their time with instruction, these resources are absolutely

indispensable. Organized women's coalitions bring women together across substantive and disciplinary frontiers, and help to articulate common interests. They can also serve as conduits to the university power centres, by formulating issues and presenting demands in a manner that is at least remotely intelligible to the institutional bureaucracy. And more than this, they function to remind academics that the feminist movement is essentially a collective endeavor, in which the university is only one of myriad sites of struggle. For feminist criminologists and others involved in critical teaching, this may be the most important pedagogical principle of all — namely that university education is ultimately political praxis, and that its currency comes from the opportunity to spread dissent not only among its mainly middle-class clientele, but on behalf of women, workers, the under- and unemployed, the poor, racial, ethnic, sexual and ideological minorities, and other subjects of subordination who typically dwell far outside the world of red brick and ivy.

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PART III: POSTMODERNISM

CHAPTER 12

INTRODUCTION

The Post-Modern Perspective In Criminology

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It is reported that Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), a German philosopher and philologist (historical linguist), believed that both Christianity and socialism were the faiths of 'little men'. He denied the reality of God, truth, morality and value, and saw these as no more than the crutches of the insecure who construct meaning rather than face an inherently meaningless world. This nihilistic vision provides the anarchistic vein that sustains the post-modernist position. For those who want answers, truth, belief, or science, as deliverance in the here, or hereafter, such nihilism can be indigestible at best, and tantamount to blasphemy, at worst.

Nor is ready acceptance of the post-modernist stance made any easier by an analysis that prioritizes language and language use as the vehicle for constituting meaningful reality. Ironically, it seems that this very mode of discourse itself requires a critical faith and a knowledge of highly complex concepts that together provide more than enough justification to 'turn off' all except those who are seduced by its fundamental irreverence. In an attempt to pre-empt such aversion, I shall focus this introduction on defining the terms used by the authors of the three papers, while simultaneously situating some of the key themes of post-modernism in relation to each of their intellectual heritages. I will conclude with a brief evaluation of the promise and the traps that await the unsuspecting student.

ANTI-ENLIGHTENMENT ROOTS

If modernism is taken to be the tendency in the early twentieth century to substitute for a faith in God and guided subjective judgement, a faith in science and empirically grounded objective judgment, then post-modernism, as Alan Hunt eloquently explains in "Post-modernism and Critical Criminology," is the disenchantment with, and questioning of, all claims to truth, knowledge, power, and progress, especially those claims based on the assumed superiority of rational logic. In Foucault's terms, the post-modernist project requires the "disruption of smooth regimes of truth," and