Political Science: Sustainment Operations

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CHAPTER 8

JOINT LAND SUSTAINMENT

1. Commander's Considerations on Operational Sustainment

a. Throughout the campaign, the land command will play an integral and essential role in providing the JFC the capabilities to project and sustain joint, multinational, and interagency efforts throughout the theater until national objectives are achieved. As such, the JFLCC, as the JFC’s lead component for sustainment, must proactively estimate, integrate, and synchronize a series of critical sustainment functions that enable success for the joint and coalition force through providing the required resources at the proper point in time.

b. Effective operational sustainment must be independent, interdependent, and interoperable, across the entirety of the LCC. It must be sufficiently robust to be executable across the depth and breadth of major land operations and ensure combat readiness of all land forces, to include coalition partners.

c. Recent experience in OEF and OIF shows that the JFLCC is at the center of the JFC’s efforts to establish and execute a myriad of theater sustainment functions; failure to “set the theater” with the proper capabilities at the required times means that the joint force as a whole will pay the price. Due to the lead component and CUL requirements usually placed upon the land component by the JFC, the JFLCC does not manage by exception–the JFLCC and his J4 must be “hands-on” from the initial planning of the campaign through execution, ensuring that the bulk of common-user requirements of the entire force are met in a timely and adequate manner to enable operational success.

d. Directive Authority for Logistics is entrusted in the combatant commander, and his staff will coordinate and synchronize the efforts of Service and national components to provide logistic support from strategic resource bases. Directive authority for logistics is a combatant commander authority and cannot be delegated. But as the JFC’s lead component for sustainment integration, the JFLCC will execute portions of this authority for the areas for which the JFLC is required to provide joint theater logistics (JTL). JTL is the capability either the JFC or subordinate commands, like the JFLCC, has to apply logistic resources to generate and sustain full spectrum theater operations. JTL includes organization, authorities and processes over assigned and attached forces to achieve desired joint and operational objectives. However, even absent delegated authorities, the JFLCC must coordinate, synchronize, and prioritize the sustainment efforts for all joint and multinational components operating within the land AO. The JFLCC must ensure unity of sustainment effort among all land components that may transcends Service/Title 10 USC parochial

“It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much more knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there.”

General A. C. P. Wavell,

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concerns through a system that prioritizes and routes essential services and supplies to all elements of the force, based on their operational needs.

e. Operational Sustainment is COMMANDER’s BUSINESS, and an essential enabler for operational success. As such, sustainment efforts must be dynamic, flexible, and constantly focused upon meeting the commander’s intent. Conversely, changes in intent and operational focus must be clearly articulated and communicated early to ensure planning and execution can proactively adapt to meet new operational requirements, to include overcoming strategic and intratheater distances and time restrictions. 2. Joint Force Land Component Commander Sustainment Roles and Authorities

a. Operational Sustainment is a proactive, dynamic process that links resources provided by the strategic base with the requirements of tactical efforts, and sustains their operations through effectively prioritizing the flow, reception, and distribution of essential resources to points directed by the commander. In all, the process enables the simultaneous execution of deployment, employment, and sustainment operations for the joint force (see Figure 8-1).

Figure 8-1. Operational Sustainment

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b. Providing Key Capabilities. As the JFC’s lead component for sustainment, the JFLCC

provides a number of key enabling capabilities for not only land forces, but for the entire military and interagency effort. The campaign plan will specify tasks to be accomplished, but recent experience shows that the LCC accomplishes or enables the following major tasks for forces that base or operate within the land AO:

(1) Force Reception. Establishes system and key facilities that enable the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces. This includes establishing facilities and procedures, designating temporary C2 relationships, and providing resources to arriving joint, multinational, and interagency elements. (See Chapter 3, “Joint Land Force Projection.”)

(2) Infrastructure Development. Acquires, establishes, and (as required) constructs the mission essential facilities and capabilities that enable operational success. These includes coordination among Services and with the HN to estimate requirements, distribute/deconflict land and facilities use, and acquire, contract, or construct necessary buildings, storage, and transportation capabilities (roads, pipelines, etc).

(3) Management of Operational Sustainment Efforts. Working with and through Service and national components, synchronizes the estimation, planning, reception, and distribution of major theater sustainment activities accomplished within the land AO, to include:

• Materials–bulk reception, storage, and distribution to support the joint/combined force as a whole.

• Maintenance--theater-level direct and general support activities, to include

contract support.

• Movements/Distribution–tracking and coordinating movement of materials into theater, and intratheater movement/delivery to meet operation requirements.

• Personnel and Finance–coordinating support to land component forces and other

elements (civilian, interagency, etc.) as designated by JFC.

• Health/Field Services--plan, establish, and coordinate capabilities that provide required care and services for all personnel in the land AO, and in other components areas (such as SOF) as directed.

• Contracting--establish contingency contract capabilities and reduce competition

for scarce HN resources. (See Tab B.)

(4) Command and Control Framework. In accordance with the JFC’s and JFLCC’s guidance, establish C2 relationships among components and theater enabling commands that facilitate sustainment effectiveness.

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c. JFLCC Authorities to Synchronize the Sustainment Effort. As the lead component for sustainment for the JFC, the JFLCC operates under a number of authorities such as Service- specific, CUL, and Army support to other Services. However, the bottom line is these authorities are assigned to enable joint sustainment capabilities that provide for operational success. No matter the authorities specifically delegated, the JFLCC efforts are empowered through the unity of effort and integration among its components that is created through cooperation, mutual support, and adherence to common processes and priorities that benefit the entire force. As such, the JFLCC is both a “team builder” and “team player” in operational sustainment success.

(1) The combatant commander has directive authority for logistics and provides specific common items and services or support through subordinate commands, like the JFLCC, where it is more operationally effective and efficient for a single component to synchronize and/or provide these services for the entire joint force. The geographic combatant commander’s directive authority does not discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support, even if another Service or agency is executing a portion of the total task. Based on the sustainment tasks assigned, the JLFCC should determine early on what directive authority is required and request approval to execute it for the JFC.

(2) The authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFLCC’s OPCON or TACON, unless the geographic combatant commander either tasks or directs the JFLCC for a selected or common support capability. The JFLCC CUL authority thus may be derived from one of two sources: (1) a geographic combatant commander’s task or directive for a selected or common land-operation-focused support capability or (2) through short-term inter- Service support agreements between the Army and Marine Corps forces. The JFLCC must ensure that JFLCC-determined CUL requirements do not conflict or interfere with other geographic combatant commander-directed LCC AO-wide CUL requirements.

(3) The supported combatant commander determines if common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or designated area. The JFLCC should make recommendations about logistic support to the JFC commensurate with priorities developed for land and joint force operations. While each Service and nation retains authority for logistic support of its forces, the JFLCC ensures support is coordinated and integrated throughout operations in the AO.

(a) Joint Theater Logistics. As part of campaign planning, the combatant commander will determine which sustainment areas are best centrally provided and managed to gain the greatest synergy and efficiency in the fastest, simplest manner. The combatant commander then analyzes which component is best positioned and resourced to accomplish key sustainment tasks. The combatant commander exercises his authority by assigning responsibilities for a specific operation to a functional/Service component or agency (usually the dominant user or most capable Service/agency) that best meets the operational requirements.

(b) Common-User Logistics. The JFLCC or Service component forces may be required to provide significant levels of theater-wide support to other Service components, multinational partners, and NGOs. However, common user support does not relieve components

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of responsibility for providing Service-peculiar supplies and services. The JFLCC should identify economies resulting from consolidating resources or tasking one or more components to provide common-user support to the remainder of the joint force.

(c) Army Support to Other Services. This also may be titled “Army Support to the Joint Force.” Although logistic support is a Service responsibility, the Army has been designated to provide certain support to other Services and organizations in a variety of Department of Defense directives (DODD). These directives focus on strategic-level activities, but they may be related to CUL support in a specific operation. Table 8-1 lists representative tasking documents and responsibilities assigned to the Army on a relatively permanent basis (a complete listing can be found in FM 3-93 and DA Pamphlet 10-1).

Army Lead Responsibilities for Support to Other Services and Agencies TASKING DOCUMENT SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY

SECDEF Memo/AR 40-656 Veterinary Support including food inspection AR 40-905 Single Integrated Medical Logistics Managment (SIMLM) DSD Memo 13/3/91 Controlled Disposal of Waste, Explosives, and Munitions DOD Memo/JP 4-06 Mortuary Affairs Program DODD 2310.1 Executive Agent for DOD Enemy Prisoner of War Detainee Program DODD 4500.9 Common-User Land Transportation in Overseas Areas DODD 4500.9 Intermodal Container Management DODD 4500.9 Overseas Ocean Terminal Operations DODD 4525.6 Management of Military Postal Services DODD 4705.1 Executive Agent for Land-Based Water Resources DODD 5030.49 Executive Agent for the Customs Inspection Program DODD 5160.65 Single Management of Conventional Ammunition DODD 4140.25/JP 4-03 Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Natural Gas, and Coal and overland

transportation DODD 5515.08 Executive Agency for Processing Claims (in selected countries) JP 4-02 Food Safety Service OSD Memo 27 Inland Logistics Support to US Marine Corps

Table 8-1. Army Lead Responsibilities for Support to Other Services and

Agencies

(4) Service responsibility for support extends into the theater, but may be modified when logistic support is otherwise provided by agreements with national agencies or allies or by the combatant commander's assignment of common, joint, or cross-servicing responsibilities. The combatant commander may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or a designated operational area. If so, the combatant commander may task or direct responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all Service components in the theater or designated area to the Service component that is the dominant user. Service components and the JFLCC must identify and validate support requirements and then provide these requirements to the supporting Service component as soon as possible.

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3. Planning for Operational Sustainment

a. Expeditionary operational sustainment must enable overlapping deployment and employment operations, a situation that increases the natural dynamic tension and competition for lift assets, both air and sea. Analyzing how and when operations will change is essential for logisticians to anticipate and position critical assets, while factoring in long request, transportation, delivery, and assembly/distribution lead times.

b. Early in the planning process, the JFLCC must determine those logistical functions that most facilitate responsiveness and flexibility for the joint force. The JFLCC must analyze operational-level logistic and transportation requirements from the entire joint force perspective, focusing on the interfaces with and potential requirements of other components, functional commands, and coalition partners. Because the JFLCC will most likely provide various forms of logistical support to the total joint force, resources always will be limited. Therefore, the key to execution success is the ability to visualize all key requirements in time and space. Just as with other operational efforts such as fires, ISR, etc., the JFLC J3 and J4 must ensure that concepts for sustainment support the major land plan in both timeliness and quantity of resources.

c. The concept for operational sustainment must be fully integrated with that of other operational systems and be interoperable across the entirety of the JFLC. The sustainment concept is an extension of the JFLCC’s intent and, as such, must address how the commander intends to “fight” sustainment just as the JFLCC fights the other LCC operational level systems to achieve joint and coalition synergy. This concept should include the following:

(1) Intelligence analysis of enemy and host nation capabilities and intended actions as they affect the ability of sustainment operations.

(2) Mission and commander’s intent for operational sustainment, to include the desired operational effects that effective sustainment must produce.

(3) Concept for sustainment operations that includes how the LCC will:

• Build sufficient capacity for deployment and continuous sustainment of joint, combined, and interagency forces within the land AO (and other parts of the joint operational area as directed by the JFC).

• Open and maintain the strategic and intratheater flow for request, delivery

and distribution of essential supplies and services from source to end user. • Major operation tasks and transition points, and where, when, and to what

levels that operations sustainment capabilities will be postured to meet tactical requirements and ensure continuous operations.

• Analyze the amount of operational flexibility and risk in each phase that the

commander can expect based on sustainment considerations.

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(4) Key tasks by phase and desired states/conditions at the transition points

(between major operations and phases). These should include the key sustainment tasks by phase, direct which commands are responsible for execution, and where/when resources/capabilities must be provided for use by the LCC or joint/combined force.

(5) Organization structure for the effort must specify a clear, simple arrangement for theater sustainment forces that ensures every element understands which command they operate under (not under staff sections), their command relationship and reporting requirements, and where they will operate within the land AO.

d. The key starting point for planning is the development of an accurate estimate of the total requirements that the LCC must support. This includes not only land requirements over time and battlespace, but also may include the requirements for joint and coalition forces for the categories and services that the LCC must provide as lead component or due to CUL requirements. Historically, this has been difficult as other service components will either plan early on to support themselves, or develop estimates that are short of their requirements or not reflective of their much broader needs as the campaign progresses. In the absence of these estimates, planners must conduct their own analysis, and conduct continuous reevaluations with components to identify emerging requirements/shortfalls in order to accurately “see the requirements” over time/space. 4. Operational Sustainment Execution

a. Intensive planning efforts will produce a comprehensive assessment of the requirements for supporting for joint and coalition operations. The challenge will be to transform this planning effort into actual performance by JFLCC forces of a series of complex sustainment tasks. Key to effective execution is the development of a planning and execution matrix that includes all critical sustainment tasks, when these tasks must occur to ensure operational success, and the effects that successful execution of these tasks must create to enable JFLCC and joint/coalition force success. This matrix is the critical tool through which all sustainment tasks are coordinated and assessed for effectiveness.

b. Effective execution includes identifying and tracking accomplishment of the critical sustainment tasks. These efforts are focused on satisfying the JFLCC’s CCIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and providing the JFLCC with accurate, timely information on whether operations can be effectively sustained. Both CCIRs and FFIRs are dynamic and changing throughout the campaign; sustainment tracking must ensure the JFLCC and other component and subordinate decision makers have accurate, timely information among the critical “sustainment focus areas” upon which to make critical decisions.

c. Sustainment Focus Areas. Throughout the execution of LCC sustainment, the JFLCC will assess and provide support across a myriad of areas (see Figure 8-2 below). Key is that monitoring and ensuring success in these focus areas are integral to success of all elements and operating systems across the land command. As such, this is not solely “logistics for logisticians”--all subordinate commands and staff sections also must monitor and assess the

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impacts of actions in these areas, assessing risk and providing feedback to the commander and J4 on overall operational sufficiency in these areas.

Figure 8-2. JFLCC Sustainment Focus Areas Assessment of these areas are based upon metrics established by the J4 and J3 and focus on whether operational capabilities are sufficient to support the ongoing campaign, not upon “stove-pipe” quantitative goals such as pallets, days of supply, etc. These assessments of existing capabilities and their impacts on operations are integrated into the LCC daily battle rhythm, to include daily status briefs to the JFLCC as part of the battle update assessment process.

d. Sustainment execution must be fully visible and integrated into the J3’s current operations reports and orders. As operational sustainment is integrated into all aspects of JFLCC operations, all significant actions, FRAGORDs, and operations summaries must include information on the status of and intended actions for operational sustainment, to include the risks and limitations induced by the resources available to support operations across the land AO.

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e. As in all other operational systems, intelligence is key to sustainment success. Accurate and timely intelligence that provides a common, shared picture of enemy capabilities, emerging security threats, and the impacts of weather are as critical to sustainment as they are to operational maneuver, fires, etc. Intelligence sections within the theater sustainment command center (TSCC) must analyze and estimate the effect of adversary's actions and the physical environment (weather, terrain, etc.) on the ability to sustainment forces to execute their assigned missions. These efforts must also estimate potential enemy actions and facilitate branch and sequel planning for sustainment.

f. Sustainment execution must also be linked to operational protection efforts across the land AO. The J4 is represented in all protection boards and assessment activities so as to ensure theater enabling forces can accomplish their missions within acceptable limitations and risks. Because sustainment must move over extended distances and through less than secure areas, continuous vulnerability and risk assessments are an integral part of successful sustainment execution.

g. Challenges to effective operational sustainment are as diverse and complex as the effort itself. Based on recent operational experience, challenges may include some or all of the following:

(1) Getting all components to estimate and provide requirements to enable planning and flexible execution.

(2) Changes in maneuver concept without considering sustainment feasibility or informing sustainment planning staff of potential changes; this breakdown in communication and coordination creates a ripple effect across the sustainment system and shortcuts the J4’s ability to anticipate, posture, and marshal resources in theater, adapt transportation plan, etc.

(3) Providing supplies in sufficient bulk to land and other joint/coalition elements, to include acquiring over strategic distances, and delivering over operational distances.

(4) Effective LCC distribution amid changing operational situations.

(5) Achieving standard Army multi-command management information system connectivity over extended operational distances without sufficient tactical satellite communications, and with coalition partners who do not possess US systems.

(6) Shortfalls of secure and long range intra-theater communications that is usually consumed by maneuver and fires requirements.

(7) Challenges in establishing and maintaining integrated, joint/coalition in-transit visibility for elements/supplies moving into and through the theater.

(8) Extended ground and air LOCs for intratheater movement require intensive planning and reliance on joint integration, opening of intermediate bases, joint logistics over-the- shore (JLOTS) employment, etc.

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(9) Unforeseen requirements to support interagency, SOF, and coalition forces that

emerge from higher guidance with no warning. As forces and resources have not been programmed, the JFLCC must constitute support “out of hide” until RFFs/additional supplies can be forwarded and approved.

(10) Failure to involve logistics planners early in the planning process can have significant negative operational effect. 5. Organizing the Operational Sustainment Effort

a. Structuring the Communications System Effort. Monitoring, assessing, and ensuring effective operational sustainment is a complex and dynamic process. As such, sustainment planning and synchronization capabilities must be integrated into all operational systems within the JFLCC and JFC.

b. For major land operations, the JFLCC will establish a TSCC that functions as the hub of all operational efforts to plan, execute, and assess ongoing effective operational sustainment for the theater.

(1) The TSCC is a multifunctional headquarters that monitors all aspects of the major land operation from RSOI through force employment and constantly assesses the sufficiency, flexibility, and risk in operational sustainment capabilities against the mission and commander’s intent. The TSCC is commanded by the Deputy Commander for Support/Sustainment, with the J4 as principal staff director. The TSCC must:

(a) Be the single point for monitoring, executing, and assessing sustainment capabilities in theater--the heartbeat of sustainment.”

(b) Coordinate theater-wide reception and distribution of essential supplies and services to support operations across the land AO.

(c) Collocate all key supporting elements, and facilitate joint information management across all Service and multinational sustainment areas.

(d) Be capable of fusing information and intelligence from across the land command and theater to develop and provide the JFC and JFLCC a COP on the ongoing status and associated risk of sustaining the campaign and major land operation.

(e) Be linked to and able to provide this sustainment COP to other headquarters, to include the JFLCC main and forward command posts (CPs), other functional components, and the JFC headquarters, as well as those of major subordinate units.

(f) Conduct constant assessment and feedback on sustainment needs and capabilities through its centers and boards.

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(g) Assess and update sustainment priorities for approval by the land commander and forwarding to the JFC. Participate in and represent the LCC in all JFC boards and processes to ensure these priorities are achieved and synchronized.

(2) Currently, the TSCC must be built through integrating a number of elements from the JFLCC rear CP, theater sustainment command (TSC), logistics support agencies (Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], etc.) and Service component logistics elements (Note: future Army UEy structures will address this shortfall). Although the flow of combat forces may be the top priority during a crisis deployment, the JFLCC and his J4 must ensure that sufficient personnel, facilities, and communications capabilities for the TSCC are resourced and on-site early in the operation, without which “setting the theater” will be very difficult at best.

c. In establishing the command, control, and communications structure and ensuring that sustainment is integrated into planning and execution across the JFLC and joint fight, the JFLCC, J4, and J6 must ensure coverage and information sharing across a number of areas beyond the TSCC:

(1) With Operational Planning, J5. Sustainment planners must be involved in operation plan (OPLAN) development, to include branches and sequels, and ensure that all maneuver options are sustainable. Planners should identify all operational tasks and establish an initial requirements matrix that delineates the sustainment tasks and forces required by phase/time to support success. During the RFF process, planners must ensure that forces are mobilized and flowed into theater to build incremental, sufficient sustainment capabilities for the joint force; any risk assumed in flowing theater sustainment forces late must be identified, assessed, and validated by the JFLCC.

(2) With Operations, J3. On the floor of the operational command post and forward

command post, sustainment operators must be linked to the land and joint COP, and constantly assess/provide feedback to current operations on the status of sustainment capabilities. Additionally, they plan, coordinate, and provide sustainment input into FRAGORDs produced by current ops (J33) and future ops (J35).

(3) With other Functional and Multinational Components. Based on the JFC’s

requirements to sustain other forces during the campaign, the JFLCC should provide liaison and planning capabilities to these elements to monitor their efforts, identify requirements as they emerge, and adapt support to emerging needs.

(4) As noted above, sustainment planning, assessment and execution is not just a JFLC rear headquarters function. Providing representation and augmentation to other components and across other operational systems/functions within the JFLC headquarters are critical for monitoring the status of other efforts in maneuver, protection, etc., as well as initiating early and proactive planning for changes in the operational focus. As such, the JFLCC and J4 must ensure that sustainment planners and operators are resourced and available to support 24 hour operations within these other sections/systems.

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d. Battlefield Geometry and Key Nodes. Early in the planning effort, the JFLCC must identify, arrange, and coordinate the essential bases, nodes, and lines of communications throughout the land AO. Throughout sustainment operations, the positioning, manning, facilities, protection, and movement between and through these nodes must be planned and executed as an integral part of J3 and J5 actions to “set” the theater battlespace, building combat power and synchronizing operational movement. Key theater bases, nodes, and lines that must be integrated into the LCC operational environment and operational protection efforts include:

• Air and sea ports.

• Base camps (in reception and integration/tactical assembly area).

• Staging areas (as part of RSOI process and intratheater movement).

• Storage areas for bulk supplies.

• Medical facilities.

• Enemy prisoner of war and detainee facilities.

• Transportation lines for bulk supplies (pipelines, rail, etc.).

• Forward operating bases/airfields.

• Intratheater lines of movement, such as MSRs, etc.

• Sustainment C2 nodes/headquarters.

e. Centers and Boards. Due to the complexity of sustainment tasks, the JFC and TSCC will organize and operate a series of functional centers and boards that analyze operational sustainment requirements, develop resource priorities and options, and forward these priorities for execution by the command. However, these centers and boards must ensure their actions are linked to the broader operational context and do not become “stovepiped” by orienting only on the success of their discrete function.

(1) Boards are conducted at both the JFC and JFLCC levels to analyze and prioritize for commander approval a variety of sustainment actions. At the joint force level, these boards develop requirements and priorities for requesting resources from the strategic base and employing them across the entirety of the joint operational area. Because the JFLCC must execute a number of these requirements, the LCC must have representation on these boards. As in other JFC boards, such as the JTCB for joint fires, the JFLCC develops and forwards priorities that represent the operational requirements for the entire land command, and the elements it is responsible for supporting within the land AO.

(2) To develop these requirements and priorities, the JFLCC normally will conduct its own boards that mirror those of the JFC. Composition of these boards will vary by

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function, but the J4 must ensure that all Service component, MSC, and supporting agencies of the LCC whose operations are effected should have adequate representation at these boards. Boards are conducted within the battle rhythm to ensure adequate time to develop/synchronize requirements and obtain necessary commander approval of their recommendations before being forwarded to the JFC as the LCC’s approved priorities.

(3) JFLCC boards are tailored to the mission and sustainment functions required. (See Tab A for a more complete discussion of JFLCC Centers and Boards.) 6. Considerations in Coalition Force Land Component Command Sustainment Operations

a. In multinational operations, each participating nation will arrive in theater with its own unique logistics organization, doctrine, and resource levels. This diversity will bring both increased capabilities and challenges, thus complicating sustainment and demanding more planning and coordination. Understanding these differences and obtaining early knowledge of the organic logistic support capabilities of participating nations will be critical to identifying the means to proactively support their needs.

(1) Although national logistics is the overall responsibility of each contributing nation, some nations do not have the assets to fully support their forces when deployed and must rely on nations with these capabilities. Most nations lack the deployable logistic assets to support their own forces and to provide additional logistic units for general support of the MNF as a whole.

(2) Due to national restrictions, some partners may be reluctant to commit logistic forces to support the overall operation early during the force generation process. This reluctance can complicate timely establishment of coalition arrangements for streamlining support and leveraging logistic assets of allies and coalition partners.

(3) Lack of established planning organizations, especially in coalitions, leads to ad hoc logistic organization development, which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of the campaign.

(4) Cultural and material factors, such as the receiving nation's religious constraints, or country of origin for equipment (not being combatable with US supply and repair capabilities) can also impact operations.

b. All nations, including the United States, will likely need some type of nonorganic support. In such cases, the JFLCC must coordinate required support to both military and civilian organizations within the guidelines and plans of the JFC. Many other nations may request CUL from the United States as a cost-effective means of providing logistics to its forces. When these nations require such support, ensure acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) are in place early and that reciprocal agreements and funding lines are clearly identified.

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c. A proven means of enhancing synchronization, deconfliction, and interaction (while improving control) is the use of a CFLCC coalition logistics readiness center (CLRC). The CFLCC should establish a CLRC in the early stages of any joint/coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. The CLRC should be the focal point for identifying requirements and providing for force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, HNS, and movement control. The CLRC should include member nations' action officers who are familiar with their nations' logistics structures and resources and who possess good language skills or linguists, and the requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters.

d. Coalition support is similar to HNS in that it is civil or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis, emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations within a coalition. The JFLCC should have the authority to coordinate coalition support activities and acquire coalition logistics status and capabilities. Multinational partners may provide sustainment support to other partners based on a preapproved standardization agreement, multipartite standardization agreement, or as directed by the MNF commander. These agreements must observe applicable laws and regulations of the contributing nations. Doctrinally, each nation is responsible for sustaining its deployed forces. Multinational support should not supplant detailed national logistics and personnel support planning in multinational operations.

e. Just as for US forces, CUL responsibilities can be delineated to specific multinational partner Services based on requirements and the nation’s ability to provide materiel and services. An accounting system may be required to ensure the appropriate national or international agency is properly billed for the logistics they receive. The JFLCC can use the following methods for executing cooperative logistics either singularly or in combination:

(1) Lead Nation. Under the lead nation (LN) concept, one nation agrees to assume responsibility for coordinating or providing a range of logistic support services to either all or part of a MNF. Such services may include transportation, medical support, medical evacuation, rear area security, port of debarkation operations, engineering, and movement control. For example, the United States provided selected LN logistic support to United Nations contingents in Somalia and Haiti, and NATO allies have provided LN support in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

(2) Role Specialization Nation. A single nation accepts responsibility to provide a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the MNFs, usually at a determined rate of reimbursement. Provision of bulk fuel in Bosnia and Kosovo by the United States and France, respectively, are examples of role specialization nation (RSN) support. The JFLCC should strongly consider this option when a participating nation possesses unique logistic strengths. The major difference between RSN and LN is that the RSN arrangements usually are single-item/single-service oriented, while the LNs are concerned with providing or coordinating multiple services within designated geographic regions.

(3) National Logistic Units for Multinational Support. One of the more effective ways for nations to optimize use of logistic capabilities in a multinational operation is by placing national logistic units under OPCON of the multinational force commander (MNFC) for tasking

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in support of the entire MNF. For many multinational operations, there is an especially urgent requirement for theater-operational level medical, engineering, and transportation capabilities.

(4) Pooled Assets and Resources. Two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to MNFs.

f. Support provided and received by the US in multinational operations must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. For example, 10 USC, Chapter 138, authorizes exchanging support between US Services and those of other countries. It authorizes DOD acquisition from other countries by payment or replacement-in-kind, without establishing a cross-servicing agreement. However, combat service support (CSS) authorized under 10 USC, Chapter 138, does not include major end items, missiles, or bombs. It does include food, billeting, petroleum, oils, transportation, communications services, medical services, ammunition, storage, spare parts, maintenance services, and training. The CFLCC must work with the Department of State for coordination of ACSAs. Planners must refer to each country’s specific ACSA to determine what type of support they may lawfully provide. The use of DOD resources that may directly or indirectly assist or otherwise benefit NGOs and international organizations is subject to strict legal requirements.

g. Challenges in Multinational Distribution. Standardization of systems and procedures can ease the challenges. Arranging units within the operational environment to leverage interoperability of equipment in adjacent or subordinate multinational units is desirable, and planners should consider this during concept development. Potential problem areas for multinational distribution include the following:

• Differences in doctrine and procedures.

• Limited mobility to accomplish intratheater distribution.

• Interoperability and compatibility with supporting US maintenance, supply, and standard Army multi-command management information systems.

• Competing requirements among Services and coalition members for common

support.

• National resource limitations that limit stockage levels, budget and infrastructure. 7. References

The following references provide additional information and detailed guidance concerning relevant joint sustainment operations:

• CJCSM 3122 series

• JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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• JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control

• JP 4-02, Joint Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

• JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations

• JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

• JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures

• FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command

• MCWP 4-12, Operational-Level Logistics

• AFM 160-20, Medical Support in Joint Operation

8. Joint Land Sustainment Checklist

• Tasks and Authorities: Under the combatant commander’s “directive authority” for logistics, what responsibilities and authorities has the combatant commander given the JFLCC? What are the TOTAL Requirements that the JFLCC must deploy/provide equipment, personnel and materials for under:

•• Current Executive Agent agreements (for what functions/areas)?

•• Common-user logistics?

•• Army support to other Services (or Army support to the joint force)?

•• Service-specific requirements (as the LCC continues as the ARFOR or MARFOR for the LCC)?

•• Coalition forces?

•• Interagency elements/agencies that will work with the LCC during stability operations and reconstruction?

• Concept of Sustainment: Have planners met the Commander's Intent?

•• JFC’s guidance: What major responsibilities and authorities have been assigned to the LCC? What related organization and management options (single-Service logistic support or lead Service/agency support with or without OPCON or TACON) have the combatant commander chosen for theater support?

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•• What are the estimates/requirements of other components for sustainment?

•• During each phase, at the transitions, and as we move from major combat operations to stability phases, what should our capabilities be (such as, continue the attack or initiate regeneration)?

•• What major logistics tasks need to be performed, including supporting and supported relationships by phase and component? What tasks will be requested of supporting agencies. Have potential intermediate staging bases and forward operating bases been identified?

•• Have we tied logistics considerations into PAO, civil affairs, and IO to create a synchronized effort?

• Organizing the Effort:

•• What are the major functions and tasks that the LCC is responsible for, and does the C2 arrangement facilitate the planning, tracking, and execution of these?

•• How does the JFLCC interface with the JFC’s JTL?

•• Does every sustainment element work for a commander?

•• Is a support organization such as the TSC place? How will the TSC be integrated into the C2 for sustainment?

• Center and Boards:

•• Which of the combatant commander’s logistics boards/centers/cells require the JFLCC attendance and representation?

•• Which logistics boards/centers/cells should the JFLCC establish?

•• How are these boards linked to the JFC’s battle rhythm?

• Risk: In what sustainment or other logistic areas is the commander willing to accept risk

or responsibility (such as during cross-border operations) and what level of approval is required in order to effect that?

• Host Nation Support: What logistic support is currently in place from contractor

support and what from HNS?

•• What authority and responsibilities does the JFLCC have for negotiating and obtaining this support?

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•• What additional support is required from either contractor and/or HNS?

• Contract Support: What capabilities and restrictions does the JFLCC have in utilizing contract support to the joint and combined force in lieu of military capabilities?

•• Is contingency contracting capability available from day 1 of the operation?

•• Have identified manpower and materiel been incorporated into planning and deployment databases and contingency plans (so military forces are not requested)?

•• Are HN agreements and negotiations capabilities in place?

•• Are ACSAs in place for all non-US and non-military organizations that depend on the LCC for support?

•• What can the contractor not provide by law, and what are the LCC’s requirements to support them with military services (information, intelligence, equipment, transportation, security, etc)?

•• Is there a joint acquisition and review board or similar process in place to prevent competition and prioritize/approve requirements for contract support?

•• Are there established pre-deployment standards for training and equipping civilians?

• Coalition/Other Agency Support: What are the TOTAL requirements for common

items/CUL designed for support of the multinational partners, and other organizations?

•• What support is provided and received from MNFs through national channels?

•• What authority does the JFLCC have over multinational/coalition support?

•• What control/authority does the JLFCC have over these items?

•• What Service/agency is best positioned to provide this support?

•• What are the logistical implications of civil-military operations, such as nation building, support to military governments, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction?

• SOF Support: How are SOF operations, to include black units and related activities of

OGAs, integrated with the overall logistical support for the land component?

• Force Flow/Rotations: What is the expectation of requirements for force rotations?

•• Does the LCC have visibility of inbound and departing forces, and their requirements for support during RSOI and redeployment?

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•• Will they be accomplished by location, by unit, or staggered?

•• Will equipment be recovered, replaced, or left in place?

• Intratheater Movement: How much tactical support airlift should be reserved or

prioritized for logistical operations and activities?

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements, which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act. Logistics brings the troops to this point.

Jomini Precis de l’ Art de la Guerre, 1838

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