U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Page 115 CHAPTER V WASHINGTON'S POLITICAL TESTAMENT: The Farewell Address

I When the last year of Washington's second presidential term had come around, there were no doubts in the

President's mind that "ease and retirement" were "indispensably necessary" [note 1] to him. He now had to decide what form the announcement of his retirement should take and what would be the most appropriate moment for it.

Four years earlier, in 1792, Washington had faced a similar situation. He had wanted to return to his beloved Mount Vernon and retire to the life of a gentleman farmer. When he had asked James Madison about the most suitable procedure for carrying out his intention, Madison had advised the President to announce his decision in a valedictory address to be published in the newspapers in September, so that the people would be informed before the balloting for the presidential electors would start. At last, however, Washington had given in to the urgings of all his political friends who had pressed him to stay on until---and this, they said, would happen in a short time--"public opinion, the character of the Govern-

[note 1] Washington to Jay, May 8, 1796, Washington's Farewell Address, ed. Victor Hugo Paltsits, New York 1935, p. 239. Since most of the documents which have bearing upon the genesis and history of Washington's Farewell Address are assembled and reprinted in this book, I shall quote from it. Page 116 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS ment, and the course of its administration should be better decided." [note 2]

The problems besetting Washington's second administration were far different frorrr those of the first; they also differed widely from the political tasks which he and his friends had envisaged when he had decided to remain in office for another term. The most important tasks of Washington's first presidential term had been the establishment of the new federal administration, the decision on a capital for the United States, and, especially, the determination of the course which the young republic should follow in its financial and economic policy. When Washington's friends had urged him to continue in office because he was needed to give "such a tone and firmness to the Government as would secure it against danger,'' [note 3] they were thinking that these domestic issues demanded further consolidation under a steady government. In Washington's second administration, however, foreign policy, which before 1792 had appeared on the American horizon only intermittently, came into the foreground and dominated the political scene. War had come close to America. The war of the German powers against France broadened into a world conflict when, in February 1793, Great Britain, Holland, and Spain joined the struggle against the French Revolution. The British blockade of France impinged on the pursuit of American trade. An attack by England and Spain against the French possessions in the West Indies might lead France to demand American assistance in accordance with the Franco- American alliance of 1778. Yet American involvement in the war was the more dangerous because the colonies of England and Spain on the North American continent encircled the frontiers of the United States; it seemed unlikely that its boundaries could be defended against the joint operations of Britain and Spain. In

[note 2] Ibid., p. 215. [note 3] Ibid., pp. 215, 216. Page 117 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS the month following his second inauguration, on April 22, 1793, Washington issued a "Proclamation of Neutrality" announcing the decision to "adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the Belligerent Powers." The President advised the citizens of the United States to avoid all acts which might be in contradiction to this attitude and threatened them with loss of protection and, if possible, prosecution in case they should violate the laws of neutrality. Although the Proclamation of Neutrality established the course which America would try to follow throughout the European conflict, the pressure of events made it frequently questionable whether the United States could hold to this position. When the Proclamation was issued, the newly appointed minister of the French Republic, Genet, had already

reached American soil and had begun his attempt to draw the United States into the war--by one-sided interpretation of the articles of the old alliance, by inflammatory appeals to the citizens over the heads of the government, and by directly unneutral acts like the equipping of French privateers in America. Genet overplayed his hand. In the summer of 1793, Washington's government agreed on the necessity of his recall. Although Genet's provocative attitude cooled the passionately pro-French sentiments prevalent among wide groups of the American public, this advantage for the advocates of a neutral policy was soon counter-balanced by the irritating attitude of the British government towards America. The actions of the British navy showed a blatant disregard of the American views on the rights of neutrals in wartime. Moreover, from Canada came disquieting news which raised suspicion of a military attack from the north. If gratitude for French assistance in the War of Independence and sympathy for republicanism had not been strong enough to bring the United States into war on the French side, the old hatred against George III, reawakened by the highhandedness of Page 118 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS the British government, might provide the spark which w start the fires of war. During the spring of 1794, W ington decided to send John Jay as a special envoy Britain--an almost desperate attempt by direct negotiations to avoid further aggravation of British-American relations.

It took almost a year, till March 1795, for the result Jay's negotiations to become known in America. With the exception of one significant concession--the evacuation of northern frontier posts the British had not yielded to Arerican wishes. They refused to abandon interference neutral shipping in wartime. The Jay Treaty was of little avail in changing the minds of those who believed that America's place was on the side of France or that neutrality benevolent towards France rather than an impartial nneutrality was the right course for America. When the Jay Treaty was presented to the Senate for ratification in the summer of 1795, a vehement struggle developed; but the treaty was ac cepted with a number of votes just equalling the constitutionally necessary two-thirds majority. Washington was to ratify the treaty.

In the light of later developments, the value of the Jay Treaty for the preservation of a neutral course in American foreign policy must be regarded as doubtful.. French resentmentr over the conclusion of the Jay Treaty resulted in the "undeclared war against France," and the unsolved differences in the British and American views on neutrality played their part in the origin of the Anglo-American War of 1812. But Washington regarded his second term as full of lasting achievements in foreign policy. Through the Proclamation of 1793, he had set the American course towards neutrality. Without dissolving the French alliance, he had refused to in terpret it as a restriction on American freedom of action. Finally, he had diminished the danger of conflict between Britain and America by a settlement which, unsatisfactory as Page 119 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS it might be in its details, removed the risk of sudden explosion. This was the reason for the optimism with which Washington had greeted Congress at the opening of its session in December 1795: "I have never met you at any period, when more than at present, the situation of our public affairs has afforded just cause for mutual congratulation." [note 4] It was true that a large percentage of the public remained hostile to the government, but even this cloud was disappearing. Washington believed he could notice that in January and February "a great change has been wrought in the public mind" [note 5]and that the people were beginning to recognize the merits of his foreign policy.

This was the time when Washington's thoughts turned to the problems involved in announcing his intention to retire. He thought it best, as we can deduce from indications about a conversation with Alexander Hamilton in the second half of February, to use the draft for a valedictory address which Madison had set up in 1792, but to add a further section about the experiences of his second administration.

Events intervened which must have pushed such thoughts into the background. For in March it became clear that the struggle over the Jay Treaty had not ended with its acceptance by the Senate. When the House of Representatives was asked to approve the expenditures necessary for the implementation of the treaty, the Republicans under Madison's leadership tried to upset the whole arrangement by refusing this financial request. The outcome of this great debate was uncertain until the last moment. It is evident that the renewal of the struggle over the

Jay Treaty put a new construction on Washington's plans for retirement. If the opponents of the treaty had won out, this would have

[note 4] Washington, Writings, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, vol. xxxrv, Washington 1940, p. 386.

[note 5] Washington to Gouverneur Morris, March 4, 1796, ibid., p. 483. Page 120 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS been a rejection of the government; and Washington's unwillingness to stand for another term could have hardly been presented as a voluntary act. It did not come to this; on April 30, 1796, by a vote of 51 to 48, the House approved the funds necessary for the implementation of the treaty. To Washington, the debate on the Jay Treaty was one of the most important events in the history of the young republic. This was not just because approval or rejection of his foreign policy was involved. Washington viewed the attempt of the House to influence foreign policy by means of its power over the purse as a violation of the Constitution, which had confided the treaty-making power to the President and the Senate. Interference by the House in foreign affairs could be explained only as an invasion of the rights of others and an attempt to enlarge its own power. Washington saw the entire Constitution brought "to the brink of a precipice." [note 6] Although the debate in the House over the Jay Treaty in March and April 1796 had shown the strength of partisan divisions in the field of foreign policy, the result was not entirely negative. Positively, the outcome of the debate represented an approval of the foreign policy of the government, and it had also clarified the constitutional issues involved in the conduct of foreign policy. Washington could rightly consider that if his first administration had established the foundations for the internal organization of the republic, his second administration had laid out the course for the rnanagement of foreign affairs. In May, Washington was free to turn aain to the problems of his valedictory address. He sent ihis draft of a valedictory address to Alexander Hamilton, on whom he was accustomed to rely for help in the composition of state documents. This draft

[note 6] Washington to Charles Carroll, May 1, 1796, ibid., vol. xxxv, p. 30. Page 121 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS represented no great change from the ideas which he had expressed in February. In the first part of the draft, Washington reproduced the valedictory address which Madison had prepared for him in 1792. Then there followed a new part which, as Washington wrote to Hamilton, had become necessary because of "considerable changes having taken place both at home and abroad.'' [note 7] The addition shows that Washington regarded the events in the field of foreign affairs as the central issues of his second administration.

II

The tone of the part which Washington had written to complement Madison's draft was very different from that of the valedictory of 1792. Taking a stand high above concrete and disputed political issues and expressing generally acceptable sentiments, Madison had woven together a justification of Washington's decision to retire, a praise of the American Constitution, and an exhortation to preserve the advantages of the Union.

In the part which Washington added in 1796, the closeness and the bitterness of the political fights of the preceding months and years were clearly noticeable. The last five paragraphs of this section mentioned the attacks against the government and the abuses to which the President had been subjected. Washington's statement that his "fortune, in a pecuniary point of view, has received no augmentation from my country" [note 8] showed how he had been hurt by the recent criticisms resulting from revelations according to which he had temporarily overdrawn his accounts with the government. The section which stands between Madison's draft and the last five paragraphs of personal defense, and which forms the most important part of Washington's addition, is

[note 7] Washington's Farewell Address, p. 168. [note 8] Ibid., p. 173.

Page 122 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS the section in which foreign policy has the most prominen role. It consists of a number of different, only loosely connecte¢ thoughts, moulded in the form of a list of "wishes," [note 9] as Washington himself called them. Of these nine wishes, only the first two and the last are not directly concerned witt foreign policy. However, the first wish--an admonition to extinguish or, at least, moderate party disputes--and the last--a counsel to maintain the constitutional delimitation: of powerswere inspired by developments in the area of foreign policy, by the bitterness of party differences revealed in the debate over the Jay Treaty, and by the attempt of th House to have a part in the making of treaties. The remaining six wishes, which refer to issues of foreign policy, summarized Washington's experiences in his second administration. Essentially, they were ideas which Washington had expressed at other places in the same or similar form Washington's first three recommendations in the field of foreign affairs--scrupulously to observe treaty obligations to refrain from political connections, and to take pride in America as a distinct nation--can be found, more briefly but in tlae same sequence, in a letter from Washington to Patrick Henry in October 1795. In his draft for the valedictoy, Washington elaborated on the dangers of foreign interference in American politics and on the necessity of realizing that in.--foreign affairs, each nation is uguided exclusively by egoistic motives. The following wish--that : America must do everything possible to keep the peace for twenty years, until which time her position would be almosl unassailable--was a revision of a paragraph in a letter from Washington to Gouverneur Morris of December 22, 1795. The last two pieces of advice--the need for maintaining truly neutral attitude and for preserving the Union as

[note 9] Ibid., p. 168. Page 123 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS check against destructive intentions of foreign powers--Washington had also voiced previously.

The part of Washington's draft dealing with foreign affairs represents a collection of diverse thoughts and ideas which are neither closely integrated nor systematically organized. Yet one theme permeates the various paragraphs: a warning--against the spirit of faction and against the danger of letting ideological predilections and prejudices enter considerations of foreign policy. This is the topic of the central paragraph in Washington's list of "wishes," where he admonished the citizens to take "pride in the name of an American." The same theme appears in the paragraphs on the duties of neutrals and the need for union; it is impressively stated as Washington's first "wish, in which he implored the citizens to use "charity and benevolence" towards each other in case of political differences and dissensions. Washington did not provide an analysis of the international situation into which America had been placed. Nor did he describe the course which, as a result of such an analysis, America ought to follow in foreign policy. He touched upon these points, but only lightly and selectively, almost accidentally. Washington's fundamental conccern was the attitude of American citizens towards foreign policy and the need for overcoming party spirit in decisions on foreign policy.

III

Washington's condemnation of the spirit of faction arose from a deep political conviction. Although differences in political opinions might be unavoidable, Washington believed that rational discussion would always lead to a realization of the true interest of the nation. Washington saw himself standing above the parties, forcing the conten-

Page 124 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS tious politicians to work toether under the uniting banner of the true national interest. He had tried to keep Jefferson and Hamilton in the government even when their political differences had nearly paralyzed the functioning of the administration.

In 1796, it was an equally strange idea to bring Hamilton and Madison together in a common task. One cannot help wondering whether, in giving both Hamilton and Madison a part in the composition of his valedictory, Washington might have hoped that he could make this document a further demonstration of his conviction that party contrasts did not exclude cooperation in a situation of national interest and that this cooperation would lend added weight to his valedictory pronouncement, securing it against the objection of being an expression of personal or partisan views.

During the preceding years Hamilton and Madison had emerged as the leaders of the two opposing parties, the Federalis the Republicans.. Both parties maintained that their differences were irreconcilable, because each

believed the other was trying to overthrow the Constitution. To the Republicans, Washington had become an enemy, a prisoner of the Federalists. On the other hand, the Federalists, who characterized Madison as an irresponsible radical, could not look approvingly upon the possible increase in Madison's reputation resulting from his collaboration in Washington's valedictory.

When, in February 1796, Washington had told Hamilton of his plan of issuing a valedictory which would consist of two parts, the one which Madison had drafted in 1792 and the other an addition for which he asked Hamilton's assistance, Hamilton expressed his reservations immediately. Hamilton preferred an entirely new document; he seems also to have raised special objections to the contents of Page 125 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS Madison's draft and to the mention of Madison's name in the valedictory.

But Washington stuck to his plan. On May 12, 1796, Washington invited Madison to dinner, probably to talk with him about his retirement. Washington might have thought he could hardly use Madison's draft for a valedictory, still less in a changed form, without informing him. Although Madison might have felt little enthusiasm for collaborating with Washington at a time when he was sharply opposed to the President's policy, he certainly had no valid reason for objecting. The valedictory of 1792 had been written in close adherence to Washington's instructions and placed at Washington's disposal.

Three days later, on May 15, 1796, Washington sent to Hamilton material for revision which consisted of a brief introduction, Madison's draft, and the lengthy addition necessitated by the "considerable changes having taken place both at home and abroad." Washington had made a concession to Hamilton's views by omitting, contrary to his original intention, a direct mention of Madison's name and by leaving out a few passages from Madison's draft. Moreover, the President permitted Hamilton "to throw the whole into a different form." [note 10] But as Washington indicated, he preferred his original idea of a valedictory address which contained the draft of 1792 and his recently composed additions. Even if Hamilton should decide to give the valedictory an entirely new form, he should submit at the same time another draft which would be restricted to emendations and corrections of the papers Washington had sent him.

After the debate on the Jay Treaty in the House, which had increased party bitterness, Hamilton must have found, the idea of Madison's associating with Washington in the

[note 10] Ibid., p. 241. Page 126 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS announcement of the President's retirement more inappropriate than ever. Moreover, the high praise of Republican government contained in Madison'sdraft could be interpreted as favoring an attitude to which Hamilton was violently opposed, that of placing America on the side of the French Revolution. Thus Hamilton was anxious to dissuade Washington from letting the valedictory appear in the form Washington intended. Hamilton could hardly leave this to chance; thus he deliberately employed a method which

promised a politically successful outcome. Instead of starting his work by amending and correcting the material which Washington had sent him, he first wrote an entirely new draft, making free use of Washington's permission to "throw the whole into a different form." On July 30, Hamilton was able to send this new draft to Washington with an accompanying letter in which he said that he was now beginning with his work on the second part of Washington's request, namely, with the corrections and improvements of the papers which Washington had sent him in May. However, he added immediately that "I confess the more I have considered the matter the less eligible this plan has appeared to me. There seems to be a certain awkwardness in the thing . . . Besides that, I think that there are some ideas which will not wear well in the former address . . . [note 11] The presentation of an entirely new and carefully worked out draft, combined with deprecatory remarks about Washington's original plan, did its work. When, on August 10, Hamilton sent to Washington a "draft for incorporating," as Hamilton called his revision of the material which Washington had sent him in May, Washington had become accustomed to the idea of using Hamilton's "Original Major Draft" for his valedictory address.

[note 11] Ibid., p. 249. Page 127 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS

IV

Hamilton was at work on the "Original Major Draft" for Washington's valedictory from the second part of May till far into July. Hamilton's wife, in her old age, still remembered that "the address was written, principally at such times as his Office was seldom frequented by his clients and visitors, and during the absence of his students to avoid interruption; at which times he was in the habit of calling me to sit with him, that he might read to me as he wrote, in order, as he said, to discover how it sounded upon the ear, and making the remark, "My clear Eliza, you must be to me what Moliere's old nurse was to him.''' [note 12] The care and deliberateness with which Hamilton proceeded suggests that he was impressed by the importance as well as by the diffleulty of the task.

Among the considerations which influenced Hamilton in the composition of the document, his eagerness to avoid inserting Madison's valedictory of 1792 was only one, and probably not the most important one. Despite the attacks against Washington in the last years of his second term, the President enjoyed still greater authority and reputation than any other American political leader; the thoughts which he would express when he announced his final retirement from office were bound to make a deep impact on American political thinking. Hamilton must have been well aware that participation in the drafting of Washington's valedictory gave him a unique opportunity to impress on the minds of Americans some of his favorite political ideas. But he was certainly not guided exclusively by personal ambition and party interest. For almost twenty years, Hamilton had been Washington's close collaborator, and he must have felt a

[note 12] R Allan McLane Hamilton, The Intimate Life of Alexander Hamilton, New York 1910, p. 111.

Page 128 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS selfless obligation to give a dignified form to the final political manifesto of the man whom he had served and admired. Yet Hamilton's work was made still more difficult because he knew that although Washington had little confidence in his own literary gifts, he was a man of "strong penetration" and "sound judgment.'' [note 13] Washington would not place his name under a document which he could not regard as an expression of his own mind and ideas.

Thus Hamilton's draft, although very different from the material which Washington had sent him, embodied in form and substance much of Washington's draft. A paper has been preserved which permits an insight into Hamilton's working methods: an "abstract of points to form an address." [note 14] It lists 23 points containing brief statements of the issues with which he wanted to deal, presenting them more or less in the sequence of the Farewell Address. Of these 23 points, 13 are brief excerpts or paraphrases of Washington's draft. In the middle, from the 10th to the 19th point, Hamilton abandoned close adherence to Washington's draft, enlarging Washington's ideas and adducing new material. Thus the list of points reveals that although Hamilton did not accept Washington's plan of inserting Madison's draft of 1792 as a whole, he had few objections to the ideas outlined by Madison and Washington; indeed, he was

willing to incorporate them almost literally. However, he felt the document should be strengthened; it ought to receive more body and substance.

This view is confirmed by the form which Hamilton's draft finally took. The first eight paragraphs, announcing Washington's intention to retire from political life and expressing his wishes for the future prosperity of America

[note 13] Jefferson on Washington, quoted in John Alexander Carroll and Mary Wells Ashworth (completing the

Biography of Douglas Southall Freeman), George Washington, vol. vn, New York 1957, p. 653. [note 14] Washington's Farewell Address, pp. 174-178. Page 129 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS under a free constitution, are closely modeled after Washington's draft. Then Hamilton let Washington say, "Here perhaps I ought to stop." But he did not do so, because solicitude for the welfare of the American people urged him "to offer some sentiments the result of mature reflection confirmed by observation and experience which appear to me essential to the permanency of your felicity as a people"; these sentiments should be received as "the disinterested advice of a parting friend.'' [note 15] With these sentences Hamilton launched a discussion leading far beyond the thoughts contained in Washington's draft. From the point of view of contents as well as from the point of view of length, this section gave the Farewell Address its real weight. Aftter this, Hamilton returned to a phraseology startlingly similar to that which he had used in introducing the section; he said that "in offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend--counsels suggested by laborious reflection, and matured by a various experience, I dare not hope that they will make the strong and lasting impressions I wish . . . " [note 16] Then there followed six paragraphs of personal justification, which in contents and phraseology were patterned after the end of Washington's draft. Thus Hamilton's chief contribution to Washington's Farewell Address was the central section of the document, which replaced the "list of wishes" of Washington's draft. Nevertheless, the theme of Washington's list of wishes, the warning against partisanship in foreign policy, was fully expressed; however, it was set in the wider framework of general survey of domestic and foreign policy.

Hamilton gave the greatest attention to the section on

[note 15] Ibid., p. 182. [note 16] Ibid., p. 198. See also the Appendix for this and the following analyses.

Page 130 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS foreign policy. Whereas the reflections on domestic policy corresponded to the outline given in his "abstract of points," the statement on foreign policy was entirely remodeled. The transition from domestic policy to foreign policy followed smoothly from a warning against party spirit which opens the door to intrigues by foreigners and may lead to attachments in which the smaller nation will revolve around the larger one "as its satellite." At this point, Hamilton repeated Washington's advice to " avoid connecting ourselves with the politics of any Nation." Hamilton was somewhat more cautious than Washington. He recommended having "as little political connection . . . as possible." Departing from Washington's draft, Hamilton did not say anything at this point about commercial relations but rather went on to justify the advice to abstain from political connections. The necessity for this attitude, Hamilton believed, followed from the natural situation of things. Each state has certain fundamental interests which it must follow in its policy. If states are in close proximity to each other, their interests touch upon each other and clashes are unavoidable. If America were to ally herself with one of the European powers, she would inevitably have to participate in every European conflict. Such a connection with European power polities would be "artificial"; America was so distant from Europe that she did not belong "naturally" to the European system. From this analysis, Hamilton deduced a "general principle of policy" for America. Although in particular emergencies America might be forced to make a temporary alliance, permanent alliances must be avoided. In its

practical consequences, this was not very different from what Washington had said in his draft. But Washington had stressed the weakness of the United States which, within the next twenty years, would make involvement in a war ex- Page 131 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS tremely dangerous for the existence of the young republic. By removing the time limit from this piece of advice, by basing it on unchangeable geographical conditions, and by presenting it as a principle of policy, Hamilton made the recomendation in his draft weightier, more impressive, and more apodictic.

It is significant that Hamilton treated with commerce after he had discussed the question of alliances. To him, regulation of commercial relations remained subordinated to power politics. Although America's aim should be the widest possible liberalization of commerce, a certain flexibility in practice was necessary. Commerce was a weapon in the struggle of power politics; in the arrangement of their commercial relations, nations did not follow idealistic principles but only their interests. With the exhortation to recognize national egoism as the driving force in international relations, Hamilton concluded the "counsels of an old and affectionate friend."

In its terminology and formulations, the section on foreign policy echoed expressions and thoughts which had dominated the discussion of foreign affairs ever since America entered the scene of foreign policy in 1776. We are reminded of Paine's Common Sense. We find the word "entangle" which in America had developed into a technical term for characterizing the dangerous consequences of involvement in Europeapolitics. We see the distinction between "artifical"' and "natural" connections, reflecting the Enlightenment belief in a progress from a world of power politics to an era of permanent peace and increasing prosperity. We recall the famous resolution of Congress of 1783 that "the true interest of these states requires that they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations." This use, in the Farewell Address, of terms and concepts Page 132 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS which had been continuously applied in the discussion of foreign affairs might have been intentional. Hamilton might have felt that these reflections would be more acceptable if they appeared as a restatement of currently held views rather than as a presentation of new ideas. But behind this facade of customary terms and concepts, there was a structure of thought which was Hamilton's own.

Whether Hamilton drafted this part of the Farewell Address with the help of documents which he had previously written, or whether the similarities to his previous works on foreign policy came from such firm and definite convictions that they always took the same expression, we cannot know. In any case, just a year before Hamilton began to work on the Farewell Address, he wrote under the name Horatius a defense of the Jay Treaty which contained a warnmg against entanglement "in all the contests, broils and wars of Europe" in words very similar to those used in the Farewell Address. [note 17] Some of the formulations which the Farewell Address and the Horatius paper have in common can also be found in the Memorandum of September 15, 1790, the first written presentation of Hamilton's opinions on foreign affairs as a member of Washington's Cabinet. In this search for ancestors of the Farewell Address among Hamilton's previous writings, we might go back still further to the Federalist. There are passages in Hamilton's draft of the Farewell Address which correspond closely to ideas in the Federalist, making it almost certain that Hamilton had this book not only on his bookshelf--as would have been a matter of course--but also on his writing desk when he drafted the Farewell Address. The warning in the Address against wars resulting from the passions of people was a restatement of

[Note 17] Alexander Hamilton, Works, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge, vol. v: New York 1904, pp. 181-185.

Page 133 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS Hamilton's argument in the sixth number of the Federalist, that "there have been . . . almost as many popular as royal wars." Stylistic similarities also exist between the eleventh number of the Federalist and passages of the Farewell Address on foreign policy. Ideas which in the Address were only vaguely adumbrated were more clearly expressed in

the eleventh number of the Federalist. In the Farewell Address, emphasis was laid on Europe's possessing a special political system; the consequence of this point--that America had a political system of her own was only suggested. The statement in the eleventh number of the Federalist that the United States ought "to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs" revealed Hamilton's full thought. Because Washington hardly would have liked this open announcement of an aggressive imperialist program, Hamilton refrained from expressing this idea explicitly in the Farewell Address.

The relationship between the Farewell Address and the Federalist is particularly important because it shows that although Hamilton used Washington's ideas and statements of others, he placed them in a different setting and gave them a new meaning.

The law of action propounded by Hamilton in the Farewell Address was presented as the specific application of general laws ruling in the political world. It was derived from the geographical division of the earth and from the principle which dominated the life of every state: striving to increase power in line with its fundamental interests." States situated in the same geographical area were tied together in a continuous power struggle arising from clshing interests. They were members of the same political system which extended as far as its natural geographical limits. In Hamilton's formulation, the warning against connection with European power politics was derived neither from a

Page 134 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS fear of strengthening the centrifugal forces in American political life, as it dominated Washington's thoughts, nor from utopian hopes in an imminent end of the era of power politics and national division, as the founders (as American independence had hoped. To Hamilton, sovereign states, competition among them, and power politics were necessary factors in social life; successful political action depended on proceeding according to these presuppositions. Hamilton presented his advice as the necessary consequence of political science; he conceived it as an application of the eternal laws of politics to the American situation. The separation of America from Europe's foreign policy was desirable not because it might be the beginning of a change, of a reform of diplomacy, but because it corresponded to what the political writers had discovered about the political practice of the time. The intellectual framework of the recommendations on foreign policy in the Farewell Address was that of the school of the interests of the state. This is reflected not only in the phraseology and the argumentation, but also in Hamilton's attempt to summarize these counsels in a "great rule of conduct," a "general principle." When Hamilton sent his draft to Washington, he wrote that he had tried "to render this act importantly and lastingly useful." [note 18] We can now better understand what these words meant. Hamilton wanted Washington to leave to his successors an explanation of the principles which had guided his policy, just as other rulers and statesmen of the eighteenth century were accustomed to doing in their Political Testaments. In revising Washington's draft for a valedictory, Hamilton transformed it into a Political Testament.

[note 18] Washington's Farewell Address, p. 249. Page 135 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS

V The "great rule" which Washington had set down in the / Farewell Address served as a guide to American foreign , policy for over a century; of all the Political Testaments of the eighteenth century, the Farewell Address alone succeeded in achieving practical political significance. Some part of its influence is due to the "accidents of polities," to events in which the United States had, at best, a supporting role. The conflicts of the Napoleonic era and the weakening of the Spanish power broke the ring which foreign colonial possessions had laid around the territory of the United States. As long as several European states were close neighbors, the advice to avoid alliances was an ideal to be pursued rather than a feasible proposition. It became a workable policy only when effective rule by a foreign power was restricted to the north of the continent. The political separation of America from the European power struggle was strengthened by changes which took place in Europe. Nationalism and industrialism shifted the interests of the European powers, and the competition

among them, into new channels. Thus, in the nineteenth century, conditions came into existence under which America's foreign policy could become a policy of isolation. Nevertheless, the profound impact of Washington's counsels in the Farewell Address was also created by features inherent in the document itself. It was the first statement, comprehensive and authoritative at the same time, of the principles of American foreign policy. Hamilton based the discussion of foreign affairs in the Farewell Address on a realistic evaluation of America's situation and interests. Because Hamilton was opposed to American involvement in a war, to which the emotional attachment with France might lead, he emphasized the necessity of neutrality and peace. Page 136 THE FAREWELL ADDRESS The Farewell Address, therefore, could repeat and absorb those views and concepts which expressed the mood of a more idealistic approach to foreign policy. These elements were not like ghost cities left abandoned outside the main stream of development; they were necessary stations on road "to the Farewell Address."

Political Testaments, in general, remained closely tied to the eighteenth-century concept of power polities. The integration of idealistic assumptions constitutes the distinguishing feature of the Farewell Address. Thus it could have an appeal in the following century of rising democracy when foreign policy demanded legitimation by clearly felt and recognized values and needed to be conducted in accordance with the will of the people. Because the Farewell Address comprises various aspects of American political thinking, it reaches beyond any period limited in time and reveals the basic issue of the American attitude toward foreign policy: the tension between Idealism and Realism. Settled by men who looked for gain and men who sought freedom, born into independence in a century of enlightened thinking and of power politics, Am erica has wavered in her foreign policy between Idealism and Realism, and her great historical moments have occurred when both were combined. Thus the history "bf the Farewell Address forms only part of a wider, endless, urgent problem. This study is an attempt to shed light on its beginnings. With the analysis of the diverse intellectual trends which went into the making of the Farewell Address, with the description of its genesis, our story ends.