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FaultySexOffenderPolicyWinter2019.ppt
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Chapter 8: Faulty Sex Offender Policy

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Brief History

  • Current policy based on policies designed in the early 1990s
  • Washington State (1990) – The Community Protection Act
  • Jacob Wetterling (1989)
  • The Jacob Wetterling Act of 1994
  • Megan Kanka (1994)
  • New Jersey’s “Megan’s Law”
  • Adam Walsh Act (2006)

Megan’s Law

  • Enacted in New Jersey 89 days after the death of Megan Kanka
  • “Registration alone is not enough”
  • President Clinton enacts federal version of Megan’s Law in 1996
  • The Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law, collectively, make up Registration and Community Notification

Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification

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Adam Walsh Act

  • Signed by President Bush July 27, 2006

  • Amends previously enacted sex offender policies

  • States had until July 26, 2010 to fully enact or risk losing 10% of Byrne funding

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  • By August 2014, twenty-eight states were still struggling with the costs and bureaucratic nuisance of implementing the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
  • Eight years after it was passed by Congress. Another 17 states were in compliance and five have flatly refused, mostly for political or fiscal reasons.

  • A 2011 study by the Texas Senate Criminal Justice Committee found the loss of 10 percent of federal justice funding is an inadequate incentive to comply with SORNA. State officials estimated it would cost $38.7 million to comply, but the state would lose only about $1.4 million in Byrne funds if it refused.
  • The costs would come from adding more offenders to the registry, some for longer periods of time, and needing more law enforcement personnel to verify information at required, frequent intervals. 

AWA Certified States

States that will not take steps to be SORNA compliant

Arizona

California

Colorado

Minnesota

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Texas

West Virginia

Adam Walsh Act: SORNA

  • Divides sex offenders into three tiers based solely on crime of conviction
  • Tier 1: Misdemeanor sexual offenses
  • Tier 2: Less severe felony sexual offenses (e.g., use of minor in sexual performance, criminal sexual act, production or distribution of child pornography)
  • Tier 3: More severe felony sexual offenses (e.g., persistent sexual abuse, predatory sexual assault, aggravated sexual abuse)

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Adam Walsh Act: SORNA

  • Tier level determines length of registration and extent of community notification
  • Tier 1 = 15 years
  • Tier 2 = 25 years
  • Tier 3 = life

  • Expands in person verification requirements and enhances public access to information

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Civil Commitment

  • There are a small number of extremely dangerous, sexually violent predators who do not have a mental disease or defect, but have antisocial personality features that make them untreatable using existing techniques
  • After completion of criminal sentence
  • Long term care in civil facility
  • High risk sex offenders will remain incapacitated until they are rehabilitated
  • Twenty states have enacted some type of civil commitment statute

Research of Sexual Recidivism

  • Not all sex offenders pose the same risk: Extrafamilial child molesters who offended against male victims most likely to re-offend

  • Research has identified many factors that are related to an increase in risk of sexual recidivism

(Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Harris & Hanson, 2004)

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Sex Offender Risk Factors
(non-exhaustive)

  • Male victims
  • Deviant sexual interest
  • Antisocial personality traits
  • General self-regulation problems
  • Sexual preoccupation
  • Being young
  • Prior sex offenses
  • Prior criminal history
  • Engagement in a diversity of crimes

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Results:
Direct Test of SORNA

  • Rates of sexual re-arrest:
  • Tier 1 (8.1%)
  • Tier 2 (6.1%)
  • Tier 3 (7.5%)

  • SORNA tier level was not significantly correlated to sexual (r = .00) or non-sexual re-arrest (r = .02)

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Discussion

  • Results cast doubts on ability of SORNA provisions to increase public safety:
  • SORNA unable to predict who will re-offend
  • Crime of conviction not accurate indication of offense (e.g., plea to lesser offense)

  • Almost any well-established risk factor would be a better predictor than tier level (i.e., crime of conviction)

  • Enactment of SORNA may give communities false sense of security

Discussion (cont.)

  • Another analysis(Justice Policy Institute, (2008) indicates cost of implementing SORNA may outweigh costs of losing 10% of Byrne funding:
  • Estimated cost for New York State to implement SORNA: $31,300,000
  • 10% of New York State’s Byrne funding in 2006: $1,100,000

  • Broader question: The ability of any registration and notification laws to increase public safety

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Research on Community Members and Registration and Notification

  • Phillips (1998):
  • More than 60% of community members believed registration and notification encouraged sex offenders to behave better
  • Over 50% of respondents:

No change in leaving children with babysitter or unsupervised

No less likely to go out alone

No change in level of community involvement

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Research on Community Members and Registration and Notification

  • Anderson & Sample (2009):
  • Almost 90% of respondents aware of the registry
  • Only 35% had accessed it
  • Over 60% of community members report taking no preventative measures
  • The most common preventative measure taken was to pass the information along

Children

Neighbors

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Research on Community Members and Registration and Notification

  • Kernsmith, Comartin, Craun, & Kernsmith (2009)
  • Over 94% of respondents aware of the registry
  • Only 37% had accessed it: Families with young children most likely (59%)
  • Sex offenders found to live in 99% of zip codes

Only 27% of respondents believed an offender lived their community

Of those who had accessed the registry, 51% believed an offender lived in their community

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Research on the Impact of Sex Offender Registration and Notification:
Evaluations using Offenders

  • Schram & Milloy (1995): No significant difference in re-arrest rates between registered (n = 90) and unregistered (n = 90) sex offenders in Washington State

  • Freeman (2009): New York State sex offenders subject to notification were re-arrested more quickly and at a higher rate than those not subject to notification requirements

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Research on the Impact of Sex Offender Registration and Notification:
Evaluations using Crime Rates

  • Barnoski (2005):

Findings:

Rates of sexual felony recidivism dropped after 1990 passage of registration law

Rates of sexual felony and violent felony recidivism dropped after 1997 amendment of the notification law

Study limitations:

Like the previous two studies, only looked at recidivisms

Only examined rates through percentage comparisons and binary logistic regression, so ignored natural changes in the crime rate

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Research on the Impact of Sex Offender Registration and Notification:
Evaluations using Crime Rates (cont.)

Walker, Maddan, Vásquez, VanHouten, & Ervin-McCarthy (2005):

Findings:

Six states experienced no change in rape arrest rates

Three states experienced a drop in rape arrest rates

One state experienced an increase in rape arrest rate

Study Limitations

Used UCR data: Could not separately model recidivisms, first time offenses, or different sex offenses

Modeled no non-sexual offense series for comparison

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Research on the Impact of Sex Offender Registration and Notification:
Evaluations using Crime Rates (cont.)

  • Zgoba, Witt, Dalessandro, & Veysey (2008)
  • Findings:

Statewide sexual offense rates steadily decreased from 1985 to 2005

No consistent effect of Megan’s Law at county level

Costs an average of about $265,000 per county per year to maintain the registry (mostly for staff)

Limited effect of Megan’s Law may not justify expense

  • Study Limitations:

Used UCR data: Could not separately model recidivisms, first time offenses, or different sex offenses

Logic

  • Closer monitoring should reduce opportunities to offend and deter future offenses.
  • The pathways by which these policies should work depend on assumptions about the criminal justice system, citizen behavior, and sex offenders.

Assumptions about Sex Offenders and Sex Crimes

  • According to prior research, there are four broad assumptions about sex offenders and sex crime.
  • The first assumption is that law enforcement can effectively track sex offenders living in the community.

  • Among the few studies that exist, results suggest law enforcement faces significant challenges in maintaining the registries and notifying the public.

  • The second assumption is that the public will use information obtained from sex offender databases and take proactive measures to avoid victimization.
  • Studies reveal that although most people favor registries, only a minority actually utilize the databases and less take preventive measures.

  • The third assumption is that sex offender registries produce deterrent effects.
  • Some evidence suggests that registries may produce a deterrent effect perhaps through fear of being formally labeled a sex offender; however, most studies offered little support that registries deter offenders or would-be offenders through fear of sanctions or stigma.

  • The fourth assumption is that most sex crimes are committed by stranger perpetrators with a known history of offending.
  • Studies have uncovered that a large majority of victims know the offender in some capacity. Also, registries may not include an exhaustive nor representative list of sex offenders.

Redicivism

  • One major study found that only about 5% of sexual offenders committed a new sexual crime within five years.
  • The U.S. Department of Justice places the re-offense rate for sexual offenders as low as 3 to 10%, and a study conducted by Karl Hanson found that out of 8,000 offenders that were tracked, none who remained offense-free for 15 years were likely to reoffend after.

  • To put the threat posed by sexual offenders committing new offenses in perspective, a 2014 study found that roughly 3 percent of felons with no known history of sexual offenses committed one within roughly five years.

Part 2:
Sex Offender Residency Restrictions

Brief History

  • Began in the mid-1990s: Delaware and Florida

  • Usually restrict sex offenders from residing within 1,000 to 2,500 feet of schools, playgrounds, daycare centers, and other places where children congregate

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Intent and Basis

  • Attempt to protect children from sexual abuse committed by previously convicted sex offenders

  • Based on several assumptions related to sexual offending:
  • Sexual recidivism accounts for many, if not most, instances of child sexual abuse
  • The majority of child sexual abuse is perpetrated by strangers
  • Residential proximity to areas where children congregate is related to offending

Research on the Assumptions:
Recidivisms are the Problem

  • Nationwide, 87% of all individuals arrested for sexual crimes had been not previously convicted of a sexual crime

  • In New York State, only 5% of all sexual crimes (and only 6% of all child molestations) were committed by individuals previously convicted of a sexual crime

(Greenfeld, 1997; Sandler, Freeman, & Socia, 2008)

Research on the Assumptions:
Perpetrated by Strangers

  • Only about 18% of child sexual abuse victims did not know their abuser (71% were acquainted/ knew by sight; 10% were family)

  • For elementary and middle school age victims of child sexual abuse, only 5% were abused by a stranger

  • For victims of sexual abuse under the age of 6, only 3% of the offenses were committed by a stranger

(Finkelhor, 2008; Greenfeld, 1997; Synder, 2000)

Research on the Assumptions:
Residential Proximity

  • Chajewski & Mercado (2009)
  • Sex offenders did not live closer to schools on average than community members in towns and counties (but did in cities)
  • Sex offenders with child victims did not live closer to schools than those without child victims
  • Sex offenders with stranger victims did not live closer to schools than those without stranger victims

(see also Zgoba, Levenson, & McKee, 2009)

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Research on the Impact:
Public Safety

  • Minnesota Department of Corrections (2003)
  • Presence and proximity of schools is not associated with greater numbers of sexual offenses or with sex offender recidivism
  • Over half of the 224 sexual recidivists made contact with their victim through “social or relationship proximity,” not residential proximity
  • Not one of the recidivism events were facilitated by close residential proximity to schools, daycare centers, parks, or other places where children routinely congregate

Research on the Impact:
Public Safety

  • Colorado Department of Public Safety (2004): Sex offenders with an offense during the first 15 months of their post-release supervision usually did not live within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center
  • Duwe, Donnay, & Tewksbury (2008): None of the child sexual recidivists contacted their victims “near a school, park, playground, or other location included in residential restriction laws” (p. 500)

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Research on the Impact:
Unintended Consequences

  • An increase in sex offenders registered as homeless in California by up to 60% (up 800% among parolees)

  • About 50% of residential space in Newark, NJ restricted by a 1,000 foot restriction zone

(California Sex Offender Management Board, 2008; Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Socia, 2009)

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Homelessness

  • In Boston, nearly two-thirds of 136 high-risk sex offenders lack permanent addresses.
  • In New York City, more than 100 registered at two homeless shelters.
  • In Miami last month, 22 reported living under the Julia Tuttle Causeway that links the city to Miami Beach.

Research on the Impact:
Unintended Consequences

  • Offenders report increased:
  • Financial and emotional hardships
  • Difficulty obtaining employment, finding affordable housing, and sustaining relationships with pro-social support networks

  • Force sex offenders to reside in mostly rural areas where there are few employment, treatment, and educational opportunities

(Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2006)

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Overview: Faulty Policy

Five basic flaws in our current policies:

  • Sex offenders have low recidivism rates
  • When registered sex offenders do recidivate, it is often with a non-sexual offense
  • Victims of sexual offenses likely know the perpetrator
  • Most sexual abuse occurs within the home of the perpetrator and/or victim
  • Local and state laws do not account for offenders committing crimes in locations outside their communities