EXSUM

(UNCLASSIFIED)

(UNCLASSIFIED)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES23-008-1 12 Jan 2023

(U) WHAT INSIGHTS ARE DERIVED FROM OPERATION ANACONDA IN REGARD TO THE NCO COMMON CORE COMPENTENCY (NCO C3) OF OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS? (U) The NCO C3 of Operations is a combination of operational skill sets that, when mastered by senior leaders can save lives and ensure effective unified action. Some of its key tenets include: Large-scale combat operations; understanding operational and mission variables; resolving complex, ill-structured problems with the use of mission command; and understanding how to integrate the different branches of the military into successful joint operations (Department of the Army [DA], 2020a). This final principle of conducting joint operations becomes increasingly important as contemporary conflicts continue to venture further into the realm of multi-domain warfare (Marr, 2018). In order to execute such a complex task, Joint Force Commanders (JFC) must “integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations” through the use of seven Joint Functions (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017, p. III-1). One of these functions, command and control, is how the JFC directs the forces toward accomplishment of the mission, and its essential task is to “Communicate and ensure the flow of information across the staff and joint force” (JCS, 2017, p. III-2). This task is critical to the creation of a shared understanding, which allows the separate branches to work seamlessly together toward a common goal. The absence of this unifying component hinders missions and increases casualties. In the case study of Operation Anaconda, JFC Major General (MG) Hagenbeck failed to create such a shared understanding with his subordinate Air Force assets, which contributed to increasing the amount of casualties his forces incurred. Although the warning order was published on 6 January, MG Hagenbeck did not notify the Combined Force Air Component Commander of Operation Anaconda until 23 February, just days before the operation began (Fleri et al., 2003). This failure to ensure the flow of information across the joint force, caused downstream effects in planning and preparation that led to diminished air support during the initial stages of the operation. As noted by Lambeth (2005) in his comprehensive analysis, “because so little air support had been requested…coalition troops entered the fight virtually unprotected by any preparatory and suppressive fire” (pp. 204-205). Operation Anaconda provides a clear case of how proficiency in the realm of Operations can result in fewer U.S. casualties. Alongside the importance of the leadership competency is the communication competency. The NCO C3 of Communications is the figurative string that connects all NCO C3s together and is the basis for the overall impression and judgement of a leader. Different types of communication include verbal, non-verbal, written, listening, visual, response and feedback, collaborative, and many others. Communication is something that everyone does, whether deliberate or instinctual; it can be something as subtle as a gesture when walking past someone, or as complex as

(UNCLASSIFIED)

(UNCLASSIFIED)

a written manual. All good leaders are good communicators who use the various forms of communication in positive ways, as in interpreting and applying the concepts of Army doctrine. Leaders at all echelons know how to use the abundance of Army doctrinal and regulatory publications to help them succeed in their implied and directed tasks. As an example, a squad leader who wants to know how to properly counsel a Soldier would rely on the Army Training Publication (ATP), The counseling process (ATP 6-22.1), found on the Army Publishing Directorate website. As an example, the Department of Army (2014) states that effective leaders and counselors will talk less and spend more time listening. Although this concept is simple, it is profoundly important to counseling and other communication forums for a leader. Many Army publications, like ATP 6-22.1, specifically help leaders understand communication and ways to enhance their communicative ability in their specific military occupational specialties (MOSs). Another example Army publication that illustrates important communication techniques is the signal support to operations (FM 6-02) publication which “describes how signal Soldiers support Army forces as they shape operational environments, prevent conflict, conduct large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains against a peer threat in joint operations” (DA, 2019, p. V). During Operation Anaconda Case Study, leaders were responsible for conducting Satellite Communications (SATCOM) in order to order to effectively transmit messages on the battlefield across vast distances. Specifically, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters was miles away from their field elements but was able to exercise regular situational reports (SITREPs), Medical Evacuations (MEDEVACs) and Close Air Support (CAS) requests, with minimal delays or interruption to operations. The leaders and Soldiers who operated the SATCOMs were proficient with knowledge from their respective Army doctrine, which allowed them to enhance operational effectiveness, while saving lives and leading to mission accomplishment (Fleri et al., 2003). Other key players were also evident to mission accomplishment during Operation Anaconda, like the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE), which was critical for bridging the communication gap between high visibility operations and covert operations (Fleri et al., 2003). Based on all of this information, it is clear why leaders must be familiar with how to communicate in various forms. From a simple handshake when meeting someone new to a detailed CAS request, leaders must continually learn and improve on communication skills through training and education to maximize the chance for mission success and to save lives.

Kenneth P. Mullan/MLC 23-008 [email protected] APPROVED BY: MSG Brian Brown

(UNCLASSIFIED)

(UNCLASSIFIED)

References

Department of the Army. (2014). The Army counseling process (ATP 6-22.1). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp6_22x1.pdf

Department of the Army. (2019). Signal support to operations (FM 6-02). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19185_FM%206- 02_FINAL_WEB.pdf

Department of the Army. (2020a). The Noncommissioned Officer Guide (TC 7-22.7). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20340_TC%207- 22x7%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf

Department of the Army. (2020b). Techniques for satellite communications (ATP 6- 02.54). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31089-ATP_6- 02.54-000-WEB-1.pdf

Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hulkill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). Operation Anaconda case study. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Joint Operations (JP 3-0). https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018 -11-27-160457-910

Lambeth, B.S. (2005). Air power against terror: America’s conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg166centaf.13?seq=1

Marr, S. (2018). Stability in Multi-Domain Battle. U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.