philosophy discussion4

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Commissive form (p & I believe that not-p)

• Given assertion-distribution, if I assert that (p & I believe

that not-p), then I assert that p. So I imply that I don‘t

believe that not-p, which contradicts the second conjunct of

my assertion. So what I assert contradicts what I imply by

asserting it.

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Moore‘s Second Principle (1944):

If one asserts that p, then one implies that one doesn‘t believe that not-p

• Given the two principles, both the omissive and the

commissive form are cases of implied and asserted

contradictions.

• In the omissive form I imply and assert that I do and don‘t

believe that p

• In the commissive form I imply and assert that I do and

don‘t believe that not-p

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Problems with Moore‘s Explanation

• Moore (1942: 542-3) claims that his first principle

• But then we should expect that performative contradictions

uttered by a known habitual liar do not sound absurd. But they

do! See the liar‘s paradox (Baldwin 2007: 77).

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“… arises from the fact, which we all learn by experience, that in the

immense majority of cases a man who makes such an assertion

does believe or know what he asserts: lying, although common

enough, is vastly exceptional“

• Moore (1942: 541) also says

• So, according to Moore, to assert

“It is raining but I don’t know that it is raining”

• would likewise be “absurd.” But it is not clear that it is absurd.

And if it is, the explanation differs. See lecture 11.3.

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“…the sense of ‘imply’ in question is similar to that in which, when a

man asserts anything that might be true or false, he implies that he

himself, at the time of speaking, believes or knows the thing in

question.”

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Wittgenstein‘s Explanation

• Wittgenstein claims that “‘I believe p’ means roughly the same as

‘p’” (1980a, §472). On this view, the absurdity of Moorean

statements lies in

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Wittgenstein’s First Principle:

If one asserts that one believes that p, then one asserts that p.

• This explains the absurdity of the

commissive assertion, for in asserting that

(p & I believe that not-p) I assert that I

believe that not-p and so assert that not-p,

which contradicts my assertion that p. So

although what I have asserted is not a

contradiction, my assertion of it involves

contradictory assertions.

• Wittgenstein’s first principle cannot explain the absurdity of the

omissive assertion. For in asserting that (p & I don’t believe that p) I

assert a lack of belief, to which Wittgenstein’s first principle cannot

apply.

• To deal with the omissive case (p & I don’t believe that p) we can

introduce a related principle:

• Given assertion-distribution, if I assert that (I don’t believe that p), I

deny that p which contradicts my assertion that p.

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Wittgenstein’s Second Principle:

If one asserts that one doesn’t believe that p, then one denies that p.

Problems with Wittgenstein‘s

Explanation

• On Wittgenstein’s Second Principle, an agnostic who truthfully

reports, “I neither believe that God exists nor believe that he

does not” would be making contradictory assertions. But he does

not.

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Baldwin‘s Explanation

• If I assert that p to you, then I have the primary intention that you will

come to believe that p by recognition of my intention.

• In so intending I have the secondary intention to make you believe that I

believe that p.

• But when I go on to assert, in the omissive case (p & I don‘t believe that

p), that I don‘t believe that p, my secondary intentions is to make you

believe that I don‘t believe that p.

• So I intend to make you form contradictory beliefs about what I myself

believe.

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• And when I go on to assert, in the commissive case (p & I

believe that not-p), that I believe that not-p, my secondary

intentions is to make you believe that I believe that not-p.

• So I intend to make you think that I have contradictory beliefs

about whether p.

• In either form of Moore‘s paradox the problem is that the

speaker has self-defeating intentions (see Baldwin 2007: 77-

8).

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Problems w. Baldwin‘s Explanation

• There are counterexamples to Baldwin‘s assumptions about

the intentional structure of assertion.

• A speaker can make an assertion without the intention of

thereby providing his audience with a reason for believing

what he asserts. Examples: when the speaker is being tested

by someone whom he takes to know the answers already.

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• A speaker can make an assertion with the intention of thereby

providing his audience with a reason for believeing the

opposite of what he asserts. Examples: sarcasm, irony (“This

is a brilliant idea,“ “Jones has beautiful handwriting“).

• Bladwin‘s explanation doesn‘t work for Moore‘s paradox in

thought.

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