Help with this assignment

Publius:  The  Federalist  67,  New  York  Packet,  11  March  1788  

To  the  People  of  the  State  of  New-­‐York.   The  Constitution  of  the  executive  department  of  the  proposed  government  claims  

next  our  attention.   There  is  hardly  any  part  of  the  system,  which  could  have  been  attended  with  great1  

difficulty  in  the  arrangement  of  it  than  this;  and  there  is  perhaps  none,  which  has  been   inveighed  against  with  less  candor,  or  criticised  with  less  judgment.  

Here  the  writers  against  the  Constitution  seem  to  have  taken  pains  to  signalize   their  talent  of  misrepresentation,  calculating  upon  the  aversion  of  the  people  to   monarchy,  they  have  endeavoured  to  inlist  all  their  jealousies  and  apprehensions  in   opposition  to  the  intended  President  of  the  United  States;  not  merely  as  the  embryo  but   as  the  full  grown  progeny  of  that  detested  parent.  To  establish  the  pretended  affinity   they  have  not  scrupled  to  draw  resources  even  from  the  regions  of  fiction.  The   authorities  of  a  magistrate,  in  few  instances  greater,  and  in  some  instances  less,  than   those  of  a  Governor  of  New-­‐York,  have  been  magnified  into  more  than  royal   prerogatives.  He  has  been  decorated  with  attributes  superior  in  dignity  and  splendor  to   those  of  a  King  of  Great-­‐Britain.  He  has  been  shown  to  us  with  the  diadem  sparkling  on   his  brow,  and  the  imperial  purple  flowing  in  his  train.  He  has  been  seated  on  a  throne   surrounded  with  minions  and  mistresses;  giving  audience  to  the  envoys  of  foreign   potentates,  in  all  the  supercilious  pomp  of  majesty.  The  images  of  Asiatic  despotism  and   voluptuousness  have  scarcely  been  wanting  to  crown  the  exaggerated  scene.  We  have   been  almost  taught  to  tremble  at  the  terrific  visages  of  murdering  janizaries;  and  to   blush  at  the  unveiled  mysteries  of  a  future  seraglio.  

Attempts  so  extravagant  as  these  to  disfigure,  or  it  might  rather  be  said,  to   metamorphose  the  object,  render  it  necessary  to  take  an  accurate  view  of  its  real  nature   and  form;  in  order  as  well  to  ascertain  its  true  aspect  and  genuine  appearance,  as  to   unmask  the  disingenuity  and  expose  the  fallacy  of  the  counterfeit  resemblances  which   have  been  so  insidiously  as  well  as  industriously  propagated.  

In  the  execution  of  this  task  there  is  no  man,  who  would  not  find  it  an  arduous   effort,  either  to  behold  with  moderation  or  to  treat  with  seriousness  the  devices,  not   less  weak  than  wicked,  which  have  been  contrived  to  pervert  the  public  opinion  in   relation  to  the  subject.  They  so  far  exceed  the  usual,  though  unjustifiable,  licenses  of   party-­‐artifice,  that  even  in  a  disposition  the  most  candid  and  tolerant  they  must  force   the  sentiments  which  favor  an  indulgent  construction  of  the  conduct  of  political   adversaries  to  give  place  to  a  voluntary  and  unreserved  indignation.  It  is  impossible  not   to  bestow  the  imputation  of  deliberate  imposture  and  deception  upon  the  gross   pretence  of  a  similitude  between  a  King  of  Great-­‐Britain  and  a  magistrate  of  the   character  marked  out  for  that  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  It  is  still  more   impossible  to  withhold  that  imputation  from  the  rash  and  barefaced  expedients  which   have  been  employed  to  give  success  to  the  attempted  imposition.  

In  one  instance,  which  I  cite  as  a  sample  of  the  general  spirit,  the  temerity  has   proceeded  so  far  as  to  ascribe  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  a  power,  which  by  

the  instrument  reported  is  expressly  allotted  to  the  executives  of  the  individual  States.–I   mean  the  power  of  filling  casual  vacancies  in  the  Senate.  

This  bold  experiment  upon  the  discernment  of  his  countrymen,  has  been  hazarded   by  a  writer  who  (whatever  may  be  his  real  merit)  has  had  no  inconsiderable  share  in  the   applauses  of  his  party;–and  who  upon  this  false  and  unfounded  suggestion,  has  built  a   series  of  observations  equally  false  and  unfounded.  Let  him  now  be  confronted  with  the   evidence  of  the  fact;  and  let  him,  if  he  be  able,  justify  or  extenuate  the  shameful  outrage   he  has  offered  to  the  dictates  of  truth  and  to  the  rules  of  fair  dealing.  

The  second  clause  of  the  second  section  of  the  second  article  empowers  the   President  of  the  United  States  “to  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of   the  Senate  to  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the   Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United  States,  whose  appointments  are  not   in  the  Constitution  otherwise  provided  for,  and  which  shall  be  established  by  law.”   Immediately  after  this  clause  follows  another  in  these  words—“The  President  shall  have   power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that  may  happen  during  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  by   granting  commissions  which  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session.”  It  is  from  this   last  provision  that  the  pretended  power  of  the  President  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  Senate   has  been  deduced.  A  slight  attention  to  the  connection  of  the  clauses  and  to  the  obvious   meaning  of  the  terms  will  satisfy  us  that  the  deduction  is  not  even  colorable.  

The  first  of  these  two  clauses  it  is  clear  only  provides  a  mode  for  appointing  such   officers,  “whose  appointments  are  not  otherwise  provided  for  in  the  Constitution,  and   which  shall  be  established  by  law;”  of  course  it  cannot  extend  to  the  appointment  of   senators;  whose  appointments  are  otherwise  provided  for  in  the  Constitution,  and  who   are  established  by  the  Constitution,  and  will  not  require  a  future  establishment  by  law.   This  position  will  hardly  be  contested.  

The  last  of  these  two  clauses,  it  is  equally  clear,  cannot  be  understood  to   comprehend  the  power  of  filling  vacancies  in  the  Senate,  for  the  following  reasons–First.   The  relation  in  which  that  clause  stands  to  the  other,  which  declares  the  general  mode   of  appointing  officers  of  the  United  States,  denotes  it  to  be  nothing  more  than  a   supplement  to  the  other;  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  an  auxiliary  method  of   appointment  in  cases,  to  which  the  general  method  was  inadequate.  The  ordinary   power  of  appointment  is  confided  to  the  President  and  Senate  jointly,  and  can  therefore   only  be  exercised  during  the  session  of  the  Senate;  but  as  it  would  have  been  improper   to  oblige  this  body  to  be  continually  in  session  for  the  appointment  of  officers;  and  as   vacancies  might  happen  in  their  recess,  which  it  might  be  necessary  for  the  public   service  to  fill  without  delay,  the  succeeding  clause  is  evidently  intended  to  authorise  the   President  singly  to  make  temporary  appointments  “during  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  by   granting  commissions  which  should  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session.”–Secondly.  If   this  clause  is  to  be  considered  as  supplementary  to  the  one  which  precedes,  the   vacancies  of  which  it  speaks  must  be  construed  to  relate  to  the  “officers”  described  in   the  preceding  one;  and  this  we  have  seen  excludes  from  its  description  the  members  of   the  Senate.–Thirdly.  The  time  within  which  the  power  is  to  operate  “during  the  recess  of   the  Senate”  and  the  duration  of  the  appointments  “to  the  end  of  the  next  session”  of   that  body,  conspire  to  elucidate  the  sense  of  the  provision;  which  if  it  had  been  

intended  to  comprehend  Senators  would  naturally  have  referred  the  temporary  power   of  filling  vacancies  to  the  recess  of  the  State  Legislatures,  who  are  to  make  the   permanent  appointments,  and  not  to  the  recess  of  the  national  Senate,  who  are  to  have   no  concern  in  those  appointments;  and  would  have  extended  the  duration  in  office  of   the  temporary  Senators  to  the  next  session  of  the  Legislature  of  the  State,  in  whose   representation  the  vacancies  had  happened,  instead  of  making  it  to  expire  at  the  end  of   the  ensuing  session  of  the  national  Senate.  The  circumstances  of  the  body  authorised  to   make  the  permanent  appointments,  would  of  course  have  governed  the  modification  of   a  power  which  related  to  the  temporary  appointments;  and  as  the  national  Senate  is  the   body  whose  situation  is  alone  contemplated  in  the  clause  upon  which  the  suggestion   under  examination  has  been  founded,  the  vacancies  to  which  it  alludes  can  only  be   deemed  to  respect  those  officers,  in  whose  appointment  that  body  has  a  concurrent   agency  with  the  President.–But,  lastly,  the  first  and  second  clauses  of  the  third  section   of  the  first  article,  not  only  obviate  the  possibility  of  doubt,  but  destroy  the  pretext  of   misconception.  The  former  provides  that  “the  Senate  of  the  United  States  shall  be   composed  of  two  Senators  from  each  State,  chosen  by  the  Legislature  thereof  for  six   years,”  and  the  latter  directs  that  “if  vacancies  in  that  body  should  happen  by   resignation  or  otherwise  during  the  recess  of  the  Legislature  of  any  state,  the  Executive   thereof  may  make  temporary  appointments  until  the  next  meeting  of  the  Legislature,   which  shall  then  fill  such  vacancies.”  Here  is  an  express  power  given,  in  clear  and   unambiguous  terms,  to  the  State  executives  to  fill  the  casual  vacancies  in  the  Senate  by   temporary  appointments;  which  not  only  invalidates  the  supposition,  that  the  clause   before  considered  could  have  been  intended  to  confer  that  power  upon  the  President  of   the  United  States;  but  proves  that  this  supposition,  destitute  as  it  is  even  of  the  merit  of   plausibility,  must  have  originated  in  an  intention  to  deceive  the  people,  too  palpable  to   be  obscured  by  sophistry,  and  too  atrocious  to  be  palliated  by  hypocrisy.  

I  have  taken  the  pains  to  select  this  instance  of  misrepresentation,  and  to  place  it  in   a  clear  and  strong  light,  as  an  unequivocal  proof  of  the  unwarrantable  arts  which  are   practised  to  prevent  a  fair  and  impartial  judgment  of  the  real  merits  of  the  constitution   submitted  to  the  consideration  of  the  people.  Nor  have  I  scrupled  in  so  flagrant  a  case  to   allow  myself  in  a  severity  of  animadversion  little  congenial  with  the  general  spirit  of   these  papers.  I  hesitate  not  to  submit  it  to  the  decision  of  any  candid  and  honest   adversary  of  the  proposed  government,  whether  language  can  furnish  epithets  of  too   much  asperity  for  so  shameless  and  so  prostitute  an  attempt  to  impose  on  the  citizens   of  America.  

    Cite  as:  The  Documentary  History  of  the  Ratification  of  the  Constitution  Digital  Edition,   ed.  John  P.  Kaminski,  Gaspare  J.  Saladino,  Richard  Leffler,  Charles  H.  Schoenleber  and   Margaret  A.  Hogan.  Charlottesville:  University  of  Virginia  Press,  2009.   Canonic  URL:  http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/RNCN-­‐03-­‐16-­‐02-­‐0123   [accessed  10  Jan  2013]   Original  source:  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution,  Volume  XVI:  Commentaries  on  the   Constitution,  No.  4