History

U N I V E R S I T Y O F C A L I F O R N I A P R E S S

Exceptional America

W H AT D I V I D E S A M E R I C A N S F R O M T H E W O R L D

A N D F R O M E A C H O T H E R

Mugambi Jouet

a ddit iona l pr a ise for e xce pt ion a l a m e r ic a

“ Mugambi Jouet traveled from Paris, France, to Houston, Texas, as a college freshman and has been trying to make sense of the American experience ever since. Th e result is a richly textured account of the forces that make the United States unlike anywhere else in the world.”

— j u n e ca r bon e , Robina Chair in Law, Science, and Technology, University of Minnesota Law School, and coauthor of Red Families v. Blue Families

“ Using a comparative perspective, and seeking to place American values in a larger context, Mugambi Jouet provides perspectives on the pervasive culture war that divides Americans.”

— naom i ca h n, Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, and coauthor of Red Families v. Blue Families

“ Exceptional America is a seminal work written by a French author from a comparative framework. It is an eye-opening presentation of America’s contradictions, highly relevant in contemporary politics and a must-read for policy makers.”

— pash au r a si ngh, Chair, Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Riverside

This page intentionally left blank

Exceptional America

This page intentionally left blank

U N I V E R S I T Y O F C A L I F O R N I A P R E S S

Exceptional America

W H AT D I V I D E S A M E R I C A N S F R O M T H E W O R L D

A N D F R O M E A C H O T H E R

Mugambi Jouet

University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu.

University of California Press Oakland, California

© 2017 by Mugambi Jouet

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Jouet, Mugambi, 1981– author. Title: Exceptional America : what separates Americans from the world and from each other / Mugambi Jouet. Description: Oakland, California : University of California Press, [2017] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifi ers: lccn 2016046909 | isbn 9780520293298 (cloth : alk. paper) | isbn 9780520966468 (eBook) Subjects: LCSH: Exceptionalism—United States. | National characteristics, American. | United States—Social policy. | United States—Economic

policy. | United States—Politics and government—21st century. Classifi cation: lcc e169.12 .j68 2017 | ddc 973—dc23 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016046909

Manufactured in the United States of America

25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

It is impossible to understand a country without seeing how it varies fr om others. Th ose who know only one country know no country.

Seymour Martin Lipset

This page intentionally left blank

Preface ix

Introduction 1

1 • One Nation, Divisible 19

2 • From the American Enlightenment to Anti-Intellectualism 4 3

3 • Th e Exceptional Infl uence of Christian Fundamentalism 80

4 • Th e Culture Wars of Faith, Sex, and Gender 113

5 • Between Democracy and Plutocracy 14 3

6 • Millions Standing against Th eir Own Economic Interest 16 8

7 • Mass Incarceration, Executions, and Gun Violence in “the Land of the Free” 19 4

8 • America and the World 232

Conclusion 261

Acknowledgments 275 Notes 277 Index 3 4 3

C O N T E N T S

This page intentionally left blank

ix

On November 9, 2016, a puzzled world woke up to a new face of America. How could Donald Trump follow Barack Obama into the White House? Experts were stunned.

I began writing this book several years before the election, and it went to press shortly aft erward. I also did not expect Trump to defeat Hillary Clinton, insofar as polls predicted her victory. I was nonetheless skeptical of the conventional wisdom that Trump hardly refl ected the views of the Republican Party or most ordinary American conservatives. My research instead suggested that the diff erence between Trump and the G.O.P. estab- lishment was oft en one of style, rhetoric, and temperament. While he built his platform on conspiracy theories about Obama’s forged U.S. birth certifi - cate and other spectacularly fact-free claims, scores of Americans were already convinced that climate change and the theory of evolution are myths. Some of Trump’s campaign promises, such as barring Muslims from entering America, surely went beyond what contemporary leaders had called for. But it was not as if he had suddenly brought bigotry back to America aft er the civil rights movement of the 1960s ended it once and for all. Yes, Trump’s incendiary declarations demonstrated reservations about democracy and the rule of law, yet many citizens and prominent politicians had come to embrace torture and indefi nite detention without trial at Guantánamo.

My thesis was that conservative America has become an outlier in the Western world because of its growing radicalization over the past three decades. Four peculiar mindsets especially stood out: profound anti-intellec- tualism, fervent Christian fundamentalism, a visceral suspicion of govern- ment, and racial resentment. Th is nexus has fostered an exceptionally hard- line and anti-rational ideolog y, which culminated in Trump’s election,

P R E F A C E

x • P R E F A C E

although it has much older roots in the birth of modern democracy in the United States. It is therefore my hope that this book will humanize Trump voters by tracing their ideology to the fabric of America, including its history, culture, politics, law, economics, religion, and race relations.

Longstanding features of American exceptionalism have shaped the nation’s intensifying polarization, from an egalitarian spirit to a tradition of religious liberty and a remarkable demographic diversity. Th ese traits can manifest themselves in inspiring, contradictory, and destructive ways. Th ey ultimately led to the presidency of a man whose movement has cast a shadow over the principles of democracy and human rights that America helped spread throughout the world.

1

I exit the subway and walk past the Flatiron Building toward the Manhattan state appellate court, crossing elegant Madison Square Park on the way. Escaping the city’s bustling corners on a weekday aft ernoon, quiet parkgoers sit pensively by the water fountain or chat lightheartedly on the lawn. But now is not the time for dawdling, as I am about to argue a criminal case before a panel of fi ve judges.

It is 2009 and I am a public defender, namely a human rights lawyer defend- ing poor people who cannot aff ord an attorney. My colleagues and I represent the most underprivileged members of society in a broad range of criminal cases, from homicides to petty drug off enses—an uphill battle at a time when America has the world’s top incarceration rate. Over 2.2 million people live behind bars in “the land of the free.” 1 America has 5 percent of the global population and 25 percent of its prisoners.2 It is also among the countries that execute the most people, alongside authoritarian regimes such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea. No other Western democracy still resorts to the death penalty, which has been abolished by two-thirds of all countries in law or practice.3 Capital punishment is primarily a Southern phenomenon but harsh justice is not limited to red states. Judges in New York routinely infl ict draconian prison terms regardless of mitigating circumstances.

Upon arriving at the courthouse I am greeted by my client’s mother, who asks me whether the judges are likely to overturn her son’s conviction for selling a small quantity of drugs. I explain that there is no basis to challenge his guilty plea, though the judges have the discretion to reduce his six-year sentence. Despite her resilience, she has little hope aft er witnessing the toll of the “War on Drugs” on her neighborhood. Th e young Afro-Latino man I defend is among the multitude of destitute New Yorkers incarcerated in

Introduction

2 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

distant rural counties whose economies heavily revolve around the prison- industrial complex.4 I previously visited my client in an austere upstate prison, but the judges will never have to look him in the eye. Unlike for trial proceedings, prisoners have no right to attend the appellate arguments that seal their fates.

I sit down and gaze around while several other cases are heard. A remark- able feat of architecture, the Manhattan state appellate courtroom is deco- rated with Renaissance-inspired murals.5 Th e salient fi gure is Lady Justice waiting to render her noble judgment. “In God we trust” is engraved above the judges’ bench. Yet a peculiar brand of justice is meted out here every day.

Th e fi ve judges in black robes fi nally grant me seven minutes to present my case. Th at is a fairly long time by the court’s standards. Once I was aff orded barely fi ve minutes to argue in an attempted murder case.

“May it please the court. Mugambi Jouet, appearing on behalf of Hector Merced.” 6

I am defending an American citizen by relying on American law even though I am not American by birth. I have always wondered whether judges can tell my background. My accent is sometimes hard to place, as I grew up in Paris in a bilingual environment.

I urge the judges to fi nd that the two years that my client has already served in prison are suffi cient for a mere fi ft een-dollar drug sale, as it would be senseless to force him to spend four more years behind bars, away from his family. Th e judges are uninterested in my references to studies showing that lengthy prison terms for nonviolent off enders are ineff ective in reducing crime and costly to taxpayers. Th ey are likewise unfazed by my appeal to the humane principle of rehabilitation.

As expected, a judge eventually asks me a familiar question: “Your client is serving six years in prison. Under the law, couldn’t he have received up to twelve years for this crime?”

Th at habitual question epitomizes how superfi cial the debate over crimi- nal justice has become in modern America. One might imagine that in Manhattan—the cosmopolitan center of the nation’s intellectual, cultural, and artistic life—appellate judges would be inquisitive about the latest stud- ies in criminology or prisoners’ prospects for rehabilitation in the age of mass incarceration.7 Nevertheless, local judges, whether Democratic or Republican appointees, oft en embrace the “tough on crime” ideology or fear appearing “soft on crime.”

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 3

I readily concede the judge’s point for strategic reasons but press on. Six years behind bars is excessive for a relatively minor drug off ense. Th e judges’ notion of what constitutes an excessive sentence has been skewed by the ruth- less penal laws now commonplace in America. If the maximum sentence for a drug sale is twelve years, then six years in prison can seem lenient. Th e court will issue its offi cial decision in a few weeks, although the outcome is predict- able. My client will spend six years in a grim cellblock in the name of justice. In Europe, he might have served a few months in prison.

• • •

Seven years later, the dehumanizing justice system I fought against as a public defender fi nally received more public attention. Aft er declaring her candi- dacy for the 2016 presidential race, Hillary Clinton raised eyebrows by denouncing the “tough on crime” policies that once helped her husband win the White House. Th e spotlight had turned to criminal justice aft er police killings of unarmed black men led to peaceful and violent protests in Ferguson, Baltimore, and beyond. Clinton promised that as president she would not only strive to stop police brutality but also “end the era of mass incarceration” and fi ght “institutional racism.” Americans ultimately chose as their president a man advocating a harsher penal system. Casting himself as “the Law and Order Candidate,” Donald Trump vowed to make America safe from threatening undocumented immigrants and inner-city thugs.

However, mass incarceration reveals far more about America than persis- tent discrimination or the diffi culty of fi nding common ground for genuine reform.8 Figure 1 illustrates how American justice is on the fringe of contem- porary Western civilization.

“One can judge a society by its prisons.” Th is timeless observation attrib- uted to Albert Camus, the French novelist and philosopher, evokes Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s earlier reference to nineteenth-century Russia: “Th e degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.” 9 Indeed, one can learn much about a society from whether it recognizes that even people convicted of serious crimes should be treated with dignity and compassion. When future generations look back on modern America, they may see its inhumane justice system as the embodiment of disturbing trends. In the words of Bryan Stevenson, a prominent attorney who has devoted his life to defending vulnerable Americans, “you judge the character of [societies] not by how they treat their rich and the powerful and the privileged but by how

4 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

they treat the poor, the condemned, the incarcerated. Because it’s in that nexus that we actually begin to understand truly profound things about who we are.” 10

Th e degeneration of American justice embodies American exceptional- ism. Readers may pause to ask: “American exceptionalism? Isn’t that the belief that America is a superior country chosen by God to enlighten the world?” No, it is not. Or not really.

While the word “exceptional” can imply greatness or superiority, the con- cept originally referred to how America is “exceptional” in the sense of “unique,” “diff erent,” “unusual,” “extraordinary,” or “peculiar.” Put diff er- ently, “American exceptionalism” means that America is an exception com- pared to other countries, for better or worse.11 We will see in Chapter 1 how Republican leaders misleadingly redefi ned this concept as “American superi- ority,” then used it as a rhetorical weapon against Obama by relentlessly accusing him of lacking faith in “American exceptionalism.” In their view, the unpatriotic Obama precipitated the nation’s decline by seeking to trans- form it into Europe with his “socialist” and “un-American” agenda. Th ese

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800 Ja

pa n

S w

ed en

N et

he rla

nd s

N or

w ay

G er

m an

y Ire

la nd Ita ly

Fr an

ce C

an ad

a B

rit ai

n Au

st ra

lia N

ew Z

ea la

nd M

ex ic

o

Ira n

S ou

th A

fri ca

R us

si a

C ub

a U

ni te

d S

ta te

s

F I G U R E 1 . Incarceration rates (prisoners per 100,000 people). SOURCE: Institute for Criminal Policy

Research, “World Prison Brief” (2016).

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 5

accusations matched the spread of conspiracy theories claiming that Obama is not truly American because he has a forged U.S. birth certifi cate and is a closeted Islamist. Th e partisan redefi nition of “American exceptionalism” obscured its original meaning and why it matters today.

Th roughout this book I turn on its head the popular belief that American exceptionalism means that America is a “shining city upon a hill” picked by God to be a beacon of light to the world. Major features of American excep- tionalism are instead sources of serious confl ict and injustice that could spell American decline. Ironically, scores of Americans equate “exceptionalism” with their nation’s superiority when it might be its Achilles heel—a self- destructive vicious circle threatening admirable dimensions of American society. Compared to other Western democracies, modern America has the worst degree of wealth inequality and the worst human rights record. Even though American exceptionalism has both positive and negative dimensions, some of its troubling features have intensifi ed in recent decades. Th is book describes how Americans are now profoundly divided over their core values and what path their country should take. Th e people who pay the greatest price for these social problems are usually the most vulnerable members of society. Th e struggling poor, working class, and middle class. Women. LGBTQ people. Racial and ethnic minorities. Immigrants. Prisoners.

Th e United States’ extraordinary polarization is partly explainable by peculiar dimensions of contemporary American conservatism: virulent anti- intellectualism, visceral anti-governmentalism, and fervent Christian funda- mentalism. Th ey foster an uncompromising, hardline ideology that impedes rational decision-making and problem-solving. Data on voting patterns con- fi rm that the G.O.P. has moved “sharply to the right” in recent decades, though the Democratic Party’s left ward shift has been more modest.12 Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 election may have been unexpected, but his rise should have surprised no one. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the run-up to the vote, Trump’s views on many issues are similar to those of the Republican establishment, as exemplifi ed by how both have supported reintroducing torture into Western civilization13 and insisted that climate change is a myth.14 Evidence further indicates that mainstream politicians have long incited animosity toward minorities with “dog whistles,” racially coded language recognizable by sympathizers.15 Trump did so more openly. His actions as president might not always match his vitriolic campaign rheto- ric, which oft en lacked coherence. In any event, Trumpism is a product of conservative America’s peculiar ideological evolution.

6 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

Intriguingly, America and other Western nations are moving apart and closer at the same time. While liberal America is mainly evolving in the same direction as the rest of the West, conservative America has become an outlier because of its unusual ideology. Liberal America’s worldview is not simply vastly diff erent from the worldview in conservative America but also closer to the dominant worldview elsewhere in the Western world: Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.* Tellingly, universal health care is broadly sup- ported by both liberals and conservatives in all Western nations except America, where Republicans persistently denounce the evils of “socialized medicine.” In other words, “conservatism” tends to have a deeply diff erent meaning in America than other Western nations.

Th e growing radicalism of American conservatism is not the only source of the nation’s intense polarization. Singular dimensions of U.S. history, politics, law, culture, religion, and race relations have shaped the views of conservative and liberal citizens by leading to peculiar ways of approaching a wide range of issues. On one hand, crippling polarization could foster America’s decline, including its ability to tackle fundamental problems at home and its credibility as a global leader. On the other hand, modern America’s acute social confl icts and injustices appear to be part of a historical cycle, as they have old roots even as they take on new forms.

Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic Democracy in America remains the most insightful book on the roots of American exceptionalism. Traveling through the young nation in the 1830s, the Frenchman remarked that Americans could live in diff erent worlds given the hierarchy between whites and blacks, as well as the divide between North and South. However, he published his essay almost two centuries ago, before the Civil War and other major devel- opments. Among later generations of comparatists, Seymour Martin Lipset stands out for noting that “the American Creed can be described in fi ve terms: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire.” 16 But America has also changed in the nearly two decades since the publication of his magnum opus, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword.

Th is book aims to go further than traditional explanations of American exceptionalism focusing mainly on how America as a whole compares to other nations. I argue that American exceptionalism is not only what divides

* Th e defi nition of “the West” used in this book does not include Latin American nations because of diff erences in history, culture, and economic development. Russia and various other former Soviet bloc countries, such as Belarus, are also not considered Western, although some Eastern European nations are gradually aligning with the West.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 7

Americans from the world—it is also what divides Americans from each other. Compared to other Westerners, Americans are far more polarized over fundamental questions regarding the purpose of government, socioeconomic equality, the literal veracity of the Bible, sexual morality, science, human rights, and foreign policy. As a result, America is torn apart by confl icts and injustices existing nowhere else or to nowhere near the same extent in the modern Western world.

Th e fi rst chapter begins by examining the history and meaning of American exceptionalism. Th is storied concept became a recurrent topic in recent years as Republican politicians turned it into a rhetorical weapon to impugn Obama’s patriotism. Meanwhile, intensifying social polarization emerged as a major dimension of American exceptionalism’s true meaning. Th e already huge rift between conservative and liberal America during the George W. Bush presidency worsened during the Obama era,17 when Congress reached its worst degree of partisan polarization since the post– Civil War Reconstruction period.18 Th roughout the Bush and Obama years, America faced a series of grave crises. “Th e War on Terror.” Hurricane Katrina. Th e fi nancial collapse and Great Recession. Health care reform. Th e government shutdown. Climate change. Ferguson. Criminal justice reform. Th e list goes on, from the clashes over gay rights and Planned Parenthood to the incendiary rhetoric and violence at Trump rallies. Polarization shows little sign of abating during his presidency.

Chapter 2 considers the exceptional weight of anti-intellectualism in parts of America. Th is peculiar mindset is animated by outright skepticism of education, leading to “a cult of ignorance.” 19 Anti-intellectualism has exac- erbated the polarization of American society by precluding a rational debate on nearly every single political issue. Th e Bush administration’s debunked justifi cations to invade Iraq20 were followed by the normalization of propa- ganda during the Obama era, as numerous politicians routinely made absurd claims about his “fake” birth certifi cate and “covert Muslim faith,” the perils of “socialized medicine,” the creation of “death panels,” the “myth” of cli- mate change, the “tyranny” of the federal government, radical tax hikes that never occurred,21 the treasonous Benghazi plot, and other canards. Trump’s ludicrous rhetoric was merely the tip of the iceberg.

Much like other peculiar mindsets that might spell American decline, anti-intellectualism was ironically shaped by positive dimensions of U.S. his- tory. We will see that it stems from an unusual conception of equality rooted in America’s heritage as the fi rst modern democracy to emerge from the

8 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

Enlightenment. As Tocqueville observed in the 1830s, the birth of modern democracy in the United States generally led to a greater “equality of condi- tions” among white men there than in Europe.22 A pitfall of this progress was the rise of a populist creed viewing knowledge as little more than a badge of elitism of the pseudoaristocracy, because all one needs is “common sense.” 23 Anti-intellectualism proved particularly infl uential in the South, the poorest region of the country. By encouraging irrationality, gullibility, and skepti- cism of education, the profound anti-intellectualism in parts of America has facilitated disinformation—false information deliberately spread to manipu- late public opinion. By contrast, the evolution of democracy in Western Europe was less shaped by the confl ation of egalitarianism and anti-intellec- tualism. While political extremism in contemporary Europe is troubling, it is less mainstream and more focused on immigration—the main target of far-right European parties. Disinformation has a far less important role in Europe than in America today, unlike in the era of European fascism, Nazism, and communism.

Interestingly, anti-intellectualism in America coexists with a vibrant intel- lectual life, exemplifi ed by its outstanding universities, which may be the best in the world. In criminology and other fi elds, American scholars are widely esteemed by their peers abroad. Nevertheless, laws and policies are less likely to be craft ed in consultation with experts in America than in other Western democracies.24 Th e eggheads’ knowledge is commonly deemed futile in the United States. Th e surge of its prison population to world-record levels would probably not have occurred but for the weight of the oversimplistic perspec- tive behind slogans like “Tough on crime,” “Zero tolerance,” “You do the crime, you do the time,” and “Lock people up and throw away the key.”

Th e next two chapters explore the extraordinary role of religion in shaping American exceptionalism. Chapter 3 explains why organized religion remains highly infl uential in America at a time when it frequently inspires indiff er- ence, skepticism, or suspicion in other developed nations. I call into question the conventional view of an America divided between believers and nonbe- lievers. In reality, the divide is mainly among people of faith, since nonbeliev- ers are a limited, albeit rapidly growing, group of Americans. Roughly four in ten Americans gravitate toward Christian fundamentalism—an ultratra- ditional faith practically nonexistent in other modern Western nations. A similar proportion of Americans share liberal-moderate faiths. Chapter 4 analyzes the “culture wars” over faith, sex, and gender. In almost no other developed country are issues such as abortion, contraception, homosexuality,

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 9

and sexual education as controversial as in America. However, the political impact of Christian fundamentalism is not narrowly limited to religious issues. By fostering anti-intellectual, retrograde, black-and-white, and authoritarian mindsets, Christian fundamentalism also infl uences how mil- lions of Americans think about education, science, climate change, econom- ics, crime, foreign policy, war, and more. Th is sheds light on why many reli- gious traditionalists fl ocked to Trump’s movement regardless of his evident irreligiosity and unabashed vulgarity.

Like anti-intellectualism, religious radicalism paradoxically stems from admirable aspects of American history. Th e relative separation of church and state since the United States’ founding spared Americans the long history of religious warfare and clerical domination that Europeans once suff ered. Th is is among the factors behind the comparatively limited skepticism toward organized religion in America, which has largely enabled Christian funda- mentalism to thrive despite its radical theology. Around 40 percent of Americans, a huge minority, are creationists, who deem that God made humans in their present form ten thousand years ago.25 Th e same proportion expects Jesus to return by 2050.26 Legions are persuaded that apocalyptic biblical prophecies are relevant to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.27 But a peculiar conception of religious freedom that equates questioning dogma with intolerance has recurrently shielded fundamentalist theology from critical analysis in America.

Th e following chapters turn to wealth inequality, which is much sharper in America than in other Western nations. Chapter 5 describes how it has evolved from a relatively middle-class society into a winner-take-all economy since the 1980s. Chapter 6 considers why millions of ordinary Americans vote against their economic interest. Several factors help explain this puz- zling dimension of U.S. politics: myopia molded by anti-intellectualism; the role of racial divisions in hindering economic solidarity; the relationship between Christian fundamentalism and market fundamentalism; and unbri- dled faith in the American Dream, fostering the conviction that any hard- working citizen can become affl uent without government assistance.

Th e prison system provides a revealing window into this aspect of American exceptionalism. Th e surge of wealth inequality in America since the 1980s has paralleled the mass imprisonment of poor people, although the concentration of wealth in the hands of the richest 1 percent of Americans has received greater attention than the plight of the 1 percent of American adults behind bars.28 Tighter control on the poor via a stringent penal system

10 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

has coincided with greater “liberty” for the rich,29 as symbolized by the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision allowing moneyed interests to spend unlimited sums on political campaigns.30 Penal systems are oft en mir- ror images of socioeconomic systems. Statistical research indicates that the more unequal a country is, the likelier it is to imprison people.31

In addition to being the Western nation with the sharpest wealth inequal- ity, America is the only one without a universal health care system. Prison is therefore the sole place where certain Americans can receive public health care. In recent years, a number of desperate people have deliberately gotten arrested to receive shelter and medical care in prison. For example, Rickie Lawrence Gardner, a forty-nine-year-old white man, staged a bank robbery in Moulton, Alabama, since he preferred heading to prison rather than face homelessness aft er being on the verge of losing his job because of a leg injury. “His is the fi rst bank robbery I’ve ever worked where the robber was waiting outside the bank for the police to turn himself in,” the local police chief said.32

Th e full story of American exceptionalism cannot be told without looking more specifi cally at the disturbing evolution of the nation’s penal laws, which I do in Chapter 7. Th is is an area where the stark divide between American ideals and reality hits home powerfully. Modern American justice is astound- ingly harsh. Th e nation not only has virtually the highest incarceration rate worldwide, but is also the sole Western democracy to retain the death pen- alty. American justice is further characterized by pervasive discrimination and other degrading practices. It was not always so, as foreign observers once saw American justice as enlightened.

Police shootings are far more common in America than in other Western democracies, a tragedy infl uenced by racial animus. Strikingly, British civil- ians are one hundred times less likely to be shot by police. Most British police offi cers do not even carry a gun.33 Of course, another reason why U.S. police offi cers are more trigger happy is that more criminals are armed in America. Nearly one gun is available to each American on average—a world record. Yemen is a distant second in the number of guns per capita.34 Th e obsession with guns among numerous Americans and die-hard groups such as the National Rifl e Association epitomizes the visceral suspicion of government in much of the country. Th e right to bear arms is not merely envisioned as a way to defend oneself from criminals—it is equally envisioned as a way to defend oneself from the government. In this view, armed patriots might well be the last line of defense when the federal government goes one step too far in violating the American people’s “liberty.” 35 Th e extraordinarily lax gun

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 11

control shaped by this far-right ideology is a major reason why America has the highest murder rate and the most gun violence in the West. Americans are generally three to fi ve times likelier to be murdered than Europeans.36

Still, America does not have an exceptionally ruthless justice system because it has an exceptionally high crime rate. Homicides aside, its crime levels are comparable to those of other Western nations.37 Th e degrading punishments routinely infl icted on American prisoners instead refl ect a peculiar view of human dignity. Illustratively, the Supreme Court held that the incredibly long sentences imposed under California’s “three-strikes law” are not “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Th e court therefore upheld the fi ft y-year-to-life sentence of a man who had shoplift ed videotapes worth only $153, since he had prior con- victions for petty theft , burglary, and transporting marijuana.38 America further stands apart from other Western democracies by relying on solitary confi nement for lengthy periods, regardless of the enormous mental harm it causes. A United Nations expert on torture denounced these practices, pointing to two American prisoners who spent over four decades alone in tiny cells.39 Th e U.N. Human Rights Committee has additionally expressed concern about the U.S. practice of shackling pregnant prisoners even while they give birth.40 Perhaps one may see progress in the fact that, since a 2005 Supreme Court case decided by a 5–4 vote, it is no longer constitutional to execute juveniles in America.41 But America remains essentially the only country to sentence teenagers to life imprisonment.42

Other fundamental human rights issues are also extremely divisive in America. Th e Bush administration’s creation of the Guantánamo camp stood for the proposition that terrorists have no human rights—and that it is therefore acceptable to torture and detain them forever without trial. Although many citizens condemned such practices as “un-American,” this treatment was not as much a deviation from contemporary American values as they thought, since it fi t within the notion that criminals’ lives are worth- less. America’s self-defeating “War on Terror” recalls its “War on Crime” in how both emphasize striking hard at off enders, downplaying root social causes behind their actions, and dismissing humanitarian concerns.43

America considers itself “the leader of the free world,” yet it regularly vio- lates international human rights standards. Paradoxically, the human rights movement that came to life aft er World War II was partly led by Americans, including Eleanor Roosevelt.44 Her vision of universal human rights bore more fruit abroad than at home. References to “human rights” are rare in the

12 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

U.S. legal and political debate. In modern America, “human rights” oft en evoke foreign problems like abuses in Th ird World dictatorships.45

Th is brings us to the last chapter, examining America’s singular relation- ship to the world. Th e United States has long been far more inclined than other Western democracies to defy norms of diplomacy, international law, and human rights deemed against its interests. Americans are thus quite divided over key aspects of U.S. foreign policy, as shown by radically diff erent perspectives on the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo, and torture. Th ese atti- tudes refl ect diverse facets of exceptionalism, such as America’s superpower status, its relative geographic isolation, and the idea that God chose it to lead the world.

Insularity helps explain why America oft en stands alone among developed nations in pursuing the numerous counterproductive policies discussed throughout this book. Studies show that Americans are generally less knowl- edgeable than other Westerners about foreign countries.46 Th ey also travel less internationally, as nearly two hundred million do not have passports,47 in the image of Sarah Palin, who had left North America only once before becoming the 2008 Republican vice-presidential candidate.48

Insularity is a curious state of mind in a country that considerably infl u- ences the world culturally, economically, geopolitically, and militarily. Yet a tension between globalism and isolationism has long existed in the United States. Millions of Americans are well traveled and sincerely interested in foreign cultures. American universities have some of the fi nest international programs of all academic institutions worldwide. In the end, America is a land of immigrants. While millions are uninquisitive about the countries from which their ancestors came, America’s global citizens are mindful that their country now lags behind other industrialized nations in areas like criminal justice, health care, and human rights.

In sum, this book explores the intriguing relationship between diff erent dimensions of American exceptionalism. Even though no chapter is specifi - cally devoted to race and immigration, they are recurrent themes. Next to other Western democracies, America has historically had a far bigger propor- tion of racial and ethnic minorities, which now constitute 38 percent of its population.49 Racism has therefore played a bigger role in shaping American attitudes. Th at may be counterintuitive at fi rst. Aft er all, America has been more successful at integrating immigrants than European nations in a number of ways. It was the fi rst Western democracy tolerant enough to choose a person of color as its leader. Obama’s election was a source of inspira-

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 13

tion to millions of people worldwide, as he came to embody the idea that “anything is possible in America.”

Th e fl ip side is that America’s extraordinary diversity has had troubling consequences by hindering socioeconomic solidarity. For instance, scores of Americans believe that most benefi ciaries of universal health care would be minorities on welfare, who should work harder instead of expecting a “hand- out.” Such stereotypes are among the reasons why the Republican base viru- lently opposed the Obama administration’s health care reform. In reality, millions of Americans who would benefi t from universal health care are white and employed.50

By contrast, few Europeans think of universal health care as a program primarily for racial minorities or even poor people. Race has had less infl u- ence in molding attitudes toward inequality in Europe than in America. Th is may again seem hard to believe, given the growing sway of far-right European political parties, not to mention discrimination against Muslims, blacks, and other minorities on the Old Continent. Th e diff erence is probably due not to lower racism but rather to the fact that there were few people of color in Europe until recent decades, when a surge of immigration from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Caribbean islands, and beyond increased their proportion.* European institutions like national health insurance were created before their arrival. Similarly, European attitudes toward social justice were framed long before the current immigration crisis, as illustrated by the creation of the European Court of Human Rights in 1959. Simply put, part of the reason why white Europeans are more inclined than white Americans to think that depriving people of health care or executing prisoners is an aff ront to human dignity is that these attitudes largely originated at a time when nearly all Europeans were white. Conversely, race has always been an issue in America, thereby coloring attitudes toward inequality and human dignity.

In our journey through America we will see that it incarnates progress in countless ways but is also a nation of stark contradictions. Why does a coun- try that prizes “liberty” so dearly have virtually the highest incarceration rate in the entire world? Why is America the only Western country to retain the death penalty, even though its people are the most suspicious of the authority of “big government” over their lives? How could the fi rst Western nation to

* Th e Holocaust is a powerful reminder that scapegoating and persecution are not new problems in Europe, although groups such as Jews and Roma have historically constituted smaller shares of the European population than blacks and other minorities in the United States.

14 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

elect a person of color as its head of state suff er from institutional racism? Why is anti-intellectualism so prevalent in the United States, considering the quality of its universities and the impressive contributions of Americans to human thought? Why has Christian fundamentalism remained so promi- nent in one of the countries that spearheaded the advent of science, the sexual revolution, and other modern developments? How does one explain the insu- larity of many Americans given their country’s infl uential role on the global stage? And why do myriad Americans vote against their self-interest by opposing sensible reforms in an age of staggering inequality?

• • •

Th e adrenaline from my court argument slowly wears off as I head back to my offi ce, a few blocks from the World Trade Center’s ruins. I linger around the workplace. Gotham’s nightlife beckons but I am not in the mood to socialize. I am alone with my thoughts as I decide to walk by the Hudson River.

Drift ing along the waterfront toward the southern tip of Manhattan, I eventually fi nd a quiet bench in Battery Park. Th e Statue of Liberty, which left France’s shores in 1885, stands on the horizon, carrying its celebrated message from the Jewish poet Emma Lazarus: “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” I wonder whether my client will stay in prison. My mind begins to wander as I refl ect on the path that led me here.

My roots are American in a sense, as my French mother and Kenyan father met in New York when they were international students at Columbia University. Th eir backgrounds could hardly have been more diff erent. My father was born in the rural village of Kangeta to illiterate parents who never attended school, since British colonial authorities sharply limited access to education for African children. Th e Kenyan government did not do much better following independence in 1963, although determination and good fortune enabled my father to attend college in Nairobi before pursuing his studies in America. My mother, on the other hand, is from Brittany, the Celtic region of France. Leaving her comfort zone, she spent years living in America, Ivory Coast, and Kenya.

Unlike Barack Obama, I was actually born in Kenya. I then moved to Paris with my mother aft er my parents separated when I was three years old. Th eir short-lived marriage left me, their only child, between worlds: France- Kenya, Europe-Africa, white-black. Growing up a few minutes from the

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 15

Eiff el Tower, I received a French upbringing at home while attending a bilin- gual French-English international school.

I fi rst set foot in America in the summer of 1989, at the age of eight, to visit my father, who had become a professor at UCLA. A summer in sunny Los Angeles provided all the youthful excitement I could handle, including visits to Universal Studios and other amusement parks. My fascination with America had begun. During my childhood I returned to California and visited additional parts of the country. Attending college in America seemed inevitable, as I was eager to broaden my horizons and gain independence. My parents encouraged me to do so because they held U.S. universities in high regard. I fi nally chose Rice University in Houston, since it was a reputable institution in another world, Texas, a state I had yet to discover. I arrived there ready to embrace its people and certainly had the opportunity to do so, as a large share of my fellow students were from Texas and neighboring Southern states.

Houston bears little resemblance to European cities. Urban sprawl. No subway system. Th e consequent need to drive almost everywhere. Th e prolif- eration of strip malls. On the upside, Rice University’s agreeable campus blended elegant architecture with green areas. NASA’s fantastic space station was only a short drive away.

Compared to the French, Americans are generally more informal and outgoing with strangers, perhaps even more so in states like Texas, where people pride themselves on Southern hospitality. It was not uncommon for a stranger to greet me with a smile as I strolled around campus, something I did not experience when pursuing my graduate studies in New York and Chicago. Southerners are reputed to be anti-French, but my Gallic origins usually generated warm reactions. Anti-French attitudes in America typi- cally arise over foreign policy disagreements, such as France’s opposition to the Bush administration’s war on Iraq. However, I no longer lived in Texas by the time America invaded Iraq, so no Texan had a chance to off er me a helping of “freedom fries” or “freedom toast.”

Living in Texas was nonetheless a culture shock, as I saw things I had never witnessed in France. People who said grace before meals, rejected the theory of evolution, and preached abstinence until marriage. People who invoked their Christian faith to support the death penalty—“an eye for an eye”—and interpreted “Th ou shalt not kill” as a license to execute prisoners. People who were content to lack universal health care because it would be a great leap toward the “tyranny of socialized medicine” in other industrialized

16 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

nations. And middle-class persons who never left their country except maybe to visit Cancún, a sanitized version of Mexico for U.S. tourists.

Originally a frontier land, Texas enjoyed independence for nearly a decade aft er seceding from Mexico in 1836. Th e Lone Star State joined the United States in 1845, although it tends to regard itself as a land of mavericks. In twenty-fi rst-century Texas, the governor can proudly give the following response on being asked whether secession is an option: “We’ve got a great union. Th ere’s absolutely no reason to dissolve it. But if Washington contin- ues to thumb their nose at the American people, you know, who knows what might come out of that?” Th ese cavalier remarks were made by the former governor—and aspiring president of the United States—Rick Perry at a Tea Party rally. Of course, the South had already tried to secede, and the U.S. Civil War cost approximately six hundred thousand lives.

George W. Bush was serving his second term as governor when I arrived in Texas, but I did not yet know who he was. While W. was convinced that God wanted him to become president,51 not all Texans felt the same way. Still, many of my Texan friends and acquaintances who struck me as intensely religious and quite conservative happened to be Democrats. As the political scientist John Kingdon has noted, “Th e center in American politics is con- siderably to the right of the center in the politics of other industrialized countries.” 52 Th at is particularly true in Southern states like Texas, where Democrats are typically well to the right of mainstream European conservatives.

Living in Texas planted the fi rst seed of this book in my mind. Why is the South so diff erent from both Europe and the rest of America? When asked this question, people tend to respond that Southerners are more conservative, religious, skeptical of education, and distrustful of government. But why is that the case? Aft er all, conservatives in Europe widely accept the theory of evolution and universal health care, whereas such ideas are oft en anathema to American conservatives, especially in the South.

When I moved to New York, it sometimes felt like I was in a diff erent country from Texas and that I had taken a step closer to Paris. New Yorkers seemed to have more in common with Europeans than with Southerners in terms of their worldviews. I saw the same pattern while living and traveling in other blue states. On multiple fundamental issues, such as evolution, abor- tion, universal health care, or the “War on Terror,” talking with a New Yorker, Bostonian, Chicagoan, or San Franciscan was not far removed from talking to an average person on the Old Continent. Upon later visiting

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 17

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as researching the nature of their political debates, I again noticed that people there were closer to U.S. liberals than to U.S. conservatives in their worldviews. Th at planted the sec- ond seed leading me to write this book. Th e hardline conservatism in red states is unusual elsewhere in the modern Western world, except for attitudes toward immigration, which have grown more reactionary in many Western countries.

Even as the contrast between conservative America and the rest of the West became clearer, certain features of American society as a whole struck me as peculiar. One of them was the exceptionally harsh criminal punish- ments described above. Th ough New York justice is less draconian than Texan justice, both are drastically more punitive than justice elsewhere in the West. On closer examination, American prisons seemed to be a microcosm of American society. Th at was the fi nal seed of the book’s genesis. Th e most vulnerable members of society, including prisoners, frequently pay the worst price for national crises.

Th is book is based primarily on multidisciplinary academic research encompassing law, history, sociology, political science, policy analysis, and economics. My focus is deliberately broad. Academic studies and news stories about American society tend to address issues piecemeal while overlooking the interrelationship between them. I aim to connect the dots here.

Seeking inspiration from Tocqueville, who blended an objective analysis of American society with a narrative of his experiences as a French traveler, I complement qualitative and quantitative evidence with my observations as an insider-outsider in modern America. Born in Kenya, raised in France, I eventually spent years in diverse regions of the United States. I was steeped in Bible Belt life during my college days, helped destitute Houstonians search for employment at the Urban League, visited evangelical and Mormon churches, spent Christmas with friends in New England, represented indi- gent prisoners in Manhattan, met with men on Alabama’s death row, and witnessed innumerable other facets of American society. Europeans who relocate to the United States are not usually well integrated. Th ey stay in communities of expats or international students. Th at was not my case. From blue to red states, I lived almost only among Americans, some of whom did not realize my foreign background, as I have an Americanized accent.

Other life experiences sparked my interest in comparative studies. Aft er being a Manhattan public defender, I moved to Th e Hague, Netherlands, to serve as a judicial clerk at the United Nations war crimes tribunal for

18 • I N T R O D U C T I O N

Yugoslavia, which allowed me to discover Dutch society. I previously studied abroad in Mexico, immersing myself in its culture and acquiring Spanish fl uency. I have visited multiple other countries, from Peru to Japan and India, oft en as a low-budget backpacker mingling with locals. Comparing America to other nations fi nally became the focus of my research at Stanford University.

I bring to this book my lifelong admiration of American society and my concern about how certain dimensions of American exceptionalism harm both the United States and the world. Above all, it is an eff ort to understand America. Th ere is no ultimate answer to what makes it a unique country, but the book aims to identify multiple pieces of the puzzle. American exception- alism has a wide range of interrelated dimensions shaped by fascinating his- torical, political, legal, economic, social, cultural, religious, and racial factors. Th ese features can be perceived in a positive or a negative light. Some may be strengths, others sources of decline or injustice. At the very least, American exceptionalism leaves no one indiff erent.

19

Living in red and blue states, I was always struck by how stars and stripes appear on nearly every corner in “the land of the free.” By the same token, “Th e Star-Spangled Banner” is sung before virtually each sporting event, and schoolchildren are commonly expected to pledge allegiance to the fl ag. From Texas to New York, Chicago, and the Bay Area, legions of Americans follow such rituals calling on people to worship their country. If the rituals’ mean- ing must sometimes be inferred, the nation’s leaders are usually more straight- forward. Both Democratic and Republican politicians regularly proclaim that America is the greatest country in history and a nation picked by God to enlighten the world.

In most other democracies, fl ags hang mainly on government buildings. People rarely wave them, except on national holidays or when a national team competes in a major event like the World Cup or Olympics. Anthems are also generally reserved for national holidays or competitions involving national teams, not ordinary sporting events between high schools, universities, or professional clubs. While the majority of Americans take ubiquitous fl ag waving and anthem singing for granted, the Pledge of Allegiance has become fairly controversial, although that is largely because it refers to America as a “nation under God,” a concern for secularists. Th e very idea of urging chil- dren to pledge allegiance has not proved remotely as divisive.

National chauvinism has evolved into a religion in America, where around 80 percent of the public agrees that “the U.S. has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world.” 1 Americans are typically con- vinced that their nation’s superiority was bestowed by the Almighty, as 62 percent deem that “God has granted America a special role in human history.” 2

O N E

One Nation, Divisible

2 0 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

Faith in the inherent greatness of the United States is oft en described as “American exceptionalism.” Figure 2 shows how references to “American exceptionalism” skyrocketed in the media aft er Barack Obama entered the White House in 2009,3 as Republican leaders constantly invoked the phrase to impugn his patriotism. From Mitt Romney to John Boehner, Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Donald Trump, the G.O.P. brass insisted that Obama does not believe in “American exceptionalism” and aimed to turn the United States into “socialist” Europe or, at best, Canada. Yet it was not sim- ply Obama’s policies that were allegedly un-American. Th e Republicans’ focus on defending “American exceptionalism” paralleled an explosion of conspiracy theories claiming that Obama was secretly born in Kenya, lacks a valid U.S. birth certifi cate, and is a covert Muslim with jihadist sympathies.

However, American exceptionalism does not necessarily mean what most people think. As the phrase became a recurrent talking point during the Obama presidency, few people paused to consider its original defi nition. Until being hijacked by politicians in recent years, the concept of American exceptionalism was primarily used by academics to identify America as an exception compared to other countries, especially Western nations. A more capitalistic economy lacking universal health care, more punitive penal sys- tem coexisting with lax gun control, and more unilateral foreign policy are among the aspects of American exceptionalism that academics have explored.

While many Americans equate “exceptionalism” with their country’s inherent superiority, certain dimensions of American exceptionalism may contribute to its decline. One of them is the worsening division of American

0

200

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2015

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

Obama election

F I G U R E 2 . Mentions of “American exceptionalism” in U.S. media, 1980–2015. SOURCE: Westlaw.

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 21

society under the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. Conservative and liberal Americans have grown further and further apart in their worldviews, values, and factual understandings.

Both the polarization of American society and American exceptionalism have received extensive media coverage for nearly a decade. But journalists and academics have largely overlooked the interrelationship between these two major issues by analyzing them separately. Th e intense polarization of American society is actually a key dimension of American exceptionalism. In no other Western nation are people so divided over fundamental questions about the role of government, access to health care, wealth inequality, fi nan- cial regulation, climate change, science, sexual propriety, reproductive rights, the literal truth of the Bible, warfare, and human rights. Th is acute polariza- tion has led to a gridlock with profound consequences for American society and the world.

T H E S T O R I E D L I F E O F A M E R I C A N E X C E P T I O N A L I S M

“For a transitory enchanted moment man must have held his breath in the presence of this continent, compelled into an aesthetic contemplation he neither understood nor desired, face to face for the last time in history with something commensurate to his capacity for wonder.” Drawn from the con- clusion of Th e Great Gatsby, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s stirring homage to America echoes longstanding ideas about the “New World.”

Th e Europeans who colonized North America were persuaded that they had settled a unique world. America was not simply a remote continent with exotic sceneries and “strange” Indian “heathens.” Many Europeans perceived America as a land with a special destiny awaiting the arrival of its rightful owners, who would mold it into an ideal society.4

Th e Founding Fathers shared this conviction. “America was designed by Providence for the Th eatre, on which Man was to make his true fi gure, on which science, Virtue, Liberty, Happiness and Glory were to exist in Peace,” John Adams wrote.5 Once thirteen colonies defying the British Empire, the United States became a continent-size country as following generations set- tled westward and thwarted rival claims to territory by Indian tribes and the British, French, Spanish, and Mexicans. “Manifest Destiny,” a phrase coined in 1845, refers to the United States’ expansion across North America in the name of progress and liberty. As the historian Anders Stephanson explained,

2 2 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

“Manifest Destiny” evoked “God’s chosen people in the Promised Land” in a “reenactment of the Exodus narrative.” Th e faithful widely thought that the United States’ creation and growth fulfi lled biblical prophecies. While cer- tain citizens called into question expansionism and the violence it could entail, the notion that America is a special country pursuing a divinely cho- sen path had not merely been ingrained by then. It was also already a way of justifying political actions, however inspiring or troubling they might be.6

America the Exception

To countless people nowadays, “American exceptionalism” evokes an inher- ent superiority hallowed by God—the same sentiment shared by colonists convinced that their takeover of Indian land was God’s plan, Founding Fathers confi dent that Providence was on their side, and later generations trusting in America’s Manifest Destiny.

Yet the initial description of America as an “exceptional” country has mostly been traced to a foreigner who did not use the term in this sense, namely Alexis de Tocqueville. Th e nineteenth-century Frenchman’s epic journey through America led him to describe it as uniquely diff erent from Europe. “Th e position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one,” he wrote in one of his many observations.7 Tocqueville is frequently remembered as an admirer of the United States. He indeed praised Americans for their trailblazing democratic institutions, sense of civic duty, industrious- ness, and spirit of innovation. Nevertheless, he criticized Americans on other grounds, including their common support for slavery, mistreatment of Indians, and materialism. When describing America as an “exceptional” country, Tocqueville meant that it is an exception—a singular nation, not an inherently superior one.

Tocqueville apparently never used the precise phrase “American excep- tionalism,” and scholars have ironically attributed its coinage to communists critical of America. Jay Lovestone, the leader of the U.S. Communist Party, used the phrase in the 1920s to argue that communism would evolve diff er- ently in the United States than elsewhere because of the country’s special conditions, a thesis he called “American exceptionalism.” Lovestone’s view drew the ire of none other than Joseph Stalin, who condemned it as heresy deviating from Marxism’s universal laws. Aft er a tense meeting in Moscow, the Soviet dictator threatened Lovestone and had him detained until he

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 2 3

narrowly escaped with the help of a Latvian contact. Lovestone was subse- quently expelled from the Communist Party.8

By the 1950s, “American exceptionalism” was mainly a descriptive concept used by academics to refer to the social traits that make America an exception compared to other countries.9 As American exceptionalism developed into a signifi cant topic of research in history, politics, law, sociology, economics, and other fi elds, academics advanced diverse theories about what makes America unique and whether such features are positive or not.10 For instance, the absence of universal health care in America may be admirable or prob- lematic, depending on one’s values. Th e same thing can be said about its retention of the death penalty, its immense military budget, and beyond.

In sum, “exceptionalism” has not historically meant “greatness.” Two dec- ades ago, the social scientist Seymour Martin Lipset already expressed concern about this misconception: “When Tocqueville or other ‘foreign traveler’ writ- ers or social scientists have used the term ‘exceptional’ to describe the United States, they have not meant, as some critics of the concept assume, that America is better than other countries or has a superior culture. Rather, they have simply been suggesting that it is qualitatively diff erent, that it is an outlier.” 11

However, the distortion of the concept reached unprecedented levels dur- ing the Obama years, as Republican politicians recurrently blasted him for repudiating “American exceptionalism.” Th e media and rank-and-fi le citizens thus also came to readily confl ate “American exceptionalism” with a convic- tion in American superiority. Even prominent journalists like Glenn Greenwald, who disclosed classifi ed National Security Agency fi les handed to him by Edward Snowden, have overlooked the phrase’s original meaning. Greenwald therefore denounced “belief in objective U.S. superiority, this myth of American exceptionalism,” thereby accepting the redefi nition of the concept by the G.O.P.12

An Anti-Obama Slogan and Dog Whistle

Expressing faith in America’s superiority has long been a theme of U.S. poli- tics. God made America “a shining city upon a hill,” Ronald Reagan famously said, combining words from the Puritan colonist John Winthrop and the lyrics of “America the Beautiful.” 13 While politicians of all stripes have pro- claimed similar ideas throughout history, Figure 2 demonstrates that Republicans did not systematically use the expression “American exception- alism” until Obama was elected.

2 4 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

At the 2015 Conservative Political Action Conference—a major stop for prospective presidential candidates—the Fox News pundit Sean Hannity asked Jeb Bush his thoughts on exceptionalism. “I do believe in American exceptionalism,” Bush responded, unlike Obama, who “is disrespecting our history and the extraordinary nature of our country.” Th e third scion of the Bush family aiming to be president added that the post-Obama era must begin with “restoring a love of our country.”

Rudolph Giuliani, New York’s ex-mayor, was more explicit. “I do not believe that the president loves America,” he asserted, as Obama does not think “we’re the most exceptional country in the world.” Giuliani’s tirade came in a speech encouraging Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker to run for president. Asked if he agreed that Obama does not love America, Walker answered: “I don’t really know what his opinions are on that one way or another.”

Ted Cruz later declared his candidacy in a speech emphasizing that “American exceptionalism” has made the United States “a clarion voice for freedom in the world, a shining city on a hill”—a promise Obama had pur- portedly betrayed. Marco Rubio followed suit by saying he would run for president “because I believe our very identity as an exceptional nation is at stake.” Donald Trump concurred, underlining that “maybe my biggest beef with Obama is his view that there’s nothing special or exceptional in America—that we’re no diff erent than any other country” and that “America would be better off if we acted more like European socialist countries.” 14

Th e 2012 Republican presidential candidates sang the same tune. Mitt Romney insisted that, unlike Obama, he believes in “American exceptional- ism,” by which he meant that America is “the greatest nation in the history of the world and a force for good.” According to Romney, Obama “thinks America’s just another nation” and wants it to become “a European-style entitlement society.” John Sununu, the cochair of Romney’s campaign, added that Obama should “learn how to be an American.” Rick Santorum agreed that Obama “doesn’t believe America is exceptional” and aimed to “impose some sort of European socialism.” Newt Gingrich published a campaign book, A Nation like No Other: Why American Exceptionalism Matters, mak- ing the same points.

Th e evolution of the Republican platform is also striking. From 1856 to 2008, the party’s offi cial platforms never used the expression “American exceptionalism” or even the adjective “exceptional” to describe the country.15 By contrast, the fi nal section of the 2012 Republican platform, lambasting the Obama presidency, was titled “American Exceptionalism.” 16 Th e 2016

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 2 5

platform was more straightforward. Th e fi rst line of its preamble stressed: “We believe in American exceptionalism.” 17

In practice, protecting the country’s “exceptional” character meant embracing the G.O.P. program of massive tax cuts, sweeping deregulation, and religious ultratraditionalism. “American exceptionalism is the product of unlimited freedom,” Texas Governor Rick Perry argued. “And there is nothing troubling our nation today that cannot be solved by the rebirth of freedom.” Th e redefi nition of “American exceptionalism” as freedom from “big government” and “Euro-style socialism” especially galvanized Tea Party supporters.

Obama had supposedly abandoned “American exceptionalism” by imple- menting stimulus measures and improving fi nancial regulation following the gravest economic and fi nancial crises since the Great Depression. Worse, he had profoundly threatened the liberty of the American people with a radical socialist takeover of everyone’s health care—by passing a moderate reform derived from Republican plans that were once considered market friendly and limited in scope. Few Americans are aware that the policy misleadingly labeled “Obamacare” was advanced by Richard Nixon and the Heritage Foundation before being instituted in Massachusetts by Romney when he was its governor.18 Republican leaders set these facts aside as part of a strategy depicting Obama as a dangerous radical. Around 41 percent of Republican citizens were indeed persuaded that Obama “wants to use an economic col- lapse or terrorist attack as an excuse to take dictatorial powers.” 19

Instead of trumpeting U.S. superiority, Obama was allegedly busy “apolo- gizing” to the world because of his uneasiness with America’s superpower status. Taking umbrage at Obama’s “apology tour,” Romney argued that America is a quasi-perfect country. “I will never, ever apologize for America,” he insisted. But this frequent Republican talking point was a straw man. Obama had never “apologized” for America.20 Rather, he had struck a con- ciliatory tone with the international community and the Muslim world in the aft ermath of George W. Bush’s widely unpopular foreign policy. Th e Bush administration’s unilateralism, invasion of Iraq, approval of torture, attempt to detain any terrorism suspect forever without trial at Guantánamo, and other human rights abuses had greatly tarnished America’s international reputation, hindering its capacity to lead by example.*

* We will see in Chapter 8 that the Obama administration eventually institutionalized certain controversial Bush-era counterterrorism policies.

2 6 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

Above all, the Republicans’ focus on “American exceptionalism” was premised on the idea that Obama denied America’s specialness. In fact, he had long proclaimed that Americans are a unique people, such as by affi rm- ing that America is “a light to the world” and “the greatest nation on Earth.” But the G.O.P. shed doubt on Obama’s conviction by exploiting his nuanced language. When Obama was asked his opinion on American exceptionalism, he responded: “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” He then added that America has a special culture and plays an “extraordinary role in leading the world.” Various pundits quoted solely the fi rst part of the answer as proof of his lack of patriotism.21 Much of the Republican base was even persuaded that Obama is not really American but rather a covert Muslim with a forged U.S. birth certifi cate.22

Paradoxically, Trump criticized establishment Republicans for talking about “American exceptionalism,” describing it as national chauvinism,23 although he ran an ultranationalistic campaign and himself accused Obama of not believing that America is “exceptional.” 24 Th is epitomized Trump’s tendency to systematically take self-contradictory positions throughout his campaign. Hillary Clinton reacted by denouncing Trump for not believing in “American exceptionalism,” 25 mirroring the Republicans’ attacks on Obama, who likewise tried to co-opt the phrase. “My entire career has been a testimony to American exceptionalism,” Obama previously emphasized.

Naturally, the meaning of words can change over time. But the confl ation of “American exceptionalism” with “American superiority” during Obama’s presidency did not occur through a natural process of linguistic evolution. It was a political strategy that led American exceptionalism to become a major topic following the election of the fi rst black president, a man with a foreign- sounding name. For decades, mainstream politicians have used dog whistles—coded racial rhetoric—to stir hostility against minorities. Th e evolution of “American exceptionalism” into an anti-Obama rallying cry with nativist overtones evoked Republican leaders’ appeals to “states’ rights” to rouse whites resenting the end of segregation.26

While Trump mostly abandoned dog whistles for an overtly nativist cam- paign, his slogan “Make America Great Again” echoed the Republican estab- lishment’s calls to restore the golden age of “American exceptionalism,” whose ideals Obama had betrayed. Trump’s conspiracy-mongering about Obama’s birthplace and Islamism also expanded on the Republican estab- lishment’s repeated assertions about Obama’s un-American values. Th ese

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 2 7

were not the only ways that the Republican establishment provided fertile ground for Trumpism.

A N E X C E P T I O N A L LY P O L A R I Z E D N A T I O N

Why did Obama’s presidency prove so divisive? Th is question relates to the original meaning of exceptionalism—America is an exception within the Western world partly because its conservatives and liberals are far more divided than other Westerners over their core values. Problems that have long been essentially resolved in almost all other Western nations, such as health care and abortion, are therefore explosive issues in America. Social divisions have always existed in America, but partisan polarization has surged in recent decades, as Figure 3 shows, making the country quasi-ungovernable at times.

In 2004, Obama famously declared that “there is not a liberal America and a conservative America—there is the United States of America.” In real- ity, that assertion was less a fact than an aspiration, wishful thinking, or a political strategy based on a theme of unity. Th e dominant worldview in liberal America is not only vastly diff erent from the one in conservative America. It is also oft en closer to the dominant worldview elsewhere in the Western world: Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Living in Different Worlds

Pundits routinely identify partisan gerrymandering as a leading cause of polarization,27 although the evidence for this claim appears thin.28 Blaming polarization largely on Republican-led gerrymandering suggests that it is an artifi cial situation caused by political gamesmanship. Th is account mini- mizes the genuinely diff erent worldviews separating modern American con- servatives and liberals.

Obama hoped to unify the nation and practically usher in a postpartisan age following the clashes of the Bush presidency. Th e precise opposite occurred. Since the post–Civil War Reconstruction era, Congress was never as polarized as during the Obama presidency, according to a sophisticated statistical study.29 Irreconcilable views about the purpose of government have kept Democratic and Republican leaders from fi nding common ground on nearly every single issue. A crippling shutdown of the federal government ensued in 2013, which again set America apart from other Western nations, whose

2 8 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

governments face virtually no risk of shutdown.30 In 2016, aft er Justice Antonin Scalia died, Republican senators categorically refused to consider any replacement that Obama might propose for the Supreme Court. Like federal institutions, “state legislatures are becoming signifi cantly more polarized.” 31

While Obama was reelected with a wide margin of Electoral College votes, 332 to 206, he won barely 51 percent of the popular vote. His contest against Romney was tighter than it seemed and featured two very distinct conceptions of what America should be. Obama’s reelection utterly dismayed the millions of conservatives who identifi ed him as a dangerous “socialist” bent on America’s economic and moral decline. Th is situation was reminis- cent of George W. Bush’s reelection in 2004, which deeply appalled most liberals.

Th e gulf between conservative and liberal America worsened in the 2016 campaign, given the starkly diff erent values defended by Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, if not Ted Cruz or Paul Ryan. Clinton won the popular vote by approximately three million ballots.32 Trump won the Electoral College comfortably, 304–227 votes, notwithstanding his endless stream of extremist, megalomaniac, racist, sexist, vulgar, and baseless statements. “I could stand in the middle of Fift h Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose any voters,” Trump boasted in early 2016. A few weeks later he tweeted a quote from Benito Mussolini—whose Fascist regime fought against America in World War II—insisting that it was “a very good quote” and “I know who

18 79

0.2

0.4

0.6

D is

ta nc

e b

et w

ee n

th e

p ar

tie s

0.8

1.0

18 87

18 95

19 03

19 11

19 19

19 27

19 35

19 43

19 51

19 59

19 67

19 75

19 83

19 91

19 99

20 07

20 15

Senate House

F I G U R E 3 . Party polarization in Congress, 1879 –2015, based on roll call voting records. SOURCE:

Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal (MIT Press; voteview.com).

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 2 9

said it.” 33 He also repeatedly praised Vladimir Putin, the Russian dictator. In the run-up to the vote, Trump alleged that it would be “rigged” and suggested that he might not accept the democratic process: “I will totally accept the results—if I win.” Even though he is not a traditional fascist in Mussolini’s mold, his campaign had neofascist dimensions. Robert Paxton, an expert on the history of fascism, observed that “Trump shows a rather alarming willing- ness to use fascist themes and fascist styles.” 34 But Paxton and several other experts described Trump as more of a far-right populist.35

It may come as no surprise that the divide is partly regional. Republicans from the most conservative regions of the country, the South and Midwest, are generally more conservative than Republicans from the most liberal regions, the Northeast and West Coast. By the same token, Democrats from liberal regions are more liberal than Democrats from conservative regions. What people usually overlook, however, is that the intensity of America’s regional divide is exceptional. Th ere are obviously rather liberal and conservative regions in other Western nations, but their citizens are not sharply divided over such basic issues as whether people should have a right to medical treatment.

Besides, the extraordinary polarization of American society is not merely between blue and red states, as a major partisan rift has occurred nationwide. Republican leaders in blue states typically join their counterparts in red states in defending hardline positions on essentially all issues. It is revealing that the New Yorker Trump proved popular not only among Southern or Midwestern conservatives. Rudolph Giuliani and Chris Christie, who respectively served as the mayor of New York and the governor of New Jersey, vehemently supported his extremist campaign.

Of course, Trump feuded with establishment Republicans, some of whom found the specter of his presidency fearful. Th e party’s two prior presidential candidates notably urged voters to reject him. Mitt Romney labeled Trump a dangerous “phony.” Yet he had gladly welcomed Trump’s endorsement in his 2012 campaign—regardless of how Trump spouted bigoted conspiracy theories about Obama’s forged birth certifi cate. John McCain equally criti- cized Trump, although McCain contributed to the degeneration of the political debate by catapulting Sarah Palin onto the national stage. His deci- sion to pick her as his running mate in 2008 aimed to energize the Republican base rather than appeal to moderates.36

According to conventional wisdom, hardline conservatism is basically limited to Trump or the Republican base, whereas the Republican establish- ment is moderate. In reality, the G.O.P. establishment has long defended

3 0 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

policies that are objectively far right by either U.S. historical standards or international standards. Th e rise of the Tea Party movement skewed percep- tions by making hardline establishment conservatives like George W. Bush and John Boehner seem center right in comparison. Indeed, when the implacable Freedom Caucus succeeded in ousting Boehner as the Speaker of the House in 2015, various commentators depicted this as a rift between the “conservative” and “moderate” wings of the G.O.P. Th e same narrative emerged when then–House majority leader Eric Cantor unexpectedly lost his congressional seat to Dave Brat, a primary challenger who painted Cantor as a pusillanimous conservative. However, neither Boehner nor Cantor are moderates. Both played an active role in fomenting the radicalism of the Republican base aft er Obama’s election, such as by denouncing his “socialist” “takeover of health care,” 37 which was actually modeled on Republican plans.38 As we will see, insurance under Obama’s limited reform was still primarily provided by private companies, and twenty-seven million people in the United States were projected to remain uninsured following its imple- mentation.39 It was not a radical reform.

Nevertheless, Boehner painted “Obamacare” as “Armageddon” and a “monstrosity” that would “ruin” America. “Your government is disrespecting you, your family, your job, your children,” he proclaimed at a 2010 rally prior to becoming Speaker. “Your government is out of control. Do you have to accept it? Do you have to take it?” Boehner answered his own questions: “Hell no, you don’t!” Interviewed on 60 Minutes, he was literally in tears when explaining his desire for children to continue to “have a shot at the American Dream” in the Obama era. Boehner was not merely pandering to the Tea Party, given that he had already taken radical stances back in the 1990s, as when he led a drive to abolish the Department of Education and helped Newt Gingrich craft the “Contract with America.” 40 Asked about the need for “compromise” aft er the G.O.P. reclaimed the House in 2010, Boehner stated, “I reject the word.” While he was relatively more measured than the Freedom Caucus elements who sought his resignation, he fanned the fl ames that eventually brought about his downfall.

Criticism of this trend has oft en taken the form of “both-sides-ism” blam- ing extremists on each side for political gridlock. Aft er suggesting that the ideologies of the Republican Party and the Obama administration were com- parable, proponents of both-sides-ism argued that the rise of Donald Trump’s and Bernie Sanders’s anti-establishment campaigns proved that America has become a “land of extremes.” In fact, Trump and Sanders are not mirror

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 31

images. Several of Sanders’s key proposals, such as universal health care, are broadly accepted by both the left and the right in other industrialized nations. Simply put, universal health care is not the equivalent of Trump’s call to ban Muslims from America. And even though Sanders misrepresented or sugarcoated some of his plans, his rhetoric was incomparable to Trump’s systematic disinformation and bigotry.

Th e agendas of Trump and the Republican establishment were more simi- lar than many commentators realized. To be sure, Trump seemed marginally more moderate than traditional Republicans on certain economic issues, as when he expressed support for Social Security. Leaving his populist rhetoric aside, Trump’s policies may worsen wealth inequality, from his vow to repeal “Obamacare” to his tax plan favoring the richest of the rich.41 In addition to economics, Trump and establishment Republicans took comparable stances on the alleged myth of climate change, the need to use torture in the “War on Terror,” and other major issues, as we will see in later chapters. What commonly set Trump apart was rhetoric, style, and temperament. He une- quivocally proved far less mentally stable, educated, thoughtful, and quali- fi ed to be president than Romney or various other traditional Republicans. But the ideological evolution of the Republican establishment contributed to Trump’s rise.

Statistical analysis of voting patterns in Congress confi rms that since the 1960s “the Republican Party has moved sharply to the right while the Democratic Party has moved, if not quite as dramatically, to the left .” 42 Another major study concluded that “Republicans in the North and South have moved sharply to the right,” “moderate Democrats in the South have been replaced by Republicans,” and the remaining Democrats “are somewhat more liberal” than 1960s Democrats on economic issues.43 Both-sides-ism is a false narrative, as the G.O.P. has a demonstrably more hardline ideology.44

Th e main disagreement among experts is about whether the polarization of elected offi cials truly refl ects the public’s views.45 Certain political scien- tists doubt that American citizens are intensely polarized. Th e most promi- nent advocate of this perspective is the political scientist Morris Fiorina, who argues that partisan polarization is basically an elite phenomenon limited to politicians and activists. According to Fiorina, most Americans hold moder- ate or ambivalent views, although professional campaigners are convinced that mobilizing a base with extreme views is crucial to winning elections—a self-fulfi lling prophecy if it turns moderates away from politics. From this angle, it appears that much of the public votes for hardline candidates because

3 2 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

there is little alternative under the two-party system.46 Evidence indeed sug- gests that conservative politicians are likelier than liberal ones to overesti- mate public support for their agenda, which may partly explain why the modern G.O.P. takes hardline positions.47 Still, its stances are not so far removed from the public’s values that it fails to attract substantial support.48 Th e average voter has also become more engaged and partisan over time, regardless of how politics repulses some people.49 Th e most politically active citizens seem the most polarized.50

A wide and growing body of evidence suggests that America is profoundly polarized by ideology, race, religion, and other factors. “Liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats” are now “almost extinct,” as Alan Abramowitz describes in a book questioning Fiorina’s theory of elite polarization.51 While Fiorina is undoubtedly correct that politicians play a signifi cant role in polarization, the public is responsible too. Ordinary conservative and liberal citizens appear increasingly consistent in adopting partisan positions on all major issues.52 If politicians’ views accurately refl ect the public’s views, it is because voters want politicians to represent their policy preferences—not some moderate mix of conservative and liberal views.53

What else accounts for how polarization between Democrats and Republicans in Congress is the strongest since Americans fought over slav- ery?54 One factor is partisan realignment, as the parties have homogenized in recent decades aft er long being hodgepodges of conservatives and liber- als.55 Th e Democratic Party notably enjoyed support among white segrega- tionists who belonged to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition. But the South gradually became Republican once the Democrats backed the civil rights movement in the 1960s. Th e religious right’s subsequent resur- gence exacerbated the Democrats’ diffi culties in the Bible Belt. However, “southern realignment does not fully account for the increase in polarization. Th e Republican Party became much more conservative across all regions of the United States.” 56

Th e G.O.P.’s growing radicalism has thus been a key factor in polarization, as contemporary conservative citizens “take extremely conservative positions on nearly all issues,” 57 hindering the chance of compromise with Democrats. Illustratively, 82 percent of consistent U.S. liberals believe in making compro- mises, next to barely 32 percent of consistent U.S. conservatives.58 But both sides tend to see opponents’ actions as illegitimate. A social study even con- cluded that “partisan animus in the American public exceeds racial hostil- ity,” 59 a remarkable fi nding given persistent racial animus.

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 3 3

Th e relative popularity of Trump’s unabashedly bigoted campaign only worsened racial tensions aft er the Ferguson crisis and other police shootings triggered the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement. Race relations in the last year of Obama’s presidency were perceived as the worst in more than two decades according to polling data.60 Th e receptiveness of many whites to Trump’s message that they are losing their country is consistent with data showing that whites think that anti-white racism is now worse than anti-black racism.61 Trump lauded white supporters who assaulted black protestors at his rallies, characterized undocumented Mexican immi- grants as “criminals” and “rapists,” tweeted an anti-Semitic image of Hillary Clinton next to a Star of David, and broke new ground in modern America by insisting that all members of a religious group be barred from the country. A full 36 percent of Americans, including 59 percent of Republicans, agreed with his call to ban Muslims.62

Xenophobia is not a new problem in the United States, as shown by the notorious Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and past opposition to immigration from Ireland, Italy, and other parts of Europe, not to forget hostility toward Jewish émigrés. But the animosity, fear, and resentment of modern white nativists is tied to a new development: whites might no longer be the majority of a diversifying U.S. population by 2050.63

Religion is just as explosive an issue as race in America, given its “culture wars” over abortion, gay rights, and beyond. Th e religious right spurred state legislatures to pass a record number of abortion restrictions during Obama’s presidency.64 Th e partisan divide on abortion and religion has widened in recent decades.65 Overall, whites who never attend church are drastically likelier to vote Democratic than whites who attend church weekly, especially evangelicals.66

Fiorina remains skeptical about polarization due to “culture wars,” which he describes as issues leaving the public ambivalent. Data from the historic 2008 election that won Obama the White House indeed show that 93 per- cent of voters considered the economy “extremely” or “very” important to their vote. More than 80 percent felt the same way about Iraq, health care, and education. Fewer voters, 50 and 36 percent respectively, had the same opinion about abortion and gay rights. Such fi gures lead Fiorina to conclude that abortion and homosexuality are marginal questions.67 In my view, how- ever, these statistics show that a considerable share of the public, between half and a third, fi nds them highly important.68 At a minimum, culture war issues are extremely contentious in America by international standards. We

3 4 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

will see in Chapter 4 that few people in other Western nations embrace the ultratraditional morality representing a major side of America’s culture wars.

Moreover, Americans are intensely divided along partisan lines on eco- nomic issues, as exemplifi ed by confl icting attitudes toward Obama’s health care reform.69 Diverging economic perspectives relate to worsening wealth inequality since the 1980s. Neighborhoods are signifi cantly segregated by class and race,70 which aff ects children’s life outcomes.71 Some people have no option but to live in certain neighborhoods—others choose to live in bubbles of like-minded individuals72 and follow ever more infl uential hyper- partisan media, such as Fox News or, to a lesser extent, MSNBC.73 Meanwhile, the intensifying blue state–red state fracture appears to have decreased the number of swing states in presidential elections.74 Th e sway of lobbying by moneyed interests has played a role in this trend by distorting the democratic process. A strong historical correlation exists between polariza- tion and wealth inequality.75

Last but not least, clashes over the role that America should play as the only global superpower contribute to social polarization. Americans were bitterly divided about the Bush administration’s use of torture, its aim to detain alleged terrorists forever without trial, and its catastrophic invasion of Iraq on grounds later revealed to be false. Th e Obama administration’s rela- tively distinct approach to foreign policy proved divisive too. We will return to this issue in depth in the book’s fi nal chapter.

Polarization does not mean that there are no independents or citizens who do not fall squarely within the categories of “liberal America” and “conserva- tive America.” People’s beliefs cannot be perfectly categorized. Rather, the point is that conservative and liberal Americans increasingly live in diff erent worlds shaped by profoundly diff erent values.

Oceans Apart

Nowadays the basic worldview in liberal America is not only highly diff erent from the one in conservative America but also generally closer to the domi- nant worldview in other Western nations when it comes to religion, govern- ment, and foreign policy. Sure, liberal and conservative Americans share a common culture, from the same language to traditional heritage and popular entertainment. For instance, New Englanders and Southerners may feel a special bond when they hear “Th e Star-Spangled Banner” before watching

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 3 5

the Super Bowl. Yet their values tend to diverge considerably on fundamental questions.

Th e list of issues below indicates that liberal Americans are oft en closer to other Westerners than to conservative Americans in their thinking. Naturally, this broad picture should not obscure key nuances. Americans are on the whole more skeptical than other Westerners of “big government.” 76 Few U.S. liberals want European-style welfare states or tax rates. Nevertheless, given the tremendous hostility to universal health care in conservative America, liberal Americans are manifestly closer to Europeans and other Westerners in accepting the idea of state-funded health care for everyone. Indeed, numerous Democrats wanted Obama’s health care reform to go fur- ther, by creating a “public option” insurance plan or a single-payer system, whereas Republicans categorically opposed expanding access to health care.77 Besides, well-informed Americans know that Europe has far lower health care costs, partly due to pricing regulations that barely exist in America’s profi t-driven medical system. Th e claim that “America cannot aff ord univer- sal health care” rests on a false premise.

Beyond health care, various examples suggest that Republicans stand apart from other Westerners on many basic economic issues. Following the disastrous 2008 fi nancial crisis, Republicans oddly grew more hostile to fi nancial regulation. Disregarding how deregulation and Wall Street’s reck- lessness had contributed heavily to the fi nancial meltdown, Republicans chiefl y blamed the crisis on government overregulation, as we will see in Chapter 5. Similarly, in the aft ermath of the massive BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the G.O.P. backed legislation that would have weakened regulation of off shore drilling.78 Th ese peculiar stances refl ect the consider- able infl uence of a radical ideology among U.S. conservatives: free-market fundamentalism. As described by Joseph Stiglitz, a winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, market fundamentalists believe that virtually all economic problems stem from “big government,” regulation, and taxes.79 Th eir staunch opposition to environmental laws is exacerbated by skepticism about clima- tology and modern science. Like U.S. liberals, most other Westerners take drastically more moderate or progressive positions on such issues.

Th e religiosity of Americans would seem to disprove the notion that U.S. liberals are closer to fellow Westerners than to U.S. conservatives.80 Faith certainly has a far greater sociopolitical role in the United States than in other industrialized nations. Only a small, albeit growing, share of Americans do not believe in God.81 However, Americans are intensely

3 6 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

I S S U E S O N W H I C H U . S . L I B E R A L S A R E G E N E R A L L Y

C L O S E R T O O T H E R W E S T E R N E R S T H A N T O

U . S . C O N S E R V A T I V E S

• Universal health care

• Financial regulation

• Environmental regulation

• Climate change

• Opposition to substantial tax cuts for millionaires

• Opposition to unlimited corporate or tycoon spending on elections

• Perception of Trump and Tea Party as extreme / far right

• Perception of U.S. religious right as extreme / far right

• Rejection of literal interpretation of Bible

• Acceptance of theory of evolution

• Skepticism of biblical prophecies

• Support for a discretionary right to abortion

• Support for broad access to contraception

• Rejection of abstinence-only sexual education

• Tolerance of homosexuality

• Opposition to indefi nite detention without trial at Guantánamo

• Opposition to torture

• Opposition to the invasion of Iraq

• Support for the United Nations and international law

divided between fundamentalist and liberal-moderate conceptions of Christianity. Fundamentalist Christians tend to interpret the Bible word for word, reject the theory of evolution in favor of a literal understanding of Genesis, deem apocalyptic biblical prophecies relevant to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, support abstinence-only sexual education, oppose state funding for contraception, condemn abortion, and fi nd homosexuality unac- ceptable. Chapters 3 and 4 make the case that this ultratraditional form of

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 3 7

Christianity is widespread in conservative America but not in liberal America or other Western countries.

Criminal justice is perhaps the biggest exception to the trend, as the atti- tudes of liberal Americans are decidedly closer to those of conservative Americans than to those of fellow Westerners on this question. American justice is harshest in the Deep South, but sentences in blue states remain extremely punitive by international standards. Democratic leaders com- monly embrace the death penalty in principle and tend to express concerns only about its administration, such as racial discrimination or the risk of executing innocents. Other Westerners are more inclined to consider execu- tions a moral aff ront to human dignity.82 Draconian prison terms are also routinely infl icted in blue states. Still, Republicans show a greater appetite for the most extreme punishments, such as executing juveniles or the mentally retarded—practices abolished in controversial Supreme Court decisions scorned by conservative judges like Antonin Scalia.83

While we will explore other nuances, the gist of the argument holds true: conservative America stands out within the modern Western world in numer- ous ways. In other words, the issue is not whether Democrats are trying to turn America into Europe, as Republicans have charged. Rather, it is that liberal America is closer to Europe and other parts of the West than to conservative America on many of its political, social, and moral values. To a large extent, it is conservative America that is an exception in the modern Western world, since it is dominated by peculiar mindsets that have little to no weight else- where, including virulent anti-intellectualism, visceral anti-governmentalism, and fervent Christian fundamentalism. Because of their hardline ideological stances, U.S. conservatives are frequently unable to see eye to eye with U.S. liberals, whose views are moderate by Western standards.

Th at is not to say that polarization is unique to America. Divisions exist in all countries. What distinguishes America from other Western nations is that its polarization not only is more intense but also concerns very funda- mental matters on which there is a general consensus elsewhere in the West. As a result, the U.S. political and social debate focuses on issues like whether people should have a right to medical treatment; whether tycoons, corpora- tions, and lobbies should be allowed to donate unlimited sums to political campaigns; whether fi nancial and environmental regulations should be utterly eviscerated; whether global warming is a hoax; whether evolution or creationism should be taught in public schools; whether women should have a discretionary right to abortion; whether public health insurance should

3 8 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

cover contraception; whether abstinence-only sexual education should be required; whether people should have an unbridled right to bear arms; whether to have mass incarceration; whether to infl ict life sentences on juve- niles; whether to abolish the death penalty; whether to torture alleged ter- rorists and detain them forever without trial; whether to respect or defy international human rights treaties; whether to embrace diplomacy or a uni- lateral foreign policy; whether strife in the Middle East fulfi lls apocalyptic biblical prophecies; and whether shutting down the government is an accept- able response to seemingly unresolvable confl ict. People elsewhere in the modern Western world may have vigorous and acrimonious disagreements, yet these are not the kinds of basic issues that usually divide them.84

Immigration is an exception, since it has become a divisive issue in America, Europe, and other parts of the West. Nativist movements have played a leading role in eff orts to dismantle the European Union and return to an age with no open borders or international institutions. However, the rise of bigoted far-right parties in Europe should not eclipse how its main- stream parties have been moving in the same direction on numerous core issues.85 Again, my point is not that Europeans have a consensus about all political matters but that the issues dividing them are less fundamental than those dividing Americans.

Th at is why Europeans, who closely follow U.S. presidential elections, have overwhelmingly supported Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and John Kerry over Donald Trump, Mitt Romney, John McCain, and George W. Bush in their bids for the White House. According to a 2012 poll of around 7,500 people in Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden, an astounding 90 percent of Europeans would have voted for Obama over Romney.86 Th is confi rms that even European right-wingers have far more affi nities with U.S. liberals than with U.S. conservatives, whose views come across as peculiar and extreme in the modern Western world. Amusingly, the British Parliament actually debated whether to ban Trump from visiting the United Kingdom.

In various ways, the gulf is between conservative America and not merely the rest of the West—but the rest of the world. A poll conducted in forty-fi ve coun- tries covering nearly three-quarters of the global population found massive support for Clinton over Trump. Russians were alone in saying they would have voted for Trump.87 Th is is not a new development. Th e vast majority of coun- tries worldwide welcomed, if not celebrated, Obama’s election in 2008.88 Th at was partly an adverse reaction to George W. Bush’s foreign policy. Obama’s

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 3 9

charisma had additionally swept the international community off its feet. Th e son of a white American mother and a black Kenyan father, the nation’s fi rst African-American president represented the rise of a more equal and open- minded America—the side of the country that much of the world admires.

Obama’s eff orts to expand access to health care against categorical Republican opposition were again revealing. In addition to other Western democracies, most nations worldwide have either established universal health care or aspire to. For example, Japan has had a top-notch universal health care system for decades.89 South Korea established one in 1989.90 Taiwan did so in 1994 following a bipartisan reform movement at around the same time as Republicans torpedoed Bill and Hillary Clinton’s health care reform.91 Mexico is on its way toward establishing universal health care.92 South Africa has taken steps in that direction too. Th e constitution it ratifi ed aft er apart- heid is viewed as a model for its human rights provisions, which are partly guiding aspirations to address enduring inequality. Th e South African Constitution notably provides that “everyone has the right to have access to . . . health care services, including reproductive health care.” 93

For all these reasons, it was not solely liberal Americans who were stunned as an increasingly radical G.O.P. heatedly denounced the “tyranny” of “Obamacare” and other moderate reforms by the Obama administration. Both liberals and conservatives in other Western democracies—not to men- tion scores of people in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and beyond—were struck by the magnitude of the ideological backlash against the Obama administration in conservative America. In all likelihood, the international community will strongly favor the Democratic opposition over Donald Trump throughout his presidency.

Exceptionalism and Decline

Th e Republicans’ partisan redefi nition of “American exceptionalism” was evidently a political strategy. But persistent claims about Obama’s lack of faith in the nation’s greatness and his aim to transform America into lowly Europe refl ected broader concerns about American decadence. Around 71 percent of Americans are convinced that the United States’ global stand- ing is declining,94 and 54 percent think that it is facing the start of a long- term decline when it will lose its place as the world’s leading country.95

Certain developments may indeed be interpreted as signs of American decline. Soaring wealth inequality. Th e surge of the U.S. incarceration rate

4 0 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

to world-record levels. Presidents claiming the authority to detain any alleged terrorist forever without judicial review, which would have been unthinkable on September 10, 2001. Th e Bush administration’s reintroduction of torture as an offi cial practice in Western civilization. Republican promises to bring back torture aft er Obama discontinued its use. Th e regression of Republican leadership from thoughtful moderates like Dwight Eisenhower to the dema- gogue Donald Trump. And so on.

Another interpretation could be that America has made tremendous progress. Th e election of a black president appeared impossible a generation ago. Despite continuing discrimination, LGBTQ people have taken strides toward equality, culminating in the hard-won right to same-sex marriage— again, an unthinkable step one or two decades earlier.

However, many of these trends may be interpreted as historical cycles rather than as American decline or progress.96 Periods of soaring wealth ine- quality are far from unprecedented. Because of the dismantlement of the New Deal model beginning in the 1980s, wealth in America is essentially as une- qually distributed now as it was in the 1920s prior to the Great Depression.97 Th e senseless Iraq War evokes the Vietnam War. Human rights abuses, social injustices, and racial discrimination have recurred throughout American his- tory, alongside periods of social progress. Th e ignoramus Trump is only the most glaring example of the longstanding anti-intellectual subculture dis- cussed in the next chapter. Th e intransigence of today’s Christian fundamen- talists recalls prior cultural battles.

Polarization has made America a particularly diffi cult country to govern, yet that is an old problem too. Compared to other democracies, the U.S. political system is exceptionally fragmented, due to the combination of fed- eralism and the separation of powers, which greatly hamper the national government’s ability to implement systemic reforms.98 Th is challenge is com- pounded by the Senate’s adoption of a fi libuster rule that permits the stone- walling of legislation unless a supermajority of sixty senators agree to support it. Both parties have historically resorted to the fi libuster, but its use reached record levels during Obama’s presidency because of the G.O.P.’s systematic obstructionism.99 Elsewhere in the democratic world, legislation can nor- mally be passed by a simple majority vote. Similarly, other nations can ratify international treaties by a simple majority vote, whereas the U.S. Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate to do so. Th e Senate has never ratifi ed an international human rights treaty when it had fewer than fi ft y-fi ve Democratic members.100 In sum, these supermajoritarian institutional

O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E • 41

devices preclude majority rule, thereby empowering minorities of Republican hardliners to block reforms and international treaties.

Th e Electoral College further hinders democracy. Like Hillary Clinton, Al Gore won the popular vote in a crucial election but never became presi- dent, since he lost the Electoral College. Th e outcome of the 2000 presiden- tial contest might have been diff erent if the Supreme Court had not seem- ingly handed the election to George W. Bush by halting the Florida ballot recount. It would not have come down to that in nearly all other democra- cies, because they lack electoral colleges. America’s unusual voting system is a vestige of an oppressive era. Back in the eighteenth century, Southern states feared that a direct presidential election would lead them to be outvoted, as they had fewer eligible white voters than Northern states. Th e resulting com- promise was an electoral college under which Southern states received votes proportional to three-fi ft hs of their sizable slave populations, in addition to those for their free populations.101 Th e fact that America still employs an anachronistic electoral system largely created to accommodate slavery exem- plifi es a broader issue. It is oft en said that America is a young nation, but it is also an old democracy. It has the oldest written national constitution in use anywhere in the world, which has been a mixed blessing by fostering both stability and immobilism.

Yet institutional peculiarities only go so far in explaining political grid- lock in modern America. For instance, the political scientist David Mayhew has noted that “if majority rule is in principle the preferred standard, condi- tions may be bad in the Senate today but weren’t they even worse in the past?” Th e threshold to defeat a fi libuster was “an even higher two-thirds vote between 1917 and 1975 (that would mean 67 senators today, not 60).” 102 Major systemic reforms were nonetheless achieved during the New Deal era, when a relative bipartisan consensus supported a more equitable economic model.

While peculiar institutions enable hardliners to use obstructionist tactics or exercise excessive leverage over policy-making, the fundamental issue remains why they wish to do so. We saw earlier that the main reason for the acute polarization of modern American society is the Republican Party’s shift toward the far right in recent decades. Republican leaders insist that America is declining because it is becoming less exceptional, due to the toll of Obama’s “un-American” and “socialist” presidency. In fact, America remains very exceptional, and certain features of American exceptionalism may contribute to its decline. Th ese features are mainly concentrated in

4 2 • O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

conservative America: profound anti-intellectualism, visceral anti- governmentalism, and Christian fundamentalism. Th ey foster a purist, far- right ideology that is hostile to compromise and impedes rational decision- making and problem-solving.

Additional evidence suggests that the peculiar ideology of contemporary U.S. conservatives plays a greater role than peculiar U.S. institutions in shap- ing American society. Indeed, the fact that legislatures in other Western democracies can adopt national reforms by a simple majority vote would theoretically make it easier for their conservatives to abolish national health insurance or abortion. But such radical policies are hardly on the conserva- tive agenda in other Western nations. Universal health care is broadly accepted there across the left and right. Abortion also tends to be broadly accepted in other Western democracies, except for a few countries, including Ireland, Poland, Spain, and Portugal. For example, we will see in Chapter 4 that although France’s legalization of abortion in 1975 was a fi erce battle, French conservatives largely moved on within a decade and now widely sup- port abortion rights. By contrast, American conservatives are far less inclined to move on from the social and economic battles that they have lost. Some have been eager to relitigate them for years and years. Trump was elected partly by vowing to repeal “Obamacare” and appoint Supreme Court justices who will reverse Roe v. Wade, the landmark 1973 decision that recognized a constitutional right to abortion. Th at is because the conception of “conserva- tism” tends to be far less moderate and far more ideological in America— notwithstanding the growing power of fringe far-right parties or the harden- ing rhetoric of certain mainstream right-wing parties in Europe.

America is not alone in struggling nowadays. Democracy has yet to fulfi ll its promise in much of the world. However, there was a time when America was among the countries paving the way toward progress.

4 3

“How stupid are the people of Iowa?” In what would have been a surreal moment to anyone unfamiliar with his diatribes, Donald Trump asked this condescending question when campaigning in Iowa. Th e uncultured billionaire turned reality TV star was shocked that some Iowans believed the “crap” from Ben Carson, one of his rivals in the Republican primary.1 Trump eventually lost the Iowa caucus, fi nishing second to Ted Cruz, but went on to win the presidency. Fact-checkers found that these Republicans were far likelier than Democrats to routinely make blatantly false claims about the evils of “Obamacare,” the “myth” of climate change, the “threat” of immigra- tion, and beyond.2 Th ey also oft en got away with it, as the Republican base proved highly receptive to their rhetoric. Aft er all, Trump had been a main promoter of the canard about Obama’s fake birth certifi cate. His question about Iowans seemed to mirror what many concerned people were asking themselves about the latest generation of Republican leaders: “How stupid are the Americans who vote for such politicians?”

Th e answer is that stupidity has very little to do with it. At most, stupidity is a symptom of a peculiar subculture rooted in American exceptionalism. Th e Founding Fathers were learned men of the Enlightenment who deemed that government requires educated citizens. But the emergence of modern democracy in America fostered a populist attitude perceiving education as little more than a sign of elitism. Legions of Americans became convinced that cultivating one’s mind is both unnecessary and pretentious, as “common sense” is supposedly enough to make money and understand politics. In the words of Isaac Asimov, “a cult of ignorance” in America has promoted “the false notion that democracy means that ‘my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge.’ ” 3 Numerous politicians have shared or exploited this attitude by

T W O

From the American Enlightenment to Anti-Intellectualism

4 4 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

peddling outlandish propaganda and conspiracy theories, an increasingly easy feat with the explosion of mass media. American society cannot be understood without considering that curious mindset, as it shapes the views of millions on diverse issues explored in this book, from the economy to health care, wealth inequality, climate change, criminal justice, foreign pol- icy, and religion. Notwithstanding this cult of ignorance, generations of American thinkers, scientists, writers, and artists have made immense con- tributions to the life of the mind, exemplifying the United States’ age-old contradictions.

M I N D P U Z Z L E

One of the greatest culture shocks I experienced as a Parisian living in the South was witnessing peculiar attitudes toward education. I vividly recall a freshman history course at Rice University where few students participated in group discussions. A classmate named Greg stood out as an exception, yet I soon realized that he had feigned interest in the subject. One day aft er class, he proudly told me that he asked questions only so the professor would give him a good grade and that he was not in the least interested in the course. Perhaps that was how Greg really felt, or perhaps he lied because he did not want to be perceived as an intellectual or a nerd. Unlike Greg, a student- athlete and stereotypical jock, my friend Trevor was an ordinary student dili- gently preparing for medical school. But he too seemed solely interested in education insofar as it had a practical purpose. I once encouraged Trevor to take a history class that I found fascinating. He understandably replied that he had no time to do so, given his scientifi c course load. I therefore suggested that he watch a brief documentary on the subject in his spare time. To my surprise, he squarely said that he saw no point in learning about history.4

Greg and Trevor defi nitely did not represent all Rice students, many of whom had genuine intellectual curiosity. Still, these two students’ attitudes refl ected the weight of anti-intellectualism in American society. Th e most ordinary form of anti-intellectualism is simply indiff erence to the cultivation of one’s mind, especially when it appears to have no practical value. Anti- intellectualism can also entail “a suspicion of too much learning,” 5 a down- right hostility toward intellectuals, or a kind of anti-rationalism. Such atti- tudes undoubtedly exist in Europe, yet anti-intellectualism is both blunter and more infl uential in the United States.

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 4 5

Growing up in Paris, I rarely heard people unabashedly denigrate the value of education, as I sometimes did later in Texas, which was particularly dumb- founding since I had moved to America largely because of my exalted image of its universities. While I was impressed by the excellent quality of education at Rice, a fair number of students displayed limited thirst for knowledge. My culture shock had nothing to do with fi nding Southerners “dumb,” as some Northerners stereotype them. Many of those I met were highly intelligent and well educated, like Trevor, the aspiring medical student and Democrat, who did not fi t the reductive image of anti-intellectualism as Trumpism or Palinism. Besides, I soon found that anti-intellectualism is not limited to the South. How could this mindset be so common in a nation known for its sta- ble political institutions, state-of-the-art technolog y, and top-notch universities?

I increasingly mulled over that question when witnessing the role of anti- intellectualism in U.S. politics. As George W. Bush made his way from the Texas Governor’s Mansion to the White House, I made my way through college in Texas. Tellingly, Bush was unaware of the historic sectarian ten- sions between Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis that contributed to the spread of war in the Middle East and, ultimately, the metastasis of ISIS. In the run-up to his invasion of Iraq, Bush had met with Iraqi-Americans to discuss the poten- tial repercussions of destabilizing the country by toppling Saddam Hussein. Th ey then noticed that W. was unfamiliar with the terms “Shiite” and “Sunni.” 6 Th is is hardly an isolated example of the mindset of a president who cast himself as a man of action animated by disdain for education. “I don’t spend a lot of time thinking about myself, about why I do things,” Bush admitted, saying his approach to diplomacy was “not very analytical.”

As his presidency came to a close, America saw the rise of Sarah Palin, an even less thoughtful fi gure. Palin was never as popular as Bush once was, and some believe that she cost John McCain the presidency. She nonetheless asserted herself as an infl uential voice appreciated by a signifi cant minority of the electorate, notably strident supporters of the emerging Tea Party move- ment. Th is trend facilitated the spread of conspiracy theories about Obama’s forged birth certifi cate and Islamism, a “socialist” takeover, “death panels,” the “hoax” of global warming, phantom tax hikes, and countless other canards. Next, much of the world was baffl ed by the gaff es and displays of ignorance of most of the 2012 Republican presidential candidates. Th e high- lights of their race to the bottom included Texas Governor Rick Perry forget- ting the name of a key federal agency he wanted to eliminate, and the tycoon

4 6 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

Herman Cain not knowing that China has had nuclear weapons for decades. Irrational fears of everything from the alleged menace of “Obamacare” to Ebola played a role in the G.O.P.’s decisive victory in the 2014 midterm elec- tions. Th e debate degenerated further as the 2016 election kicked into gear with the tirades of Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, and Ben Carson.

Th ese politicians’ critics regularly attribute their mindsets to idiocy, as Bill Clinton did when contending that Republicans had created an environment where “you can’t be authentic unless you’ve got a single-digit I.Q.” But the answer to the puzzle lies elsewhere. America’s exceptional history helps explain why certain politicians draw support partly by boasting their igno- rance in a country with no shortage of bright minds.

T H E R O O T S O F A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

Ironically, anti-intellectualism largely stems from a positive value in American society: equality. Alexis de Tocqueville, who visited America in 1831 to study the world’s fi rst modern democracy, famously found a higher degree of equality there than in Europe. “Amongst the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States,” he noted, “noth- ing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions.” 7 From his vantage point as a Frenchman, Tocqueville believed that democracy was an equalizing infl uence in America, whereas Europe’s monarchical, aristo- cratic, and feudal systems had fostered greater social stratifi cation. Suff rage in the United States indeed was the widest in the world in the early nine- teenth century.8 Economic data confi rm that white Americans enjoyed more income equality than Western Europeans when the United States was founded.9 Numerous Americans of limited schooling then prospered as mer- chants, artisans, and farmers.10

Naturally, nineteenth-century notions of democracy and equality were very restrictive by modern standards. Slavery remained in part of the country. Free blacks, Native Americans, and women were also denied equal rights. Signifi cant inequalities of wealth existed, even among white males.11 Nevertheless, egalitarian ideals animated the America that Tocqueville explored.12

Winner-take-all capitalism has made twenty-fi rst-century America far more unequal than Europe,13 yet back in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen- turies various European observers shared Tocqueville’s impression about the

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 4 7

value of equality in America. Adam Smith, the Scottish philosopher, wrote that “there is more equality . . . among the English colonists than among the inhabitants of the mother country.” J. Hector St. John de Crèvecœur, a French-born American colonist, remarked that “the rich and poor” were “not so far removed from each other” in America as in Europe. Th omas Paine, who emigrated from England and went on to become a Founding Father of the United States, likewise felt that America was a land of unparalleled equality.14 Th ese circumstances had far-reaching ramifi cations.

A Suspicion of Education

In Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, Richard Hofstadter analyzed how egalitarian ideas led generations of Americans to grow wary of the infl uence of the privileged elite, the pseudoaristocracy, and what they construed as its symbols, including education. Such attitudes existed in all regions of the country but became especially prevalent in the Deep South, where people had the highest levels of poverty and the lowest levels of education. Even though disadvantaged whites widely supported the racial caste system, they resented their low social status relative to more privileged and educated whites, particularly the Northern elite. A peculiar conception of education took hold as the popular mind oft en associated learning with elitism.

Nineteenth-century Americans commonly believed that “too much learn- ing might set one citizen above another and violate the very democratic ideals that education was supposed to foster,” as Susan Jacoby has explained.15 Th e general public was inclined to support the creation of free elementary educa- tion programs, yet many concurrently disdained “high culture” and perceived university education as little more than a privilege serving to maintain the elite’s power. Academic education was frequently seen as not only pointless but also detrimental to practical tasks by encumbering the mind with abstract distractions. Learning for its own sake was considered a pastime of the idle pseudoaristocracy.16 Tocqueville observed that Americans appeared solely concerned with the aspects of their trade having “an immediate practical application.” 17 Science primarily served to please the body rather than the mind, and practicality was more important than “beauty,” which was expected to be “useful.” 18 Tocqueville concluded, exaggeratedly, that “no class” in America valued “intellectual pleasures” or “the labors of the intellect.” 19

Th is attitude rested partly on the misconception that a person is either a thinker or a doer and that those who think or know too much are incapable

4 8 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

of acting. Cultured men were sometimes depicted as eff eminate and lacking virility. “As popular democracy gained strength and confi dence,” Hofstadter wrote, “it reinforced the widespread belief in the superiority of inborn, intuitive, folkish wisdom over the cultivated, over-sophisticated, and self- interested knowledge of the literati and well-to-do.” 20

Nowadays the relative popularity of uncultured politicians is frequently seen as modern decadence, although they embody a longstanding mindset. When Sarah Palin mocks Obama by saying, “We need a commander in chief, not a professor of constitutional law giving us a lecture,” or when the magnate Herman Cain adds, “We need a leader, not a reader,” they are echoing histori- cal stereotypes about inept intellectuals whose minds are dimmed by useless knowledge.

A Twist of Irony

It is intriguing that a nation born of the Enlightenment has off ered fertile ground for anti-intellectualism. Th e Founding Fathers aspired to rescue his- tory from Europe’s political and moral failures by creating a system combin- ing individual liberty, religious freedom, and wise government.21 Th e birth of the United States represented the beginning of a momentous experiment in democracy that preceded the French Revolution of 1789. Th e American expe- riences of illustrious Frenchmen—the Marquis de Lafayette, Crèvecœur, and Tocqueville—led them to view the United States as a country where human- kind had made great strides. America was not a utopia, yet it was praisewor- thy. Th e Marquis de Condorcet, a leading French philosopher, did not travel overseas but wrote that, because of the American Revolution, people no longer had to learn about the rights of men from philosophy—they could now learn from “the example of a great people.” 22 Th ese men were not alone in admiring the Founding Fathers, as many European thinkers shared this senti- ment,23 despite the emergence of anti-Americanism.24 Th e Americans had not passively realized “European ideals in the drama of the American Revolution”—they had made their own imprint on human thought.25

A trailblazing, republican form of government had been created in the New World, enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Th e latter became a model for the constitutions of other coun- tries. Of course, the new American republic’s egalitarian ideals were far from fulfi lled, due to glaring contradictions ranging from the persecution of Native Americans to the cruelties of slavery and the oligarchy of propertied

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 4 9

white males. But European nations were guilty of comparable abuses, espe- cially colonial powers such as Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands.

Th e founding of the United States coincided with the American Enlightenment, an age of intellectual vitality.26 Th e Founding Fathers were well-read, highly cultivated polymaths, some of whom were even remarkably versed in science, like Benjamin Franklin and Th omas Jeff erson. Th e excep- tionally brilliant Franklin made groundbreaking discoveries in electricity, meteorology, and oceanography, as when he charted the Gulf Stream. Th e Founders embraced the Enlightenment’s celebration of reason. James Madison illustratively declared that “it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. Th e passions ought to be con- trolled and regulated by the government.” 27 Political pamphlets had a broad readership, as the literacy rate for adult males in New England then may have surpassed England’s. In particular, Th omas Paine’s Common Sense sold 120,000 copies in three months, a phenomenal number for the time.28

Th e origins of the United States in the Enlightenment may have led to the conclusion that it would blossom into a country animated by a broad consen- sus on the value of education, intellect, and reason. But the rise of a populistic conception of democracy tied to anti-intellectualism restrained the spread of these ideals. Th e emergence of a populistic conception of religion seeing educa- tion as an obstacle to faith—a dominant trait of American evangelicalism— also fostered anti-intellectualism, as we will see in Chapter 3.

Oddly enough, the modern leaders most inclined to passionately invoke the Founding Fathers typically have an anti-intellectual bent. John Boehner, the former Speaker of the House, repeatedly accused Obama and the Democrats of unpatriotically ignoring the framers. “Th is is my copy of the Constitution,” Boehner defi antly proclaimed at a rally, “and I’m going to stand here with the Founding Fathers, who wrote in the preamble: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights including life, lib- erty and the pursuit of happiness.’ ” Boehner apparently did not know that these words come from the 1776 Declaration of Independence, not the Constitution, which was created more than a decade later.

Th e general public’s grasp of elementary history is not more impressive. Only 58 percent of Americans know that it was in 1776 that their nation declared independence. One in four also does not know from which country it seceded (Great Britain).29 One in three is unable to name any of the three

5 0 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial). Only 38 percent can name all three.30 Newsweek had one thousand Americans take the civic edu- cation exam that immigrants must pass to become U.S. citizens—38 percent failed.31 Such ignorance is condoned, if not encouraged, by prominent politi- cians. Consider how Boehner proudly affi rmed that being the Speaker of the House requires no higher education: “Trust me—all the skills I learned growing up are the skills I need to do my job.” And Donald Trump became president despite never having served in government and being proudly igno- rant of basic policy-making.

Anti-Intellectualism across the Atlantic

While Americans have tended to stress the practical value of education, Western Europeans have been more inclined to emphasize its intrinsic value. Th e democratization of French society was notably expected to gradually broaden the masses’ access to the joys and benefi ts of culture and higher learning. Ideally, a good French citizen should acquire culture générale—a broad body of knowledge—even though many do not, because of scant intel- lectual curiosity or limited educational opportunities. Conversely, in parts of America, democracy was expected to usher in a more equal epoch, when cultivating one’s mind would fi nally be recognized as pretentious and futile elitism. Th e weight of these contrary civic ideals in America and Europe was relative, not absolute, but they help explain the fairly divergent attitudes toward intellectual curiosity existing to this day on each side of the Atlantic.

In contemporary Western Europe, a broad education is not merely consid- ered important for the sake of cultivating one’s mind—it is expected to enable people to adequately participate in the political process. Th ese ideals have likewise long existed in America. Yet the infl uence of anti-intellectualism in parts of society has fostered an opposite perspective: education is not particu- larly useful to political participation, because all one needs is “common sense.” In the end, equality of education may be achieved by promoting the best education for everyone or by ensuring that no one is “too educated.” Th e former proposition has had more sway in Europe, and the latter has greatly shaped the populist psyche in America.

Scorn of education has relatively limited weight in twenty-fi rst-century Western Europe. Th at was not always the case, as anti-intellectual attitudes were prevalent in nineteenth-century France, according to the observations of Jean-Marie Déguignet (1834–1905), who was raised in a destitute peasant

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 51

family in Brittany. A self-educated freethinker, he joined the French army in search of a better wage, which took him around the world on various military campaigns. He ultimately returned to farmwork in Brittany and commented at length on the superstition, ignorance, and backward-mindedness of its impoverished rural inhabitants. Th e latter resented Déguignet’s education, republicanism, and anti-clericalism. Th ey mocked him for introducing mod- ern agricultural techniques to his farm in spite of his unparalleled success.32

Déguignet’s account shows a France quite removed from its famous phi- losophers and writers. Ordinary French people lacked educational opportu- nities and sometimes felt disdain and resentment toward the learned. Th ose sentiments gradually abated as commoners gained greater access to public education and France became a more equal society.33 Resentment of social inequality and the domination of elites still exists in modern France but seldom encompasses an outright denigration of education. A revealing excep- tion nowadays is the case of marginalized French ghettos, where certain poor, minority, and immigrant youths are inclined to scorn education as a privilege of well-to-do whites. Henry Louis Gates made comparable observations about the plight of underprivileged African-American youths, some of whom believe that “speaking standard English, getting straight A’s, or even visiting the Smithsonian” amounts to “acting white.” 34 One can see in both coun- tries related forms of anti-intellectualism spurred by resentment of racism and socioeconomic inequality. However, education simultaneously became what Ta-Nehisi Coates called “a profound act of auto-liberation” 35 for other members of disempowered minority groups in America and France. Leaders like Frederick Douglass, Malcolm X, and Aimé Césaire were well aware that slaves and colonized people were widely barred access to education—a threat to all forms of oppression.

We therefore cannot forget periods in not too distant European history when education and refl ection faced aggressive repression. Th e rise of Nazism, fascism, and communism were largely spurred by propaganda that promoted a black-and-white worldview and violently discouraged critical thinking. While the Allied democracies also resorted to propaganda, theirs did not reach the level of the Axis powers, the Soviet Union, Vichy France, or Franco’s Spain. Political extremism oft en has an intensely anti-intellectual bent. We will return to this issue later in this chapter when examining how, during the Obama presidency, America’s anti-intellectual subculture helped foster demagoguery of a magnitude rarely witnessed in modern Western democracies.

5 2 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

A N A T I O N O F C O N T R A D I C T I O N S

Th e fi ercest anti-intellectualism in American society is a staple of the far right, but as we have seen, the mindset transcends the conservative-liberal divide. Th e problem is frequently blamed on the poor quality of public schools, yet it largely stems from a peculiar conception of education rooted in America’s exceptional history.

I have cited various polls showing that a signifi cant share of Americans, including college graduates, lack elementary civic or historical knowledge. Other polls suggest the same. For example, nearly half of U.S. Protestants are unaware that Martin Luther inspired the Protestant Reformation.36 A com- parative study similarly found that Americans were less likely than Europeans to know who the Taliban are, despite the fact that U.S. forces led the invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks on America.37 Consider another example from Susan Jacoby, the American author. On September 11, 2001, she was in Manhattan among other civilians shocked aft er the terrorist attacks. Two of them were businessmen in expensive attire. “Th is feels just like Pearl Harbor must have,” one said. Th e other responded: “Pearl Harbor? What’s that?” “It’s when the Vietnamese bombed one of our harbors and started the Vietnam War,” the fi rst man explained.38

Even though no one knows everything, this degree of ignorance is stagger- ing, especially among the well-to-do in the world’s only superpower. Why does anti-intellectualism persist, given that American universities have been among the very best worldwide for decades? And how does one square this circumstance with America’s countless contributions to science, literature, art, and other vast dimensions of human thought? Th ese questions point to one of the greatest contradictions of modern American society: a vibrant intellectual world coexists with the crassest anti-intellectualism.

The Qualities and Peculiarities of American Education

In the nineteenth century, America emerged on the world stage as the coun- try whose population had the most years of formal education. From New England to rural Iowa, Americans were global pioneers in gradually institut- ing free public education at all stages: elementary school, middle school, high school, and university. European nations generally did so later than America, as certain European experts then deemed the U.S. model “wasteful” in schooling so many people, including girls in a relatively gender-neutral

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 5 3

system. European nations usually tested children to determine those suited to receive more than an elementary education, thereby favoring the well-to- do and the ruling class.39 Th e American South nonetheless lagged in this area, as its segregated schools denied education to blacks, and even Southern whites were less likely to be schooled than Northern whites.40 Still, for dec- ades America had a major global lead in school enrollment and graduation levels. Th is lead had decreased by the 1980s, which also saw the start of wors- ening wealth inequality. America’s educational advantage has now largely evaporated next to multiple industrialized nations that have established rather egalitarian school systems. As Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz conclude in their comparative study, “the United States is no longer the fi rst in the world in high school and college graduation rates and lags considerably in K–12 quality indicators.” 41

Even as America made impressive strides in providing mass public educa- tion by the twentieth century, a suspicion of deeper learning and refl ection remained, prompting Hofstadter to remark that “American education can be praised, not to say defended, on many counts; but I believe that it is the only educational system in the world vital segments of which have fallen into the hands of people who joyfully and militantly proclaim their hostility to intel- lect.” 42 Hofstadter published his research in 1963, but the suspicion he described may have subsequently intensifi ed because of the resurgent reli- gious right movement, which exacerbated resentment of secular public schools among Christian fundamentalists.43 Th e latter have denounced pub- lic education for promoting “liberal” ideas and calling into question ultrat- raditional beliefs, such as by teaching the theory of evolution instead of creationism.

Despite the popular tendency to value narrow, practical training, American universities commonly strive to impart a wide body of knowledge about the world. Undergraduate education is less specialized in the United States than in many other countries. Th e possibility to choose multiple elec- tives enables one to simultaneously study fi elds as varied as history, political science, anthropology, and astronomy. Moreover, American universities are front-runners in producing scholarly and scientifi c research. Numerous top European academics have relocated to the United States. In particular, French professors teaching in America normally consider that greater rewards for talent, industriousness, and innovation can be found there. Interestingly, many deem U.S. universities more intellectually stimulating than French ones, which they fi nd rigid, bureaucratic, and averse to change.

5 4 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

Of course, U.S. universities possess vastly superior resources with which to fund research and attract top academics by off ering them heft y salaries that are typically two or three times higher than those in France.44 Th ese resources partly come from exorbitant tuition, leading a signifi cant proportion of U.S. students to graduate with considerable debt from academic loans.45

Although America is a global leader in providing quality university educa- tion, the limited thirst for knowledge of many students has undercut this eff ort. Leading politicians, sometimes marginally cultured, have likewise downplayed the importance of being learned and suggested that it dims one’s judgment. As the governor of California, Ronald Reagan tellingly deplored that the state’s public universities were “subsidizing intellectual curiosity,” shocking professors who retorted that this was their very mission. Rick Santorum later went further in contending that Barack Obama was guilty of “snobbery” for setting the goal of a college education for all Americans. Other leaders, such as John McCain46 and John Boehner,47 proposed elimi- nating the federal Department of Education as superfl uous “big govern- ment.” As we will now see, a suspicion of “too much” education can even be found among certain graduates of America’s best universities.

Studying Abroad in America

Two contradictions immediately struck my mind as I attended college in Texas. While I admired the outstanding quality of American university edu- cation, I was baffl ed by the lack of intellectual curiosity of various students.

My professors at Rice University were undisputed experts in their fi elds. Th ough not a model student, I found most of my classes genuinely interesting. I befriended Dr. Bob O’Dell, my astronomy professor, who was formerly a chief scientist for the Hubble Space Telescope and took me on a private tour of Houston’s NASA station. We stayed in touch following my graduation, and Bob regularly impressed me with his vast knowledge of the humanities and literature in addition to science. Millions of people have been exposed to his research, as the acclaimed TV program Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey featured wondrous images of the universe captured by the Hubble Telescope. Campus life could also be highly intellectual stimulating. Student groups organized cultural events. Prominent scholars gave lectures. Nelson Mandela even came to campus in 1999 to give a moving speech about his life struggles.

Scores of Rice students took a vivid interest in learning. One of them was Corey, a charming Midwestern conservative who regularly approached

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 5 5

professors aft er class to ask more questions about his favorite subjects. He availed himself of the broad range of opportunities at Rice, from serving in student government to volunteering at a research center. Eager to broaden his horizons, he traveled to several continents and sometimes practiced his Spanish with me and fellow students outside class. Myriad other students had a broad range of interests, such as budding anthropologists, authors, and activists for social change. In 1999, Rice organized a public service trip to Haiti in which I participated. Th e students in the group had diverse origins, but all showed a broad interest in tackling social problems and discovering the local culture.

Th e fact that many students were inquisitive was not surprising at a selec- tive institution. Th e presence of students who had anti-intellectual mindsets despite being well accomplished was far more unexpected. Th ey seemingly saw college merely as a practical way of getting a good job, as well as a place to have fun in the meantime. Th at category included Greg, the jock who feared being perceived as an intellectual, and Trevor, the smart aspiring medical student who unabashedly said he had no interest in learning about history. Rice students were not an exception in this regard but similar to vari- ous alumni of other top colleges I have met over the years.

An unsettling experience made me realize that certain students eff ectively ignored or frowned on those who tried to raise important issues. A repre- sentative of the Nigerian government had been invited for an event at Rice’s public policy center. Th e subject came up when I had lunch with several stu- dents, including Edna, a Nigerian foreign student eager to meet the diplomat. Given that the Nigerian regime was extremely authoritarian and corrupt, I asked Edna if she had qualms about fraternizing with its representative. She downplayed the regime’s abuses. I then inquired about her thoughts on the notorious case of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the peaceful activist whom Nigerian authorities executed in 1995.* Edna pointedly dismissed that case as trivial. I pressed on about how the Nigerian government had hanged Saro-Wiwa aft er a sham trial. Annoyed, she argued that the unfairness of the trial was a mere allegation: “Th at’s their story.” As we talked for several minutes, we were seated at a small table with three or four American friends, white and black. All of them stayed silent, utterly uninterested in the conversation, unfazed

* Saro-Wiwa led a protest movement in the Niger Delta, where the Nigerian government, along with Shell, extracts oil from the lands of local tribes. Th e region is highly polluted because of reckless extraction and remains destitute, as much of the oil revenue goes to cor- rupt government offi cials and Shell instead of being invested there.

5 6 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

by Edna’s defense of brutal authoritarianism, and insular in outlook. I suspected that I might have bothered everyone by trying to engage in a serious political discussion. Th e following week, I found myself again seated with Edna. I ventured to ask if she had had a chance to refl ect on Saro-Wiwa’s execution. Her response was scathing: “Saro-Wiwa was just a little journal- ist!” Th e other students at our table were unperturbed, continuing to eat their meals in a mental stupor. Of course, they may not have reacted because they wanted to avoid a confrontation. Perhaps they also did not want to sound politically incorrect. What I sensed, however, was profound apathy.

Th e sociologist Nina Eliasoph documented the relative prevalence of such attitudes in American society. While interacting with various social groups as part of a study, she observed that political conversations were rare, includ- ing among volunteers and activists. Social analysis aroused little interest and supposedly lacked practical value. Eliasoph concluded that a social dynamic leads certain Americans not simply to be apathetic but to deliberately avoid meaningful conversations by mingling in superfi cial ways and ignoring those who try to raise serious issues.48

Indiff erence toward knowledge or refl ection is obviously not unique to America. Some may consider Europe the mecca of Western culture, but it would be wrong to assume that the vast majority of its people are vividly interested in art, literature, history, or politics. Th e average European may be more inquisitive than the average American because of the stronger infl uence of anti-intellectualism in the United States, although the diff erence goes only so far. However, a greater lack of intellectual curiosity is palpable among the most educated Americans next to their European counterparts.

Th e contradictions of American education that I observed in college were also noticeable when I attended the Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago. Much like at Rice, I was impressed by the faculty at Northwestern and found most classes captivating. Various students contributed to intellec- tual life on campus by organizing well-attended events where experts debated topical issues, such as the war on Iraq, campaign fi nance reform, and gay mar- riage. Th ere was no clear distinction between inquisitive students along left - right, Democratic-Republican lines. While Northwestern was a largely liberal environment, I befriended students of all stripes, including libertarians and evangelicals with whom I enjoyed debating legal, political, and social issues. We rarely agreed but did learn from one another’s perspectives.

On the other hand, certain law students felt lukewarm about learning for its own sake. Some were exasperated by the Socratic method: when a profes-

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 5 7

sor asks a student to give his or her opinion on a legal problem and the stu- dent’s answers are followed by more questions from the professor or counter- arguments from other students. Such prolonged classroom discussions, these students charged, did not provide “the answers.” Th ey just wanted to know “what the law is” and what to say in their fi nal exams. Of course, complex legal questions have no single answer but rather competing answers based on diff erent analytical frameworks, policy preferences, and moral values.

Th ese students almost systematically preferred small talk. A few even resented the label “intellectual.” I recall a dumbfounding experience with a studious classmate who had received an academic distinction. When I unsus- pectingly used the detestable term to compliment her, she erupted, “I’m not an intellectual!” I had just insulted her. Th e term has become politically charged and is sometimes associated with the “liberal elite.” But this student was a liberal. While most of our fellow students probably would not have taken umbrage at being called intellectuals, and a number might have defi ned themselves that way, her virulent reaction was intriguing.

To a greater extent than in other Western nations, peer pressure leads Americans to believe that they should not appear “too smart” if they want to be popular. A recurrent theme in American movies and TV series is the tale of the intelligent and socially awkward high school student struggling in a conformist environment dominated by dumb jocks and bullies. Such stories reveal social tensions.

American Intellectual Life

Anti-intellectualism has not fully eradicated the spirit of the American Enlightenment, as generations of citizens have continued to make immense contributions to thought and culture. Th ey could hardly be summarized in an entire book, but diverse examples demonstrate how a vibrant intellectual life has coexisted in America alongside anti-intellectualism—a powerful reminder that it is a nation of fascinating contradictions.

America has produced a host of brilliant authors, such as Henry David Th oreau, Emily Dickinson, Mark Twain, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Heming way, John Steinbeck, Richard Wright, Sylvia Plath, Langston Hughes, Tennessee Williams, James Baldwin, Harper Lee, J. D. Salinger, Toni Morrison, Robert Pirsig, Jon Krakauer, Jared Diamond, and Carl Sagan. Art critics esteem American painters like James Whistler, Georgia O’Keefe, Edward Hopper, Andy Warhol, Jasper Johns, Keith Haring, and

5 8 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

Jean-Michel Basquiat. In the musical realm, the composers George Gershwin, Samuel Barber, and Aaron Copland have craft ed masterpieces. Americans have otherwise greatly shaped, if not invented, various modern musical gen- res, including jazz, rock, and rap. Th e virtuosity of John Coltrane is undeni- able, the folk songs of Bob Dylan are compelling, countless rappers fuse activism with rhythm, and Yo-Yo Ma’s eclectic tunes, from Appalachian to Silk Road music, embody the cosmopolitan side of America.

Th e list of American accomplishments goes on. Th omas Edison was one of the greatest inventors in history. Architecture and design are indebted to the contributions of Frank Lloyd Wright and Frank Gehry, among others. Americans have been instrumental in the advancement of modern science, which enabled them to send the fi rst people to the moon. American academ- ics have provided insightful perspectives on innumerable issues. Global cul- ture has long been patronized by American philanthropists and promoted by institutions like the Smithsonian and the New York Philharmonic. America has produced excellent fi lms, although Hollywood’s commercialism has at times hindered its creativity. Leading U.S. newspapers, magazines, and pub- lic radio programs are on a par with their equivalents in Europe. Last but not least, millions worldwide have turned to diverse American icons for inspira- tion, from Th omas Jeff erson to Benjamin Franklin, John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Cesar Chavez, Margaret Sanger, and Harvey Milk.

While anti-Americans perceive the United States as a haven of ignorance, its contributions to human thought since independence rival those of Europe. Th e antidote to anti-intellectualism in American life lies not in imitating Europe but in drawing on the United States’ own intellectual tradition. “We have been afraid to think,” John Adams wrote prior to the American Revolution. “Let us dare to read, think, speak and write.” 49

Are TV, the Internet, and Social Media to Blame?

Th e elevation of Donald Trump, a superfi cial reality TV star, to the status of U.S. president marks a cultural crisis in Western civilization. Social critics have long expressed concern about how modern popular culture exacerbates intellectual apathy. From America to France, scores spend most of their free time glued to their TV sets and read few or no books each year.50 Given that social pressure against cultivating one’s mind is not as signifi cant in Europe as in America, something else may be at work.

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 5 9

TV, the internet, and other mass media have come to play a dominant role in people’s lives at the dawn of the twenty-fi rst century. While they have facilitated access to information, mass media can concurrently numb the mind, considering how legions watch little besides sports, shallow sitcoms, formulaic fi lms, and reality TV. Social media has likewise been a boon for busybodies and cranks, who got an effi cient means of sharing gossip and con- spiracy theories. Th at said, modern popular culture and mass entertainment are not necessarily mindless. One can fi nd analytical news coverage and insightful documentaries on TV or online. Th e Simpsons, South Park, and various other programs stand out for their witty social satire. Th oughtfulness can also be found in other series, from Mad Men to Band of Brothers and Lost.

Assuming TV and the internet are what we choose to make of them, the question becomes why certain people massively gravitate toward their most superfi cial dimensions. On one level, some prefer light entertainment to concentrating on more complex issues, which can be understandable aft er a stressful day at work or school. On another level, mass media can mold the collective imagination with shallow messages. But as we ponder mass media’s negative dimensions, we should be wary of idealizing the past. “Th e vast amount of time most Americans spend with television is appalling,” the soci- ologist David Riesman bewailed more than half a century ago, “but the pre- TV alternatives, such as driving aimlessly about, sitting vacantly, attending sports events, or playing canasta, are hardly more ‘real’ or less appalling.” 51

If mass media has led the citizenry further into a mental stupor, it may help explain indiff erence to the life of the mind. Th e contrast between America and Europe is only relative in this regard. What sets America apart is an infl uen- tial subculture animated by disdain of intellectual pursuits. In the end, some may argue that this is a nonissue because the value attributed to intellect is a matter of preference. Given that diff erent people and societies value diff erent things, is there really any harm in not valuing inquisitiveness, refl ection, and knowledge? Such a position would overlook how anti-intellectualism can shape a country’s political culture in far from innocuous ways.

T H E R I S E O F T H E A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L P O L I T I C I A N

Th e rise of know-nothing politicians like George W. Bush, Sarah Palin, and Donald Trump cannot simply be equated with American decline, as they are heirs to a long tradition of anti-intellectualism. While the Founding Fathers

6 0 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

were learned men of the Enlightenment, intellect soon became a relative liability in the nation’s politics. Th omas Jeff erson’s opponents branded him a Francophile philosopher whose mind was unfi t for practical tasks because of its preoccupation with abstract and theoretical questions. Th e now familiar attack was repeated against John Quincy Adams, whom Andrew Jackson and his supporters accused of being a scholar rather than a man of action and common sense. As president, Adams wanted the government to promote science and culture, an aspiration his adversaries ridiculed. Adams could write but Jackson could fi ght, it was said. Adams conversely saw Jackson as “a savage who can scarcely spell his own name.” Jackson, an “untutored genius” to his admirers, won the presidency in 1828, thwarting Adams’s bid for reelec- tion and leading the country toward a more populist form of democracy.52

Educated politicians have had to prove that they are not just thinkers but doers, the latter trait being the preferable one. Some have tried to connect with the common man by emphasizing their military or athletic experience or by using plain language and tough talk to promote an image of folksiness and virility. Th eodore Roosevelt was esteemed for his work as a naturalist, writer, and president of the American Historical Association, yet his experi- ence as a soldier, hunter, and boxer dispelled doubts about his manliness.53 Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate in the 1952 presidential election, was handicapped by his learnedness, an “ivory tower.” His victorious oppo- nent, Dwight Eisenhower, was admired as a military hero and equally bene- fi ted from what many saw as his concrete knowledge of the world next to the bookish Stevenson.54 Eisenhower’s secretary recalled that he was “deathly afraid of being considered highbrow.” But one of Eisenhower’s speechwriters observed that he had a greater ability with the English language than anyone else the speechwriter had known and was an “absolute pedant” in private, although much of the public had come to think of the president as someone “who had no concept of the English language, no interest in it.” 55 Eisenhower, undoubtedly highly intelligent, may have sought to appear less intellectual than he actually was. One of Richard Nixon’s speechwriters likewise described Nixon as “an intellectual who pretended not to be.” 56

Eisenhower and Nixon were fairly moderate conservatives, but extreme voices, from Senator Joseph McCarthy to the John Birch Society, were espe- cially scathing in denigrating intellectuals and associating them with com- munists. Th e election of John F. Kennedy in 1961, however, suggested that anti-intellectualism was retreating. Kennedy’s intelligence and sophistication contributed to his popularity, and he appeared comfortable exuding these

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 6 1

qualities. Still, his image as a World War II hero tempered doubts that his erudition would translate into weakness.57 Perhaps only a pessimist could then have expected that anti-intellectualism would remain a major dimen- sion of U.S. politics at the dawn of the twenty-fi rst century.

In light of a privileged background that gave him the best educational opportunities, George W. Bush could only have been an anti-intellectual by choice. Aft er getting admitted to Yale based on his connections, Bush gradu- ated with mediocre results.58 He later became a multimillionaire business- man. Yet the two-term president painted himself as an average Joe, “the kind of guy you can have a beer with,” a political strategy facilitated by his scant intellectual curiosity. Spectacularly inarticulate, Bush multiplied peculiar declarations like “Too many ob-gyns aren’t able to practice their love with women all across the country” and “Rarely is the question asked: is our chil- dren learning?” Entirely overlooking World War II, he told a Tokyo audience that “for a century and a half now, America and Japan have formed one of the great and enduring alliances of modern times.” Bush’s misstatements about the Iraq War were either comical or revealing: “You know, one of the hardest parts of my job is to connect Iraq to the War on Terror.” “I am surprised, frankly, at the amount of distrust that exists in [Washington D.C.]. And I’m sorry it’s the case, and I’ll work hard to try to elevate it.” “[Our enemies] never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country and our people, and nei- ther do we.” Speaking about his upcoming memoir, Bush announced: “When the history of this administration is written at least there’s an authoritarian voice saying exactly what happened.”

Bush’s worldview made no room for nuance. He defended a black-and- white morality, labeled his critics unpatriotic, and warned that “either you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists.” Paul O’Neill, his secretary of the Treasury, remarked that Bush was strikingly uninterested in debating policy ideas.59 As Tony Blair stated, “George had immense simplicity in how he saw the world.” 60

Bush surrounded himself mainly with people who thought like him. John DiIulio, a conservative political scientist, resigned from a senior post in his administration aft er eight months, expressing dismay at what he had wit- nessed: “I heard many, many staff discussions, but not three meaningful, substantive policy discussions. . . . On social policy and related issues, the lack of even basic policy knowledge, and the only casual interest in knowing more, was somewhat breathtaking . . . Senior and junior [staff ] consistently talked and acted as if the height of political sophistication consisted in

6 2 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

reducing every issue to its simplest, black-and-white terms for public con- sumption, then steering legislative initiatives or policy proposals as far right as possible.” 61

Studies suggest that scores of Bush’s supporters shared his thoughtless- ness. Consider the public response to W.’s signature policies, the “Bush tax cuts” and the Iraq War, both of which had lasting consequences for the U.S. economy and global order. First, the Bush administration’s 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were among the largest in American history, but surveys found that a full 40 percent of the public had not even thought about the issue. Among those who had formed an opinion, support for the tax cuts was very high, despite the fact that they aimed to benefi t a minority of wealthy citizens. Middle-class and working-class Americans received a tiny tax cut in compari- son and were disproportionately disadvantaged by consequent limitations on spending for services such as education and health care. Larry Bartels, a political scientist, noted other startling incoherencies in the public’s views: “Most of the people who recognized and regretted the fact that economic inequality [had] been increasing nevertheless supported President Bush’s tax cuts. People who wanted to spend more money on a variety of government programs were more likely to support tax cuts.” Public support for Bush’s tax cuts was lower among well-informed citizens.62

Second, the Bush administration easily manipulated most of the public into embracing a reckless invasion of Iraq with predictably grave human and fi nancial costs. Not only was the administration’s rationale dubious—a preemptive war, an easy victory—but it was rooted in false assertions about weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein’s alliance with Al-Qaeda. Roughly half of Americans still think that invading Iraq was the right deci- sion, notwithstanding the fact that experts debunked Bush’s justifi cations for the war long ago. Th at proportion has not dropped since the surge of ISIS—a repercussion of toppling Hussein’s largely secular dictatorship. If anything, Americans appear less likely to regret invading Iraq since ISIS has gained ground there.63

However, the tendency to dumb down presidential rhetoric did not start with Bush. A study by Elvin Lim indicates that presidential speeches have become linguistically and substantively simpler since the early 1800s. Nixon exacerbated the trend in 1969 when he separated speechwriting and policy- making into two separate departments in his administration. Subsequent presidents maintained this arrangement, which prioritizes style over sub- stance. In addition, earlier generations of speechwriters had greater academic

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 6 3

training and important policy-making responsibilities. Th eir current coun- terparts specialize in speechwriting only, further explaining why presidential addresses have become, in Lim’s words, “increasingly devoid of policy sub- stance, simplistic, and sloganistic.” 64 Beyond the presidency, that pattern is apparent in U.S. politics as a whole. For example, TV campaign ads do little more than broadcast slogans, sound bites, emotional appeals, personal attacks, or downright propaganda.

By promoting an anti-intellectual form of politics for decades, mainstream politicians in both the Democratic and the Republican Parties paved the way for the Tea Party’s rise and Trump’s election in 2016. Ironically, Obama’s decisive electoral victory in 2008 was interpreted as the dawn of a more rational age. Bush had been repudiated, and Palin, the G.O.P.’s rising star, had been ridiculed for her peculiar statements during the campaign. Th e president was now a worldly intellectual whose résumé included the presi- dency of the Harvard Law Review and a law professorship at the University of Chicago. Obama’s distinctions, together with the high hopes accompany- ing his election, may have led his supporters to grow overly optimistic in expecting anti-intellectualism to abate in political life.

D I S I N F O R M I N G T H E M A S S E S

Demagogues and extremists around the world have historically been fi ercely anti-intellectual. Whether they are on the left or the right, their rhetoric thrives on ignorance, fear, emotion, and prejudice. One of their primary tac- tics is disinformation: the deliberate spread of false information to manipu- late public opinion. Disinformation goes further than misinformation— information that is merely incorrect—as it is a shrewd political strategy.

In an authoritarian regime, disinformation can work by controlling all information, censoring dissent, and tolerating only offi cial versions of his- tory. Disinformation must operate diff erently in a democratic society like the United States, where information and ideas can circulate quite freely. It then largely relies on repeating falsehoods to make people believe them. Concurrently, disinformation leads people to disbelieve facts by distorting them, claiming that they are myths, or denigrating their sources, such as scientists or the “liberal media.” Th e weight of anti-intellectualism in America has therefore facilitated disinformation by fostering irrationality, gullibility, and skepticism of education. Th is helps explain why conspiracy

6 4 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

theories and blatant deception came to play a major role in the Obama years as an increasingly far-right opposition resorted to propaganda on a scale unmatched in contemporary Western democracies.

A Covert Muslim with a Forged Birth Certifi cate

John McCain and Sarah Palin campaigned for the White House to the tune of “Who is the real Barack Obama?” and eff ectively encouraged conspiracy theorists convinced that he was secretly born in Kenya. Th at would suppos- edly mean that Obama was unlawfully elected, because of the constitutional requirement that the president be “a natural born citizen.” 65 Of course, Obama was born in Hawaii. In an eff ort to put the issue to rest, he disclosed his birth certifi cate, which public offi cials authenticated. Undeterred, the “birthers” either disputed the certifi cate’s validity or maintained that Obama had never produced a certifi cate. “What I don’t know is why the president can’t produce a birth certifi cate,” Representative Roy Blunt of Missouri illus- tratively said. A year into his presidency, 8 percent of Democrats and a full 45 percent of Republicans were convinced that Obama “was not born in the United States and so is not eligible to be President.” 66

Along came reports that growing numbers of Islamophobes falsely identi- fi ed Obama as a Muslim, some of whom may have recalled the McCain-Palin campaign’s claim that Obama was “palling around with terrorists.” Obama’s estranged Kenyan father was raised a moderate Muslim but became an athe- ist, and his American mother was spiritual but not religious.67 Although Obama spent part of his childhood in Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation, his Christian faith had been well publicized. Around a quarter of Americans still came to identify him as a Muslim.68 Rumors about Obama being a closet Muslim become so viral that he opted not to visit Amritsar’s Golden Temple, a Sikh holy site, during his state visit to India.69 Obama would have had to wear a turban inside the temple, and his administration was concerned that a picture of him turbaned would fuel conspiracy theories over his supposed Islamic faith. Th ere was apparently little hope that the public would know that Muslims do not typically wear turbans or that Sikhism is a diff erent religion from Islam.

“Take our country back!” became a Tea Party slogan. Th at exhortation implied not only that Obama’s agenda was un-American but also that he was essentially a foreigner. Various politicians promoted this idea, such as Mike Huckabee and Herman Cain, who both asserted that Obama was raised in

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 6 5

Kenya, a claim refl ecting either startling ignorance or brazen deception. It was subsequently revealed that in a crucial Supreme Court case aiming to torpedo “Obamacare,” King v. Burwell, one of the plaintiff s had proclaimed that Obama is the “anti-Christ” and was elected by getting “his Muslim peo- ple to vote for him.” No less than 54 percent of Republicans thought that “deep down” Obama believes in Islam.70

Th e Republican leadership generally refused to condemn such conspiracy theories and stated that Obama’s birthplace and religion are matters of per- sonal opinion, not matters of fact. Boehner was asked on Meet the Press whether he had a “responsibility to stand up to that kind of ignorance” within his party. “It’s not my job to tell the American people what to think,” the Speaker of the House objected before pressing on about why the public should reject Obama’s policies. Rick Santorum also employed this standard defense, protesting that he had no duty to correct a supporter who told him that Obama is an “avowed Muslim” and not “legally” President. “I’m doing my best to get him out of the government,” Santorum had instead assured her. Romney proceeded to campaign for president with Donald Trump’s backing, noting that the huckster was entitled to promote birther canards.

By the time of the 2016 election, more than six in ten Trump supporters thought that Obama is a foreign-born Muslim.71 When Obama visited a mosque to promote tolerance, Trump said, “Maybe he feels comfortable there.” Aft er the gruesome terrorist strike at an Orlando gay nightclub, Trump implied that Obama is a jihadist sympathizer: “We’re led by a man that either is not tough, not smart, or he’s got something else in mind.” He later argued that Obama is “the founder of ISIS.” Ted Cruz too tried to capi- talize on fear by insisting that Obama is “the world’s leading fi nancier of radical Islamic terrorism” because of his nuclear deal with Iran. Cruz made Frank Gaff ney—a conspiracy theorist who claims that Obama is a Muslim— one of his campaign advisers. Likewise, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker squarely answered “I don’t know,” when asked if Obama is a Christian. In the fi nal weeks of the campaign, Trump sought to appear more presidential by grudgingly admitting that Obama was born in America while accusing Hillary Clinton of starting the birther movement.

Th e union of anti-intellectualism and bigotry turned pure sophistry into a major national issue. Elevating a black man to the presidency—to boot, one with an alien-sounding name—made certain people uneasy. It represented something foreign, un-American. Fear of rebuke made it hard to express such ideas openly, but the prejudiced could more easily make a “constitutional”

6 6 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

claim that Obama is not a “natural born citizen.” In addition to an illegiti- mate president, a forged birth certifi cate would make Obama an undocu- mented immigrant—a member of the vilifi ed group that Trump and many others want deported. Th e hoax about Obama’s Muslim faith went further in insinuating jihadism.

Th is controversy epitomizes American society’s contradictions. A large share of the public was open-minded enough to support the election of a black president. No Western country had, until then, ever had a head of state who happened to be a person of color. Conversely, much of the opposition doubted that Obama was even American in the fi rst place. Yet while no more than a solid minority of Americans believed absurd theories about the presi- dent’s identity, far more people were prepared to accept false allegations about his policies.

The Alleged Evils of “Socialized Medicine”

Fistfi ghts, arrests, and hospitalizations occurred in several cities as Americans clashed over Obama’s health care reform.72 Even as more than fi ft y million U.S. residents had no medical insurance,73 twenty-fi ve million were critically underinsured,74 and scores of people were ruined by medical bills or denied care—sometimes with fatal consequences—Republican leaders roused much of the public against reform. Turning the world upside down, they claimed that America off ered excellent access to treatment as part of the world’s “best” health care system75 and that instituting universal health care would lead to callous “rationing.”

Exemplifying the relentless propaganda of “Obamacare” opponents, Rick Santorum claimed that “in socialized-medicine countries” disabled children “don’t survive,” because they “are not given the treatment that other children are given.” “Care is rationed, and it’s rationed by government agencies who decide which lives are valuable and should be cared for,” Santorum said. “Th ey just simply refuse care. It’s just too expensive.” Sarah Palin similarly warned that “Obamacare” would include “death panels” of bureaucrats who would decide who should live or die, based on their “level of productivity in society,” because of the outrageous cost of “socialized medicine.” In fact, countries with universal care have far lower medical costs than America and generally achieve better or equal health levels,76 as Chapter 5 explains in greater detail.

Republicans nonetheless favored the status quo and stressed that “Obamacare” was a “government takeover” of health care, heeding the advice

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 6 7

of a strategist who said this would make the reform sound like a “coup” by a “dictator.” 77 In reality, the law did not create a single-payer system or even include a reasonably priced “public option” (i.e., government-run) insurance plan to compete against private companies. Rather, it copied past Republican proposals under which for-profi t companies would still be the primary insur- ance providers.78 Obama’s limited reform included a controversial mandate to purchase health insurance—once embraced by Nixon, Romney, and the Heritage Foundation—but it was no more a “government takeover” than are laws requiring drivers to purchase car insurance.79

Th e shortcoming of Obama’s reform, the Aff ordable Care Act, was that it introduced insuffi cient regulation, not too much. An estimated twenty-seven million people were expected to stay uninsured following the law’s full implementation.80 Another thirty-one million were direly underinsured as of 2014.81 Th e law equally failed to regulate the uniquely steep pricing of medical drugs and treatment in America’s profi t-driven health care system. In other developed nations, legal regulations and ethical norms strictly limit profi teering from people’s medical problems.82 Regardless of its drawbacks, the Aff ordable Care Act improved access to health insurance for millions of Americans, such as by fi nally preventing insurance companies from denying coverage to people with preexisting medical conditions—a virtually unthink- able practice elsewhere in the developed world. However, the G.O.P. falsely maintained that “Obamacare” caused a drop in the number of insured Americans.83

Not a single Republican member of Congress voted for health care reform, whereas around half of Republicans in Congress voted to create Medicare back in 1965.84 “Obamacare” proved extraordinarily divisive, yet much of the public was ignorant of its most basic provisions. An astonishing 52 percent of Americans wrongly thought it included a new, government-run insurance plan, and 41 percent were unaware that it prohibited insurance companies from denying coverage because of preexisting medical conditions.85 Even among Americans reporting that they or someone in their household had a preexisting condition, 39 percent were unaware that the law prohibited insur- ance companies from denying them coverage.86 Unscrupulous politicians exploited and promoted such misconceptions, precluding rational debate on a key issue that utterly poisoned the Obama presidency. Trump ultimately won the 2016 election in no small part by lambasting “Obamacare.” As this book went to press, he emphasized that getting rid of it would be a priority aft er he entered the White House.

6 8 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

The “Tyranny” of the Obama Administration

Faced with health care reform and other Democratic policies, Republican leaders claimed that the Obama presidency was bringing America to the brink of collapse and toward an authoritarian “socialist” regime. Extreme statements ran the gamut. John Boehner declared that “Obamacare” is a “monstrosity” that will “ruin” America. Mike Huckabee said that “Lenin and Stalin would love” this law. Newt Gingrich affi rmed that Obama’s “secular-socialist machine represents as great a threat to America as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union once did.” Ted Cruz vowed that surrendering to Obama would be like saying “Accept the Nazis.” Ben Carson concurred that Obama’s rule evoked “Nazi Germany” and added that “Obamacare” is “the worst thing that has happened in this nation since slavery.”

Substantial proportions of Republicans were indeed prepared to believe that Obama “wants to use an economic collapse or terrorist attack as an excuse to take dictatorial powers” (41 percent), is “anti-American” (41 per- cent), “is doing many of the things Hitler did” (38 percent), and “may be the Anti-Christ” (24 percent).87 Chain e-mails spreading conspiracy theories were far likelier to target Obama and the Democrats than Republicans.88 Conservative politicians had long advanced ludicrous claims, and the public had caught on. Left ist conspiracy theories, like the nonsense that Bush orchestrated 9/11, never had remotely the same infl uence on Democrats.

Far-right pundits helped normalize disinformation. In particular, Glenn Beck swore that scheming left ists have been pushing America toward totali- tarianism. Among an endless list of accusations, he frantically warned that radicals prepared to kill 10 percent of the U.S. population had infi ltrated the federal government. Beck even contended that “Obamacare” includes health insurance for pet dogs. Liberals and moderate conservatives fi nd him repul- sive, yet he is popular among the Republican base. Fox News broadcast Beck’s lunatic show for three years but denied that the network has a far-right perspective. According to Roger Ailes, who founded Fox News and headed it for twenty years, it is rather National Public Radio that is a “Nazi” organization.

Fox News is the leading cable news channel, with twice as many prime- time viewers as CNN or MSNBC.89 Data indicate that Fox News is both the most trusted and the most distrusted media outlet in America, given the confl icting reactions it evokes on the right and the left . Notwithstanding the rise of MSNBC as an alternative, liberal partisan station, conservatives

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 6 9

are far likelier to identify Fox News as their most trusted media outlet than liberals are to identify MSNBC as theirs,90 refl ecting Fox News’ dominance in conservative America. While it cannot be said that Fox News viewers are always the least informed citizens,91 research shows that they are particularly ill informed on key issues such as climate change, health care reform, and the Iraq War compared to citizens whose primary source of information is MSNBC or more traditional media outlets. For instance, a survey found “a negative association between Fox News viewership and acceptance of global warming, even aft er controlling for numerous potential confounding factors.” 92

Th e sway of fringe media outlets reached another level during the 2016 presidential race. Trump appointed the disreputable Stephen Bannon as the director of his campaign. Until then, Bannon had headed Breitbart News, a website known for its extreme-right ideology, conspiracy-mongering, and bigotry. Aft er winning the election, Trump intended to make Bannon his chief White House strategist.93 In addition to alt-right news outlets, Trump masterfully used Twitter and other social media to spread his propaganda. More to the point, he chronically denigrated the traditional media, all while benefi ting from the extensive airtime it gave to his deliberately provocative campaign.

Th e diminishing infl uence of traditional media is tied to America’s shift toward an increasingly capitalistic economic system. “Since the 1980s, com- mercial broadcasting has been almost entirely deregulated, meaning that American news organizations are essentially entrepreneurial actors which strive to maximize profi t” to a greater extent than media in other Western democracies, where thoughtful public-broadcasting TV channels typically have a far bigger audience.94 Traditional American media outlets struggled to consistently provide “hard news” as they lost viewers to competing outlets emphasizing “soft news,” including such questionable topics as the lives of frivolous celebrities and sensationalized crime stories. Although millions of Europeans are ill informed, a thorough comparative study concluded that “Americans are signifi cantly less informed about public aff airs than Europeans,” partly because U.S. news programming “is aimed at entertain- ment more than education.” 95

Th e normalization of far-right news outlets is tied to an ideological evolu- tion as well. Reactionary pundits whose propaganda is disseminated on TV, talk radio, or social media are now far from the fringe. As we have seen, a signifi cant share of the electorate and political leadership was convinced that

7 0 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

the Obama administration led the country toward a left ist dictatorship. Richard Hofstadter is again instructive, here for his essay “Th e Paranoid Style in American Politics,” which describes the prevalence of a mindset characterized by “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy” that “could create a political climate in which the rational pursuit of our well-being and safety would become impossible” even if those sharing this mindset did not win the White House.96 Hofstadter was writing with the problems of the 1950s and 1960s in mind—McCarthyism, Bircherism, Goldwaterism, religious fundamentalism—but his observations are applica- ble to modern times.

“Th e paranoid style” is more than a mindset. It is also a political strategy. Republican leaders galvanized much of the country by hysterically asserting that Obama had radically raised taxes on entering offi ce, although his eco- nomic stimulus plan cut income taxes for 95 percent of working families.97 Despite their obsession with excessive taxation, barely 2 percent of Tea Party supporters knew that taxes had decreased, and a whopping 44 percent thought Obama had raised taxes.98 Contrary to popular belief, income tax rates in modern America have not escalated toward all-time highs. Th e tax rate for the top income bracket was 35 percent during Obama’s fi rst term, the same as under George W. Bush. As Figure 4 shows, it was 50 percent during most of Reagan’s presidency in the eighties and more than 90 percent under Eisenhower in the fi ft ies. Th e rate modestly rose to 39.6 percent at the outset of Obama’s second term.99 Th e Aff ordable Care Act further included a tax raise of 3.8 percent on top capital incomes and 0.9 percent on top labor incomes.100 Rush Limbaugh nonetheless affi rmed that “Obamacare” was “the largest tax increase in the history of the world.” Ted Cruz added that it was “the biggest job-killer in this country” and had forced millions into job- lessness, even as the unemployment rate dropped. Jeb Bush agreed that “Obamacare” was “the greatest job suppressor in the so-called recovery.” Donald Trump fl oated the idea that the true unemployment rate might be as high as “42 percent.”

Th e rabid fear of “socialism” among the conservative base encouraged congressional Republicans in their refusal to compromise with the Obama administration. Brinksmanship ultimately led certain Republican leaders to precipitate the shutdown of the federal government in late 2013. In a spec- tacular feat of demagogy, Cruz and other hardliners most responsible for the shutdown then joined protests by World War II veterans denouncing the closure of war memorials due to the shutdown.

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 71

Disinformation about the Obama administration’s policies had clear ben- efi ciaries: the richest of the rich, most of whom oppose improved regulation and a more equal economic system at a time when America has by far the worst degree of wealth inequality in the West. We will further see in Chapter 5 how moneyed interests aggressively backed claims about Obama’s “tyranny” via lobbying and campaign donations.

The “Hoax” of Climate Change

In late 2015, 195 nations reached a landmark agreement in Paris to fi ght climate change. But the Republican Party would have none of that, as it denounced Obama for backing the Paris Agreement. Like health care, climate change is a far more controversial issue in America than in other Western countries. To legions of U.S. conservatives, it is “ junk science” concocted by scheming, know-it-all scientists, an attitude steeped in anti-intellectualism and irrational conspiracy theories. By contrast, a relative consensus on the issue exists across both the left and the right in Europe, where conservatives are drastically less inclined to embrace the disbelief of science fueling both climate change denial and creationism among the U.S. right wing.101

As a result, the international community partly craft ed the Paris Agreement mechanism to circumvent two dimensions of American exceptionalism. First, the G.O.P. adamantly opposed the deal because of its peculiar ideology. Second, America is virtually the only country where treaties cannot be ratifi ed by a

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1913 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013

F I G U R E 4 . Top marginal individual income tax rate (percent), 1913–2016. SOURCE: Tax Policy

Center.

7 2 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

simple majority vote.102 Instead, the Constitution requires the agreement of two-thirds of the Senate—a higher threshold than needed to defeat a fi libus- ter.103 In a bitterly gridlocked Senate, fi nding a supermajority to ratify a climate change treaty was a nonstarter. As a successful deal required America’s coopera- tion, the Paris Agreement has limited binding provisions. Th e Obama admin- istration essentially considered it a nonbinding executive accord—not a treaty up for ratifi cation.104 Th is would enable a Democratic president to comply with the deal, just as a Republican might not. Th e future of the Paris Agreement hangs in the balance, as few Republican politicians accept climatic science.105

Because America is the leading global economy, Republicans have had a disproportional impact on the planet by scuttling previous agreements on climate change. Despite its reservations, the Clinton administration signed the Kyoto Protocol, a failed prior treaty on climate change. But the Senate never ratifi ed it, and George W. Bush refused to push the matter further. His head treaty negotiator admitted to pseudoscience-touting oil lobbyists that Bush “rejected Kyoto in part based on input from you.” 106 Canada withdrew from the treaty in 2011, arguing that it harmed its ability to compete eco- nomically with America, which never adhered to the treaty.107 Certain coun- tries likewise backed away from the Copenhagen Accord, another failed treaty, aft er pointing to U.S. lawmakers’ refusal to adopt binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions.108 Unfazed, the Republican Party inserted the fol- lowing clause in its 2016 platform: “We reject the agendas of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, which represent only the personal com- mitments of their signatories; no such agreement can be binding upon the United States until it is submitted to and ratifi ed by the Senate.” 109

Th e G.O.P. does not merely oppose reforms to curb climate change—it aims to eviscerate existing policies by barring the Environmental Protection Agency from continuing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.110 Th e “con- spiratorial fantasy” evoked by Hofstadter animates the party’s top brass. James Inhofe, anointed the Chair of the Senate’s environmental committee, is convinced that global warming is a “hoax” invented by the United Nations to stifl e the U.S. economy with environmental regulations. In a cartoonish antic, Inhofe threw a snowball on the Senate fl oor to “prove” that global warming is nonsense. Ralph Hall, whom Republicans made the Chair of the House’s committee on science, claimed that global warming is a hoax by sci- entists looking for funding. “I just don’t think we oughta mind ’em,” he said. “I’m really more fearful of freezing. And I don’t have any science to prove that.” Lamar Smith, who replaced Hall as the Chair, led a witch hunt against

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 7 3

federal scientists accused of doctoring data on climate change. Skepticism of climatic science is particularly common among hardline evangelicals.111 Tellingly, the global warming deniers Mary Fallin and Rick Perry, then the governors of Oklahoma and Texas, respectively, encouraged their states’ resi- dents to “pray for rain” to stop droughts and wildfi res. In sum, Donald Trump was far from alone in promoting the idea that climate change is a “hoax.” 112

Corporate interests exacerbate skepticism of climatic science by spending billions to lobby against environmental laws. In the 2012 election cycle alone, the oil and gas industries donated more than $86 million to federal candi- dates, 88 percent of which went to Republicans.113 As Upton Sinclair observed, “It is diffi cult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” 114 Because of their close ties with lobbyists, these politicians promote pseudoscientifi c studies funded by polluting industries that deny evidence of climate change. Th at tactic would be far less eff ective if they were unable to exploit the profound ignorance and anti-rationalism of millions of Americans.

Th e bold anti-intellectualism and cynicism of the modern G.O.P. on envi- ronmental issues is a regression from the days of Richard Nixon, under whom the Clean Air Act passed with bipartisan support. Not a single senator and only one representative voted against the bill, an unimaginable feat in con- temporary America. But the pendulum might fi nally swing back, as polls suggest that a growing share of Republican citizens are concerned about cli- mate change.115 For the time being, however, climate change skeptics remain extremely infl uential in America. As soon as Obama entered the Paris Agreement, his administration’s corresponding environmental plan became entangled in domestic legal and political challenges that were unresolved at the time of writing.116 Eliminating America’s participation in the interna- tional accord, as Trump said he would on the campaign trail, could have disastrous environmental repercussions.

A Loss for Democracy

Far-right populism played a decisive role in thwarting Obama’s agenda. His administration barely passed its health care and fi nancial reforms on party- line votes.* Once the Democrats lost their fi libuster-proof sixty-seat majority

* No Republican member of Congress voted for health care reform. Only three senators and three House representatives in the party voted for fi nancial reform.

74 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

in the Senate, Obama was largely unable to govern because the Republicans categorically blocked all his major initiatives, such as his jobs bill. Obama’s presidency may have disappointed his supporters, but it marked, above all, a great loss for democracy.

Anti-intellectual populism could foster American decline, as it impedes rational decision-making and problem-solving. It also contributes to polari- zation by tilting conservative America to the far right, thereby hindering the possibility of compromise with liberal America. Th e latter has not made an equivalent shift to the far left ,117 as its views generally range from center left to center right in the Western world’s political spectrum. It is contemporary Republicans who stand out, not only by international standards but by U.S. historical standards too. “Rockefeller Republicans,” “liberal Republicans,” and “moderate Republicans” hardly exist anymore.118

Th ese developments led Mike Lofgren to quit his position as a congres- sional Republican operative and lament that his party was “becoming less and less like a traditional political party in a representative democracy and becoming more like an apocalyptic cult, or one of the intensely ideological authoritarian parties of 20th century Europe.” 119 Th e Republican establish- ment’s ideology was mostly behind that trend, which worsened with the Tea Party and Trump movements. It is particularly revealing that Trump and Vladimir Putin have enthusiastically praised each other. Trump notably insisted that, unlike Obama, the Russian dictator is a real “leader,” regardless of his regime’s violent crackdown on journalists and political opponents, not to mention his invasion of Ukraine. Trump was further acclaimed by European extremists such as Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch far right, who attended the 2016 Republican National Convention and was generally warmly received.120

Th is does not mean that the Democratic Party is a model of integrity. Fact-checkers have rated numerous statements of the Obama administration as either false or half-truths. For example, in an eff ort to build support for reform, Obama notoriously argued: “If you like your health care plan, you can keep it.” Th at could not have been true for various reasons, including that his reform aimed to bar insurance plans failing to meet certain benchmarks. Even though Obama blatantly distorted the truth, only around two million people ultimately had their plans canceled. As the policy analyst Jon Gabel underlined, that number is similar to what “the normal churn” of the private insurance market produces, and “these cancellations aff ected less than one percent of persons holding comprehensive private insurance.” 121 Many of the

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 7 5

people who protested losing their old plan did not realize that it did not protect them well. In the end, virtually no one “lost” insurance, as alterna- tives replaced subpar plans.122 However, America still has the worst health insurance system in the industrialized world, notwithstanding the fact that some Democrats touted “Obamacare” as a huge success. Bernie Sanders was not among them, yet he too made dubious claims when campaigning for president, such as promising to achieve a fantastic economic growth rate of 5.3 percent.123

Th at being noted, few Democrats have displayed an indiff erence to facts comparable to that of the countless Republicans who levied outlandish alle- gations about Obama’s counterfeit birth certifi cate and secret Muslim faith, the “tyranny” of his “out of control” government, the evils of “socialized medicine,” phantom tax hikes, the “hoax” of climate change, the treasonous Benghazi conspiracy, and more. Data show not only that Republican voters were signifi cantly less inclined than Democratic voters to trust experts, but also that Republican leaders were much more willing than Democrats to make false or ludicrous claims.124 Table 1 summarizes the fi ndings of PolitiFact, a nonpartisan fact-checking group. We see that the likes of Trump, Carson, and Cruz used extremely deceptive rhetoric. Boehner, who played a leading role in the Republican establishment’s opposition to Obama, was far closer to them in his falsehoods than to Democratic leaders and Jeb Bush. If anything, this table does not refl ect the full extent of disinformation from the Republican establishment, given its consistently misleading rhetoric about key issues such as global warming and “Obamacare.” Th is environment

T A B L E 1 Accuracy of statements by U.S. politicians

False or “Pants on fi re”

claims (%) Mostly false claims (%)

Half-true claims (%)

True and mostly true claims (%)

Ben Carson 57 25 11 7 Donald Trump 51 19 15 15 Ted Cruz 35 30 13 22 John Boehner 35 19 16 31 Barack Obama 14 12 27 48 Hillary Clinton 12 14 24 51 Bernie Sanders 11 17 21 51 Jeb Bush 9 22 22 48

sou rce: PolitiFact, November 14, 2016.

76 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

provided fertile ground for Trump’s systematic disinformation. Fact-checkers who set out to follow his declarations for fi ve days on the campaign trail strikingly found that he made eighty-seven false statements during that period.125 Liberal and conservative America have come to hold increasingly irreconcilable worldviews, grounded in both diff erent values and diff erent factual understandings.

H O W E X C E P T I O N A L I S T H I S T R E N D ?

Needless to say, political extremism, demagogy, and ignorance are not unique to America. Th ese pitfalls of electoral politics exist, to a greater or lesser extent, in all democracies. In particular, European politics can be a dismal spectacle.

Regardless of whether the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union was a positive or a negative step, ignorance, disinformation, and anti-immigrant propaganda clouded the 2016 referendum on “Brexit.” Aft er the British voted to leave, their most Googled questions were “What does it mean to leave the EU?,” “What is the EU?,” and “Which countries are in the EU?” 126

Th e French political debate is not more thoughtful. Nicolas Sarkozy, who held the French presidency from 2007 to 2012, was faulted for his uncultured manner. “Oh, I am not an intellectual!” he insisted. “I am a practical per- son.” 127 Although Sarkozy is not as uncultured as, say, George W. Bush, his words recall a premise of American anti-intellectualism: too much learning hinders common sense. Known for his close ties to France’s jet set and his taste for luxury, the man dubbed Président Bling-Bling sought to challenge the French political and intellectual elite. His platform combined promises of innovative reforms with a nativist theme and an oversimplistic tough-on- crime stance. Sarkozy routinely made grand proposals that he did not follow up on, such as la république irréprochable (the unfulfi lled promise that his administration would be free from ethical scandals), le Plan Marshall des banlieues (a never implemented program to revitalize poor suburbs), la dis- crimination positive (a never undertaken affi rmative action program), and la politique de civilisation (a concept snatched from the sociologist Edgar Morin, whose call for a more equal social system was contrary to Sarkozy’s poli- cies).128 A divisive fi gure, Sarkozy seemed overly preoccupied with promoting his image. Public debate worsened during his tenure, as he was charged with

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 7 7

debasing the presidency with his short temper and unbecoming behavior. Th e most humorous or inexcusable antic, depending on one’s point of view, may have been his outburst of “Casse-toi, pauvre con” (“Beat it, jerk”) to a bystander who refused to shake his hand.129

Sarkozy’s main contribution to French political life was normalizing anti- immigrant scapegoating in a failed eff ort to co-opt supporters of the National Front (Front National, or FN), France’s extreme-right party. Th e FN’s found- ers included supporters of Marshal Philippe Pétain, who led the local collabo- ration with the Th ird Reich during its occupation of France.130 Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN’s leading founder, is known for his staunch opposition to immi- gration, legal or illegal, but especially colored. He equally distinguishes himself as a Nazi sympathizer and anti-Semite. In his view, the Nazi occupation of France “was not particularly inhumane,” and the Holocaust is merely a “detail” of history. Th e FN is now led by his more charismatic daughter, Marine Le Pen, an arriviste who ousted her father from his own party. Th e parricide gave the FN a more mainstream look appealing to both extremists and naïve voters.131 A cynical strategist, she secured a 9 million euro loan for the FN from a Russian bank tied to Putin’s brutal regime, which she admires.132 While a vote for the FN is essentially a neofascist vote, the French sometimes describe it euphemis- tically as a “protest vote” against the establishment. Many ordinary people formerly construed their support for Hitler or Mussolini as a protest against the establishment too. Th e French left also has radical elements, such as Jean- Luc Mélenchon, who argues that Cuba is not a dictatorship. Yet it is not the far left but the far-right FN that has drawn popular support in recent decades. Th is trend was exacerbated by the mediocre record of François Hollande of the center-left Socialist Party, who was elected president in 2012. His prime minis- ter, Manuel Valls, notably evoked Bush when declaring that seeking “cultural or sociological explanations” for terrorism is condoning it.

Other examples of demagogy and extremism abound in modern Europe. Politicians such as Silvio Berlusconi, Viktor Orbán, Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders, Jörg Haider, and Norbert Hofer come to mind. Th e continent struggles with its own set of grave problems and the growing infl uence of far-right anti-immigrant parties. Europe’s case shows that America is not alone in being aff ected by reactionary forces. A lack of insightful leaders is not what distinguishes America either. Th e likes of Obama, the Clintons, the Kennedys, Eisenhower, Truman, Franklin Roosevelt, and Th eodore Roosevelt have proved no less thoughtful than their European counterparts, to whom they have oft en compared favorably.

7 8 • F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

One might therefore ask if America is truly exceptional in this area. Aft er all, the main reasons for political extremism in contemporary Europe may appear similar to those in America at fi rst glance. First, there is hostility toward (legal or illegal) immigrants, who are accused of taking away precious jobs and resources while committing crimes and making no eff ort to respect European customs—a concern at times animated by Islamophobia.* Second, there is resentment of the bureaucratic establishment, including the European Union, as ordinary people struggle in a time of economic stagnation. Both concerns are intertwined because the European Union has promoted open borders, which xenophobes hate. Th ese factors foster the rise of leaders who scapegoat immigrants, defy the establishment, and call for dismantling the European Union. Th ese two forms of extremism exist in America too, given the animosity toward Muslim and Latino immigrants, not to mention resentment of the establishment, particularly Washington insiders.

Yet extremism has other driving forces in America that are much rarer elsewhere in the West. Th ree interrelated ideologies stand out: virulent anti- intellectualism, visceral anti-governmentalism, and fervent Christian funda- mentalism. As discussed throughout this book, they are major dimensions of American exceptionalism that profoundly intensify demagogy. Th at nearly half of Republicans could consider Obama a Muslim133 with a fake birth certifi cate134 evidences this trend. Such conspiracy theories do not have as much traction or political infl uence in other Western nations. Th at universal health care, which is broadly accepted by the right and the left in the rest of the West, could be widely identifi ed with Machiavellian totalitarianism in conservative America further demonstrates that it is an outlier.

Extremism is more of a fringe phenomenon in Europe so far, leaving aside exceptions such as Hungary, where the far right was in power at the time of writing. Other prominent far-right parties, like France’s National Front and the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, generally receive around 15 to 25 percent of the vote.135 Th ey focus mainly on immigration, not universal health care, fi nancial deregulation, or abortion, for instance.136 Moreover, far-right par- ties have less clout in various other European nations. By contrast, the Republican Party is a mainstream party—a leading party in a two-party system—that was already heavily infl uenced by extremist leaders and a reac-

* Many of the people they consider “immigrants” are actually second- or third-genera- tion citizens.

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M • 7 9

tionary base adopting hardline positions on virtually every single issue well before Trump’s rise.137

Because demagogy has a noxious eff ect on the political debate, its preva- lence in America has powerfully contributed to social polarization. A crop of extraordinarily anti-intellectual leaders, who would usually be relegated to the fringe in other Western democracies, are regularly able to attain top offi ces. Resorting to an astounding degree of disinformation, they exploit their supporters’ ignorance, skepticism of education, and irrationality.

America seems to have evolved into what the political scientist Francis Fukuyama describes as a “post-truth society.” 138 Millions of citizens are unable or unwilling to accept simple facts. Naked propaganda has been nor- malized on mass and social media. Donald Trump not only engaged in relentless disinformation and conspiracy-mongering to win the presidency. He additionally tended to systematically take self-contradictory positions, thereby enabling his supporters to hear what they wanted to hear.139 Trump’s rhetoric evoked what George Orwell called “doublethink” in the dystopia of 1984: “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simulta- neously, and accepting both of them.” Th e doublethinking authoritarian in Orwell’s novel “knows that he is playing tricks with reality; but by the exer- cise of doublethink he also satisfi es himself that reality is not violated.” 140 America is a democracy, not Orwell’s dystopia, although this image captures how Trump did not merely deceive others. He may even have deceived himself to rationalize his own fabrications.

8 0

“Th ere is no country in the world where the Christian religion retains a greater infl uence over the souls of men,” the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville wrote aft er visiting America in the 1830s.1 Two centuries later—in an age when Christianity generally inspires indiff erence, skepticism, or suspicion in other Westerners—nonbelievers remain a limited minority of the U.S. popu- lation that is frequently perceived as immoral, radical, or un-American.2

Like Tocqueville, I was struck by the weight of religion in America aft er moving from Paris to attend college in Texas, a pillar of the Bible Belt. While Jesus was almost nowhere to be seen in France, I discovered that myriad Americans had “a personal relationship” with him.3 Th e recurrent displays of faith by both Democratic and Republican politicians, the pious invocations at presidential inaugurations, and other signs suggested that America is indeed “one nation under God,” as in the Pledge of Allegiance. However, living in more secular regions of the country led me to conclude that faith is at least as great a source of division as of unity in American society. Its reli- gious divide is typically thought of as a confl ict between religious and non- religious citizens. In reality, it is mainly among people of faith. Seventy per- cent of Americans identify as Christian,4 but their churches are oft en at odds on basic issues, such as whether the Bible should be interpreted literally.

A series of social changes since the eighteenth century have had profound implications for American religion: the spread of evangelicalism, the rise of modern science, the liberalization of social mores, and the increasing seculari- zation of government. Th ese developments split American Christianity into two main currents. One encompasses liberal and moderate Christians, who are relatively tolerant, try to combine religion with modernity, and do not usually interpret the Bible literally. Th eir views are not distinctively American,

T H R E E

The Exceptional Infl uence of Christian Fundamentalism

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 8 1

as this approach to religion is common among people of faith elsewhere in the West. Th e opposite current is Christian fundamentalism, an absolutist form of faith characterized by biblical literalism, anti-intellectualism, ultratradi- tionalism, and deep reservations about science, including the theory of evolu- tion. Conservative America is the sole part of the modern Western world where Christian fundamentalism is widespread. Some may object to the term “fundamentalism,” yet it is more accurate than “conservatism,” since millions of religious conservatives in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand do not typically interpret scripture literally, denigrate education, or resist modernity as fundamentalists do. If approximately four in ten Americans lean toward fundamentalism, a similar proportion share liberal and moderate forms of faith.5 Meanwhile, the ranks of secular-minded and nonreligiously affi liated Americans are growing, although millions among the unchurched still believe in God.6

Why is faith so intense in America? Part of the answer lies in the fact that the relative separation of church and state in the United States since its founding spared Americans the history of religious strife and oppression that Europeans once endured. Americans are thus far less suspicious of organized religions, which many see as benign means of worship, not social institutions. Paradoxically, various Founding Fathers were skeptical of Christian dogma. But modern-day Americans widely celebrate faith over refl ection while approaching religion as practical self-help. Levels of religious literacy are low. In twenty-fi rst-century America, most Christians are prepared to believe in Jesus’s prophesied return,7 yet half do not know who Martin Luther was.8 Even though Americans are sharply divided by their faiths, there is little public debate on theology.9 Th e political manifestations of Christian fundamentalism—especially anti- abortion, anti-contraception, anti-gay, and anti-scientifi c attitudes—tend to anger nonfundamentalists, but it is oft en taboo to question the religious beliefs shaping these views, such as the notion that the Bible is inerrant divine revela- tion. Challenging dogma is regularly confl ated with opposing religious freedom. All of these factors have enabled religious extremism to thrive, with grave con- sequences for America and, at times, the rest of the world. Ironically, millions of Americans lean toward Christian fundamentalism when the United States is battling Islamic fundamentalists in the “War on Terror.”

Because faith is quite shielded from scrutiny in America, people com- monly overlook how the social infl uence of Christian fundamentalism extends beyond religion, as it can mold an anti-intellectual, black-and-white, and authoritarian ideology. We will see that this helps explain why legions of

8 2 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

evangelicals joined Donald Trump’s movement irrespective of his irreligios- ity, profanity, and libertinage.

F R O M T H E E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

Th e sway of religious fundamentalism in modern America is intriguing, given that the nation was born of Enlightenment ideas. Leading Founding Fathers shared views that would seem radically irreligious nowadays. However, the more rational approaches to faith that emerged during the American Enlightenment were off set by the rise of evangelicalism, which fostered an anti-intellectual and dogmatic understanding of faith. American Christianity ultimately split into the fundamentalist and liberal-moderate currents that remain antagonistic today.

The Religious Enlightenment and the Founding Fathers

Th e Enlightenment marked a shift toward forms of religion giving more room to reason and liberty of thought, and less room to dogmatism, supersti- tion, and authority. Th is movement had diverse currents, ranging from mod- erate to radical. Certain philosophers aimed to refi ne Christian theology. Others embraced deism and shunned Christianity. Some prized skepticism above all.10 Yet this revolution of thought went only so far in America, despite its standing as the nation where Enlightenment ideals of political liberty led to the birth of modern democracy. Christianity remained prevalent in America as the religious Enlightenment made progress in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe.11 Still, the religious Enlightenment had a remarkable infl uence on key Founding Fathers.

Deism, a form of monotheism emphasizing rationality, was particularly infl uential among American thinkers of the founding era.12 Deists usually respected Jesus’s precepts but tended to oppose the Christian religion and its claims about divine revelation. Th ey argued that whatever was immoral, irrational, or contradictory in the Bible could not truly come from God. Deists were disproportionately found in Virginia’s upper class, the intellec- tual capital of Philadelphia, and New England, notably Vermont.13

Th e most prominent deist may have been Th omas Jeff erson, who famously craft ed his own version of the Bible by removing descriptions of supernatural events and other passages that he regarded as irrational or forged. Jeff erson

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 8 3

considered Jesus a magnifi cent moral teacher but argued that his “pseudo followers” had fi lled scripture with “a groundwork of vulgar ignorance, of things impossible, of superstitions, fanaticisms and fabrications.” 14 To Jeff erson, the virgin birth, the divinity of Jesus, the Trinity, and divine revela- tion were all social constructs.15 Orthodox Christians were appalled by the spread of deistic beliefs at the University of Virginia, which Jeff erson founded, prompting eff orts to strengthen Christianity’s infl uence there aft er his death.16 In fact, Jeff erson’s private correspondence would probably scan- dalize most modern Americans: “Among the sayings and discourses imputed to [ Jesus] by his biographers, I fi nd many passages of fi ne imagination, cor- rect morality, and of the most lovely benevolence; and others, again, of so much ignorance, so much absurdity, so much untruth, charlatanism and imposture, as to pronounce it impossible that such contradictions should have proceeded from the same Being. I separate, therefore, the gold from the dross; restore to Him the former, and leave the latter to the stupidity of some, and roguery of others of His disciples.” 17

In Jeff erson’s opinion, the Holy Trinity was nothing more than “hocus- pocus” and “abracadabra.” 18 As for the Book of Revelation’s apocalyptic prophecies, which roughly half of twenty-fi rst-century Americans believe in,19 they were “the ravings of a maniac, no more worthy nor capable of expla- nation than the incoherences of our nightly dreams.” 20 His anti-clericalism led him to conclude that priests live on “duperies” and “dread the advance of science as witches do the approach of daylight.” 21

Benjamin Franklin also believed in a supreme being who ought to be wor- shiped, yet found various aspects of religion irrational. On one hand, he thought that the soul is immortal and that people would be rewarded for good conduct in the aft erlife. On the other hand, he was skeptical of Christian dogma. Franklin viewed Jesus’s morals as “the best” but had “doubts as to his divinity” and thought that his doctrines had “received vari- ous corrupt changes.” 22 Franklin felt that people could “live a virtuous life without the assistance aff orded by religion,” although the “weak and igno- rant” need religion to be virtuous.23

Other Founding Fathers shared comparable views. John Adams, a Unitarian Christian whose faith resembled rational deism,24 wrote that “the question before the human race is, whether the God of nature shall govern the world by his own laws, or whether priests and kings shall rule it by fi ctitious miracles?” 25 James Madison likewise sought to blend religion with reason and enjoyed read- ing the skeptic Voltaire, among other philosophers.26 Alexander Hamilton was

8 4 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

disturbed by religious fanaticism and superstition, as well as atheism. He apparently evolved from deism to a renewed interest in orthodox Christianity in his last years.27 Th omas Paine’s criticism of Christianity was particularly iconoclastic, drawing the scorn of Adams and other peers.28 In Th e Age of Reason, Paine praised Jesus but called the Bible a “book of lies, wickedness, and blasphemy” that “served to corrupt and brutalize mankind.” 29

George Washington’s faith is perhaps the most ambiguous because of his lack of defi nite statement on the issue. Evangelicals have long tried to rein- vent this quintessential American icon as one of their own. Historical research suggests that Washington was not an orthodox Christian but held moderate views shaped by both Christian and deist beliefs.30

In the end, these Founding Fathers’ relative religious skepticism did not refl ect the creed of the average citizen. America remained solidly Christian throughout the Enlightenment.31 Certain founders, such as Samuel Adams, Elias Boudinot, John Jay, and Patrick Henry, held orthodox Christian views.32 Unlike in Europe, deism made only limited progress in America and had essentially disappeared by the 1830s. It was commonly denounced as a cult of reason aiming to supplant Christianity and create a radical new social order. Some saw it as a kind of atheism, although by defi nition, deists are not atheists. As deism and religious skepticism were infl uential in France at the time, Americans, like Jeff erson, who gravitated toward these ideas faced accusations of atheistic Francophilia.33

As Tocqueville wrote, “in political matters, there was not a country in the world where the boldest doctrines of the philosophes of the eighteenth century were more applied than in America; only the anti-religious doctrines of the French* were never able to make headway there.” 34 Th at is partly because Americans never experienced the long history of religious control that the French and other Europeans endured, which meant that irreligion did not read- ily go hand in hand with revolutionary ideals of freedom in the United States.

The Rise of Evangelicalism

While leading Founding Fathers vigorously questioned Christian dogma, politicians in twenty-fi rst-century America are widely expected to believe in

* French philosophes like Voltaire and Diderot were far from alone in promoting skepti- cism of organized religion, as illustrated by the infl uential writings of Baruch Spinoza and David Hume, who were respectively Dutch and Scottish.

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 8 5

the trustworthiness, if not the literal truth, of scripture. Th at is largely because modern American religion was shaped far less by the Enlightenment ideas of the Founding Fathers than by the spread of evangelicalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in momentous stages known as the Great Awakenings.35

In that epoch the traditional American clergy lost touch with the com- mon people because of its perceived formalism and austerity. Th is favored the rise of a populist alternative, namely “revivalist” evangelical preachers, who used unconventional methods to gather large followings. Revivalists gave lively sermons to emotional and boisterous crowds, dramatically urging peo- ple to embrace Jesus so their souls could be saved. Th ey celebrated faith as a kind of self-help. Th eir rather theatrical and entertaining performances allowed little room for an intellectual understanding of religion.

Evangelical revivalists frequently believed that people do not need to read any books except the Bible. Th e infl uential preacher Dwight Moody (1837– 99) denigrated all education lacking a religious purpose: “I would rather have zeal without knowledge; and there is a good deal of knowledge without zeal.” “I have one rule about books,” he stressed. “I do not read any book, unless it will help me to understand the book.” 36 Not all revivalists belittled the value of education. Yet many were suspicious of intellect, not simply because of anti-elitism but also because they saw education as a corrupting infl uence that would lead people to question religion.

By contrast, the learned clergy believed that the Bible could not be prop- erly interpreted without scholarship and that education should encompass nonreligious topics. While the traditional Puritan clergy had contributed to the development of New England’s intellectual life, the revivalist ideology was rooted in the conviction that any person could reach God without using clergy as intermediaries, an idea analogous to the Protestant Reformation’s rebellion against the Catholic clergy’s claim over the Bible.

Revivalism spread throughout the country but had the most appeal in the relatively poor rural areas and frontier lands of the South and Midwest, where the educated clergy lacked a signifi cant presence. Harsher living condi- tions made people more receptive to evangelical sermons emphasizing straightforward and consoling themes of struggle, sin, repentance, forgive- ness, and redemption.37

Th e American Enlightenment once downplayed religious dogma, but evangelicalism did the opposite. American Christianity started to favor faith and emotion over education and refl ection. Dogmatism was increasingly

8 6 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

defended as true faith. An anti-intellectual conception of religion grew in parallel with the anti-intellectual conception of democracy and education described in Chapter 2. Religious and secular life became marked by a com- mon emphasis on practicality and disdain for refi ned ideas.38 To this day, the most rabid anti-intellectual populists are typically Christian fundamental- ists, in the image of Sarah Palin.

The Split of American Protestantism

Evangelical revivalism was not the only factor in the spread of Christian fundamentalism in America, as it was also a reaction to the challenges that modernity posed to traditional religion. Th e term “fundamentalist” derives from booklets called Th e Fundamentals, published in the 1910s in defense of the “fundamentals” of Christianity against modern and liberal infl uences.

In the nineteenth century, scientifi c breakthroughs called many accepted beliefs into question. Th e Scottish geologist Charles Lyell theorized that slow geological forces had shaped the earth over extremely long periods of time. His fi ndings helped change the conception of the planet’s age and formation. Lyell was a model to Charles Darwin, whose theory of evolution likewise rests on the notion of minute changes over ages. Before Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859, Genesis was oft en treated as recorded history. Religious contemporaries faulted him for removing God from our under- standing of the world. But Darwin explained that he had only reported his fi ndings: “With respect to the theological view of the question; this is always painful to me. I am bewildered. I had no intention to write atheistically.” Darwin did not say much about religion and considered evolution “quite compatible with the belief in a God.” He described himself as agnostic and thought the question of God’s existence “beyond the scope of man’s intellect.” 39

American fundamentalists responded by seeking to forbid the teaching of evolution. Th ese eff orts precipitated the famous Scopes “Monkey Trial” in 1925, when a Tennessee high school teacher was prosecuted for teaching the theory. Th e trial received extensive national media coverage that led millions of U.S. citizens to identify fundamentalists as backward provincial ele- ments.40 Additional diffi culties beset fundamentalists. Scholarly research on the Bible increasingly challenged its historical accounts, as well as its textual errors and discrepancies.41 Freudianism and modern psychology contributed to shaping a secular perception of the mind. Within a generation, religious

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 8 7

considerations disappeared from vast areas of American thought and aca- demic life.42 Some felt that religion had become anachronistic.

For the many more Americans who retained religious beliefs, social change demanded the reconciliation of religion and modernity. Th e cultural transformations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created a crisis in American Protestantism, leading it to split into two major lines. Liberal and moderate Protestants were willing to adapt their religious beliefs to modern knowledge. Th ey did not insist that the Bible was literally true. Conversely, conservative Protestants defended “the fundamentals” of the faith and clung to traditional doctrines. Th e following declaration summa- rizes their stance: “Fundamentalism is a protest against that rationalistic interpretation of Christianity which seeks to discredit supernaturalism. Th is rationalism, when full grown, scorns the miracles of the Old Testament, sets aside the virgin birth of our Lord as a thing unbelievable, laughs at the cre- dulity of those who accept many of the New Testament miracles, reduces the resurrection of our Lord to the fact that death did not end his existence, and sweeps away the promises of his second coming as an idle dream. . . . In rob- bing Christianity of its supernatural content, [modernists] are undermining the very foundations of our holy religion.” 43

Numerous conservatives ended up leaving mainline Protestant denomina- tions. Conservative theology gradually became associated with conservative politics, and liberal theology with liberal politics, although in past times many evangelicals had been involved in progressive reform movements, such as the abolition of slavery.44 Besides the social changes precipitated by mod- ern knowledge, massive immigration of Catholic, Jewish, and unchurched Europeans, oft en deemed undesirable groups, contributed to the fundamen- talists’ urge to defend the nation’s “true” faith.45

In an infl uential 1922 sermon, Harry Emerson Fosdick, a liberal evangeli- cal pastor based in Manhattan, accused fundamentalists of aiming “to drive out of the evangelical churches men and women of liberal opinions.” To Fosdick, fundamentalists were hostile to science and accepted only thinking that “brings you to certain specifi ed, predetermined conclusions.” “A great mass of new knowledge has come into man’s possession—new knowledge about the physical universe, its origin, its forces, its laws,” he explained, “and new knowledge, also, about other religions and the strangely similar ways in which men’s faiths and religious practices have developed everywhere.” Fosdick argued that the Christian faith does not require a belief in the literal truth of the Bible, the virgin birth, or the Second Coming of Christ—its

8 8 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

meaning is broader than that.46 He thus wrote in favor of teaching Darwin’s theory of evolution, denouncing creationists as proponents of “medievalism” who discredit the Bible by misrepresenting it as “an authoritative textbook in science.” 47 As Fosdick saw it, “the new knowledge and the old faith had to be blended in a new combination,” a process that fundamentalists resisted and liberal Christians accepted.48 Th ese social changes did not separate U.S. Protestants into two absolutely distinct groups, as some stood between the fundamentalist and modernist camps.49 But Fosdick’s words are emblematic of a religious divide that persists in America.

A growing regional divide matched the split of American Protestantism. Few people realize that fundamentalist theology was partly developed in the North in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Illustratively, the Princeton Th eological Seminary played a signifi cant role in framing the doc- trine of biblical inerrancy. Major religious conferences held in the North also promoted faith in apocalyptic prophecies.50 However, liberal and moderate forms of Christianity mostly carried the day in the North, as on the West Coast, whereas the South and Midwest gravitated heavily toward fundamentalism, sometimes denigrating liberal theology as a wicked Yankee infl uence.51

U N I T E D A N D D I V I D E D B Y G O D

Religion continues to be a source of both unity and polarization in America, where an extraordinary diversity of Christian denominations bitterly disa- gree over what the Bible says and what Jesus would do. Citizens without a formal religious affi liation are a fast-growing group, but many still believe in God, prayer, life aft er death, and supernatural blessings.52 Modern America is therefore largely divided between Christian fundamentalism and moder- ate-to-liberal faiths. In comparison, the religious contrast in most other Western countries pits moderate-to-liberal believers against a vast number of nonbelievers. Christian fundamentalism is either absent from or signifi cantly less infl uential in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where reli- gion is seldom a source of controversy. Islam stands out as an exception because it is an object of intolerance in these parts of the West, as in America.

Unlike other modern Western countries, America has an important evan- gelical movement, which tilts much of the nation toward religious ultratra- ditionalism. During most of the past two decades, more than 40 percent of

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 8 9

Americans have described themselves as either evangelical or born-again Christians.53 Th ough most born-agains are evangelicals, not all are. Certain Catholics and Mormons, among others, identify as born-again.54 Charismatism, another radical Christian current, is relatively common in America.55 Charismatics believe in faith healing, prophesizing, and speaking in tongues—speaking spontaneously in an unknown language (or gibberish), interpreted for divine messages. Born-agains and charismatics lean toward fundamentalism because of their usual conviction that the Bible is literally true.

Th ese categories are malleable, as 42 percent of Americans do not belong to their childhood faith. Aside from the growing ranks of unchurched citi- zens, this trend refl ects how Americans convert to other denominations quite regularly. Conversions especially benefi t evangelical churches aiming to turn lapsed Christians into born-agains, as they gain more adherents than they lose, unlike struggling mainline Protestant churches.56

Th e diversity of America’s religious landscape, shown in Table 2, should not obscure the quasi-consensus on the existence of God. Approximately 80 percent of Americans believe in God, and another 12 percent believe in a universal spirit. Only 6 percent believe in neither, as Table 3 indicates.57 By

T A B L E 2 Religious affiliations in America by percentage of population

Evangelical Protestant 25.4 Mainline Protestant 14.7 Historically black Protestant* 6.5 Catholic 20.8 Mormon 1.6 Jehovah’s Witness 0.8 Other Christian 0.9 Jewish 1.9 Muslim 0.9 Buddhist 0.7 Hindu 0.7 Other 1.8 Unaffi liated 22.8 “Don’t know” 0.6

sou rce: Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape” (2015). * Many of these churches are also evangelical.

9 0 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

contrast, skepticism of religion is ordinary in the rest of the West.58 When they do believe in a higher power, other Westerners are far less likely than Americans to believe in a defi nite, personal God rather than a vague spirit or life force.

Seven in ten Americans nonetheless think that religion “is losing its infl u- ence” in the United States.59 Antonin Scalia, the late Supreme Court justice, exemplifi ed that conviction when declaring that “the Devil” is “a real person” who is engaged in “getting people not to believe in him or in God” nowadays. Th e share of Americans without a religious affi liation indeed rose from 16.1 to 22.8 percent between 2007 and 2014.60 While they lead increasingly secular lifestyles, 61 percent of the unaffi liated believe in God, despite their lukewarmness toward organized religion.61 Likewise, the conventional notion that younger Americans are fl ocking to atheism is doubtful. A full 86 percent of eighteen- to thirty-three-year-olds believe in God.62 But younger Americans are signifi cantly more skeptical of religion than average, not to mention less churchgoing and fundamentalist-minded.63

T A B L E 3 Faith in various countries by percentage of population

Belief in God

Belief in a spirit or life force Belief in neither

United States 80 12 6 Australia 49 11 24 Czechia 16 44 37 Denmark 28 47 24 France 27 27 40 Germany 44 25 27 Ireland 70 20 7 Italy 74 20 6 Netherlands 28 39 30 Poland 79 14 5 Portugal 70 15 12 Spain 59 20 19 Sweden 18 45 34 United Kingdom 37 33 25 European Union average 51 26 20 Turkey 94 1 1

sou rce s: “Religion | Gallup Historical Trends” (2010); European Commission, “Eurobarometer: Biotechnolog y,” October 2010; Nielsen, “Faith in Australia,” December 16, 2009.

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 9 1

Around 40 percent of Americans report attending religious services on a weekly basis.64 Even though social pressure leads people to exaggerate their church attendance, the actual rate in America is undoubtedly high.65 Organized religion is prevalent in only a few Western countries besides the United States, such as Ireland, Italy, and Poland. And America is the only one where fundamentalist forms of Christianity are widespread.

I witnessed these immense contrasts fi rsthand as an international student in Texas. To be sure, religion had limited weight at Rice University, my undergraduate alma mater, as most students ranged from moderately devout to nonreligious. I still befriended a number of pious evangelicals, many of whom were Democrats, notwithstanding their social conservatism. Th ey practiced their faith privately and without proselytizing. While moderate by Southern standards, they were extremely religious next to both Europeans and Americans from the Northeast. Th ey considered Jesus their “Lord and Savior,” said grace before meals, routinely read scripture, and went to church every Sunday—practices that were quite foreign to me as a nonreligious Frenchman. I respected their faith but was struck by how, despite their intel- ligence and education, dogma had shaped their entire lives. Disbelieving in God was not merely a cardinal sin in their eyes—it was not even an option if one wanted to lead a moral and meaningful life.

Th e religious fervor I observed in the South diff ered widely from the rather soft Catholicism I was accustomed to in France. Th roughout my child- hood I sporadically attended mass. At twelve years old, I chose to immerse myself more fully in Catholicism by attending religious classes for a year at my local parish, a few blocks from the Eiff el Tower. I was left unconvinced. Religion no longer played a role in my life by the time I arrived in Houston, but I remained spiritual and open to learning about my Texan friends’ faiths. On a dozen occasions, curiosity led me to attend services at various evangeli- cal churches in Houston, joining friends or visiting by myself. Th e congrega- tions were either overwhelmingly white or overwhelmingly black, as is the case in much of American social life, where interactions between racial groups go only so far. But having a Kenyan father and a French mother, I felt comfortable entering both black and white churches.

I vividly recall an eloquent African-American preacher giving a moving sermon about how, as a child, he was once stuck in a city late at night with no money to take the bus back home. Scared, he proceeded to pray for God’s help. He suddenly remembered that he had a coin in his pocket. A few moments later, he found another coin on the street, completing his bus fare.

9 2 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

As his congregation listened attentively, he then proclaimed: “Th ere are no coincidences in the lives of God-loving people!” Th e faithful cheered and I clapped along. On further refl ection, I found that the preacher had drawn sweeping conclusions from a patently mundane event. What he and his con- gregation saw as unmistakable divine assistance was hard to reconcile with the fact that millions of innocents succumb to violence and disease despite pleading for God’s help.

Th is is not an isolated example, as American Christians commonly see divine signs in trivial events—a belief that would puzzle most European Christians. Consider the case of Francis Collins, the prominent U.S. scien- tist who led the Human Genome Project. Collins used to be an atheist but was eventually tempted to become a Christian. He demanded a sign from God. It came when Collins went hiking one day and stumbled upon a frozen waterfall formed into three parts. Taking it as a revelation of the Trinity, he converted to Christianity.66 One is left to wonder if Collins would have con- verted to another religion if the waterfall had been frozen into any other number of parts with a sacred signifi cance, such as the Five Pillars of Islam.

Comparative studies show that when it comes to religiosity, America oft en has more in common with poor, developing countries than with other indus- trialized nations.67 Th is illustrates American religious exceptionalism. We will now take a closer look at the most peculiar and anachronistic aspects of faith in modern America before considering why Americans remain so attracted to religion.

Creationist Zeal

In 2002, Mike Pence, the future U.S. vice president, gave an eloquent speech calling into question Darwin’s theory of evolution. Th en a Congressman from Indiana, Pence declared on the House fl oor that evolution had never been “proven by the fossil record” and was merely a “theory,” not a “fact.” Emphasizing that people are God’s creation, he advocated “teaching other theories of the origin of species,” especially “intelligent design.” Pence further predicted that “someday scientists will come to see that only the theory of intelligent design provides even a remotely rational explanation for the known universe.” 68 Th at is unlikely to occur, however, as experts have easily identifi ed intelligent design as a pseudoscientifi c creationist theory. In 2005, a federal district court found that a Pennsylvania school board’s attempt to depict intelligent design as nonreligious biological education was

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 9 3

a “sham.” 69 Th e court held that teaching intelligent design in public schools violates the separation of church and state.

America is the only Western nation with a substantial share of creation- ists.70 Around 42 percent of Americans think that “God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000 years or so.” 71 More Americans believe in angels (68 percent), the soul’s sur- vival aft er death (64 percent), hell (58 percent), and the Devil (58 percent) than in evolution (47 percent), ghosts being close challengers (42 percent).72

People typically think of evolution as a source of polarization between secularists and fundamentalists, yet it sharply divides Christians too. Most U.S. evangelicals reject the theory, unlike most U.S. Catholics and mainline Protestants,73 whose clerical leaders generally recognize evolution but believe that God has guided the process. It may come as no surprise that the fairly open-minded Pope Francis of Argentina accepts evolution. What is more revealing is that his predecessor, Pope Benedict XVI, a conservative German cleric, lambasted creationists for depicting evolution and faith as mutually exclusive. “Th is contrast is an absurdity, because there are many scientifi c tests in favor of evolution, which appears as a reality that we must see and enriches our understanding of life and being,” Benedict stressed.74

While the roots of the modern creationist movement are American, it has also emerged internationally because of proselytization. In New Zealand, the Discovery Institute and the local branch of Focus on the Family—American fundamentalist groups—distributed heaps of unsolicited creationist materi- als to public schools.75 Creationism has made some progress in other coun- tries, such as the United Kingdom.76 Th ese developments prompted the Council of Europe to declare that creationism was spreading aft er having long been “an almost exclusively American phenomenon.” Th e council urged European schools not to teach creationism, which it depicted as “religious extremism closely linked to extreme right-wing political movements” that denigrate science and aim “to replace democracy by theocracy.” 77

Th e U.S. Supreme Court has barred eff orts to teach creationism in public schools in light of the separation of church and state. But resilient fundamen- talists have sought to circumvent the law by promoting intelligent design as “science.” Because fundamentalists believe that it off ers a more spiritually desirable worldview than evolution, they insist that creationism must be factu- ally accurate. Th e creationist movement therefore aims to have intelligent design taught as an alternative to evolution before ultimately replacing it in the curriculum.78 A large share of Americans embrace this goal: four in ten

9 4 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

support teaching creationism instead of evolution in public schools, and six in ten are amenable to teaching creationism alongside evolution.79 Disinformation fuels the creationist movement, as fundamentalists claim there is no consensus among scientists about evolution. Illustratively, former Representative Michele Bachmann contended that “there are hundreds and hundreds of scientists, many of them holding Nobel Prizes, who believe in intelligent design,” a bla- tant falsehood. Around a third of Americans think that many scientists har- bor serious doubts about evolution.80

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to simply conclude that creationism is prevalent in the United States. Liberal America widely accepts evolution, like the rest of the Western world. It is conservative America that stands out for embracing creationism.

The Apocalypse Cometh

In a last-ditch eff ort to persuade the French president Jacques Chirac to sup- port his invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush told him that “biblical prophecies are being fulfi lled” and that “Gog and Magog are at work in the Middle East,” a reference to an apocalyptic confl ict between good and evil that Ronald Reagan also mentioned during the Cold War. “Th is confrontation,” Bush claimed, “is willed by God, who wants to use this confl ict to erase his people’s enemies before a New Age begins.” Bush’s literal interpretation of scripture appalled Chirac, a barely religious French conservative, and strengthened his resolve to defy Bush by opposing the Iraq War.81

Following his presidency, Bush was the keynote speaker at a fund-raiser for the Messianic Jewish Bible Institute, a group aiming to convert Jews to Christianity. Its broader objective is to “restore” Israel to bring about the Second Coming of Christ.82 Evangelicals widely believe that the return of the Jews to Israel is a precondition of Jesus’s prophesied return. Around 35 percent of Americans hold this view, and another 18 percent are unsure about whether it might be true.83 Behind the religious right’s seemingly unconditional sup- port for Israel lie ideas about its destruction during the epic battles of the Apocalypse and a conception of Israelis as pawns serving to hasten Jesus’s return.* Indeed, Christian fundamentalists oft en think that Jews will be sent

* Other factors also shape steadfast support for Israel among U.S. conservatives. For instance, many identify with its struggle against terrorism, which they commonly associate with the Palestinian cause as a whole.

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 9 5

to hell on doomsday, along with all non-Christians, unless they fi nally accept Jesus’s divinity.84

Chirac was not alone in his incredulous reaction to Bush’s religious rationalizations for invading Iraq.85 Th e revelation that religion partly infl u- enced the war shocked scores of liberal Americans, just like Europeans, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders. Th ey were notably dumb- founded when Bush answered, “Th ere is a higher father that I appeal to,” when asked if he had consulted with his father about the war. Such beliefs were arguably less shocking to conservative Americans, as Bush’s claims did not come out of nowhere. It is common for evangelical politicians to declare that God guides their policies or told them to run for offi ce.86 Belief in an impending Apocalypse, intertwined with the image of a vengeful God, is ordinary too. Six in ten Americans think that the prophecies in the Bible’s Book of Revelation will come true, meaning that the world will end when Jesus returns to “rapture” Christians to heaven and send others to hell.87 Four in ten also expect Jesus to return by 2050.88

Th is brand of apocalypticism is rooted in the doctrine of premillennial dispensationalism, which holds that the moral decline of civilization and the Jews’ return to the holy land will precipitate the Second Coming of Christ. Fundamentalists believe that several omens point to the End of Days: the creation of the state of Israel, strife in the Middle East, clashes with Islamic terrorists, the decreasing infl uence of religion, and the abandonment of tra- ditional morality signaled by trends like gay marriage. Th ese convictions combine great pessimism about the state of the world with great optimism about Jesus’s return.

Numerous Americans therefore interpret global events in light of apoca- lyptic prophecies. A year aft er September 11, 2001, nearly a quarter were convinced that the Bible had predicted the terrorist strikes.89 Th e reverends Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson claimed that the attacks were divine retribu- tion for the ways of “abortionists,” “pagans,” “feminists,” “gays,” and those “who have tried to secularize America.” Although most Americans fi nd these views off ensive, both preachers had signifi cant infl uence in their careers. Reagan even relied on Falwell to help mobilize his base.90

Similarly, various religious conservatives suggested that Hurricane Katrina was divine punishment for New Orleans’s hedonism and tolerance of LGBTQ people.91 Th ese views are, again, far from extraordinary. Approximately 49 percent of Americans agree that “the severity of recent natural disasters is evidence of what the Bible calls ‘the end times.’ ” 92

9 6 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

Biblical prophecies already led earlier generations of Americans to see signs of the end of times. Some colonists interpreted their War of Independence against the British as such an omen. Th e French Revolution and Napoléon’s rise led to more eschatological predictions. People of all stripes saw apocalyp- tic signs in the carnage of World Wars I and II. Certain evangelicals even viewed the 1991 Gulf War as an omen.93 Th e arrival of the year 2000 suppos- edly marked the end of times—a purely ethnocentric notion, since the Gregorian calendar is only one of multiple calendars used by diverse civiliza- tions throughout history. To Bush and millions of Americans, the “War on Terror” again signaled a looming doomsday.94

Th e historical context in which the Bible’s Book of Revelation was written suggests that it may have been a metaphor for events of the fi rst century ce surrounding the Roman Empire’s rule. Christians have nonetheless inter- preted Revelation for two thousand years as if it applied to current events and described an imminent Apocalypse.95 Nowadays, however, America is one of the few remaining parts of the developed world where belief in biblical prophecies is both widespread and intense. Yet faith in apocalyptic prophe- cies is not evenly distributed nationwide. Th e fact that much of conservative America takes biblical prophecies with the utmost seriousness while much of liberal America fi nds that absurd further demonstrates their largely irrecon- cilable worldviews.

Religious Illiteracy

As Bart Ehrman describes in Jesus, Interrupted, millions of devout Americans remain in the dark about what biblical scholars have revealed for centuries. Th e average person tends to read the Bible in sequence or pick passages here and there for inspiration, unlike scholars who examine the textual, factual, and theological discrepancies in scripture.

It is no secret that the apostles’ Gospels were written not by them but by unknown authors who inherited their accounts from a malleable oral tradition decades aft er Jesus’s time.96 Signifi cant contradictions therefore exist between the Gospels of John, Luke, Mark, and Matthew regarding Jesus’s genealogy, birth, teachings, last supper, trial, crucifi xion, last words, and resurrection. For example, the idea that Jesus was born to a virgin is found only in Matthew and Luke. And these two Gospels trace Jesus’s line- age through Joseph, even though they would have had no blood relation, since Jesus was reportedly born to the Virgin Mary, whose lineage is not

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 9 7

given. Besides, Matthew and Luke both provide diff erent lineages for Joseph.97

Naturally, there may be mythological and allegorical value to biblical sto- ries refl ecting ancient civilizations’ eff orts to explain the world based on the knowledge at their disposal. While a historical understanding of scripture is compatible with faith, it is irreconcilable with a fundamentalist mindset. In the eyes of fundamentalists, the Bible must be literally true because God would not have given us a fl awed text.

Certain Americans deliberately reject information contradicting their religious beliefs, yet many simply lack elementary religious education. Th e fi rst comprehensive survey on the issue found that atheists and agnostics had greater knowledge of religion than the devout.98 It revealed that only 47 percent of Protestants and 42 percent of Catholics know that Martin Luther was the main fi gure behind the Protestant Reformation, compared to 68 percent of agnostics and atheists. In addition, more than half of Americans are unaware that the Koran is the Islamic holy book and that Ramadan is the Islamic holy month. No more than 65 percent can identify Zeus as the supreme divinity in Greek mythology. Barely 62 percent realize that most people in India are Hindus. Only 47 percent know that the Dalai Lama is Buddhist. Surely, all human beings have gaps in their knowledge, although miseducation of this magnitude is remarkable. In the words of Stephen Prothero, the author of Religious Literacy, a substantial proportion of Americans are both “deeply religious and profoundly ignorant about religion.” 99

A D I S T I N C T I V E A P P R O A C H T O F A I T H

Why are so many Americans drawn to religion in the fi rst place? Th e uncanny appeal of faith in the United States is epitomized by the Jesus Movement, an evangelical current within the hippie counterculture of the sixties and seven- ties. Known as the Jesus People, its followers sought to fuse evangelical dogma with hippie skepticism of conventional ideas. Th ese Christian radicals “believed in a love that their elders preached but did not follow,” while embracing the hippie struggle against “the establishment and the Vietnam War,” as Tanya Luhrmann writes in her book on modern evangelicals.100 Jesus People could be indistinguishable from fellow hippies, and some used drugs to attain psychedelic spiritual states. Th eir movement contributed to

9 8 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

the rise of Christian rock music, which equally benefi ted from Bob Dylan’s controversial conversion to evangelicalism. Jesus People aimed to reinvent Christianity because they could not bring themselves to abandon religion despite their radicalism.

One regularly sees similar patterns when talking to ordinary Americans or following the news. American LGBTQ Catholics press the pope to recog- nize their rights—and reconsider the church’s longstanding sexism and prudishness.101 A “black Mormon feminist” aims to reform the Mormon Church, whose history of racism and patriarchy is well documented.102 Th ese examples refl ect a broader trend. Th e history of American religion, like per- haps all religion, is one of constant reinvention. African-Americans co-opted Christianity as a gospel of resilient hope even though it served to rationalize their enslavement. Quakers redefi ned as a pacifi st creed a faith that others used to justify wars of conquest. Fundamentalist and modernist Protestants split into opposite currents. Today new generations redefi ne what God wants as social circumstances change. However, the trend has not been identical on the Old Continent. Since the Enlightenment, Europeans have redefi ned Christianity but have also been more willing to let go of religion.

Social pressure to be religious partly explains Christianity’s popularity in America. Yet it appears to stem mainly from a tendency to envision religions as benign means of worship, self-help, and fellowship rather than as human- made institutions, as is oft en the case in Europe. Dogma is thus commonly absolved from critical thinking in America, which allows organized religions to thrive regardless of how peculiar their views may be.

A Moral Society Needs Religion

Nearly two centuries ago, Tocqueville made a revealing observation aft er traveling from France to the United States: “I stop the fi rst American whom I meet . . . and I ask him if he believes religion to be useful to the stability of laws and to the good order of society; he answers me without hesitation that a civilized society, but above all a free society, cannot subsist without reli- gion. . . . Th ose least versed in the science of government know that at least.” 103

Tocqueville remains insightful, as lacking a religious faith is still unac- ceptable in numerous American communities. Atheism and agnosticism are regularly associated with extremism, immorality, and nihilism in the United States.104 Th ose who admit to not believing in God risk being ostracized by their peers, particularly in conservative areas.105

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 9 9

Th ese circumstances do more than encourage people to be devout—they entice people to show that they are, thereby creating a strong social norm of religiosity. A Danish expat interviewed as part of a comparative study was astonished by what he witnessed on moving to California. Faith is a private matter in Denmark, as is largely the case throughout Europe, but in America multitudes have bumper stickers with messages about God. Morten, the Dane, wondered: “Are they saying this because they want other people to see that they are [so religious]?” He described how he casually asked an acquaint- ance whether he went to church. “No, but I study the Bible at home,” the man replied. Morten sensed that “he thought he had to say that—that he was embarrassed for not going to church.” Morten was likewise shocked by how U.S. politicians, from George W. Bush to Hillary Clinton, made sure to tell voters that they believe in God.106

Virtually no Democratic or Republican politician has ever accepted the label “nonbeliever.” A full 43 percent of Americans would not vote for a qualifi ed presidential candidate who happened to be an atheist—a remark- ably higher proportion than for a Catholic (5 percent), a Jew (6 percent), a Mormon (18 percent), or a Muslim (40 percent).107 Social pressure therefore encourages U.S. politicians of all stripes to invoke God regularly. In turn, religious rhetoric from the nation’s leaders helps normalize religiosity and dissuade skepticism, irrespective of whether such public displays of faith are heartfelt or contrived. Politicians’ religious rhetoric turns off some Americans, yet we will see in the next chapter that millions welcome displays of faith, which supposedly enable them to relate to their leaders on a personal level.

Th e religious right and certain religious moderates like ex-senator Joe Lieberman warn that an irreligious society would be chaotic, depraved, full of crime, and fi lled with selfi sh, empty-feeling people.108 Phil Zuckerman, an American sociologist, sought to test this theory by moving to Denmark and Sweden, two of the world’s least religious countries. He found scores of irre- ligious people leading moral, loving, and satisfying lives. Th e nonnegligible share of Danes and Swedes who believe in God or subscribe to Christianity are far closer to rational deism than to dogmatism. Almost no one considers the Bible literally true. People observe certain Christian rites, such as baptiz- ing their children or getting married in church, more out of custom than faith. Politicians basically do not discuss their religious views. Despite their secularism, Denmark and Sweden are highly prosperous nations with high levels of well-being and low crime levels.109

10 0 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

In America, accepting modern knowledge, science, and social mores has oft en meant adopting liberal or moderate forms of faith. Elsewhere in the West, accepting these dimensions of modernity has oft en meant abandoning religion altogether. Religious skepticism there has not been mostly limited to progressive circles, unlike in America. Numerous European conservatives, for instance, harbor viewpoints that would be labeled archliberal in America, such as the notion that biblical accounts are only “stories.” While faith has not disappeared from Europe, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand, few of the people who remain religious there lean toward Christian fundamentalism.

Certain Americans fear that their country may follow other nations into a postreligious age, although that seems unlikely in the immediate future. While religion is not as dominant in America in the twenty-fi rst century as in prior centuries, it retains considerable weight. In fact, merely 22 percent of Americans want organized religion to have less social infl uence. Th e rest want it to have either equal or greater infl uence.110

From Self-Help and Fellowship to Indoctrination

Notwithstanding social pressure to be religious, scores of Americans are genu- inely attracted to organized religion. But many are not initially drawn to its theological, moral, or spiritual dimensions. People commonly join fundamen- talist churches for the same reason that others join moderate or liberal churches: religion is oft en seen as a means of self-help and fellowship in America.111 People are told that faith will off er solace and help them succeed in their careers, that the Bible will provide concrete dos and don’ts, and that a support- ive church community will give them a meaningful social life. Th is approach to religion is illustrated by one of the conclusions in Luhrmann’s anthropologi- cal study of evangelicals: “Th eir faith is practical, not philosophical.” 112

Over the years I have met diverse American evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons drawn to organized religion by the notion that it would give them a sense of purpose, a belief system, a supportive community, and comfort. Th ey wanted more than what secular morality, education, social activities, friendships, and romantic relationships had to off er.

A landmark study found that joining hardline churches can be especially rewarding.113 If not taken past a certain threshold, strictness and even adher- ence to eccentric beliefs can enhance fellowship by screening out individuals who lack devotion. Th is stimulates participation for those who remain, enriching their experience. In general, the more distinctive a church is, the

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 101

more its members attend services—like Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example.

In other words, the primary reason for joining a religious community is not necessarily whether its assertions about God and the universe are true. People who belong to evangelical churches may not have thoroughly exam- ined whether the Bible is inerrant, just as Catholics may not have fully con- sidered whether the pope has special knowledge of God. Acquiring such dogmatic beliefs is commonly a by-product of joining a church where one hopes to fi nd fellowship, structure, and self-help. Churchgoers in other Western countries may be drawn to organized religion for the same reasons. But American churches are likelier to indoctrinate their members with fun- damentalist ideas.

I debated religion with my friend Judy, a cheerful Democrat raised in a left -leaning family in California. In search of religious fellowship and guid- ance aft er graduating from college, she decided to join an evangelical church. It turned out to be a fundamentalist one. Judy was taught that homosexuality and any form of premarital sex are grave sins. She learned about creationism and was convinced that scientists regularly forge fossils to fabricate evidence of evolution. Judy was also trained to proselytize. In our conversations she demonstrated the ability to present her case in a constructive way that might have persuaded ill-informed or ambivalent people. Her main argument was that the universe must have a God because life could not exist on earth if it were at a slightly diff erent distance from the sun. She likewise asserted that neither a cell nor a full organism has been proved to evolve. Judy therefore concluded that Genesis must be literally true. Based on her reasoning, one could equally conclude that ancient Greek mythology or the Koran must be absolutely true. But Judy was just repeating her church’s teachings.

Legions similarly enter fundamentalist churches seeking a self-help sys- tem, emotional fulfi llment, a sense of belonging, and spirituality. Th ey then embrace a narrow yet all-encompassing ideology, proclaim the literal truth of ancient scripture, promote creationism, extol intolerance, and defy reason.

Th ose whom Richard Hofstadter described as “men of emotional power or manipulative skill” commonly play a role in that process.114 Th e fundamental- ist preacher Rick Warren rose to fame with his bestseller Th e Purpose Driven Life, a self-help religious book. Preachers like Warren encourage their follow- ers to build “a personal relationship with God.” Th is evangelical aspiration is far more than a metaphor. It rests on the conviction that one can literally talk and interact with God on a routine basis. Luhrmann’s anthropological

10 2 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

research led her to meet numerous evangelicals who “were invited to put out a second cup of coff ee for God while they prayed, to go for a walk with God, to go on a date with God, to snuggle with God, to imagine that they’re sitting on a bench in the park and God’s arm is around their shoulders, and they’re kind of talking about their respective days.” 115 Luhrmann found that the evangeli- cals she studied approached religion as a “self-help” means of feeling content and confi dent. Alongside this process of emotional fulfi llment, Warren and other fundamentalist preachers encourage churchgoers to interpret the Bible literally, reject evolution, endorse abstinence-only sexual education, and con- demn abortion, gay rights, and stem-cell research.116

How Secular Government Helped Religion

Americans have fewer historical reasons than Europeans to be wary of organ- ized religion, which helps explain the stronger dogmatism found in the United States. Th e offi cial establishment of religion in premodern Europe fostered mistrust. European clergy were frequently considered corrupt and oppressive allies of authoritarian monarchs who claimed to be divinely cho- sen. Because of the union of church and state, challenging one’s government could imply challenging the authority of intertwined religious institutions and vice versa. Even though millions of Europeans remained faithful Christians, these conditions helped build awareness on the Old Continent that the Catholic Church, Anglican Church, and other churches are partly sociopolitical institutions. Meanwhile, members of Europe’s persecuted Christian denominations sought refuge in America.

Th is is not to say that early American colonists necessarily embraced reli- gious liberty. Th e Puritans fl ed religious persecution in England but enforced religious orthodoxy in their Massachusetts Bay Colony, leading to clashes with Quakers, Baptists, and other dissenters, some of whom were expelled. Strikingly, between 1659 and 1661, Puritan authorities hung four Quakers for their unorthodox religious views.117 Colonies under the yoke of the Anglican Church likewise enjoyed limited freedom of worship. Quakers were com- paratively tolerant and stood out for their pacifi sm.118 It is therefore a myth that early colonists, especially the Pilgrims and the Puritans,* established

* People oft en confl ate these two groups despite key diff erences. In broad terms, the Puritans sought to reform the Church of England, whereas the Pilgrims were separatists who aimed to leave it altogether.

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 10 3

religious liberty in America. Th e Founding Fathers deserve more credit for doing so a century later, as they deliberately avoided establishing a national religion in the U.S. Constitution of 1787.119 We will return to the history of secular American government in the next chapter. At this stage, it is impor- tant to grasp how greater religious liberty helped organized religion spread in America.

Th e comparative absence of coercive, state-established religion in the United States since its founding spared Americans the religious strife and clerical domination that Europeans once faced.* Early generations of Americans fur- ther tended to defi ne themselves as the opposite of Europeans, whom they faulted for repressing religious freedom.120 Th ese circumstances enabled democracy and Christianity to grow in relative harmony in the United States. “In France,” Tocqueville wrote in the 1830s, “I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom pursuing courses diametrically opposed to each other; but in America I found that they were intimately united, and that they reigned in common over the same country.” 121

Unlike in America, the struggle for democracy in Europe was partly predicated on ending the dominance of clerical institutions over society. Th e relative separation of church and state in the United States meant that Americans who opposed their government did not necessarily become criti- cal or skeptical of religion, as many Europeans did. Religion in America was thus able to prosper in an independent sphere where it was quite shielded from scrutiny.122

Religious confl ict has obviously not been fully absent from U.S. history. Nativist riots against Catholic immigrants occurred in the nineteenth cen- tury. Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and other minorities have also faced discrimination. Moreover, modern-day liberal and conservative Americans are polarized by diverging conceptions of Christianity. Nevertheless, the average American tends to regard religious faith with a presumption of good- ness. By contrast, the average European is more inclined to view all organized religions with at least some suspicion. When debating religion with Americans, I regularly felt that the fi rst question on their minds was: “If a religion makes someone happy, who am I to question it?” Europeans seem more disposed to consider: “Is this religion true?” In the eyes of countless

* We will see in the next chapter that churches were offi cially established in several states at the time of the founding, although the separation of church and state nationwide was generally stronger than in Europe.

10 4 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

Europeans, religions are human-made institutions serving as means of politi- cal, social, and gender control, bolstered by dubious supernatural claims. Americans are more inclined to regard religions as personal matters of wor- ship, self-help, or fellowship, thereby enabling Christian fundamentalists to promote radical ideas while facing limited opposition.

A Peculiar View of Religious Freedom

Several prominent American writers mounted a protest when the PEN American Center presented its Freedom of Expression Courage Award to Charlie Hebdo aft er jihadists tragically massacred its cartoonists for publish- ing caricatures of Muhammad.123 Th e French satirical newspaper’s critics argue that it capitalizes on bigotry in a society where discrimination against Muslims is undoubtedly common. Its defenders respond that barely 7 per- cent of its headlines from 2005 to 2015 focused on Islam, as Charlie Hebdo has satirized multiple other targets, from the Catholic Church to a wide array of politicians.124

However, another aspect of the issue was mostly overlooked: it is far less socially acceptable to criticize religion in America than in France, whether mockingly or constructively. Th is helps explain why Americans are likelier to perceive caricatures of Muhammad as discrimination or hate speech. Few people grasp that such cartoons are, at least to an extent, the fruit of anti- Christian attitudes that spread during the Enlightenment and eventually fostered greater skepticism toward all faiths in Europe than in America.

Th ere is a remarkable taboo against questioning religious beliefs in the United States. Tellingly, Christian fundamentalism leaves millions of Americans unfazed despite its extremist theology. Barely 26 percent have an “unfavorable impression” of “Christian fundamentalist religions,” while 35 percent have a favorable one. A third have no opinion on the matter.125 Liberal and moderate Americans generally oppose the fundamentalist agenda on issues like abortion, gay rights, and evolution. But many consider it inappropriate to question fundamentalist religious beliefs. Paradoxically, it is diffi cult to undermine the political manifestations of fundamentalism without challenging its underlying religious dogma, such as the notion that the Bible is inerrant.

Th e taboo against questioning even hardline dogma is palpable in the stances of politicians and the media. During Bill Clinton’s presidency, the

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 10 5

head of the Southern Baptist Convention asked him: “I just want an answer, not a political answer. A straight yes [or] no answer. Do you believe the Bible is literally true or not?” Clinton responded: “Pastor, I think it is completely true. But I don’t think you or I or anyone else on earth is smart enough to understand it.” 126 Answering no might have been political suicide. Much of the media has displayed a similar reluctance to question fundamentalist the- ology. CNN and Fox News, for example, have devoted nonanalytical cover- age to biblical prophecies and claims that strife in the Middle East signals the Apocalypse.127

Of course, exceptions exist. Certain journalists have critically analyzed the faiths of politicians like Bush, Palin, Romney, and Obama. Richard Dawkins’s Th e God Delusion, Sam Harris’s Th e End of Faith, and other athe- ist treatises were bestsellers in America. Bill Maher and various other U.S. comedians mock religion. Humorous television shows, such as Th e Simpsons, Family Guy, and South Park, have parodied the religious right. On an epi- sode of Th e West Wing, the U.S. president sarcastically asked a Bible-toting fundamentalist whether he should sell his daughter into slavery because the Bible licenses that behavior (Exodus 21:7–8). Unsurprisingly, the episode concluded with a religion-friendly balancing act in which the main charac- ters sequentially repeated “God bless America” with conviction.128

Th e taboo against applying critical thinking to religion rests on a peculiar conception of religious freedom. It is widely thought that challenging reli- gious beliefs amounts to challenging the right to believe in them, a profound misconception. Freedom of religion is obviously a basic human right. Yet respecting people’s faiths does not preclude skepticism. Religious freedom encompasses the rights to criticize, analyze, and debate faith. Th ese are largely the fruit of Enlightenment ideas that arose in response to theocratic governments that repressed not only religious minorities but also iconoclastic philosophers and anyone who doubted religion.

From the Protestant Reformation to the Enlightenment, innumerable historic events would never have occurred if religion had been exempt from critical thought. Christianity itself would not exist. Indeed, the argument that questioning religion is intolerance is hard to square with the views of the founders of leading religions. Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, Martin Luther, and the Mormon prophet Joseph Smith did not preach “Believe any- thing you want—all religions are great.” In fact, they could be critical of other faiths, from “primitive” polytheism to rival forms of monotheism.

10 6 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

Into the Mainstream

America’s general reluctance to analyze religion is epitomized by the scant attention devoted to Mormon theology as the nation came close to awarding the presidency to Mitt Romney, whose entire life has been steeped in Mormonism. Long considered a fringe movement, the Mormon Church has made eff orts to enter the mainstream in recent decades. It abandoned the racist policy that barred blacks from its priesthood until 1978, as well as vari- ous sexist rites,129 although it remains a highly patriarchal institution. Romney’s 2012 presidential race led the media to focus on whether his faith could cost him votes and on the political and social values of Mormons, who constitute barely 2 percent of Americans. But the media and the public widely declined to scrutinize the alleged revelations of Joseph Smith (1805– 44), the founder of the faith, even though they are the religion’s very premises and more than 90 percent of Mormons believe in them.130

Smith, a treasure hunter, claimed that an angel called Moroni led him to ancient golden plates buried in upstate New York. According to Smith, they revealed that Native Americans are of Jewish origin and were visited by Jesus aft er his crucifi xion. Smith said that the plates were written in an unknown language, “reformed Eg yptian,” which he translated into the Book of Mormon by using supernatural seer stones that he placed at the bottom of a hat. Th e angel later took the plates away. Smith gained a following as a prophet that eventually enabled him to polygamously marry around thirty women, including ten who were already married to other men. Smith assured them that marrying him would have spiritual rewards. He did not believe that whites and blacks should marry, however, despite opposing slavery.131 Fleeing religious persecution from hostile contemporaries, Smith and his followers reached the American hinterland, where he received another revelation: the Garden of Eden was once in what is now Jackson County, Missouri.

Mormon theology is noticeably America-centric: the Garden of Eden was in America, Jesus came to America, the greatest prophet since Jesus was an American, and so forth. If a Dutch person were to say that the Garden of Eden was near Rotterdam, that Jesus visited the Netherlands, and that the greatest prophet since Jesus was Dutch, the Dutch and other Europeans would widely dismiss such assertions as chauvinistic nonsense. Expressing such skepticism is oft en deemed unacceptable on the other side of the Atlantic in the twenty-fi rst century.

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 10 7

Eight in ten Americans indicated that Romney’s Mormon faith should not be a major reason to support or oppose his presidential candidacy.132 What could be viewed as exemplary tolerance may also be interpreted other- wise. Only half of the U.S. public knows who Joseph Smith was.133 Many Americans know little about Mormonism beyond the idea that it involves polygamy,134 a practice that the Mormon Church has long repudiated and that only marginal elements carry on. If people decline to question Mormon beliefs without caring to learn about their very basics, is that truly a refl ection of tolerance? Could it instead be a sign of indiff erence or an unwillingness to analyze religion?

Most Americans have “faith in faith.” 135 Th ey celebrate it but are fre- quently indiff erent to the meaning of underlying religious beliefs. Th at senti- ment is captured by President Eisenhower’s statement that “our form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.”

Th e taboo against examining Mormon beliefs is remarkable, given that Smith’s account raises elementary factual issues besides there being no proof of the golden plates’ existence. For example, linguists dispute his key asser- tion about the existence of a “reformed Egyptian” language, Egyptologists ridiculed his interpretation of hieroglyphics,136 and archeologists and anthropologists fi nd no support for his claim that Native Americans descend from Israelites—they instead fi nd the Book of Mormon rife with anachro- nisms. Yet a broader apprehension may dissuade people from skepticism. Questioning whether Smith received divine revelations could open the door to doubting the revelations of Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, and other fi gures.

While Mormons faced persecution in the nineteenth century, they are now fortunately accepted as members of American society. Refusing to ques- tion organized religion is far preferable to intolerance. But tolerance is com- patible with critical thinking. People with distinct religious views can still form sincere friendships and constructively debate religion, which is the greatest form of tolerance. No beliefs, whether religious or irreligious, con- servative or liberal, should be deemed beyond analysis or discussion. Mormon friends with whom I debated Smith’s revelations once invited me to attend church services with them. I gladly did so. It was a moving human experience that enabled me to learn more about their world.

Th ere is ultimately no valid reason why America could not have a good president who happened to be a moderate Mormon. Church members have made valuable contributions to society, such as Marriner Eccles, who served

10 8 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

as the chair of the Federal Reserve during the New Deal. Th e Constitution rightly bars a religious test for offi ce. However, this clause should not be used as a shield while religious rhetoric is used as a sword. Romney downplayed his Mormonism, but like many politicians of both parties, he recurrently invoked God to try to obtain votes. Romney notably affi rmed that the country’s sharp wealth inequality is a nonissue and that focusing on it “is entirely inconsist- ent with the concept of one nation under God.”

Th e progress of Mormonism in America refl ects a major social dynamic. New religions oft en face public rebuke and outright skepticism, as Mormonism did in the nineteenth century. Its case shows that, with resil- ience and a sophisticated public relations strategy, a new religion can cross a tipping point in how outsiders perceive it. As the religion becomes more established, it gains respectability in the public eye so that questioning its beliefs is less acceptable.

Around the time when Romney was preparing his presidential race, the journalist Lawrence Wright obtained the military records of L. Ron Hubbard (1911–86), the founder of the Church of Scientology—an authoritarian and secretive religion accused of abusing and fi nancially exploiting its members. Th e records disproved Hubbard’s claims about having graduated from col- lege, having received certain medals for military service, and having been gravely wounded during World War II—injuries he allegedly healed with Scientologist techniques. Th e Church of Scientology possessed diff erent, forged versions of Hubbard’s records.137 In other words, as with Smith, some of Hubbard’s most important claims are demonstrably false. Another paral- lel can be drawn between these men. Smith was a treasure hunter who said he received revelations from ancient golden plates discovered with an angel’s guidance. Hubbard was a science-fi ction writer who professedly received revelations that the earth formerly belonged to a galactic confederation under the domination of aliens.

Scientologists claim that questioning their beliefs amounts to bigotry, although it is more socially acceptable in contemporary America to criticize (or mock as “science fi ction”) their beliefs than those of more established faiths, from Catholicism to Mormonism. Yet if Scientology becomes more transparent, waters down some of its practices, and improves its public image, it might someday become a mainstream religion, gain social infl uence, and be shielded from criticism. Th us far, Scientology is mostly known for appeal- ing to celebrities like Tom Cruise and John Travolta. Th ey largely approach Scientology as a self-help system meant to provide focus, fellowship, and well-

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 10 9

being.138 Perhaps one day America will have key political leaders of Scientologist faith.

T H E I M P A C T O F F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

Th is chapter has described how ordinary, kind, and educated people can gravitate toward religious fundamentalism. While fundamentalists are sometimes demonized, this oversimplistic perspective ignores the historical and social roots of their faith.

Even though ample evidence indicates that Christian fundamentalism has considerably more weight in America than in other Western nations, polls may not fully gauge nuances in intensity of belief.139 Among the Americans who report to pollsters that the Bible is literally true, there are scores of pious individuals but also some who are not extremely religious, have not thought much about the matter, and reiterate conventional ideas about the good book’s noble truths. Th eir answers may be more attributable to conformism, limited refl ection, or a lack of information than to a downright fundamen- talist ideology. But insofar as such answers may be simply refl exive, they still refl ect a bent toward dogmatism over skepticism. In addition, not all people who intensely believe in the literal truth of the Bible are hardline militants in the image of reverends Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell. In fact, ultracon- servative evangelical leaders receive disproportional media attention com- pared to moderate and liberal ones.140

Nevertheless, the infl uence of religious fundamentalism on American society should not be underestimated. Religious beliefs help frame one’s worldview, moral code, and conception of existence. Fundamentalism there- fore has signifi cant repercussions in shaping how millions of people think.

First, it encourages people to embrace irrationality and anti-intellectual- ism with open arms. Fundamentalists combine extraordinary gullibility concerning religious dogma with extraordinary skepticism of science, his- tory, and other knowledge contradicting biblical inerrancy. Indeed, disbe- lieving this evidence is a litmus test of their faith. Th eir anti-rationalism fosters a great degree of credulity, especially relative to nonfundamentalist believers and the irreligious. Th at mindset is not limited to religion, as fun- damentalists are particularly receptive to political disinformation, such as claims about the evils of “socialized medicine” or the “myth” of global warming.

110 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

Second, fundamentalism is an inherently retrograde ideology. Ambiguous scriptures written by human beings ages ago are taken as infallible divine dictates about how we should live aft er the Enlightenment, the progress of democracy and human rights, and the rise of science. By idealizing ancient times, fundamentalists seek to lead civilization backward.

Th ird, fundamentalism fosters a rigid, narrow, black-and-white world- view. Whereas liberal and moderate forms of religion give more room to discernment, fundamentalists oft en think in absolutes. Th ey are likelier to categorically oppose abortion, contraception, homosexuality, and premarital sex, on the grounds that these are simply immoral. When it comes to crime, they usually value harsh retribution over rehabilitation, forgiveness, and redemption. Fundamentalist-leaning denominations, including the Southern Baptist Convention, Assemblies of God, and Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, favor biblical literalism, deny the evolution of species, and tend to strongly support the death penalty. Conversely, the nonfundamentalist Catholic Church, Episcopal Church, Presbyterian Church, United Methodist Church, and United Church of Christ generally reject biblical literalism, accept evolution, and oppose the death penalty.141 In short, fundamentalist churches see limited value in compassion, unlike nonfunda- mentalist ones. Naturally, not all members of a denomination endorse its stance on issues such as the death penalty, although church teachings are not irrelevant.

Fourth, fundamentalism fosters an authoritarian mindset. Fundamentalists imagine God not as a fi gure of unconditional love but rather as a dictatorial one prepared to lavishly reward those who obey his commandments and to subject others to eternal damnation. Authoritarian approaches to faith trans- late into other aspects of life. Fundamentalists are particularly inclined to embrace militarism and downplay the values of peace, democracy, and human rights. A relationship also exists between their authoritarian religious model and the patriarchal family model they commonly defend, which rests on the authority of the man as the head of the household. Statistical studies confi rm that, on average, evangelicals are more authoritarian than mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, or nonbelievers.142

Fift h, fundamentalism seeks to blur or undo the separation of church and state. When people are persuaded that they hold God-given absolute truths, they may try to bring government under the fold of religion to counter the perceived moral decadence of secular life. Fundamentalism thus plays a role in shaping public policy.

C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M • 111

Sixth, Christian fundamentalism is a dangerous ideology for America and the world. Many fundamentalists believe that God made the earth for humankind and therefore would not let climate change occur.143 An Indiana Tea Party activist illustratively emphasized that global warming is “a fl at-out lie” because the Bible says that God “made this earth for us to utilize.” A fel- low Tea Partier concurred: “I cannot help but believe the Lord placed a lot of minerals in our country and it’s not there to destroy us.” 144 Similarly, James Inhofe, whom the G.O.P. made the chair of the Senate’s environmental com- mittee, cited scripture as evidence that climate change is a “hoax.” “ ‘As long as the earth remains there will be seed time and harvest, cold and heat, winter and summer, day and night,’ ” Inhofe said, quoting Genesis 8:22. “God’s still up there. Th e arrogance of people to think that we, human beings, would be able to change what he is doing in the climate is to me outrageous.” John Shimkus, a member of a key House committee on energy, likewise dismissed the danger of climate change by citing “infallible” biblical prophecies: “Th e earth will end only when God declares it’s time to be over. Man will not destroy this earth. [It] will not be destroyed by a fl ood.” Rick Santorum, the former senator and presidential candidate, added that eff orts to curb global warming refl ect “a phony theology” that is not “based on the Bible.”

Fundamentalism is also dangerous because it shapes attitudes toward warfare. We saw earlier that millions of Americans are persuaded that strife in the Middle East is an omen of the Apocalypse and that George W. Bush believed his invasion of Iraq fulfi lled a biblical prophecy. Another infl uential president believed in prophecies. In 1971, then–California governor Ronald Reagan stated: “For the fi rst time ever, everything is in place for the battle of Armageddon and the Second Coming of Christ. . . . Ezekiel says that fi re and brimstone will be rained upon the enemies of God’s people. Th at must mean that they’ll be destroyed by nuclear weapons. Th ey exist now, and they never did in the past.” Trying to fi t ancient prophecies into the modern world, Reagan thought that Armageddon would consist of a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, the evil, godless empire, sparked by an incident in the Middle East.145 (Biblical literalism additionally led Reagan to proclaim that evolu- tion is “theory only,” unlike creationism, which he said ought to be taught in public schools.)146

As president, Reagan became amenable to negotiating with the Soviets for nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding his pragmatism in the face of a potential nuclear holocaust, he included Reverend Jerry Falwell in National Security Council briefi ngs on the Cold War.147 Th at is Falwell the

112 • C H R I S T I A N F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

fundamentalist preacher, who later declared that the 9/11 attacks were a divine punishment;148 that the Anti-Christ was a Jew already present on earth as of 1999, because of Jesus’s impending return, which Falwell expected to occur by 2009;149 and that pornography leads God to chastise people with problems like oil crises.150 Because Falwell and his Moral Majority group were an important part of Reagan’s base, Reagan recruited him to speak out against the proposed freeze on nuclear weapons. Falwell claimed that advo- cates of nuclear freeze had ties to the Kremlin.151

In sum, Christian fundamentalism fosters anti-intellectual, retrograde, black-and-white, authoritarian, and dangerous mindsets. Th ese are also among Donald Trump’s traits, shedding light on why he appealed to millions of evan- gelicals despite his impieties. In the 2016 election, Trump won the votes of white evangelical/born-again Christians by 81 to 16 percent against Hillary Clinton.152 Tellingly, the evangelicals who denounced Trump usually embraced the evangelical Ted Cruz, another demagogue with similar ideologi- cal traits.153 Recall that Hofstadter described long ago how certain religious ultratraditionalists are drawn to “men of emotional power or manipulative skill.” 154 Th e fact that evangelical support for the irreligious Trump com- monly puzzled ordinary citizens and experts alike epitomizes the exceedingly narrow understanding of religion in much of American society. Religions are not mere means of worship, as they can profoundly mold people’s minds.

We will see in following chapters that Christian fundamentalism infl uences other aspects of modern America, from attitudes toward economics to social policy, criminal justice, and foreign aff airs. Fundamentalism may lead to American decline, as it fosters a purist, uncompromising, far-right ideology that impedes rational decision-making and problem-solving. While its infl uence is strongest in conservative America, it has repercussions for the nation as a whole, particularly since one of the two main parties is under the sway of the religious right. For years, numerous Republican leaders have been fundamentalist or fundamentalist-leaning, such as Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Tom DeLay, Mike Huckabee, Sarah Palin, Rick Santorum, Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry, Scott Walker, Sam Brownback, Ben Carson, Marco Rubio, and Ted Cruz, to name only a few. Moreover, most state-level G.O.P. organizations are “under the eff ective control of the religious right.” 155 Th ese circumstances exemplify the considerable political implications of religious beliefs.

113

As a college student in Texas, I encountered a conception of morality that I had never witnessed in France. As I did not limit my friendships to liberal circles, I interacted with many evangelicals who held ideas entirely foreign to me. In their eyes, abortion was one of the greatest evils the world had ever known, premarital sex was sinful, and unmarried couples who “shacked up” together were dissolute. Naturally, not all Southerners share these values, although they are ordinary in the Bible Belt. When I later lived in New York, Chicago, and the Bay Area, I felt that attitudes toward these issues there were closer to those in Western Europe.

In almost no other Western country are questions of faith, sex, and gender as controversial as in America. Th e “culture wars” over such issues refl ect sharply diff erent understandings of religion, secularism, sexuality, gender roles, and the family. A modernist worldview essentially prevails in liberal America, where people hold moderate religious beliefs or none at all. Modernists largely support the separation of church and state, reproductive rights, and gay rights. On the other hand, an ultratraditionalist worldview is commonplace in conservative America, where people lean toward Christian fundamentalism. Ultratraditionalists generally take a dim view of secular government, abortion, contraception, homosexuality, and sexual education unless it teaches abstinence only. While modernists tend to favor gender equality over patriarchy, ultratraditionalists typically believe that the man should be the head of the household.

Of course, millions of Americans do not fall neatly within the modernist or traditionalist camps. Some blend opposite views, like following orthodox evangelical precepts except for supporting gay marriage because of the con- viction that people should have equal rights under the law. Others do not

F O U R

The Culture Wars of Faith, Sex, and Gender

114 • C U L T U R E W A R S

practice what they preach, such as encouraging abstinence until marriage but not abstaining themselves. Th e modernist and traditionalist categories are nonetheless helpful to understand America’s culture wars.

It might seem obvious that values vary greatly between the Northeast and West Coast, where Democrats are more liberal and Republicans less con- servative, and the South and Midwest, where Republicans are more conserva- tive and Democrats less liberal. However, people oft en overlook the fact that a regional divide of that magnitude hardly exists in most other Western nations. When one leaves Amsterdam or Paris for provincial regions of the Netherlands or France, for example, one may meet more conservative people. But one does not enter a world where people widely wish to teach creationism and abstinence-only sexual education in public schools, as in the U.S. Bible Belt. Even if one takes into account pockets of blue in red states and vice versa, America’s regional divide is striking.

Overall, the modernist worldview shared by liberal Americans is the norm in nearly all other Western nations. Few Europeans, Canadians, Australians, or New Zealanders share the ultratraditional morality found in both con- servative America and much of the developing world. Yet, the United States’ culture wars may eventually fade, given the growing ranks of unchurched young Americans who are highly tolerant and opposed to ultratraditional- ism.1 For the time being, the confl ict rages on, as the G.O.P. remains largely under the religious right’s domination and citizens without a religious affi li- ation have become a third of Democrats.2

T H E C U L T U R A L B A T T L E S O F T H E O B A M A Y E A R S

At fi rst glance, traditionalists seem to have accomplished little during the Obama years. Abortion remained legal and the LGBTQ movement enjoyed a series of victories culminating in the Supreme Court decision recognizing same-sex marriage as a constitutional right. But the religious right profoundly shaped the Republican agenda in a bitter battle against the Democratic Party over hot-button issues, evoking the words of George Washington: “Religious controversies are always productive of more acrimony and irreconcilable hatreds than those which spring from any other cause.” 3

In 2012, Richard Mourdock, a Republican senatorial candidate, provoked a storm by arguing that pregnancy from rape is “a gift from God” and that abortion should not be tolerated. Republican Representative Todd Akin

C U L T U R E W A R S • 115

distinguished himself too by claiming that “if it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down”—a pseudoscientifi c way of rationalizing his opposition to abortion even in rape cases. Akin was then a member of the House Committee on Science. Th e G.O.P.’s evolution into “the anti-science party” was further refl ected by the ideology of Representative Ralph Hall, the committee’s former chair, who asserted that there is no point in trying to stem global warming, because “I don’t think we can control what God controls.” Representative Paul Broun, who also served on the science committee, affi rmed, “I don’t believe that the earth’s but about 9,000 years old. I believe it was created in six days as we know them. Th at’s what the Bible says.” “All that stuff I was taught about evolution and embryology and the big bang theory, all that is lies straight from the pit of Hell,” Broun stressed. Members of the Senate’s science committee expressed similar ideas. Senator James Inhofe, its chair, insisted that human-caused climate change is impos- sible because God controls the climate. Th e presidential candidate Marco Rubio, another Senate science committee member, declared that earth’s age is a “mystery,” even though scientists agree it is around 4.5 billion years old— unlike “young earth” creationists, who claim it is a few thousand years old. Rubio added that it is impossible to know if God created the planet in seven days or not. He later retracted his remarks.

Certain Republicans voiced their profound disagreement, but these state- ments did not refl ect fringe mindsets. Th e G.O.P. hardly recognizes human- caused climate change.4 Its offi cial platforms have recurrently called for a ban on abortion via constitutional amendment, without exceptions for rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother.5 Its 2016 platform referred to “abortion” thirty-two times and “God” sixteen times, on top of endorsing “the public display of the Ten Commandments” in government buildings. It went on to “condemn” the Supreme Court decision holding that gay mar- riage is a constitutional right. Th e Democratic Party took opposite stances.

State legislatures passed abortion restrictions in record numbers between 2011 and 2014.6 For instance, Virginia state legislators backed a law that would have forced women seeking an abortion to undergo an invasive vaginal ultrasound to compel them to see the fetus. Th e law was passed aft er a com- promise replaced the vaginal ultrasound with a mandatory abdominal ultra- sound. Th e Supreme Court subsequently overturned a Texas law that delib- erately forced around half of the state’s abortion clinics to close by imposing highly burdensome and unnecessary administrative regulations.7 Americans equally fought over whether “Obamacare” should compel employers with

116 • C U L T U R E W A R S

religious objections to cover contraception under their insurance plans. Th e Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of family-owned Christian busi- nesses in its Hobby Lobby decision—one of the most controversial cases in recent history.8 In a separate battle, Republicans relentlessly tried to block all federal funding for Planned Parenthood, a major provider of contraception, HIV tests, cancer screenings, and other health services for women.* Like multiple Republican leaders, Jeb Bush nonetheless assured his supporters that Planned Parenthood is “not actually doing women’s health issues.”

Meanwhile, Congress narrowly voted to end “Don’t ask, don’t tell,” a policy resembling those of developing nations and theocracies that ban gays from serving in their militaries.9 Gay marriage was an even more contentious issue, despite rising support for marriage equality. Aft er the landmark Supreme Court decision holding that states cannot ban same-sex marriage, certain states adopted “religious freedom laws” allowing “Christian busi- nesses” to discriminate against gay customers. Georgia’s Republican governor opted to veto such a bill in light of public pressure and the threat of losing business investments.

Th e fi rst politician to declare his candidacy for the 2016 presidential elec- tion, Ted Cruz, made his announcement at Liberty University, a bastion of Christian fundamentalism founded by Reverend Jerry Falwell. Donald Trump, once avowedly “very pro-choice,” stated that women who abort should be punished. Trump sought to improve his religious bona fi des by picking Mike Pence as his vice president. A fervent Christian and longstand- ing culture warrior, Pence notably believes that a woman’s primary roles should be mother and homemaker.10

Religious moralizing likewise played a role in the 2012 presidential race. Rick Santorum, the runner-up in the Republican primaries, stressed that contraception is “not okay,” because “it’s a license to do things in a sexual realm that is counter to how things are supposed to be.” He added that America is falling prey to “Satan.” Santorum’s reactionarism partly obscured the fact that Mitt Romney, his victorious adversary in the primaries, had urged pregnant women not to get abortions when he was a Mormon bishop. As the governor of Massachusetts, Romney later vetoed a law that would have made the “morning-aft er pill” available over the counter and required

* Planned Parenthood also off ers abortions but has long been barred from using federal funds for that purpose.

C U L T U R E W A R S • 117

hospitals to off er it to rape victims. Th e state legislature overrode his veto by a landslide.11 Romney otherwise took fairly tolerant positions on abortion and gay rights when he was a politician in Massachusetts, which he renounced when running for president, drawing praise from the Republican base. Th e base’s hostility to reproductive rights was epitomized by how Rush Limbaugh, the truculent talk show host, labeled a young woman a “slut,” “prostitute,” and “feminazi” for demanding that students’ health care cover contraception.

Social scientists off er competing theories about the culture wars. According to James Davidson Hunter, Americans with a liberal-modernist worldview reject fi xed moral standards in favor of learning from experience and social context. Conversely, those of conservative-traditionalist bents emphasize deference to “transcendent authority,” based on infl exible concep- tions of religion or tradition.12 Morris Fiorina instead argues that no “culture wars” truly exist in America, as people usually hold moderate or ambivalent views on these issues. He does not dispute that the confl ict matters to politi- cians and activists but deems that it “never had much of a mass base.” 13 Th e role of politicians and activists in the culture wars is indeed signifi cant, yet it is not extraordinary. As in other democracies, elected offi cials, political par- ties, interest groups, and the media infl uence public opinion in the United States. Th is infl uence does not mean that the public lacks agency.

Research by Alan Abramowitz suggests that the culture wars are not nar- rowly limited to elites or activists, as numerous citizens are far from ambiva- lent about the hot-button issues that have gained political importance since the 1970s, especially abortion and gay rights. Data indicate that religious beliefs now “are stronger predictors of party affi liation and candidate prefer- ence than characteristics traditionally associated with partisan orientations such as social class and union membership.” To Abramowitz, the polariza- tion of politicians accurately refl ects the electorate’s polarization.14 Providing historical perspective, fellow political scientist Marc Hetherington estimates that the polarization of modern-day Americans on gay rights is statistically similar to the polarization over civil rights in the 1960s, although race has been a more pivotal political issue.15

At the very least, culture war issues are extremely divisive in America by comparative standards. Few people elsewhere in the modern Western world defend the ultratraditional morality representing a major side of America’s cultural battles. What explains this intense divide? We will see that it is the sum of many dimensions of American exceptionalism.

118 • C U L T U R E W A R S

R E L I G I O U S P O L A R I Z A T I O N

Ironically, even though the vast majority of Americans are devout Christians, religion divides them far more than Europeans. We saw in Chapter 3 that around four in ten Americans share liberal or moderate forms of faith, while a similar proportion lean toward fundamentalism. In particular, evangelicals are likelier to condemn abortion and gay marriage, as well as identify with the G.O.P., than either mainline Protestants or Catholics.16

Polarization between evangelical and mainline Protestants partly refl ects the split of U.S. Protestantism discussed in Chapter 3. Diff erences between evangelicals and Catholics are more subtle. Despite rejecting creationism and strict biblical literalism, the Catholic Church remains a highly conservative institution. It does not approve of condoms or other means of “artifi cial” contraception, such as the pill, even for married couples. Th e U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has distributed a “fact sheet” contending that contracep- tion does not decrease unwanted pregnancies.17 Th e church denounces homosexuality and abortion too. It excommunicated Sister Margaret McBride, an administrator at Saint Joseph’s Hospital in Phoenix, because she approved an abortion for a woman who risked death by continuing her preg- nancy. Th e hospital was stripped of its affi liation with the Catholic diocese aft er backing Sister Margaret.18 Th e church also made clear that anyone who ordains a woman as a priest will be excommunicated along with the woman.19 “Th ere may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not, however, with regard to abortion,” the future Pope Benedict XVI warned.20 Since then, Pope Francis has promoted a more inclusive perspective but few substantive changes.

Yet numerous Catholics in America (and beyond) oppose church teach- ings on abortion, contraception, and homosexuality.21 When it comes to diffi cult moral questions, 73 percent of U.S. Catholics rely “a great deal” on “their own conscience,” while merely 21 percent look to church teachings.22 Just as there are modernist Catholics, certain evangelicals lean toward mod- ernism. Dozens of evangelical leaders defi ed orthodoxy by signing a letter supporting gay marriage.23 Th ey included Reverend Richard Cizik, whose tolerance led him to be fi red as the chief lobbyist for the National Association of Evangelicals. Cizik underlines that younger evangelicals are likelier to embrace gay rights.24

In other words, the modernist-traditionalist divide also exists within reli- gious denominations. Conservative U.S. Catholics have notably joined most

C U L T U R E W A R S • 119

evangelicals in defending religious traditionalism in recent decades. Th e end of the Protestant-Catholic divide as a source of confl ict in America made this development possible. Many nineteenth-century Protestants resented the infl ux of Catholic immigrants, because of xenophobia, class diff erences, and competition for jobs. Popular conspiracy theories warned of the Vatican’s takeover of America.25 As recently as the 1960s, an alliance of Catholics and evangelicals would have been diffi cult to imagine.26 John F. Kennedy, America’s fi rst Catholic president, had to rebuff fears about his loyalty to the Vatican by declaring: “I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute.”

Suspicion of Catholicism has faded among Protestants, although abortion has become a big issue and evangelicals have lauded the Vatican’s opposition to the procedure.27 Evangelicals remain the leading force behind the religious right, yet it now includes prominent Catholic Republicans such as Jeb Bush, Rick Santorum, and Sam Brownback. Th e Supreme Court justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Th omas, both staunch Catholics, drew the religious right’s praise for opposing abortion and gay rights in their decisions. But it is not conservatives alone who transcend denominations. In the image of Protestants like Hillary Clinton or Catholics like Joe Biden and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, religious liberals of all stripes—some of whom are hardly church- going—have joined the growing share of irreligious Americans defending modernism and secular government.

W H E T H E R T O S E P A R A T E C H U R C H A N D S T A T E

On the surface, the separation of church and state seems to have always been stronger in America than in Europe. Th e United States has never had an offi cial national religion since gaining independence in the eighteenth cen- tury, but Anglicanism remains the mother country’s offi cial faith in the twenty-fi rst century.28 Twenty-six Church of England bishops sit in the House of Lords as a matter of law. Crucifi xes are displayed in Italian public schools. Other practices call secularism into question, such as tax funding for churches in various European nations.29 By contrast, France lacks an offi cial church and is among the countries where state secularism, there known as laïcité, is particularly intransigent. It encompasses contentious measures like banning religious attire, especially Muslim headscarves, in public schools. Exceptions still exist, as in Alsace and Lorraine, where the French

12 0 • C U L T U R E W A R S

government pays priests’ salaries because these were German territories when laïcité became French law.

Nevertheless, religion has far more political clout in modern America than in Europe. We saw in Chapter 3 that most Europeans lead highly secu- lar lives, and their politicians tend to treat faith as a private matter, regardless of the presence of offi cial churches. Illustratively, the rhetoric of the German chancellor Angela Merkel is quite secular, even though her party is the Christian Democratic Union, whose theological views are very moderate compared to those of the U.S. religious right. Overall, both Democratic and Republican politicians are far likelier than European politicians to invoke God, base their agendas on religion, proclaim that their nation is fulfi lling a divinely chosen destiny, or assert that God told them to run for offi ce.

The Trials and Tribulations of Secularism

References to God abound in American public life. Children in public schools are asked to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, describing their country as “one nation under God,” a passage added during the Cold War to diff erentiate America from the Soviet “godless empire.” Elected offi cials are commonly sworn into offi ce while touching a Bible. Th e Senate and the House both begin their sessions with prayers. Each has its own chaplain. Prayers are deliv- ered at presidential inaugurations. Even the Supreme Court, which has issued controversial decisions enforcing the separation of church and state, begins its proceedings with “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.”

However, traditionalists are concerned that America is turning its back on its Christian roots. Th is has allegedly led to moral decadence, as exemplifi ed by the legalization of abortion and gay marriage. Roy Moore, a leading voice of the religious right who has served as the chief justice of Alabama’s Supreme Court,30 stressed that “separation of church and state never was meant to separate God and government.” Moore is convinced that the Ten Commandments are the foundation of American law.

In fact, the U.S. Constitution mentions neither God nor Christianity but for the indication that it was written “in the year of our Lord” 1787. Th at is unsurprising, given that many Founding Fathers were not orthodox Christians. Th e Constitution explicitly precludes a religious test for offi ce. Th e phrase “separation of church and state” appears nowhere in its text, yet the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” Th e 1776 Declaration of Independence mentions

C U L T U R E W A R S • 121

God, but it is not a constitutional or statutory text and was written by Th omas Jeff erson, a rational deist known for his anti-clericalism. Th e expres- sion “separation of church and state” has been traced to him.31 His fellow Founding Father John Adams wrote that the U.S. government was created “merely by the use of reason and the senses.” “It will never be pretended,” Adams vowed, that the founders “were in any degree under the inspiration of Heaven.” 32 Th e 1796 Treaty of Tripoli, which Adams signed, provides that “the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion.” 33

While the religious right falsely claims that the Constitution is based on biblical principles, the secular left also engages in revisionism by claiming that the Founding Fathers wanted an absolute separation of church and state. In reality, legislative sessions commonly began with public prayers in the era of the framers, as they still do today. In the early years of the republic, taxes funded churches in certain states, whereas Virginia notably forbade that practice, due to the eff orts of Jeff erson and Madison.34 Th ere was no clear consensus among the Founding Fathers about what “establishment of reli- gion” means under the First Amendment.*

Nineteenth-century U.S. public schools had children read the King James Bible, a Protestant text, and fi gure out its meaning without clerical assist- ance. Catholics, who were growing in number because of European immigra- tion, criticized such “nonsectarian” moral instruction as Protestantism in disguise. Th e Catholic Church used a diff erent version of the Bible and insisted that scripture must be interpreted by its clergy. Proposals to discon- tinue Bible reading in public schools were rejected and led to anti-Catholic nativist riots. Only a minority of Catholics managed to send their children to private Catholic schools. Most had little choice but to accept public schools and their Protestant teachings.35 Students were exposed to other orthodox beliefs in the process. Popular textbooks in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included lessons on the importance of prayer, “the goodness of God,” religion as “the only basis of society,” and the Bible as “the best of classics.” 36

In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court ultimately disallowed offi cial prayers and religious teachings in public schools, emphasizing that laws must

* Th e Supreme Court did not apply the First Amendment, along with most of the Bill of Rights, to state governments before the twentieth century. Th e amendment previously con- cerned only actions by the federal government.

12 2 • C U L T U R E W A R S

have “a secular legislative purpose and a primary eff ect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 37 It thus seems inconsistent that the Supreme Court has not disallowed the mention of “God” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited by public school children, “In God we trust” on the dollar, and public prayers before legislative sessions and presidential inaugurations.38 Behind this con- tradiction lie the assumptions that essentially everyone believes in God and that nonbelievers are somehow un-American. Th ese celebrations of mono- theism also set aside the views of citizens from other traditions, such as Hindus, Buddhists, and Native Americans. In 2014, the Supreme Court further disregarded minorities by authorizing offi cial Christian prayers at government assemblies over objections from Jewish and atheist citizens in a case from a small town in New York.39

Th e government’s generic promotion of God may seem innocuous, but it entails promoting certain religious beliefs over others, which is technically what the justices forbid. Th eir convoluted First Amendment jurisprudence may be an attempt to accommodate public opinion. As many as nine in ten Americans want to keep “God” in the pledge and on the dollar.40 Eight in ten support offi cial prayers at government assemblies.41 A clear majority of 57 percent even opposes the half-century-old ban on offi cial prayers in public schools.42

Wanting More God in Government

Th e Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has not dismayed only the secular left . Traditionalists applauded Justice Scalia for emphatically dis- senting in various decisions expanding the separation of church and state.43 Expressing his personal views in an article, Scalia said he took comfort in how U.S. politicians frequently mention God and how references to God appear on the dollar and in the Pledge of Allegiance. According to him, gov- ernment “derives its moral authority from God” and Americans “are a reli- gious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Th e well- traveled justice denounced “secular Europe” and the “tendency of democracy to obscure the divine authority behind government.” 44

Scalia and other traditionalists have sought to undermine secularism by mischaracterizing it as an atheistic concept—a far-reaching confl ation, because atheists are deeply unpopular in much of America. Secular govern- ment does not require nonbelieving citizens. Millions of religious Americans oppose policies shaped by fundamentalism, such as teaching creationism or

C U L T U R E W A R S • 12 3

abstinence-only education. For instance, Reverend Barry W. Lynn of the United Church of Christ has led Americans United for Separation of Church and State.

When asked to explain how America was created as a “Christian nation,” traditionalists can have diffi culty answering except in vague terms, although some contend that the Ten Commandments are a cornerstone of American government.45 In 2001, Roy Moore used his authority as the chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court to place a 2.6-ton Ten Commandments monu- ment in the court building. A judicial ethics panel eventually removed him from offi ce aft er he defi antly rejected a federal court order to remove the monument because it violated the First Amendment. While many liberals ridiculed Moore as a backward Bible-toter, traditionalists celebrated him as a heroic martyr.46 He lost his subsequent bid for Alabama governor but was reelected as the chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court in 2012. Moore was again suspended in 2016, for instructing state judges to disregard the U.S. Supreme Court decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.

Nevertheless, only the most hardline activists aspire to build a full-blown theocracy. Numerous evangelicals feel lukewarm about proselytization. Even those convinced that all Americans should share Christian values can simul- taneously say that people should be free to live as they wish.47 Seventy percent of evangelicals state that “the best thing to do when someone disagrees with you about religion” is to “try to understand the person’s beliefs and agree to disagree.” 48 Still, if most traditionalists do not aspire to end the separation of church and state, they oft en aim to blur it. And in their view, God has much to say about the rights of women and gays.

C L A S H I N G O V E R S E X A N D G E N D E R R O L E S

America’s endless culture wars over gender roles, sexual propriety, and “fam- ily values” can mostly be traced to the peculiar stances of ultratraditionalists. While patriarchy, sexism, and homophobia defi nitely remain common on the Old Continent,49 they have far less impact there in shaping public policy, because European religious conservatives are much less radical than their American counterparts, besides constituting a smaller share of the popula- tion. Th e distinct worldview of U.S. ultratraditionalists was epitomized by President George W. Bush’s insistence that America form an alliance with

12 4 • C U L T U R E W A R S

Iran and other authoritarian Islamic states at the United Nations in an eff ort to block international standards on reproductive and gay rights.50 Other Western countries generally took opposite positions at the U.N., as the Obama administration later did.51

From Patriarchy to Feminism

America was among the fi rst countries to legalize female suff rage, with the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratifi cation in 1920. While it did not enable all women citizens to vote—black women living under Jim Crow were deprived of that right until the 1960s—American suff ragettes were pioneers. New Zealand had paved the way by granting female suff rage in 1893, which several American states and territories also did in the late 1800s.52 By contrast, France and Italy did not recognize women’s right to vote until 1944 and 1945, respectively. America was later one of the nations where the sexual revo- lution of the 1960s had the greatest impact. Generations of American femi- nists have inspired women abroad. American scientists largely invented the birth-control pill, which allowed women to make strides toward autonomy and sexual liberation.53 Nonetheless, twenty-fi rst-century America is among the developed countries where women’s rights are the most fi ercely contested.

American traditionalists are concerned that social emancipation harms the family by leading women to value their education and careers over their duties as wives and mothers. In the 1970s, activists came close to passing an Equal Rights Amendment (ER A) to the U.S. Constitution, which would have barred discrimination on the basis of gender. But the ER A movement faced great opposition from both male and female conservatives, such as Phyllis Schlafl y, who swore it would wreck family cohesion—an argument previously used to oppose women’s voting rights. Th ey also worried that it would eventually guarantee rights to abortion and gay marriage.54

William Rehnquist, who went on to become the chief justice of the Supreme Court, wrote in a 1970 Justice Department memo that the ER A would result in “the sharp reduction in importance of the family unit, with the eventual elimination of that unit by no means improbable.” In his view, the ER A movement had “a virtually fanatical desire to obscure not only legal diff erentiation between men and women, but insofar as possible, physical distinctions between the sexes.” Rehnquist blamed ER A supporters for chal- lenging “the traditional diff erence between men and women in the family

C U L T U R E W A R S • 12 5

unit” and “woman’s traditionally diff erent role in this regard.” 55 On Rehnquist’s death, George W. Bush appointed John Roberts to lead the court. Like Rehnquist, Roberts had expressed patriarchal views and fought the ER A. During his time in the Reagan administration, Roberts questioned “the purported gender gap” and “whether encouraging homemakers to become lawyers contributes to the common good.” He also opposed abortion rights and supported school prayer.56

Th e ER A was never ratifi ed. Additionally, America is the sole Western democracy that has not ratifi ed the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women—a major international human rights treaty—chiefl y because of the opposition of traditionalists fearful that it would bolster reproductive rights.

In principle, traditionalists commonly believe that the husband should head the household. In practice, however, their marriages oft en revolve around mutual decision-making, not strict male authoritarianism.57 But patriarchal assumptions remain ingrained, as refl ected in the words of an evangelical woman describing her relationship with her husband: “Just because he’s the head doesn’t mean that he’s the boss. He’s not the boss. He’s just there to answer for situations. To be the strong leader, the responsible person. To depend on.” 58 Th e same contradiction stands out in the words of the evangelical politician Michele Bachmann. “My husband is the head of the household,” and “We’re equals,” she said before admitting that “if it came down to it, I’d probably let him have the last word.” Bachmann also told a church audience that the Bible requires her to be “submissive” to her hus- band. Mike Huckabee, another infl uential evangelical politician, once led a massive marriage vow ceremony where thousands of women promised to “submit” to their husbands.59 Representative Steve Pearce of New Mexico similarly wrote in his memoirs that husbands must “lead” and wives “sub- mit.” Certain biblical passages indeed urge women to be submissive, such as 1 Corinthians 14 and 1 Timothy 2. Historical research suggests that these were forgeries added to the Bible at later stages of antiquity,60 although fun- damentalists insist that scripture is inerrant. Regardless of the reliability of scripture, patriarchy is embedded in Christian imagery, as illustrated by mas- culine terms like “Heavenly Father” and “Lord.”

Yet religion does not tell the whole story. Research by Naomi Cahn and June Carbone shows that sharply diff erent family models have evolved in America. Blue states gravitate toward a modern model, deferring family for- mation until both partners have reached emotional maturity and fi nancial

12 6 • C U L T U R E W A R S

independence. It is not considered responsible to have children before obtain- ing a college or graduate degree and professional experience—or at least the latter if one cannot attend university. Contraception is widely embraced and sexuality is a private matter. Conversely, an ultratraditional family model prevails in red states, as well as blue state communities that are particularly religious and rural. Americans in these areas marry and have children at younger ages, hindering their ability to invest in higher education and thus placing them at an economic disadvantage. Earlier marriages also contribute to higher divorce rates. Further, by encouraging abstinence until marriage while frowning on contraception, red families wind up with higher teenage pregnancy rates.61

Th e modern family model is the product of vast social changes in America and the rest of the West. Broader access to contraception, especially the birth-control pill, has made it easier for women to defer childbearing until aft er acquiring a university education and professional experience. Th roughout the 1960s, the percentage of women students in professional schools was extremely low: 10 percent in medicine, 4 percent in law, and 3 percent in business. Th ese numbers had respectively surged to 30, 36, and 28 percent by 1980.62 Today, women have nearly reached parity with men in medicine and law but lag behind in business. And they are now the majority of all doctoral and master’s degree recipients.63 Despite a persistent gender gap and glass ceiling in America, women have achieved greater independence because of the liberalization of social mores.

If modernists consider patriarchy to be on the wrong side of history, it cannot be anachronistic to traditionalists vowing to defend eternal values.64 Some traditionalists argue that opposition to abortion is the truest feminism because bearing children is women’s special role.65 Sarah Palin, for example, invoked “feminism” a dozen times in a 2010 speech urging voters to oppose pro-choice candidates. “Our prominent woman sisterhood is telling these young women that they are strong enough to deal with [pregnancy],” the self-dubbed “Mama Grizzly” declared. Palin made clear that she would out- law abortion and publicly funded contraception if she could. In her 2016 presidential campaign, the multimillionaire executive Carly Fiorina advanced a comparable agenda, which would have denied to many poor and middle- class women the economic opportunities she had enjoyed.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump ran a relatively popular campaign partly built on machismo. He notably suggested that Fiorina’s looks made her unelecta- ble and that a journalist who asked him a challenging question was menstru-

C U L T U R E W A R S • 12 7

ating. In the fi nal stages of the 2016 race, certain Americans were shocked by the release of a 2005 video in which Trump boasted about groping women without their consent, although the future president had a lengthy history of misogynistic and callous statements.

The Interminable Abortion War

Abortion in early stages of pregnancy was relatively tolerated in both Europe and America until being gradually criminalized in the nineteenth century. Women continued to obtain illegal abortions, oft en performed with hazard- ous methods. Th ousands died.66 Fast-forward to the early twenty-fi rst cen- tury, and America remains one of the few Western nations where a battle over abortion is still being fought.67

In 1973, the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision held that women have a constitutional right to abortion. Th e ruling received limited attention at fi rst but eventually provoked a backlash that contributed to the resurgence of Christian fundamentalism and the shift of the Republican Party to the far right.68 Abortion opponents charged that Roe was an endorsement of baby killing by liberal “ judicial activists.” Few contemporary Republican politi- cians support the right to elective abortion, sometimes known as “abortion on demand.” John McCain, the archetypical moderate Republican, has stressed that abortion should be banned except in cases of rape, incest or threat to the life of the mother. 69 Th e G.O.P. has been unable to reverse Roe thus far, as several Republican Supreme Court appointees—Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter—voted to uphold abortion rights. But the religious right wants to relitigate the issue and, if it loses again, keep litigating until kingdom come.

Abortion intensely divides America because people view it as a moral issue but for sharply diff erent reasons. Social liberals think that abortion is a fun- damental right grounded in liberty and privacy. Th ey consider it a responsible option to avoid forcing women to give birth when they are unwilling or unprepared to have children. To the contrary, social conservatives believe that teaching women responsibility requires them to follow through with pregnancies resulting from their immoral sexual choices. Th e anti-abortion stance holds that life begins at conception and that a fetus is a full human life—abortion is consequently murder. Th e abortion-rights stance is that a fetus is a potential life and that women should have the choice of whether to carry a pregnancy to term.70

12 8 • C U L T U R E W A R S

Th e legalization of abortion by the French Parliament in 1975 was hotly contested too. “I had not imagined that I would become the object of such hatred,” said Simone Veil, the law’s main architect as the health minister. Certain legislators accused Veil—a Jewish survivor of Holocaust death camps—of “choosing another genocide” and throwing fetuses in “gas cham- bers.” 71 France’s lengthy history of abortion restrictions had been shaped not only by social conservatism but also by a natalist policy identifying abortion as a national security threat, especially from the 1870s to 1940s. French lead- ers then asserted that the country’s small population and comparatively low birthrate next to neighboring Germany hindered its ability to raise a large army. However, French conservatives had largely moved on by the late 1970s, as few wished to relitigate the issue. Social mores have evolved, and abortion is no longer a signifi cant issue in France four decades later.72 In fact, it is covered by the national health care system. A fringe eff ort to end public funding of abortion in 2014 lost by a 142–7 vote aft er drawing virtually no support from French right-wing legislators.73 Yet American conservatives have hardly moved on, as exemplifi ed by the record number of abortion restrictions that state legislatures passed during the Obama presidency. Th ese state restrictions cannot constitutionally abolish abortion, but they aim to make it diffi cult or quasi-impossible to obtain.74

As in France, abortion is broadly accepted elsewhere in Europe, except in a few nations. Because of the weight of Catholicism, Ireland and Poland do not allow elective abortion. Portugal legalized it in 2007 aft er a referendum backed it by more than 59 percent. Spain also did so in 2010, under a socialist government, but the subsequent election of a right-wing government led to a heated debate over its agenda to reban abortion except in cases of rape or threat to the mother’s health.75 Again, these countries are exceptions, and most Europeans who have moral reservations about abortion rarely feel as strongly about it as Americans, a large number of whom make it a central consideration in their votes.76 Although abortion remains fairly divisive in Portugal, for example, the intensity and political importance of the U.S. anti- abortion movement surprised Beatriz Padilla, a Portuguese expert on gender issues, who found that in America “many fundamentalists are involved in the debate” and “it’s always about the fetus and never about the women.” 77

America technically provides a very broad right to abortion, as it is among fewer than ten countries worldwide allowing elective abortion aft er fi ve months of pregnancy. Other Western nations generally limit this to the fi rst trimester of pregnancy.78 Nevertheless, American women can face greater

C U L T U R E W A R S • 12 9

hurdles to obtain abortions in practice. Th e federal government and most states notably bar public funding for elective abortion, unlike numerous Western governments.79 On the other hand, the laws of European nations commonly create other obstacles to abortion, from mandatory waiting peri- ods to counseling about alternatives.80 Such regulations exist on a state-by- state basis in the United States, not nationwide.81 Th ey tend to be less con- troversial in Europe than in America, whose pro-choice movement strongly condemns them as attempts to dissuade women from exercising their abso- lute right to abortion. While the stance of American pro-choice activists may seem uncompromising, contextual diff erences are important. Restrictions on abortion in countries like France are not moves toward outlawing elective abortion as a whole. By contrast, the U.S. pro-life movement makes no secret of its goal to use such restrictions as stepping stones toward eliminating all elective abortions.

Barely 15 percent of Americans oppose abortion when the woman’s health is endangered, although 22 percent oppose it in rape cases and 46 percent if the child would be physically impaired.82 But the crucial battle is over abor- tion motivated by personal reasons. Four in ten think that it should be illegal if a woman is poor and cannot aff ord more children, is unmarried and does not want to marry the father, or is married and does not want any more children.83 Overall, Americans are basically evenly split in identifying as either “pro-choice” or “pro-life.” 84

Ironically, many Americans who identify as “pro-life” categorically sup- port the death penalty, have limited reservations about warfare, and oppose state-funded health care for the needy, including children. Th is contradiction further suggests that what the U.S. anti-abortion movement rationalizes as a fi ght for life is largely a defense of patriarchy and ultratraditionalism.

Moralizing Sex

In addition to condemning abortion, millions of Americans stand out in the modern Western world for opposing state-funded contraception and backing abstinence-only sexual education. Th e United States is simultaneously home to a continuing sexual revolution.

Paradoxically, the strict opposition to premarital sex oft en advocated in conservative America comes across to Europeans as unbelievably prudish, while the openness of dating mores in much of liberal America can strike even the French as excessively permissive. Indeed, if attitudes toward

13 0 • C U L T U R E W A R S

sexuality in conservative America are among the most traditional in the West, attitudes in liberal America are perhaps the freest. Europeans are more inclined to think that a couple is in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship aft er they have kissed or slept together. Once two people have started dating, it is usually considered wrong for either to go out with anyone else. Modern American couples are mostly unburdened by these expectations until they have been dating for some time. It is quite acceptable to date other people unless a formal commitment has been made.85 Th e sexual openness found in liberal America refl ects pragmatism toward relationships, allowing people to forgo a commitment until they feel truly compatible with a partner.

However, the tension between sexual openness and prudishness in American society can lead to ambivalence, if not pathological behavior. Practices like males “slut-shaming” teenage girls or young women for being sexually open86 appear more pervasive in America than in countries such as the Netherlands, where gender roles are more equal and sexual freedom is better accepted.87 Th e sexism behind “slut-shaming” refl ects the idealization of female virginity, a longstanding dimension of patriarchy alongside double standards tolerating or glorifying male promiscuity.88 Th ese social tensions may be among the root causes of an emerging federal bureaucracy requiring U.S. universities to regulate “social norms around sex and relationships” so broadly as to punish “sexual behavior that is not sexual violence or harass- ment.” 89 According to the Harvard law professors Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk, this “sex bureaucracy” aims to stamp out “impersonal sex” by promoting traditional, monogamous sex as the only morally acceptable or even legally permissible choice. Students may thus face suspension or expulsion for engag- ing in fully consensual “hookups” if their partner later fi les a complaint that may stem from regrets caused by the stigma associated with sexual libera- tion.90 Leaving aside consensual intercourse, troubling reports about a rape “epidemic” on university campuses91 likewise raise profound social questions about the tensions between patriarchy, sexism, sexual liberation, and sexual oppression.

American traditionalists typically identify the 1960s as the time when sexual morality came under threat, thanks to libertine youths and hippie rebels. In reality, the liberalization of social mores was a gradual process over generations. By the 1920s, sex was already a common theme in movies and tabloids. “Along with this change in the popular culture came the virtual col- lapse of communal enforcement of standards of personal behavior,” the histo- rian George Marsden writes. “Women smoked in public, did not always cover

C U L T U R E W A R S • 131

their knees (even in church), and refused to follow the domestic examples of their mothers. Dancing, which had long been a taboo for many Protestants, now was an integral part of social acceptability in the age of the fl apper. While some church leaders simply conceded the issue and even brought dancing into church youth group meetings, others were horrifi ed.” 92

Despite lingering social tensions, most Americans no longer have prudish ideas about sex. Table 4 shows that more than twice as many people in 2012 as in 1972 thought that premarital sex is simply “not wrong.” Still, the propor- tion that found premarital sex “wrong” remained substantial at 26 percent. Another poll indicates that a third of Americans consider premarital sex immoral.93 Obama’s plan to have businesses cover their employees’ contra- ception proved controversial, since traditionalists felt the government had licensed sexual immorality. Th e alternative of publicly funded contraception for everyone, as in Europe,94 would have been even more controversial.

If attitudes toward sex are more traditional in red states than in blue states, the divide is not absolute. Living in Texas, I met numerous evangeli- cals who said that one should remain a virgin until marriage. Some stayed chaste. Others engaged in foreplay or intercourse anyway. Th ose who did so could feel remorseful because they had “misbehaved.” More-liberal Texans had no qualms about premarital sex and regularly spent the night at their partner’s home. Th ere was not much diff erence between them and liberal Northerners in their dating lives, although Texans were more inclined to think that moving in with their partner before marriage would be wrong.

Americans are likelier to get married than other Westerners, and they do so at younger ages.95 Growing numbers of young Americans cohabit out of wedlock,96 yet America still feels uneasy about this, as refl ected in the general expectation that politicians be married. When running for president, Hillary

T A B L E 4 American public opinion on the morality of premarital sex between a man and a woman (percentage of population)

Wrong

Only sometimes wrong Not wrong

1972 45 24 26 2012 26 15 56

not e: The table’s first category merges answers for “always wrong” and “almost always wrong.” sou rce: NORC at the University of Chicago, “Final Report: Trends in Public Attitudes about Sexual Morality” (2013).

13 2 • C U L T U R E W A R S

Clinton strikingly began her Twitter biography with traditional gender roles: “Wife, mom, grandma, women+kids advocate, FLOTUS, Senator, SecState, hair icon, pantsuit afi cionado, 2016 presidential candidate.”

In comparison, Julia Gillard became the Australian prime minister in 2010 despite having a male life partner to whom she was not married. And she did not have children. Either of these facts would be almost unthinkable for a prominent U.S. politician. Similarly, Ségolène Royal, the runner-up in the 2007 French presidential election, cohabitated and had four children with her partner, François Hollande, another politician. Hollande was elected president in 2012. By then he had a diff erent female partner, to whom he was also not married. None of this was a secret or an issue in the elections. Most French people hardly care about politicians’ private lives or sexuality.97 Th e French press is loath to report on politicians’ extramarital aff airs, because these are deemed private matters. Steamy intrigues may fi ll the pages of tab- loids but have virtually no bearing on elections. By contrast, concerns over American politicians’ private lives spurred impeachment proceedings against Bill Clinton, among innumerable “sex scandals.” When Nikki Haley ran for South Carolina governor in 2010, two unscrupulous men accused her of hav- ing had extramarital aff airs with them. Haley, who won the election, vowed to resign if the allegations were proved.98 Th e public was left to wonder if the claims were true. Few seemingly thought, “Who cares?”

Social conservatives claim that sexual open-mindedness threatens “family values,” thereby suggesting that social liberals do not love their families. Once people have children, promoting familial stability may indeed be laudable, as parental separation can harm children. Yet blaming high divorce rates on lib- eral values overlooks the fact that blue states enjoy more-stable marriages than red states.99 Notwithstanding its moralism, the Bible Belt largely accounts for why America has the highest rate of unintended teenage pregnancy in the industrialized world.100 Th e states with the highest teenage birthrates are in the South and Midwest, the nation’s poorest regions. Over 95 percent of sexu- ally active American women will use contraception in their lives, but poor women with inadequate insurance cannot always aff ord the pill or an abortion. Th ey are also likelier to receive abstinence-only sexual education.101

If adolescent sex is commonly “dramatized” in America, it is oft en “nor- malized” in Europe. European teens are much likelier to use the pill, which is generally state-funded.102 When their teenage child has a steady boyfriend or girlfriend, for example, many Dutch parents will let the couple spend the night together at home, knowing they will probably have sex. Th is enables

C U L T U R E W A R S • 13 3

the parents to stay connected to the emotional lives of their children, who are not forced into secretive sexual activity. Th is approach refl ects the “need to adjust the moral rules governing sexual life to real behavior.” Th e opposite has occurred in America, especially in traditionalist communities, where “No sex!” or “Not under my roof!” is the typical attitude.103

Th e U.S. federal government spent $1.5 billion on abstinence-only pro- grams between 1997 and 2009. Th e Bush administration more than doubled their budget.104 Abstinence-only programs are sometimes run by activists lacking public health credentials. Th ey do not discuss safe sex or birth control except to peddle disinformation on failure rates.105 Using condoms has “little to no benefi t,” as one curriculum put it.106 Th e Government Accountability Offi ce found that, despite the common inaccuracies in abstinence-only edu- cation, the Bush administration never reviewed many of its grantees’ materi- als for scientifi c accuracy.107

Bush tellingly placed Pam Stenzel, an abstinence educator, on a Department of Health and Human Services task force. At the 2003 Reclaiming America for Christ conference, Stenzel was less circumspect than the Bush administra- tion about the goals of abstinence-only education, as she openly admitted that it “doesn’t matter” whether the policy works, because people must “answer to God.” In her words, unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) are “not the enemy.” It is, rather, the “stinking, fi lthy, dirty, rotten sin” of premarital sex.108

Comprehensive sexual education does not license sex, since it encompasses arguments for both abstinence and contraception.109 Unsurprisingly, teens who receive abstinence-only education are likelier to face unplanned pregnan- cies and STDs. Studies of evangelical teenagers show that only the most devout, roughly a quarter, abstain from sexual activity to a greater degree than other teens. For various reasons, including class diff erences, evangelicals on average lose their virginity at younger ages than members of religions with more fl exible attitudes toward sex. Th e vast majority of evangelicals have sex before marriage, and their rate of nonmarital sex is at least as high as that of everyone else.110 Th e failure of abstinence-only education is epitomized by how Sarah Palin’s then seventeen-year-old, unmarried daughter, Bristol, became pregnant while her mother was campaigning for the vice presidency.

Following his election as president, Barack Obama aimed to end federal support for abstinence-only education, but Republican legislators managed to include $250 million for it in the budget.111 Th e G.O.P. also seeks to eviscerate Title X of the Public Health Service Act, which provides federal

13 4 • C U L T U R E W A R S

funding for contraception, STD prevention, and cancer screenings. Family planning was not always a hot-button issue. Title X passed with strong bipar- tisan consensus in 1970 under Richard Nixon.112

The Broader Implications of Gay Rights

Th e rapid progress of gay rights in America is striking. From having almost no legal protections a few decades ago, LGBTQ people are now increasingly treated as equals. Th e Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that banning gay marriage is unconstitutional, might suggest an end to this confl ict. Yet it was a deeply controversial 5–4 decision, and it is too early to tell if opponents will refuse to move on, as with abortion. “Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote in dissent. Justice Scalia agreed and later declared in a speech that Obergefell was an “extreme” decision “contrary to the religious beliefs of many of our citizens.” Senator Marco Rubio likewise insisted that “God’s rules always win” and that believers should “ignore” Supreme Court decisions confl icting with their faith.

Th e clash over gay rights is an extension of the confl ict between traditional patriarchy and the more egalitarian gender system of modern times. Patriarchy seeks to affi rm unambiguous gender roles: men are expected to be “mascu- line” and women to be “feminine.” Homosexuality inherently challenges traditional patriarchy, because men seemingly assume a “feminine” identity and women a “masculine” one.113 Homosexuality consequently threatens the religious right’s conception of the family, which is fundamentally patriarchal. Because traditionalists also tend to equate sexuality with procreation, at least in principle, they commonly fi nd homosexuality taboo. Th ese are among the reasons why they describe gay marriage as an assault on the family and an eff ort to destroy society. What may sound like hyperbole is true from the point of view of patriarchal traditionalists.

Traditionalists do not want the defi nition of marriage to become a matter of secular government policy, despite how civil marriage without religious ceremony long preexisted gay marriage. In their eyes, desecrating the “sanc- tity of marriage” would be the last straw in abandoning “family values,” namely the patriarchal family model. Illustratively, the offi cial platform of the Republican Party’s Texas branch stated for years that “homosexuality tears at the fabric of society and contributes to the breakdown of the family.”

C U L T U R E W A R S • 13 5

Th at clause was replaced in 2014 with an endorsement of “therapy” seeking to straighten gays. Th e broader implications of gay rights help explain why traditionalists hailed Kim Davis, a Kentucky county clerk, as a martyr aft er her short stint in jail for refusing to issue marriage licenses to gays, in defi ance of the Supreme Court.

American evangelicals are much less tolerant of homosexuality than either mainline Protestants or Catholics.114 Some emphasize that the Bible calls homosexuality an “abomination” in Leviticus 20:13,115 although those who say so normally disregard passages that they fi nd anachronistic, absurd, or revolting. Leviticus 20:10 calls for the execution of adulterers. Leviticus 11 states that eating pork, lobster, crab, shrimp, oysters, or various other animals is an “abomination” too. Leviticus 19:19 forbids planting diff erent crops in the same fi elds or wearing garments made from diff erent materials. Deuteronomy 13 teaches that if a child proselytizes for another god, the par- ent must kill the child. Even fundamentalists do not follow the Bible to the letter. Conversely, American liberals oft en take God out of the equation by regarding marriage primarily as an expression of love and commitment. Because of their greater tolerance, they usually do not see a valid reason why gay couples cannot be responsible partners or parents.116

Of course, homophobia does not stem solely from traditional conceptions of religion or the family. It can equally refl ect animosity or uneasiness toward those who seem diff erent. Th e taboo can range from “a defensive attitude that responds to a perceived threat to the boundaries of the self ” to “an unex- amined echo of attitudes that [people] have unrefl ectively learned and internalized.” 117

Opposition to gay marriage is surely not unique to America. At the time of writing, it was legal in only around twenty countries. Th e considerable contrasts found within America are more remarkable. When the U.S. Episcopal Church became one of the fi rst major churches worldwide to elect an openly gay bishop, Gene Robinson, he faced such an onslaught of calum- nies and threats that he wore a bulletproof vest under his robe during his consecration ceremony in New Hampshire. On one hand, Americans have largely spearheaded the global movement for gay rights, whose icons include the activist Harvey Milk. Certain blue states like Massachusetts, Vermont, and Washington, were among the world’s trailblazing jurisdictions in recog- nizing gay marriage. On the other hand, the leaders of various other states have endorsed the criminalization of homosexuality, as is now the case in much of the developing world. Indeed, many traditionalists were appalled

13 6 • C U L T U R E W A R S

when the Supreme Court held in 2003 that consensual sex between men cannot be criminalized.

Th at decision, Lawrence v. Texas, concerned a virtually never enforced Texas law under which two men were convicted of sodomy. By a 6–3 vote, the court held that the law violated fundamental liberty and was discriminatory. Justice Scalia wrote a sharp dissent joined by Justices Th omas and Rehnquist.* “Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home,” Scalia underlined.

Th e most comparable European case was decided more than three decades earlier, when the European Court of Human Rights held that homosexual relations could not be penalized.118 Th e Supreme Court’s majority in Lawrence cited this precedent for its persuasive value—it is obviously not binding on U.S. courts—thereby off ending conservatives who protested that America has nothing to learn from foreign courts.119 President Bush subsequently pushed an unsuccessful constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage.

Aft er Lawrence, Americans were quite evenly divided on whether consen- sual gay sex between adults should be legal or not.120 By 2016, the proportion saying that it should be legal had reached 68 percent, a modest majority for a question concerning basic privacy and equality.121 Th e shift on gay marriage is more impressive. Only 35 percent of Americans supported it in 2001. Th at number had surged to 55 percent by 2016. But profound divisions remain, as 70 percent of Democrats favor gay marriage, compared to 33 percent of Republicans.122

Th e protests in Paris against France’s legalization of gay marriage in 2013 show that this remains a hot-button issue in many Western countries. But opposition to gay rights has been more uncompromising in America. French conservatives who oppose gay marriage have generally accepted gay civil unions, which were legalized in 1999 following a divisive debate. Conversely, multiple blue and red American states passed laws banning both gay mar- riage and civil unions. Th ese bans are no longer constitutional, because of the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision.

Another battle illustrates the extraordinary divide over gay rights in America. In 2011, Democrats managed to repeal “Don’t ask, don’t tell”

* Recall that Rehnquist had opposed the Equal Rights Amendment in the name of tra- ditional gender roles in the 1970 memo discussed above.

C U L T U R E W A R S • 13 7

(DADT), a policy that the Clinton administration adopted in 1993. Clinton had promised to stop excluding gays from the military, yet certain members of Congress opposed his eff orts, leading to a compromise under which enlist- ing persons would not be asked about their sexual orientation. But DADT remained a discriminatory policy and resulted in more than thirteen thou- sand people being discharged from the armed forces for homosexual conduct.123

By the time Obama was president, America stood alone in the West in continuing to ban openly gay people from the military, a policy characteristic of authoritarian and theocratic regimes.124 At least seven in ten Americans then favored integrating gays into the military, including a majority of Democrats and Republicans.125 Prominent military fi gures, such as General David Petraeus and Admiral Mike Mullen, publicly supported ending DADT. Th e Pentagon conducted a study fi nding that a large majority of troops would be comfortable with repeal.126 Nevertheless, only eight Republican senators and fi ft een Republican representatives voted to end the discriminatory policy, illustrating how G.O.P. offi cials almost uniformly embrace the religious right’s views. Aft er all, it was John McCain, one of the most moderate Republicans of modern times, who led the opposition to repeal. Ignoring contrary evidence from the Pentagon study, he claimed that this would endanger American troops. McCain was visibly angry on the Senate fl oor when DADT was repealed. It was “a very sad day,” he said.127

Gay rights are exceptionally controversial in America because they relate to multiple aspects of the culture wars, including the religious divide, sexual liberty, the clash between ultratraditional and modern conceptions of the family, the tension between patriarchy and equal gender roles, and the sepa- ration of church and state. Like the rest of the West, liberal America has been evolving toward modern norms of tolerance on these issues while conserva- tive America has resisted this process. Even though conservatives in other Western nations can be quite traditional-minded, they rarely embrace the wide range of radical stances that many Republicans defend, such as crimi- nalizing homosexuality or excluding gays from the military.

In Britain, then–prime minister David Cameron and his Conservative Party–led coalition spearheaded eff orts to legalize gay marriage, frustrating certain British conservatives and clergy members. “I don’t support gay mar- riage despite being a conservative,” Cameron declared. “I support gay mar- riage because I am a conservative.” Th is decision was partly strategic, as it aimed to woo moderates and young voters. But it also epitomizes how the

13 8 • C U L T U R E W A R S

British right wing is generally closer to Democrats than to Republicans. In the run-up to the United Kingdom’s legalization of gay marriage in 2013, there were twelve openly gay members of Parliament from the Conservative Party, more than from all the other parties combined.128

A poll of fi ve Western nations found the United States the least tolerant on homosexuality. Sixty percent of Americans felt that society should accept homosexuality, a far lower proportion than of people in Spain (91 percent), Germany (87 percent), France (86 percent), or Britain (81 percent).129 Th e views of Republicans mainly account for this disparity, once again showing that conservative America is an outlier in the West.

Th e divide over gay marriage in America initially led Obama to declare that his faith made him oppose it. Back in 2004, he stressed that “tradition and my religious beliefs say that marriage is something sanctifi ed between a man and a woman.” 130 He said substantially the same thing during a 2008 campaign debate, adding that marriage is “a sacred union” where “God’s in the mix.” 131 Once polls showed growing support for gay marriage, however, Obama affi rmed that his views were “evolving,” and he endorsed it toward the end of his fi rst term. Despite his prior statements, he had long been sym- pathetic to gay rights and openly acknowledged his gay supporters in his 2008 electoral victory speech. Yet if Obama’s past claims that his faith made him oppose gay marriage were calculations, that raises the question of whether they were attempts to exploit religion for political gain. Th is leads us to the fi nal part of this chapter.

U S I N G G O D

Something more than the culture wars is at work behind all the talk about God and moral values in American politics, namely the strategic use of reli- gion by politicians of all stripes. Not only is it more common for politicians to appeal to faith in America than in essentially all other developed coun- tries, but there are also reasons to believe that many Americans are oblivious to how this is a political strategy.

George W. Bush cultivated the image of a born-again Christian and cred- ited Jesus with solving the alcohol problem he faced before becoming the governor of Texas. “I believe God wants me to run for president,” he once told a preacher. Bush later denied feeling a divine calling. “Did God want me to be president?” he pondered. “I don’t know. My relationship is on a personal

C U L T U R E W A R S • 13 9

basis trying to become as closer [sic] to the Almighty as I possibly can.” At the same time, W. could not help betraying the belief that God guided his presi- dency. “Th ere is calm in the Oval Offi ce. People say, ‘But how do you know that it’s because of prayer? . . . It’s just a crutch.’ For me, it’s not a crutch,” he said. “For me it’s the realization of a power of a universal God and recogni- tion that the God came manifested in human [sic] and then died for our sins.” Summarizing how faith had benefi ted his life, Bush said, “It gave me strength and understanding. Th ere is love, universal love.” 132

Such declarations would be unthinkable in practically all other Western countries, where people would probably interpret them as phony demagogy. Of course, Bush’s God talk dismayed certain Americans. Some were particu- larly off ended by his claim that God guided the decision to invade Iraq. Bush nonetheless convinced numerous supporters that he was a compassionate man of faith. Aft er his presidency ended, a strikingly vain remark suggested that his pious rhetoric may have been contrived. “Eight years [as president] was awesome, and I was famous and I was powerful. But I have no desire for fame and power anymore,” he admitted.

Religious rhetoric is commonly assumed to be a Republican tactic, yet Democrats also use it to bolster their agenda. Obama did not reject the infl u- ence of religion in government—he approached it diff erently than his pred- ecessor. Obama mentioned “God” fi ve times in his fi rst inauguration speech. “Let it be said [that] with eyes fi xed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations,” he proclaimed. Th e inescapable suggestion was that God sup- ported Obama’s inauguration.

It is one thing for private citizens or religious leaders to invoke God to support their views. It is another for politicians to do so. Religious rhetoric by public offi cials does not technically violate the First Amendment, but is incompatible with the spirit of secular government. If God exists, how does one defi ne God? And what does God want from us? Th roughout history there have been countless answers to these questions among Christians alone, not to mention other groups. Both society and religion suff er when politi- cians speak on these questions for their own gain and that of their party.

Most Americans do not share this view, as they want politicians to express faith in God, which notably allows voters to see if they can personally relate to their leaders. Barely 27 percent of Americans consider that there is “too much” religious rhetoric from politicians. Th e vast majority deem that there is either not enough or just enough of it.133 Relatively few Americans identify

14 0 • C U L T U R E W A R S

politicians’ expressions of faith as strategic eff orts to increase their popular- ity. Th is obliviousness refl ects the presumption of goodness associated with religion in America, as described in Chapter 3.

Since the United States’ founding, politicians have mentioned God, off ered prayers, quoted scripture, and argued that America has a divinely chosen destiny. But the infusion of religion into politics has surged in recent decades. In 1953, in the midst of the Cold War against the atheistic Soviet Union, Dwight Eisenhower became the fi rst president to be baptized in offi ce. He also instituted prayers at cabinet meetings, promoted nondenomi- national faith in a broadcast called Back to God, and lauded Congress for passing a resolution making “In God we trust” the offi cial U.S. motto.134

However, as David Domke and Kevin Coe document in Th e God Strategy, Eisenhower and other presidents of the 1940s to 1970s used religious rhetoric less systematically than their successors. For example, immediately aft er Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt spoke to the nation once and invoked God a single time. In contrast, following the September 11 attacks, Bush addressed the nation thrice and invoked God more than twenty times. In 1947, aft er an electoral defeat led his Democratic Party to lose control of both chambers of Congress, Harry Truman’s State of the Union speech placed moderate emphasis on faith. Bill Clinton adopted a diff erent approach in his 1995 State of the Union address following the Democrats’ loss in midterm elections. Clinton then used religious symbolism forty-nine times, such as by declaring, “We are the keepers of a sacred trust.” 135

Th e religious right’s radicalization was a key factor in this development. Th e G.O.P. tried to capitalize on this movement early on, as when Richard Nixon denounced the liberal excesses of the sixties. But the Watergate scan- dal ultimately forced him to resign and favored the election of Jimmy Carter, an evangelical Democrat. Yet conservative evangelicals were utterly disap- pointed with Carter’s presidency, given his relative support for secularism and abortion rights, not to mention their concerns about his economic and foreign policies. Ronald Reagan crushed Carter in the 1980 election and was reelected by a landslide. A large proportion of evangelicals and other social conservatives backed Reagan, who had no qualms about condemning abor- tion, making public displays of faith, or catering to hardline fundamentalists like Reverend Jerry Falwell.136

Reagan’s success helped change the standards of acceptability of religious speech and symbolism. Prior presidents had referred to God regularly in their national addresses, but Figure 5 shows that Reagan made this a quasi-

C U L T U R E W A R S • 141

systematic practice, as he did so 96 percent of the time. His successors fol- lowed suit. Reagan was also the fi rst president to regularly say “God bless America,” an expression that all his successors adopted. It had been employed only once before in a national presidential speech, by Nixon.137

Th e God strategy can backfi re. To become a U.S. senator in 2004, Obama had to defeat the Republican Alan Keyes, who campaigned on a socially conservative platform—a curious strategy in a blue state like Illinois. “Christ would not vote for Barack Obama,” Keyes said with the assurance that he himself would have gotten Jesus’s vote. Obama predictably won by a wide margin, yet Keyes refused to congratulate him, instead calling the future president “evil” because of his tolerance of abortion and gays.

When used more cleverly, religion can be a powerful weapon. Politicians who decline to speak about their faith do so at their own risk, as John Kerry observed when refl ecting on his failed presidential race against George W. Bush: “Despite this New Englander’s past reticence of talking publicly about my faith, I learned that if I didn’t fi ll in the picture myself, others would draw the caricature for me. I will never let that happen again.” 138 Even moderate use of the God strategy might not do. Obama regularly used religious rheto- ric but faced criticism for not being suffi ciently public about his Christian faith, besides conspiracy theories about being Muslim.

0

Ro os

ev elt

Tru ma

n

Eis en

ho we

r

Ke nn

ed y

Joh ns

on Nix

on Fo rd

Cl int

on Ca

rte r

Re ag

an

G. H.

W . B

us h

G. W

. B us

h

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

F I G U R E 5 . Percentage of national presidential speeches invoking God. SOURCE: David Domke and

Kevin Coe, The God Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2010). The study was completed before

Obama’s presidency.

14 2 • C U L T U R E W A R S

Hillary Clinton took notice. Gearing up for her 2016 presidential race, she claimed that the Bible was the book that had the “biggest infl uence” on her thinking. Her rival Bernie Sanders represented the rise of the religiously unaffi liated, as he admitted that faith played a limited role in his life. He was nonetheless an exception, as most candidates boasted about their faith. “Father God, please, keep this awakening going,” Ted Cruz tellingly pro- claimed at a rally. Donald Trump could not credibly claim to be devout, but many evangelicals gave him the benefi t of the doubt or identifi ed with his agenda, as demonstrated by the endorsement of Reverend Jerry Falwell Jr.139

Other Western leaders typically treat religion as a private matter and do not face nearly as much pressure to display their faith. Again, consider how Julia Gillard became the head of government in Australia regardless of her atheism, a feat hard to imagine in modern America. When asked if she believed in God, she was unequivocal. “No, I don’t. . . . I’m not a religious person. . . . I’m not going to pretend a faith I don’t feel,” Gillard answered, distancing herself from opponents who used an Aussie version of the God strategy.140 But U.S. politicians are far likelier than their counterparts in the West to feel religious faith, regardless of whether they exploit it for political gain. A study suggests that members of Congress are even more religious than the average citizen. Only one member of the 114th Congress was reli- giously unaffi liated, compared with around 20 percent of Americans.141

It goes without saying that the omnipresence of religion in U.S. politics mirrors the nation’s religiosity. Yet the sword cuts both ways. Elected offi cials promote religion by invoking God or publicly displaying their faiths, which exacerbates the culture wars by legitimizing the infusion of religion into politics. Th e culture wars refl ect not only genuine cultural divisions but also a political strategy. Th ese cultural divisions intensify the political game and vice versa, further pitting Americans against one another. However, they are at least as polarized over economic issues,142 as we will see in the next two chapters.

14 3

Wealth inequality is more acute in America than in other Western nations.1 Th e bulk of U.S. income growth since the 1980s has gone to the richest of the rich.2 America further stands out as the only industrialized nation without universal health care, leading myriad citizens to face tremendous medical and fi nancial hardship. America has objectively been evolving toward a plutocracy—a society largely governed by the rich—as its political system is considerably infl uenced by campaign donations and lobbying from tycoons, corporations, and Wall Street. Th e already signifi cant role of money in U.S. politics reached another level fol- lowing the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which signifi cantly curtailed campaign fi nance regulations.

But America once was on the same path as nations with more equal eco- nomic systems. It developed from a land of stark wealth inequality in the 1920s into an increasingly middle-class society aft er Franklin Roosevelt launched the New Deal in the 1930s.3 FDR’s agenda involved greater wealth redistribution, higher taxes on the affl uent, fairer labor conditions, and other reforms to improve the lives of ordinary people. A relative consensus emerged among both Democrats and Republicans about the merits of the New Deal model, which lasted until the 1980s, when anti-government hardliners grew infl uential. Ronald Reagan associated the New Deal with “fascism” and his heirs followed suit.4 Wealth inequality surged as the G.O.P. adopted a near- categorical stance against taxation, regulation, and public assistance. Th is helped tilt the Democratic Party’s economic agenda to the right. Bill Clinton was persuaded that “the era of big government” was fortunately over and that fi nancial deregulation was needed, helping pave the way for the disastrous 2008 fi nancial crisis. Wealth in America is essentially as unequally distrib- uted now as in the 1920s, before the New Deal.5

F I V E

Between Democracy and Plutocracy

14 4 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

T H E T I D E O F H I S T O R Y

Th e Obama presidency was marked by gridlock on virtually every economic issue, as partisan polarization in Congress reached record levels.6 Th e huge ideological divide between the parties continued throughout the 2016 elec- tion. Despite bitter disagreements, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders jointly called for the government to tackle wealth inequality and preserve, if not expand, public health care. In contrast, all the Republican presidential candidates aimed to eviscerate “Obamacare” and make the U.S. economy more capitalistic. At times, Donald Trump blurred party lines and distanced himself from the “small government” platforms of fellow Republicans, as when he suggested support for Social Security and regulating the cost of pharmaceutical drugs. He nonetheless repeatedly painted the image of a haywire federal government ruining America with taxes and worthless gov- ernment programs. Alongside the repeal of “Obamacare,” Trump notably proposed colossal tax cuts for the rich and said that attempts to reduce wealth inequality were “class warfare.” 7 However, Democrats and Republicans were not always so far apart.

Toward a New Social Contract

We saw in Chapter 2 that relative economic equality existed in the United States’ early years, particularly among white men. But the nation’s industri- alization concentrated the fruits of growth in a few hands by the 1920s.8 Because of a purist ideology, conservatives in that epoch were commonly persuaded that taxation, regulation, and income redistribution were hardly compatible with capitalism.9 If they failed to block legislation seeking to assist ordinary people, they could regularly count on the Supreme Court to invalidate it. Th e court then adhered to a narrow interpretation of the Constitution that led it to fi nd various economic regulations unconstitu- tional, including statutes that aimed to curtail unsafe working conditions and child labor.10 Writing in dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the majority’s reasoning refl ected “an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.” 11

Th e Progressive movement was ultimately able to implement signifi cant reforms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the crea- tion of the federal income tax, anti-corruption initiatives, and measures to rein in monopolies and trusts. But partisans of unregulated capitalism con-

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 14 5

tinued to oppose eff orts to reduce the nation’s immense wealth inequality. Th e time was ripe for social change when the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression undermined the establishment and facili- tated Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s election.12 Even though the New Deal was essentially limited to FDR’s age, it became the cornerstone of a broader eco- nomic model that remained in place until the 1980s.

FDR wanted the federal government to play a more active role in fi ghting the economic crisis and bettering the lives of ordinary Americans. Beside public work projects aiming to create jobs, the New Deal encompassed assist- ance to the poor and improved labor conditions. Workers notably gained the right to unionize, as well as minimum wage and maximum hour protec- tions.13 Despite coming from an extremely privileged family, FDR also sub- stantially raised taxes on the rich.14

Roosevelt went on to propose a “Second Bill of Rights” guaranteeing an adequate wage, a decent home, a good education, and proper health care. It was left unrealized but exemplifi ed his vision. “I have never believed that with our capitalistic system people have to be poor,” FDR said. “I think it is an outrage that we should permit hundreds and hundreds of thousands of peo- ple to be ill clad, to live in miserable homes, not to have enough to eat; not to be able to send their children to school for the only reason that they are poor.” 15 Yet Roosevelt was not a naïve idealist, as his reforms partly aimed to co-opt left ist opponents and prevent social unrest.16

Th e New Deal would hardly have been possible if the Supreme Court had not stopped blocking reforms that ran against its ideology of laissez-faire economics. In 1937, Roosevelt threatened to have Congress pass a dubious constitutional amendment raising the number of justices from nine to fi f- teen. It would have allowed him to pack the court with loyalists—a serious challenge to the separation of powers. His proposal was defeated, but certain historians believe that it pressured some justices to stop striking down New Deal legislation. Others argue that the court’s jurisprudence had started to evolve before the court-packing controversy began, as the justices minded their growing unpopularity.17 At any rate, several justices died or resigned during FDR’s twelve-year presidency,* so that by his death in 1945 he had appointed seven of the then-serving nine justices.18 Th e court largely refrained from reviewing economic regulations for decades aft erward.

* Aft er FDR died, the Twenty-Second Amendment’s ratifi cation limited presidents to two elected terms.

14 6 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

A growing bipartisan consensus pointed toward a social contract under which the government had to ensure the American people’s basic well-being. Much of the Republican Party had initially opposed the New Deal, although many conservatives came to accept its popular reforms. “Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and elimi- nate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history. Th ere is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these things. . . . Th eir number is negligible and they are stupid,” Dwight Eisenhower privately wrote about hardliners within his party.19 Richard Nixon, the next Republican president, agreed to a tax increase, a signifi cant expansion of Social Security, the establishment of a national food stamp program, and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. He also tried to introduce a national health insurance system.20 “I am now a Keynesian in economics,” Nixon remarkably declared.

In that era, taxes on the wealthy were signifi cantly higher than they had been in the 1920s or were aft er the New Deal model increasingly fell into disfavor beginning in the 1980s. U.S. tax rates then even topped those in Europe. Under Eisenhower, the top marginal tax rate illustratively was over 90 percent. Th at did not preclude growth, as America enjoyed prosperity in the decades following World War II.21 Among other factors, the war contrib- uted to reducing wealth inequality by shrinking the fortunes of capital own- ers who were heavily taxed to fund the hostilities.22

However, America did not move toward universal health care, partly because of an accident of history. FDR had instituted wage controls during World War II that did not apply to health insurance. Labor unions therefore saw it as a precious, nontaxable benefi t and were not necessarily enthusiastic about the government establishing health insurance, which became closely tied to Americans’ jobs. Th is path dependence was compounded by mistrust of “socialized medicine,” foreshadowing reactions to “Obamacare.” Fearmongering by the American Medical Association played a key role in torpedoing Harry Truman’s 1949 plan for national health insurance.23 Medicare was fi nally created in 1965, under the Democrat Lyndon Johnson, to provide government-funded health insurance to the elderly. Certain Republicans denounced it as a step toward communism. In 1961, Ronald Reagan notably declared that Medicare threatened “the continuation of our free enterprise system” and would lead to a left ist dictatorship: “Behind it will come other federal programs that will invade every area of freedom [until] we will wake to fi nd that we have socialism.” Nevertheless, approxi-

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 14 7

mately half of Republicans in Congress voted for Medicare, refl ecting the bipartisanship of the times.24

Roosevelt’s vision of solidarity had its limitations, as his agenda hardly encompassed abolishing racial segregation. Th e Democratic Party then con- sisted of a coalition including white Southerners who staunchly supported Jim Crow. Yet the civil rights icons Charles Hamilton Houston and Th urgood Marshall spearheaded legal challenges culminating in the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which offi cially ended segregation by rejecting its deceitful rationale: “separate but equal.” Th e deci- sion was barely enforced, however, until mass protests spurred Congress to enact civil rights legislation a decade later. Th e movement opened new doors for African-Americans, although segregation and discrimination persisted more insidiously. Th is was not an idyllic time, but it seemed that, like other Western nations, America was evolving toward a relatively equal socioeco- nomic system.

No More “Fascism”

Th e hardline branch of the Republican Party grew more infl uential in the 1980s. Reagan, who led this trend, claimed that “fascism was really the basis for the New Deal.” 25 Once president, he condemned “big government,” pushed for huge tax cuts, and backed corporate eff orts to disempower labor unions. America’s unionization rate had been higher than those of Canada, France, and Italy in the 1950s,26 yet the nation’s rightward shift led to a signifi cant drop in union membership, thereby hindering working people from resisting policies favoring the wealthy.27

Th e G.O.P. would have had greater diffi culty defending winner-take-all economics if the South had not become solidly Republican, partly due to resentment over desegregation. Until Lyndon Johnson signed civil rights legislation in the 1960s, the Democratic Party had enjoyed extensive infl u- ence in the South, the poorest region of the nation, which disproportionately benefi ted from the New Deal. But the New Deal coalition gradually col- lapsed as Southern whites largely abandoned the Democratic Party.28 We will see in the next chapter that Reagan and other conservatives capitalized on white resentment by infusing their criticism of “big government” with racially coded rhetoric about lazy blacks living on welfare.

Th e Republican Party’s evolution helped change the U.S. political debate and tilt the left to the right. Democrats of yesteryear had been bolder in

14 8 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

fi ghting inequality. In addition to the New Deal, FDR proposed his “Second Bill of Rights,” and Johnson launched a “War on Poverty.” Modern Democratic presidents have stayed clear of such sweeping initiatives. Th e closest thing to them was the Obama administration’s limited health care reform—a program based on past Republican plans29 that modern Republicans identify as “radical socialism.”

As a result, the vast majority of U.S. income growth since the 1980s has gone to the wealthiest citizens, while the income of ordinary people has stagnated or risen modestly.30 Nowadays, the richest 1 percent of U.S. households possess 37 percent of the nation’s net worth and the next richest 9 percent another 40 percent. Figure 6 shows that the bottom 90 percent—a category including the middle class, the working class, and the poor—own only 23 percent.31 Th e primary benefi ciaries of this evolution have been corporate executives and fi nanciers, who are the majority of the richest 1 percent.32 Tellingly, the six Walmart heirs are worth as much as the bottom 41 percent of U.S. families combined.33 Wealth inequality would be even worse but for the fact that American women are likelier to be employed now than they were a generation ago, which has increased household income.34

Contrary to what some commentators claim, the main gap is not between people with advanced degrees or technological skills and those without them, but rather between the richest of the rich and everyone else.35 Th e dramatic escalation in corporate executive pay epitomizes winner-take-all economics. In 1965, the CEOs of the top 350 U.S. fi rms earned around twenty times as much as the average worker. By 2014, they earned three hundred times as

Richest 1% households

Next richest 9%

Bottom 90%

36.7%

40.4%

22.9%

F I G U R E 6 . Distribution of net worth in the United States. SOURCE: Edward

N. Wolff, “Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–2013”

(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 2014), 49.

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 14 9

much.36 Th e Home Depot CEO Bob Nardelli got a $210 million severance package as the company’s stock prices fell, exemplifying unabashed self- dealing by the corporate elite.37 Th e presidential candidate Carly Fiorina similarly received a golden parachute of more than $42 million on being fi red as Hewlett-Packard’s CEO.38 No empirical relationship exists between mas- sive executive pay, company performance, and individual competence. Surging executive pay is largely traceable to a shift in cultural norms. Huge tax breaks for the rich since the Reagan revolution have encouraged execu- tives to demand higher pay, the bulk of which previously would have gone directly to the government in taxes. Members of compensation committees that set executive pay are mostly drawn from the corporate elite and share its values.39

Th e struggling middle class has received some attention from politicians, yet it has minimal political clout next to the wealthy. Th e destitute tend to be ignored entirely.40 Th e degree of extreme poverty in America is among the worst of wealthy nations.41 America has long been the world’s leading econ- omy, though other Westerners are likelier to share the fruits of growth.42 Various nations also experienced rises in inequality in past decades, but they were both more modest and alleviated by stronger eff orts to reduce inequal- ity.43 Th e exorbitant cost of health care in America’s for-profi t medical system has further wiped out income gains of ordinary families.4 4 Additionally, America’s higher degree of inequality closely correlates with worse health and social problems, as Figure 7 demonstrates. Th is picture refl ects a historic reversal. Income inequality was more acute in Europe than in America in the early twentieth century.45

Despite soaring inequality since the 1980s, surveys indicate that conserva- tives were more than twice as likely as liberals to deny the fact that wealth inequality had risen.46 Th is fi nding further suggests that a factual divide has powerfully contributed to the polarization of American society.

Some expected social change when Barack Obama was elected and ree- lected president aft er consistently vowing to tackle wealth inequality. His eight years in the White House, however, did not spell the end of winner- take-all economics. Aft er inheriting a catastrophic economic situation from the Bush administration, Obama focused primarily on rebooting the eco- nomic system, not fundamentally rethinking it. A whopping 58 percent of the income gains from the 2009–14 economic recovery went to the richest 1 per- cent.47 Perhaps most important, Obama was unable to fi nd common ground with the Republican opposition. Notwithstanding certain similarities in

15 0 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

both parties’ economic programs, the modern Republican Party’s radical anti- government ideology led it to systematically oppose Obama’s moderate agenda and resort to a degree of obstructionism essentially unprecedented in U.S. history.48

T H E I M P A C T O F M A R K E T F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

By the time of the Obama presidency, the G.O.P.’s radical branch was not simply infl uential—it controlled the party. Around 95 percent of the Republicans in Congress signed a pledge to never raise taxes under any cir- cumstances,49 an initiative of Grover Norquist, a libertarian ideologue who aims to reduce government “to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub.” At a debate during the 2012 Republican presidential primaries, all eight can- didates memorably said that they would reject a hypothetical defi cit-cutting deal with ten times the amount of spending cuts as tax increases. By the same token, nearly all Republican leaders remained adamantly opposed to increas- ing regulation aft er the 2008 fi nancial crisis brought the U.S. and global economies near breakdown. Following the disastrous BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Republican leaders equally pushed for legislation that would have made regulation of off shore drilling weaker than it was before the spill.50

Japan

Low HighIncome inequality

Better

In d

ex o

f he

al th

a nd

s o

ci al

p ro

b le

m s

Worse

Sweden

Netherlands Switzerland

Spain Canada Italy

Australia

New Zealand

USA

Index includes:

• Life expectancy

• Social mobility

• Mental illness (inc. drug and alcohol addiction)

• Obesity • Trust • Teenage births • Imprisonment • Homicides • Infant mortality • Maths & literacy

Portugal

UK

Greece Ireland

FranceAustria

GermanyDenmark Belgium

Finland Norway

F I G U R E 7. Correlation of health and social problems with income inequality. SOURCE: Richard

Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level (Bloomsbury, 2009).

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 151

Th at intransigence refl ected the triumph of a peculiar ideology: free- market fundamentalism. According to Joseph Stiglitz, a winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, this ideology assumes that “markets are self-correcting and that society can rely on the self-interested behavior of market partici- pants to ensure that everything works honestly and properly—let alone works in a way that benefi ts all.” 51 Market fundamentalism has shaped poli- cies that concentrated wealth at the top in both the pre–New Deal and modern eras, contradicting the notion that wealth “trickles down” to the masses. In any case, market fundamentalists believe that wealth redistribu- tion is illegitimate. Th is conviction intensifi ed with the rise of the Tea Party, whose activists advanced views in the vein of “government is for the post offi ce, and to defend our country, and maybe for the roads. Th at’s all.” 52

Right-wing think tanks have had an important role in promoting the idea that regulation, taxes, and public assistance cause nearly all economic prob- lems. Since the 1980s, the billionaire Koch brothers alone donated well over $100 million to seemingly independent groups defending their radical anti- government ideology and personal fi nancial interests. Th is strategy “weap- onized philanthropy” by enabling them to receive substantial tax breaks for giving money to such “nonprofi t organizations” that otherwise would have gone to the government as tax revenue.53

Many Republican politicians likewise promoted this ideology, but not all practiced what they preached. Some who denounced Obama’s economic stimulus as a wasteful “big government” program used stimulus money to assist their own states.54 Th ey included Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the House, who has a history of seeking public funding for his Wisconsin district while advocating libertarianism.55 Similarly, Representative Michele Bachmann’s vigorous opposition to public assistance programs for the poor was hard to square with her affl uent family’s collection of around $240,000 in federal farm subsidies.56 In other words, stances that appear to be ideologically driven may instead be posturing. We will now take a closer look at this intriguing dimension of American exceptionalism.

Into Plutocracy

Roughly half of Americans doubt that wealth inequality is a serious problem.57 Th is helps explain why the G.O.P. nominated Mitt Romney, a businessman with a net worth of at least $255 million, as its 2012 presidential candidate. Echoing stereotypes about destitute people living comfortably on welfare,

15 2 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

Romney declared: “I’m not concerned about the very poor. We have a safety net there.” During a primary debate, Romney casually challenged another can- didate to a $10,000 bet in the way that an ordinary person would have off ered a $10 bet. Romney said that the $360,000 he had lately made from public speaking engagements was “not very much” money. In his view, focusing on wealth inequality “is entirely inconsistent with the concept of one nation under God,” as it should be discussed only “in quiet rooms,” if at all. Four years later, Romney practically looked like the incarnation of capitalism with a human face next to Donald Trump, who became the party’s standard-bearer. Trump routinely bragged about his opulence and embodied dog-eat-dog capitalism with exploitative practices, illustrated by his for-profi t Trump University.58

Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton blasted Wall Street despite taking millions from it in campaign contributions. Th e Clintons equally made more than $153 million in speaking fees from 2001 to 2015, including at least $7.7 mil- lion from banks.59 Hillary sought to rationalize these practices by claiming that they were “dead broke” aft er Bill left the White House. As she set her own eyes on the presidency, Hillary also received six-fi gure fees for speeches at colleges. Th at money partly went to the philanthropic Clinton Foundation, but it could have helped students crushed by steep tuition.60 Bill also received more than $17 million for serving as the “honorary chancellor” of a for-profi t college.61 However, the Clintons defended policies that would raise their own taxes, unlike Trump or Romney.

America’s evolution into a plutocracy is further refl ected by the growing wealth of Congress members. Between 1984 and 2009, the median net worth of a House member jumped from $280,000 to $725,000 in infl ation-adjusted dollars, excluding home equity. American families saw theirs decline from $20,600 to $20,500 during that period.62 By 2014 and for the fi rst time in history, most Congress members were millionaires.63

Moneyed interests have additionally grown more infl uential in recent decades, partly due to the revolving door between lobbying and government. Lobbying is a key reason why pharmaceutical drugs are far costlier in America than in other Western democracies. Representative Billy Tauzin, who chaired the House committee regulating the pharmaceutical industry, left offi ce in 2005 for a lucrative position as the CEO of the industry’s top lobbying group.64 Before becoming a lobbyist for the industry that he was supposed to regulate, he helped pass a law establishing the fi rst Medicare prescription drug benefi t for seniors. Th is legislation was highly profi table for drug com- panies because of an arrangement prohibiting the federal government from

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 15 3

negotiating lower prices for medication. Tauzin later played an instrumental role in ensuring that Obama’s health care reform would not regulate drug prices, unlike universal health care systems. Th e administration struck a deal with the pharmaceutical industry, which essentially agreed to back “Obamacare” in exchange for obtaining millions of new customers who would keep paying exorbitant prices for medication.65

Th e leverage of lobbyists in American government may seem like naked corruption, yet it is perfectly lawful. Th e law has evolved from being an inef- fective bulwark against moneyed interests to giving them nearly free rein. Over the vigorous dissent of four justices, the Supreme Court eviscerated campaign fi nance regulations in its 2010 Citizens United decision. Th e court’s conservative majority held that corporations and unions should be able to donate unlimited sums as long as they are not given “directly” to candidates, their parties, or their campaigns. Subsequent decisions extended this ruling to donations by individuals.66 Th e justices thus enabled tycoons and big cor- porations to donate unlimited sums to candidates via third-party groups known as Super PACs (political action committees). Th e court’s claim that so-called “independent expenditures” to Super PACs are “not coordinated with a candidate” was diffi cult to reconcile with the fact that former staff members of both Obama and Romney came to head their respective Super PACs. Th e Democratic Party nonetheless opposed the Citizens United deci- sion, unlike the Republican leaders who fi led amicus briefs supporting it.67

Aft er the justices opened the fl oodgates, “independent expenditures” soared from around $147 million in the 2008 election to over $1 billion in the 2012 election.68 Sheldon Adelson, a reactionary casino mogul, spent at least $98 million in the latter cycle.69 Anonymous donors secretly gave hundreds of millions.70 While the court has so far not abolished “base limits”—the maximum amount a donor may directly give to a candidate—they can now be circumvented by donating to Super PACs.

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that unlimited donations to Super PACs “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption” and “will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” 71 Opinion polls strongly suggest otherwise. Long before Citizens United, scores of Americans already believed that campaign donations have a corrupting infl uence.72 Th e court’s decision exacerbated that mistrust. In an ensuing case striking down more campaign fi nance regulations, Chief Justice Roberts still repeated that donating a fortune to get “political access” to elected offi cials cannot be seen as “corruption.” 73

15 4 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

Th is has led to a debate about whether the justices cannot grasp the con- siderable role of money in U.S. politics from their ivory tower.74 According to the court’s conservatives, more “speech,” meaning more campaign dona- tions by corporations or tycoons, makes society more democratic. Its defi ni- tion of “corruption” is essentially limited to bribery. Th at is not so much a naïve view as one refl ecting a particular ideology. As Roberts emphasized, it is unacceptable for the government to try to “level the playing fi eld.” 75 From this angle, equality means allowing all citizens to freely compete by donating as much money as they can to infl uence politicians. It does not matter if a millionaire can donate more than millions of citizens put together. For mar- ket fundamentalists, a society functions best without government interven- tion. Naturally, an economic system tailored to benefi t the affl uent is not really a free market. Nor can a system where special interests actively infl u- ence government truly be laissez-faire.

In the end, spending does not always change the result of an election. Jeb Bush did not win the 2016 Republican primary, despite having the most Super PAC money.76 Hillary Clinton’s huge fundraising advantage over Donald Trump could not lead her to victory.77 However, regardless of who wins a particular race, money can heavily shape the political agenda by ensur- ing that the interests of the rich are a central part of the debate. Th ey would not donate otherwise.

A key statistical study of 1,779 policy issues found that average citizens have minimal political infl uence compared to economic elites and special interest groups. Unsurprisingly, the demands of “business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes.” Th e study’s conclusion was unequivocal: “When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose.” 78

The Wall Street Economy

Conservative America’s reaction to the 2008 fi nancial crisis refl ects the extent to which it has become an outlier in the Western world. One might have thought that the crisis would lead more Republicans to acknowledge the need for fi nancial regulation and for reforms to curb the nation’s stark wealth inequality. Instead, the Republican establishment grew even more hostile to regulation and egalitarian policies. Th is period also marked the rise of the Tea Party, just as fi nancial crises have historically fostered far-right move- ments and intensifi ed polarization.79

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 15 5

Th e 2008 fi nancial crisis was precipitated by a bubble that led housing prices to be artifi cially infl ated. Th is led numerous people to borrow money by mortgaging their homes. Agencies commonly loaned money at usurious rates to unsophisticated low-income persons who took risky mortgages.80 James Th eckston, a regional vice president for Chase Bank in southern Florida, described how executives earned a commission seven times higher for subprime loans than for prime ones. Th at encouraged them to seek bor- rowers with limited education, no prior mortgage experience, or no English fl uency.81 Certain subprime mortgages had variable interest rates that were low at fi rst but sharply rose over time, thereby precluding borrowers from repaying them. Th ey off ered little protection if houses lost value or home- owners lost their jobs. Regulations in various other countries bar such risky mortgages.82

Mortgage lenders frequently sold these loans to fi nancial institutions, which combined them with other loans into securities and resold them to investors. Th ese practices largely aimed to maximize short-term profi ts for Wall Street institutions, with little regard for the interests of their clients or society.83 When the housing bubble burst and home prices fell, legions were ruined and lost their homes. And fi nancial institutions that had heavily invested in mortgage-based securities were devastated. Ratings agencies could have stemmed the growth of toxic fi nancial instruments. Th ey instead ratifi ed them. Federal authorities equally declined to adopt measures to limit predatory lending.84

Th e crisis was the worst fi nancial collapse since the Wall Street crash of 1929, which had seemingly been lost to history. Th e growing popularity of laissez-faire economics in the 1990s had led the Clinton administration and both political parties to back sweeping fi nancial deregulation at the bidding of lobbyists. What was good for Wall Street was deemed good for the econ- omy. Reforms included terminating the separation of commercial from investment banking under the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. Th is New Deal meas- ure had aimed to preclude the risky speculation that contributed to the Great Depression. Partisans of laissez-faire believed it was obsolete. But deregula- tion led to riskier investments, sharply heightened leverage, and increased domination of the fi nancial system by a few big banks.85

During the 2008 fi nancial meltdown, a member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform asked Alan Greenspan—the former chair of the Federal Reserve and an advocate of minimally regulated markets—whether his “ideology” had led to poor decision-making. “Yes, I’ve

15 6 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

found a fl aw,” he answered euphemistically. “I don’t know how signifi cant or permanent it is.” Greenspan appeared stunned that Wall Street could not police itself: “Th ose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending insti- tutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief.” Numerous other U.S. regulators remained skeptical of or hostile toward regulation even aft er the crisis ravaged the global economy. Spencer Bachus, the Republican chair of the House Committee on Financial Services, was explicit: “In Washington, the view is that the banks are to be regulated, and my view is that Washington and the regulators are there to serve the banks.”

Republican leaders attributed the crisis mainly to irresponsible low- income borrowers, as well as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, government- sponsored mortgage lenders. In Marco Rubio’s words, “big government” was to blame: “Th is idea—that our problems were caused by a government that was too small—it’s just not true. In fact, a major cause of our recent down- turn was a housing crisis created by reckless government policies.” To the contrary, government-sponsored lending agencies and regulations were not the primary causes of the crisis. Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize in Economics laureate, stressed that “private lenders actually made the vast majority of subprime loans” and “only one of the top 25 subprime lenders was subject to the regulations in question.” 86 Besides, the rationale behind public policies promoting homeownership for poor people was to encourage stable, aff ord- able possession. Predatory lending and toxic instruments instead entailed “putting someone in a home for a few months and then tossing him out aft er having stripped him of his life savings,” as Joseph Stiglitz, another Nobel Prize winner, emphasized.87

Th e bipartisan bailout of Wall Street in the Bush administration’s fi nal months proved unpopular. Th e banks repaid the rescue funds with interest,88 yet people wondered why the government had rescued rich bankers from their gambles while millions were deprived of public assistance as they strug- gled fi nancially or lost their homes. Th e refusal to prosecute bankers for fraud additionally stood in sharp contrast to the harshness of American justice toward the poor.

Once elected president, Obama warned bank CEOs that he would be “the only thing between you and the pitchforks.” Despite criticizing the banks’ recklessness, he kept fairly close ties to Wall Street fi gures, such as Larry Summers, an engineer of fi nancial deregulation under Clinton. Obama made Summers his top economic adviser and would plausibly have named him the

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 15 7

chair of the Federal Reserve but for protests from his base. Obama ultimately opted for Janet Yellen, a moderate economist known for questioning unregu- lated markets. Congress also passed legislation that put a wider range of fi nancial companies under federal oversight, regulated instruments like credit derivatives, founded the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and instituted the Volcker rule—a measure akin to the repealed Glass-Steagall Act.89

If American decline stems from gridlock in the face of grave national problems, it was exemplifi ed by the aft ermath of the fi nancial crisis. Th is was a wake-up call for liberals who realized that the Clinton administration’s fi nancial deregulation was a mistake and that the bulk of wealth created by Wall Street fl ows into few hands. Conversely, the G.O.P. reacted by calling for more deregulation and more tax cuts for the wealthiest citizens. Only three Republican senators and three Republican representatives voted for the Obama administration’s fi nancial reform, known as the Dodd-Frank Act. All of the 2012 and 2016 Republican presidential candidates vowed to repeal it, notwithstanding the fact that reform hardly crippled Wall Street, which continued to enjoy record profi ts.90 Summarizing the consensus among the party, Representative Pete Sessions declared that the relatively modest reform was “about diminishing the free-enterprise system” and “creating larger gov- ernment that will encroach upon every single one of us and ultimately crush us.” Mitt Romney agreed that fi nancial regulators were “gargoyles.” Various prominent fi nanciers equated the Obama administration’s economic pro- gram with the policies of Adolf Hitler or Mao Zedong.91 Th ese peculiar reac- tions epitomized the exceptional infl uence of market fundamentalism in conservative America. In the age of globalization, the U.S.-born fi nancial crisis had negative economic repercussions abroad, but conservatives in other Western democracies seldom reacted by calling for barebones fi nancial regulation.

The Absence of Universal Health Care

America is the only developed country without a genuine universal health care system.92 Paradoxically, its system is the most expensive in the industri- alized world yet off ers the least coverage to the public. Prior to Obama’s con- troversial health care reform, almost fi ft y-one million Americans lacked medical insurance and twenty-fi ve million were seriously underinsured.93 Th e reform expanded access to health care, but approximately twenty-seven

15 8 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

million people were expected to stay uninsured aft er its implementation.94 High deductibles for coverage purchased on the new insurance exchanges still saddle people with heft y out-of-pocket costs.95 And thirty-one million people were dangerously underinsured as of 2014.96 Trump vowed to repeal the law upon entering offi ce. As the book went to press it was unclear what alternative, if any, he would propose.

Unlike in other Western nations, health care in America is largely consid- ered a for-profi t business instead of a public service and a fundamental human right. Tellingly, the CEO of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center makes more than $6 million per year.97 And this is a “nonprofi t” hospital. By some estimates, the medical industry’s profi t margins exceed those of the fi nancial sector.98 Steven Brill, an investigative reporter, uncovered multiple examples of price gouging, including $283 for a basic X-ray worth only $20, a $30,000 profi t on the sale of an implantable device, $15,000 for lab tests worth a few hundred dollars, a cancer drug sold for $13,700 at a 400 percent profi t margin, and a person being charged $21,000 for a three-hour hospital visit.99 Costs for insured people are lower, because insurance companies nego- tiate discounts, although hospitals still make vast profi ts aft er that process. Costly hospital bills in turn encourage insurance companies to charge expen- sive premiums. In the jargon of U.S. insurance companies, paying for a client’s treatment is a “loss” because it reduces profi ts.100

Inadequate health insurance has put myriad Americans one major illness or injury away from ruin. A study found that medical expenses were a leading cause of 62 percent of U.S. bankruptcies in 2007. Most of the bankrupted were not poor but middle-class people who had attended college and owned homes. Th ree-quarters had health insurance yet were direly underinsured. Average out-of-pockets costs were $17,943.101 While this study might have overstated its conclusions,102 medical bankruptcy is “an extreme example of a much broader phenomenon,” namely medical debt.103

In other industrialized nations, people do not face bankruptcy or consid- erable debt because of medical bills.104 Ruthless price gouging is practically impossible there in light of regulations on the costs of drugs and treatment, not to mention ethical norms frowning on profi teering from medical prob- lems. For instance, the average cost of an MRI is $1,080 in America, $599 in Germany, and $281 in France.105 America spent more than $280 billion on prescription drugs in 2012. It could have saved around $94 billion if it had paid what other countries do for the same drugs. Th is system is sometimes defended on the ground that huge fi nancial incentives inspire groundbreak-

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 15 9

ing research, yet only a limited segment of the pharmaceutical industry’s revenues goes toward research.106

Th e U.S. medical system’s singular lack of transparency facilitates profi t- eering. A researcher who called more than one hundred hospitals to ask about the cost of a hip replacement found that barely half of them would off er an estimate in advance. Prices also varied arbitrarily from $11,100 to $125,798 among those willing to provide information.107

Ironically, the Aff ordable Care Act went only so far in making care more aff ordable, because it lacked adequate measures to regulate pricing. Th e medical industry spent over $4 billion on lobbying between 2008 and late 2016.108 It thus “steered the debate from why bills are so high to who should pay them,” as Brill describes.109 Under Obama’s reform, for-profi t insurance companies received scores of new clients who got government subsidies to cover overpriced services.

It may seem counterintuitive that other industrialized countries can have lower health care costs while insuring everyone, but they do, as Figure 8 shows. Universal health care is not “free,” as some people claim, although regulations ensure far lower costs than those in the United States’ profi t- oriented system. Instituting universal health care could raise each American’s disposable income by 8 percent of the gross domestic product.110 America has among the highest rates of death from treatable medical problems in the West.111 It also does poorly on other indicators, such as infant mortality, life expectancy, and survival of major diseases. Exceptions exist, as America ranks well in the rate of survival of breast cancer, for example.112 But the big picture is clear: the U.S. health care system is plagued by problems that exist nowhere else in the West or to nowhere near the same extent there. Even wealthy Americans, who are generally well off , are not healthier than their European counterparts.113

Nevertheless, approximately half of Americans are persuaded that their country has “the best” health care system worldwide.114 Th at poll fi nding came before the 2010 reform barred insurance companies from denying cover- age to people with preexisting medical conditions. Th is conviction in American superiority signals not only chauvinism but also insularity, as much of the U.S. public knows little about other nations’ health care systems.

We saw in Chapter 2 that opponents of reform exploited this ignorance by resorting to extraordinary propaganda. Leading politicians compared “Obamacare” to the tyranny of Nazi Germany or the U.S.S.R. Likening it to despicable foreign medical systems was another recurrent theme. “It’s the

16 0 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

Europeanization of America, and that’s the worst thing that could possibly happen to our country,” Senator Orrin Hatch said as the reform passed. Representative Michele Bachmann warned that those who criticized public health insurance would be blacklisted and denied treatment, as she con- tended was the case in Japan.115 Th e Republican base paid attention. Before the bill passed, Senator Arlen Specter illustratively faced a hostile crowd at a town hall in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, where he was told: “We don’t want this country to turn into Russia,” “God is going to stand before you, and he’s going to judge you,” “It says plainly right there they want to limit the type of care elderly can get,” and “Th ey are talking about killing people.” 116

Meanwhile, many Democrats wanted “Obamacare” to go further by creat- ing a single-payer health care system, thereby exacerbating the partisan divide. Bernie Sanders ran a fairly popular presidential campaign in 2016 by demanding “Medicare for all” and emphasizing that all other industrialized nations have universal health care. Medicare is less expensive than for-profi t insurance policies, which have higher administrative costs because of market- ing, claim reviews, and more.117 Medicare is also less expensive because the U.S. government has the power to negotiate lower costs from medical provid- ers, like other industrialized countries do. But it would be cheaper if lobbyists had not managed to preclude Medicare from negotiating lower drug prices, as previously discussed. Th at being said, Sanders probably lowballed his

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

So ut

h Ko

re a

Sp ain Ita

ly

Ne w

Ze ala

nd

Fin lan

d

Un ite

d Ki

ng do

m Ja

pa n

Fr an

ce

Au st

ra lia

Ca na

da

Sw ed

en

G er

m an

y

Ne th

er lan

ds

Un ite

d St

at es

F I G U R E 8 . Annual health spending per capita (U.S. dollars with purchasing power parity). SOURCE:

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015).

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 16 1

plan’s cost and tax burden.118 Th e price tag of “Medicare for all” could indeed prove exorbitant, unless the cost of medical services in America was substan- tially lower. Th is would mean rethinking profi t-based health care. In any event, Sanders’s “democratic socialist” agenda stood little chance in Congress.

Republicans frequently insist that neither “Obamacare” nor “Medicare for all” is necessary since, in Mitt Romney’s words, “we don’t have people that become ill, who die in their apartment because they don’t have insurance.” While hospitals are obliged to treat people facing certain emergencies, such treatment can be prohibitively expensive.119 Besides, multiple serious condi- tions do not qualify as “emergencies.” Nor does routine or preventive care. Th e claim that emergency rooms are suffi cient defi es logic. If this were true, why would anyone bother to obtain medical insurance or visit a doctor? Surely the politicians who make this claim all have health insurance. According to a comprehensive study, uninsured people have a higher risk of death, even aft er accounting for socioeconomic factors. Up to forty-fi ve thou- sand annual deaths in America were attributable to lack of health insurance before Obama’s reform.120 Breast cancer, for instance, tends to be detected later in uninsured women.121

Opponents of reform further claim that in countries with “socialized medicine,” people wait an eternity to receive care because of “rationing.” In reality, many of these countries off er quicker access to care and more choice than America, where “in-network” lists of doctors or the requirement that an insurance company preauthorize an expense can limit access to treat- ment.122 Only certain universal health care systems have relatively long wait- ing lists. “Canada and Britain limit the number of specialists and operating rooms in the system to save money, with the result that patients wait weeks or months for nonemergency care,” a comparative study noted. “But other nations—Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark—perform better than the United States on standard measures such as ‘Waiting time to see a specialist’ and ‘Waiting time for elective surgery.’ ” 123

Contrary to other myths, overbearing governments do not control every- thing in nations with universal health care, which instead rely heavily on the private sector to pay for or provide treatment. Th is misconception is due to the common confl ation of “single-payer system” with “universal health care.” A single-payer system essentially exists in Britain, where the government pays for nearly all treatment via taxation. But numerous industrialized nations do not have a single-payer system, as they fund treatment through diverse com- binations of government insurance, nonprofi t insurance companies, and

16 2 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

out-of-pocket costs. In addition, their doctors are generally private practi- tioners—as is also the case in Britain’s system.124

Irrational fears about “socialized medicine” partly refl ect the exceptional role of money in U.S. politics. By the summer of 2012, approximately $69 million had been spent on ads supporting the Obama administration’s health care reform. More than three times as much, $235 million, had been spent on ads attacking it. Among opponents of the law were uninsured peo- ple who had been convinced that it would limit access to care and that America simply “can’t aff ord” to insure more people.125

It is no secret that the G.O.P. resisted “Obamacare.” What is more striking is that well before it passed, many Republicans argued that overregulation causes America’s health care problems. Consider Ronald Reagan’s thoughts on national health insurance: “I’m opposed. Th ere is no health care crisis in America. Most of the problems we have today with the increasing cost of medi- cal care have been caused by government intervening in the health scene.” 126 Similarly, Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the House, claimed that Obama’s “takeo- ver” of health care would harm a system that was “already heavily burdened, manipulated, and distorted by government spending and regulation.”

Market fundamentalists promote a utopian dream: a purely private health care system, with minimal government intervention, that would serve the public good. What about the people who would remain uninsured or criti- cally underinsured? (Namely, seventy-fi ve million Americans before Obama’s health care reform.)127 No worries, Michele Bachmann and other prominent lawmakers declared, charity would somehow take care of exorbitant medical bills.128 Senator Tom Coburn added that seniors were better off before Medicare was enacted in 1965. According to him, communities came together to provide adequate medical help to most. Doctors and hospitals were not always paid, he said, but they sometimes accepted chickens or baked goods in exchange for their services.129

The Economic Failures of Modern Democracy

America does not have a monopoly on wealth inequality. Th e vast ghettoes and sizable homeless populations found in both Paris and New York evoke the recurrent failure of modern democracy to deliver economic justice on each side of the Atlantic. Th e life of the middle class is not trouble free either on the Old Continent, where wealth has become very unevenly distrib- uted too.130

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 16 3

People oft en attribute Europe’s economic woes to overbearing govern- ments. Businesses in France and neighboring countries complain that the cost of labor has spiked because of high taxes. Th is problem may be com- pounded by infl exible labor regulations that can make it diffi cult to lay off workers in periods of economic downturn or when they are underperform- ing. Certain companies consequently refuse to risk hiring new workers at a high cost, which may contribute to rather high unemployment rates. An attempt in France to address these concerns by reforming labor regulations led to mass protests in 2016. Some opponents of the reform rejected it cate- gorically, whereas others argued that it might work in theory but is one-sided in practice. In their view, the reform will lead to layoff s, the spread of precari- ous, low-paying jobs, and more inequality.131 Its long-term eff ects were unclear at the time of writing.

Generous public assistance programs have factored in Europe’s substantial defi cit and debt levels. Th e cost of universal health care is not negligible, although it is not the cause of Europe’s struggles, as it has far lower medical expenditures than America. Rather, European governments spend signifi - cant sums on pensions, subsidies, poverty relief, and additional services.132

European economies face serious challenges, but according to the renowned French economist Th omas Piketty, the U.S. gross domestic prod- uct (GDP) per capita did not grow “any more rapidly” than those of Germany, France, Denmark, or Sweden between 1980 and 2010.133 More recent data indicate that the Eurozone economy was far more aff ected than America by various shocks since 2008, from the U.S.-born subprime crisis to the mis- management of the euro currency. Th e Obama administration responded to these situations with more budgetary fl exibility than European nations that adopted “austerity measures,” meaning steep cuts in public spending, and other counterproductive policies precipitating what Piketty called a “lost decade” of economic growth for Europe.134

Th e GDP per capita in America stands above those of almost all European nations. As of 2015 only Norway and Switzerland had higher GDPs per capita than America, while Denmark and Sweden* lagged slightly behind.135 But GDP per capita is an average measure that does not account for wealth ine- quality or well-being. In addition to lacking universal health care, America is the lone industrialized country that does not guarantee workers paid

* Norway and Switzerland are not EU members. Denmark and Sweden are part of the EU but have not joined the euro monetary union.

16 4 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

vacation or paid maternity leave.136 Put otherwise, the average American does not necessarily enjoy a better quality of life than fellow Westerners, as the United States’ winner-take-all system has concentrated the benefi ts of its economic power in the hands of the most privileged.

A P E C U L I A R C O N C E P T I O N O F D E M O C R A C Y

If conservative Americans generally stand out in the West for embracing market fundamentalism, the economic values of liberal Americans are rather similar to those of other Westerners in supporting universal health care, rela- tive wealth equality, and meaningful regulation. Granted, Democratic eco- nomic policies have historically been further to the right than those of other left -wing parties in the West.137 But whether at the center left or the center right, Democrats’ economic values have been comparable to those of leading liberal and conservative parties in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. By contrast, the contemporary Republican economic agenda is radi- cal by Western standards.

Th ese circumstances refl ect the peculiar nature of politics in America, where “conservative” does not mean the same thing as elsewhere in the West. At fi rst glance, conservatives in other Western nations may appear to share similar values with modern-day Republicans. Th ey too have deep reserva- tions about the welfare state, overtaxation, and overregulation. Nevertheless, European conservative leaders like Th eresa May, Angela Merkel, and Nicolas Sarkozy widely support universal health care. Th ey are equally amenable to sensible fi nancial and environmental regulations. Contemporary Republicans tend to condemn such moderation, which runs contrary to the ideological purity of market fundamentalism.

Recurrent allegations that Obama is a dangerous “socialist” rarely gave way to rational debate about what the term means. While the rise of Bernie Sanders, a proud “democratic socialist,” refl ected a measure of change, “socialism” largely remains taboo in America. Th is is partly because it is a double entendre. On one hand, it can refer to communism, as exemplifi ed by the name of the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On the other hand, “socialism” may also refer to “social democracy,” which is sharply dif- ferent from a communist dictatorship. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued that communism “may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.” 138 Communists have sought to do away with

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 16 5

the market altogether to build utopian societies, by force if necessary, where “a new man” would somehow come into existence. Conversely, most social democrats recognize the value of private property and a market economy in which personal profi t is an incentive. But they believe that unbridled capital- ism can lead to severe inequality, recklessness, and other market failures. Th ey consequently aim to steer the market to serve the greater good.

Th e American social scientist Seymour Martin Lipset emphasized that two of the European fi gures most associated with the emergence of social democracy in the late nineteenth century were conservatives: Otto von Bismarck of Germany and Benjamin Disraeli of the United Kingdom. “Th ey represented the rural and aristocratic elements, sectors which disdained capi- talism, disliked the bourgeoisie, and rejected materialistic values. Th eir poli- tics refl ected the values of noblesse oblige, the obligation of the leaders of society and the economy to protect the less fortunate,” Lipset wrote.139 Th e aristocracy has mostly lost political power in modern Europe, though con- servative leaders still believe that the government has a duty to ensure the public’s basic well-being. Conservatives in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are prone to share this conviction. So are liberals in these countries and in the United States. As a result, the overwhelming majority of Westerners consider universal health care a pillar of democracy.

Conservative Americans are the main exception, as many gravitate toward an ideology on the fringe of modern Western civilization because of a visceral suspicion of government.140 In their eyes, universal health care is the antith- esis of democracy, since it threatens individual liberty. From the 1950s to 1980s, Republicans were more inclined to recognize that the government has a responsibility to provide for the public’s well-being. But the government’s foremost duty is now primarily seen as getting out of the way, as one of Reagan’s quips suggests: “Th e nine most terrifying words in the English lan- guage are ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help.’ ” Individualism has come to trump nearly all other values.

Tea Party protestors, some of whom are affl uent,141 defended unbridled individualism the most stridently. At a rally in Columbus, Ohio, several insulted an elderly man holding a sign indicating that he backed health care reform because he had Parkinson’s disease. A Tea Partier pointedly told him: “If you’re looking for a handout, you’re in the wrong part of town. Nothing for free. You have to work for everything you get.” Another Tea Partier threw dollar bills at the ailing man while yelling: “I’ll decide when to give you money!” Th e crowd additionally called the man a “communist.” 142 Tea

16 6 • B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

Partiers likewise heckled supporters of health care reform at various town halls, including a wheelchair-bound woman and a woman who explained that her young, pregnant daughter-in-law had died and lost her unborn child because she lacked insurance.143

Such reactions refl ect not only a lack of empathy but also a misconceived sense of individualism. People cannot fulfi ll their life goals if they are beset by medical problems and exorbitant bills. Universal health care does not negate individualism—it helps enable it.144 “Necessitous men are not free men,” as Franklin Roosevelt stressed.

Th e tendency to overlook the greater good is further embodied in the Citizens United decision and its progeny, which have permitted unlimited spending on political campaigns in the name of individual “freedom of speech.” Th is kind of individualism empowers only the handful of individuals who can donate enormous sums to political campaigns, ignoring the innu- merable individuals who cannot. American conservatives have generally dis- missed this concern by stating that society must treat all individuals equally, without regard to income diff erences. Under that Orwellian conception of democracy, all citizens are equal but some are more equal than others.

Narrow individualism similarly shaped reactions to the 2008 fi nancial crisis. We saw that mortgage-lending agencies issued loans at usurious rates to unsophisticated people, many of whom were ruined and lost their homes when the housing bubble burst. Numerous American conservatives nonethe- less argued that poor people had only themselves to blame for irresponsibly taking unaff ordable mortgages. Th ey were disinclined to blame mortgage lenders or Wall Street for engaging in predatory lending and risky investments on a colossal scale. Th is stance refl ects the idea that investors have no duty to act in a socially responsible manner or with the interests of others in mind.

Hostility to basic gun control also echoes unbridled individualism. Because of incredibly lax regulations, America has by far the highest rate of gun violence in the West.145 But the Second Amendment’s fi ercest supporters focus solely on their individual right to bear arms, regardless of social costs. In their peculiar view, gun control is a slippery slope toward the end of all liberties. Consider how Larry Pratt, the director of Gun Owners of America, portrayed citizens who support gun control: “Th ey are coming for our free- dom, for our money, for our kids, for our property. Th ey are coming for everything because they are a bunch of socialists.”

However, a signifi cant exception to conservative America’s staunch indi- vidualism stands out: morals legislation. Chapter 4 describes the wide sup-

B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y • 16 7

port for policies based on ultratraditional values among modern Republicans. For example, Paul Ryan casts himself as a libertarian devoted to ending gov- ernment control, yet he wants the government to prevent women from hav- ing abortions.146 Criminal justice presents another contradiction, as con- servative Americans commonly have a narrow conception of prisoners’ individual rights, as we will see in Chapter 7.

Th e radical conception of individualism in modern conservative America should not obscure the positive role that individualism has played in history. Enlightenment thinkers called for expanding individual liberty against state and clerical authorities. Th e Western democracies that emerged from the Enlightenment beginning in the eighteenth century—the fi rst of which was the United States—were based on individual rights. In contrast, communist regimes have seldom recognized individual rights, under the pretense that the individual’s perspective is encompassed by the collective perspective, which has paradoxically been defi ned by a handful of individuals exercising dictatorial powers.

Even though individualism is indispensable to democracy, it is a double- edged sword because it can threaten democracy if taken too far. A democratic government must strive to protect the individual and the greater good. A society that provides primarily for the well-being of a minority of privileged individuals might be democratic in a narrow, procedural sense but not in substance.

16 8

Living in Manhattan, I discussed politics with Robert, a friendly white working-class neighbor who toiled long hours for such a measly salary that he had trouble paying rent. Priding himself on being a “Ronald Reagan fi scal conservative,” he believed that America “cannot aff ord” universal health care, even though he had limited medical insurance. He seemed unaware that nations with universal health care have drastically lower medical costs than America. As the 2008 Obama-McCain presidential race unfolded, Robert was on the fence about which candidate’s policies would most help him. At any rate, he was fi xated on whether Obama might have forged his birth cer- tifi cate. Overall, Robert resented his relative poverty and fi ercely distrusted politicians. “Th ey don’t care about guys like me,” he insisted. Like countless ordinary Americans, he protested his low economic status in a way that helped perpetuate it.

Th e Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza wrote that people can be led to “fi ght for their servitude as if they were fi ghting for their own deliverance.” 1 Th at observation seems applicable to modern-day America, where millions of common people stand against their own economic interest by defending policies that heavily benefi t the richest of the rich.

Insofar as Donald Trump’s election was a revolt of struggling working- class and middle-class whites, it epitomized this peculiar phenomenon. Trump is not a small-business owner, social democrat, or altruistic person. He is a billionaire who campaigned on a platform of massive tax cuts that would primarily favor the affl uent.2 He is the head of a shift y business empire that has a history of refusing to pay its employees and contractors, has used a phony “charity” for self-dealing, has operated an exploitative and fraudulent

S I X

Millions Standing against Their Own Economic Interest

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 16 9

for-profi t “university,” and has mostly manufactured its products in China and other developing countries—yet who ran for president on an anti-trade agenda promising to aid plain folk.3 To boot, legions fl ocked to Trump as he relentlessly vowed to repeal “Obamacare,” a program that was intended to help them—and that would have helped them more if not for adamant obstructionism from his party.

Th e G.O.P.’s shift toward winner-take-all economics beginning in the 1980s might not have been possible if numerous nonaffl uent citizens had stopped voting Republican. But “weakness of pressure from the left is [also] one of the main reasons that the United States has less ambitious domestic programs and a smaller public sector than is found in other industrialized countries,” as the political scientist John Kingdon wrote.4 Th is aspect of American exceptionalism is not new. Seymour Martin Lipset underlined that “the United States had a lower rate of taxation, a less developed welfare state, and many fewer government-owned industries than other industrial- ized nations” well before Ronald Reagan became president.5

Given that sharp wealth inequality and the lack of universal health care harm not just the poor but also the middle class—the vast majority of the U.S. population—why do so many ordinary Americans vote against their own economic interest? Th is chapter considers various pieces of the puzzle: myopia fostered by anti-intellectualism; the relationship between religious fundamen- talism and market fundamentalism; racial divisions hindering economic soli- darity; and unbridled faith in the American Dream leading people to think that anyone can become affl uent without government assistance.

M Y O P I A

Contrary to conventional wisdom, voting preferences in America are not all backwards. Th e poor are likelier to vote Democrat. Th at is a regular fi nding in political science studies,6 and it again seemed true in the 2016 election. Hillary Clinton won the vote of citizens with an annual income below $30,000 by 13 points over Trump. Th e vote of the wealthy was split rather evenly between both candidates, contradicting the notion that Trump’s sup- port narrowly came from the working class. Th e tally is nonetheless striking if we factor race into the equation. Trump won the vote of whites without a college degree by 39 points.7

17 0 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

Voting against one’s economic interest did not begin with Trumpism. A comprehensive study of presidential elections between 1976 and 2004 found that Republican candidates received a large share of the white vote in all economic categories: low income (49 percent), middle income (56 percent), and upper income (63 percent). Support for the G.O.P. among nonwealthy whites was somewhat counterbalanced by the tendency of racial and ethnic minorities to vote Democrat.8 Other data confi rm this general pattern. In 2012, 35 percent of all voters making less than $30,000 per year backed Mitt Romney.9 In 2004, a considerable minority of the destitute voted for George W. Bush, namely 36 percent of voters making less than $15,000.10

Voting against one’s pocketbook can go the other way, as a sizable propor- tion of the well-to-do have historically voted Democrat, partly due to a sense of solidarity with poorer Americans. But what is more remarkable is the Republican Party’s ability to consistently draw signifi cant support from ordi- nary citizens even as its policies have increasingly catered to the wealthy few. Many nonwealthy people also vote for conservative parties in other Western nations,11 yet “conservative” does not mean the same thing there as in America. Th e modern G.O.P. is far more supportive of winner-take-all economics.

Scholars have long observed that Americans are quite complacent about stark wealth inequality.12 While other Westerners are more concerned about the income gap in their countries,13 around half of Americans think that the United States “would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.” 14 Th is lack of concern partly refl ects unawareness of the magnitude of wealth inequality in modern America. Th e typical American thinks that the CEO of a Fortune 500 company makes about $1 million a year, when the median is more than $10 million.15 People in other countries also underesti- mate earnings at the top, but to a far lesser extent.16

Data indicate that the more conservative Americans are, the less likely they are to recognize that wealth inequality has risen in the United States in recent decades.17 Th e weight of anti-intellectualism helps explain this situa- tion, as people who deprecate education and rational analysis are more dis- posed to vote against their own interest. Recall the public’s response to the Bush tax cuts discussed in Chapter 2. Most of the citizens who were con- cerned about worsening inequality supported the huge tax cuts, even though they primarily benefi ted the wealthy. A landmark study by Larry Bartels, a political scientist, concluded that Americans’ opinions commonly refl ect “rather simple-minded—and sometimes misguided—considerations of self- interest stemming from their views about their own tax burdens.” 18

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 171

Paradoxically, taxation and regulation are most fi ercely resisted in the states where people most benefi t from them. Th e staunchly conservative states of the South and Midwest receive more federal money than they pay in federal taxes, whereas the rather liberal states of the Northeast and West Coast receive less than they pay.19 Democratic states eff ectively subsidize Republican states, which are poorer and lag behind in areas such as health and education. As the political scientist Andrew Gelman wrote, “Th e richest segment of Connecticutians is only barely more likely to vote Republican than the poorest Mississipians.” 20

A multitude of working-class and middle-class citizens thus fl ocked to the Tea Party, demanding a barebones federal government that would dispropor- tionately harm the states where the movement enjoyed the most support. Business elites stood behind this supposedly anti-elitist revolt. “Grassroots” Tea Party rallies were partly funded by moneyed interests, such as the bil- lionaire Koch brothers. Major corporations like Pfi zer, Lockheed Martin, JPMorgan Chase, Dow Chemical, and Rolls-Royce have been represented on the board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a lobby that Tea Party activists enthusiastically embraced.21 Much of the poor South subsequently became Trump Country.22

Apart from the pompous billionaire, politicians who stem from the busi- ness elite commonly try to hide their identity by claiming to be ordinary people. John Boehner, for instance, said that he headed a “small business” before being elected to Congress. His wife stressed that the Boehners were “ just normal, average people.” In reality, Boehner made millions while run- ning a marketing fi rm. Similarly, in his prime-time speech accepting the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney said, “When I was thirty- seven, I helped to start a small company.” Th is was Bain Capital, which had $37 million in funds. Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the House, hails from a rich family. He nonetheless suggested that he had struggled to fulfi ll the American Dream: “When I was growing up, when I was fl ipping burgers at McDonald’s, . . . washing dishes, or waiting tables, I never thought of myself as stuck in some station in life.” 23 Champions of the business elite tend to misrepresent not only their identities but also their policies, such as by affi rming that huge tax cuts for the rich will help “working families” or that repealing “Obamacare” will improve access to health care.

Th e mix of disinformation and peculiar mindsets has led some ordinary Americans to go exceptionally far in fi ghting against their own good. A retired Boston police offi cer interviewed at a Tea Party rally condemned the

17 2 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

idea that America should have universal health care: “My little girl, when she was three, she got real sick. Had to be in intensive care for ten days. Had to have a tracheotomy. I had shit for insurance. Th e hospital sent me a bill. Ten thousand dollars. I got a second job; I sent the hospital one hundred bucks a week. Th at was the right thing to do.” Th e man claimed that Obama’s eff orts to broaden access to health care were plain “wrong.” “If people want some- thing,” he argued, “they have to work for it.” 24 His anger was misdirected toward alleged loafers who depend on “big government,” rather than against profi teering by the medical industry. He had become active in a movement defending a system that put his daughter’s life at risk.

Likewise, the plaintiff s in King v. Burwell, an unsuccessful Supreme Court challenge to health care reform, were mainly low-income whites who probably benefi ted from the law despite claiming that it harmed them. Some were so poor that they were exempt from the modest tax penalty imposed on people who refuse to obtain health insurance. One plaintiff apparently did not grasp that her lawsuit could have led millions to lose health insurance. “I don’t want things to be more diffi cult for people,” she told a journalist. “I don’t like the idea of throwing people off their health insurance.” Two other plaintiff s had previously faced $8,500 in out-of-pocket medical costs, which had contributed to their fi ling for bankruptcy aft er their company collapsed during the fi nancial crisis of 2008. Another plaintiff called Obama the “anti- Christ” and said that “his Muslim people” elected him.25

Of course, other Americans have protested in favor of greater equality. Th e Occupy Wall Street movement gained traction in 2011 by demanding a fairer economy and denouncing “the 1 percent.” Bernie Sanders’s relatively popular 2016 presidential campaign echoed the same concerns. But neither had as much infl uence on the Democratic Party as the Tea Party did on the G.O.P.26 Besides, similar egalitarian movements exist elsewhere in the West. Th e Tea Party incarnated American exceptionalism, since no other modern Western country has had an infl uential movement advocating extreme anti- governmentalism and leading scores of ordinary people to vote against their own good while helping millionaires.27

Fewer Americans might vote against their own economic interest if they realized the magnitude of wealth inequality in America next to other industri- alized nations. “Th e masses never revolt of their own accord, and they never revolt merely because they are oppressed,” George Orwell wrote in his pessi- mistic novel 1984. “Indeed, so long as they are not permitted to have standards of comparison, they never even become aware that they are oppressed.” 28

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 17 3

A F U N D A M E N T A L I S T F A I T H I N T H E M A R K E T

In What’s the Matter with Kansas?, Th omas Frank argued that many work- ing-class whites vote Republican because of the party’s ultratraditional stances on culture war issues such as abortion and gay rights, thereby enabling the G.O.P. to implement economic policies favoring the rich. However, Frank’s theory did not seem to square with the data, which show that most voters are more concerned about economics than about culture war issues.29 On aver- age, the rich also care more than the working class about the culture wars, perhaps because voters are more inclined to focus on social issues once they are fi nancially secure.30 In response to Frank’s 2004 bestseller, the political scientist Larry Bartels presented compelling data showing that working-class whites had not abandoned the Democratic Party. Still, the data indicated that half of them voted Republican in presidential elections between 1976 and 2004, the period of his study.31 What’s the Matter with Kansas? is more per- suasive if we think of the culture wars as one of several reasons why certain working-class Americans vote Republican. Even if these citizens are a minor- ity of the public, they can infl uence the outcome of elections.32

Most of the debate over the role of religion in U.S. elections seems to revolve around the question that Frank’s theory raises: how much do the culture wars matter to voters? People generally overlook another way in which faith may infl uence political decision-making: religious convictions can mold people’s worldviews. Earlier chapters describe how roughly four in ten Americans gravitate toward biblical literalism and other aspects of reli- gious fundamentalism—a form of Christianity nearly absent elsewhere in the modern Western world. Christian fundamentalism fosters anti-intellec- tual, black-and-white, and authoritarian mindsets. Th is infl uence is not limited to culture war issues, as Christian fundamentalism can also shape how people think about the economy.

How Religious Fundamentalism and

Market Fundamentalism Overlap

Both religious fundamentalism and market fundamentalism emphasize ideological purity.33 Religious fundamentalists have an unbending faith in the literal veracity of the Bible and consequently dispute all confl icting sci- ence, from the theory of evolution to the Big Bang. By the same token, mar- ket fundamentalists dispute facts that call into question strict laissez-faire

174 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

economics. Th e catastrophic 2008 fi nancial crisis and ensuing Great Recession did not change their conviction that markets can adequately regu- late themselves without government intervention.34 Since their radical views do not square with reality, fundamentalists commonly make up their own facts by resorting to disinformation and conspiracy theories. Religious fun- damentalists claim that the theory of evolution is a “fraud” and that many scientists believe in creationism.35 Market fundamentalists likewise resort to glaring misrepresentations, such as claiming that overregulation caused the fi nancial meltdown or denouncing the evils of “socialized medicine.”

Fundamentalists are usually oblivious to the social costs of ideological purity. Th is is refl ected not merely in indiff erence toward soaring wealth inequality or the plight of people without medical insurance. Th ey have fought eff orts to curb global warming regardless of the consequences. In any event, most reject climatic science. Some market fundamentalists, particu- larly Tea Party activists, would rather see the federal government shut down than allow it to operate with a budget not encompassing drastic tax and spending cuts.36 Religious fundamentalists have displayed an equivalent indiff erence to the social costs of their ideology. Given their conviction that premarital sex is a grave sin, they have promoted abstinence-only sexual edu- cation while seeking to eviscerate reproductive rights. Th ese attitudes help explain why America leads the industrialized world in the rate of unintended teenage pregnancies.37

Religious fundamentalism and market fundamentalism do not merely parallel each other. Th ese two ideologies oft en overlap. Christian fundamen- talists typically hold hardline views on economic issues.38 Th e Tea Party movement is primarily known for its denunciation of “big government,” but many of its activists also condemned abortion and gay rights in the name of religion. A study indicates that, aft er being a Republican, expecting religion to play a prominent role in politics was the strongest predictor of Tea Party support.39 Moreover, Tea Partiers are signifi cantly likelier than the average voter to be biblical literalists.40

Millions of American conservatives think that “dependence on a secular state” threatens “personal virtue.” 41 In the words of Jim DeMint, who left the Senate to head the Heritage Foundation, “You can’t be a fi scal conserva- tive and not be a social conservative.” He aspires to abolish the federal income tax and the IRS.42 DeMint also thinks that gays and unmarried pregnant women should be barred from teaching in public schools.43 He once skipped a conference because a gay rights group was invited.44 “We’ve been told we

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 17 5

need a truce on social issues,” former Representative Michele Bachmann concurred, “and I would highly disagree with that because social conserva- tism is fi scal conservatism.” 45 Bachmann, who has accused Obama of being a “socialist,” believes that to be gay is “part of Satan.” 46 She runs a Christian counseling clinic where people “cure” homosexuality through prayer.47 Bachmann embraces traditional patriarchy, as she thinks that “God” wants women to be “submissive” to their husbands. She also declared that “God” told her to run for offi ce.48

“Th e long-standing divide between economic, pro-business conservatives and social conservatives has blurred,” according to a Pew survey. Contemporary American conservatives commonly “take extremely conserva- tive positions on nearly all issues.” 49 Th e union of fi scal conservatism and religious conservatism is not always coherent. It has led the G.O.P. to try to block federal funding to Planned Parenthood while ignoring the relationship between family planning and economic prosperity. Unintended pregnancies cost taxpayers roughly $21 billion per year.50 Meanwhile, millions of federal dollars have been spent on abstinence-only sexual education, a counterpro- ductive policy. Th e odd relationship between market and religious funda- mentalism is epitomized by how legions want to compel underprivileged women to bear children but usually reject the notion that society should provide for these children.

Conservative America is essentially the only part of the modern Western world where religious fundamentalism and market fundamentalism have colossal weight. Th is peculiar nexus of ideological purity provides the context for the observation of the Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, who wrote that “many American conservatives, but far fewer [people else- where] in the developing world,” share a “fundamentalist” faith in “unfet- tered markets.” 51

The Religious Right’s Economic Agenda

Th e politicians who have steered the Republican Party toward market fun- damentalism starting in the 1980s have largely been religious hardliners. We previously saw that Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were devout evangelicals. Numerous other Republican leaders have similarly shared a quasi-absolutist faith in both the market and religion.

Tom DeLay of Texas, who served as the House majority leader, declared that God chose him to promote “a biblical worldview.” He argued that the

176 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

Columbine High School shooting occurred “because our school systems teach our children that they are nothing but glorifi ed apes who have evolu- tionized out of some primordial mud.” Like DeLay, Bill Frist of Tennessee, the former Senate majority leader, was involved in the religious right move- ment.52 Th ese leaders embraced hardline economic policies. So did Rick Santorum, who attained the chairmanship of the Republican Senate Caucus and later campaigned for president by proclaiming: “People underestimate me, people underestimate what God can do.” “I almost threw up” were the words he used to describe his reaction to JFK’s famous speech on the separa- tion of church and state. Claiming that Voltaire would agree with him, Santorum argued that barring the teaching of creationism in public schools stands against the Enlightenment and would “thwart scientifi c progress.” His vitriol about Obama’s “socialist” and “Marxist” policies was just as extreme.

David Brat said, “God acted through people on my behalf,” aft er he man- aged the unprecedented feat of unseating a House majority leader in a pri- mary election, Eric Cantor of Virginia, a fellow Republican. Brat has called for a system that would “synthesize Christianity and capitalism” and has warned of the rise of a Hitler-like ruler if Christians do not embrace strict laissez-faire economics. Other key fi gures of the modern Republican Party have suggested that they embody God’s will, such as Scott Walker, who tweeted, “Philippians 4:13”—namely “I can do all things through [Christ,] who strengthens me.” Walker sparked intense protests as the governor of Wisconsin by implementing sweeping tax and budget cuts, as well as drastic anti-union measures. He is a member of Meadowbrook Church in Wauwatosa, whose statement of faith lists belief in biblical inerrancy and the prophesied Second Coming of Christ.53 Sam Brownback, the governor of Kansas, launched another ambitious experiment in barebones government and massive tax cuts in his state. He is also an ultratraditionalist.54

Several leading 2016 presidential candidates were hardliners in matters of economics and religion. Aft er winning the Iowa caucus, Ted Cruz argued that constitutional rights come from God, which suggests that he is a divine messenger, since he oft en expounds on his interpretation of constitutional rights. Marco Rubio contended that “God’s rules” should trump Supreme Court decisions. Ben Carson, a devout Seventh-day Adventist, was scarcely more moderate. Mike Pence, who came across as Donald Trump’s more rational running mate, is a proponent of “intelligent design,” the pseudosci- entifi c creationist theory.55 All of them have relentlessly denounced the threats of “Obamacare” and “big government.”

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 17 7

Sarah Palin’s faith equally deserves attention, given her far-right economic views. In 1996, aft er becoming the mayor of Wasilla, a small Alaskan town, she sought to ban from the public library books promoting tolerance of homosexuality. A creationist, Palin also insisted in a private conversation that humans and dinosaurs “coexisted on an Earth created 6,000 years ago.” 56 She compared voting for her to putting things “in God’s hands.”

Glenn Beck, whose infl uential punditry blends conspiracy theories and far-right economics, is a hardline Mormon.* He thinks that the theory of evolution is “ridiculous,” just like climate change. “I haven’t seen a half mon- key–half person yet,” Beck quipped. Apocalyptic biblical prophecies have received serious attention on his shows. He once suggested that doomsday would occur on August 22, 2006.57 As authoritarians do not always see eye to eye, Beck has clashed with his rival pundit Stephen Bannon, the former head of the alt-right Breitbart News who became Trump’s campaign director. Bannon may not be an ordinary religious traditionalist, but he has criticized secularism and called for returning to a supposed golden age when capitalism and Christianity operated in unison.58

Th e far-right intellectual Dinesh D’Souza received attention aft er con- tending that Obama incarnates his father, whom Obama barely knew. “Th e U.S. is being ruled according to the dreams of a Luo tribesman of the 1950s,” D’Souza claimed. “Th is philandering, inebriated African socialist, who raged against the world for denying him the realization of his anticolonial ambi- tions, is now setting the nation’s agenda through the reincarnation of his dreams in his son.” D’Souza is also a fervent born-again Christian who has sternly denounced secularism, feminism, abortion, contraception, homo- sexuality, and sexual education. He charged that America’s “cultural left ” was responsible for the 9/11 terrorist strikes because its immorality provoked anger in the Muslim world and Al-Qaeda’s attack.59

Many other Republican leaders combine hardline religious and economic views, including Mike Huckabee, Rick Perry, Bobby Jindal, and Herman Cain. Even some of the ostensibly religiously moderate G.O.P. leaders tend to hold hardline convictions. Paul Ryan usually avoids strident religious rhetoric and is mainly known for his libertarianism. Still, his staunch Catholicism has led him to oppose abortion even in rape or incest cases.60 He equally supported a constitutional amendment against gay marriage and

* Needless to say, moderate Mormons have rejected Beck’s views as unrepresentative of their faith.

17 8 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

voted against ending “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” But Ryan’s moral values seem moderate next to those of fellow Republicans such as former senator Tom Coburn, who declared, “I favor the death penalty for abortionists.” Coburn additionally thinks that “Obamacare” will “Sovietize the American health- care system.” He embraced the federal government’s shutdown and suggested that defaulting on the national debt could be “a wonderful experiment.”

In sum, a substantial share of politicians and pundits who have driven the uncompromising modern Republican economic agenda happen to be reli- gious hardliners, if not downright Christian fundamentalists. Th is trend is likewise found among the public, as rank-and-fi le conservatives have increas- ingly adopted hardline attitudes toward both religion and economics since the 1980s.61 Of course, a correlation between religious fundamentalism and market fundamentalism does not prove a causality. But a relationship argu- ably exists between these rigid fundamentalisms, which reinforce each other because of the ideological similarities discussed above.

Christian fundamentalists are certainly not the only people who have played a role in tilting the G.O.P. to the far right on economic issues. Wall Street fi nanciers and other business elites, some of whom are not socially conservative or even religious, frequently defend winner-take-all economics. Th e irreligious Donald Trump stems from this world. Moreover, not all reli- gious fundamentalists embrace strict laissez-faire economics. For instance, Pentecostals are marginally more liberal than other evangelicals with regard to assistance for the needy.62 More to the point, African-American evangeli- cals in the Deep South commonly hold traditional religious views but vote Democrat and favor egalitarian economic policies. Nevertheless, the relation- ship between far-right attitudes toward religion and toward the economy is palpable in the contemporary G.O.P. Th e phenomenon is not new. In the 1950s, for example, the iconic reverend Billy Graham praised big business while condemning “socialism,” government regulations, and labor unions.63 Yet the G.O.P. has grown more radical on both religious and economic issues since then.

Winner-take-all economics seems incompatible with Jesus’s message of compassion and charity for the poor. According to Matthew 6:24, Jesus said, “You cannot serve God and wealth.” In Matthew 19:23, he added that “it will be hard for a rich person to enter the kingdom of heaven.” But recall that if roughly four in ten Americans lean toward religious fundamentalism, a com- parable proportion share liberal or moderate faiths. Jimmy Carter, a liberal evangelical, has been particularly critical of the fundamentalists’ take on

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 17 9

economics. “If you are a wealthy white man, then you are naturally inclined to think that the poor are inferior and don’t deserve your fi rst consideration,” he said. “Th is builds up a sense of prejudice and alienation that permeates the Christian right these days.” 64

Th e relationship between Christian fundamentalism and market funda- mentalism is not inherent. In an earlier age, partisans of unbridled markets included social Darwinists who claimed that regulating the economy and assisting the needy violated the laws of nature. Th ey co-opted the theory of evolution to justify the “survival of the fi ttest,” namely the wealthiest mem- bers of society. Th eir staunchest opponent was William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925), the three-time Democratic presidential candidate now prima- rily remembered for condemning evolution in the “Scopes Monkey Trial,” where a Tennessee professor was prosecuted for teaching the heretical the- ory.65 Bryan was not merely a biblical literalist. He had a far more progressive agenda than most of his contemporaries, distinguishing himself as “an early proponent of women’s suff rage, railroad regulation, the federal income tax, opposition to capital punishment, a federal department of labor, campaign fund disclosure, state initiative and referendum, and vigorous enforcement of antitrust law.” 66 Th e tide has turned, however, as the modern-day con- servatives least likely to accept the theory of evolution are among those likeli- est to champion a contemporary social Darwinism, rooted in the belief that the rich simply deserve their wealth and the poor deserve their poverty. Th is mindset is related to the American Dream, a national ideal that may be a greater source of division than of unity.

H O W F A I T H I N T H E A M E R I C A N D R E A M

D R I V E S T H E N A T I O N F U R T H E R A P A R T

Millions of Americans fervently believe that what makes their country exceptional is the possibility of becoming wealthy through personal eff ort and without government assistance.67 Th is conception of the American Dream rests on the image of America as a beacon of freedom, a land of unri- valed opportunity, a classless country unhindered by the aristocratic, feudal, or class divisions that have impeded Europe’s progress. America is the nation where self-made men and women can succeed, where people can rise from rags to riches, where the poor can pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. Such idealism fosters the notion that the government is fundamentally a

18 0 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

meddler, a nuisance, a usurper in a blessed, free country that can mostly do without it.

In reality, modern-day America stands out not as an equal meritocracy but as the developed nation with the sharpest inequality. It is not the possibility of realizing the American Dream that makes America exceptional—it is the prevalence of this belief, especially among conservatives. Faith in the American Dream oft en serves to rationalize the nation’s stark inequality. If one assumes that virtually any hardworking person can become affl uent in America, one is likely to conclude that it is wrong for the government to reduce wealth inequality, assist the needy, or establish universal health care. Th is conviction reinforces myopia by downplaying systemic factors of wealth inequality and focusing almost exclusively on personal traits, such as one’s work ethic.

The Dream and the Reality

Contrary to popular belief, intergenerational mobility is lower in contempo- rary America than in various nations with economic systems that are more social democratic. Th e mobility of children is tied to their parents’ achieve- ments more closely in America than in multiple countries, including Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden.68 Within America, economic mobility is lowest in the South, the region where market fundamentalism is strongest. A statistical study concluded that “nine states, all in the South, have consistently lower upward and higher downward mobility compared to the nation as a whole.” With the exception of Utah, the eight states with better-than-average economic mobility were Democratic- leaning and in the North.69

Nevertheless, Republican leaders promote the belief that America enjoys the greatest economic mobility because its system is the most capitalistic. Consider Paul Ryan’s arguments in a 2011 speech at the Heritage Foundation. “Class is not a fi xed destination in this country,” he said. “We are an upwardly mobile society with a lot of income movement between income groups.” Ryan contrasted America with Europe, where “top-heavy welfare states have replaced the traditional aristocracies, and masses of the long-term unem- ployed are locked into the new lower class.” Rick Santorum went further, arguing that the term “middle class” is “Marxism talk,” since “there are no classes in America.” Echoing the same theme, Matt Kibbe, a Tea Party leader, declared that “the diff erence between Europe and America, and why America is so great, is that Europe has haves and have-nots.” 70

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 18 1

While ardent faith in the American Dream is rooted more in chauvinism than in fact, there was indeed a time when America was a place of exceptional social mobility. Many Europeans were able to improve their lot by migrating to America in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, notably because vast expanses of fertile land were available or seized from Native Americans. In the eyes of early colonists, American land was waiting in an unoccupied and uncultivated state for “a good people to populate it,” as Indian “hea- thens” had no valid property rights.71 Access to land was of consequence in an epoch when agriculture played a major economic role. Cultivating crops could result in signifi cant profi t or at least provide for a family’s well-being. Colonists managed to acquire landholdings far larger than they could have dreamed of in Europe, where vast expanses of land were hardly there for the taking or were off limits to commoners because of feudalism. Overall, it seemed that hard work had greater rewards in America, which came across as an “exceptionally fl uid and mobile” society.72

“What impressed observers most about the societies of colonial British America,” the historian Jack Greene noted, “was the fact that the entire top of the European status order was missing.” 73 Europe was then under the control of monarchies characterized by rigid aristocratic and feudal systems. Th e contrast became even more signifi cant when the United States attained independence and established the fi rst modern democracy. As Tocqueville and other travelers found, nineteenth-century America stood out for the unusual degree of equality found among white men there. Modern economic studies confi rm their observations.74

Yet the unparalleled opportunities found in preindustrial America declined in the nineteenth century. Agriculture gradually diminished in importance and the value of farmland dropped while industrial, fi nancial, and real estate capital expanded. Th e early fruits of capitalism largely fl owed into the hands of a new gilded class. Ordinary people who aimed to rise up the social ladder faced a diff erent challenge than colonists who became small landowners.75 Moreover, the comparatively high social mobility in America’s early days was also due to the fact that it lacked the feudal systems that kept people down in Europe (except for African-Americans, who lived under a caste system). But Europe evolved too, ultimately establishing social democ- racies that made twentieth- and twenty-fi rst-century Europe more equal than America in many ways. In other words, the ideal of the American Dream is partly rooted in two anachronisms: an America and a Europe that no longer exist.

18 2 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

Even in America’s early days, the success of certain colonists was not sim- ply the product of hard work. Fertile land was oft en forcibly taken from Native Americans, many of whom were massacred or died from European diseases to which they had no biological immunity.76 Th e economy relied on the brutality of African slavery. Scores of white men struggled in indentured servitude or other forms of poverty. And women were disempowered in a fi rmly patriarchal society. Th ese circumstances profoundly contradicted the notion that anyone could succeed with ambition alone.

Th e American Dream has always represented what is possible, not necessar- ily what is plausible. It is symbolized by self-made men who made fortunes despite humble beginnings and little formal education. Cornelius Vanderbilt (1794–1877), for instance, started working at eleven years old on the New York waterfront and ultimately became a billionaire in the steamboat and railroad industries. But self-made men (and women) are exceptions. One may even doubt whether any person can be genuinely “self-made.” Economic success depends, to an extent, on factors beyond our control. Behind stories of self- made men one frequently fi nds auspicious social circumstances, not to men- tion supportive associates. Government is also infl uential in enabling private activity, such as by enforcing contracts and building infrastructure.77

Of course, hard work and determination can greatly contribute to indi- vidual success. Th e stories of self-made men can be inspiring in celebrating these values. Th ey are more questionable when presented as proof of the claim that acute inequality does not truly exist because anyone can become rich merely by working hard. In America, as in any country, the affl uent have commonly enjoyed a variety of advantages. Donald Trump did not become a billionaire because he is a billion times more intelligent and hardworking than the average person. His father was extraordinarily rich. People who rise from dire poverty to tremendous wealth are few and far between. Th e American Dream makes the exception the rule and the rule the exception.

A Divisive National Ideal

In times of crisis, a country oft en turns to its national ideals in the hope that they will provide guidance and common ground. Yet invoking the American Dream has hardly attenuated the United States’ polarization, because the views of Democrats and Republicans largely rest on incompatible premises. When it comes to fulfi lling the American Dream, they respectively see the government as either a helper or an obstacle.

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 18 3

To Democrats, the American Dream is an aspiration that the government must help realize via meaningful regulations, public assistance programs, and wealth redistribution. Citing Th eodore and Franklin Roosevelt’s policies, Barack Obama called for such government intervention while affi rming that worsening inequality “gives [the] lie to the promise that’s at the very heart of America: that this is a place where you can make it if you try.” 78

Conversely, to many Republicans the American Dream is far more than an aspiration. It is a factual proposition: America is an equal meritocracy where every hardworking person can become rich without government assist- ance. Seventy-seven percent of Republicans believe that “everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed in America,” compared to 35 percent of Democrats.79 Republicans typically consider that people are likelier to rise up the social ladder in an economy rendered more effi cient by the elimination of virtually all regulation, taxes, and public assistance. As Ted Cruz said, “Government control hurts those trying to achieve the American Dream.” Donald Trump agreed that Obama’s vow to reduce wealth inequality was “class warfare.” 80

While conservatives long denied that wealth inequality had risen in America,81 the majority now recognize that fact.82 Most are nonetheless persuaded that the way to reduce poverty is to cut assistance programs to the poor and lower taxes on the rich, to encourage economic growth. Liberals believe the opposite.83 How to realize the American Dream may seem an intractable matter of opinion, yet the evidence suggests that strict laissez- faire hinders economic mobility, which is higher in nations with systems that are more social democratic. However, the conviction that all hard workers would become rich if the government simply got out of the way is ideological and usually unshakable.

Th e American Dream is, almost by defi nition, a myth. A dream is not reality. Exalted faith in this ideal can distort one’s perspective. Th e more one treats it as a factual proposition, the more one believes that those who fail to succeed have only themselves to blame. Despite enjoying a life of fabulous privilege since birth, George W. Bush had no doubt that the destitute can pull themselves up by their bootstraps, as he proclaimed that people “who work hard and make the right decisions can achieve anything they want in America.” From this standpoint, redistributing wealth is unnecessary—fair- ness instead requires that the rich receive generous tax cuts. Similarly, there is no need for universal health care—the millions of uninsured Americans could obtain proper health care for themselves if they worked harder. Nor is

18 4 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

there a need to regulate campaign fi nancing to limit lobbying by moneyed interests—lobbying is fair competition in an equal arena. Th ose who can give the most money to politicians deserve the most infl uence because they earned their fortunes simply through their own eff orts.

Th e American right traces most of the country’s economic problems to the New Deal era, which spoiled the fruits of meritocracy by fostering depend- ence on “big government.” Th is view of history is embodied in “A Roadmap for America’s Future,” a policy initiative by Paul Ryan: “Until [the creation of the welfare state], Americans were known and admired everywhere for their hopeful determination to assume responsibility for the quality of their own lives; to rely on their own work and initiative; and to improve opportu- nities for their children to prosper in the future. But over time, Americans have been lured into viewing government—more than themselves, their families, their communities, their faith—as their main source of support. . . . Th e trend drains individual initiative and personal responsibility.”

Th is narrative is recurrent. Note how Chris Christie explained American decadence: “I think it’s really simple. It’s because government’s now telling [people], ‘Stop dreaming, stop striving, we’ll take care of you.’ We’re turning into a paternalistic entitlement society.” He added that anyone can succeed all alone in America: “When the American people no longer believe that this a place where only their willingness to work hard and to act with honor and integrity and ingenuity determines their success in life, then we’ll have a bunch of people sittin’ on a couch waiting for their next government check.” Senator Rand Paul, who prides himself as a wonk, likewise downplayed wealth inequality, by asserting that it is simply “due to some people working harder and selling more things.” Mitt Romney even disparaged nothing less than “47 percent” of all Americans for being “dependent upon government.” “I’ll never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives,” he insisted.*

Of course, some people are indeed lazy and irresponsible. But the case of the working poor belies the stereotype that the impoverished are, by and large, idle welfare recipients.84 Besides, it is not the poor alone who are in a

* Romney was referring to the 47 percent of people who did not pay income taxes in 2011, which he ludicrously equated with the Democratic electorate. First, these “47 percent” include not only the destitute but also students and the elderly who do not pay income taxes because of their low income. Second, many of them pay other taxes, such as payroll taxes. Th ird, some do not pay income taxes because of tax cuts advocated by Republicans. Fourth, many of these “47 percent” vote Republican.

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 18 5

tough predicament, as the income of the middle class has stagnated or slightly increased for decades while the bulk of income growth has gone to the wealthiest citizens.85 Attributing systemic inequality to sloth implies that only the rich are hardworking. To be sure, Republicans are not alone in denouncing the indolence of the masses. For example, Nicolas Sarkozy, the French conservative leader, argued that on Labor Day the French should celebrate people who “really work” rather than loafers on public assistance. Yet he and other leading European conservatives support universal health care and have a much more moderate economic agenda than contemporary Republicans.

Living in a Dream

Belief in the American Dream does not serve only to rationalize inequality. It can also have a positive social infl uence by inspiring ambition. Th e prospect of fulfi lling the American Dream can be a source of hope for the poor, immi- grants, or the struggling middle class. But such idealism can hinder realism if taken too far. A large share of people with modest incomes believe they will realize the American Dream. More than one in three citizens with an annual income under $25,000 expect to do so. Further, 44 percent of those making $25,000 to $50,000 share this belief.86 Th ese fi ndings are remarkable in light of the relatively limited economic mobility in modern America.

Many destitute Americans aspire to make it out of their current situation without questioning the economic system. In Nickel and Dimed, Barbara Ehrenreich described her experience working with an impoverished maid who saw no problem with cleaning lavish mansions for a pittance. “All I can think of is like, wow, I’d like to have this stuff someday,” the maid said. “It motivates me and I don’t feel the slightest resentment because, you know, it’s my goal to get to where they are.” Ehrenreich, a writer, had conducted a social experiment by taking on the kinds of lowly jobs the working poor live on. Despite pinching pennies, she could barely subsist on the roughly $7 an hour she earned toiling as a maid, waitress, nursing-home aide, and Walmart asso- ciate. Nonetheless, she saw that only a small fraction of the working poor truly resented their miserable predicament and were interested in doing something to change it, such as unionizing.87 David Shipler made a similar observation in his study of America’s working poor: “Rarely are they infuri- ated by their conditions, and when their anger surfaces, it is oft en misdirected against their spouses, their children, or their co-workers. Th ey do not usually

18 6 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

blame their bosses, their government, their country, or the hierarchy of wealth, as they reasonably could. Th ey oft en blame themselves, and they are sometimes right to do so.” 88

Again, not all ordinary Americans are politically apathetic or eager to vote against their own interest.89 Numerous working-class and middle-class citi- zens want the government to reduce wealth inequality and provide meaning- ful public assistance programs. Th e economic downturn of the Bush and Obama years led scores of Americans to grow pessimistic about their chances of becoming affl uent. Half of the public thinks that the main reason why some people are rich is because they have had more advantages. A similar share believes that the main reason why some people are poor was circum- stances beyond their control.90 Many Americans thus doubt that they live in a meritocracy. But unbridled faith in the American Dream remains infl uen- tial in shaping the worldview of a signifi cant part of the population.

Seymour Martin Lipset emphasized that America’s lack of an “aristocratic or feudal past” has made its citizens “less class conscious” than Europeans.91 However, voting patterns might be more marked by social class in modern America than in Europe.92 In other words, America has a class-based society even though legions think it is essentially the only country without social classes.

D I V I D E D B Y C O L O R

Myriad Americans are persuaded that poor people have only themselves to blame for their predicament. Beyond the ideology behind the American Dream, this perspective is frequently rooted in racial and ethnic stereotypes. A sizable share of Americans equate “big government” with little more than a system of handouts to people of color who do not want to work.

America has historically been the Western nation with by far the highest proportion of racial and ethnic minorities. Th is has hindered economic soli- darity by separating ordinary Americans into distinct communities. Generations of white labor unions illustratively were either ambivalent about or hostile toward embracing black, Latino, and Asian workers.93 Such divi- sions have been less infl uential in shaping economic attitudes in other Western countries, which had few, if any, people of color until the surge of immigration following World War II. Today the proportion of minorities in America still dwarfs those in European nations.

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 18 7

Make America Hate Again

In the last chapter we saw that it would have been more diffi cult for the G.O.P. to defend winner-take-all economics if the South had not become solidly Republican partly because of resentment toward racial desegregation beginning in the 1960s. But the backlash against racial integration was not limited to Southerners convinced that integration violated “states’ rights.” Slavery and segregation were abolished earlier in the North, although inte- gration had been limited in practice. Attempts to remedy this problem by busing white and black children to public schools in other neighborhoods were frequently resented and even led to violent protests in Boston in the 1970s. Meanwhile, affi rmative action policies contributed to the growth of the African-American middle class yet solidifi ed the impression of certain voters that the Democratic Party had done too much to help blacks. Reagan, the father of the modern G.O.P., fomented this resentment by insinuating that lazy blacks on welfare were heavily responsible for the country’s eco- nomic problems,94 proclaiming his support for “states’ rights,” and saying that the government has no business fi ghting discrimination: “If an indi- vidual wants to discriminate against Negroes or others in selling or renting his house, it is his right to do so.” 95

Two chairs of the Republican National Committee, Michael Steele and Ken Mehlman, ultimately admitted that, for over forty years, the G.O.P. pursued a “Southern Strategy” seeking the vote of whites hostile to racial progress. Th e party tried to “benefi t politically from racial polarization,” as Mehlman apologetically acknowledged in 2005.96 Th ey appear to be excep- tions. Other Republicans have typically been outraged by the notion that racism has shaped their party’s ideology or strategy in the postsegregation era. Aft er all, the G.O.P. has not used explicitly racist language like the segrega- tionists of yesteryear. But that is precisely because the Southern Strategy epitomized dog whistle politics—coded language targeting people at a con- scious or subconscious level. Th e strategy involves “three basic moves,” as the legal scholar Ian Haney López explains: “a punch that jabs race into the con- versation through thinly veiled references to threatening nonwhites,” “a parry that slaps away charges of racial pandering, oft en by emphasizing the lack of any direct reference to a racial group or any use of an epithet,” and “a kick that savages the critic for opportunistically alleging racial victimization.” 97

Lee Atwater, a prominent Republican operative behind the Southern Strategy, perfected this game. As he stated in a 1981 off -the-record interview

18 8 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

that was republished with his name aft er his death, “You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘Nigger, nigger, nigger.’ By 1968 you can’t say ‘nigger’—that hurts you, backfi res. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff , and you’re getting so abstract.” 98

As market fundamentalism grew increasingly infl uential beginning with the Reagan revolution, government assistance was commonly framed in racially coded terms. For instance, a “welfare state” technically describes a government that provides for the public’s well-being in key areas, such as edu- cation, health care, housing, and retirement. However, “welfare” has become one of the most racially charged words in America, as to some it conjures the image of shift less blacks happy to depend on government handouts. In reality, people “on welfare” have never exceeded approximately 5 percent of the U.S. population, and they now constitute around 2 percent. Besides, blacks are a minority of welfare recipients, and abuse is not as widespread as politicians profess.99

Various Republicans thus sought to obstruct Barack Obama’s economic program by equating it with black America’s supposed culture of welfare, crime, and anti-white racism. Pat Buchanan alleged that “Obama is a drug dealer of welfare” who “wants permanent dependency.” Senator Tom Coburn agreed that Obama wanted to “create dependency because it worked so well for him.” “As an African-American male,” Coburn claimed, Obama had received “tremendous advantage from a lot of these programs” on his agenda. Michele Bachmann compared “Obamacare” to “crack cocaine.” Rush Limbaugh described Obama’s health care reform as “a civil rights bill” and “reparations” for slavery. Representative Mo Brooks equated Obama’s agenda with “a war on whites.” Glenn Beck asserted that Obama “has a deep-seated hatred for white people or the white culture” and is “a racist.” A full 42 per- cent of Republicans shared Beck’s view that Obama is “a racist.” 100 Sarah Palin concurred that Obama aspired to take America “back to days before the Civil War,” to a time “when we were in diff erent classes based on income, based on color of skin.” A sophisticated statistical study confi rms that these are not fringe views, as most white Americans now believe that anti-white racism is worse than anti-black racism.101

Donald Trump capitalized on this resentment. Aft er being an early pro- ponent of conspiracy theories about Obama’s birth certifi cate, he campaigned for president on a bigoted and anti-immigration platform. Incited by his incendiary rhetoric, his supporters assaulted minorities in various incidents. Aft er a white man punched a black protestor at a rally, Trump said, “Th at’s

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 18 9

what we need a little bit more of.” Trump even expressed ambivalence about disavowing Ku Klux Klan supporters.

Th e Republican establishment occasionally distanced itself from Trump’s campaign, although its dog whistles have long conveyed comparable messages more politely. Jeb Bush, perhaps the most moderate candidate in the 2016 Republican primary, notably reiterated that Democrats win the black vote by saying, “Get in line, we’ll take care of you with free stuff .”

Other establishment Republicans made similar claims in the 2012 presi- dential race. Newt Gingrich declared that “the African-American commu- nity should demand paychecks and not be satisfi ed with food stamps.” Rick Santorum likewise confl ated African-Americans with welfare cheats, insist- ing, “I don’t want to make black people’s lives better by giving them some- body else’s money.” Moreover, Mitt Romney falsely claimed that Obama wanted to “gut welfare reform” by ending work requirements. Aft er losing the election, Romney attributed the outcome to the “gift s” that Obama had handed out to his base, “especially the African-American community, the Hispanic community and young people.”

To a lesser degree, Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and other Democrats also used dog whistles to rally white voters and co-opt the Southern Strategy.102 In her 2008 primary contest against Obama, Hillary Clinton remarkably argued that she had “a much broader base,” given her popularity among “whites.” “Obama’s support among working, hardworking Americans, white Americans, is weakening,” she stressed, implying that blacks are averse to work.

Notwithstanding Obama’s election and reelection, dog whistle politics particularly helped the G.O.P. galvanize its base to obstruct the fi rst black president’s agenda. Th e emergence of the Tea Party movement, oft en described as a revolt of fi scal conservatives fed up with “big government,” had a palpable racial dimension. Tellingly, 52 percent of Tea Partiers deemed that too much had been made of black people’s problems, compared to 28 percent of the general public.103 Another study concluded that Tea Partiers “are over- whelmingly white, but even compared to other white Republicans, they had a low regard for immigrants and blacks long before Barack Obama was presi- dent, and they still do.” 104

Othering People

In the United States, recipients of public assistance are commonly stereotyped as blacks and Latinos. On one hand, it is true that these minorities

19 0 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

disproportionately receive public assistance, because they are poorer on average. While society regards education as an equalizer, the net worth of black college graduates is ten times lower than that of white college graduates.105 Institutional and individual racism heavily contribute to this stark disparity. When identi- cally qualifi ed minorities and whites apply for the same jobs, for instance, the former are less likely to be interviewed or hired.106 On the other hand, minori- ties do not have a monopoly on economic hardship. Around 42 percent of all low-income families are white, whereas 30 percent are Latino and 22 percent are black.107 As a result, many low-income whites receive public assistance.

In addition to racial stereotypes, attitudes toward the welfare state in America have been infl uenced by the misconception that it exists only to help the poor. In fact, the middle class has greatly benefi ted from a broad range of public assistance programs. In what appears to be cognitive dissonance, numerous citizens who benefi t from the U.S. welfare state are willfully blind to that fact. Almost six in ten Americans say they have never “used a govern- ment social program.” It turns out that 94 percent of those who denied doing so had availed themselves of at least one program. In particular, around 40 percent of the people who had received benefi ts from Medicare, Social Security, Pell Grants, the GI Bill, or unemployment subsidies claimed they had never used a government program. People who identifi ed as “liberal” were far likelier than those who identifi ed as “conservative” to admit to hav- ing used a government program,108 recalling the factual divide between lib- eral and conservative America. A signifi cant share of those who think they have not benefi ted from government assistance are, in all likelihood, work- ing-class and middle-class whites who deem that the welfare state exists not for them but for other people. Th ere is little doubt that these “others” are mainly envisioned as lazy blacks or Latinos on welfare.

Public assistance at the peak of the New Deal was less seen in racial terms, as people generally grasped that most of its benefi ciaries were white.109 Th at was partly because pro-segregation Southern Democrats had suffi cient lever- age to ensure that economic reforms were implemented discriminatorily. For example, professions that made up the majority of the black labor force, such as farmworker and maid, were deliberately excluded from legislation estab- lishing modern unions, minimum wages, and maximum work hours, as well as from Social Security until the 1950s. Benefi ts granted to veterans under the GI Bill were likewise administered discriminatorily. Th e New Deal conse- quently was much more helpful to whites than to blacks in the attainment of middle-class status.110

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 19 1

Th e civil rights movement of the 1960s, which initially focused on racial discrimination, eventually broadened its message by calling for economic rights for poor Americans of all colors. Th is led Martin Luther King Jr. to fall into disfavor with some white civil rights supporters, who did not agree with his interracial message of socioeconomic justice, not to mention his outspo- ken opposition to the Vietnam War.

But for racial and ethnic divisions, Americans would be likelier to embrace the welfare state and a universal health care system. Southern states with large black populations, such as Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, vote solidly Republican in presidential elections despite being among the poorest states nationwide. Th at is partly because certain white Southerners associate the Democrats with policies assisting African-Americans, which exacerbates their suspicion of “big government.” A revealing study indicates that states with large black populations have more-limited poverty assistance programs than other states. A strong correlation exists between racial homogeneity and support for wealth redistribution.111

Such divisions have been less infl uential in hindering economic solidarity in Europe. Few white Europeans assume that the welfare state exists mainly to assist racial minorities. Universal health care is widely accepted there, and documented immigrants normally have full access to it. Th at is funda- mentally not because there is less racism in Europe but because of distinct historical circumstances.

Western European welfare states, which emerged in the nineteenth cen- tury, aimed to assist downtrodden members of society. Aside from oppressed groups like Jews and Roma, underprivileged Europeans were mostly white Christians. Enslaved or colonized people of color under the domination of Europeans predominantly lived in remote continents: Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas. Racial minorities formed only a tiny segment of Western Europe’s population until the post–World War II surge in immigration from former colonies. European welfare states were thus largely conceived before their populations became less homogenous.112

Nowadays, even far-right European parties such as France’s Front National do not denounce the welfare state per se, which they describe as an important service that should be for “citizens” only.113 (Again, many of the “immi- grants” they want to get rid of are second- or third-generation citizens of color.) Th e logic of the modern European far right is analogous to National Socialism, the Nazi doctrine, minus its extreme violence and militarism, as it rests on the following idea: “We take care of our own but not others.”

19 2 • S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

By contrast, the G.O.P. is categorically opposed to universal health care for a host of reasons, including racial stereotypes. Scores of white U.S. con- servatives incorrectly perceived “Obamacare” as a handout to blacks and Latinos, even though millions of its benefi ciaries were white.114 Unlike in Europe, race has almost always been in the background when people in America have contemplated economic issues.

Much of the American public has nonetheless grown highly tolerant. People of color are present in spheres of power and infl uence to a greater extent in modern America than in other Western nations, as epitomized by Obama’s election. Racial and ethnic divisions may therefore eventually diminish as obstacles to economic solidarity. Still, the nation’s outstanding diversity has disturbed the popular psyche. As the ever insightful Richard Hofstadter observed back in the 1960s, “We boast of ‘the melting pot,’ but we are not quite sure what it is that will remain when we have been melted down.” 115

A T Y P I C A L I N S T I T U T I O N S A N D A P A T H E T I C V O T E R S

While acute wealth inequality in America partly stems from the peculiar cultural and historical factors discussed so far, distinctive institutions have also helped cement the status quo. We saw in Chapter 1 that federalism, the separation of powers, the Senate fi libuster, and the Electoral College hinder simple majority rule, unlike in other Western democracies. Th ese atypical U.S. institutions can empower a minority of legislators, primarily Republican hardliners, to obstruct reforms that would benefi t most Americans. More to the point, Donald Trump and George W. Bush became president despite losing the popular vote.

Yet such institutional factors are probably not the main reason why mod- ern America’s economic system is highly unequal. Aft er all, a relatively bipar- tisan consensus about the legitimacy of a more equal economic system emerged around the New Deal. Th e ideological nexus shaping a visceral sus- picion of government therefore appears critical to understanding modern America’s evolution into a winner-take-all economy.

If poor, working-class, and middle-class Americans resolutely supported a “new New Deal,” it might become a reality, given their overwhelming vot- ing power. Th is brings us to the question of voter turnout, which is not a singularly American problem. In many democracies, a large share of the elec-

S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T • 19 3

torate does not vote and is deeply apathetic. But voter turnout still tends to be lower in America than in other Western nations.116 Illustratively, turnout was 58 percent in the 2012 U.S. presidential election, compared to 80 percent in the French presidential election the same year.117

Poor turnout in America refl ects not only apathy or the undemocratic inconvenience of having to vote on a weekday but also the potential impact of atypical institutions. Because of the Electoral College, some citizens may see little point in casting a ballot in states where a clear majority will vote either Democrat or Republican, say Massachusetts or Texas. Th ey might be more motivated to vote in a direct presidential election, where every vote would count.118 Besides, why should Florida, Ohio, and a few other swing states decide America’s fate? And why should unrepresentative states such as Iowa and New Hampshire have disproportional leverage in elections by kick- starting the primary and caucus season?

Despite the shortcomings of democracy, voting is not futile. Lack of turn- out among working-class and middle-class citizens helps explain why modern America is so unequal. Failing to vote is a good way to ensure that one’s interests will be overlooked.

19 4

Before serving as a defense lawyer for indigent New Yorkers, I represented juveniles in Chicago while attending law school at Northwestern University. Under the guidance of astute professors who had forgone lucrative careers in business to fi ght for justice, my classmates and I defended Alberto, a fi ft een- year-old Latino teenager accused of several violent felonies. He faced decades in prison. I had a chance to forge a bond with Alberto as I visited him in detention. His empty eyes were always fi lled with despair as he tried to grasp that he might spend his entire life locked up for the misdeeds of his youth. Aft er grueling litigation in which prosecutors painted him as a callous preda- tor, Alberto fortunately received a fairly moderate sentence, due to the zeal- ous pro bono representation of Northwestern’s Legal Clinic. But many American teenagers wind up serving life sentences. Other Western democra- cies consider life sentences for juveniles blatant human rights violations. If this is how the U.S. penal system treats children, one can imagine the pun- ishments it metes out to adults.

Th e lyrics of “Th e Star-Spangled Banner” describe America as “the land of the free.” Its people are indeed among those who most passionately invoke “liberty.” So why is America the country most willing to incarcerate human beings? And why is it the sole Western democracy to still conduct executions, even though its people are the most suspicious of the government’s authority over their lives?

Th e U.S. criminal justice system is a microcosm of American exceptional- ism. Th e draconian sentences infl icted on racial minorities and the poor, including low-income whites, refl ect the nation’s profound inequalities. Unbridled individualism encourages numerous Americans to ignore root social causes of crime, from poverty to failing schools and lax gun control. In

S E V E N

Mass Incarceration, Executions, and Gun Violence in

“the Land of the Free”

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 19 5

their view, off enders are merely “bad people,” who must “take responsibility” for their actions. Anti-intellectualism bolsters this oversimplistic mindset, as both ordinary citizens and public offi cials commonly deem criminology, sociology, economics, psychology, and psychiatry irrelevant to understanding criminal behavior. Th e black-and-white morality of Christian fundamental- ism, particularly in the Bible Belt, reinforces the tendency to view off enders as little more than evildoers. And the extraordinary role of demagogy in U.S. politics exacerbates all of these factors. Politicians, judges, and prosecutors oft en get elected by fomenting fear and vowing to be “tough on crime.” As a result, American justice strongly emphasizes harsh retribution, not rehabili- tation or prevention. Paradoxically, draconian punishments have not made America safer than countries with “lenient” policies. It has by far the highest murder rate in the West and the most gun violence.1 Meanwhile, indiff erent or defi ant attitudes toward human rights shed light on the normalization of dehumanizing practices in the United States.

Contrary to other aspects of American exceptionalism explored in this book, criminal justice is an area where both U.S. conservatives and U.S. liber- als are outliers in the modern Western world. Executions are concentrated in the South, but prison terms in red and blue states alike are draconian by international standards. No single factor can explain this phenomenon. A poisonous cocktail blending multiple peculiar ingredients has led modern America to have a justice system in name only.

T H E D E G E N E R A T I O N O F A M E R I C A N J U S T I C E

Alexis de Tocqueville, who thoroughly studied American prisons in the 1830s, wrote that “in no country is criminal justice administered with more mildness than in the United States.” 2 Illustratively, Michigan and Wisconsin permanently abolished capital punishment as early as 1846 and 1853, respec- tively, well before Western European countries, which generally did so in the twentieth century. Th ere was never a golden age of criminal justice in America, as lynchings and chain gangs demonstrate,3 but it once was com- paratively advanced.

Few observers today would make the same observation as Tocqueville, who advised France to adopt elements of American justice.4 To modern experts in the United States and abroad, American justice is now largely a model of disastrous policies to avoid. Because of the rise of mass

19 6 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

incarceration, America has approximately 25 percent of the world’s prisoners despite having 5 percent of the world’s population.5

Figure 1 (see page 4) shows that America incarcerates around fi ve times as many people as Britain, seven times as many as France, Ireland, and Italy, and ten times as many as Scandinavian countries like Norway and Sweden. Naturally, some American states are more punitive than others. Th ose with the highest incarceration rates are in the South and Midwest, including Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma. Nevertheless, even the states with the low- est incarceration rates, such as Maine and Massachusetts, are far more inclined than other Western democracies to lock people up.6 In some ways, American prison terms are harsh even compared to those in dictatorships like Cuba or Iran.7

As of 2016, the U.S. incarceration rate had technically been surpassed by the Seychelles—a tiny African archipelago with a troubling human rights record.8 But since the rate represents the number of prisoners per 100,000 people and the population of the Seychelles is 90,000, that means it has barely 800 prisoners, compared to over 2.2 million in America.9

Th e same crimes are punished drastically more severely in America than in other Western nations. Sentences for violent crimes are generally fi ve to ten times longer in America than in France, for example.10 A substantial proportion of U.S. prisoners serve lengthy terms for relatively minor off enses like burglary or selling $15 worth of drugs. People locked up for nonviolent crimes represent around half of state prisoners.11 In addition to shorter sen- tences, European authorities are likelier to rely on alternatives to incarcera- tion, including community-based rehabilitation programs, probation, and fi nes.12 Political and legal authority are much more decentralized in America’s federal system, rendering policy-making less coherent than in European nations. Data suggest that local American prosecutors, who enjoy extensive discretion, played a particularly important role in driving mass incarceration for decades, given their growing willingness to fi le felony charges.13

America does not have an extraordinarily repressive justice system because it has an extraordinarily high crime rate. Its murder rate is by far the highest in the West, but its rates for other crimes are ordinary.14 America’s incarcera- tion rate was comparable to those of European nations until the 1970s.15 Mass incarceration stems from the emergence of peculiar attitudes toward crime. Th e notion that both serious and minor off enders need to be elimi- nated from society or cast away for a long time gained ground in the 1980s as American justice regressed dramatically.

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 19 7

And Justice for All

Th e evolution of American law in the 1960s did not suggest that the country was on the path to building the most ruthless penal system in the history of modern democracy. Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court concluded that penal practices routinely ran afoul of the Constitution. In Mapp v. Ohio (1961), it held that evidence seized by the police in unconsti- tutional searches cannot be admitted at trial. Until then, what is known as the exclusionary rule had not covered the actions of state governments, only federal authorities. Th e rationale was deterring police misconduct, at the possible price of acquitting the guilty. In reality, relatively few people have gone free because of this rule. Motions to suppress evidence are diffi cult to win, since the defendant’s word is pitted against that of a police offi cer, more conservative justices carved out various exceptions to the rule in later decades, and the police can circumvent legal challenges by easily obtaining search warrants from pliant judges in a nonadversarial process.16 Still, Mapp became a cornerstone of constitutional law, as did the Warren Court’s subsequent decision in Brady v. Maryland (1963), which held that law enforcement cannot keep secret “any evidence favorable to an accused,” since this could notably result in the conviction of an innocent.

Th e Warren Court went one step further by holding in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) that the police must give the now famous warnings to sus- pects before interrogating them: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot aff ord an attorney, one will be provided for you.”* Consequently, a confession by an unwarned defendant might no longer be admissible at trial. In practice, however, Miranda changed little. Most defendants waive their right to remain silent because they naïvely think they can talk their way out of accusations or because police goad them into talking. Th ose who invoke their Miranda rights are typically recidivists or well-to-do defendants who understand how the law works. Besides, the justices also carved out vari- ous exceptions to this rule over time.17 Miranda nonetheless remarkably held that incommunicado interrogations are “destructive of human dignity” and serve “no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner” through “intimidation.”

* Th e warnings need not follow this precise wording.

19 8 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

Among other key reforms, the Warren Court ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) that states must provide lawyers to criminal defendants who cannot aff ord them. It unanimously held that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.” Many indigent defendants previously had no lawyers at all. Th e Warren Court additionally revolutionized juvenile justice by holding in In re Gault (1967) that children cannot be locked up without constitutional due process. Th e Warren Court did not focus solely on criminal justice, of course, as Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was among its seminal decisions. To this day, it is considered the most liberal Supreme Court in history.

Th e Warren Court’s decisions led to a backlash, as certain conservatives felt it went too far in expanding the rights of black people and criminals.18 Th at resentment refl ected broader concern about social change in the 1960s, a decade that contributed profoundly to the polarization of America. To many liberals, this period marked achievements toward greater equality and fairness: the civil rights movement, the sexual revolution, anti-war protests, and other challenges to the establishment. But the sixties also gave rise to a counter-counterculture among those hostile to the liberalization of society.19 Dubbed the “Silent Majority,” they had no sympathy for prisoners, black militants, feminists, or anti-war protestors. In their view, a Supreme Court run amok had violated “states’ rights” by acting as an unelected liberal legis- lature. Th e deep-seated suspicion of “ judicial activism” among Republicans can largely be traced to this period.

Beginning in the Nixon presidency, the Supreme Court has been staff ed by increasingly conservative justices, some of whom made no secret of their hostility to Earl Warren’s court. Th at evolution paralleled the rise of the so- called tough on crime movement as Supreme Courts headed by Chief Justices Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Roberts rubber-stamped dra- conian punishments that the Warren Court would probably have found unconstitutional.

No Mercy

America’s state prison population surged by more than 700 percent from the 1970s to the 2010s.20 Th at partly refl ected a “massive and incontestable” rise in crime from the 1960s to the 1980s,21 although the prison population explosion is explained more by how America responded to crime than by crime itself.22 Mass incarceration represented not merely a shift toward

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 19 9

draconian sentences but also a radically diff erent way of thinking about crime.

While rehabilitation had become a driving principle of American justice by the 1960s, it was mostly abandoned in the following decades, as David Garland describes in Th e Culture of Control. Conservative critics charged that criminology was a fi eld tainted by liberal assumptions, because rehabili- tation does not work.23 Th e rehabilitative model did not cause the spike in crime, but it could entail a lack of pragmatism by discounting “occasional, opportunistic, rationally motivated off ending,” since it “spoke to no particu- lar pathology and off ered no opportunity for expert treatment or correc- tional reform.” Despite its imperfections, the rehabilitative model grasped the infl uence of social circumstances on criminal behavior. Its repudiation was synonymous with a shift toward an oversimplistic conception of crime: bad people doing bad things. Policy-making became animated by a “zero- sum” attitude whereby “the off ender’s gain is the victim’s loss, and being ‘for’ victims automatically means being tough on off enders.” 24

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court abdicated its duty to review “cruel and unusual punishments” under the Eighth Amendment by interpreting it so narrowly as to practically eliminate it from the Constitution.25 Th e justices thus licensed “three-strikes laws” infl icting extremely long prison terms on recidivists with three felony convictions of any gravity. In 1980, they upheld Texas’s three-strikes law and affi rmed the life sentence of a man convicted of credit card fraud, forging a check, and obtaining money under false pre- tenses—nonviolent property off enses worth less than $230 in total.26 Th e court revisited the issue in 2003 and upheld California’s three-strikes law. Th e defendant in that case received a fi ft y-year-to-life sentence for shoplift ing videotapes worth $153, as he already had convictions for theft , burglary, and marijuana transportation.27 Th at decision was authored by Sandra Day O’Connor, who was then considered a moderate or centrist justice. Furthermore, in an infl uential precedent upholding a life sentence for cocaine possession, the court explicitly held that the Eighth Amendment does not require that a prison sentence be “proportional” to the crime.28

Th ose three cases were decided by 5–4 margins by conservative justices who rationalized their votes as deferring to states’ rights to run their justice systems as they wished. Because of such precedents, prisoners serving obscenely long sentences had no constitutional recourse. Th e court’s logic could be read between the lines: “If people want merciless justice, let them have it.”

2 0 0 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

Fueling the Hysteria

During a 1988 presidential campaign debate, a journalist asked the Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis if he would hypothetically support executing a man who had raped and murdered Dukakis’s wife. “No,” the candidate calmly responded, “I think you know that I’ve opposed the death penalty during all of my life.” Dukakis’s answer may have helped cost him the election against George H. W. Bush, as critics impugned his unwillingness to kill in vengeance as a character fl aw.

If politicians fear being similarly called “soft on crime,” it is partly because news coverage in America is oft en sensationalized, as reporters tend to favor shock value.29 News coverage of crime escalated in the 1990s even as crime dropped, thereby giving the impression that society was increasingly danger- ous. Blacks and Latinos were likelier than whites to be portrayed as social predators.30

Politicians tried to capitalize on fear. Th e 1996 Democratic platform thus adopted an approach to crime that earlier Democrats had condemned. “Today’s Democratic Party believes the fi rst responsibility of government is law and order,” the platform stated, refl ecting the view of the Clinton admin- istration. However, in 1972 the Democrats had declared that the Nixon administration’s “law and order” approach justifi ed “repression and political persecution.” By the same token, the 1972 Democratic platform vowed to “abolish capital punishment,” depicting it as “an ineff ective deterrent to crime, unequally applied and cruel and excessive.” By 1996 the Democrats were instead boasting of having made the death penalty applicable for more crimes.31

In 1992, when then–Arkansas governor Bill Clinton was out of state cam- paigning for the presidency, he returned to Arkansas to signal support for its execution of a seriously mentally impaired black prisoner.32 Clinton later declared, “No one can say I’m soft on crime.” 33 George W. Bush equally sought to burnish his presidential credentials by emphasizing his satisfaction with Texas’s 152 executions during his tenure as governor, despite his avowed “compassionate conservatism.” As for Obama, he said that the death penalty “does little to deter crime,” though he supports it in cases “so heinous, so beyond the pale, that the community is justifi ed in expressing the full meas- ure of its outrage.” In fact, that rationale is likely to justify executions in virtually all murder cases—any deliberate homicide is an understandable source of outrage. Obama’s phrasing is also misleading because “the full

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 01

measure” of outrage would be not simply death but also torture or mutila- tion, as in executions of yesteryear. Upon viewing executions by lethal injec- tion, certain victims’ relatives express frustration that the prisoner did not suff er enough.34 Politicians indulge such ideas when they bow to calls to kill prisoners.

Hillary Clinton embraced the push for increased executions and draco- nian prison terms in the 1990s. Far from a passive First Lady, she was a respected policy adviser whose opinion mattered. She notably supported the harsh 1994 federal crime bill by citing pseudoscientifi c and racially coded studies about juveniles. “Th ey are not just gangs of kids anymore,” she warned. “Th ey are oft en the kinds of kids that are called ‘super-predators.’ No conscience, no empathy.” 35 Multiple experts denounced the “teenage super- predator” theory as a myth. Its chief proponent, the political scientist John DiIulio, later disavowed his research as juvenile crime dropped considerably, counter to his predictions of a teenage crime onslaught.* To his credit, DiIulio tried to undo his damage by calling for reform. It was too late for countless children. New state laws facilitated the transfer of adolescents to criminal court, where they were prosecuted as adults and received unforgiv- ing sentences.36 Figure 9 shows that the gulf in incarceration rates between America and other Western democracies nowadays is even worse for children than for adults.

Th e greater responsiveness of American offi cials to calls for ruthless justice contributed to this extraordinary repressiveness. America is essentially the sole country worldwide with elected judges and prosecutors.† Th eir counter- parts abroad are either political appointees or career civil servants.37 Nonelected judges and prosecutors enjoy more independence, as they are fairly insulated from calls to crack down on crime if they want to stay in offi ce. But even ordinary elected politicians in Europe have been far less inclined than their American counterparts to embrace ruthless justice. Th ere has been a movement to make sentences harsher in Europe, yet it has focused on violent crimes. Europe has seen no push to make sentences extremely harsh for all off enders as in America.38 Diff erent racial dynamics and atti- tudes toward human rights partly explain why European politicians appear

* As we saw in Chapter 2, DiIulio later joined the George W. Bush administration but left aft er a few months because he found that it devoted insuffi cient attention to rigorous policy analysis.

† In the federal system and certain states, judges and prosecutors are appointed, not elected.

2 0 2 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

more responsible than U.S. politicians in refusing to heed calls for degrading punishments, as we will see below.

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to imagine U.S. offi cials passively responding to public pressure for retribution. Certain politicians, judges, and prosecutors are elected precisely by fomenting hysteria, such as by promising to get “tough on crime” and denigrating their adversaries as “soft on crime.” Some run televised ads boasting about the number of people locked up or executed during their tenure.39 Without demagogy by politicians and mis- leading media coverage, the public would probably have been less inclined to embrace the “tough on crime” movement.

Indeed, much of the public does not fully grasp that draconian punish- ments are routinely imposed in their name and on their behalf. Practicing law in Manhattan from 2006 to 2009, I tried to get a sense of the picture. Whenever friends and acquaintances asked me what I did for a living, I said that I was a public defender and usually mentioned that America practically has the top incarceration rate worldwide. Few were aware of that fact, even though the people I questioned in my informal survey were predominantly

800

600

400

200

0

Sw ed

en

G er

m an

y

Fr an

ce

En gl

an d

& W

ale s

Au st

ra lia

Un ite

d St

at es

Total incarceration rateJuvenile incarceration rate

F I G U R E 9 . Incarceration rates (prisoners per 100,000 people). SOURCES: Institute for Criminal

Policy Research, “World Prison Brief” (2016 ) (total rate); Neal Hazel, “Cross-National

Comparison of Youth Justice,” Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (2008) (juvenile rate).

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 0 3

university educated and included lawyers. Many grasped that U.S. sentencing laws are punitive, especially for drug crimes. But almost no one knew how repressive they are compared to other democracies. I recall a conversation with a student at a top law school who aspired to be a prosecutor but had absolutely no idea that America was such an outlier. She was frankly sur- prised when I described the harshness of U.S. prison sentences.

Deference to the public’s actual or supposed demands for ruthless justice has eclipsed the views of experts, most of whom have long underlined that excessive prison terms do not deter crime, are costly to taxpayers, and can hinder rehabilitation or exacerbate prisoners’ mental problems. Th e subcul- ture of anti-intellectualism examined in Chapter 2 helps to explain why experts have less input on penal policies in America than in other Western democracies.40 When I argued cases before the Manhattan state appellate court, I cited studies showing that imposing lengthy prison terms on rela- tively minor off enders is counterproductive. Th e judges tended to treat such studies as if they were totally irrelevant. When they asked me questions dur- ing my presentations, they seemed to care only about whether defendants would get their just deserts. Th ere was typically no discussion of their pros- pects for rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances. When it was the pros- ecutors’ turn to defend the sentence, judges almost never asked them to jus- tify how a lengthy stay in prison would serve justice and be in society’s best interest. Th e prosecutors’ presentations, which the judges generally found persuasive, depicted defendants as simply bad people who should spend a long time in prison without making excuses. Prosecutors would add that there was no basis for protest, since in most cases an even longer sentence could have been legally imposed, such as twenty years instead of fourteen. Whether the judges were Democratic or Republican appointees, asking them to reduce a sentence, even by a year, frequently felt like talking to a brick wall.

In sum, it is not the average person on the street who is primarily respon- sible for the degeneration of American justice but rather people in positions of power who have abdicated the important responsibilities coming with public offi ce. Simple-minded mottos like “Tough on crime,” “Zero toler- ance,” “You do the crime, you do the time,” “Adult time for adult crime,” “Lock them up and throw away the key,” “An eye for an eye,” and “Just deserts” sometimes refl ect the views of the public—but they also summarize the attitudes of many public offi cials.

2 0 4 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

Reform or Status Quo

“Increasingly, Republicans are talking about helping ex-prisoners fi nd hous- ing, drug treatment, mental-health counseling, job training and education. Th ey’re also reconsidering some of the more punitive sentencing laws for drug possession.” Th is quotation is from a 2006 news article.41 Talk about a grow- ing bipartisan consensus for criminal justice reform has continued since then, yet little has changed. In 2006, America had more than 2.2 million prisoners.42 A decade later it still did.43 Its incarceration rate has slightly decreased relative to the growth in the U.S. population. Th is reduction has also been stronger for blacks than for whites.44 America’s incarceration rate nonetheless remains enormous next to those of other Western democracies. Both Democrats and Republicans have failed to tackle the problem.

At the outset, the federal government has restricted authority in this area, regardless of Hillary Clinton’s promise to fi ght mass incarceration if she were elected president. Federal prisons hold a small minority of all inmates. Th e rest are in state prisons or county jails. Th e federal government can certainly provide incentives for reform, such as by funding state prisoner rehabilitation or reentry programs. But profound change will probably have to happen at the state and local level.

Some states have taken laudable steps. California, New York, and New Jersey signifi cantly reduced their prison populations while seeing their crime rates decline faster than the national average.45 In 2012, California voters approved a ballot initiative to scale back the state’s three-strikes law. Th e previous year, the Supreme Court had ordered California to decrease its dra- matically overcrowded prison population because “depriv[ing] prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity.” 46 As of early 2016, Governor Jerry Brown had granted parole to approximately 2,300 lifers convicted of murder and about 450 lifers convicted of lesser off enses. California had then reduced its prison population by 44 percent since 2006.47 How far this eff ort will go is uncer- tain. Even if crime declines or remains steady, some parolees will unavoidably recidivate. Th at could lead to a backlash.

In any case, ending mass incarceration will take much more than what has been done so far. Many liberals apparently think that legalizing marijuana will go a long way toward solving the problem. To be sure, a whopping 620,000 people were arrested in America for mere marijuana possession— not sale—in 2014.48 Still, people locked up for drug off enses constitute barely

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 0 5

a quarter of the prison population. Half of all state prisoners are serving time for violent crimes.49 Th e debate on ending mass incarceration has essentially focused on petty off enders, although the notion that anyone who commits a violent crime should be removed from society for decades contributed to the prison buildup. Th e real question is not whether someone has been convicted of a violent or a nonviolent crime but whether the sentence fi ts the crime. Aside from raising humanitarian questions, draconian sentences are hardly necessary for public safety. It is well established that crime drops considerably with age, for various reasons including that the last parts of the brain to evolve relate to impulse control.50 A twenty-year-old who commits a serious assault may no longer be a threat to society aft er spending a decade in prison, especially if he receives meaningful rehabilitation. Yet once draconian laws are in place, it is exceedingly challenging to scale them back. Politicians fear being labeled “soft on crime” or being blamed for the consequences if crime were to spike aft er reform.

Th e misconception that mass incarceration made America safer is another obstacle to reform.51 Aft er complacently watching Hillary Clinton distance herself from his “tough on crime” policies throughout her 2016 campaign, Bill Clinton seemed to reveal what he really thought when he vehemently responded to Black Lives Matter activists who interrupted one of his speeches to criticize his 1994 crime bill. “Because of that bill we had a 25-year low in crime, a 33-year low in the murder rate, and because of that and the back- ground-check law, we had a 46-year low in deaths of people by gun violence!” His supporters cheered. But experts dispute these claims as either baseless or grossly exaggerated. Crime began to drop before that federal law’s passage, and criminal justice is primarily handled at the state or local level.52 It is also doubtful that the 1994 crime bill greatly contributed to mass incarceration, regardless of how it ratcheted up federal penalties. Mass incarceration started well before the law’s passage.53 Th e Clintons still bolstered the “tough on crime” movement with their hardline stances and irresponsible rhetoric.

Few social scientists think that mass incarceration was the main cause of the signifi cant drop in crime since the 1990s. Experts have identifi ed various other factors, from a changing economy to revamped policing tactics, diff er- ent social circumstances, and beyond.54 Th e bottom line is that experts do not fully understand the reasons for fl uctuations in crime.55 And even if mass incarceration contributed to reducing crime, low crime levels can undoubt- edly be attained by diff erent means. No other Western democracy has adopted the ultrapunitive policies characterizing American justice. Despite

2 0 6 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

this repressiveness, Americans are generally three to fi ve times more liable to be murdered than other Westerners.56

At fi rst glance, there appears to be broad support to end mass incarcera- tion. Some 69 percent of voters say it is important to reduce America’s prison population, including 81 percent of Democrats and 54 percent of Republicans. Moreover, 58 percent believe this would “help communities by saving tax- payer dollars that can be reinvested into preventing crime and rehabilitating prisoners.” 57 Seventy-seven percent favor ending mandatory minimum sen- tences in all cases, to give judges “the fl exibility to determine sentences based on the facts of each case.” Opposition to draconian sentences seems strongest for minor drug off enses, as barely 25 percent of Americans would back a man- datory ten-year sentence for a drug dealer selling narcotics on the street, compared to 68 percent for a drug kingpin.58

Th e evolution of the parties’ platforms is also encouraging. Th e 2016 Republican platform urged improved rehabilitation, alternatives to incar- ceration, and “restorative justice.” 59 Th e Democratic platform supported “ending mass incarceration” and “systemic racism.” It equally vowed to “abol- ish the death penalty” because it is “cruel and unusual.” 60 Various prosecu- tors nationwide have additionally been elected by embracing reform, demanding more humane sentences for underprivileged minorities, and promising to swift ly prosecute police brutality. Perhaps the most memorable prosecutorial race saw Mark Gonzalez—a longtime defense attorney with “Not Guilty” tattooed across his chest—unseat a prominent district attorney in Nueces County, Texas.61

However, growing public concern and improved media coverage about harsh justice should not obscure the fact that scores of Americans still fi nd their penal system neither excessively punitive nor discriminatory. Even though the United States has world-record imprisonment levels, only 51 per- cent of Americans think there are too many people in prison.62 A vast pro- portion, 47 percent, think that “in most cases” it is “a waste of time and money” to try to rehabilitate adults convicted of violent crimes. And 36 per- cent, a big minority, feel the same way about nonviolent adult prisoners.63 Besides, a majority of the electorate is direly misinformed, as exemplifi ed by how, year aft er year, people mistakenly think that crime is rising,64 which can temper support for reform.

Unlike minorities, most whites think the justice system “treats people of all races equally,” in the face of massive evidence to the contrary.65 Whites, especially conservatives, are also likelier to think that police shootings of

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 0 7

unarmed black men are isolated incidents that do not refl ect racism or profi l- ing.66 Remarkably, Donald Trump baselessly asserted in his presidential campaign that blacks kill 81 percent of white homicide victims. Th e actual fi gure is 15 percent—it is whites who kill 82 percent of white homicide vic- tims.67 Interracial crime is less common than people realize. Data indicate that whites overestimate the share of crime by blacks and Latinos. Th ey like- wise overestimate the share of white victims.68 Fear of colored predators has hindered reform. Trump’s nativist campaign also brought “tough on crime” rhetoric back toward the center of the political debate. Misleadingly depict- ing Obama’s America as a chaotic nation falling prey to “illegal immigrants” and like-minded black thugs, Trump cast himself as “the Law and Order Candidate” when accepting the presidential nomination at the 2016 Republican Convention.

For all of these reasons, ending mass incarceration remains a tall order. It is particularly striking that much of the debate has focused on whether mass incarceration is too expensive rather than inhumane. Without a moral evolu- tion, most Americans might fi nd that mass incarceration is worth its fi nan- cial cost if crime spikes or if the price of running prisons drops because of technological automatization in the future.

A W I N D O W I N T O A M E R I C A N S O C I E T Y

America’s shift toward mass incarceration cannot be explained merely by growing conservatism, hysteria over crime, and the weight of anti-intellectu- alism over policy-making. A justice system has broad functions beyond law enforcement, as it is an extension of society’s overarching values. We will now see that the U.S. penal system embodies key aspects of American exception- alism: a thorny history of racism, sharp wealth inequality, religious tradition- alism, and a peculiar conception of democracy that discounts human rights. Th ese are all obstacles to genuine and lasting criminal justice reform, which may ultimately depend on more Americans reconsidering how they think about race, class, religion, and democracy.

Racial Discrimination

Minorities are extremely overrepresented in the U.S. penal system. Blacks constitute 13 percent of the U.S. population but around 36 percent of state

2 0 8 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

and federal prisoners. Latinos are 17 percent of the population yet 22 percent of prisoners.69 Discrimination is present at each stage of the legal process. Minorities who commit the same off enses as whites are likelier to be arrested, charged, convicted, and mercilessly sentenced.70

In Th e New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander argued that mass incarceration has replaced segregation as a means of controlling blacks. Ex-prisoners are com- monly denied the rights to vote and serve on juries, like blacks under racial segregation. Moreover, they are frequently unable to obtain work, housing, or public benefi ts, because of their criminal records. Th ey thus become perma- nent second-class citizens. Alexander traces the mass incarceration of African- Americans primarily to the “War on Drugs,” which enabled authorities to gain control over underprivileged blacks by harshly repressing petty drug off enses, such as possessing a tiny quantity of marijuana, crack, or cocaine for sale or personal use.71 While studies show that people of all colors use and sell drugs at similar rates, law enforcement has strongly focused on drug off enses by blacks. Th is disparity is not explainable by the notion that blacks are more inclined to sell drugs outdoors and can be more easily apprehended there— research suggests that police tend to ignore open-air drug markets with white dealers in white neighborhoods.72 Rather than pursue, say, white college stu- dents or yuppies who consume drugs, police instead target black people in ghettos. Black drug users are treated as dangerous thugs, whereas whites are perceived as benign, recreational users. Local police forces were given millions of dollars in federal funding to wage the “War on Drugs,” a major incentive.73 By attributing mass incarceration largely to the “War on Drugs,” however, Alexander may have underestimated the fact that drug off enders are a minority of all prisoners, many of whom are locked up for violent crimes.74

Irrespective of the nature of the crime, racism has undoubtedly contrib- uted to ruthless justice. Psychological studies show that whites are more inclined to consciously or subconsciously support harsh punishments if they perceive off enders as blacks. Fear of crime is also greater when off enders are identifi ed as blacks.75 And the “blacker” off enders are perceived to be, based on African features, the more they are perceived to deserve the death pen- alty.76 Evidence of racism in the administration of capital punishment cor- roborates psychological research.77 Modern executions have roots in the tradition of vigilante justice, as a high correlation exists between a state’s number of executions and its past number of lynchings. No less than 88 per- cent of lynchings occurred in the South, the region most likely to execute today. Th ree in four lynching victims were black.78

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 0 9

In McCleskey v. Kemp, a 1987 case, anti–death penalty advocates brought compelling evidence of discrimination in Georgia.79 An intricate statistical study demonstrated that, all other factors being equal, blacks who killed whites were likelier to receive a death sentence. Th e Supreme Court’s most conservative members were unfazed. During oral arguments, Justice Antonin Scalia derisively asked: “What if you do a statistical study that shows beyond question that people who are naturally shift y-eyed are to a disproportionate extent convicted in criminal cases? Does that make the criminal process unlawful?” John Charles Boger, who represented the black death row pris- oner, responded by pointing to the obvious: “Th is is not some sort of statisti- cal fl uke or aberration. We have a century-old pattern in the state of Georgia of animosity [toward blacks].” 80 Scalia and four other justices nonetheless chose to analyze discrimination out of its social context, including in cases from Southern states with a long history of slavery, segregation, and lynchings.

McCleskey, a 5–4 decision, held that Georgia’s capital punishment system was fully constitutional. It largely closed the door to statistical evidence as a means of challenging systemic discrimination in sentencing under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Th e majority reasoned that a defend- ant must prove intentional discrimination in his or her own case—an almost impossible standard without considering systemic patterns. Its opinion expressed concern about opening the door to other claims of systemic dis- crimination. In a memorable dissent, Justice William Brennan denounced this “fear of too much justice.”

Some state courts and legislatures have been more receptive to statistical evidence of racial discrimination in sentencing. Th e Connecticut Supreme Court remarkably acknowledged that the death penalty “inevitably open[s] the door to impermissible racial and ethnic biases.” 81 Th is was a key factor in its 2015 decision holding that executions violate the Connecticut state con- stitution. Th e state legislature had abolished capital punishment in 2012, and the court held that this reform retroactively barred people remaining on death row from being executed. Empirical evidence of racial bias and other endemic problems played a signifi cant role in both the legislative and court proceedings.82 Th at being noted, abolition was a vigorous battle in Connecticut, whose death penalty proponents vehemently denied racial bias.

Alongside blacks, Latinos face harsh sentences and stigma, regardless of their citizenship, because the immigration debate has been increasingly criminalized. Donald Trump urged the deportation of all Mexican “illegals,”

210 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

describing them as “criminals” and “rapists.” Rush Limbaugh similarly affi rmed that undocumented Mexicans are “a renegade, potential criminal element” that is “unwilling to work.” Both said aloud what many think in private. In fact, the U.S. economy could scarcely function without undocu- mented people, as the overwhelming majority come to America to work hard and lift their families out of poverty. Research strongly suggests that deport- ing undocumented immigrants, including those with criminal records, has led to “no meaningful reductions” in the crime rate.83 Th at is partly because they appear to have a lower crime rate than native-born Americans. Ironically, acculturation to American society might foster criminal conduct, as second- generation citizens are more drawn to criminal activity than fi rst-generation immigrants.84

Yet racism is hardly the sole reason for the harshness of American justice, as some argue. Racism in America long predated the shift toward draconian prison terms in recent decades.85 Besides, it is diffi cult to claim that Americans are considerably more racist than Europeans, and that this accounts for the exceptional repressiveness of American law. Minorities and immigrants are also highly overrepresented among prisoners in countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.86

What sets America apart in this area, however, is that it has historically been the Western nation with by far the biggest proportion of racial minori- ties, as discussed earlier. Racism is thus more entrenched in American insti- tutions than in European ones. Aft er all, discrimination in modern Europe has not encompassed subjecting minorities to mass incarceration and the death penalty. Furthermore, America is essentially the lone democracy that strips former convicts of their right to vote.87 Around 7.7 percent of African- Americans cannot vote as a result.88 In European countries, even current prisoners can generally vote.89

Racism may have played a lesser role in shaping European attitudes toward criminal punishment because there were relatively few people of color in Europe until the surge of immigration in the post–World War II era. Th e European Court of Human Rights, which has helped bar the kinds of dehu- manizing punishments routinely infl icted in America, was created in 1959, when Europe’s population was far more homogenous than it is today. We saw in Chapter 6 that social democracy in Western Europe, which began to develop in the late nineteenth century, aspired to lift up downtrodden mem- bers of society, who were historically white Christians. Conversely, in the United States, people in the bottom rungs of society have always included a

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 211

large minority of blacks, with whom many whites have had diffi culty identi- fying. Th e legal historian James Whitman suggested that “what must drive continental European sensibilities is the natural identifi cation that most Europeans are able to feel with their low-status ancestors. We were all, most of them can say, once at the bottom. It is precisely the nature of American slaveholding that we Americans were not all once at the bottom; most Americans do not by any means identify with African slaves.” 90 According to Whitman, this is a key reason why justice is far less humane in America than in Europe.

But race’s role is complicated. James Forman, a law professor and former public defender, stressed that legions of African-Americans supported the ultrapunitive laws leading to mass incarceration and more executions.91 Th e surge in crime from the 1960s to the 1980s helps explain their support, as it disproportionately harmed blacks. Th ese are among the critiques that Forman levels at Alexander’s “New Jim Crow” theory despite acknowledging its outstanding contributions to explaining mass incarceration. Forman notably emphasizes that few blacks supported Jim Crow segregation, unlike the “tough on crime” movement. Other experts have underlined that blacks also wanted the government to address root social causes of crime, from pov- erty to jobs failing to pay a living wage and subpar schools. Th ese calls fell on deaf ears as whites focused almost exclusively on punitiveness.92

Race is ultimately best understood as one of various factors making mod- ern American justice exceptionally harsh. My personal skepticism toward the claim that racism alone explains the problem stems from my time in Texas, where I was struck by how several of my black Democratic friends adamantly supported the death penalty in principle. Others condemned executions as inherently inhumane, echoing the stances of Martin Luther King, Frederick Douglass, and Th urgood Marshall. Th e black community is not homoge- nous. In particular, it is revealing that a signifi cant segment of African- Americans seem primarily concerned with capital punishment’s discrimina- tory application, mirroring the declarations of innumerable Democratic politicians who never suggest that executions are inhumane per se.

Whatever the reason, the sensibilities of Americans of all colors oft en dif- fer from those of other Westerners—Europeans, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders—whose penal systems are far more humane. Th is is a key reason why recognizing racism in America’s justice system would not neces- sarily mean abolishing the death penalty or draconian prison terms. To some Americans, the solution to discrimination is ensuring that harsh justice is

212 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

infl icted “equally” on people of all races. In practice, this would entail execut- ing and locking up more whites rather than abandoning dehumanizing punishments altogether.

Th is logic contributed to mass incarceration. In the 1970s and 1980s, some advocates of penal reform felt that judges favored white and well-to-do off enders because they had too much discretion at sentencing. With parti- sans of harsher justice, they backed the creation of mandatory minimum sentences leaving judges little or no discretion to consider mitigating circum- stances.* Avowed eff orts to make the law more equal therefore led sentences to ratchet up.93 Th at did not help minorities who disproportionately received ruthless sentences. It did not eliminate systemic discrimination either. Additional evidence suggests that nonracist justice may not mean humane justice. Even in predominantly white prisons in heavily white states such as Idaho, white prisoners commonly face inhumane treatment.94

Th inking of harsh justice solely in racial terms further disregards the facts that a third of state and federal prisoners are white and that around 55 per- cent of executed prisoners since 1976 have been white.95 Th ese are not negli- gible proportions. Promoting the misconception that virtually all prisoners are people of color may help perpetuate the stereotype that blacks and Latinos are criminals. Whites commit crimes too. Moreover, the misconcep- tion that almost only minorities face harsh punishment may hinder the ability of certain whites to identify with prisoners and lead them to think that the real solution to mass incarceration is for minorities to “fi x their communities” rather than expect leniency. Psychological research shows that support for penal reform increases the more whites perceive prisoners as fellow whites—and decreases the more they perceive them as blacks.96 One can draw a parallel with how racism exacerbates wealth inequality, as previous chapters describe. Just as many white Americans oppose wealth redistribution and universal health care because they wrongly think these policies would mainly assist minorities, many whites are lukewarm to penal reform because they assume it would help primarily minorities. Profound criminal justice reform will probably require a multiracial movement recog- nizing racial discrimination along with other injustices in the penal system.97

* Th at factor has gone only so far. In many cases, judges retained extensive discretion, and some have routinely infl icted draconian sentences well above the minimum.

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 213

The Other 1 Percent

Regardless of skin color, those who are locked up and executed in America usually have one thing in common: they are poor. Th e historic surge in wealth inequality in America since the 1980s coincided with the mass incar- ceration of poor people on an unprecedented scale. Strikingly, 1 percent of American adults came to be locked up while income growth fl owed into the pockets of the richest 1 percent of Americans.98 As the courts endorsed tighter control of the poor via ultrapunitive sentencing laws, they simultane- ously favored greater “liberty” for the rich with increasingly business-friendly decisions.99 Partisans of winner-take-all economics oft en dismissed compas- sion for the poor, as exemplifi ed by how George F. Will ridiculed concerns about mass incarceration being inhumane, unjustifi ed, or racially discrimina- tory. “Liberalism likes victimization narratives and the related assumption that individuals are blank slates on which ‘society’ writes,” Will stressed. “Hence liberals locate the cause of crime in fl awed social conditions that liberalism supposedly can fi x.” 100

Criminal justice systems largely refl ect economic systems.101 It is no coin- cidence that penal practices are the most humane in Scandinavian nations, known for their high degree of economic solidarity. In a society marked by sharp wealth inequality like modern America, the penal system can come to embody the notion that those on the bottom rungs of society are nuisances, if not parasites.102 Within America, states with higher levels of wealth ine- quality are more inclined to imprison people and retain capital punishment. Th at is also true at the international level: the more unequal a country is, the likelier it is to imprison people.103 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett describe these fi ndings in their groundbreaking study Th e Spirit Level: “In societies with greater inequality, where the social distances between people are greater, where attitudes of ‘us and them’ are more entrenched and where lack of trust and fear of crime are rife, public and policy makers alike are more willing to imprison people and adopt punitive attitudes towards the ‘criminal elements’ of society.” 104

Americans are likelier than other Westerners to deem that criminals have nobody but themselves to blame, and less likely to empathize with them as fellow members of society headed down the wrong road. Th is mindset relates to the attitudes toward wealth inequality analyzed in Chapter 6, especially the notion that any hardworking citizen can realize the American Dream without any government assistance. Th e Americans most opposed to assisting the poor are those most supportive of harsh sentences. Illustratively,

214 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

a study indicates “an extremely strong relationship between supporting capi- tal punishment and opposing welfare.” 105

America spends less than other Western nations on public assistance pro- grams yet considerable sums to lock up its citizens. In the 1980s, during a period of growing wealth inequality, public spending on prisons increased six times as fast as spending on education.106 America spends around $80 billion per year on corrections.107 Locking up poor people has become a lucrative business. Private prison corporations like the Corrections Corporation of America and the Geo Group have annual revenues of more than $1 billion apiece.108

Th e perceived worthlessness of the poor is epitomized by the unwilling- ness to provide them with adequate lawyers. Even in capital cases, court- appointed lawyers oft en receive scant fi nancial compensation—sometimes below minimum wage if one takes into account the combination of low legal fees and the endless hours needed to prepare a capital defense.109 Aft er serv- ing twenty years on the Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated: “Perhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards for appointed coun- sel in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.” 110 “People who are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also said in a speech. “I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve- of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was well represented at trial.” 111

Certain lawyers who represent the poor are truly committed, but system- atically underfunding the defense means that many will be inexperienced, incompetent, unmotivated, or overworked while coping with insuffi cient resources. Well-to-do judges, prosecutors, and politicians would never toler- ate such a poor caliber of defense for themselves if they risked spending one day in jail.

Divine Retribution

On the day I graduated from law school at Northwestern University, I had an unforgettable conversation with a classmate’s mother. Aft er I mentioned that capital punishment was among my areas of interest, the middle-aged white lady politely said she was pro–death penalty. I mentioned that given the number of homicides in America, executing every single murderer might mean putting to death more than ten thousand people per year. “As

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 215

they should be,” she emphatically answered. “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” Her response was probably not shaped by bigotry, since she was the parent of an interracial child. But it might have been infl uenced by religion.

We saw in prior chapters that religion evolved diff erently in the United States than in other Western nations, leading approximately four in ten Americans to gravitate toward Christian fundamentalism. By fostering a black-and-white worldview, fundamentalism encourages people to see pris- oners as evildoers deserving retribution. By contrast, liberal and moderate forms of religion have a more nuanced understanding of criminal behavior and place more emphasis on rehabilitation. Fundamentalist-leaning denomi- nations, such as the Southern Baptist Convention, Assemblies of God, and Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, tend to strongly support the death pen- alty. On the other hand, the nonfundamentalist Catholic Church, Episcopal Church, Presbyterian Church, United Methodist Church, and United Church of Christ stand against the death penalty, as do the Quakers.112

Consider the offi cial statement on the death penalty by the Assemblies of God, a Pentecostal denomination.113 While noting that not all its members support capital punishment, the statement underlines that most do: “Th is consensus grows out of a common interpretation that the Old Testament sanctions capital punishment, and nothing in the New Testament negates maximum punishment as society’s means of dealing eff ectively with serious crimes.” Th e statement goes on to suggest that life imprisonment is an unsat- isfactory alternative because “the cost of such lifetime maintenance and the number of criminals needing incarceration are genuine concerns for a society that is already heavily taxed.” Th is argument is rooted in a glaring factual error. Th e death penalty has a higher fi nancial cost than life without parole because the legal process in capital cases is extremely expensive, as we will see later in this chapter. Th at falsehood refl ects the anti-intellectualism of fun- damentalist churches, which contest basic facts on the theory of evolution, earth’s age, climate change, the eff ectiveness of abstinence-only sexual educa- tion, and other issues. Although it makes a passing reference to “the sacred- ness of human life (of the criminal as well as of the victim),” the church suggests that a tax cut has greater value than a person’s life.

Th e Assemblies of God’s statement further omits any discussion of com- passion, forgiveness, rehabilitation, or social factors behind crime, which it depicts solely as “heinous,” “despicable,” “outrageous,” and “irresponsible” conduct. While the statement briefl y notes “the power of God to transform

216 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

even the most violent sinners,” it immediately adds that this “must be bal- anced with the obligation of government to protect its citizens.” In other words, even people who have attained redemption can be executed in the interest of law and order. Finally, the statement describes executions as “ret- ribution or repayment to victims or society.” Th ere is no suggestion that kill- ing is simply wrong.

It is common for Americans to argue that their Christian faith calls for the death penalty, such as by saying, “An eye for an eye.” 114 Th is tit-for-tat mindset seems contrary to the teachings of Jesus, who reportedly said in the Sermon on the Mount: “You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also” (Matthew 5:38– 39). “An eye for an eye” is one of the few precepts from the Hebrew Bible that the New Testament explicitly rejects, yet few believers know that.115 It is hard to reconcile support for executions and other draconian punishments with Jesus’s call to “love your enemies” (Matthew 5:44). Jesus is ultimately cruci- fi ed next to two “criminals,” one of whom tells him, “Remember me when you come into your kingdom,” to which Jesus responds, “Today you will be with me in Paradise” (Luke 23:42–43).* Given that Jesus apparently did not probe whether the prisoner felt remorse for his crime, his words suggest unconditional compassion.

In other biblical passages, Jesus seems to embrace the Old Testament prin- ciple of executing people who curse and fail to honor their parents (Matthew 15:3–6; Mark 7:9–10). As Bart Ehrman and other scholars have noted, con- tradictory passages abound in the Bible.116 One cannot be certain about what Jesus would think of capital punishment if he were alive today. Still, the cru- cifi xion of Jesus—the most famous victim of the death penalty—seems to exemplify the cruelty of executions.

Th e late justice Antonin Scalia, who was revered by the religious right, off ered a distinct understanding of Christianity. A staunch supporter of capital punishment, he even dissented in rulings abolishing it for juveniles and the mentally retarded.117 He also wrote an essay claiming that executions are divinely ordained. In his opinion, “the more Christian a country is the less likely it is to regard the death penalty as immoral.” Scalia argued that,

* Th e Gospels of John, Mark, and Matthew provide diff erent accounts of the crucifi xion.

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 217

unlike people in nations that have abolished capital punishment, Americans “are more inclined to understand, as St. Paul did, that government carries the sword as ‘the minister of God,’ to ‘execute wrath’ upon the evildoer.” “I attribute [this diff erence] to the fact that, for the believing Christian, death is no big deal,” he stressed.118

“Death is no big deal” to Christians? Are most Christians somehow una- fraid of death because of their belief in an aft erlife? Are we to infer that Christians take executions more lightly and are justifi ed in doing so? In fact, millions of Christians condemn executions. Th at is the position of the Catholic Church, of which Scalia was a member.

Scalia aimed to distinguish himself from the liberal “ judicial activists” he accused of imposing their moral values on the public. He therefore began his essay by emphasizing that his own values had no bearing on how he ruled in capital cases, an incredible assertion. It is impossible for judges to wholly dissociate themselves from their worldviews when on the bench. Scalia’s essay indeed states, “I could not take part in [the death penalty] process if I believed what was being done to be immoral,” contradicting his disclaimer.

According to Scalia, the strongest justifi cation for an execution is that the “evildoer” morally “deserves” it. In his view, recognizing social factors behind crime negates “free will” and means “there is little sense in assigning blame.” From this standpoint, criminology, sociology, economics, psychology, and psychiatry have nothing to teach us about the complexities of criminal behavior—crime is simply a matter of sinful people doing evil things.

Th is approach to faith can intensify moral support for retribution among the Americans leaning toward religious traditionalism. However, we must recall that diff erent religious beliefs polarize American Christians. Attitudes on punishment refl ect this divide, as liberal and moderate believers support more humane policies. Not only do nonfundamentalist churches oppose the death penalty, but certain evangelicals have been at the forefront of criminal justice reform. William Stuntz, the great American criminal law professor, was a moderate evangelical.119 Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and other people of faith run prisoner rehabilita- tion programs.120 Numerous American secularists oppose ruthless punish- ments too. All of these Americans demanding a fairer justice system should not be forgotten, even as I focus in this chapter on those whose peculiar mindsets have led the United States to adopt exceptionally harsh punishments.

218 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

Democracy without Human Rights?

Whether a person may be executed or imprisoned for life for a crime com- mitted as a child would seem to many foreign observers a question that only a fascist regime would debate—or perhaps a society where people commonly share the peculiar conception of democracy described in previous chapters. Unlike in other Western democracies, the concepts of “human rights” and “human dignity” do not fi gure prominently in U.S. notions of law and morality. In practice, people oft en forfeit their humanity by committing a crime in America, as dehumanizing treatment is ordinary once one becomes a prisoner.

It was not before 2005 that the Supreme Court decided, in a Missouri case, that the death penalty cannot be infl icted on juveniles.121 Th ere was no consensus on the matter. Missouri defended the juvenile’s death sentence to the end, and four justices dissented. Americans can no longer be executed for crimes committed before they are deemed mature enough to vote or buy a beer. But they can still be imprisoned for the rest of their lives. America is now virtually the only country worldwide to sentence adolescents to life in prison without the possibility of parole.122 An estimated twenty-fi ve hun- dred people in America are serving such sentences for crimes committed before turning eighteen, usually homicides.123

When Arkansas defended before the Supreme Court a sentence of life without parole for a fourteen-year-old convicted of murder, the state’s lawyer argued that “the punishment for this crime reinforces the sanctity of human life.” Given that empathy for the victim of a crime and empathy for the cul- prit are not mutually exclusive, what is most striking about Arkansas’s approach is that it negated the value of the teenager’s life. It was simply a nonfactor. As Justice Ginsburg told Arkansas’s lawyer, “You’re making a fourteen-year-old a throwaway person,” who “will die in prison without any hope.” 124

Th e Supreme Court declined to abolish life without parole for juveniles under the Eighth Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishments,” although it limited its scope in two key decisions. In 2010, the court held that life without parole cannot be imposed on juveniles in nonmurder cases.125 In 2012, it added that this cannot be a mandatory sentence for a murder by a juvenile.126 Sentencing teenagers to life without parole thus remains consti- tutional, so long as it is not an automatic penalty for murder. Besides, sen- tencing teenagers to regular life sentences (with the option of parole) or

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 219

extremely long prison terms (say twenty to fi ft y years) remains perfectly law- ful. While these two decisions were signifi cant, given the justices’ habitual hands-off attitude toward draconian punishments, there was no consensus about children’s basic rights, as the cases were respectively decided by 6–3 and 5–4 votes. Th e fact that contemporary Americans are debating whether chil- dren should be among those who may be put to death or permanently incar- cerated refl ects the United States’ position on the fringe of modern Western civilization.

People oft en ask: “How did America change in recent decades to adopt such harsh justice?” What they usually overlook is that other Western democracies also changed during that period by strengthening their human rights standards, which largely preclude the degrading practices that have become routine in modern America. We will see in the next chapter that America was frequently the lone Western democracy that refused to adopt international human rights treaties spearheaded by the United Nations in the post–World War II era. Th is period also marked the creation of the European Court of Human Rights and multiple domestic human rights commissions throughout the West.127

Th is does not mean that other Western nations’ justice systems are exem- plary. For instance, France has regularly subjected prisoners to abusive, naked strip searches, which led to its condemnation by the European Court of Human Rights.128 Prison overcrowding and harsh living conditions are like- wise notorious problems in France, whose prisons are heavily fi lled with racial and ethnic minorities, including underprivileged Muslims.129 Despite dubbing itself “le pays des droits de l’ homme” (nothing less than “the country of human rights”), France has a poor human rights record compared to vari- ous other European nations. Still, its incarceration rate is seven times lower than America’s.130

No other modern Western democracy resorts to American practices such as mass incarceration, the death penalty, the merciless treatment of juveniles, placing prisoners for years in solitary confi nement,131 or shackling female prisoners while they give birth.132 Experts commonly see America as a sys- tematic human rights violator in criminal justice.

Tellingly, the detention of alleged terrorists at Guantánamo represents an extension of the notion that people forfeit their humanity by committing a grave crime. To be sure, Guantánamo went far beyond the U.S. penal system, since the camp’s creation stood for the proposition that alleged terrorists can be tortured and detained forever without trial. But Guantánamo also stood

2 2 0 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

for the proposition that the worst of the worst criminals have no human rights. It appalled scores of Americans, yet numerous others wondered what the big deal was about. Th at may be because Guantánamo fi t within the pre- existing notion that criminals’ lives have no value. It is revealing that the worst abuses there occurred under the watch of the most fi ercely pro–death penalty president in modern U.S. history. George W. Bush’s ability to run for the presidency as a “compassionate conservative” aft er 152 prisoners were put to death during his time as the governor of Texas epitomizes the worthless- ness of prisoners’ lives to a signifi cant share of the public.

To Americans, “human rights” generally evoke foreign problems, not domestic ones. Americans instead normally refer to concepts like “civil rights” or “due process” when talking about problems at home. But this is not just a semantic diff erence. “Human rights” place emphasis on protecting human dignity. Notwithstanding the growing importance of “dignity” in Supreme Court decisions,133 this principle still has far less weight in America than in other Western nations.134

Th at is a regression, given that Americans, led by Eleanor Roosevelt, played a central role in draft ing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights aft er World War II.135 It is not a binding treaty but a cornerstone of modern human rights standards, although it is less respected in modern America than in other democracies. Any American lawyer or politician citing it nowa- days would risk ridicule.

Human rights skeptics argue that America is more “democratic” than other Western nations whose elected offi cials are less inclined to heed their citizens’ calls for merciless justice. In particular, the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in the face of rela- tive popular support has been criticized as contrary to democracy—an alleged refl ection of elitist leaders’ preferences. Indeed, diff erences in public opinion go only so far in explaining why America is the only Western nation to retain capital punishment. Between 50 and 60 percent of Americans, depending on the data, favor the death penalty for murder.136 Solid majori- ties supported it in various European nations around the time of abolition. While the United Kingdom abolished capital punishment in 1965, a 1975 poll indicated 82 percent support for its reintroduction.137 But support has declined over time. In 2015, the British public’s support for the death penalty dipped slightly below 50 percent for the fi rst time on record.138 Th e trend is comparable in France, where 52 percent want to bring back capital punish- ment—a less socially acceptable view than at the time of abolition.139

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 21

Reservations are stronger in Scandinavia. Only a third of Swedes support the death penalty, for example.140

However, democracy is not limited to simple majority rule, since it encom- passes individual rights. Th is principle is more readily acknowledged when Americans think about constitutional protections for racial and ethnic minorities, gays, and women against discrimination supported by a majority of citizens.141 Constitutional rights trump the majority’s will. Th e same rationale should guide politicians and judges approaching prisoners’ rights. Th e fundamental question is not whether the death penalty, draconian prison terms, or other sentencing practices are popular. Rather, it is whether they are just and humane.

At fi rst glance, that seems to be the analysis called for by the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” But defi ning “cruel” is problematic. Th e Supreme Court has held that its meaning is not fi xed in time, as it must refl ect “evolving standards of decency,” 142 although the jus- tices have oft en disagreed about these standards. Th e Eighth Amendment ultimately may not have a particular meaning besides the one that the Supreme Court chooses, as the Constitution’s text is amenable to multiple interpretations and the justices have extensive discretion, even when consid- ering their general duty to follow precedents. From this angle, the question becomes why many justices have chosen to interpret the Constitution in a way that treats humanitarian concerns as virtually irrelevant, unlike courts in other Western democracies. Th eir agency does not exist in a vacuum. Diverse dimensions of American exceptionalism shape judicial decisions, from distinctive institutions to historical circumstances, social dynamics, and cultural sensibilities.

Killing Justice

A closer look at the death penalty can tell us a lot about American sensibili- ties. Th e United States is the only Western democracy retaining capital pun- ishment. It is also among the countries that execute the most people world- wide, alongside dictatorships like China, North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.143 More than fourteen hundred people have been executed in America since the Supreme Court reauthorized capital punishment in 1976 aft er abolishing it in 1972 on the ground that it was applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily.14 4 Th ese problems have remained pervasive despite the adoption of new procedures aiming to make the death penalty “fair.”

2 2 2 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

Meanwhile, it has been abolished in law or in practice by more than two- thirds of all countries and is increasingly recognized as a violation of interna- tional human rights standards.145

Capital punishment is very unevenly applied in the United States. Table 5 shows that the vast majority of executions are conducted in conservative America, especially Southern states. Texas alone has executed over fi ve hun- dred people since 1976, more than a third of all other states combined. By contrast, we see in Table 6 that nineteen states have abolished the death pen- alty, most being in the North and Democratic leaning. Abolition has made remarkable progress in the past decade. Disparities are huge within states too. Around 52 percent of executions since 1976 stem from merely 2 percent of counties nationwide.146

Th e distinguished National Research Council of the National Academies has found no compelling evidence that capital punishment deters crime more than prison does.147 Besides, America has a far higher murder rate than other Western nations, even though they all have abolished the death penalty. Within America, states without it have lower murder rates than states retain- ing it.148

In response, it is oft en said that society should save money by killing pris- oners rather than pay to imprison them for the rest of their lives—a claim resting on a false premise. Life imprisonment is far less expensive than the death penalty for various reasons, including the longer trial and appellate process in capital cases.149 For instance, California spends $184 million more on death penalty cases annually than it would if capital punishment had been abolished.150 Some have thus called for abbreviating legal proceedings in capital cases to save money, notwithstanding the fact that more than 150 innocents have so far been exonerated aft er being sentenced to die—

T A B L E 5 Number of executions by U.S. region from 1976 to November 14, 2016

South 1,172 Midwest 178 West 85 Northeast 4 Texas alone 538 Total 1,439

sou rce: Death Penalty Information Center.

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 2 3

sometimes aft er spending years on death row desperately contesting their guilt.151 Misidentifi cations, coerced confessions, the withholding of exculpa- tory evidence by police or prosecutors, and incompetent defense lawyers are among the main reasons for wrongful convictions.152 “If statistics are any indication,” Justice O’Connor admitted, “the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed.” 153 Th at problem is inherent to the death penalty, an irreversible punishment requiring fl awless justice. Nevertheless, 53 percent of Americans think it is “applied fairly.” 154

When it comes to capital punishment, America has more in common with the dictatorships with which it leads the world in executions than with democratic societies. A dictatorship is prepared to mistakenly execute some innocents to continue executing guilty people. By contrast, nearly all modern democracies have found it preferable to abandon the death penalty altogether rather than risk executing a single innocent person. Leaving innocence aside, a society’s attitude toward executing the guilty is even more revealing. Aft er all, recognizing that innocents should not be executed is a low benchmark of humanity.

While death sentences and executions have decreased in America since the 1990s,155 this seems primarily due to growing concern over administra- tive problems such as fi nancial cost, racial bias, and the risk of executing innocents. Talking to American death penalty opponents in both blue and red states, I have regularly been struck to hear things in the vein of “I have no moral problem with executing murderers, but I’m not comfortable with the way the system is run, so we should probably get rid of it.” Th e movement

T A B L E 6 American states and federal district without the death penalty

Year of abolition Year of abolition

Alaska 1957 Minnesota 1911 Connecticut 2012 New Jersey 2007 Delaware 2016 New Mexico 2009 Hawaii 1957 New York 2007 Illinois 2011 North Dakota 1973 Iowa 1965 Rhode Island 1984 Maine 1887 Vermont 1964 Maryland 2013 Washington DC 1981 Massachusetts 1984 West Virginia 1965 Michigan 1846 Wisconsin 1853

sou rce: Death Penalty Information Center.

2 2 4 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

against capital punishment has not necessarily been matched by a moral evolution.156

For strategic or moral reasons, U.S. death penalty opponents tend to avoid suggesting that executions are inherently inhumane. Illustratively, in a 2015 capital case about lethal injection protocols, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer issued an infl uential dissenting opinion urging legal advocates to bring a broader challenge to the death penalty’s constitutional- ity. Th eir lengthy opinion lists almost every imaginable argument against the death penalty—except the very idea that killing prisoners is inhumane.157

Conversely, opposition to the death penalty in other Western democracies is largely rooted in the idea that executions inherently violate human dignity, as they entail unnecessarily killing prisoners. Indeed, it is hardly possible to support executing a prisoner without fi rst dehumanizing him or her to remove the misgivings that we normally have about killing. Prisoners’ troubling upbringings or mental health problems are oft en disregarded. Th ey are reduced to their worst act or imagined as little more than monsters. Th ey must die.

Capital punishment negates the principle of rehabilitation and the possi- bility of redemption. Th e lengthy period between a death sentence and an execution, usually well over a decade,158 means that prisoners have frequently changed by the time they are put to death. Examples abound of prisoners who engaged in introspection, repented, and educated themselves while on death row but were still executed.159 Consider the last words of Napoleon Beazley, a black man executed by Texas at twenty-fi ve years old for a murder perpetrated at seventeen: “Th e act I committed to put me here was not just heinous, it was senseless. But the person that committed that act is no longer here—I am.”

Of course, not all killers feel remorse aft er causing victims and their loved ones tremendous hardship. Th is is a key argument used to justify the death penalty: “Remorseless people who heinously murder innocents don’t deserve to live.” In other words, most people approach the death penalty by focusing on the off ender.

But the death penalty says far more about the executioner than about the executed person. People commonly expect the government to execute people in their name and on their behalf without ever coming face-to-face with that act. Th ose who support the death penalty in the abstract might not be pre- pared to execute people themselves if they had to. How many citizens would be willing to strap human beings to a gurney, inject poison into their veins, and not fi nd satisfaction until their death? Confronting this reality might

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 2 5

raise reservations in those who romanticize the death penalty. Th e French Enlightenment philosopher Denis Diderot wrote that “our virtues depend on the sensations we receive.” He argued that people would prefer killing a human being at a distance to slaughtering with their own hands the animal they would eat for dinner.160

However, history demonstrates that many people are capable of killing in cold blood under certain circumstances. Th e genocides of World War II, Cambodia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and beyond were extraordinary atrocities committed largely by ordinary persons. Scores of people who favor executions might thus be prepared to conduct them in person, especially since the proc- ess has been sanitized in modern America. Means of putting prisoners to death have evolved from the gallows, rifl e squad, gas chamber, and electric chair to lethal injection. Th is forcible euthanasia has led to agonizing pain in various botched executions. Yet it is oft en considered the most “civilized” method. Ronald Reagan compared it to putting down an animal. “Being a former farmer and horse raiser, I know what it’s like to eliminate an injured horse by shooting him. Now you call the veterinarian and the vet gives it a shot and the horse goes to sleep—that’s it,” Reagan said before suggesting that America should adopt “more humane methods” of executing human beings.161

Th ere are reasons to be skeptical when people deem prisoners so worthless that they should be killed—and simultaneously declare that they really care about not causing them pain. Th e search for painless methods of execution is not animated by empathy. Rather, it refl ects society’s eff orts to ease its qualms about killing incapacitated persons.162 Th is ambivalence may also explain why most death row prisoners are never executed and languish behind bars until dying from “natural causes.” 163

Support for the death penalty is obviously not unique to America. Numerous people elsewhere in the West favor it despite its abolition, as noted above. What distinguishes America is “the intensity with which people iden- tify with the death penalty rather than . . . the proportion of respondents who express support,” as Franklin Zimring underlined in a comparative study.164 Expressing support for capital punishment is unlikely to mean the same thing in Sweden as in Texas. Th e third of Swedes who favor the death penalty would plausibly back it in a narrower range of cases.165 By contrast, if rhetoric from politicians and ordinary citizens is any indication, a fair number of Southerners approach the death penalty in cut-and-dried terms: you kill someone, we kill you, end of story. Living in Texas, I once debated the issue with friends at a Houston restaurant. Overhearing our conversa-

2 2 6 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

tion, a stranger at a nearby table saw fi t to interject. “I understand what you’re saying,” she said amicably, “but I think that if somebody kills someone we should do exactly the same thing to them.”

What about murder victims’ loved ones? Most will support execution, and we should honor their wish, one might argue. Since the 1990s, executions in America have been increasingly defended on the ground that killing murder- ers will provide “closure.” 166 In fact, seeking the death penalty can prolong loved ones’ suff ering, because court proceedings in capital cases take years to end.167 Capital punishment has nonetheless come to be seen as “a service program for homicide survivors,” as Zimring describes it. Th at is partly why people who are otherwise extremely wary of “big government” can feel com- fortable with government executions.168

However, not all victims are pro–death penalty. Martin Luther King notably denounced capital punishment, and his wife Coretta Scott King reemphasized this conviction aft er his assassination: “An evil deed is not redeemed by an evil deed of retaliation. Justice is never advanced in the tak- ing of a human life. Morality is never upheld by a legalized murder.” Similarly, the group Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation brings together peo- ple who oppose capital punishment despite having lost parents, children, and spouses to murder. In their view, a society cannot show that killing is wrong by vengefully killing people.169

While it is widely assumed that victims’ loved ones are entitled to see perpetrators executed, that is hardly how the system works.170 Around four- teen thousand homicides currently occur each year in America but only several dozen executions.171 Th e death penalty is sought in only a fraction of murder cases, for reasons distinct from the gravity of the crime, including prosecutors’ temperaments, whether they or judges are seeking reelection, whether counties have suffi cient funds to try death cases, the degree of news attention cases have received, and the races of victims and defendants.172 As Justice Potter Stewart famously wrote, being sentenced to death is as arbi- trary as “being struck by lightning.” 173 Nevertheless, whether the death penalty is sought is oft en interpreted as a judgment on the social worth of the victim, leading some loved ones to feel “cheated” if a murderer is not put to death.174 Empathy for victims and empathy for prisoners are commonly seen as mutually exclusive.

In 2004, I attended a protest vigil outside a Georgia prison where a man was executed for a horrible crime—raping and murdering his two-year-old niece.175 Fift y feet away from the protestors stood people who came to sup-

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 2 7

port the execution, including the victim’s loved ones. Some of them stared at us angrily. Th ey misinterpreted our stance as a sign that we condoned the crime. As the scheduled execution time arrived, a fellow protestor solemnly rang a bell and said: “We are here to mourn the victim and the man who will be executed tonight.” Moments later, an ambulance drove out of the prison. Inside lay the man who had just been put to death. Th e victim’s loved ones then started singing:

Amazing Grace, how sweet the sound, Th at saved a wretch like me. I once was lost but now am found, Was blind, but now I see . . .

“Liberty,” Guns, and Prisons

Killing seems more socially acceptable in the United States than in other Western nations. Intense support for executions among millions of Americans is matched by uncanny gun violence and gun toting. Th at is the fi nal ingredi- ent of the cocktail poisoning American justice.176

A striking contrast exists between the radical deprivation of liberty via mass incarceration and the unbridled liberty to own guns in America. To an extent, mass incarceration is a reaction to violent crime and the fear of it, both of which partly stem from the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. Any other country with as much tragic gun violence as America would most likely have repealed that amendment long ago. In fact, only nine countries have had a right to bear arms in their constitutions since 1789. By 2013, the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala were the sole ones left —and the United States construed this right considerably more broadly. Th e other nations had eliminated it from their constitutions.177 While few Americans would support repealing the Second Amendment, many demand better gun control. But this has proved impossible because of dimensions of American exceptionalism discussed in prior chapters, from the clout of moneyed inter- ests to radical anti-governmentalism.

Americans are about ten to twenty times likelier than other Westerners to be killed by fi rearms, as Figure 10 illustrates.178 Th is is a key reason why the U.S. murder rate is the highest in the West. Around 67 percent of murders in America are perpetrated with fi rearms.179 Th e number of guns per capita in America has doubled since 1968. Approximately 310 million guns are now in the hands of U.S. civilians.180 Forty-three percent of American house-

2 2 8 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

holds report owning a gun—some own several, others none.181 It is simple to obtain weapons illegally in America, such as on the street or via a “straw” purchase, whereby an intermediary buys a gun for someone who could not pass a background check.182 But what is most striking is how easily one can legally obtain guns. In multiple states, people can purchase fi rearms at gun shows without any background check or questions asked.183 State regulations barring people from buying more than one gun per month pass for signifi - cant control. Jerry Brown, California’s Democratic governor, vetoed such a provision because he felt it went too far.184 Virginia had one but repealed it.185 It later adopted a law allowing people to carry concealed weapons in bars or restaurants where alcohol is served. Th at occurred aft er the 2007 carnage at Virginia Tech cost thirty-three lives.186 Th e shooter had acquired his guns legally.187 So had the man who used semiautomatic rifl es to massacre the audience in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado.188 And the man who killed six people and gravely wounded Representative Gabrielle Giff ords in Tucson, Arizona.189 Even people with a criminal record or a history of mental illness are commonly authorized to buy guns.190

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

Au st

ra lia

En gl

an d

& W

ale s

G er

m an

y Sp

ain

De nm

ar k

Fin lan

d

Ca na

da

Ire lan

d

Un ite

d St

at es

F I G U R E 1 0 . Homicides by fi rearm per 100,000 people. SOURCE: U.N. Offi ce on Drugs and Crime

(2009 and 2010 data).

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 2 9

Stricter gun control is a major reason why other Western nations have far less gun violence. Th ere are also wrongdoers and deranged people there, but it is harder for them to lay their hands on guns. However, regulations would go only so far in limiting access to guns in America, because it has a world- record number in circulation.191

To die-hard partisans of gun rights, there is no relationship between easy access to guns and murders perpetrated with guns. Th ey believe the opposite: more guns make society safer. Numerous politicians therefore oppose basic gun control, back right-to-carry laws, and idealize vigilantism.192 According to Wayne LaPierre, the head of the National Rifl e Association, “the only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun.” Th e NR A is much more popular than its critics realize, as more than half of Americans view it favorably.193 Th e NR A spends roughly ten times more on lobbying than all gun control groups combined.194

Th e Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” Today, conservative and liberal scholars disagree about whether that refers to an individual right to bear arms or a collective right of states to maintain armed militias like the National Guard.195 Since the 1970s, the NR A has been instrumental in pushing the individualist view, which historically was the minority position.196 In a 1991 interview, the former chief justice Warren Burger argued that the NR A’s interpretation of the Second Amendment was “one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by special-interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.” Yet the Supreme Court ultimately embraced the NR A’s stance in a 2008 decision that further weakened gun control. Dismissing the “well regulated militia” clause, the court’s conservative major- ity held by a 5–4 vote that the Second Amendment provides an individual right to possess a fi rearm.197 Assuming that the amendment indeed confers such a private right, it is an anachronistic remnant of the revolutionary era.

Fift y-one percent of Americans remained opposed to banning semiauto- matic weapons even aft er an insane man massacred twenty children and six adults at an elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut.198 Th e main reforms later proposed by the Obama administration—background checks at gun shows and bans on assault weapons—were backed by most of the public but failed in Congress.199 At any rate, the eff ort’s limitations were clear when Vice President Joe Biden urged people to “buy a shotgun” instead of an assault rifl e.

2 3 0 • M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S

Th e romanticized notion of being able to lead an insurrection against Washington’s despotism is a motivating factor for the Second Amendment’s fi ercest partisans. Sharron Angle, the Nevada Republican who lost a close senatorial race in 2010, identifi ed “Second Amendment remedies” as a recourse against “a tyrannical government.” In 2016, gun-toting men took over federal land in Oregon. One died in a standoff with government forces. Twenty-nine percent of Americans, including 44 percent of Republicans, believe that “in the next few years an armed revolution might be necessary in order to protect our liberties.” 200

Th e obsession with guns refl ects a broader subculture of violence. Modern- day Americans are more inclined on average than other Westerners to embrace military force.201 Even considering the greater risk of criminals being armed in America, its legal system gives the police extensive discretion to kill suspects.202 In the fi rst twenty-four days of 2015, more people were fatally shot by American police than by police in England and Wales com- bined over the prior twenty-four years.203 Certain U.S. politicians emphasize their capacity for violence, such as then-senator Tom Coburn, who declared that “it’s just a good thing I can’t pack a gun on the Senate fl oor,” to take care of its “elitists” and “cowards,” or then–Texas governor Rick Perry, who described himself as “the kind of guy who goes jogging in the morning, pack- ing a Ruger .380 with laser sights and loaded with hollow-point bullets, and shoots a coyote that is threatening his daughter’s dog.” Perry was cheered at a Republican presidential campaign debate when he said he had no regrets about the 234 prisoners who had been executed during his tenure as Texas governor.204 Donald Trump’s supporters acclaimed him as he vowed to assas- sinate both terrorists and their families.205 Like many of his fellow Republicans, he also promised to bring back the Bush administration’s tor- ture methods. Trump encouraged mob violence at his rallies too.

American society already had a reputation for violence by the nineteenth century, as dueling or brawling to defend one’s honor was relatively common. Alexander Hamilton, the distinguished Founding Father, was mortally wounded in a duel. In the run-up to the Civil War, the South Carolina rep- resentative Preston Brooks notoriously used his cane to assault the Massachusetts senator Charles Sumner on the Senate fl oor. During his jour- ney through the South in the early 1830s, Tocqueville inquired about whether “people in Alabama are as accustomed to violence as is said.” His interlocutor, a young lawyer, unequivocally agreed: “Yes, there’s no one here who doesn’t carry weapons under his clothes. At the slightest quarrel he’ll have a knife or

M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N S • 2 31

a pistol in his hand.” Th e lawyer had several deep scars from his habitual fi ghting.206

At the dawn of the twenty-fi rst century, weapons are deadlier than ever, yet half of Americans think that ordinary citizens should have access to semi- automatic rifl es resembling those used by military troops.207 To a degree, lethal violence in America is what economists call a negative externality, namely an indirect social cost of lax gun control. To some, that is a small price to pay for the “liberty” to clench a gun.

2 3 2

America’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 has had far-reaching repercussions. It exacerbated the instability of the Middle East by spurring the rise of ISIS, the ruthless jihadist group that conquered part of Iraq and Syria. ISIS went on to organize or inspire terrorist strikes in the West, which bolstered dema- gogues playing on fear and Islamophobia. Th is ultimately contributed to the election of Donald Trump in the United States and strengthened far-right European parties.

In the early stages of the 2016 U.S. presidential race, two candidates strug- gled to explain their past support for the fateful invasion. Hillary Clinton admitted that her senatorial vote for it was a mistake based on faulty intel- ligence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), had forged an alliance with Al-Qaeda, and was involved in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Jeb Bush likewise evoked intelligence failures but was loath to recognize that his brother’s invasion was a blunder. Th e debate subsequently focused on whether describing the war as a “mistake” was accurate, given evidence suggesting that the George W. Bush administra- tion had overstated intelligence to justify an invasion driven by perceived geopolitical interests.

Other parts of the equation received little to no attention. We saw in Chapter 2 that the incurious Bush did not know about the historic sectarian tensions between Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis, which contributed to Iraq’s desta- bilization aft er America toppled Hussein.1 Bush also tried to persuade French President Jacques Chirac to back the invasion by claiming that it fulfi lled biblical prophecies.2 As Bush predicted that U.S. soldiers would be widely welcomed as liberators, only 41 percent of Americans were aware that most people worldwide strongly condemned the invasion.3 People with a modicum

E I G H T

America and the World

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 3 3

of knowledge about the Middle East were otherwise puzzled by Bush’s confl a- tion of Hussein, a largely secular Arab dictator, and Al-Qaeda, an Islamist terrorist group. Hussein’s regime had a record of repressing Islamists.4 Certain governments, especially those of France and Germany, opposed the war by disputing the intelligence that Bush advanced.5 Th ey were dismissed as cow- ards trying to appease Saddam as “old Europe” had once appeased Hitler.6

Anti-intellectualism, Christian fundamentalism, and insularity help explain why Bush persuaded a substantial share of Americans to support a war that changed the course of history. Th ese factors have received less atten- tion than other aspects of American exceptionalism infl uencing U.S. foreign policy, such as its tendency to exempt itself from international law and human rights standards.

However, the “War on Terror” proved intensely controversial, as millions of Americans were appalled by the Bush administration’s actions. Clashes over the role that the United States should play as the only global superpower have contributed to the polarization of American society. Other Westerners seldom face such disagreements. Th at is because their countries are not just far less powerful than America but also less polarized over these issues. A relative consensus exists nowadays among Europeans, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders about warfare and basic human rights.7 Th e same cannot be said about Americans. Yet it is again the views of American conservatives that are most exceptional. American liberals gener- ally agree with other Westerners that torture is unjustifi able, Guantánamo is troubling, international courts have more benefi ts than costs, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a mistake. In contrast, many American conservatives continued to defend the Iraq War even aft er it became evident that Hussein did not have WMDs or an alliance with Al-Qaeda.8 While some American conservatives have denounced torture and Guantánamo, they have been more inclined than liberals to embrace these practices. No less than 79 per- cent of self-identifi ed U.S. conservatives believe America should continue to operate the Guantánamo detention camp, compared to 33 percent of liber- als.9 Around 61 percent of Republicans think that torture is justifi able, next to 40 percent of Democrats.10 American conservatives have additionally played a crucial role in keeping the United States from adhering to interna- tional law, as Republican senators have historically led eff orts to block the ratifi cation of multiple treaties.11

Foreign policy diff erences between Democrats and Republicans are not absolute. Barack Obama opposed the Iraq War and announced an end to

2 3 4 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

torture but, as we will see, pursued other aspects of Bush’s “War on Terror” and sometimes took them further. Nevertheless, Donald Trump was elected president aft er painting Obama as a weak leader, threatening to use military force more aggressively, openly defying the international community, prom- ising to reinstate torture, and planning to end America’s participation in the Paris Agreement—the landmark 2015 international accord against climate change that Obama had fi rmly supported.

Experts commonly analyze foreign aff airs by focusing closely on interna- tional law, policy-making, and geopolitics. In this chapter I take a diff erent approach, beginning with American cultural peculiarities and then off ering a theory of how this social context helps shape attitudes toward foreign policy and international law. Th ese two approaches are not incompatible, yet the latter can shed light on the neglected roots of America’s exceptional relation- ship to the world.

R I V A L W O R L D V I E W S

Living in Texas, I regularly saw on TV a recruitment commercial for the U.S. Marines titled “Contest of Honor.” 12 It featured a man slaying a hideous fi re monster in a coliseum while spectators cheered. Th e man then transformed into a uniformed marine. Th e message was clear: U.S. soldiers are the incar- nation of good, the nation’s enemies are simply evil, and people are expected to cheer for war. But what is perhaps most remarkable about this video is that it was created before September 11, 2001. It symbolizes the longstanding infl uence of a self-righteous, black-and-white worldview in American society that only grew stronger once the “War on Terror” began.

In the age of mass media, a video montage gone viral embodies a rival worldview. Named “Where the Hell Is Matt?,” it features a globe-trotting American joyfully performing a dance routine with locals in dozens of coun- tries worldwide.13 Th is compelling performance refl ects a belief in reaching out to other cultures, and it is revealing that an American, Matt Harding, took the initiative of realizing it.

Th ese two videos illustrate two confl icting worldviews. Even though Americans have long been infl uential on the global stage, some have main- tained an insular mentality comparable to the one that reinforced the nation’s isolationist foreign policy between the First and Second World Wars. Millions of Americans rarely or never travel abroad and have sparse knowl-

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 3 5

edge of foreign nations. Parochial and chauvinistic mindsets are typically matched by fi erce suspicion of diplomacy, the United Nations, and interna- tional law. Th e Americans who share this outlook are prepared to embrace a deeply unilateral foreign policy if it appears to serve U.S. interests. Th ey have limited qualms about military force or the clout of the military-industrial complex. While this worldview is prevalent among Republicans, in Europe it can be found almost only among supporters of extreme-right, nationalist parties nowadays.

America’s global citizens tend to see the world diff erently. Th ese citizens have traveled internationally, are eager to learn about foreign cultures, and have made parts of the United States highly cosmopolitan. One frequently comes across such Americans when traveling in Europe, Africa, Asia, or Latin America. Th ey want America to assert its infl uence through diplomatic cooperation with the international community. Th ey are wary of military force. Th eir approach to international aff airs is comparable to those of most other Westerners.

Naturally, these two camps are not all-encompassing, as numerous Americans are neither parochial chauvinists nor global citizens. But these social tensions exist and stem from key dimensions of American exceptionalism.

Patriotism and Nationalism

Eight in ten Americans agree that “the U.S. has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world.” 14 Politicians of both parties recurrently emphasize faith in American superiority. Barack Obama declared that America is the “greatest nation on Earth” and “a light to the world.” His rival Mitt Romney described it similarly: “Th e greatest nation in the history of the world and a force for good.” As the journalist Scott Shane observed, modern-day Americans demand from their leaders “constant reassurance that their country, their achievements and their values are extraordinary.” 15

Th is is not a new development. Leo Damrosch, an American scholar, noted that nineteenth-century European travelers were “exasperated by the Americans’ tendency to boast about their country and to extort compliments from visitors.” Along with fl attering observations about the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that “the people here seem to me to be stinking with national conceit.” 16 He added that “no pains have been spared to con- vince the inhabitants of the United States that they constitute the only reli- gious, enlightened, and free people.” 17

2 3 6 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

Americans do not have a monopoly on national chauvinism. Charles de Gaulle and other Gallic leaders, for instance, have historically promoted a sublime image of France. A study asked people in various countries whether they agreed that “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.” Th e proportion of Americans who agreed (49 percent) was similar to those of Germans (47 percent) and Spaniards (44 percent). A signifi cant, albeit lower, share of British (32 percent) and French (27 percent) people also did.18 Yet polls can fail to account for intensity of belief. One reason why chauvinism is more intense in the United States is that Americans are both far more religious than Europeans and far likelier to think that their coun- try’s greatness has been bestowed by God. Six in ten believe that “God has granted America a special role in human history.” 19 Such ideas were fairly common in European countries in the age of their colonial empires. But few Europeans would seriously claim nowadays that God has made their country superior to others. U.S. politicians routinely proclaim “God bless America,” which comes across as arrogant navel-gazing to foreigners. If a benevolent God exists, it should bless all countries.

A comparative study confi rms that Americans are particularly proud of their nationality. Th ey also appear more self-righteous than other Westerners in claiming the authority to act militarily regardless of opposition from the international community.20 Consider this declaration by Mitt Romney: “God did not create this country to be a nation of followers. America is not destined to be one of several equally balanced global powers.” Such rhetoric is ordinary in America. In European countries, only far-right, anti-immigra- tion parties express their sense of national superiority so bluntly, and they usually do not bring God into the picture.

Americans rarely call this kind of rhetoric by its name: nationalism. At most, critics fault the politicians who speak that way for their excessive “patriotism.” But patriotism (loving one’s country) is diff erent from national- ism (believing that it is superior). Nationalism is a complex phenomenon oft en animated by the notion that a country should either dominate others or isolate itself from the rest of the world. Both tendencies are palpable in American nationalism, given the draw of imperialism and insularity.

Th e roots of American nationalism can largely be traced to the revolution- ary era. Th e Founding Fathers widely believed that they had created an ideal country blessed by Providence that would stand apart from the corrupt out- side world.21 Th omas Jeff erson warned that “an American coming to Europe

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 3 7

for education, loses in his knowledge, in his morals, in his health, in his hab- its, and in his happiness.” 22

Faith that America is fulfi lling a divinely chosen destiny suggests that atrocities in its history, from the extermination or expulsion of Native Americans to the enslavement of Africans, were part of God’s plan. Th at is indeed what European colonists and their American descendants usually thought. Th e Indians’ military defeats and losses of land were interpreted as signs that God was not on their side. Th e viruses that decimated them were considered another godsend. In the words of John Archdale, a British colo- nial offi cial, “unusual Sicknesses” sent by God thinned the indigenous popu- lation “to make room for the English” and pave the way for “introducing a Civilized State” in America.23 Similarly, African slavery was rationalized as a way to civilize and Christianize savages.

Th e canonization of the Founding Fathers evokes the spirit of national- ism, which is buoyed by an unbridled veneration of national heroes. For example, one of Ronald Reagan’s speeches would have us forget that when America was founded, slavery existed and only propertied white males could vote: “In this country of ours took place the greatest revolution that has ever taken place in the world’s history; the only true revolution. Every other revo- lution simply exchanged one set of rulers for another. But here, for the fi rst time in all the thousands of years of man’s relations to man, a little group of men, the Founding Fathers, for the fi rst time, established the idea that you and I had within ourselves the God-given right and ability to determine our own destiny.”

Th e tendency to minimize past wrongs is obviously not unique to Americans. Many Europeans downplay shameful aspects of their history, such as the practice of slavery or the atrocities that their colonial empires committed. Gérard Longuet, a prominent French conservative politician, tellingly made a forearm jerk—a variant of the middle fi nger—during a 2012 TV interview to show what he thought of Algeria’s demand for “an honest acknowledgment of the crimes perpetrated by French colonialism.” Longuet later asserted that “France need not be ashamed of its presence in Algeria during colonization.” 24 Because of a mix of denial and ignorance, scores of French people do not recognize the realities of colonialism: invading a foreign land, exploiting its population and resources, violently repressing dissent, all while claiming that one is civilizing primitive people, if not inferior races. Th e rise of far-right European political parties has bolstered the idealization of

2 3 8 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

colonialism, as they aim to return to a supposedly idyllic time when whites were in power. Donald Trump’s campaign had a similar message.

Beside the fact that the G.O.P. is a mainstream party, unlike European far-right parties, nationalism is particularly common in America because it is promoted on a daily basis: U.S. fl ags are ubiquitous, the national anthem is sung at everyday sporting events, and schoolchildren recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Such rituals, which hardly exist in other Western democracies, encourage people to think that loving one’s country means regularly singing its praises and having unquestioning allegiance to it.

The Worldly and the Insular

“No man is an island, entire of itself,” wrote the poet John Donne, yet America can come across as a nation disconnected from the rest of the world. At a time when America has been facing Islamist terrorism, has led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has long been heavily involved in the Muslim world, half of Americans do not know what the Koran or Ramadan are.25 Th is exemplifi es a remarkable contradiction: America actively infl uences the world but much of its population knows very little about things beyond its borders. While multiple factors and interests shape U.S. foreign policy, it cannot be understood outside this social context.

Ironically, as a global superpower America would seem to be the precise opposite of an insular country. Th e intense polarization of liberal and con- servative Americans sheds light on this paradox, as it tends to mirror the divide between worldly and insular citizens. Two fi gures embody this social divide. Barack Obama is the exemplar of a global citizen because of his mixed American and Kenyan background, not to forget his partial upbringing in Indonesia. Conversely, Sarah Palin, the archetype of parochial reactionarism, did not obtain a passport before 2006. She had left North America only once when she became the 2008 Republican vice presidential candidate.26 Just 30 percent of Americans have a passport, compared to approximately 50 percent of Australians, 60 percent of Canadians, 75 percent of New Zealanders, and 80 percent of the British.27 Naturally, some Americans do not travel interna- tionally because they are poor. But scores of middle-class people are also disinclined to do so. Additionally, some of the Americans who do travel internationally go only to tourist resorts like Cancún. Of an estimated sixty- one million international trips originating in the United States in 2009, about half were to either Mexico or Canada.28 Th e point is not that

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 3 9

Americans as a whole are insular—many travel abroad—but that they are more likely than other Westerners to share that trait.

One of the reasons why Americans travel less is that they have fewer vaca- tion days. Besides, there is much to visit within America, including fascinat- ing cities, national parks, ski resorts, beaches, and deserts. Further, the United States is relatively isolated geographically as a continent-size country situated between two oceans and with only two immediate neighbors.

Living in diff erent regions of America, I met a fair number of university- educated people who had limited knowledge of the world. Some thought that Indians, Iranians, and Turks are Arabs. One college student did not know that Britain is an island. Others were unaware of the existence of several foreign countries, including Kazakhstan, Mauritania, and Slovenia. A Latvian woman I met in New York asked me, with a concerned look, if I knew of Latvia. I said I did. She sighed in relief and explained that many New Yorkers had never heard of her country. By the same token, a Lithuanian acquaintance residing in a Virginian suburb of Washington, D.C., became accustomed to saying that she was from Russia, because most of the Americans she met had never heard of Lithuania.

Rick Shenkman, a U.S. academic, made a comparable observation when describing his discussion with a young American he met aboard a train from Paris to Amsterdam: “[He] had graduated from college and was now consid- ering medical school. He had received good grades in school. He was articu- late. And he was anything but poor, as was clear from the fact that he was spending the summer tooling around Europe. But when the subject involved history, he was stumped. When the conversation turned to Joseph Stalin, he had to ask who Stalin was.” 29

Polls confi rm that a sizable segment of Americans know little about world history, including events that involved America. Forty percent are unaware of who America fought in World War II.30 Th irty percent do not know what the Holocaust was.31 In 1980, during the Cold War, 38 percent of Americans thought that the Soviet Union was part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an anti-Soviet alliance.32 A comparative study found that Americans know far less than Brits, Danes, and Finns about basic aspects of international aff airs, as Table 7 indicates. Americans were less likely to correctly identify the Taliban, even though the United States led the invasion of Afghanistan aft er the 9/11 attacks on American soil. Similarly, fewer Americans could identify the Kyoto Accords as a treaty on climate change, Kofi Annan as the United Nations secretary-general, or

2 4 0 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

Slobodan Milošević as the Serbian leader against whom America and other countries went to war. A later study again concluded that “the knowledge gap between the Americans and the Europeans was huge” on international news.33

Even America’s closest allies sometimes come across as obscure foreign lands. Professor Charles Lockhart of Texas Christian University, an expert in comparative politics, was “frequently surprised by how sketchy the under- standings of intelligent, well-educated Americans are of the most fundamen- tal diff erences between politics in the United States and in societies relatively well-known to Americans such as the United Kingdom or Canada.” 34 Chauvinism and ignorance of foreign countries usually go hand in hand. John Kingdon, who taught at the University of Michigan, noticed that stu- dents generally entered his classes with the conviction that America is simply “the best” despite having “very little knowledge” of other countries.35

Yet numerous American universities have top-notch international pro- grams for students eager to broaden their horizons. And the cosmopolitan environment at certain American universities is the antithesis of insularity. My personal experiences studying and teaching in American universities were overwhelmingly positive. Faculty and students aware of my French and Kenyan roots were warm and welcoming regardless of whether their aca- demic fi elds had an international dimension. Few seemed to share the ultra- chauvinistic perspective trumpeted by various politicians. Th is may be because America’s universities oft en lean to the left of the political spectrum. Comparably, the views of the French extreme right have limited traction at French universities.

Th e parochialism of many U.S. politicians is nonetheless striking. George W. Bush declared that “Africa is a nation that suff ers from incredible dis-

T A B L E 7 Percentage of correct answers to international affairs questions

Topic United States United Kingdom Denmark Finland

Taliban 58 75 68 76 Kyoto Accords 37 60 81 84 Kofi Annan 49 82 91 95 Slobodan Milošević 33 58 78 72

sou rce: Shanto Iyengar, James Curran, and Anker Brink Lund, “Media Systems, Public Knowledge and Democracy,” European Journal of Communication 24, no. 1 (2009): 5–29.

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 41

ease,” echoing the misconception that Africa is a homogeneous country rather than a diverse continent. Likewise, the presidential candidate and tycoon Herman Cain said he wanted to prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons, although it had already been a nuclear power for half a century. It is no coincidence that such politicians lean toward Christian fun- damentalism, as those who most fervently believe that God made America “the best” may have scant interest in the rest of the world.

Basic knowledge of foreign nations easily disproves certain claims at the heart of the U.S. political debate, as we have seen throughout this book. If politicians and the public were better informed, for instance, they might not claim that countries with universal health care have much higher medical costs. Th e precise opposite is true. Well-traveled Americans are far less inclined to accept propaganda about the evils of “socialized medicine.” Th e political divide on this issue is remarkable as well. In the abstract, both Republicans and Democrats affi rm that America is the world’s best country.36 In practice, however, Democrats appear less chauvinistic. Prior to Obama’s health care reform, 68 percent of Republicans thought that the U.S. health care system was “the best” worldwide, compared to 32 percent of Democrats.37 Most Democrats want America to join the rest of the developed world in establishing universal health care. Republicans are adamantly against it.38

Whether America has anything to learn from other countries has become a divisive matter in its courtrooms. References to international human rights standards in Supreme Court decisions abolishing the death penalty for juve- niles and the mentally retarded scandalized both dissenting justices and Republican politicians.39 In the age of globalization, it is common for courts in democratic nations to evaluate foreign legal practices when deciding intri- cate or novel issues.40 But this tends to divide conservative and liberal Americans. During the Supreme Court confi rmation hearings for Elena Kagan—an Obama appointee and former dean of Harvard Law School—a Republican senator took off ense at Harvard’s requirement that students take a course in international law. Another Republican senator voiced concern that citizens “could turn to foreign law to get good ideas.” 41 Kagan responded that foreign law can be instructive, a point that would be uncontroversial elsewhere in the West.

As America has the world’s oldest written constitution, foreign countries have regularly turned to it for inspiration, given its numerous wise principles of government. Yet certain Americans favor a one-sided approach. Th ey are content to have America serve as a model abroad but believe that it has

2 4 2 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

nothing to learn from foreign laws, as they regard the U.S. Constitution as a sacrosanct text. Th is attitude is common among proponents of “originalism,” a doctrine holding that the Constitution’s meaning cannot evolve over time—irrespective of unforeseeable developments, changing values, or the profound disagreements among the framers themselves over how to interpret the Constitution. Th e historian Joseph Ellis suggested that this doctrine is rooted in the belief that the Founding Fathers were miraculously “permitted a glimpse of the eternal verities and then embalmed their insights in the document.” “Any professional historian proposing such an interpretation today would be laughed off the stage,” Ellis observed. “We might call it the Immaculate Conception theory of jurisprudence.” 42

In sum, Americans are quite divided in their global outlooks, although those who share deeply nationalistic and insular mindsets especially stand out in the West nowadays. Th ese citizens have played a major role in shaping the “War on Terror,” with grave consequences for America and the world.

T H E V I C I O U S C I R C L E S O F U . S . F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

Even considering that America was emotionally vulnerable to calls for retri- bution aft er 9/11, the ease with which the Bush administration manipulated most of the public is remarkable. Nearly all Republicans and around half of Democrats supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was widely unpopular throughout the world. Support decreased among Democrats as the plan turned into a fi asco and as it became clear that Saddam Hussein neither had ties to Al-Qaeda nor WMDs—notwithstanding Dick Cheney’s assertion that Hussein “has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.” But Republican support for the war remained steadfast. Th ree years aft er the invasion, 80 percent of Republicans continued to back the Iraq War. Barely 20 percent of Democrats still did.43 Statistical research shows that the partisan divide was much deeper over the Iraq War than over the Vietnam War.44 As of 2015, merely 31 percent of Republicans recognized that invading Iraq was a mis- take, compared to 68 percent of Democrats. Overall, only 51 percent of all Americans deemed the Iraq War a mistake.45 Th ese fi ndings are striking because the Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq predictably exacer- bated terrorism well before the emergence of ISIS, as Robert Pape and James Feldman emphasized in a statistical study published in 2010:

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 4 3

Far from declining, anti-American-inspired terrorism—particularly suicide ter- rorism—is more frequent today than before 9/11 and even before the invasion of Iraq. In the 24-year period from 1980 to 2003, there were just under 350 suicide terrorist attacks around the world—of which fewer than 15% could reasonably be considered directed against Americans. By contrast, in the six years from 2004 to 2009, the world has witnessed over 1,833 suicide attacks—of which 92% are anti-American in origin. . . . Th e more we’ve gone over there, the more they’ve wanted to come over here—and the absence of another 9/11 is due more to extensive American domestic security measures, immigration controls, intel- ligence, and pure luck than to lack of intent or planning by our enemies.46

Multiple jihadist plots were envisioned as retaliation for the invasion of Iraq, including the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist bombings.47 Similarly, the two French jihadists who killed Charlie Hebdo cartoonists in January 2015 were partly radicalized by the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the mistreatment of Muslims by American personnel at Abu Ghraib.48

Naturally, the global crisis of terrorism cannot be pinned simply on the Bush administration. We will see below that Obama’s foreign policy also was counterproductive. European leaders such as François Hollande, the French president, deserve blame too. Although France opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it joined the American-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq in 2014, which led ISIS to identify France as a prime target.49 Among other factors, the 2015 Paris attacks can be traced to the shortcomings of France’s counterterrorism services and the marginalization of underprivileged French Muslims, some of whom have become jihadists. Nevertheless, legions of ISIS members come from privileged socioeconomic backgrounds or countries where Muslims are a majority, thereby demonstrating that the troubling discrimination against European Muslims is hardly the sole reason behind the rise of ISIS.50 Th is complex phenomenon lacks a single explanation and has, of course, also been infl uenced by the Middle East’s internal dynamics, including the Syrian Civil War. Even aft er taking these nuances into account, there is no doubt that the Bush administration’s war on Iraq profoundly worsened global terrorism. Why did most Americans readily believe in 2003, as many still do, that invading Iraq was the right decision?

Good versus Evil

If the United States incarnates good in this world to numerous Americans, the fl ip side is that the nation’s enemies can come to represent evil. Th is may

2 4 4 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

not seem remarkable at fi rst. Aft er all, the people of any country tend to view themselves positively and their enemies negatively. But what sets America apart in the modern democratic world is the impact of a black-and-white moralism encapsulated in George W. Bush’s farewell speech: “I have oft en spoken to you about good and evil. Th is has made some uncomfortable. But good and evil are present in this world, and between the two there can be no compromise.” Th e tendency to see the world in dualistic terms of good versus evil is especially palpable among Americans with nationalistic and insular mindsets. It heavily infl uenced U.S. foreign policy and the “War on Terror” during the Bush presidency.

Shortly aft er the 9/11 attacks, a cleric in the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, a fundamentalist denomination, told Bush that he was “a servant of God called for such a time like this.” Bush answered, “I accept this responsi- bility.” Bush also gave a speech at the National Cathedral in Washington declaring that America’s “responsibility” is to “rid the world of evil.” 51 Like a comic book character, he set out to fi ght an “Axis of Evil,” warning, “Either you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists.” In his eyes, America was “chosen by God and commissioned by history to be a model to the world.”

Th e best-selling author Joel Rosenberg, a proponent of apocalyptic proph- ecies, was invited to speak at a White House Bible study. He met with various congressional leaders and national security offi cials to advise them on biblical prophecies purportedly relevant to U.S. foreign policy.52 Rosenberg said he did not meet with Bush during this visit, although Bush himself claimed that a divine signal inspired his “crusade” against Islamic terrorism. “I was praying for strength to do the Lord’s will,” he explained aft er invading Iraq.53 Asked whether he had consulted his father about the war, Bush famously answered: “Th ere is a higher father that I appeal to.” He tried to persuade French President Jacques Chirac to support his invasion of Iraq by arguing that it fulfi lled biblical prophecies about an apocalyptic confl ict between good and evil that would precede the Messiah’s return. Bush’s exegesis baffl ed Chirac.54 Bush likewise invoked God when trying to convince King Abdullah II of Jordan to back the invasion.55 Bush’s spiritual acumen also supposedly gave him insight into the mind of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s cynical dictator. “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trust- worthy,” Bush said. “I was able to get a sense of his soul.”

Th e religious rhetoric surrounding the Iraq campaign made some soldiers uneasy. A marine reported that “it was frowned upon” to opt out of chapel and prayer sessions. Chaplains came into bunkers and said, “Bow your heads

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 4 5

and pray.” Base personnel received a daily prayer by email. Th e marine had diffi culty coping with the fact that troops had “killed a lot of people” during her fi rst tour of duty. When she asked for help, she was sent to a chaplain, even though she did not believe in God.56 Trijicon, a weapons manufacturer with a $660 million military contract, took it upon itself to engrave biblical refer- ences on rifl es used by U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. It stopped doing so aft er a public outcry led military leaders to object to the inscriptions.57

Th e fascination of Christian fundamentalists with an apocalyptic confl ict in the Middle East was not new. Th e presidential notes of George H. W. Bush indicate that the prominent evangelical preacher Billy Graham, who was close to the Bushes, supported the 1991 Gulf War and thought that Hussein was the “anti-Christ.” 58 Still, Bush the elder was religiously moderate next to his son, who appointed General William Boykin to head the hunt for Osama bin Laden. An outspoken evangelical, Boykin asserted that America was leading “the army of God” in a fi ght against “Satan.” 59

To an extent, the “War on Terror” devolved into a confl ict between fun- damentalist conceptions of Islam and Christianity. Th e infusion of religion into warfare had gone full circle when the Navy SEAL who killed bin Laden in Pakistan proclaimed that he had done so “for God and for country.” Bin Laden’s death occurred during a mission authorized by Obama, who had stood against Bush’s invasion of Iraq. It is noteworthy that Vice President Joe Biden, a moderate Catholic, anxiously clenched a rosary when following the bin Laden mission from the White House. Biden suggested that those in attendance go to mass aft er the mission.60 Yet faith did not signifi cantly infl uence the Obama administration’s foreign policy, as opposed to the Bush administration.

Self-righteousness buoyed by faith particularly helps explain why Bush and much of the American public thought that U.S. troops would be broadly acclaimed as liberators in Iraq. Americans commonly envisioned themselves as “the good guys,” who would get rid of Saddam, “the bad guy.” A predictable insurgency was not anticipated. Nor was the fact that invading a Muslim country on questionable grounds and against strong opposition from the international community would exacerbate the resentment and anti-Ameri- canism that contribute to terrorism.61 Standard counterinsurgency strategy, which stresses measured force and eff orts to gain the trust of the local popu- lation, was mostly ignored in Iraq under Bush. American troops emphasized force in dealing with both actual and suspected insurgents. Th is led to abuse that was not limited to the Abu Ghraib scandal. A signifi cant number of

2 4 6 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

Iraqi civilians were humiliated, threatened, beaten up, baselessly detained, or otherwise mistreated by U.S. troops, ruining the eff orts of American soldiers who honestly tried to help Iraqis.62 It was not before several years into the war that various offi cers, including General David Petraeus, fi nally led a shift toward standard counterinsurgency strategy.63 Its premise is straightforward: excessive force is counterproductive, alienating locals and spurring resistance. Th at dynamic may seem evident. However, people with a moralistic perspec- tive are disinclined to consider social factors behind terrorism because they tend to identify their enemies as simply “evil.”

Self-righteousness has also shaped U.S. attitudes toward Iran, which Bush included in the “Axis of Evil.” Th e popular perception of Iran as plainly evil disregards the fact that its Islamist regime was preceded by a pro-American dictatorship led by the Shah, a secular monarch who amassed a fortune through corruption while the multitude struggled. Back in 1953, America, Britain, and the Shah conspired to depose Mohammed Mosaddeq, Iran’s democratically elected prime minister, who was faulted for nationalizing Iran’s oil produc- tion.64 Yet the Shah’s dictatorship and America’s meddling in Iranian aff airs helped radicalize the elements who led Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, who have themselves promoted a Manichean view of America as “Th e Great Satan.”

People may disagree over whether it is wiser not to interfere in foreign states or to support “the lesser of two evils” when hostile factions exist within a country. America has oft en preferred the latter course. Indeed, what largely drives U.S. foreign policy is not virtue but realpolitik—a geostrategy based on raw calculations of a nation’s perceived best interest. Realpolitik negates idealistic and humane considerations unless they are politically advanta- geous, such as by improving a nation’s image.

Hence, America chooses which dictators are good or bad depending on whether they serve its interests. Saddam Hussein was depicted as an evil tyrant who oppressed his own people. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was praised as a solid U.S. ally even though he ruled with an iron fi st. Iran is faulted for its authoritarianism, Islamist extremism, and oppression of women, yet Saudi Arabia has historically been one of America’s closest allies despite sharing these traits. Naturally, realpolitik and its double standards are hardly unique to America. Britain, France, and other countries have likewise backed ruthless regimes sympathetic to their interests. But the cynicism of realpolitik coexists with an exceptionally moralistic bent in U.S. foreign policy.

At fi rst glance, realpolitik seems incompatible with the notion that God has made America a force for good, since, by defi nition, supporting “the

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 4 7

lesser of two evils” means supporting evil. Self-righteous rhetoric can be a smoke screen for ulterior motives. Th e Bush administration certainly would not have invaded Iraq simply out of religious conviction or to altruistically spread democracy in the Middle East, as neoconservatives claimed. However, moralism is not solely a pretext in U.S. foreign policy, given that it can also shape policy decisions and serve to rationalize contradictions. It is comfort- ing to believe that America is waging a battle for good against evil when one is faced with countless civilian deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of torture, the abuses of pro-American dictatorships, and other consequences of realpolitik.

Interest in black gold was more readily acknowledged in the First Gulf War, precipitated by Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Colin Powell then wrote that “since the free fl ow of oil from the Persian Gulf was as crucial to us as blood pumping through an artery, Iraqi and Iranian threats to Kuwaiti oil tankers would be met.” 65 In contrast, American partisans of the 2003 invasion of Iraq were generally duplicitous or in self-denial about oil. Tony Blair, who defi ed British public opinion by thrusting the United Kingdom into the war, was somewhat franker when questioned by a British commis- sion. “I think it is at least arguable that [Hussein] was a threat and that, had we taken that decision to leave him there with the intent, with an oil price, not of $25, but of $100 a barrel, he would have had the intent, he would have had the fi nancial means and we would have lost our nerve,” Blair said.66 Th e former prime minister’s statement epitomizes not only the speculation behind this preemptive war but also the notion that Westerners are entitled to obtain oil from developing countries at a satisfactory price. Imagine the leader of a poor nation claiming that invading America or Europe is justifi ed because their technology is too expensive.

Overall, the Bush administration’s intelligence on Iraq was blatantly false.67 It is unclear whether it deliberately advanced false intelligence or recklessly used unreliable intelligence while ignoring contrary information.68 In any event, it undoubtedly persuaded itself that toppling Hussein was imperative because of perceived national security and geopolitical interests. Paul O’Neill, who attended National Security Council meetings as the Treasury secretary, reported that ten days aft er Bush’s inauguration—long before 9/11—the administration began discussing how to eff ect regime change in Iraq, occupy it militarily, and secure access to its oil. Aft er 9/11, Bush took war on Iraq as a foregone conclusion.69 Powell and George Tenet, who respectively served as Bush’s secretary of state and CIA director,

2 4 8 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

acknowledged that the war was hardly debated.70 Notes taken by Donald Rumsfeld’s aides indicate that within hours of the 9/11 attacks, the defense secretary was considering whether to “hit SH [Saddam Hussein] at same time—not only UBL [Usama bin Laden].” 71

Lieutenant-General Gregory Newbold, then the director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff , recalled that a large fraction of the military leader- ship was taken aback by the Bush administration’s agenda. “I can’t tell you how many senior offi cers said to me, ‘What in the hell are we doing?’ ” “Th ey just didn’t understand,” he said. “ ‘Why Iraq? Why now?’ ” Newbold chose to retire because of his opposition to the war.72 Dissent was nonetheless mark- edly limited, given the enormity of the Bush administration’s actions.

Drawing Peculiar Lessons from History

Th e lessons that Americans have drawn or not drawn from history have oft en set them apart from other Westerners. Th ey help explain why America boldly invaded Iraq against considerable opposition from the international com- munity, thereby worsening strife in the Middle East.

America emerged from the Cold War as the world’s sole superpower. Th e collapse of the Soviet bloc confi rmed the United States’ sense of moral supe- riority. Th e atheism of communist regimes and their repression of religion strengthened the notion that America is a divinely chosen country. To many Americans, Ronald Reagan brought down the Soviet Union by bravely standing against communism and forcing the Russians into an arms race they could not keep up with.

While America was indeed an important bulwark against Russian impe- rialism, the Soviet bloc’s collapse largely stemmed from longstanding internal problems.73 Communist economies failed to create wealth, as illustrated by the stark diff erences in living standards between the U.S.S.R. and the United States or between East and West Germany. Moreover, the oppression of com- munism spurred recurrent protests, which ultimately were somewhat toler- ated—some would even say encouraged—by Mikhail Gorbachev. Pope John Paul II and dissidents such as Andrey Sakharov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Václav Havel, and Lech Wałęsa also had an infl uential historical role in rous- ing people against communism. Nevertheless, the popular image of Reagan single-handedly defeating the atheist Soviet empire, like Saint George slew the dragon, fostered confi dence in the United States’ ability to prevail against evil.

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 4 9

America’s decisive victory in World War II likewise shaped that perspec- tive. References to World War II were therefore frequent in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Th e Bush administration and its supporters depicted the war’s most infl uential adversaries, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, as naïve and pusillanimous pacifi sts who recalled the “old Europe” that had tried to appease Hitler. On the other hand, Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi, and José María Aznar—respectively the British, Italian, and Spanish prime ministers—were lauded for embodying a “new Europe,” given their support for invading Iraq, notwithstanding the fact that most of their citizens condemned the war. Even though the invasion of Iraq was widely unpopular worldwide, 56 percent of Americans thought that global opinion either favored the war or was evenly divided.74 Americans eager to invade Iraq mainly equated opposition with the pesky French, prompting irritated hawks to spill out their supplies of French wine.

Th e epithet “old Europe” evoked the naïveté and ineptitude of the British and French governments of the 1930s, which had indeed failed to grasp the threat that Hitler posed. Th e French leadership was especially reprehensible, as its poor strategy caused France to suff er a quick and humiliating defeat to the Th ird Reich. A visit to the D-Day beaches and the local U.S. military cemetery in Normandy provides a compelling reminder of the sacrifi ce that Americans made in liberating Europe. America was, by far, the main reason the Allies won the war. Yet the Bush administration’s suggestion that America took the initiative in combating Nazism while cowardly Europeans refused to fi ght was historical revisionism. America was ambivalent about entering World War II and did not do so until aft er Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, well aft er the war started in 1939.

Th e denunciation of “old Europe” in 2003 resonated with nationalistic Americans partly because many had drawn lessons from World War II dis- tinct from those of Europeans, who experienced the confl ict quite diff er- ently. While the war was hardly fought on American soil, it ravaged Europe. Additionally, the outcome confi rmed America’s military and economic supe- riority. Th e British and French never regained their global power and soon lost their colonial empires. Th e toll of the war was even worse for Germany. World War II was the culmination of centuries of warfare in Europe, and it helped persuade Europeans that they must live together peacefully—an aspi- ration that motivated the creation of the European Union.

Naturally, European reservations about warfare are far from categorical. Following World War II, certain European states tried to brutally crush

2 5 0 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

armed independence movements in their colonies, such as France in Madagascar, Indochina, and Algeria; the Netherlands in Indonesia; and the United Kingdom in Kenya. (Several other colonies attained independence through fairly peaceful processes.) European nations have further been involved in NATO operations, including in Afghanistan following 9/11.

Still, a comparative study confi rms that modern Americans are more sup- portive than other Westerners of military force. Americans express the strongest support for the right to preemptively attack a foreign nation, as well as the lowest support for the idea that countries should gain U.N. approval before using military force.75 Th e more powerful a country is, the more mili- tary victory may be plausible in its eyes. From that standpoint, it is unsurpris- ing that war seems a more attractive means of confl ict resolution to Americans than to Europeans. However, most of the major wars fought by America since World War II have shown the limits of military power. Th e Korean War ended in stalemate and the Vietnam War in defeat. At this time it appears that the Afghan War will end in stalemate. Th e invasion of Iraq was either a Pyrrhic victory or a defeat, considering that it contributed to the rise and spread of ISIS. Th e Iraq War left nearly forty-fi ve hundred Americans dead and many more suff ering from physical or mental wounds. Th e number of Iraqi deaths directly or indirectly caused by the war is harder to estimate but appears to be approximately half a million.76

In particular, the invasion of Iraq was comparable to the Vietnam debacle, as both were unnecessary wars with considerable human and fi nancial costs that profoundly damaged America’s global standing. Four decades aft er the Vietnam War, Vietnam remains a one-party communist state. It is hard to believe that the existence of communism in that remote country has signifi - cantly threatened the United States, even though 58,000 Americans died in this confl ict, not to mention 1 to 3.8 million Vietnamese (sources diff er).77 Th e prediction that the fall of Vietnam would have a domino eff ect, leading multiple other countries to become communist, was never realized. Th e his- torian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. doubted that most Americans had learned anything from this confl ict. “[In Vietnam] we suff ered military defeat— fi ghting an unwinnable war against a country about which we knew nothing and in which we had no vital interests at stake,” he lamented, “but to repeat the same experiment thirty years later in Iraq is a strong argument for a case of national stupidity.” 78 Indeed, America being deathly afraid of Iraq was like an elephant fearing a mouse. Yet insular-minded citizens were swayed by the Bush administration’s disinformation, from nonexistent WMDs to the

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 51

notion that there was no diff erence between the secular tyrant Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda jihadists, who were actually enemies. Hussein had long persecuted jihadists. Bush lumped them all together.79

Remarkably, the “War on Terror” was also defended on the ground that it would protect America’s “freedom.” Th e wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were respectively named Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. French fries and French toast were rebaptized “freedom fries” and “freedom toast.” U.S. troops were said to be fi ghting in Iraq and Afghanistan so that Americans could continue to be “free”—a peculiar contention, given that terrorists do not genuinely aspire to turn America into an Islamist dic- tatorship. Th eir main goal has instead been to expunge American infl uence from the Muslim world in order to establish theocracies there.80 Th e invasion of Iraq could therefore have been defended on the ground that it protected Americans’ safety, albeit unconvincingly, since Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11. But to say that Americans were fi ghting for their own freedom was absurd. So was the claim that the primary reason to invade Iraq was to bring freedom to its people.81

Unilateralism

Th e Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq violated international law, as U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan underlined, refl ecting the consensus among legal experts.82 Similarly, its decision to torture presumed terrorists blatantly violated international human rights standards and the U.N. Convention against Torture, which America ratifi ed in 1994. (Torture also violates domestic U.S. law.) Bush further asserted the power to detain alleged terror- ists forever without trial, another fl agrant international human rights viola- tion. Such unilateralism did not begin with his administration, as America has long stood out among modern Western democracies for refusing to follow norms of diplomacy and international law that it deems against its interests.

For generations, the United States has been involved in creating interna- tional laws and institutions while exempting itself from their jurisdiction, mainly because of the opposition of conservatives.83 Th e fi rst major episode in this pattern occurred in the aft ermath of World War I, when President Woodrow Wilson proposed a League of Nations to help resolve confl icts diplomatically and avoid warfare. Th e League of Nations was eventually founded, but America never joined it, as the Senate refused to heed Wilson’s call to ratify the treaty.

2 5 2 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

Given its failure to prevent the carnage of World War II and other confl icts, the League of Nations was deemed ineff ective and replaced by the United Nations, which was founded with active American support. Th is time America rejected isolationism and immediately became a member of the U.N., whose headquarters are in New York. While the League of Nations was considered a paper tiger, the U.N. has broader ability to authorize peacekeeping operations. However, its charter ensures that no U.N. troops will be dispatched without the consent of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. Th ese fi ve countries are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, authorized to veto any of its resolutions. Th e U.N. is sometimes described as an obstacle to U.S. power, but America has signifi cant power within the organization because of its veto. In addition, Americans are quite well represented among U.N. staff members. Th e United States is also the organization’s biggest fi nancial contributor. Whereas America’s absence pro- foundly undermined the League of Nations’ mission, its involvement in the U.N. has helped build it into a respectable, albeit imperfect, organization.

Th e days when America embraced hardline isolationism seem gone, yet its superpower status has allowed it to defy norms of diplomacy and interna- tional law. In particular, the U.N. has spearheaded several human rights treaties that America has refused to ratify, matching the stances of dictator- ships like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, China, and North Korea. All other Western democracies basically support human rights treaties.84 America considers itself “the leader of the free world,” but its hostility to international law weakens its ability to credibly lead by example, a crucial dimension of “soft power.” 85

Th is aspect of American exceptionalism refl ects the conservative-liberal divide. Mainly due to the eff orts of Democrats, America has played an active role in developing international laws and institutions, while Republicans, especially Southern and Midwestern conservatives, have recurrently ensured that it would not fall under their jurisdiction. Th e Senate has never ratifi ed an international human rights treaty when Democrats held fewer than fi ft y- fi ve seats (though some were ratifi ed under Republican presidents).86

Racism was an early driving factor in resistance to international human rights. Southern segregationists initially opposed ratifying the U.N. Genocide Convention and the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because they feared these treaties would bar lynching African-Americans or restricting them to second-class citizenship. America fi nally ratifi ed them in 1988 and 1992, respectively, decades aft er their enactment.87

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 5 3

To this day, America has refused to ratify other major treaties. Religious traditionalists notably blocked the ratifi cation of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Th ey contend that it would license abortion, which the convention does not provide a right to. Similarly, America never ratifi ed the Convention on the Rights of the Child, because opponents dubiously claimed that it would bolster children’s abortion rights and eviscerate U.S. parental laws, especially regarding homeschooling, a concern for evangelicals opposed to secular public schools. But this convention would indeed prohibit the death penalty or life imprisonment for juveniles—a nonstarter for advocates of merciless sentences. Every nation worldwide has ratifi ed that treaty, except America.

Beyond racism and social conservatism, realpolitik has motivated Americans hostile to international law. John Bolton, a far-right ideologue, argued that “it is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law, even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so, because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything, are those who want to constrict the United States.” Bolton sug- gested that America should be the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. “Th ere is no United Nations,” he declared. “Th ere is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that’s the United States.” Bolton is not a fringe fi gure. George W. Bush made him America’s ambassador to the United Nations, albeit via a recess appointment, to circumvent a fi libuster by Democrats appalled by the prospect of giving this key diplomatic position to the man who said that the U.N. is so worthless that “if [its headquarters] lost ten stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of diff erence.”

In practice, most U.S. diplomats have taken a more nuanced approach to international law than Bolton’s scorched-earth rhetoric suggests. Th is was apparent when I worked in Th e Hague, Netherlands, as a judicial clerk for the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the court that tried Serbia’s ex-president Slobodan Milošević and other alleged war criminals. On one hand, the ICTY was created in 1993 with U.S. support and employs many Americans. On the other hand, America has declined to join the International Criminal Court (ICC), another court in Th e Hague. What explains this double standard? Th e ICTY focuses solely on Balkan war criminals, but the ICC is a permanent court that might try Americans someday, such as for abuses in the “War on Terror.”

2 5 4 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

My American colleagues at the ICTY, who were progressive and well- traveled, considered this double standard shameful.

Th e ICC was created in 2002 to try people for mass atrocities, especially genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes. It is the fi rst and only permanent court of its kind. Th e Clinton administration had reserva- tions about the ICC’s jurisdiction over Americans but eventually signed the treaty establishing the court. Th e Senate never ratifi ed it. George W. Bush subsequently withdrew America’s signature on the ground that no interna- tional court should ever prosecute an American. His administration even passed legislation empowering America to invade Th e Hague if a U.S. soldier ever came into the court’s custody.88

Th e rival perspectives of the men who conducted the ICC signature pro- tocol epitomize the partisan divide over international law. David Scheff er, a diplomat who devoted his career to promoting international human rights and stopping mass atrocities, proudly signed the ICC treaty on behalf of Clinton aft er helping to negotiate its terms when serving as the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues. Scheff er was later a law profes- sor of mine at Northwestern University, and his enthusiasm for international human rights was palpable, just like his respect for foreign cultures. However, Bush had Bolton “unsign” the treaty. Bolton called this act the “happiest moment” of his career, to Scheff er’s dismay.

If America were to join the ICC, this would technically empower its prosecutor to pursue Americans suspected of war crimes. Yet the ICC has “complementary jurisdiction,” meaning that it could intervene only if America failed to prosecute its own war criminals. For example, the ICC could not try rogue American soldiers who were convicted by U.S. authori- ties for murdering and abusing Iraqis and Afghans. However, it could charge members of the Bush administration who authorized torture, since they never faced domestic prosecution. Th e Obama administration declined to re-sign the ICC treaty and announced that it would simply have a coopera- tive relationship with the court. Given the nature of both the Bush and Obama administrations’ actions in the “War on Terror,” from Bush’s use of torture to Obama’s reliance on drone strikes with signifi cant collateral dam- age, it is unsurprising that they refused to have the ICC scrutinize their actions.

Even if Obama had backed the ICC treaty, the Senate would not have ratifi ed it. Th e U.S. Constitution is atypical in requiring two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty—an even higher threshold than the sixty votes

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 5 5

needed to defeat a fi libuster. Legislators can ratify a treaty by a simple major- ity vote in essentially all other democracies.89 Th is peculiarity enables a minority of Americans—mainly hardline Republicans—to exempt the United States from international law.

Perceived geopolitical interests have also dissuaded America from recog- nizing other international courts. It accepts the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only on a case-by-case basis.90 Th is institution was established in 1945 to decide disputes between countries. America does not recognize the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an arm of the Organization of American States. But the refusal to join the ICC has par- ticularly undermined America’s moral credibility and global eff orts to pun- ish mass atrocities. America likewise set a bad example by failing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord, two treaties aiming to curb climate change. Th e future of the subsequent Paris Agreement on climate change partly depends on the outcome of America’s internal confl icts, as Democrats have vowed to support it, while Republicans have expressed opposition.

V A R I A T I O N S O N A T H E M E

In 2009, Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize “for his extraordi- nary eff orts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.” Th e Norwegian Nobel Committee’s press release struck a decidedly positive tone: “Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world’s attention and given its people hope for a better future.” He had become highly popular internationally in no small part because he was perceived as the antithesis of Bush.

Obama thus received the Nobel Peace Prize at the start of his fi rst term and before he had done anything to concretely advance peace. In fact, he accomplished little on the matter during his presidency. He intensifi ed the war in Afghanistan; sharply increased drone attacks, notwithstanding their high civilian toll; failed to close Guantánamo; refused to prosecute Bush administration offi cials who had licensed torture; declined to push for America’s membership in the ICC; and maintained U.S. support to various dictatorships, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Th at raises the question of whether Obama rejected merely Bush’s abrasive rhetoric without truly changing his policies. To his credit, on his fi rst day

2 5 6 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

in offi ce, Obama signed an executive order to close Guantánamo within a year. But neither Democratic nor Republican lawmakers wanted its detainees brought to America for trial or continued detention. Th e Senate notably voted 90–6 to block funding that Obama requested to close the camp.91 He still pursued eff orts to try to transfer prisoners away from Guantánamo.92

Obama put an end to waterboarding and other torture methods but declined to prosecute Bush administration offi cials for authorizing their use. A climate of impunity now prevails. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney proudly admitted to authorizing waterboarding. Many other Republicans openly advocate a return to “enhanced interrogation techniques,” a euphe- mism for torture. Aside from fi gures like John McCain—a former prisoner of war who was tortured in Vietnam—numerous prominent Republicans support torture, including Mitt Romney, Mitch McConnell, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Donald Trump.93 Roughly half of the American public fi nds torture justifi able, although we saw above that support is stronger among conservatives.94

America might therefore have become even more polarized if Obama had taken the step of prosecuting his predecessor. Obama instead adopted a con- ciliatory attitude toward Bush, whom he invited to lead, along with Bill Clinton, a fund-raising project for victims of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Th is sign of goodwill got Obama nothing from his Republican opponents, who remained categorically opposed to all his proposals.

Despite denouncing profl igate spending on “big government,” Republicans accused Obama of underfunding the military. During the 2012 presidential race, Obama responded by promising a raise while boasting that “military spending has gone up every single year that I’ve been in offi ce.” 95 Indeed, both parties have sought to maximize American power by engaging in a per- petual arms race and projecting a worldwide military presence. Th e United States leads the world in both military spending and deployment, by far. As Figure 11 shows, its military budget is 36 percent of the world’s total. America spends as much on its military as the next eight countries combined, all of which are U.S. allies except for China and Russia, which are not technically its enemies. Further, America had approximately 900 military bases or offi ces in 148 countries worldwide as of 2011, a colossal deployment even considering that 56 of those countries had fewer than 10 staff members on active duty.96

Th e public tends to accept politicians’ claims about the need for massive military spending, as only a third of Americans deem current levels

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 5 7

excessive.97 Th e country has not heeded President Dwight Eisenhower’s warning about “the acquisition of unwarranted infl uence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex,” which he depicted as a threat to democracy. Th e fi ve-star general added that outsize military spending could help make a country insolvent.98

Foreign policy is an area where presidents have signifi cant leeway to act as they see fi t, as their authority is less circumscribed there than in domestic policy-making. Th at was undoubtedly tempting to a president like Obama, whom a hostile Congress stymied for most of his tenure. Tellingly, his administration asserted the legal authority to detain alleged terrorists forever at Guantánamo despite promising that it did not intend to do so. It even created a procedural framework to manage their prolonged detention.99 Th e

Saudi Arabia 5%

United States 36%

Russia 4%

U.K. 3%

India 3%

France 3%

Germany 3%

Japan 2%

28% Other nations

28%

China 13%

F I G U R E 1 1 . Percentage of global military spending. SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (2016).

2 5 8 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

Obama administration also asserted that habeas corpus protections do not apply to those held in Bagram, Afghanistan, whom it claimed could be detained indefi nitely without judicial review.100

While Obama denounced Bush’s surveillance methods, he backed the National Security Agency’s dragnet collection of millions of internet and telephone records under the PRISM program. Obama duplicitously defended PRISM as “transparent,” 101 although it came to light only because of a whis- tle-blower, Edward Snowden. Obama later claimed that “there is no spying on Americans.” European nations have likewise expanded spying operations and other practices jeopardizing the rule of law, as exemplifi ed by France’s dragnet police searches and arrests with minimal judicial oversight following several terrorist strikes in Paris. At this stage, however, the U.S. surveillance appara- tus appears to go beyond those of all other Western democracies.

With regard to warfare, Obama carried on Bush’s foreign policy and even took it further in some areas. During his fi rst presidential campaign, Obama strategically stressed his longstanding opposition to the increasingly unpopu- lar Iraq War. He equally sought to project toughness by vowing to step up the war in Afghanistan, depicting it as the true battle against terrorism, which Bush had neglected. Once president, Obama indeed withdrew U.S. troops from Iraq and boosted their ranks in Afghanistan. But he simultaneously announced their planned withdrawal from the latter, revealing his ambiva- lence. According to the military historian Andrew Bacevich, Obama did not believe in the Afghan War and intensifi ed it only for political reasons, whereas Bush believed that America could bring “freedom” to Afghanistan. “Who is more deserving of contempt?” Bacevich asked. “Th e commander-in- chief who sends young Americans to die for a cause, however misguided, in which he sincerely believes? Or the commander-in-chief who sends young Americans to die for a cause in which he manifestly does not believe and yet refuses to forsake?” 102

It seems unrealistic to expect to turn Afghanistan into a modern democ- racy and reliable American ally through little more than force. An impover- ished rural country with a hostile landscape, it is home to an intricate tradi- tionalist society. Dubbed “the graveyard of empires,” it essentially proved indomitable by the British colonial empire and the Soviet Union.103 America scarcely managed to pacify the country aft er toppling the ruthless Taliban regime, which had enabled Al-Qaeda to orchestrate 9/11 from Afghanistan. Th e Taliban regrouped as a resistance force that has only grown stronger. In 2015, Obama fi nally halted the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan

A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D • 2 5 9

and indefi nitely prolonged America’s role in a fi ft een-year confl ict that had already cost more than $65 billion.104

Th e war in Afghanistan dragged on partly because the Bush and Obama administrations tried to either decidedly crush the elusive Taliban or kill them all. Yet killed Taliban are regularly replaced by relatives, peers, or jihad- ists from foreign countries eager to avenge them.105 Th e Taliban has further drawn recruits among Afghans who resent the U.S. military presence. While the vast majority of Afghan civilian casualties have come at the Taliban’s hands, the relatively signifi cant collateral damage in U.S. operations has also fostered animosity.106 Mistrust of America is exacerbated by its support to the highly corrupt Afghan government, from which certain offi cials and soldiers have defected to the Taliban.107

Moreover, Obama relied on drones to kill alleged terrorists to a far greater extent than Bush.108 Because of its tendency to count only U.S. casualties of war,109 America’s concern over drone strikes has mostly centered on whether it is constitutional to use them to assassinate U.S. citizens accused of terror- ism, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, a cleric killed by a drone in Yemen. Less atten- tion has been paid to the predicament of foreigners killed by drone strikes. A 2012 study indicated that, in Pakistan, U.S. drones had killed between 2,562 and 3,325 people, including between 474 and 881 civilians, since 2004. “High- level” terrorists were merely 2 percent of those killed.110 Another study found that several attacks in Yemen by U.S. drones and other aerial weapons killed 82 people, including at least 57 civilians. Inhabitants of targeted regions com- monly live in fear of being instantaneously struck by U.S. drones.111 Terrorists mention drone strikes in recruitment eff orts.112

Given that America’s actions generate terrorists even as they eliminate others, the “War on Terror” has turned into an endless struggle. Terrorism and jihadism are ideologies that cannot be eradicated mainly by violence, which predictably begets more violence. Peter Neumann, an expert on ter- rorism, emphasized that jihadists aim to “inspire overreaction” from Western governments in order to radicalize more jihadists.113 But the moralistic per- spective described above leads numerous Americans to perceive terrorists and Taliban as simply “bad guys.” Th e preferred solution is then to try to kill them all so that only “good guys” are left .

Obama’s overreliance on force may have refl ected a desire to placate oppo- nents who depicted him as “soft ” on terrorism. Such criticism did not abate even aft er he authorized bin Laden’s assassination. Denouncing Obama’s pusillanimity, Donald Trump vowed to assassinate both terrorists and their

2 6 0 • A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

families. Th is would be a war crime, yet his supporters cheered him on.114 Ted Cruz called for “carpet-bombing” the entire area occupied by ISIS, which would cause huge civilian casualties. Even more moderate Republican leaders echoed these views. Asked whether America should negotiate with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan, Mitt Romney answered: “Th ese people have declared war on us. Th ey’ve killed Americans. We go anywhere they are, and we kill them.”

Th e Obama administration’s foreign policy exemplifi ed how American exceptionalism can lead to path dependence. Th e blank check that Congress, the courts, and most of the public generally gave the Bush administration to conduct the “War on Terror” aft er 9/11 sent America on a path that it may have great diffi culty abandoning. Some of Bush’s autocratic measures became more institutionalized under Obama, who defended them in court.115 During his fi rst presidential campaign, however, Obama had given this answer when asked what he would do if elected: “Guantánamo, that’s easy. Close down Guantánamo. Restore habeas corpus. Say no to renditions. Say no to wireless wiretaps.” “We are gonna lead by example, by maintaining the highest standards of civil liberties and human rights,” Obama insisted. “No more ignoring the law when it is inconvenient. Th at is not who we are.” 116 Obama ultimately found some of his predecessor’s methods convenient. So will his successor, Donald Trump, who will enjoy the executive power and massive surveillance apparatus at his disposal.

261

America is undoubtedly an exceptional country, in every sense of the word. If “exceptional” is taken to mean “great,” it is a fi tting description, given the nation’s impressive achievements since the American Enlightenment. Th e birth of modern democracy in the United States in the late eighteenth cen- tury became a model for the world. Naturally, the understanding of democ- racy then was extremely narrow by today’s standards, considering slavery, the restriction of the franchise to white male landowners, and other injustices. America nonetheless began as a land of progress, and subsequent generations built on that heritage to lead their country forward.

In the twenty-fi rst century, America still stands out as a global leader in diverse areas, although it remains a land of contradictions. Th e outcome of the 2016 presidential election epitomizes the cycle of progress and reactionar- ism that has driven American history. Th e United States went from being the fi rst modern Western nation to elect a person of color as its head of state to being the fi rst one to elect a far-right anti-immigration populist.* Obama’s election refl ected the open-mindedness of millions of Americans. Conversely, much of the country suspected that the U.S. president was not truly American. Donald Trump painted himself as the antithesis of Obama by stoking fear about the fi rst black president’s purported jihadist sympathies and forged U.S. birth certifi cate, which would make Obama an undocu- mented immigrant as well as an illegitimate president.

Other glaring contradictions epitomize tensions at the heart of American society. American women were pioneers in fi ghting for gender equality, yet

* Th e election of Viktor Orbán in Hungary is the main modern precedent, insofar as this former Soviet bloc country is now part of the West.

Conclusion

2 6 2 • C O N C L U S I O N

patriarchal ultratraditionalists retain extraordinary infl uence in American society. Th e United States is one of the Western nations where LGBTQ peo- ple have made the greatest strides toward equality—and the one where homophobic legal measures have been the fi ercest in recent decades.1 Americans make outstanding contributions to science and technology, as exemplifi ed by the dramatic landing of the Curiosity rover on Mars in 2012. But around 40 percent of Americans obstinately reject the theory of evolu- tion and believe in anachronistic biblical prophecies.2

Because of the lack of consensus between U.S. conservatives and liberals on very fundamental issues, America stands out as the Western country where certain social problems are the most acute. It is the one with the worst degree of wealth inequality. Th e sole one without universal health care. Th e one where moneyed interests have the strongest lobbying and electoral infl u- ence. Th e one where conspiracy theories about climate change and other issues have the most sway. Th e one where basic reproductive rights are the most relentlessly challenged. Th e one whose criminal justice system is the most inhumane. Th e one with the worst gun violence. Th e one that openly reintroduced torture into Western civilization. Th e one that paved the way for detaining alleged terrorists indefi nitely without trial. And the one that led the 2003 invasion of Iraq on dubious grounds, further destabilizing the Middle East, predictably exacerbating terrorism, and contributing to the rise of ISIS.3

Where does Trumpism fi t in this picture? Th roughout this book we have seen that the Republican Party’s growing radicalization over the past three decades has fostered an exceptionally hardline and anti-rational ideology. Four peculiar mindsets central to this ideological evolution helped enable Trump’s movement: profound anti-intellectualism, fervent Christian funda- mentalism, a visceral suspicion of government, and racial resentment. Th e fi rst three are considerably more intense in conservative America than else- where in the West in light of diverse dimensions of American exceptional- ism. Racial animus is hardly limited to America, although its ideological weight there stems from another facet of American exceptionalism: the United States has historically been the Western nation with by far the biggest proportion of racial and ethnic minorities. Th is has led attitudes toward socioeconomic rights and human dignity to be more racialized in America. In other words, each of these four peculiar mindsets has itself been shaped by interrelated aspects of American exceptionalism, if not path dependence traceable to the nation’s singular circumstances.

C O N C L U S I O N • 2 6 3

Th ese circumstances have been obscured by the Republican establish- ment’s redefi nition of “American exceptionalism” as an anti-Obama catch- phrase with nativist overtones. Creating fertile ground for Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement, Republican leaders spent years accusing Obama of betraying “American exceptionalism” and turning his back on the Founding Fathers. In reality, “exceptionalism” has historically referred to how America is an exception. It is objectively diff erent from other countries. Th ese diff erences are not necessarily positive, and some may precipitate American decline.

In the early days of the American republic, Alexis de Tocqueville joined multiple foreign observers in praising its people. “Americans are hardly more virtuous than others, but they are more enlightened (I speak of the masses) than any other people I know,” the Frenchman concluded. “Th e mass of those with a grasp of public aff airs, a knowledge of laws and precedents, a feeling for the well-understood interests of the nation, and an ability to understand them, is greater there than in any other place on earth.” 4

Today, one may reverse Tocqueville’s observation. Because of the extraor- dinary weight of anti-intellectualism and unbridled individualism in vast segments of modern America, its people are arguably the least informed of all Westerners and the likeliest to ignore the greater good, such as by oppos- ing universal health care, fi nancial and environmental regulation, or basic gun control as matters of ideological principle.

E X C E P T I O N A L N O M O R E ?

“Th e irresponsible rhetoric of our president, who has used the pulpit of the presidency to divide us by race and color, has made America a more dangerous environment for everyone.” One might assume that this was a statement by a Trump critic. Th ese are instead Trump’s own words denouncing Obama upon accepting the 2016 Republican presidential nomination. Of course, Trump had long engaged in explicit race-baiting, mobilizing nativists and white suprema- cists like no other major politician in modern U.S. history. A wave of hate crimes occurred during his campaign and aft er his election.5 To boot, Trump savaged all of his critics, from fellow Republicans to a disabled reporter,6 although his campaign called for an end to bullying.7 In the Orwellian world of Trumpism, doublethink and role reversals are ubiquitous—a reality TV star plays with reality.

2 6 4 • C O N C L U S I O N

It is too early to tell whether Trumpism will normalize itself. Th e U.S. demographic group that is the most staunchly conservative on average, white males, is decreasing in the face of immigration and higher birthrates for minorities. For the fi rst time ever, in 2013 more minority than white babies were born in America.8 Th e Latino population increased by 43 percent between 2000 and 2010—four times faster than the general U.S. popula- tion.9 Latinos now represent around 16 percent of the U.S. population, com- pared to 13 percent for African-Americans, previously the largest minority group. Th e Asian population also grew by more than 43 percent during that period, reaching nearly 6 percent overall, another fairly large minority.10 Community-based socializing and groupthink remain strong among both minorities and whites. Around a quarter of whites still oppose a family mem- ber marrying a black person.11 But the number of children born to parents of diff erent racial or ethnic groups is increasing.12

America’s diversifying population may weaken the clout of staunchly conservative voters, as racial and ethnic minorities are rather liberal on aver- age. Barack Obama was elected partly because he won the vote of minorities by a landslide. Hillary Clinton fared slightly worse than he did among minorities but enjoyed a sizable advantage over Trump. As a result, Republican leaders have long backed eff orts to make it harder for minorities to vote or register to do so. Th is cynical strategy is rationalized as an eff ort to fi ght rampant voter fraud—another baseless conspiracy theory.13 A thorough investigation of voter impersonation found barely thirty-one incidents out of a billion votes cast.14

Certain whites who formerly voted for Obama decided to vote for Trump, exemplifying how racial attitudes are not black-and-white. Data indicate that the public’s image of blacks and Latinos deteriorated during the Obama years.15 Human beings can fl uctuate between tolerance and intolerance dur- ing their lifetimes, just as the U.S. national mood has ebbed and fl owed between liberalism and conservatism for decades.16 Working-class whites who joined Trump’s movement were partly misled by his alarmism about a wrecked U.S. economy. In fact, the economic situation in various heavily white counties that changed sides had improved under Obama.17

While Trump was born into the business elite and ran a business empire embodying dog-eat-dog capitalism,18 he cast himself as an anti-elitist popu- list eager to assist the underprivileged. However, we have seen that his program largely overlapped with the Republican Party’s winner-take-all economics, including repealing “Obamacare,” passing a tax plan primarily

C O N C L U S I O N • 2 6 5

favoring the wealthy, and eviscerating fi nancial and environmental regulations.

Even though the Democratic Party has also embraced aspects of winner- take-all economics, the G.O.P. categorically obstructed the Obama admin- istration’s moderate eff orts to reduce wealth inequality and expand access to health care. Obama stressed that his rejected policy proposals “would make a huge diff erence with the white working class—and the black working class, and the Latino working class,” and disputed the notion that Trumpism is explainable by how “both Republican and Democratic elites have neglected the white working class.” Racial divisions have indeed been historically infl u- ential in persuading many whites to vote against their own economic inter- est. Th e 2016 election was no exception.

It is unclear how long the Republican Party can keep winning elections with a nearly all-white coalition. Trump’s nativist, sexist, and incendiary rhetoric has alienated not only minorities but also millions of whites. Merely 38 percent of voters on election day had a favorable opinion of Trump. Th e same dismal proportion deemed him “qualifi ed” for the presidency. Barely a third found him “honest and trustworthy.” 19

Nevertheless, legions of citizens were convinced that Hillary Clinton, a centrist with vast political experience, presented a graver threat to democ- racy. “Th e election of Hillary Clinton will lead to the destruction of our country,” Trump warned. His supporters were persuaded that Clinton deserved to be imprisoned for mismanaging her email—a fi tting picture in the age of mass incarceration and wild conspiracy-mongering. While numer- ous progressives felt lukewarm about or suspicious of Clinton, the reactions she stirred in conservative America were striking. Slogans on (unoffi cial) pins distributed at the Republican National Convention stated, “Life’s a Bitch, Don’t Vote for One” and “2 Fat Th ighs, 2 Small Breasts . . . Left Wing,” 20 recalling the exceptional infl uence of patriarchy in parts of the nation.

Much has been said about how Trump hurt the G.O.P.’s image, although he may have helped it in various ways, such as by making hardline establish- ment Republicans seem like centrists. Many experts previously considered the George W. Bush years the heyday of modern anti-intellectualism and reaction- arism. Th en came Sarah Palin, the Tea Party movement, and Donald J. Trump. Now Bush practically evokes a polished, well-read gentleman with a moderate ideology—notwithstanding his reintroduction of torture into Western civili- zation, vow to detain people forever without trial at Guantánamo, baseless invasion of Iraq, adamant embrace of the death penalty, promotion of

2 6 6 • C O N C L U S I O N

abstinence-only sexual education, aspiration to outlaw abortion, attempt to pass a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, and defense of winner-take-all economics.

It remains to be seen what Trump will actually do as president. He toned down his rhetoric aft er the election, suggesting that he may have been posturing. In any event, the demagogy Trump used to win the White House marked a defi ning historical moment in and of itself.

Trump’s election and the growing infl uence of anti-immigrant European parties may signify that far-right populism will become normalized in the West. Trump’s fi ery and fact-free campaign rhetoric openly defi ed virtually every single norm of human decency. He was a celebrity with absolutely no government experience who touted his “common sense” and disdained edu- cation. For the approximately sixty-three million Americans who voted for Trump, these were either good reasons to elect him or nothing to worry about. While the Republican establishment recurrently resorted to disinfor- mation to obstruct Obama’s agenda, Trump intensifi ed the weight of naked propaganda in U.S. politics. Alt-right news media like Breitbart are no longer on the fringe but a central part of Trump’s coalition. Bestowing the status of president on Trump may also dignify him, making opponents more deferen- tial and further normalizing his movement.

“Today, the United States; tomorrow, France. Bravo!” Th is was the reac- tion of Jean-Marie Le Pen—the founder of France’s extreme-right National Front party—congratulating Trump on his victory. His daughter Marine Le Pen, who now heads the party, concurred: “Nothing is immutable. What has happened this night is not the end of the world, it’s the end of a world.” Florian Philippot, the party’s vice president, struck an ominous tone: “Th eir world is collapsing. Ours is being built.” Other European far-right leaders were jubilant.

Th e European far right is not a product of the same ideological nexus as the American far right. Christian fundamentalism is practically absent in modern Europe, anti-intellectual conspiracy-mongering has limited traction, and Europeans do not share a visceral suspicion of government programs like universal health care. We have seen that the European far right’s ideology primarily stems from nativism and resentment of the establishment, includ- ing the European Union. Still, authoritarianism is a key dimension of the European far right’s ideology. It may ultimately lead to a similar type of soci- ety as Trumpism but via a diff erent path. In addition to receiving a greater

C O N C L U S I O N • 2 6 7

proportion of the vote in recent decades, far-right parties have tilted certain mainstream European political parties rightward.

For the time being, however, political extremism is less mainstream in Europe than in America. Th e fact that the G.O.P., a mainstream conservative party, has aligned itself with fringe, far-right European parties is revealing. When it comes to their basic worldview, mainstream European conservatives are oft en closer to U.S. liberals than to U.S. conservatives. Because of its peculiar ideological evolution, conservative America has become an outlier in the West.

On the other hand, the over-the-top nature of Trumpism may be inter- preted as the last throes of a peculiar ideology doomed by a demographic revo- lution. Yet predicting the future is a risky business. Illustratively, the ridiculed “Scopes Monkey Trial” of 1925 then seemed to be the nail in the coffi n for creationists. Christian fundamentalism survived and grew into a powerful movement.21 Likewise, when the Supreme Court abolished capital punish- ment in 1972, some thought that America was joining the rest of the West in abandoning executions.22 States responded by enacting new death penalty statutes, which the court licensed in 1976.23 Certain justices now appear dis- posed to hear another challenge to capital punishment’s constitutionality.24 American conservatives never moved on aft er Roe v. Wade made abortion a constitutional right in 1973. Trump stated that he would appoint justices who would reverse Roe, which would spark staunch resistance from Americans who support the right to abortion. Th is further suggests that Trump’s election is perhaps best interpreted as part of the cycles of American exceptionalism.

Th e latest social developments can obscure longstanding dynamics. As this book went to press, the public debate focused on whether the 2016 presi- dential race was swayed by the spread of pro-Trump “fake news” on social media and allegations that Vladimir Putin’s regime was involved in hacking the Democratic National Committee’s computer network to help Trump. But the emergence of fake news should not eclipse the broader disinforma- tion that started well before the 2016 election and that is partly rooted in America’s subculture of anti-intellectualism. Attributing Trump’s win mainly to Russian interference is also questionable. While these factors may indeed have contributed to the election’s outcome, understanding Trump’s rise requires us to look beyond the last few weeks of the 2016 campaign. Th e prior years, decades, and centuries shed light on the evolution of American democracy.

2 6 8 • C O N C L U S I O N

T H E A M E R I C A N W A Y

Various reforms could strengthen American democracy and improve the pub- lic’s well-being. America could establish a genuine universal health care sys- tem with pricing regulations on medical treatment. Steps could be taken to undercut the infl uence of lobbyists in American government and overhaul the campaign fi nance system. Th e nation’s colossal wealth inequality could be tackled in several ways, such as by reasonably raising taxes on the affl uent and expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit. Unlike stereotypical welfare pay- ments to the idle, the EITC provides underprivileged workers with supple- mentary income to help make ends meet. Sensible family planning could be promoted by discontinuing abstinence-only education and bolstering repro- ductive rights, including better access to contraception and abortion. Following the legalization of same-sex marriage, additional reforms could fully bar discrimination against LGBTQ people in the workplace and else- where. America could abolish the death penalty, revise the draconian sentenc- ing laws that contributed to mass incarceration, abandon the “War on Drugs,” tackle police brutality, and expand gun control. Th ese reforms would improve the predicament of minorities, and specifi c measures could be taken to address institutional racism. When it comes to foreign policy, America could use its power more wisely by rethinking militarism and respecting interna- tional human rights, which would notably entail closing the Guantánamo detention camp and joining the International Criminal Court.

Several of these proposals seem obvious to experts and well-informed citi- zens. Th e intriguing question is why much of American society has fi ercely resisted sensible laws and policies that other Western democracies have adopted. Th is book has aimed to provide answers by exploring the peculiar mindsets that lead so many Americans to oppose or only modestly support policies that would benefi t them. Voting preferences in America are not all backwards, yet a sizable minority of Americans vote against their own interests.

A mix of national chauvinism, insularity, anti-intellectualism, and disin- formation reinforces the status quo by leading myriad Americans to believe that the United States has nothing to learn from the rest of the world. However, there is nothing un-American about such reform proposals. Generations of Americans have advocated for them. Back in 1944, Franklin Roosevelt was already calling for a “Second Bill of Rights,” encompassing health care, education, and a decent standard of living.

C O N C L U S I O N • 2 6 9

Th e Fox News pundit Bill O’Reilly contended that Obama’s reforms, including a modest raise of the top income tax bracket from 35 to 39.6 percent, risked turning America into Sweden.25 (Recall that the top income tax rate reached 90 percent under Eisenhower, which did not preclude high economic growth.) Th is led to a memorable episode of Th e Daily Show where an American comedian traveled to Stockholm to frantically warn incredulous Swedes that they were enslaved by universal health care, weeks of paid vaca- tion, and “socialism.” In reality, a study shows that Americans would much prefer the level of wealth equality in Sweden. A representative sample was asked to identify which of several pie charts had the ideal wealth distribution. Unbeknown to them, two depicted the wealth distributions in the United States and Sweden. A full 92 percent of Americans preferred the Swedish level.26

Improving wealth equality is not necessarily synonymous with resorting to Swedish tax levels. In Th e Spirit Level, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett compare how Sweden and Japan achieved relatively high levels of income equality: “Sweden does it through redistributive taxes and benefi ts and a large welfare state. As a proportion of national income, public social expenditure in Japan is, in contrast to Sweden, among the lowest of the major developed countries. Japan gets its high degree of equality not so much from redistribution as from a greater equality of market incomes, of earnings before taxes and benefi ts.” 27 Similarly, New Hampshire and Vermont are among the most equal American states, though Vermont has one of the highest tax bur- dens nationwide and New Hampshire one of the lowest. “Th e need for redis- tribution depends on how unequal incomes are before taxes and benefi ts,” Wilkinson and Pickett note.28

Americans could learn from prosperous democracies that blend greater solidarity with a market economy, just as foreigners have historically followed examples set by American society. For instance, several countries looked to the U.S. Constitution and to FDR’s Second Bill of Rights for inspiration when craft ing their own constitutions.29 In recent years, Europeans con- vinced that austerity measures are counterproductive have invoked FDR’s New Deal policies. French progressives even created a reform initiative named “Roosevelt 2012.” Simultaneously, Europeans have criticized the excesses of U.S. capitalism, demonstrating that foreigners perceive America as a model of both what to do and what not to do.

In the end, social democracy will not lead to utopian societies in America, Europe, or elsewhere. But “better the occasional faults of a government that

2 7 0 • C O N C L U S I O N

lives in a spirit of charity than the consistent omissions of a government fro- zen in the ice of its own indiff erence,” as Roosevelt emphasized.

A M E R I C A N D E C L I N E , A D O U B L E - E D G E D S W O R D

Decline may be the inevitable fate of any leading society. From the Roman Empire to the Mongol Empire and European colonial empires, countless dominant societies have faded over the course of history.30 Perhaps it is America’s turn to experience the cyclical rise and fall of civilizations.

Yet decline is not simply a matter of fate. Just as the ascent of civilizations is largely human-made, so is their downfall.31 America’s decline aft er little more than a century as a superpower seems far from inevitable at this stage. It remains the world’s strongest economy. It is a leader in technology and multiple other fi elds. Its universities are widely recognized as the best in the world. It has great thinkers and innovators. In sum, there is much to admire about contemporary America.

American decline would be a negative development if it meant an inability to resolve the nation’s problems. But if “decline” is taken to mean a reduction in U.S. power, it might not lead to worse living standards for Americans. A country does not have to be the world’s top power for its citizens to lead satisfying lives. Th e people of Sweden, for example, enjoy higher living standards than Americans in various ways. Sweden is prosperous, yet it is neither economically dominant nor militarily powerful. Th e days of the Swedish Empire are long gone. By the same token, the average British or French person is not worse off today than their counterparts were at the peak of the British or the French Empire. Th anks to internal social progress, Britain and France have more just and equal societies now than when they were conquering colonies across the world. Th e same can be said of today’s Germany, which found a way to thrive and remain infl uential without being belligerent.

It is therefore possible to imagine a scenario in which America is no longer a superpower but its citizens are better off . Th e decline of the United States may not have the disastrous consequences that many Americans fear. In fact, the country’s current superpower status arguably contributes to its immobi- lism. So long as scores of Americans are persuaded that the United States is simply “the best,” it will be diffi cult to envisage meaningful reforms to its political, legal, social, and economic systems. If pride comes before a fall, it is

C O N C L U S I O N • 2 71

relevant that most Americans think they live in an inherently superior coun- try chosen by God to lead the world.32

Th ose who oppose the idea of an American empire may take comfort in American decline. But the United States never had a genuine empire, and even its most reprehensible abuses of power, such as the Vietnam War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, were generally less abusive than those of European colonial empires. Th e invasion of Iraq led to massive loss of life yet ultimately also to an Iraqi government—a government over which America had a measure of infl u- ence, but an Iraqi government nonetheless. Conversely, European colonial empires typically rejected the very notion of self-rule for those they conquered and oft en brutally repressed protest and independence movements.

If America has been wiser in its use of power than the European empires of yesteryear, this is partly because its rise as a superpower paralleled a global movement toward democracy and human rights—a trend that somewhat accelerated with the collapse of the authoritarian Soviet bloc. Th e United States has at times helped promote this trend, such as by pressuring dictator- ships to transition toward democracy and playing a role in craft ing interna- tional human rights treaties. It is thus important that the world’s most infl uential country be a democracy, even though America has regularly sought to exempt itself from these treaties and certain aspects of its foreign policy are imperialistic.

Th e prospect of American decline should be approached warily, since the most serious contender to become the next global superpower is China, a totalitarian, one-party dictatorship. While China remains a largely rural and impoverished country, it is now the world’s second economy and largest exporter.33 It has the world’s biggest population and a nuclear arsenal. Assuming that China does not evolve toward democracy, its rising clout may challenge democratic principles worldwide. Th e Chinese Communist Party engages in systematic censorship, rampant corruption, and state violence. Th e Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo is among the dissidents impris- oned for urging a nonviolent transition to democracy.

On the bright side, China’s rapid development led to a reduction in pov- erty and better standards of living. But it has become a highly unequal coun- try, as its newfound wealth is concentrated in the hands of the ruling class and the business elite. Th e Chinese system conciliates some of the least desirable aspects of communism and capitalism, yet certain voices laud its “effi ciency.” Its supporters affi rm that the slow workings of democracy would stifl e China’s economic progress—as if economic development were incompatible with

2 7 2 • C O N C L U S I O N

democracy. Th e Chinese Communist Party defi antly rejects calls for democ- racy and human rights, describing them as foreign concepts irreconcilable with Chinese values—as if communism came from China. Authoritarianism is obviously not ingrained in Chinese culture. Chinese philosophers such as Laozi and Zhuangzi already condemned tyrants more than two thousand years ago. Democracy has made progress in modern Asia, and there is no fundamental reason why it could not do so in China.

A democratic China could play a positive role on the international stage, but now the world has to contend with a Chinese government that sees no legitimacy in representative government or human rights. American power may prove to be the most viable bulwark against Chinese power as these countries keep competing for infl uence in coming decades. America’s rise shows that democratic rule and economic development are not mutually exclusive.

China has thus far been remarkably unfazed by pressure from America and other democracies urging it to recognize basic human rights. Th e Chinese government denounces such lesson-giving as hypocrisy, and it is sometimes right. Th e only credible way to lead is by example, and the United States’ harsh socioeconomic inequality and troubling human rights record undermine its calls for reforms abroad. Th e Chinese government makes a point of publishing reports emphasizing U.S. social injustices and human rights abuses.34 Of course, diff erences of degree matter. China has a far worse human rights record than America. Still, America cannot convincingly call on China to discontinue its abuses when, for example, the CIA waterboarded alleged terrorists, slammed them into walls, chained them in uncomfortable positions for hours, stripped them of clothing, and forced them to stay awake for days.35 Th e torture methods that America used to interrogate suspected terrorists were copied from a 1957 Air Force study of techniques that Chinese communists employed during the Korean War to elicit confessions from U.S. prisoners, including sleep deprivation, exposure, and prolonged stress posi- tions. America then denounced these methods as “torture.” 36 Moreover, the Bush administration’s most prominent torture method, waterboarding, was a primary means of torture under the Spanish Inquisition.37 Certain Americans protest that their nation’s enemies resort to heavy-handed meas- ures, leaving it no choice but to do the same. Yet America is a longstanding democracy that cannot be held to the same standard as dictators or terrorists. Th e expectations for America are high, as they should be for a superpower aspiring to lead the free world.

C O N C L U S I O N • 2 7 3

As Trump came into power, the evolution of democracy in America and the Western world took an uncharted path. Far-right European parties, Vladimir Putin, and other dictators hailed his election. Civil society and human rights defenders shuddered at the prospect of an authoritarian wave or the spread of illiberal democracy. People across the globe wonder what happened to the United States.38

America is no longer a commendable standard-bearer for democracy and human rights, although it once helped plant their seeds. A few generations ago, Tocqueville wrote admiringly: “In that land the great experiment was to be made, by civilized man, of the attempt to construct society upon a new basis; and it was there, for the fi rst time, that theories hitherto unknown, or deemed impracticable, were to exhibit a spectacle for which the world had not been prepared by the history of the past.” 39 America may eventually reclaim credibility as a global leader by building on its tremendous strengths, tapping into its enormous potential, and addressing the fundamental prob- lems behind its decline. If it chooses that path, America could draw on its legacy of progress to fulfi ll the expectations of the great experiment in democracy in which it was a trailblazer. American exceptionalism is not set in stone.

This page intentionally left blank

275

Innumerable people generously assisted me in this project, from loved ones to friends and scholars who reviewed the manuscript or shared insights, including colleagues at Stanford Law School. I express my gratitude to all, though special thanks go to Naomi Schneider and the University of California Press team, my literary agent Kate Johnson, my research assistant Nicole Bronnimann, Juliana Froggatt, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Susan Jacoby, Dorothy Roberts, Norman Spaulding, Rick Banks, John Donohue, David Sklansky, Bob Weisberg, Deborah Rhode, Michelle Mello, David Studdert, Nathaniel Persily, Beth Van Schaack, Allen Weiner, Jeanne Merino, Abbye Atkinson, Sarah Duranske, Th ea Johnson, Justin Weinstein- Tull, Beth Colgan, Andrew Gilden, Morris Fiorina, Shanto Iyengar, Tanya Luhrmann, Amir Weiner, Nina Eliasoph, Bob O’Dell, Chandler Davidson, Bhargav Gopal, Mirte Postema, Keren Mock, Marie-Pierre Ulloa, Cóman Kenny, Francisco Moneta, Rick Greenberg, Catherine Paradeise, Jean- Claude Th oenig, Mireille Honeïn, the Stefani family, and my parents. Last but not least, I cannot forget Iaru and Annie for their exceptional kindness.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

This page intentionally left blank

277

Epigraph. Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (Norton, 1997), 17.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. Institute for Criminal Policy Research, “World Prison Brief ” (2016). As we will see in Chapter 7, the tiny archipelago of the Seychelles has technically surpassed America as the country with the highest incarceration rate.

2. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Fact Check: Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the World’s Population and One Quarter of the World’s Prisoners?,” Washington Post, April 30, 2015.

3. Amnesty International, “Death Sentences and Executions in 2014” (2015), 64.

4. Th e prison-industrial complex encompasses correctional facilities and related services.

5. Th e court is offi cially named New York Appellate Division, First Department. It has jurisdiction over Manhattan and the Bronx.

6. Hector Merced is a composite character based on several of my clients. Cer- tain case details have been modifi ed to ensure privacy.

7. New York State’s incarceration rate is 433 prisoners per 100,000 people, below the U.S. national average of 693. But New York State’s incarceration rate is very high by international standards: approximately three times higher than Britain’s, four times higher than France’s, and eight times higher than Sweden’s. See Institute for Criminal Policy Research, “World Prison Brief ” (2016); Prison Policy Initiative, “States of Incarceration: Th e Global Context,” accessed October 18, 2016, www .prisonpolicy.org/global/.

8. While the debate over mass incarceration has led to various reforms in parts of America, Chapter 7 describes how they have had a relatively limited scope.

N O T E S

2 7 8 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 – 9

9. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Th e House of the Dead, trans. Constance Garnett, (1862), quoted in Th e Yale Book of Quotations, ed. Fred R. Shapiro (Yale University Press, 2006), 210.

10. Bryan Stevenson, “We Need to Talk about an Injustice,” TED talk, March 2012. 11. For instance, see Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A

Double-Edged Sword (Norton, 1997), 18. 12. Alan Abramowitz, Th e Polarized Public? Why American Government Is So

Dysfunctional (Pearson, 2013), 2. 13. While John McCain opposed the George W. Bush administration’s use of

torture, as we will see in Chapter 8, many other Republican leaders have supported torture, from Mitt Romney to Mitch McConnell, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Donald Trump.

14. Comparative research on mainstream conservative parties in various coun- tries has found that “the U.S. Republican Party is an anomaly in denying anthropo- genic climate change.” Sondre Båtstrand, “More Th an Markets: A Comparative Study of Nine Conservative Parties on Climate Change,” Politics and Policy 43, no. 4 (2015): 538.

15. Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class (Oxford University Press, 2015).

16. Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 19. 17. See generally Gallup, “Bush Ratings Show Historical Levels of Polarization,”

June 4, 2004; Gallup, “Obama Approval Ratings Still Historically Polarized,” Feb- ruary 6, 2015.

18. Christopher Hare and Keith Poole, “Th e Polarization of Contemporary American Politics,” Polity 46, no. 3 (2014): 428.

19. Isaac Asimov, “A Cult of Ignorance,” Newsweek, January 21, 1980. 20. Despite the revelation that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction or ties

to Al-Qaeda, Americans proved “less sensitive about the reasons for going to war in Iraq than many experts expected.” Th omas Ricks, Fiasco: Th e American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin, 2007), 108. In fact, we will see that many Americans still believe that invading Iraq was the right decision, regardless of how it contrib- uted to the rise of ISIS.

21. See, for instance, Michael Cooper, “From Obama, the Tax Cut Nobody Heard of,” New York Times, October 18, 2010.

22. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Bantam, 2000), 4.

23. See generally Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (Vintage, 1966).

24. See, for example, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, Th e Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger (Bloomsbury, 2010), 155–56; James Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe (Oxford University Press, 2003), 200.

25. Gallup, “In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human Origins,” June 1, 2014.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 9 – 1 1 • 2 7 9

26. Pew, “Life in 2050,” June 22, 2010. 27. See, for instance, Pew, “Many Americans Uneasy with Mix of Religion and

Politics,” August 24, 2006; Sarah Posner, “George W. Bush to Raise Money for Group Th at Converts Jews to Bring about Second Coming of Christ,” Mother Jones, November 7, 2013; Ariel Levy, “Prodigal Son,” New Yorker, June 28, 2010.

28. Pew, “One in 100: Behind Bars in America,” February 2008. 29. David Garland, Th e Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contem-

porary Society (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 99, 197. 30. An empirical study shows that the Supreme Court has grown friendlier to

big business over time. Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner, “How Business Fares at the Supreme Court,” Minnesota Law Review 97 (2013): 1471–72.

31. Wilkinson and Pickett, Spirit Level, 148–50. 32. Scott Keyes, “As Alabama Cuts Benefi ts, Desperate Man ‘Robs’ Bank to Get

Food, Shelter in Jail,” Th ink Progress, July 11, 2013. Similar cases include those of Timothy Alsip in Oregon, Frank Morrocco in New York, and James Richard Verone in North Carolina. See Meredith Bennett-Smith, “Timothy Alsip, Oregon Home- less Man, Robs Bank for $1, Asks to Go to Jail to Access Healthcare,” Huffi ngton Post, August 28, 2013; Dan Herbeck, “Judge Refuses to Jail Ex-Convict on Quest for Health Coverage,” Buff alo News, December 10, 2012; Tony Pierce, “$1 Bank Rob- bery Doesn’t Pay Off for Man Who Said He Was Desperate for Healthcare,” Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2011.

33. D.K., “Armed Police: Trigger Happy,” Democracy in America (blog), Econo- mist, August 15, 2014.

34. Small Arms Survey, “Estimating Civilian Owned Firearms” (2011). 35. Nearly a third of Americans think that “in the next few years an armed revo-

lution might be necessary in order to protect our liberties.” Fairleigh Dickinson University PublicMind Poll, “Beliefs about Sandy Hook Cover-up, Coming Revolu- tion Underlie Divide on Gun Control,” May 1, 2013.

36. United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, “Global Study on Homicide” (2011), 93, 95.

37. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Better Life Index, “Safety,” accessed October 17, 2016, www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics /safety/”; Civitas, “Comparisons of Crime in OECD Countries” (2012); Peter Bald- win, Th e Narcissism of Small Diff erences: How America and Europe Are Alike (Oxford University Press, 2009), 78–87.

38. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Th is precedent has largely barred other challenges to three-strikes laws.

39. Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “US: ‘Four Decades in Solitary Confi nement Can Only Be Described as Torture,’ ” Octo- ber 7, 2013.

40. International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School, American Civil Liberties Union, and Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcer- ated Mothers, “Th e Shackling of Incarcerated Pregnant Women: A Human Rights Violation Committed Regularly in the United States” (August 2013), 2–3.

2 8 0 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 1 – 1 9

41. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 42. Human Rights Watch, “Against All Odds: Prison Conditions for Youth

Off enders Serving Life without Parole Sentences in the United States,” January 4, 2012. Iran is another country with virtually unparalleled draconian punishments for juveniles. Amnesty International, “Growing Up on Death Row: Th e Death Penalty and Juvenile Off enders in Iran,” January 26, 2016.

43. Not only are draconian punishments and police shootings more common in the United States, but Americans are also more inclined to embrace military force than other Westerners. Jerome Karabel and Daniel Laurison, “An Exceptional Nation? American Political Values in Comparative Perspective” (Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper 136–12, University of Califor- nia, Berkeley, 2012), 29–32.

44. Samuel Moyn, Th e Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap, 2010), 63.

45. Mugambi Jouet, “Th e Exceptional Absence of Human Rights as a Principle in American Law,” Pace Law Review 34, no. 2 (2014): 704–8.

46. See, for example, Shanto Iyengar, James Curran, and Anker Brink Lund, “Media Systems, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative Study,” Euro- pean Journal of Communication 24, no. 1 (2009): 5–26.

47. U.S. State Department, “Valid Passports in Circulation (1989–Present),” https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/statistics.html.

48. Bryan Bender and Sasha Issenberg, “Palin Not Well Traveled outside US,” Boston Globe, September 3, 2008.

49. Non-Latino whites represent approximately 61.6 percent of the U.S. popula- tion. U.S. Census, “Quick Facts” ( July 1, 2015, data), www.census.gov/quickfacts /table/PST045215/00.

50. Michael L. Millenson, “Why Obamacare Is Good for White People,” Health Care Blog, October 30, 2012; Urban Institute and Robert Wood Johnson Founda- tion, “Characteristics of Th ose Aff ected by a Supreme Court Finding for the Plain- tiff in King v. Burwell,” January 2015. Chapters 5 and 6 cover other reasons why most Americans stand to gain from universal health care.

51. Stephen Mansfi eld, Th e Faith of George W. Bush (Tarcher, 2004), 108. 52. John Kingdon, America the Unusual (Worth, 1999), 55. See also 72.

1 . O N E N A T I O N , D I V I S I B L E

1. Gallup, “Americans See U.S. as Exceptional,” December 22, 2010. A later poll found fewer Americans convinced of U.S. superiority: Pew, “Most Americans Th ink the U.S. Is Great, but Fewer Th ink It’s the Greatest,” July 2, 2014. Given that the drop was strongest among Republicans, it might have been infl uenced by the G.O.P.’s recurrent claim that Barack Obama’s policies have ruined America. Th e drop among Democrats might refl ect preoccupation over the damaging gridlock in Washington and the rise of the Tea Party. In any event, a comparative international

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 9 – 2 3 • 2 8 1

study confi rms that Americans are generally the Westerners proudest of their nationality. Jerome Karabel and Daniel Laurison, “An Exceptional Nation? Ameri- can Political Values in Comparative Perspective” (Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper 136–12, University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 22–23, 32.

2. Public Religion Research Institute, “Most Americans Believe Protests Make the Country Better,” June 23, 2015.

3. A chart tracking references to “American exceptionalism” in the U.S. media previously appeared in Jerome Karabel, “ ‘American Exceptionalism’ and the Battle for the Presidency,” Huffi ngton Post, December 22, 2011.

4. Jack Greene, Th e Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity fr om 1492 to 1800 (University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 6–7, 69.

5. John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), quoted in Robert Ferguson, Th e American Enlightenment, 1750–1820 (Harvard University Press, 1997), 89.

6. Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (Hill and Wang, 1995), especially xi, xii, 5–6 (quotes), 8, 49–51, 56, 60.

7. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Bantam, 2000), 548.

8. Ted Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster (Random House, 1999), 41, 78, 91, 100–104. Th e linguist Ben Zimmer has underlined that it was Lovestone, not Stalin, who fi rst used the expression “Ameri- can exceptionalism.” Zimmer, “Did Stalin Really Coin ‘American Exceptional- ism’?,” Slate, September 27, 2013. Various other scholars have commented on the communist origins of the phrase. See, for instance, James W. Ceaser, “Th e Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,” American Political Th ought 1 (2012): 6; Donald Pease, Th e New American Exceptionalism (University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 10; Mark Liberman, “Th e Th ird Life of American Exceptionalism,” Language Log, February 23, 2012, http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3798; Karabel, “ ‘American Exceptionalism.’ ” Th e Yale librarian Fred Shapiro identifi ed a prior reference to “exceptionalism” in an 1861 London Times article on the U.S. Civil War, which evoked the chauvinistic defi nition that especially reemerged during the Obama presidency: “It is probable that the ‘exceptionalism,’ if one may use the word, on which the Americans rather pride themselves, will not prevail in the case of the struggle between North and South.” “Th e Civil War in America,” Times (London), August 20, 1861, quoted in Shapiro to American Dialect Society mailing list, Sep- tember 29, 2013, http://listserv.linguistlist.org/pipermail/ads-l/2013-September /128665.html.

9. See Greene, Intellectual Construction of America, 4–5; Ceaser, “Origins and Character,” 2; Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (Norton, 1997), 18.

10. Besides the previously cited publications, a wide range of scholarship focuses on American exceptionalism. See, for instance, Peter H. Schuck and James Q. Wil- son, eds., Understanding America: Th e Anatomy of an Exceptional Nation (Public

2 8 2 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 3 – 2 7

Aff airs, 2008); Charles Lockhart, Th e Roots of American Exceptionalism: Institu- tions, Culture and Policies (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); Michael Ignatieff , ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005).

11. Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 18. 12. Glenn Greenwald, “Th e Premises and Purposes of American Exceptional-

ism,” Guardian, February 18, 2013. 13. See Sylvia Söderlind, “Introduction: Th e Shining of America,” in American

Exceptionalisms: From Winthrop to Winfr ey, ed. Söderlind and James Taylor Carson (State University of New York Press, 2011), 1; Emily García, “ ‘Th e Cause of America Is in Great Measure the Cause of Mankind’: American Universalism and Excep- tionalism in the Early Republic,” in ibid., 52–53.

14. Donald Trump, Time to Get Tough: Making America #1 Again (Regnery, 2011), 155–56.

15. Th is fi nding is based on my review of the Republican platforms in the data- base of Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley’s American Presidency Project (www .presidency.ucsb.edu/) at the University of California, Santa Barbara. It should be noted that various platforms emphasized faith in American greatness even though they did not use the precise adjective “exceptional.”

16. “American Exceptionalism,” in “We Believe in America: Republican Plat- form 2012” (August 27, 2012), American Presidency Project, 39–50, www.presidency .ucsb.edu/papers_ pdf/101961.pdf.

17. Preamble, “Republican Platform 2016” ( July 18, 2016), American Presidency Project, i, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_ pdf/117718.pdf.

18. Steven Brill, America’s Bitter Pill: Money, Politics, Backroom Deals, and the Fight to Fix Our Broken Healthcare System (Random House, 2015), 30–34, 93.

19. Harris Interactive, “ ‘Wingnuts’ and President Obama,” March 23, 2010. 20. PolitiFact, “Mitt Romney Repeats Claim Th at Obama Went around the

World Apologizing for the United States,” September 22, 2011. 21. Andrew Sullivan, “Th e Big Lie,” Daily Dish, Atlantic, November 9, 2010. 22. Harris Interactive, “ ‘Wingnuts’ and President Obama.” 23. David Corn, “Donald Trump Says He Doesn’t Believe in ‘American Excep-

tionalism,’ ” Mother Jones, June 7, 2016. 24. Trump, Time to Get Tough, 155–56. 25. Hillary Clinton, speech at the American Legion National Convention,

Cincinnati, August 31, 2016. 26. Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Rein-

vented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class (Oxford University Press, 2015), 1, 4. 27. “Gerrymandering” refers to redrawing electoral districts for political gain.

Th e term stems from the actions of Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, whose 1812 electoral map featured a district shaped like a salamander. His critics derisively called it a “gerry-mander.” Carl Hulse, “Seeking to End Gerrymandering’s Enduring Legacy,” New York Times, January 25, 2016.

28. “On gerrymandering, much of the discussion tends to confl ate the issue of increasingly ‘safe seats’ for one party or the other, which has occurred, with gerry-

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 7 – 3 1 • 2 8 3

mandering as the cause for the rise of these safe seats. Many empirical studies now conclude that the increasing geographic concentration of Democrats in urban areas, and their geographic isolation in college towns and certain other areas, is the major cause for the rise of these safe seats.” Richard Pildes, “Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government,” Yale Law Journal 124 (2014): 821 fn. 46. See also Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: Th e Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press, 2016), 207 (“We are reluctant to see gerrymandering as a major source of the overall polarization of American politics.”). Jill Lepore of Harvard aptly summa- rized the general consensus among political scientists: “First, polarization has taken place in both chambers at about the same time and rate and, since redistricting does not aff ect the Senate, it cannot wholly explain what’s happened in the House. Sec- ond, much polarization in the House has taken place in districts that have not been redrawn by legislators. Th ird, much of the polarizing in gerrymandered districts preceded their redrawing. Th e best calculation is that redistricting accounts for no more than ten or twenty per cent of the polarization in the House. Gerrymandering is bad for all kinds of reasons, but polarization isn’t one of them.” Lepore, “Long Division,” New Yorker, December 2, 2013, 77–78.

29. Christopher Hare and Keith Poole, “Th e Polarization of Contemporary American Politics,” Polity 46, no. 3 (2014): 428.

30. Belgium and Canada, like the United States, are exceptional in this regard. See Katharine Young, “American Exceptionalism and Constitutional Shutdowns,” Boston University Law Review 94 (2014): 991–92.

31. Pildes, “Romanticizing Democracy,” 823. 32. Lisa Lerer, “Clinton Wins Popular Vote by Nearly 2.9 Million,” Associated

Press, December 23, 2016. 33. Elena Schneider, “Trump Explains Mussolini Quote,” Politico, February 28,

2016. 34. “Father of Fascism Studies: Donald Trump Shows Alarming Willingness to

Use Fascist Terms and Styles,” Democracy Now!, March 15, 2016. 35. Dylan Matthews, “I Asked 5 Fascism Experts Whether Donald Trump Is a

Fascist. Here Is What Th ey Said,” Vox, May 19, 2016; Peter Baker, “Rise of Donald Trump Tracks Growing Debate over Global Fascism,” New York Times, May 28, 2016.

36. Alan Abramowitz, Th e Polarized Public? Why American Government Is So Dysfunctional (Pearson, 2013), 3.

37. Bill Adair and Angie Drobnic Holan, “PolitiFact’s Lie of the Year: ‘A Gov- ernment Takeover of Health Care,’ ” December 16, 2010.

38. Brill, America’s Bitter Pill, 30–34, 93. 39. Congressional Budget Offi ce, “Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Aff ord-

able Care Act—March 2015 Baseline,” March 2015, Table 2. 40. Andrew Romano and Daniel Stone, “Th e Necessary Man,” Newsweek,

September 19, 2010. 41. Jim Nunns, Len Burman, Jeff Rohaly, and Joe Rosenberg, “An Analysis of

Donald Trump’s Tax Plan,” Tax Policy Center, December 22, 2015.

2 8 4 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 1 – 3 2

42. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 2. 43. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America, 12. 44. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Confronting Asymmetric Polarization,”

in Solutions to Polarization in America, ed. Nathaniel Persily (Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2015), 59–70; Th omas E. Mann, foreword to American Gridlock: Th e Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization, ed. James Th urber and Antoine Yoshinaka (Cambridge University Press, 2015), xxiv.

45. Nathaniel Persily, introduction to Solutions to Polarization, 6. 46. Morris Fiorina with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? Th e

Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2010), 55, 73, 76–77, 93, 206, 208. Fiorina’s theory about the outsize role of political elites is bolstered by a study which found that “Democrats and Republicans now speak diff erent languages to a far greater degree than ever before” because of increasingly partisan rhetoric framed by political consultants and campaign strategists. Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse Shapiro, and Matt Taddy, “Measuring Polarization in High-Dimensional Data: Method and Application to Congressional Speech” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22423, July 2016), 23.

47. David Broockman and Christopher Skovron, “What Politicians Believe about Th eir Constituents: Asymmetric Misperceptions and Prospects for Constitu- ency Control” (working paper, July 17, 2015), www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/miller- stokes/08_MillerStokes_BroockmanSkovron.pdf.

48. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, xii, 56–57; Hacker and Pierson, “Confront- ing Asymmetric Polarization,” 63.

49. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 8, 16, 44–45, 54, 60, 105. 50. Ibid., 105; Pew, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” June 12,

2014. By other estimates, “the highly politically active and knowledgeable citizens that scholars routinely indict for pulling politics to the extremes appear, if anything, less likely than their peers to support more extreme policies.” David Broockman, “Approaches to Studying Policy Representation,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (2016): 206.

51. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 2. 52. Ibid., xv, 60. Broockman, however, has questioned political scientists’ fi nd-

ings regarding ideological consistency among conservative and liberals. Broockman, “Studying Policy Representation,” 181–215.

53. Douglas Ahler and David Broockman, “Does Elite Polarization Imply Poor Representation? A New Perspective on the ‘Disconnect’ between Politicians and Voters” (working paper, March 14, 2016), https://people.stanford.edu/dbroock /sites/default/fi les/ahler_broockman_ideological_innocence.pdf.

54. Hare and Poole, “Polarization of Contemporary American Politics,” 428. 55. Ibid.; Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 2, 25–26, 42; Morris Fiorina, “If I

Could Hold a Seminar for Political Journalists . . . ,” Forum 10, vol. 4 (February 2013): 2–10.

56. Hare and Poole, “Polarization of Contemporary American Politics,” 417. On realignment, see also Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 45–61.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 2 – 3 5 • 2 8 5

57. Pew, “Beyond Red vs. Blue: Th e Political Typology,” May 4, 2011. 58. Pew, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” June 12, 2014. 59. Shanto Iyengar and Sean Westwood, “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines:

New Evidence on Group Polarization,” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 3 (2015): 691.

60. Giovanni Russonello, “Race Relations Are at Lowest Point in Obama Presi- dency, Poll Finds,” New York Times, July 13, 2016.

61. Michael Norton and Samuel Sommers, “Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game Th at Th ey Are Now Losing,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, no. 3 (May 2011): 215–18.

62. Scott Clement, “Republicans Embrace Trump’s Ban on Muslims While Most Others Reject It,” Washington Post, December 14, 2016.

63. Sam Roberts, “Projections Put Whites in Minority in U.S. by 2050,” New York Times, December 17, 2009.

64. Guttmacher Institute, “In Just the Last Four Years, States Have Enacted 231 Abortion Restrictions,” January 5, 2015.

65. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 65, 70–72. 66. Ibid., 65. 67. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War, 241. 68. According to Marc Hetherington, modern public opinion data on gay rights

suggests that Americans are more polarized over this issue than Fiorina’s interpreta- tion of the data indicates. Proceeding by analog y, Hetherington showed that a narrow interpretation of statistical data could even support the conclusion that Northern and Southern whites were not truly polarized over race and civil rights in the 1960s. Hetherington, “Putting Polarization in Perspective,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 2 (2009): 433–36.

69. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 10–11. 70. Sean F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff , “Th e Continuing Increase in Income

Segregation, 2007–2012” (Stanford Center for Education and Policy Analysis, 2016).

71. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence Katz, “Th e Eff ects of Expo- sure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment,” American Economic Review 106, no. 4 (2016): 855–902.

72. Bill Bishop, Th e Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart (Mariner, 2009).

73. Chapter 2 describes how Fox News plays a more dominant role in conserva- tive America than MSNBC does in liberal America. Fox News viewers also tend to be far less informed and more radical than their MSNBC counterparts.

74. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 86, 100. 75. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America, 9, 79. 76. Th at is a recurrent fi nding of the World Values Survey. See Karabel and

Laurison, “Exceptional Nation?,” 5–13; Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 71–76. 77. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 10–11. 78. “Th e Return of ‘Drill, Baby, Drill,’ ” Editorial, New York Times, May 6, 2011.

2 8 6 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 5 – 4 0

79. Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (Norton, 2010), 219.

80. Again, this is a persistent fi nding of the World Values Survey. See Karabel and Laurison, “Exceptional Nation?,” 16–21; Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 60–67.

81. Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” May 12, 2015. 82. See generally Mugambi Jouet, “Th e Exceptional Absence of Human Rights

as a Principle in American Law,” Pace Law Review 34, no. 2 (2014): 101–42. 83. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551

(2005). 84. I present various nuances to this argument throughout the book, such as in

Chapter 7, where I discuss how the death penalty was abolished in Europe despite public support.

85. Data suggest that, unlike in America, mainstream political parties in West- ern Europe have largely depolarized. See Philipp Rehm and Timothy Reilly, “United We Stand: Constituency Homogeneity and Comparative Party Polarization,” Elec- toral Studies 29, no. 1 (2010): 40–53; Morris Fiorina, “Is the US Experience Excep- tional?,” Hoover Institution, October 26, 2016. Another study found that partisan animosity is worse in America than in Britain. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood, Yphtach Lelkes, “Aff ect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polariza- tion,” Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2012): 405–31.

86. Peter Schwartzstein, “90 Percent of Europeans Would Vote for Obama,” Reuters, October 31, 2012.

87. “Global Poll on the American Election,” WIN/Gallup International, Octo- ber 4, 2016.

88. Ethan Bronner, “For Many Abroad, an Ideal Renewed,” New York Times, November 5, 2008.

89. T. R. Reid, Th e Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care (Penguin, 2010), 84–90.

90. Soonman Kwon, “Th irty Years of National Health Insurance in South Korea: Lessons for Achieving Universal Health Care Coverage,” Oxford Journal of Health Policy and Planning 24, no. 1 (2009): 63–71.

91. Reid, Healing of America, 173. 92. Felicia Marie Knaul, Eduardo González-Pier, Octavio Gómez-Dantés,

David García-Junco, Héctor Arreola-Ornelas, Mariana Barraza-Lloréns, Rosa San- doval, et al., “Th e Quest for Universal Health Coverage: Achieving Social Protec- tion for All in Mexico,” Lancet 380, no. 9849 (October 6, 2012): 1259–79.

93. South African Constitution, Article 27(1)(a). 94. Time Magazine / ABT SRBI survey, October 9–10, 2011, http://swampland

.time.com/full-results-of-oct-9–10–2011-time-poll/. 95. Jonathan Weisman, “Poll Finds Voters Deeply Torn,” Wall Street Journal,

November 8, 2011. 96. Data going back to the 1950s suggest that the public’s mood swings to the left

when conservatives are in power and to the right when liberals are. Larry Bartels,

N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 0 – 4 6 • 2 8 7

Unequal Democracy: Th e Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton Uni- versity Press, 2016), 289–90.

97. Th omas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Gold- hammer (Belknap, 2014), 321.

98. John Kingdon, America the Unusual (Worth, 1999), 10; Pildes, “Romanticiz- ing Democracy,” 808–17; Persily, introduction to Solutions to Polarization, 7.

99. Sarah Binder, “How We Count Senate Filibusters and Why It Matters,” Washington Post, May 15, 2014; “Not Too Late to Curb the Filibuster,” Editorial, New York Times, May 14, 2012; Steven S. Smith, “Partisan Polarization and the Senate Syndrome,” in Persily, Solutions to Polarization, 219–21.

100. Andrew Moravcsik, “Th e Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” in Igna- tieff , American Exceptionalism, 184, 187.

101. Akhil Reed Amar, “Foreword: Th e Document and the Doctrine,” Harvard Law Review 114 (2000): 61–62.

102. David R. Mayhew, “Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate,” Political Sci- ence and Politics 36, no. 1 (2003): 31.

2 . F R O M T H E A M E R I C A N E N L I G H T E N M E N T T O

A N T I - I N T E L L E C T U A L I S M

1. Trump was questioning aspects of Carson’s controversial biography. Maggie Haberman, “Donald Trump Asks Iowans: ‘How Stupid’ Are Th ey to Believe Ben Carson?,” New York Times, November 13, 2015.

2. Angie Drobnic Holan, “All Politicians Lie. Some Lie More Th an Others,” New York Times, December 11, 2015.

3. Isaac Asimov, “A Cult of Ignorance,” Newsweek, January 21, 1980. 4. As privacy requires, I have usually modifi ed the names and identifying details

of people I have interacted with. 5. Susan Jacoby, interview by Nick Gillespie, Aft er Words, Book TV, C-SPAN2,

May 1, 2008. 6. Peter Galbraith, Th e End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War

without End (Simon and Schuster, 2007), 83. 7. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Bantam,

2000), 4. 8. Henry May, Th e Enlightenment in America (Oxford University Press, 1976), 314. 9. Peter Lindert and Jeff rey Williamson, “American Incomes before and aft er

the Revolution,” Journal of Economic History 73, no. 3 (2013): 725–65; Th omas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Belknap, 2014), 150–52.

10. May, Enlightenment in America, 29. 11. Leo Damrosch, Tocqueville’s Discovery of America (Farrar, Straus and Giroux,

2010), 26.

2 8 8 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 6 – 5 1

12. On this point see also May, Enlightenment in America, 308–9. 13. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington

Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (Simon and Schus- ter, 2010), 39.

14. Jack Greene, Th e Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity fr om 1492 to 1800 (University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 106–7, 132.

15. Susan Jacoby, Th e Age of American Unreason (Vintage, 2009), 37. 16. See generally Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life

(Vintage, 1966). See also Jacoby, Age of American Unreason, 37–38, 57; Michael Kazin, Th e Populist Persuasion: An American History (Basic, 1995), 12.

17. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 58. 18. Ibid., 560. 19. Ibid., 58. 20. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 154. 21. Robert Ferguson, Th e American Enlightenment, 1750–1820 (Harvard Univer-

sity Press, 1997), 89, 109. 22. Marquis de Condorcet, “Infl uence of the American Revolution on the Opin-

ions and Legislation of Europe” (1786), quoted in Greene, Intellectual Construction of America, 140.

23. Ibid., 131, 138–40; Denis Lacorne, Religion in America, trans. George Holoch (Columbia University Press, 2011), 2–12.

24. See, for example, Philippe Roger, Th e American Enemy: Th e History of French Anti-Americanism, trans. Sharon Bowman (University of Chicago Press, 2006).

25. Caroline Winterer, American Enlightenments: Pursuing Happiness in the Age of Reason (Yale University Press, 2016), 12.

26. As the historian Caroline Winterer has emphasized, the notion of a single “American Enlightenment” emerged in the twentieth century, although “American Enlightenments” may better describe this complex and multifaceted epoch. Ibid., 5–13.

27. Federalist Paper No. 49, available at www.congress.gov/resources/display /content/Th e+Federalist+Papers#Th eFederalistPapers-49.

28. Ferguson, American Enlightenment, 86–87, 110. 29. Marist Poll, “7/1: Independence Day—Seventeen Seventy When?,” July 1,

2011. 30. Annenberg Public Policy Center, “New Annenberg Survey Asks: ‘How Well

Do Americans Understand the Constitution?,’ ” September 16, 2011. 31. Andrew Romano, “How Dumb Are We?,” Newsweek, May 20, 2011. 32. Jean-Marie Déguignet, Mémoires d’un paysan bas-breton (Pocket, 2001). 33. While anti-intellectualism has had less weight in France than in America,

the French have long debated whether their high schools should prioritize practical instruction or the humanities. Th is enduring Gallic debate emerged in the nineteenth century. See Philippe Savoie, La construction de l’enseignment secondaire (1802–1914): Aux origines d’un service public (ENS Éditions, 2013), 138, 401–4.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 1 – 6 0 • 2 8 9

34. Henry Louis Gates Jr., “Mister Jeff erson and the Trials of Phillis Wheatley,” Jeff erson Lecture in the Humanities, National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington D.C., March 22, 2002.

35. Ta-Nehisi Coates, “Acting French,” Atlantic, August 29, 2014. 36. Pew, “U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey,” September 28, 2010. 37. Shanto Iyengar, James Curran, and Anker Brink Lund, “Media Systems,

Public Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative Study,” European Journal of Communication (2009): 14.

38. Jacoby, interview on Book TV. 39. Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, Th e Race between Education and Tech-

nology (Belknap, 2008), 12 (quote), 28, 154–55. 40. Ibid., 157, 197, 206. 41. Ibid., 4–5, 325 (quote). 42. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 51. 43. Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 257–58. 44. Ioanna Kohler, “Gone for Good? Partis pour de bon? Les expatriés de

l’enseignement supérieur français aux États-Unis,” Institut Montaigne, November 2010, 22. See also Maïa de la Baume, “French Professors Find Life in U.S. Hard to Resist,” New York Times, November 21, 2010.

45. Susan Dynarski, “New Data Gives Clearer Picture of Student Debt,” New York Times, September 10, 2015.

46. Sam Stein, “McCain Backed Abolishing the Department of Education,” Huffi ngton Post, September 9, 2008.

47. Andrew Romano and Daniel Stone, “Th e Necessary Man,” Newsweek, Sep- tember 19, 2010.

48. Nina Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Every- day Life (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

49. John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), quoted in Ferguson, American Enlightenment, 89.

50. See, for example, Jacoby, Age of American Unreason, 250–51; Olivier Donnat, “Les pratiques culturelles des français à l’ère numérique: Eléments de synthèse 1997–2008,” Culture Études, Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, October 2009, 6; Pew, “A Snapshot of Reading in America in 2013,” January 16, 2014.

51. David Riesman, “Preface to the 1961 Edition,” in Th e Lonely Crowd (Yale University Press, 2001), lxiv.

52. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 145–51, 155–57, 160 (fi rst quote); May, Enlightenment in America, 312; Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 22 (second quote).

53. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 192–96. 54. Ibid., 10 (quote), 226–27. 55. Elvin Lim, Th e Anti-Intellectual Presidency: Th e Decline of Presidential Rheto-

ric fr om George Washington to George W. Bush (Oxford University Press, 2008), 42.

56. Ibid., 43.

2 9 0 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 6 1 – 6 7

57. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 227–29; Jacoby, Age of American Unreason, 283–84.

58. Jerome Karabel, “Th e Legacy of Legacies,” New York Times, September 13, 2004; “Kerry Grades near Bush’s While at Yale,” New York Times, June 8, 2005.

59. Ron Suskind, Th e Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (Simon and Schuster, 2004), 57–60, 88, 149, 153.

60. Tony Blair, A Journey: My Political Life (Knopf, 2010), 393. 61. John DiIulio to Ron Suskind, October 24, 2002, available at www.esquire

.com/news-politics/a2880/dilulio/. 62. Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: Th e Political Economy of the New Gilded

Age (Princeton, 2008), 163 (quote), 186. 63. “Iraq | Gallup Historical Trends,” www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx. 64. Lim, Anti-Intellectual Presidency, 93 (quote), 96. 65. Even if Obama was born in Kenya, he would still be a “natural born citizen”

eligible for the presidency because his mother was a U.S. citizen. Paul Clement and Neal Katyal, “On the Meaning of ‘Natural Born Citizen,’ ” Harvard Law Review Forum 128 (2015): 161–64.

66. Harris Interactive, “ ‘Wingnuts’ and President Obama,” March 23, 2010. 67. Barack Obama, “My Spiritual Journey,” Time, October 16, 2006. 68. Josh Gerstein, “Should Obama Show His Faith?,” Politico, October 19, 2010. 69. Lydia Polgreen, “A Question of Appearances: Obama Will Bypass Sikh

Temple on Visit to India,” New York Times, October 19, 2010. 70. Alex Th eodoridis, “Scott Walker’s View of Obama’s Religion Makes Him a

Moderate,” Washington Post, February 25, 2015. 71. Public Policy Polling, “Trump Supporters Th ink Obama Is a Muslim Born

in Another Country,” September 1, 2015. 72. Ian Urbina, “Beyond Beltway, Health Care Debate Turns Hostile,” New

York Times, August 7, 2009. 73. Reed Abelson, “Census Numbers Show 50.7 Million Uninsured,” New York

Times, September 16, 2010. 74. Reed Abelson, “Ranks of Underinsured Are Rising, Study Finds,” New York

Times, June 10, 2008. 75. Th is was the conviction of Republican voters too. See Harvard School

of Public Health and Harris Interactive, “Most Republicans Th ink the U.S. Health Care System Is the Best in the World. Democrats Disagree,” March 20, 2008.

76. See, for example, Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, “State of the Union” (2016), 58–64; Commonwealth Fund, “U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective” (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Why Is Health Spending in the United States So High?” (2011); T. R. Reid, Th e Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care (Penguin, 2010), 31–34.

77. Bill Adair and Angie Drobnic Holan, “PolitiFact’s Lie of the Year: ‘A Gov- ernment Takeover of Health Care,’ ” December 16, 2010.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 6 7 – 7 9 • 2 9 1

78. Steven Brill, America’s Bitter Pill: Money, Politics, Backroom Deals, and the Fight to Fix Our Broken Healthcare System (Random House, 2015), 30–34, 93.

79. Adair and Holan, “PolitiFact’s Lie of the Year.” 80. Congressional Budget Offi ce, “Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Aff ord-

able Care Act—March 2015 Baseline,” March 2015. 81. Commonwealth Fund, “31 Million People Were Underinsured in 2014;

Many Skipped Needed Health Care and Depleted Savings to Pay Medical Bills,” May 20, 2015.

82. See generally Reid, Healing of America, 36–37; Mugambi Jouet, “Th e Excep- tional Absence of Human Rights as a Principle in American Law,” Pace Law Review 34 (2014): 714.

83. Glenn Kessler, “Fact-Check: Boehner’s Claim Th at Obamacare Has Resulted in a ‘Net Loss’ of People with Health Insurance,” Washington Post, March 17, 2014.

84. PolitiFact, “James Clyburn Says Republicans Sat on Sidelines for Passage of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid,” September 6, 2012.

85. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Health Tracking Poll,” September 2013. Another poll similarly found that fewer than four in ten Americans realize that enrollees in new insurance plans can choose among diff erent private health plans, whereas a quarter wrongly believe they are enrolled in a single government plan and another four in ten are unsure. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Health Tracking Poll,” July 2014.

86. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Health Tracking Poll,” September 2011. 87. Harris Interactive, “ ‘Wingnuts’ and President Obama.” 88. Paul Farhi, “Th e E-mail Rumor Mill Is Run by Conservatives,” Washington

Post, November 18, 2011. 89. Pew, “Cable News Fact Sheet,” April 29, 2015. 90. Public Policy Polling, “Americans Closely Divided on Brian Williams,”

February 26, 2015. 91. PolitiFact, “Jon Stewart Says Th ose Who Watch Fox News Are the ‘Most

Consistently Misinformed Media Viewers,’ ” June 20, 2011. 92. Lauren Feldman, Edward Maibach, Connie Roser-Renouf, and Anthony

Leiserowitz, “Climate on Cable: Th e Nature and Impact of Global Warming Cover- age on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC,” International Journal of Press/Politics 17, no. 1 (2012): 3. See also Bruce Bartlett, “How Fox News Changed American Media and Political Dynamics,” June 3, 2015, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstract_id=2604679; Fairleigh Dickinson University’s PublicMind Poll, “Some News Leaves People Knowing Less,” November 21, 2011; Kaiser Family Foun- dation, “Pop Quiz: Assessing Americans’ Familiarity with the Health Care Law,” February 2011; Program on International Policy Attitudes / Knowledge Networks Poll, “Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War,” October 2, 2003.

93. Michael Grynbaum and John Herrman, “Breitbart, Reveling in Trump’s Election, Gains a Voice in His White House,” New York Times, November 13, 2016.

94. Shanto Iyengar, James Curran, Anker Brink Lund, Inka Salovaara-Moring, Kyu Hahn, and Sharon Coen, “Cross-National versus Individual-Level Diff erences

2 9 2 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 6 9 – 7 2

in Political Information: A Media Systems Perspective,” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 20, no. 3 (August 2010): 294–95.

95. Ibid., 294, 304 (quote). 96. Richard Hofstadter, Th e Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other

Essays (Vintage, 2008), 3, 65. 97. Michael Cooper, “From Obama, the Tax Cut Nobody Heard Of,” New York

Times, October 18, 2010. 98. Robert Hendin, “Poll Reveals Most Americans Don’t Know Th ey Got a Tax

Cut,” CBS News, February 12, 2010. 99. Tax Policy Center, “Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates,” www

.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates. 100. Emmanuel Saez, “Striking It Richer: Th e Evolution of Top Incomes in the

United States,” UC Berkeley Economics Department, January 25, 2015. 101. As noted above, a study of conservative parties in nine countries found that

“the U.S. Republican Party is an anomaly in denying anthropogenic climate change.” Sondre Båtstrand, “More Th an Markets: A Comparative Study of Nine Conservative Parties on Climate Change,” Politics and Policy, 43, no. 4 (2015): 538. Still, a relative partisan divide exists in various countries. Pew, “Th e U.S. Isn’t the Only Nation with Big Partisan Divides on Climate Change,” November 6, 2015. However, both the extent and the intensity of the U.S. partisan divide over climate change are considerable, as illustrated by the conspiracy theories that Republican leaders promote. Pew, “Americans, Politics and Science Issues,” July 1, 2015, 40–41; Pew, “Global Warming Seen as a Major Problem around the World,” December 2, 2009; Institut français d’opinion publique, “Les français et le climato- scepticisme,” November 15, 2010 (comparing poll data in France and the United States).

102. Andrew Moravcsik, “Th e Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” in Ameri- can Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton University Press, 2005), 187.

103. Th e fi libuster is not a constitutional provision but a Senate rule. 104. Regarding the infl uence of America’s situation on the negotiation process,

see Coral Davenport, “Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris,” New York Times, December 12, 2015.

105. PolitiFact, “Jerry Brown Says ‘Virtually No Republican’ in Washington Accepts Climate Change Science,” May 18, 2014.

106. Cordula Meyer, “ ‘Science as the Enemy’: Th e Traveling Salesmen of Cli- mate Skepticism,” Der Spiegel, October 8, 2010.

107. Bill Curry and Shawn McCarthy, “Canada Formally Abandons Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change,” Globe and Mail, December 12, 2011.

108. Juliet Eilperin, “U.S. Plays Confl icted Role in Global Climate Debate,” Washington Post, November 1, 2010.

109. “Republican Platform 2016” ( July 18, 2016), American Presidency Project, 22, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_ pdf/117718.pdf.

110. “Into Ignorance,” Nature, March 16, 2011.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 7 3 – 7 7 • 2 9 3

111. Chris Mooney, “Th e Surprising Links between Faith and Evolution and Climate Denial,” Washington Post, May 20, 2015.

112. PolitiFact, “Yes, Donald Trump Did Call Climate Change a Chinese Hoax,” June 3, 2016.

113. Center for Responsive Politics, “Oil and Gas: Long-Term Contribution Trends,” accessed October 29, 2016, w w w.opensecrets.org/industries/totals .php?cycle=2016&ind=E01.

114. Upton Sinclair, I, Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked (Univer- sity of California Press, 1994), 109.

115. Coral Davenport and Marjorie Connelly, “Most Republicans Say Th ey Back Climate Action, Poll Finds,” New York Times, January 30, 2015.

116. Coral Davenport, “Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Eff orts May Imperil Paris Climate Accord,” New York Times, February 10, 2016.

117. See the data on political polarization cited in Chapter 1. 118. Alan Abramowitz, Th e Polarized Public? Why American Government Is So

Dysfunctional (Pearson, 2013), 2; Pew, “Beyond Red vs. Blue: Th e Political Typol- ogy,” May 4, 2011.

119. Mike Lofgren, “Goodbye to All Th at: Refl ections of a GOP Operative Who Left the Cult,” Truthout, September 3, 2011.

120. John Nichols, “Why Dutch Far-Right Extremist Geert Wilders Has Come to Cleveland to Cheer On Donald Trump,” Nation, July 20, 2016.

121. Jon Gabel, “Cancelled Non-group Plans: What We Know Now Th at We Did Not Know in October,” Health Aff airs blog, June 17, 2014.

122. Glenn Kessler, “Fact-Check: Obama’s Pledge Th at ‘No One Will Take Away’ Your Health Plan,” Washington Post, October 30, 2013.

123. Paul Krugman, “Varieties of Voodoo,” New York Times, February 19, 2016. 124. Wendy Rahn and Eric Oliver, “Trump’s Voters Aren’t Authoritarians, New

Research Says. So What Are Th ey?,” Washington Post, March 9, 2016; Holan, “All Politicians Lie.”

125. Kyle Cheney, Isaac Arnsdorf, Daniel Lippman, Daniel Strauss, and Brent Griffi ths, “Donald Trump’s Week of Misrepresentations, Exaggerations and Half- Truths,” Politico, September 25, 2016.

126. Brian Fung, “Th e British Are Frantically Googling What the E.U. Is, Hours aft er Voting to Leave It,” Washington Post, June 24, 2016.

127. Émilie Trevert, “Les intellectuels entre haine et fascination,” Le Point, October 20, 2008.

128. “Edgar Morin: ‘Que connaissent Sarkozy et Guaino de mes thèses?,’ ” Le Nouvel Observateur, January 2, 2008.

129. Th e bystander made the fi rst provocation, saying that shaking Sarkozy’s hand would have “soiled” him.

130. Th omas Guénolé, “Les électeurs qui votent FN votent pétainiste,” Slate France, June 8, 2014.

131. Abel Mestre, “34% des français ‘adhèrent aux idées du Front national,’ ” Le Monde, February 12, 2014.

2 9 4 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 7 7 – 8 1

132. Abel Mestre, Caroline Monnot, and Isabelle Mandraud, “Le FN embar- rassé par une nouvelle aff aire russe,” Le Monde, April 3, 2015.

133. Gerstein, “Should Obama Show His Faith?” 134. Harris Interactive, “ ‘Wingnuts’ and President Obama.” 135. Th e FN won roughly 28 percent of the vote in the fi rst round of the 2015

French regional elections. It may garner a higher proportion in the 2017 presidential elections. “Elections régionales: Ce qu’il faut retenir d’un premier tour dominé par le FN,” Le Monde, December 6, 2015. See also Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce, and Bryant Rousseau, “How Far Is Europe Swinging to the Right?,” New York Times, July 5, 2016.

136. Th e FN certainly wants a more patriarchal society and has been blasted by feminist groups for years. Marion Maréchal Le Pen—a legislator and niece of Marine—especially wants to bar public funding for family planning and abor- tion. Still, social conservatism is not a huge part of the FN platform so far and Christian fundamentalists practically do not exist in France, as Chapters 3 and 4 explain.

137. Pew, “Beyond Red vs. Blue.” 138. Nancy Murphy, “Addressing Social and Political Inequality at Home and

Mobilizing Allies to Counter Global Th reats Are Challenges for the Next President of the U.S., Stanford Expert Says,” “Wide Angle: Election 2016,” Stanford Univer- sity, September 29, 2016.

139. See, for example, Philip Bump, “Donald Trump Took 5 Diff erent Positions on Abortion in 3 Days,” Washington Post, April 3, 2016.

140. George Orwell, 1984 (Signet, 1961), 214.

3 . T H E E X C E P T I O N A L I N F L U E N C E O F C H R I S T I A N

F U N D A M E N T A L I S M

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Bantam, 2000), 352–53 (quote), 358.

2. Will Gervais, Azim Shariff , and Ara Norenzayan, “Do You Believe in Athe- ists? Distrust Is Central to Anti-atheist Prejudice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101, no. 6 (2011): 1189–1206. See also, for instance, Husna Haq, “Ted Cruz: Atheists Shouldn’t Be President. Why Are Th ey So Vilifi ed?,” Christian Sci- ence Monitor, November 10, 2015.

3. Th is fascinating phenomenon has been the subject of anthropological research. See T. M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God (Vintage, 2012), 72–100.

4. Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” May 12, 2015, 4. 5. See, for example, Gallup, “In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human

Origins,” June 1, 2014; Pew, “Life in 2050,” June 22, 2010, 15–16 (four in ten Ameri- cans expect Jesus to return by 2050). Additional evidence is provided throughout this chapter.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 8 1 – 8 3 • 2 9 5

6. Pew, “Religious ‘Nones’ Are Not Only Growing, Th ey’re Becoming More Secular,” November 11, 2015; Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” 3–4, 10, 30. See also Pew, “ ‘Nones’ on the Rise,” October 9, 2012, 9, 13, 22; Stephen Pro- thero, Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know about Religion—and Doesn’t (Harper, 2007), 31.

7. Nancy Gibbs, “Apocalypse Now,” Time, June 23, 2002; Pew, “Many Ameri- cans Uneasy with Mix of Religion and Politics,” August 24, 2006.

8. Pew, “U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey,” September 28, 2010. 9. See also Pew, “Many Americans Don’t Argue about Religion—or Even Talk

about It,” April 15, 2016. 10. Th is section draws on Henry May, Th e Enlightenment in America (Oxford

University Press, 1976). 11. Ibid., 232–33, 326–27. 12. David Holmes, Th e Faiths of the Founding Fathers (Oxford University Press,

2006), 50–51. 13. May, Enlightenment in America, 133, 140–41, 149, 184–85, 197, 215, 231–33,

245, 259 (Vermont), 262–67. 14. Th omas Jeff erson to William Short, August 4, 1820, in Jeff erson: Political

Writings, ed. Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 402.

15. Robert Ferguson, Th e American Enlightenment, 1750–1820 (Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1997), 77.

16. Holmes, Faiths of the Founding Fathers, 85–86. 17. Th omas Jeff erson to William Short, April 13, 1820, available at http://

memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mtj1&fi leName=mtj1page051.db&recNum= 1223.

18. Holmes, Faiths of the Founding Fathers, 87. 19. See, for instance, Gibbs, “Apocalypse Now”; Kenneth Woodward, “Th e Way

the World Ends,” Newsweek, November 1, 1999; PR Newswire, “Newsweek: Forty Percent of Americans Believe the World Will End as the Bible Predicts: A Battle between Jesus and the Antichrist at Armageddon,” October 24, 1999; Pew, “Life in 2050,” 15–16.

20. Th omas Jeff erson to General Alexander Smith, January 17, 1825, in Th e Writ- ings of Th omas Jeff erson, vol. 7, ed. H. A. Washington (Riker Th orne, 1854), 394.

21. Th omas Jeff erson, quoted in Frank Lambert, Religion in American Politics: A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2010), 39–40.

22. Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography, and Other Writings (Oxford University Press, 1999), 353.

23. Benjamin Franklin, quoted in May, Enlightenment in America, 129. 24. Holmes, Faiths of the Founding Fathers, 78. 25. John Adams to Th omas Jeff erson, June 20, 1815, in Th e Writings of Th omas

Jeff erson, vol. 6, ed. H. A. Washington (Taylor and Maury, 1854), 473. 26. May, Enlightenment in America, 96–97. See also Holmes, Faiths of the

Founding Fathers, 97–98, 136.

2 9 6 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 8 4 – 8 8

27. Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (Penguin, 2004), 205, 659–60. 28. May, Enlightenment in America, 124, 173–75, 242, 285. 29. Th omas Paine, Th e Age of Reason: Being an Investigation of True and Fabu-

lous Th eology (G. E. Wilson, 1890), 74, 16. 30. Holmes, Faiths of the Founding Fathers, 59–71, 162. 31. May, Enlightenment in America, 232–33, 326–27. 32. Holmes, Faiths of the Founding Fathers, 141, 143, 150, 154. 33. May, Enlightenment in America, 232–33, 326–27. On the decline of deism, see

also Holmes, Faiths of the Founding Fathers, 49. 34. Alexis de Tocqueville, Th e Old Regime and the Revolution, trans. Alan

Kahan, vol. 1 (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 206. 35. Th is section draws on Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American

Life (Vintage, 1966), 55–116; May, Enlightenment in America, 42–44, 48, 54–55, 317–34; Prothero, Religious Literacy, 58–59, 109–17, 134–39; Nathan Hatch, Th e Democratization of American Christianity (Yale University Press, 1989); George Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Eerdmans, 1990), 115; Mark Noll, Th e Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Eerdmans, 1994), 59–64.

36. Dwight Moody, quoted in Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 108. 37. Susan Jacoby, Th e Age of American Unreason (Vintage, 2009), 45–46. 38. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 55. 39. Charles Darwin, Selected Letters on Evolution and Origins of Species, ed.

Francis Darwin (Courier, 1958), 249, 61; on his agnosticism, see 66. 40. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 59–61. 41. See Jaroslav Pelikan, Whose Bible Is It? (Penguin, 2006), 183–99. 42. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 15, 32. 43. Curtis Lee Laws, undated remarks at Chicago Moody Bible Institute,

quoted in “Baptist Fundamentals,” Herald and Presbyter 92, no. 29, July 19, 1922, 10. 44. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 3, 18, 30, 57;

Pelikan, Whose Bible Is It?, 211. 45. Noll, Scandal of the Evangelical Mind, 114. 46. Harry Emerson Fosdick, “Shall the Fundamentalists Win?,” Christian Work

102 ( June 10, 1922): 716–22, available at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5070/. 47. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Evolution and Mr. Bryan (American Institute

of Sacred Literature, 1922), available at http://darrow.law.umn.edu/documents /Evolution_and_Mr_Bryan_Fosdick.pdf.

48. Fosdick, “Shall the Fundamentalists Win?” 49. Noll, Scandal of the Evangelical Mind, 101. 50. Th ese matters are discussed at length in Ernest Sandeen, Th e Roots of Funda-

mentalism: British and American Millenarianism, 1800–1930 (University of Chicago Press, 1970).

51. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 172. 52. Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” 3–4, 10, 30. See also Pew,

“ ‘Nones’ on the Rise,” 13, 22; Prothero, Religious Literacy, 31.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 8 9 – 9 2 • 2 9 7

53. “Religion | Gallup Historical Trends,” www.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion .aspx. Th ere is no defi nite consensus among scholars on how to defi ne “evangelical- ism.” See Christian Smith, Christian America? What Evangelicals Really Want (University of California Press, 2002), 15–18; Conrad Hackett and Michael Lindsay, “Measuring Evangelicalism: Consequences of Diff erent Operationalization Strate- gies,” Journal for the Scientifi c Study of Religion 47, no. 3 (2008): 499–514.

54. Hackett and Lindsay, “Measuring Evangelicalism,” 510. 55. Pew, “Spirit and Power: A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals,” October

2006, 94. 56. Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” 12–13, 33–38. 57. Th e U.S. data source in Table 3 is from 2010 because more recent Gallup polls

confl ate “God” and “universal spirit.” It is noteworthy that a 2014 poll showed that 7.1 percent of Americans identifi ed as “atheists” or “agnostics,” a fi gure similar to the 6 percent of nonbelievers in the 2010 Gallup poll. See Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” 4.

58. For a study on Canada, see Timothy Avery, “One in Four Don’t Believe in God, Poll Finds,” Toronto Star, May 31, 2008. For more statistics, see Ipsos, “Supreme Being(s), the Aft erlife and Evolution,” April 25, 2011.

59. Pew, “Faith and the 2016 Campaign,” January 27, 2016, 11. 60. Pew, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” 3–4. 61. Pew, “Religious ‘Nones.’ ” See also Pew, “America’s Changing Religious

Landscape,” 10 (emphasizing that “many people who are unaffi liated with a religion believe in God, pray at least occasionally and think of themselves as spiritual peo- ple”); Pew, “ ‘Nones’ on the Rise,” 9; Prothero, Religious Literacy, 31.

62. Pew, “Millennials in Adulthood,” March 7, 2014, 13. 63. Pew, “Religious ‘Nones’ ”; Pew, “Religion among the Millennials,” February

17, 2010, 1–2. 64. “Religion | Gallup Historical Trends.” 65. “Europe’s Irreligious,” Economist, August 9, 2010. See also Michael Paulson,

“Americans Claim to Attend Church More Th an Th ey Do,” New York Times, May 17, 2014.

66. Peter Boyer, “Th e Covenant,” New Yorker, September 6, 2010. Elaine Howard Ecklund’s thought-provoking research indicates that, like Collins, a sizable segment of American scientists aim to blend modern scientifi c understanding with religious faith. Ecklund, Science v. Religion: What Scientists Really Th ink (Oxford University Press, 2012).

67. Th is fi nding has been constant over the years. See Jerome Karabel and Dan- iel Laurison, “An Exceptional Nation? American Political Values in Comparative Perspective” (Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper 136–12, University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 16–20; Pew, “Among Wealthy Nations U.S. Stands Alone in Its Embrace of Religion,” December 19, 2002; Gallup, “Religiosity Highest in World’s Poorest Nations,” August 31, 2010; Pew, “Th e American–Western European Values Gap,” November 17, 2011; Pew, “How Do Americans Stand Out from the Rest of the World?,” March 12, 2015.

2 9 8 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 9 2 – 9 4

68. 107 Cong. Rec. H4527 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pence). Creationists know that their views can undermine their electoral chances, especially at the national level. In a 2009 TV interview, Pence unsurprisingly dodged ques- tions about whether he accepted evolution, although he used creationist rhetoric: “We should teach all of the facts about all of these controversial areas.” Pence, inter- view, Hardball with Chris Matthews, May 5, 2009.

69. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 762 (M.D. Pa. 2005). On intelligent design, see also Michelle Goldberg, Kingdom Coming: Th e Rise of Christian Nationalism (Norton, 2007), 80–105.

70. Jon Miller, Eugenie Scott, and Shinji Okamoto, “Public Acceptance of Evolution,” Science 313, no. 5788 (August 11, 2006): 765–66.

71. Gallup, “In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human Origins,” June 1, 2014. Answers depend on the wording of the question. Another poll found that 31 percent of Americans think that humans have “existed in their present form since the beginning of time.” Pew, “Religion and Science,” October 22, 2015, 19. People appear likelier to interpret scripture literally when asked about specifi c stories. Six in ten Americans indicated that biblical accounts about God creating Earth in six days or Noah’s Ark are true word for word. David Morris, “Poll: Jews Not to Blame for Jesus’ Death,” ABC News, February 15, 2004. Sixty-seven percent also indicated that the entire story behind Christmas—the virgin birth, the Star of Bethlehem, and the Wise Men from the East—is historically accurate. “Th e Christmas Miracle,” Newsweek, December 5, 2004.

72. Harris Interactive, “Americans’ Belief in God, Miracles and Heaven Declines,” December 16, 2013.

73. Pew, “Public’s Views on Human Evolution,” December 30, 2013. 74. Data confi rm that many religious Americans are not opposed to modern

science. Elaine Howard Ecklund, David Johnson, Christopher Scheitle, “Individual Religiosity and Orientation towards Science: Reformulating Relationships,” Socio- logical Science 2 (2015): 106–124.

75. Chris Barton, “Intelligent Design—Coming to a School near You,” New Zealand Herald, August 27, 2005.

76. Stephen Moss, “Defying Darwin,” Guardian, February 17, 2009; Sophia Deboick, “Creationist Claims in Northern Ireland,” Guardian, June 19, 2010.

77. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1580, “Th e Dangers of Creationism in Education,” October 4, 2007.

78. Th e Discovery Institute, an arm of the religious right, called for replacing evolution with “a science consonant with Christian and theistic convictions.” Dis- covery Institute, “Th e ‘Wedge Document’: ‘So What?,’ ” 8, www.discovery.org /scripts/viewDB/fi lesDB-download.php?id=349.

79. Pew, “On Darwin’s 200th Birthday, Americans Still Divided about Evolu- tion,” February 5, 2009.

80. Pew, “Religion and Science,” 21. See also Virginia Commonwealth Univer- sity Life Sciences Survey 2010, 10; Pew, “Americans Still Divided about Evolution.”

N O T E S T O P A G E S 9 4 – 9 9 • 2 9 9

81. Kurt Eichenwald, 500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars (Simon and Schuster, 2012), 459–61.

82. Sarah Posner, “George W. Bush to Raise Money for Group Th at Converts Jews to Bring about Second Coming of Christ,” Mother Jones, November 7, 2013.

83. Pew, “Many Americans Uneasy.” Regarding belief in such prophecies, see Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 77; Goldberg, King- dom Coming, 72.

84. See, for instance, Ariel Levy, “Prodigal Son,” New Yorker, June 28, 2010. 85. Religion was obviously not the main reason for invading Iraq, yet it can infl u-

ence U.S. foreign policy, as we will see in Chapter 8. 86. Chapter 6 provides examples of such declarations when discussing evangeli-

cal politicians’ views. 87. Nancy Gibbs, “Apocalypse Now,” Time, June 23, 2002. 88. Pew, “Life in 2050.” 89. Gibbs, “Apocalypse Now.” 90. See, for example, David John Marley, “Ronald Reagan and the Splintering

of the Christian Right,” Journal of Church and State 48, no. 4 (2006): 851–68. 91. Selwyn Crawford, “In Disasters, Some See the Wrath of God,” Dallas Morn-

ing News, September 30, 2005. 92. Public Religion Research Institute and American Academy of Religion,

“Believers, Sympathizers, and Skeptics,” November 22, 2014. 93. Noll, Scandal of the Evangelical Mind, 13–14 (Gulf War of 1991), 71 (Ameri-

can Revolution); Holmes, Faiths of the Founding Fathers, 153 (French Revolution and Napoléon); Sandeen, Roots of Fundamentalism, 233 (World War I).

94. Eichenwald, 500 Days, 459–61. 95. Elaine Pagels, Revelations: Visions, Prophecy, and Politics in the Book of Rev-

elation (Penguin, 2013), 1–35. 96. Bart Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted: Revealing the Hidden Contradictions of the

Bible (and Why We Don’t Know about Th em) (Harper, 2010), 13, 20, 183–89. 97. Ibid., 9–10, 29, 35–39. 98. Pew, “U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey.” 99. Prothero, Religious Literacy, 1. 100. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back, 16–22. 101. Laurie Goodstein, “Gay and Transgender Catholics Urge Pope to Take a

Stand,” New York Times, July 28, 2015. 102. Carol Kurivilla, “Six Questions with a Black Mormon Feminist,” Huffi ng-

ton Post, September 3, 2015. 103. Tocqueville, Old Regime and the Revolution, 206. 104. See generally Gervais, Shariff , and Norenzayan, “Do You Believe in

Atheists?” 105. See, for example, Julian Baggini, “In God We Must,” Slate, February 5, 2012. 106. Phil Zuckerman, Society without God: What the Least Religious Nations

Can Tell Us about Contentment (New York University Press, 2010), 177–79.

3 0 0 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 9 9 – 1 0 5

107. Gallup, “Atheists, Muslims See Most Bias as Presidential Candidates,” June 21, 2012. Another poll identifi es atheism as the least desirable trait in a presidential candidate. Pew, “Faith and the 2016 Campaign,” 3.

108. “Mr. Lieberman’s Religious Words,” Editorial, New York Times, August 31, 2000.

109. Zuckerman, Society without God. 110. Gallup, “U.S. Satisfaction with Religion Settling at Lower Levels,” Febru-

ary 12, 2015. 111. See, for example, Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 238, 265; Prothero, Reli-

gious Literacy, 143. 112. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back, 299. 113. Laurence Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches Are Strong,” American Jour-

nal of Sociology 99, no. 5 (1994): 1180–211. 114. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 55. 115. Tanya M. Luhrmann, interview by Terry Gross, Fresh Air, National Public

Radio, April 9, 2012. See also Luhrmann, When God Talks Back, 72–100. 116. Jon Meacham, “Th e God Debate,” Newsweek, April 9, 2007; Michelle Gold-

berg, “A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing,” Guardian, December 18, 2008. 117. Denis Lacorne, Religion in America, trans. George Holoch (Columbia

University Press, 2011), 27, 32, 147–49; Nathaniel Philbrick, Mayfl ower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War (Penguin, 2006), 177.

118. Lacorne, Religion in America, 2–8, 27. 119. Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem—and

What We Should Do about It (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 23. 120. See Ferguson, American Enlightenment, 73–74, 89. 121. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 358. 122. See, for example, Jacoby, Age of American Unreason, 46; Zuckerman, Society

without God, 111, 171–72. 123. Th is section partly draws on my Public Books article “Reading Charlie

Hebdo across the Atlantic,” May 5, 2015. 124. Céline Goff ette and Jean-François Mignot, “Non, ‘Charlie Hebdo’ n’est pas

obsédé par l’Islam,” Le Monde, February 24, 2015. 125. CBS News Poll, “Mitt Romney’s Race for the Nomination,” February 13,

2007. 126. Clinton reported this event in a speech at Riverside Church, New York,

August 29, 2004. 127. See, for example, these Media Matters in America articles: “CNN Still Fix-

ated on Apocalypse Predictors,” August 1, 2006; “CNN or CBN? Phillips Asks Apocalypse Authors: ‘[A]re We Living in the Last Days?,’ ” July 26, 2006; “In Middle East Confl ict, Other Crises, Conservative Media Find Signs of Biblical Prophecy of Armageddon,” July 25, 2006.

128. Th e episode is titled “Th e Midterms” and ran in the second season of Th e West Wing.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 0 6 – 1 1 1 • 3 01

129. See, for example, Peter Steinfels, “Mormons Drop Rites Opposed by Women,” New York Times, May 3, 1990.

130. Pew, “Mormons in America,” January 12, 2012. 131. Richard Lyman Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling: A Cultural Biography of

Mormonism’s Founder (Vintage, 2007), 48–52, 289, 437–40. 132. Washington Post–ABC News poll, April 10, 2012. 133. Pew, “U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey.” 134. Half of the public admits knowing “not very much” or “nothing” about

Mormonism. “Polygamy” is one of the words that most oft en comes to people’s minds when they are asked about Mormonism. Pew, “Americans Learned Little about the Mormon Faith, but Some Attitudes Have Soft ened,” December 14, 2012.

135. Prothero, Religious Literacy, 142. 136. “In 1835, Smith bought some ancient Egyptian papyruses. One, he said, had

been written by Abraham, the Jewish patriarch. He translated it and published it as the Book of Abraham. At the time, no one in America could read hieroglyphics, but when professional Egyptologists fi rst saw facsimiles of Smith’s papyrus, they recog- nized them as fragments from an ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead that bore no relation to his translation.” “From Polygamy to Propriety,” Economist, December 19, 2007.

137. Lawrence Wright, “Th e Apostate,” New Yorker, February 14 and 21, 2011. 138. Ibid. 139. See Robert Wuthnow, Inventing American Religion (Oxford University

Press, 2015). 140. Smith, Christian America?, 7, 48, 87–88, 122–23. 141. Pew, “Religious Groups’ Views on Evolution,” February 4, 2009; National

Center for Science Education, “Statements from Religious Organizations on Evolu- tion,” http://ncse.com/media/voices/religion; Death Penalty Information Center, “Offi cial Religious Statements on the Death Penalty,” http://deathpenaltyinfo.org /religion-and-death-penalty#state.

142. Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler, Authoritarianism and Polariza- tion in American Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 59–60.

143. However, “political party identifi cation and race and ethnicity are stronger predictors of views about climate change beliefs than are religious identity or observ- ance.” Pew, “Religion and Science,” 32. See also Chris Mooney, “Th e Surprising Links between Faith and Evolution and Climate Denial,” Washington Post, May 20, 2015.

144. John Broder, “Climate Change Doubt Is a Tea Party Article of Faith,” New York Times, October 20, 2010.

145. Daniel Schorr, “Reagan Recants: His Path from Armageddon to Détente,” Los Angeles Times, January 3, 1988.

146. Edward Caudill, Intelligently Designed: How Creationists Built the Cam- paign against Evolution (University of Illinois Press, 2013), 118.

147. Marley, “Splintering of the Christian Right.”

3 0 2 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 1 2 – 1 1 6

148. John F. Harris, “God Gave U.S. ‘What We Deserve,’ Falwell Says,” Wash- ington Post, September 14, 2001.

149. “Antichrist Is Alive, and a Male Jew, Falwell Contends,” New York Times, January 16, 1999.

150. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 113. 151. Haynes Johnson, “Nuclear Arms in the Pulpit,” Boston Globe, April 12, 1983. 152. “Election 2016: Exit Polls,” New York Times, November 8, 2016. 153. Trump won 40 percent of the evangelical vote in the Republican primary,

next to Cruz’s 34 percent. NBC News, “Lacking a Clear Champion in 2016, White Evangelicals Voted for Trump,” May 10, 2016. See also Maggie Haberman and Th o- mas Kaplan, “Evangelicals See Donald Trump as Man of Conviction, If Not Faith,” New York Times, January 18, 2016. While data indicate that Trump supporters were somewhat less authoritarian than Cruz’s, both groups shared far more authoritarian traits than Clinton or Sanders supporters. Wendy Rahn and Eric Oliver, “Trump’s Voters Aren’t Authoritarians, New Research Says. So What Are Th ey?,” Washington Post, March 9, 2016.

154. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 55. 155. Morris Fiorina with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? Th e

Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2010), 169.

4 . T H E C U L T U R E W A R S O F F A I T H , S E X , A N D G E N D E R

1. Gallup, “Americans Continue to Shift Left on Moral Issues,” May 26, 2015; Pew, “Religious ‘Nones’ Are Not Only Growing, Th ey’re Becoming More Secular,” November 11, 2015; Pew, “Religion among the Millennials,” February 17, 2010, 1–2.

2. Pew, “U.S. Becoming Less Religious,” November 3, 2015. See also Alan Abramowitz, Th e Polarized Public? Why American Government Is So Dysfunctional (Pearson, 2013), 68.

3. George Washington to Edward Newenham, June 22, 1792, available at http:// founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05–10–02–0324.

4. PolitiFact, “Jerry Brown Says ‘Virtually No Republican’ in Washington Accepts Climate Change Science,” May 18, 2014.

5. “Political Party Platforms of Parties Receiving Electoral Votes, 1840–2016,” American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, www .presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php.

6. Guttmacher Institute, “In Just the Last Four Years, States Have Enacted 231 Abortion Restrictions,” January 5, 2015.

7. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 1001 (2016). 8. Timothy Williams, “Th e Surprise in the Hobby Lobby Comments,” New

York Times, July 3, 2014. 9. Stephen Kurczy, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: How Do Other Countries Treat Gay

Soldiers?,” Christian Science Monitor, May 26, 2010.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 1 6 – 1 1 9 • 3 0 3

10. Eric Bradner, “Pence in 1997: Working Mothers Stunt Emotional Growth of Children,” CNN, July 19, 2016.

11. Th e Massachusetts State Senate voted unanimously to override Romney’s veto, and its House did so by a 139–16 margin. Laura Bassett, “Mitt Romney Vetoed Contraception Bill for Rape Victims as Governor,” Huffi ngton Post, January 9, 2012.

12. James Davidson Hunter, “Th e Enduring Culture War,” in Hunter and Alan Wolfe, Is Th ere a Culture War? A Dialogue on Values and American Public Life (Brookings, 2006), 15.

13. Morris Fiorina, “Further Refl ections on the Culture War Th esis,” in Hunter and Wolfe, Is Th ere a Culture War?, 84.

14. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 56–57, 82 (quote). 15. Marc Hetherington, “Putting Polarization in Perspective,” British Journal of

Political Science 39, no. 2 (2009): 433–36. 16. Pew, “Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage,” March 2014; Pew, “Roe v.

Wade at 40: Most Oppose Overturning Abortion Decision,” January 16, 2013; Pew, “Trends in Party Identifi cation of Religious Groups,” February 2, 2012.

17. Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families: Legal Polari- zation and the Creation of Culture (Oxford University Press, 2010), 183.

18. Nicholas Kristof, “Tussling over Jesus,” New York Times, January 26, 2011. 19. Catholic Church Internal Laws, “Substantive Norms,” Article 5, www

.vatican.va/resources/resources_norme_en.html. 20. Benedict gave these instructions when he was an infl uential cardinal, prior

to becoming the pope. “Benedict’s Answers to Big Questions,” Los Angeles Times, April 20, 2005.

21. Pew, “What’s a Sin? Catholics Don’t Always Agree with Th eir Church,” September 25, 2015.

22. Pew, “Most U.S. Catholics Rely Heavily on Th eir Own Conscience for Moral Guidance,” April 19, 2016.

23. Carol Kuruvilla, “Meet the Evangelicals Who Cheered the SCOTUS Gay Marriage Ruling,” Huffi ngton Post, June 29, 2015.

24. Richard Cizik, interview by Terry Gross, Fresh Air, National Public Radio, July 28, 2010.

25. Richard Hofstadter, Th e Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays (Vintage, 2008), 21–23.

26. David Campbell, “A House Divided? What Social Science Has to Say about the Culture War,” William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 15 (2006): 59–74.

27. Ibid., 66–67; Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem—and What We Should Do about It (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 196.

28. Like England, Scotland has a state-established church. Wales and Northern Ireland, the other main parts of the United Kingdom, do not.

29. Pew, “In Some European Countries, Church Membership Means Paying More Taxes,” September 22, 2014. Regarding the limits of secularism in Europe, see also Peter Baldwin, Th e Narcissism of Small Diff erences: How America and Europe Are Alike (Oxford University Press, 2009), 170–71.

3 0 4 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 2 0 – 1 2 4

30. Michelle Goldberg, Kingdom Coming: Th e Rise of Christian Nationalism (Norton, 2007), 25–27.

31. Feldman, Divided by God, 23. 32. John Adams, “Defense of the Constitutions of Government” (1787), quoted

in Robert Ferguson, Th e American Enlightenment, 1750–1820 (Harvard University Press, 1997), 42.

33. Stephen Prothero, Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know about Religion—and Doesn’t (Harper, 2007), 29.

34. Feldman, Divided by God, 33–38, 50–51, 81, 109; Mark Noll, Th e Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Eerdmans, 1994), 64–65.

35. Feldman, Divided by God, 61–92. 36. George Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism

(Eerdmans, 1990), 10–11. 37. School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S.

203, 222 (1963). See also Feldman, Divided by God, 180–81; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

38. See generally Bob Egelko, “ ‘In God We Trust’ Suit Rejected by Supreme Court,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 2011.

39. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014). 40. Gallup, “Americans Indivisible on Pledge of Allegiance,” May 4, 2004; Gal-

lup, “Americans Approve of Public Displays of Religious Symbols,” October 3, 2003. 41. Public Religion Research Institute, “Majority of Americans Still Support

Contraception Coverage Mandate,” June 2, 2014. 42. Pew, “South Carolina Valedictorian Reignites Debate on Prayer in School,”

June 13, 2013. 43. See, for example, Scalia’s dissents in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) and

McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 44. Antonin Scalia, “God’s Justice and Ours,” First Th ings, May 2002. In his

comment about Americans, Scalia was quoting Justice William Douglas’s opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

45. Christian Smith, Christian America? What Evangelicals Really Want (Uni- versity of California Press, 2002), 33–34, 102.

46. Goldberg, Kingdom Coming, 25–27. 47. Smith, Christian America?, 12, 42, 115. 48. Pew, “Many Americans Don’t Argue about Religion—or Even Talk about

It,” April 15, 2016. 49. See, for example, Angelique Chrisafi s, “ ‘We Can No Longer Stay Silent’:

Fury Erupts over Sexism in French Politics,” Guardian, May 13, 2016. 50. Goldberg, Kingdom Coming, 208–10. 51. See, for example, Julie Mianecki, “Obama Administration Calls on United

Nations to Support Gay Rights,” Los Angeles Times, March 23, 2011. 52. Sandra Day O’Connor, “Th e History of the Women’s Suff rage Movement,”

Vanderbilt Law Review 49 (1996): 657–76.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 2 4 – 1 2 8 • 3 0 5

53. Various American and foreign scientists contributed to the pill’s discovery and development, but the New Jersey–born scientist Gregory Pincus is generally credited as its main inventor. Margaret Sanger, the American reproductive rights activist, notably spearheaded this breakthrough by urging Pincus to develop an eff ective contraceptive. See Jonathan Eig, Th e Birth of the Pill: How Four Crusaders Reinvented Sex and Launched a Revolution (Norton, 2015).

54. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Ratifi cation of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Mat- ter of Time,” Texas Law Review 57 (1979): 938; Martha F. Davis, “Th e Equal Rights Amendment: Th en and Now,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 17 (2008): 425– 28; Michael Kazin, Th e Populist Persuasion: An American History (Basic, 1995), 259.

55. Reva Siegel, “Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Confl ict and Con- stitutional Change: Th e Case of the De Facto ER A,” California Law Review 94 (2006): 1379.

56. Jeff rey Toobin, Th e Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (Anchor, 2008), 325–26, 348.

57. Smith, Christian America?, 182–86, 189. 58. Ibid., 182. 59. Goldberg, Kingdom Coming, 68. 60. Bart Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted: Revealing the Hidden Contradictions of the

Bible (and Why We Don’t Know about Th em) (Harper, 2010), 222, 280. 61. Cahn and Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, 1–2, 19–20. 62. Ibid., 78–84, citing Claudia Goldin and Laurence Katz, “Th e Power of the

Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage,” Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 4 (2002): 730–70.

63. Th omas Diprete and Claudia Buchmann, Th e Rise of Women: Th e Growing Gender Gap in Education and What It Means for American Schools (Sage, 2013), 38, 183. On the relative economic progress of American women in recent decades, see also June Carbone and Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How Inequality Is Remak- ing the American Family (Oxford University Press, 2014), 196.

64. Hunter, “Enduring Culture War,” 15. 65. Goldberg, Kingdom Coming, 142, 208, 209. 66. Anna Peterson, “From Commonplace to Controversial: Th e Diff erent His-

tories of Abortion in Europe and the United States,” Origins 6, no. 2 (November 2012): http://origins.osu.edu/article/commonplace-controversial-diff erent-histories- abortion-europe-and-united-states.

67. Charles Lockhart, Th e Roots of American Exceptionalism: Institutions, Cul- ture and Policies (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 1.

68. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 68–69. 69. Pew, “Religion and Politics ’08: John McCain,” November 4, 2008. 70. See, for example, Cahn and Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, 92.

Th ese divergent views are also refl ected in the parties’ briefs in Roe v. Wade. 71. “Avortement: Ce qui a changé depuis le discours de Simone Veil,” France 24,

November 26, 2014.

3 0 6 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 2 8 – 1 3 1

72. Jean-Yves Le Naour and Catherine Valenti, Histoire de l’Avortement: XIXe– XXe Siècle (Seuil, 2003), 114–21, 192, 201–4, 262–70, 283; Lockhart, Roots of Ameri- can Exceptionalism, 110–17.

73. Gaëlle Dupont, “Quarante ans après la loi Veil, l’IVG à nouveau débattue dans l’hémicycle,” Le Monde, January 22, 2014.

74. Guttmacher Institute, “231 Abortion Restrictions.” 75. Ashifa Kassam, “Spain Abandons Plan to Introduce Tough New Abortion

Laws,” Guardian, September 23, 2014. 76. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 76–77; Gallup, “Abortion Is Th reshold

Issue for One in Six U.S. Voters,” October 4, 2012. 77. “In Portugal, Abortion Legal but Many Doctors Refuse to Perform Th em,”

WBEZ 91.5, July 18, 2012, www.wbez.org/shows/worldview/in-portugal-abortion- lega l-but-many-doctors-ref use-to-perform-them/5a63e08f-7ea0–4a9b-a9a5– 4eac4ad570cf.

78. Center for Reproductive Rights, “Th e World’s Abortion Laws: Fact Sheet,” June 2013.

79. Guttmacher Institute, “State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws,” June 1, 2014.

80. See, for example, Lockhart, Roots of American Exceptionalism, 105–17; Fed- erico Fabbrini, “Th e European Court of Human Rights, the EU Charter of Funda- mental Rights and the Right to Abortion: Roe v. Wade on the Other Side of the Atlantic?,” Columbia Journal of European Law 18 (2011): 1–53.

81. Guttmacher Institute, “State Policies in Brief.” 82. “Abortion | Gallup Historical Trends,” w w w.gallup.com/poll/1576

/abortion.aspx#3. 83. Morris Fiorina with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? Th e

Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2010), 81–84. 84. “Abortion | Gallup Historical Trends.” 85. For a discussion of this change since the early twentieth century, see Justin

Garcia, Chris Reiber, Sean Massey, and Ann Merriwether, “Sexual Hookup Cul- ture: A Review,” Review of General Psychology 16, no. 2 (2012): 161–76.

86. See generally Nancy Jo Sales, American Girls: Social Media and the Secret Lives of Teenagers (Knopf, 2016); Peggy Orenstein, Girls and Sex: Navigating the Complicated New Landscape (Harper, 2016).

87. Amy Schalet, Not under My Roof: Parents, Teens, and the Culture of Sex (University of Chicago Press, 2011), 173, 178.

88. See ibid., 197. 89. Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk, “Th e Sex Bureaucracy,” California Law

Review 104 (2016): 912. 90. Ibid., 913. 91. See, for instance, Kate Carey, Sarah Durney, Robyn Shepardson, Michael

Carey, “Incapacitated and Forcible Rape of College Women: Prevalence across the First Year,” Journal of Adolescent Health 56, no. 6 ( June 2015): 678–80.

92. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 55–56.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 1 – 1 3 6 • 3 0 7

93. Gallup, “Americans Continue to Shift Left .” 94. Center for Reproductive Rights, “European Standards on Subsidizing Con-

traceptives” (2009). 95. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Marriage and

Divorce Rates,” July 7, 2015. 96. Gallup, “Fewer Young Americans Say I Do—to Any Relationship,” June 8,

2015. 97. An exception was the case of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who was accused of

rape in New York while director of the International Monetary Fund. Strauss- Kahn, who had been considered likely to win the 2012 French presidential election, fell into disfavor and chose not to run.

98. Andy Barr, “Haley Will ‘Resign’ If Aff airs Proved,” Politico, June 4, 2010. 99. Cahn and Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, 28, 39, 118. 100. Ibid., 8, 13. 101. Ibid., 8, 21–24, 45, 104, 111–12. 102. Schalet, Not under My Roof, 3 (quotes), 4, 9–10. 103. Ibid., 7 (quote), 20. 104. Sarah Kliff , “Th e Future of Abstinence,” Newsweek, October 27, 2009. 105. Goldberg, Kingdom Coming, 108, 120–22, 126, 135, 139–40, 145, 147. 106. Kliff , “Future of Abstinence.” 107. Government Accountability Offi ce, “Abstinence Education: Eff orts to

Assess the Accuracy and Eff ectiveness of Federally Funded Programs” (2006), 5, 14–19, 20.

108. Goldberg, Kingdom Coming, 135–36. 109. Cahn and Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, 176. 110. Ibid., 4, 42–43, 175. 111. Rob Stein, “Health Bill Restores $250 Million in Abstinence-Education

Funds,” Washington Post, March 27, 2010. 112. Cahn and Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, 87. 113. Andrew Koppelman, “Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men

Is Sex Discrimination,” New York University Law Review 69 (2004): 237–38. 114. Pew, “Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage.” 115. Biblical quotations in this book come from the New Revised Standard

Version. 116. Cahn and Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, 128. 117. Koppelman, “Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men,” 249. 118. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981). 119. See Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence; Martha Minow, “Th e Controversial Status

of International and Comparative Law in the United States,” Harvard International Law Journal Online 52 (2010): 1–25.

120. Gallup, “Public Shift s to More Conservative Stance on Gay Rights,” July 30, 2003.

121. “Gay and Lesbian Rights | Gallup Historical Trends,” www.gallup.com /poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx.

3 0 8 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 6 – 1 4 3

122. Pew, “Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage.” 123. Kurczy, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” 124. Ibid. 125. Gallup, “In U.S., Broad, Steady Support for Openly Gay Service Members,”

May 10, 2010. 126. Ed O’Keefe and Craig Whitlock, “ ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Report: Little

Risk to Allowing Gays to Serve Openly,” Washington Post, November 30, 2010. 127. Dana Milbank, “John McCain at His Fieriest before ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’

Vote,” Washington Post, December 18, 2010. 128. Anthony Faiola, “British Conservatives Lead Charge for Gay Marriage,”

Washington Post, March 30, 2012. 129. Pew, “Th e American–Western European Values Gap,” November 17,

2011. 130. Patrick Healy, “Hopefuls Diff er as Th ey Reject Gay Marriage,” New York

Times, November 1, 2008. 131. Civil Forum on the Presidency, Saddleback Church, Lake Forest, CA,

August 16, 2008. 132. George W. Bush, interviewed by Cynthia McFadden, Nightline, Australian

Broadcasting Corporation, December 8, 2008. 133. Pew, “Faith and the 2016 Campaign,” January 27, 2016, 11. 134. Kevin Kruse, One Nation under God: How Corporate America Invented

Christian America (Basic, 2015), xii–xiii, 72–75, 81–84, 124, 242. 135. David Domke and Kevin Coe, Th e God Strategy: How Religion Became a

Political Weapon in America (Oxford University Press, 2010), 4–6, 39–45 (Clinton quote on 44).

136. Ibid., 14–17. 137. Ibid., 33–34, 61–64, 89–97. 138. John Kerry, speech at Pepperdine University, September 18, 2006, quoted in

ibid., 142. 139. Maggie Haberman and Th omas Kaplan, “Evangelicals See Donald Trump

as Man of Conviction, If Not Faith,” New York Times, January 18, 2016. 140. “Prime Minister Julia Gillard Speaks to Jon Faine,” Australian Broadcast-

ing Corporation, June 29, 2010. 141. Pew, “Faith on the Hill,” January 5, 2015. 142. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War?, 241.

5 . B E T W E E N D E M O C R A C Y A N D P L U T O C R A C Y

1. America has the worst score of any Western nation on the Gini index, a statis- tical measure of income inequality. “Gini Index,” Th e World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency; Lane Kenworthy and Timothy Smeeding, “Growing Inequali- ties and Th eir Impacts in the United States: Country Report for the United States” (Gini Growing Inequalities’ Impacts Project, January 2013).

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 3 – 1 4 6 • 3 0 9

2. Th omas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Gold- hammer (Belknap, 2014), 297, 291, 320; Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner- Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (Simon and Schuster, 2010), 22–25, 36; Robert Reich, Aft ershock: Th e Next Economy and America’s Future (Knopf, 2010), 19; “Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010 to 2013: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 100, no. 4 (September 2014): 1–41.

3. Paul Krugman, Th e Conscience of a Liberal (Norton, 2009), 18. 4. Robert Healy, “From Reagan’s Past, Grist for the Carter Mill,” Boston Globe,

September 10, 1980. 5. Piketty, Capital, 321. 6. See the empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 1. 7. Tax Policy Center, “An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Tax Plan,” December 22,

2015; Nicholas Confessore, “9 Times Donald Trump Complained about Taxes,” New York Times, October 2, 2016 (quote). Given that Trump repeatedly made contradic- tory statements throughout his campaign, one could not state with certainty what his economic policies as president would be when this book went to press. See, for example, Peter Eavis, “Donald Trump’s Plan to Raise Taxes on Rich: Just Kidding,” New York Times, May 11, 2016; Binyamin Appelbaum, “Confl icting Policy from Trump: To Keep, and Remove, Tax Cut,” New York Times, September 16, 2016.

8. Piketty, Capital, 152. 9. Krugman, Conscience of a Liberal, 32. 10. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247

U.S. 251 (1918). 11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissenting opinion in Lochner, 198 U.S. 45. 12. Krugman, Conscience of a Liberal, 35. 13. Cass Sunstein, Th e Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfi nished Revolution and

Why We Need It More Th an Ever (Basic, 2004), 41. 14. Piketty, Capital, 506–7. 15. Sunstein, Second Bill of Rights, 94–95. 16. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here: Why

Socialism Failed in the United States (Norton, 2001), 73–75. 17. Alan Brinkley, “With Justices for All,” New York Times, March 25, 2010. 18. Th ese were Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, Robert Jackson, Felix

Frankfurter, Frank Murphy, Stanley Reed, and Wiley Rutledge. FDR also promoted Harlan Fiske Stone to chief justice.

19. Dwight Eisenhower to Edgar Eisenhower, November 8, 1954, quoted in Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 189.

20. Ibid., 96–97; Steven Brill, America’s Bitter Pill: Money, Politics, Backroom Deals, and the Fight to Fix Our Broken Healthcare System (Random House, 2015), 32.

21. Piketty, Capital, 97, 506–7. 22. Emmanuel Saez, “Striking It Richer: Th e Evolution of Top Incomes in the

United States,” UC Berkeley Economics Department, January 25, 2015, 5 fn. 7.

310 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 6 – 1 4 9

23. Brill, America’s Bitter Pill, 21–23. 24. PolitiFact, “Dean Claims Social Security and Medicare Were Passed with-

out Republican Support,” August 28, 2009. 25. Healy, “From Reagan’s Past.” 26. Krugman, Conscience of a Liberal, 111. 27. Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: Th e Political Economy of the New Gilded

Age, 1st ed. (Princeton, 2008), 226, 234, 240. 28. See generally Alan Abramowitz, Th e Polarized Public? Why American Gov-

ernment Is So Dysfunctional (Pearson, 2013), 25–26. 29. Brill, America’s Bitter Pill, 30–34, 93. 30. Piketty, Capital, 297, 291, 320; Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Poli-

tics, 22–25, 36; Reich, Aft ershock, 19; Federal Reserve Bulletin, “Changes in U.S. Family Finance from 2010 to 2013” (2014); PolitiFact, “Warren: Th e Average Family in the Bottom 90 Percent Made More Money 30 Years Ago,” January 13, 2015.

31. Edward Wolff , “Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–2013” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 2014), 49.

32. Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 46. 33. PolitiFact, “Bernie Sanders Says Walmart Heirs Own More Wealth Th an

Bottom 40 Percent of Americans,” July 31, 2012. 34. Reich, Aft ershock, 61; Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 22. 35. Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 34–37; Piketty, Capital, 314,

321. Th is does not mean that factors like technological skills play no role in wage inequality among workers. But such technological advances also occurred in West- ern nations where inequality is less acute than in America. Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, Th e Race between Education and Technolog y (Belknap, 2008), 291–92, 329.

36. Economic Policy Institute, “Top CEOs Make 300 Times More Th an Typical Workers,” June 21, 2015.

37. Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 61. 38. Eric Dash, “Fiorina Exiting Hewlett-Packard with More Th an $42 Million,”

New York Times, February 12, 2005. 39. Piketty, Capital, 330–35, 508–9. 40. Th at is the conclusion of a comprehensive statistical study of 1,779 policy

issues. See Martin Gilens and Benjamin Paige, “Testing Th eories of American Poli- tics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 564–81.

41. Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, “State of the Union” (2016), 15–23.

42. America ranks last among Western nations on the Gini inequality index. See n. 1, above.

43. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 296. 44. David Auerbach and Arthur Kellermann, “A Decade of Health Care Cost

Growth Has Wiped Out Real Income Gains for an Average US Family,” Health Aff airs 30, no. 9 (2011): 1630–36.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 9 – 1 5 3 • 311

45. Piketty, Capital, 321–24. 46. Th ese fi ndings were based on 2002 and 2004 data. See Larry Bartels, Une-

qual Democracy: Th e Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, 2nd ed. (Russell Sage, 2016), 126–27.

47. Saez, “Striking It Richer.” Th is statistic excludes government transfers, such as Social Security and nontaxable benefi ts.

48. See Sarah Binder, “How We Count Senate Filibusters and Why It Matters,” Washington Post, May 15, 2014; “Not Too Late to Curb the Filibuster,” New York Times, May 14, 2012; Steven S. Smith, “Partisan Polarization and the Senate Syn- drome,” in Solutions to Polarization in America, ed. Nathaniel Persily (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 219–21.

49. Aaron Blake, “Will the Fiscal Cliff Break Grover Norquist’s Hold on Republicans?,” Washington Post, November 26, 2012.

50. “Th e Return of ‘Drill, Baby, Drill,’ ” New York Times, May 6, 2011. 51. Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World

Economy (Norton, 2010), 219. 52. Jill Lepore, “Tea and Sympathy,” New Yorker, May 3, 2010. 53. Jane Mayer, Dark Money: Th e Hidden Story of the Billionaires behind the Rise

of the Radical Right (Doubleday, 2016), 58–59, 76, 147. 54. Alison Fitzgerald and Justin Blum, “Republicans Voting against Stimulus

Th en Asked Obama for Money,” Bloomberg, February 22, 2010. 55. Jerry Markon and David Fallis, “Paul Ryan Has Record of Pushing for and

Earmarking Federal Funds for His District,” Washington Post, August 17, 2012. 56. Melinda Henneberger, “Michele Bachmann’s New Book Matches Her

Political Message,” Washington Post, November 23, 2011. 57. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 1st ed., 131. 58. Rosalind Helderman, “Trump Agrees to $25 Million Settlement in Trump

University Fraud Cases,” Washington Post, November 18, 2016. 59. Robert Yoon, “$153 Million in Bill and Hillary Clinton Speaking Fees,

Documented,” CNN, February 6, 2016. 60. Philip Rucker and Rosalind Helderman, “At Time of Austerity, 8 Universi-

ties Spent Top Dollar on Hillary Rodham Clinton Speeches,” Washington Post, July 2, 2014.

61. Rosalind Helderman and Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Inside Bill Clinton’s Nearly $18 Million Job as ‘Honorary Chancellor’ of a For-Profi t College,” Washington Post, September 5, 2016; “Hillary’s For-Profi t Education,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2015.

62. Peter Whoriskey, “Growing Wealth Widens Distance between Lawmakers and Constituents,” Washington Post, December 26, 2011.

63. Center for Responsive Politics, “Millionaires’ Club: For First Time, Most Lawmakers Are Worth $1 Million–Plus,” January 9, 2014.

64. William M. Welch, “Tauzin Switches Sides from Drug Industry Overseer to Lobbyist,” USA Today, December 16, 2004.

65. Brill, America’s Bitter Pill, 232.

312 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 5 3 – 1 5 5

66. In a 2010 case called SpeechNOW.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686, the D.C. Circuit Court interpreted Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), as allowing unlimited “independent expenditures” by individual persons. Th e Supreme Court declined to review that decision, eff ectively endorsing it. Th e FEC then issued an advisory opinion on July 22, 2010, interpreting Citizens United and SpeechNOW as allowing unlimited individual contributions to Super PACs. See Cynthia Bauerly and Eric Hallstrom, “Square Pegs: Th e Challenge for Existing Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the Super PAC,” NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 15 (2012): 329–62.

67. See the amicus briefs fi led by Mitch McConnell, the Senate Republican leader, in Citizens United and McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014), and the amicus brief of the Republican National Committee in United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (2012), before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

68. Source: Center for Responsive Politics. 69. Source: ProPublica. 70. Mayer, Dark Money, 314. 71. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314. 72. Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, “Perceptions of Corruption and Cam-

paign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law” (University of Pennsylvania Law School Research Paper, 2004).

73. McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1441. 74. Mugambi Jouet, “Is the Supreme Court Disconnected from the Real

World?,” Hill, April 22, 2014. 75. McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1450. 76. “Which Presidential Candidates Are Winning the Money Race,” New York

Times, June 22, 2016. 77. Carrie Levine, Michael Beckel, and Dave Levinthal, “Donald Trump Dis-

mantles Hillary Clinton’s Big Money Machine,” Time, November 9, 2016. 78. Gilens and Paige, “Testing Th eories of American Politics,” 576. Another

study found that Citizens United helped Republican candidates win several state elections. See Tilman Klumpp, Hugo Mialon, and Michael Williams, “Th e Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections,” Journal of Law and Economics 59, no. 1 (2016): 1–43.

79. Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch, “Th e Political Aft ermath of Financial Crises: Going to Extremes,” Vox, Centre for Economic Policy Research, November 21, 2015.

80. Piketty, Capital, 297. 81. Nicholas Kristof, “A Banker Speaks, with Regret,” New York Times, Novem-

ber 30, 2011. 82. Stiglitz, Freefall, 113. See also this blog post by the French economist Anne

Lavigne: “Pourquoi le subprime ne peut exister en France,” Mutatis mutandis, August 18, 2007.

83. Stiglitz, Freefall, 1–3, 13, 88, 113. 84. Ibid., 7–9.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 5 5 – 1 5 9 • 313

85. Ibid., 162–63. 86. Paul Krugman, “Disaster and Denial,” New York Times, December 14, 2009. 87. Stiglitz, Freefall, 10–11. 88. ProPublica, “Bailout Tracker,” February 16, 2016. 89. Binyamin Appelbaum and David Herszenhorn, “Financial Overhaul Signals

Shift on Deregulation,” New York Times, July 15, 2010. 90. William Cohan, “ ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks Th riving a Few Years aft er Finan-

cial Crisis,” New York Times, January 22, 2016; Emily Glazer and Peter Rudegeair, “J. P. Morgan Posts Record Earnings, but Can Good Times Last?,” Wall Street Jour- nal, January 14, 2016.

91. Th ey included Leon Cooperman and Stephen Schwarzman. See Chrystia Freeland, “ ‘First Do No Harm’ Prescription Issued for Wall Street,” Financial Times, April 28, 2009.

92. Th is section partly draws on Mugambi Jouet, “Th e Exceptional Absence of Human Rights as a Principle in American Law,” Pace Law Review 34, (2014): 711–15.

93. Reed Abelson, “Census Numbers Show 50.7 Million Uninsured,” New York Times, September 16, 2010; Abelson, “Ranks of Underinsured Are Rising, Study Finds,” New York Times, June 10, 2008.

94. Congressional Budget Offi ce, “Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Aff ordable Care Act—March 2015 Baseline,” March 2015.

95. Robert Pear, “On Health Exchanges, Premiums May Be Low, but Other Costs Can Be High,” New York Times, December 9, 2013.

96. Commonwealth Fund, “31 Million People Were Underinsured in 2014,” May 20, 2015.

97. Kimberly Barlow, “Romoff Is UPMC’s Top Wage Earner,” University of Pittsburg Times, May 29, 2014.

98. Ezra Klein, “Why an MRI Costs $1,080 in America and $280 in France,” Washington Post, March 15, 2013. See also Brill, America’s Bitter Pill, 4–5, 232–36.

99. Steven Brill, “Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us,” Time, Febru- ary 20, 2013.

100. T. R. Reid, Th e Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care (Penguin, 2010), 36–37. See also PolitiFact, “Feinstein Says U.S. Is Only Nation to Rely Heavily on For-Profi t Insurers for Basic Health Care,” March 11, 2010.

101. David Himmelstein, Deborah Th orne, Elizabeth Warren, and Steffi e Wool- handler, “Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study,” American Journal of Medicine 122, no. 8 (2009): 741–46.

102. PolitiFact, “Former U.S. Rep. Patrick Kennedy Says Most Bankruptcies in U.S. Are Due to Health Care Costs,” July 29, 2012.

103. Robert Seifert and Mark Rukavina, “Bankruptcy Is the Tip of a Medical- Debt Iceberg,” Health Aff airs 25, no. 2 (2006): w89–w92.

104. Reid, Healing of America, 31. 105. Klein, “Why an MRI Costs $1,080.” 106. Brill, America’s Bitter Pill, 235–36.

314 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 5 9 – 1 6 2

107. Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Price for a New Hip? Many Hospitals Are Stumped,” New York Times, February 11, 2013.

108. Center for Responsive Politics, “Health Lobbying,” accessed November 6, 2016, www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2016&ind=H.

109. Brill, “Bitter Pill.” 110. Bruce Bartlett, “What Your Taxes Do (and Don’t) Buy for You,” New York

Times, June 7, 2011. 111. Ellen Nolte and Martin McKee, “Variations in Amenable Mortality—Trends

in 16 High-Income Nations,” Health Policy 103, no. 1 (November 2011): 47–52. 112. Reid, Healing of America, 3, 32. See also Commonwealth Fund, “U.S.

Health Care from a Global Perspective” (2015). 113. Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, “State of the Union,” 58–64. 114. Harris Interactive, “Most Republicans Th ink the U.S. Health Care System

Is the Best in the World; Democrats Disagree,” March 20, 2008. 115. Eric Roper, “Bachmann: Criticize Health Care Plan and Forget about Being

Treated,” Star Tribune, February 2, 2010. 116. Ian Urbina and Katherine Seelye, “Senator Goes Face to Face with Dissent,”

New York Times, August 11, 2009. 117. Reid, Healing of America, 51, 232; Diane Archer, “Medicare Is More Effi cient

Th an Private Insurance,” Health Aff airs blog, September 20, 2011; Paul Krugman, “Medicare Saves Money,” New York Times, June 12, 2011.

118. See, for example, Kenneth Th orpe, “An Analysis of Senator Sanders Single Payer Plan,” January 27, 2016. Other experts disagree that Sanders’s plan would be far costlier than presented. See, e.g., David Himmelstein and Steffi e Woolhandler, “On Kenneth Th orpe’s Analysis of Senator Sanders’ Single-Payer Reform Plan,” Huffi ngton Post, January 29, 2016.

119. Timothy Jost, “Th e Aff ordable Care Act: What’s Th ere to Like about It?,” Engage 13, no. 3 (October 2012): 13.

120. Andrew Wilper, Steffi e Woolhandler, Karen Lasser, Danny McCormick, David Bor, and David Himmelstein, “Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults,” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 12 (2009): 2289–95.

121. Institute of Medicine, “America’s Uninsured Crisis” (2009). 122. Reid, Healing of America, 231, 242. 123. Ibid., 231. 124. Ibid., 230. 125. Abby Goodnough, “Distaste for Health Care Law Refl ects Spending on

Ads,” New York Times, June 20, 2012. While a signifi cant minority of nonwealthy Americans stand against their own interest by opposing health care reform, affl uent voters are far likelier to oppose it. Andrew Gelman, “Economic Divisions and Politi- cal Polarization in Red and Blue America,” Pathways (2011): 4.

126. Healy, “From Reagan’s Past.” 127. Abelson, “50.7 Million Uninsured;” Abelson, “Ranks of Underinsured Are

Rising.” 128. Henneberger, “Michele Bachmann.”

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 6 2 – 1 6 8 • 315

129. Randy Krehbiel, “Coburn Sour on Economy,” Tulsa World, August 18, 2011. 130. Piketty, Capital, 567. 131. See generally Sylvain Cypel, “Why French Workers Are So Mad,” New York

Times, June 8, 2016. 132. Willem Adema, Pauline Fron, and Maxime Ladaique, “Is the European

Welfare State Really More Expensive?: Indicators on Social Spending, 1980–2012; and a Manual to the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)” (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, no. 124, 2011), 21.

133. Piketty, Capital, 174, 510 (quote). 134. Th omas Piketty, “2007–2015: Une si longue récession,” Le Monde blog,

January 8, 2016. See also Peter Goodman, “Europe’s Economy, aft er 8-Year Detour, Is Fitfully Back on Track,” New York Times, April 29, 2016.

135. World Bank, “GDP Per Capita” (2015). 136. Rebecca Ray and John Schmitt, “No-Vacation Nation,” Center for Eco-

nomic and Policy Research (2007); Sarah Jane Glynn and Jane Farrell, “Th e United States Needs to Guarantee Paid Maternity Leave,” Center for American Progress, March 8, 2013.

137. See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (Norton, 1997), 32.

138. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Th e Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore (Penguin, 2002), 235.

139. Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 35. 140. Th e rest of this section partly draws on my Truthout article “Paul Ryan’s

Misconceived Rugged Individualism,” October 13, 2012. 141. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 112–13. 142. Spencer Magloff , “Tea Party Protester Sorry for Mocking Man with Par-

kinson’s,” CBS News, March 25, 2010. 143. David Weiner, “Wheelchair-Bound Woman Shouted Down at New Jersey

Health Care Town Hall,” Huffi ngton Post, September 2, 2009; Rachel Weiner, “Tea Party Patriots Attack Family Who Lost Daughter and Grandchild,” Huffi ngton Post, November 23, 2009.

144. See Sunstein, Second Bill of Rights, 90. 145. U.N. Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, “Percentage of Homicides by Firearm,

Number of Homicides by Firearm and Homicide by Firearm Rate per 100,000 Population,” accessed October 16, 2016, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and- analysis/statistics/Homicide/Homicides_by _fi rearms.xls.

146. Robin Abcarian, “Paul Ryan Says His Abortion Stance Is Unchanged, Matches Romney’s,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2012.

6 . M I L L I O N S S T A N D I N G A G A I N S T T H E I R O W N E C O N O M I C I N T E R E S T

1. Baruch Spinoza, Th eological-Political Treatise, trans. Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6.

316 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 6 8 – 1 7 0

2. Tax Policy Center, “An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Tax Plan,” December 22, 2015.

3. David Fahrenthold, “Trump Boasts about His Philanthropy. But His Giving Falls Short of His Words,” Washington Post, October 29, 2016; Alexandra Berzon, “Donald Trump’s Business Plan Left a Trail of Unpaid Bills,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2016; Steve Reilly, “Hundreds Allege Donald Trump Doesn’t Pay His Bills,” USA Today, June 9, 2016; Rosalind Helderman, “Trump Agrees to $25 Million Settlement in Trump University Fraud Cases,” Washington Post, November 18, 2016; David Fahr- enthold, “Trump Foundation Admits to Violating Ban on ‘Self-Dealing,’ New Filing to IRS Shows,” Washington Post, November 22, 2015; PolitiFact, “Fact-Checking the Funny or Die Video about Trump-Brand Products Made Overseas,” July 25, 2016.

4. John Kingdon, America the Unusual (Worth, 1999), 55, 72 (quote). See also Jerome Karabel and Daniel Laurison, “An Exceptional Nation? American Political Values in Comparative Perspective” (Institute for Research on Labor and Employ- ment Working Paper 136–12, University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 13.

5. Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (Norton, 1997), 38–39.

6. Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: Th e Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, 1st ed. (Princeton University Press, 2008), 64–97; Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: Th e Dance of Ideology and Une- qual Riches (MIT Press, 2016), 75; Andrew Gelman, Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way Th ey Do (Princeton University Press, 2010), 10–17.

7. “Election 2016: Exit Polls,” New York Times, November 8, 2016. As this book went to press shortly aft er the election, data breaking down the exit polls by both income and race were not yet available. However, prior data suggest that Trump supporters earn relatively high household incomes despite being less educated and likelier to work in blue collar occupations than the average citizen. Overall, the Trump coalition appears economically diverse. See Jonathan Rothwell and Pablo Diego-Rossell, “Explaining Nationalist Political Views: Th e Case of Donald Trump” (working paper, November 2, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstract_id=2822059; Nate Silver, “Th e Mytholog y of Trump’s ‘Working Class’ Support,” FiveTh irtyEight, May 3, 2016.

8. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 72–73. Th ese statistics are limited to votes for either the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate, leaving aside third parties and blank ballots.

9. “Exit Poll,” in “Presidential Election Results,” “Decision 2012,” NBC News, http://elections.msnbc.msn.com/ns/politics/2012/all/president/.

10. Gelman, Red State, Blue State, 9. 11. John Huber and Piero Stanig, “Voting Polarization on Redistribution across

Democracies” (paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, 2006).

12. For example, see Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 72–75; Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 162–63.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 7 0 – 1 7 3 • 317

13. Pew, “Th e U.S.’s High Income Gap Is Met with Relatively Low Public Con- cern,” December 6, 2013.

14. Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: Th e Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, 2nd ed. (Princeton University Press, 2016), 109.

15. Stanford Graduate School of Business and Rock Center for Corporate Gov- ernance, “Americans and CEO Pay: 2016 Public Perception Survey on CEO Com- pensation,” 4.

16. Sorapop Kiatpongsan and Michael Norton, “How Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A Universal Desire for More Equal Pay,” Perspectives on Political Sci- ence 9, no. 6 (2014): 587–93.

17. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 1st ed., 153. 18. Ibid., 163, 179, 186. 19. Gelman, Red State, Blue State, 62; PolitiFact, “ ‘Red State Socialism’ Graphic

Says GOP-Leaning States Get Lion’s Share of Federal Dollars,” January 26, 2012. 20. Gelman, Red State, Blue State, 22. 21. Dana Milbank, “A Tea Party of Populist Posers,” Washington Post, October

20, 2010. 22. Naturally, Trumpism was not limited to the South. See generally Neil Irwin

and Josh Katz, “Th e Geography of Trumpism,” New York Times, March 12, 2016. A prior study further indicates that poor people typically vote Democrat but poor states vote Republican. Gelman, Red State, Blue State, 22.

23. Ralph Vartabedian, Richard Serrano, and Ken Bensinger, “Despite Working- Class Image, Ryan Comes from Family of Wealth,” Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2012.

24. Jill Lepore, “Tea and Sympathy,” New Yorker, May 3, 2010. 25. Stephanie Mencimer, “Th e Supreme Court Is about to Hear the Case Th at

Could Destroy Obamacare,” Mother Jones, February 9, 2015. 26. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 2nd ed., 289, 312–15, 341, 353. Compelling data

demonstrate that politicians are barely receptive to ordinary citizens’ concerns, unlike those of the wealthy. Martin Gilens and Benjamin Paige, “Testing Th eories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 564–81.

27. Th e “Tea Party movement” as such seemed to decline toward the end of Obama’s presidency, although its concerns remained omnipresent among the Republican base and were reinvigorated by Trump’s movement.

28. George Orwell, 1984 (Signet, 1961), 207. 29. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 1st ed., 3–4, 66, 72–73, 89–90; Morris Fiorina

with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? Th e Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2010), 241.

30. Gelman, Red State, Blue State, 91, 172. 31. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 1st ed., 3–4, 66, 72–73, 89–90. 32. In 2008, for instance, “whites with family incomes below $50,000 who

attended religious services more than once a week voted for John McCain over Barack Obama by better than a two-to-one margin.” Alan Abramowitz, Th e Polar- ized Public? Why American Government Is So Dysfunctional (Pearson, 2013), 65.

318 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 7 3 – 1 7 7

33. Th is section partly draws on my Truthout article “Religious and Free-Market Fundamentalism Have More in Common Th an Th eir Fans in the Tea Party,” July 21, 2012.

34. See Meredith Shiner, “G.O.P. Begins Rollback of Wall Street Reform,” Politico, March 16, 2011.

35. Illustratively, we saw in Chapter 3 that Michele Bachmann has claimed that scores of Nobel Prize–winning scientists are creationists.

36. Tom Cohen, “Tea Party: Bring on a Government Shutdown,” CNN, April 6, 2011.

37. Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families: Legal Polari- zation and the Creation of Culture (Oxford University Press, 2010), 8, 13.

38. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 16–17, 78–82, 114. 39. David Campbell and Robert Putnam, “Crashing the Tea Party,” New York

Times, August 16, 2011. 40. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 114. 41. Ibid., 80. 42. Julian Borger, “Cultural Conservatives Tighten Grip in Congress,” Guard-

ian, November 5, 2004. 43. Michelle Goldberg, Kingdom Coming: Th e Rise of Christian Nationalism

(Norton, 2007), 3. 44. “Jim DeMint, Chris Christie Skipping CPAC 2011,” Huffi ngton Post, Janu-

ary 24, 2011. 45. Maggie Haberman, “Michele Bachmann Steals the Show in Iowa,” Politico,

March 26, 2011. 46. Mark Duel, “ ‘Gays Are Part of Satan and Th eir Life Is Bondage’: Bach-

mann’s Th oughts on Homosexuality,” Daily Mail (UK), July 13, 2011. 47. Brian Ross, Rhonda Schwartz, Matthew Mosk, and Megan Chuchmach,

“Michele Bachmann Clinic: Where You Can Pray Away the Gay?,” ABC News, July 11, 2011.

48. Michele Bachmann, speech at the Living Word Christian Center, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, October 14, 2006.

49. Pew, “Beyond Red vs. Blue: Th e Political Typology,” May 4, 2011. See also Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 16–17, 78–82.

50. Guttmacher Institute, “Unintended Pregnancies Cost Federal and State Governments $21 Billion in 2010,” March 2, 2015.

51. Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (Norton, 2010), 219.

52. Goldberg, Kingdom Coming, 46, 169. 53. Diana Butler Bass, “God in Wisconsin,” Huffi ngton Post, May 25, 2011. 54. See, for example, Sam Brownback, “What I Th ink of Evolution,” New York

Times, May 31, 2007. 55. 107 Cong. Rec. H4527 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pence). 56. Stephen Braun, “Palin Canny on Religion and Politics,” Los Angeles Times,

September 28, 2008.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 7 7 – 1 8 3 • 319

57. Media Matters for America, “Beck, Carlson Noted Th at Apocalyptic August 22 Predictions Were Wrong,” August 23, 2006.

58. Tara Golshan, “10 Th ings We Learned about Trump Adviser Steve Bannon from Th is Recently Surfaced Speech,” Vox, November 17, 2016.

59. Dinesh D’Souza, Th e Enemy at Home: Th e Cultural Left and Its Responsibil- ity for 9/11 (Broadway, 2008).

60. Robin Abcarian, “Paul Ryan Says His Abortion Stance Is Unchanged, Matches Romney’s,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2012.

61. Abramowitz, Polarized Public?, 16–17, 78–82. See also Pew, “Beyond Red vs. Blue.”

62. Pew, “Palin V.P. Nomination Puts Pentecostalism in the Spotlight,” Septem- ber 12, 2008.

63. Kevin Kruse, One Nation under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America (Basic, 2015), 37–39.

64. Ayelish McGarvey, “Carter’s Crusade,” American Prospect, April 5, 2004.

65. Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Th ought (Beacon, 1992), 200.

66. Andrew Koppelman, “Th e Nonproblem of Fundamentalism,” William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 18 (2010): 917. See also Michael Kazin, Th e Populist Persuasion: An American History (Basic, 1995), 42–45.

67. Th is section features excerpts of my article “Th e Polarization of the Ameri- can Dream,” published by Collier’s in October 2012.

68. Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, “State of the Union” (2016), 52; Economic Mobility Project, “Does America Promote Mobility as Well as Other Nations?,” November 2011; Economic Mobility Project, “Is the American Dream Alive and Well?,” May 25, 2007.

69. Economic Mobility Project, “Economic Mobility of the States,” April 2012. 70. Matt Kibbe, Real Time with Bill Maher, HBO, July 29, 2011. 71. Jack Greene, Th e Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and

Identity fr om 1492 to 1800 (University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 69. 72. Ibid., 102 (quote), 104. See also Th omas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First

Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Belknap, 2014), 150–51. 73. Greene, Intellectual Construction of America, 107. 74. Piketty, Capital, 152; Peter Lindert and Jeff rey Williamson, “American

Incomes before and aft er the Revolution,” Journal of Economic History 73, no. 3 (2013): 725–65.

75. Piketty, Capital, 150–52. 76. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: Th e Fates of Human Societies (Nor-

ton, 1997), 77–78. 77. Cass Sunstein, Th e Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfi nished Revolution and

Why We Need It More Th an Ever (Basic, 2004), 198–99. 78. Barack Obama, speech in Osawatomie, Kansas, December 6, 2011. 79. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 2nd ed., 338.

3 2 0 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 8 3 – 1 8 9

80. Nicholas Confessore, “9 Times Donald Trump Complained about Taxes,” New York Times, October 2, 2016.

81. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 1st ed., 153. 82. Pew, “Most See Inequality Growing, but Partisans Diff er over Solutions,”

January 23, 2014. 83. Ibid. 84. For example, see David Shipler, Th e Working Poor: Invisible in America

(Vintage, 2005). 85. See generally Piketty, Capital, 297, 291, 320. 86. Economic Mobility Project, “Economic Mobility and the American Dream:

Examining Income Diff erences,” March 2012. 87. Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America

(Holt, 2008), 108, 118 (quote), 178, 180, 184–85, 208. 88. Shipler, Working Poor, x. 89. As discussed in this chapter’s fi rst section, research by Gelman, Bartels, and

other political scientists demonstrates that the rich are likelier than the poor to oppose the welfare state.

90. Pew, “Most See Inequality Growing.” 91. Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 108–9. 92. Gelman, Red State, Blue State, 102; Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 1st ed., 95;

Huber and Stanig, “Voting Polarization.” 93. Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 36–41, 59–61, 147. 94. Paul Krugman, Th e Conscience of a Liberal (Norton, 2009), 92–93, 106, 178. 95. Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have

Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class (Oxford University Press, 2015), 58. 96. Ibid., 1. 97. Ibid., 4. 98. Rick Perlstein, “Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern

Strategy,” Nation, November 13, 2012. 99. Paul Krugman, “Love for Labor Lost,” New York Times, September 1, 2013;

U.S. Offi ce of Family Assistance, “Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients, Fiscal Year 2015” (2016). Th e programs typically identifi ed as “welfare” are Temporary Aid to Needy Families and its predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Other anti-poverty programs exist, such as Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, which dispenses food stamps.

100. Harris Interactive, “ ‘Wingnuts’ and President Obama,” March 23, 2010. 101. Michael Norton and Samuel Sommers, “Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum

Game Th at Th ey Are Now Losing,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, no. 3 (May 2011): 215–18.

102. López, Dog Whistle Politics, 55–56, 108–11. 103. “Racial Attitudes,” in “Polling the Tea Party,” New York Times, April 10,

2010. 104. David E. Campbell and Robert Putnam, “Crashing the Tea Party,” New

York Times, August 16, 2011.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 9 0 – 1 9 3 • 3 21

105. William Emmons and Bryan Noeth, “Why Didn’t Higher Education Pro- tect Hispanic and Black Wealth?,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, In the Balance 12 (2015).

106. See Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Bart Bonikowski, “Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 5 (2009): 777–99.

107. Families are considered “low income” if they have an income below 200 percent of the poverty level. See Margaret Simms, Karina Fortuny, and Everett Henderson, “Racial and Ethnic Disparities among Low-Income Families,” Urban Institute, August 2009. Whites, Latinos, and blacks respectively constitute 61, 17, and 13 percent of the U.S. population. U.S. Census, “Quick Facts” (2015 data), www .census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00.

108. Suzanne Mettler, “Our Hidden Government Benefi ts,” New York Times, September 19, 2011. See also Mettler, “Reconstituting the Submerged State: Th e Challenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 3 (September 2010): 803–24.

109. Sunstein, Second Bill of Rights, 135. 110. Ira Katznelson, When Affi rmative Action Was White (Norton, 2005),

22–23, 140. 111. Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Why Doesn’t the

US Have a European-Style Welfare State?,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research 1933 (2001): 49–51.

112. Needless to say, the horrors of the Holocaust epitomize the capacity of Europeans to scapegoat and persecute minorities. Th at being noted, in 1933 Jews represented barely 1.7 percent of Europe’s population, which was much less diverse than America’s. See United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Ency- clopedia, s.v. “Jewish Population of Europe in 1933: Population Data by Country.” Although anti-Semitism was part of anti-socialist and anti-communist rhetoric in Europe, Jews were not widely perceived as the main recipients of national health insurance or the welfare state.

113. See generally Andrew Higgins, “Right Wing’s Surge in Europe Has Estab- lishment Rattled,” New York Times, November 8, 2013.

114. See, for instance, Michael Millenson, “Why Obamacare Is Good for White People,” Health Care Blog, October 30, 2012. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, a major 2015 Supreme Court decision, rejected an attempt to eviscerate Obama’s health care reform. More than 60 percent of the people who would otherwise have become uninsured were white. See Urban Institute and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, “Characteristics of Th ose Aff ected by a Supreme Court Finding for the Plaintiff in King v. Burwell,” January 2015.

115. Richard Hofstadter, Th e Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays (Vintage, 2008), 51.

116. Th is is especially true for legislative elections. See International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout Database, www.idea.int /themes/voter-turnout.

3 2 2 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 9 3 – 1 9 6

117. Turnout is generally lower for nonpresidential elections in both America and France.

118. Data suggest that voter turnout is higher in swing states. Carl Bialik, “Voter Turnout Fell, Especially in States Th at Clinton Won,” FiveTh irtyEight, November 11, 2016; Susan Page, “Voter Turnout Higher in Swing States Th an Elsewhere,” USA Today, December 23, 2012. But turnout also tends to be high in various nonswing states. James Gimpel, Karen Kaufmann, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, “Battle- ground States versus Blackout States: Th e Behavioral Implications of Modern Presi- dential Campaigns,” Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (2007): 795. Moreover, another study concluded that voters in swing states do not have signifi cantly higher turnout. Alan Gerber, Gregory Huber, David Doherty, and Conor Dowling, “Are Voting Norms Conditional? How Electoral Context and Peer Behavior Shape the Social Returns to Voting” (2016), http://huber.research.yale.edu/materials/56_ paper.pdf.

7 . M A S S I N C A R C E R A T I O N , E X E C U T I O N S , A N D G U N V I O L E N C E

1. Recall that our defi nition of the West does not include Latin American nations, some of which have much higher murder rates.

2. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Bantam, 2000), 694.

3. Lawrence Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century (Yale Univer- sity Press, 2002), 92–95.

4. Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont, On the Penitentiary System in the United States and Its Application in France, trans. Francis Lieber (Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1833). “We have signaled . . . the advantages of the penitentiary sys- tem in the United States,” Tocqueville and Beaumont emphasized (106).

5. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Fact Check: Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the World’s Population and One Quarter of the World’s Prisoners?,” Washington Post, April 30, 2015.

6. Prison Policy Initiative, “States of Incarceration: Th e Global Context 2016,” www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html.

7. Institute for Criminal Policy Research, “World Prison Brief ” (2016). 8. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2015.” 9. Institute for Criminal Policy Research, “World Prison Brief.” See also Lisa

Mahapatra, “Why Are So Many People in US Prisons?,” International Business Times, March 19, 2014.

10. James Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe (Oxford University Press, 2003), 71–72.

11. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prisoners in 2014,” September 2015, 16. 12. Whitman, Harsh Justice, 63, 71–72, 83. 13. John Pfaff , “Th e Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth,” Georgia State

University Law Review 28 (2012): 1241.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 9 6 – 2 0 0 • 3 2 3

14. See Civitas, “Comparisons of Crime in OECD Countries” (2012); Peter Baldwin, Th e Narcissism of Small Diff erences: How America and Europe Are Alike (Oxford University Press, 2009), 78–87.

15. William Stuntz, Th e Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Belknap, 2011), 2–3, 34.

16. Ibid., 224–25. 17. Ibid., 223–24, 235. 18. Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 242. 19. Susan Jacoby, Th e Age of American Unreason (Vintage, 2009), 137, 149–53. 20. Christian Henrichson and Ruth Delaney, “Th e Price of Prisons: What

Incarceration Costs Taxpayers,” Vera Institute of Justice, January 2012, 2. 21. David Garland, Th e Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contem-

porary Society (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 90. 22. As John Pfaff noted, “Canada’s crime rates have risen and fallen roughly in

sync with those in the United States, yet its incarceration rate barely budged from 100 per 100,000 between 1981 and 2001. An increase in crime thus does not inexo- rably lead to an increase in prisoners.” Pfaff , “Causes of Prison Growth,” 1246.

23. Garland, Culture of Control, 20, 58, 62. 24. Ibid., 143. 25. See, for instance, Eva Nilsen, “Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ide-

als of Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse,” UC Davis Law Review 41 (2007): 111–75.

26. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 27. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). As Justice O’Connor’s majority

opinion stated, in California “petty theft with a prior conviction” was “punishable either as a misdemeanor or as a felony” at the prosecutor’s discretion. In Lockyer “the prosecutor decided to charge the two counts of theft as felonies rather than misde- meanors” (67). Th at underscored the drive to infl ict the harshest possible sentence. Leandro Andrade, the petty off ender, thus received a sentence of fi ft y years to life, meaning that he must serve fi ft y years in prison before being eligible for parole. Because he was thirty-seven when sentenced, he was likely condemned to die in prison.

28. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 29. See generally Shanto Iyengar, James Curran, Anker Brink Lund, Inka

Salovaara-Moring, Kyu Hahn, and Sharon Coen, “Cross-National versus Individ- ual-Level Diff erences in Political Information: A Media Systems Perspective,” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 20, no. 3 (August 2010): 294.

30. Katherine Beckett and Th eodore Sasson, Th e Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America (Pine Forge, 2000), 77–87; Opportunity Agenda, “An Overview of Public Opinion and Discourse on Criminal Justice Issues” (hereaft er “Opportunity Agenda Report”), August 2014, 18.

31. Marc Fisher, “Democratic Party Platform: An Uneven Progression over the Years,” Washington Post, September 4, 2012.

32. Marshall Frady, “Death in Arkansas,” New Yorker, February 22, 1993.

3 2 4 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 0 – 2 0 4

33. Bill Clinton, quoted in Michelle Alexander, Th e New Jim Crow: Mass Incar- ceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New Press, 2012), 56.

34. See Paul Duggan, “ ‘Too Easy for Him’: For Witnesses in Oklahoma City, a Long Day Brought Little Relief,” Washington Post, June 12, 2001.

35. Michelle Alexander, “Why Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Deserve the Black Vote,” Nation, February 10, 2016.

36. DiIulio was among the criminologists who fi led an amicus brief in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), a challenge to life sentences for juveniles. See also Elizabeth Becker, “As Ex-Th eorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets,” New York Times, February 9, 2001.

37. Carol Steiker, “Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism,” in American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton University Press, 2005), 77. Only a tiny number of countries have judicial elections. In particular, certain Swiss cantons elect judges, and appointed judges on Japan’s Supreme Court face retention elections that tend to be a formality. Th ese elections are vastly diff erent in practice than those in America, which exist on a far larger scale and in a far more politicized environment. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, “Th e Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law,” Georget- own Law Journal 98 (2010): 1351 fn. 3; Adam Liptak, “Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-election,” New York Times, May 25, 2008. Other examples similarly diff er from American judges campaigning on their willingness to impose death sentences or draconian prison terms. In France, for instance, lower court commercial and labor judges are elected professionals who usually lack legal training. Th ey have no jurisdiction over criminal cases. Amalia D. Kessler, “Marginalization and Myth: Th e Corporatist Roots of France’s Forgotten Elective Judiciary,” American Journal of Com- parative Law 58 (2010): 681–83.

38. Whitman, Harsh Justice, 71. 39. See Carol Steiker, “Capital Punishment,” 71–72; Carol Steiker and Jordan

Steiker, “No More Tinkering: Th e American Law Institute and the Death Penalty Provisions of the Model Penal Code,” Texas Law Review 89, no. 2 (2010): 390–96.

40. See Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, Th e Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger (Bloomsbury, 2010), 155–56; Whitman, Harsh Justice, 200.

41. Chris Suellentrop, “Th e Right Has a Jailhouse Conversion,” New York Times, December 24, 2006.

42. Vera Institute of Justice, “Confronting Confi nement,” June 2006. 43. Institute for Criminal Policy Research, “World Prison Brief ” (2014 data). 44. Keith Humphreys, “Th ere’s Been a Big Decline in the Black Incarceration

Rate, and Nobody’s Paying Attention,” Washington Post, February 10, 2016. 45. Sentencing Project, “Fewer Prisoners, Less Crime: A Tale of Th ree States,”

July 23, 2014. 46. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011). 47. Rob Kuznia, “An Unprecedented Experiment in Mass Forgiveness,” Wash-

ington Post, February 8, 2016.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 4 – 2 0 7 • 3 2 5

48. FBI Uniform Crime Reports (2014). See also Christopher Ingraham, “Every Minute, Someone Gets Arrested for Marijuana Possession in the U.S.,” Washington Post, September 28, 2015.

49. James Forman Jr., “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow,” NYU Law Review 87, no. 1 (2012): 24–25; U.S. Bureau of Justice Statis- tics, “Prisoners in 2014,” 16.

50. Laurence Steinberg, “Th e Infl uence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 14 (2013): 513–18.

51. See, for example, George Will, “More Prisoners, Less Crime,” Washington Post, June 22, 2008.

52. See PolitiFact, “Fact-Checking Bill Clinton’s Philly Defense of His Contro- versial Crime Bill,” April 8, 2016.

53. See John Pfaff , “Bill Clinton Is Wrong about His Crime Bill. So Are the Protesters He Lectured,” New York Times, April 12, 27.

54. See generally Brennan Center for Justice, “What Caused the Crime Decline?” (2015).

55. Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 26. See also Shaila Dewan, “Th e Real Murder Mystery? It’s the Low Crime Rate,” New York Times, August 2, 2009.

56. OECD Better Life Index, “Safety,” accessed October 17, 2016, www .oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/safety/. Th e U.S. homicide rate is approximately 5.2 per 100,000 people, compared to 1.5 for Canada, 0.8 for Italy, 0.4 for Austria, and 0.2 for the United Kingdom, for example.

57. “ACLU Nationwide Poll on Criminal Justice Reform,” July 15, 2015. 58. Pew, “Voters Want Big Changes in Federal Sentencing, Prison System,”

February 12, 2016. Another poll had similar fi ndings: Reason-Rupe, “Poll: 77% of Americans Favor Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentences for Nonvio- lent Off enders; 73% Favor Restoring Voting Rights,” October 21, 2014.

59. “Republican Platform 2016” ( July 18, 2016), American Presidency Project, 39–40, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_ pdf/117718.pdf.

60. “2016 Democratic Party Platform” ( July 21, 2016), American Presidency Project, 14–16, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=117717.

61. David Alan Sklansky, “Th e Changing Political Landscape for Elected Pros- ecutors,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 14, no. 2 (Spring 2017).

62. Opportunity Agenda Report, 31. 63. Ibid., 20. 64. Gallup, “More Americans Say Crime Is Rising in US,” October 22, 2015. 65. Opportunity Agenda Report, 3 (summarizing the fi ndings of various studies).

Another study found that only half of whites believe the justice system is discrimina- tory. See Christopher Ingraham, “In a Post-Ferguson World, Americans Increasingly Doubt the Notion of Colorblind Justice,” Washington Post, September 23, 2014.

66. David Graham, “Systemic Racism or Isolated Abuses? Americans Disagree,” Atlantic, May 7, 2015; Giovanni Russonello, “Race Relations Are at Lowest Point in Obama Presidency, Poll Finds,” New York Times, July 13, 2016.

3 2 6 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 0 7 – 2 1 0

67. PolitiFact, “Trump’s Pants on Fire Tweet Th at Blacks Killed 81% of White Homicide Victims,” November 23, 2015.

68. Sentencing Project, “Race and Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support for Punitive Policies” (2014).

69. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prisoners in 2014”; U.S. Census, “Quick Facts” (2015 data) www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00.

70. See, for example, Alexander, New Jim Crow, 117–18; PolitiFact, “Hillary Clinton Says Blacks More Likely to Be Arrested, Get Longer Sentences,” February 26, 2016; Sonja Starr and M. Marit Rehavi, “Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Eff ects of Booker,” Yale Law Journal 123 (2013): 2–80. Latinos may be undercounted among prisoners partly because states did not defi ne them as a separate group for years. Forman, “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration,” 59–61.

71. Alexander, New Jim Crow, 99–100, 126–27. 72. Ibid., 126–27; Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 4. 73. Alexander, New Jim Crow, 72–78. 74. Forman, “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration,” 47–48. 75. Rebecca Hetey and Jennifer Eberhardt, “Racial Disparities in Incarceration

Increase Acceptance of Punitive Policies,” Psychological Science 25, no. 10 (2014): 1949–54.

76. Jennifer Eberhardt, Paul Davies, Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, and Sheri Lynn John- son, “Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes,” Psychological Science 17, no. 5 (2006): 383–86.

77. See, for example, Steiker and Steiker, “No More Tinkering,” 396–402. 78. Franklin Zimring, Th e Contradictions of American Capital Punishment

(Oxford University Press, 2004), 88–89. 79. Th is paragraph draws on my Slate article “Th e Human Toll of Antonin

Scalia’s Time on the Court,” February 17, 2016. 80. Oral arguments, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, October 15, 1986

[emphasis mine]. 81. State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 14 (2015). 82. My Stanford colleague John Donohue notably provided key empirical evi-

dence in these proceedings. See “An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System since 1973: Are Th ere Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 11, no. 4 (2014): 637–96.

83. Th omas Miles and Adam Cox, “Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from ‘Secure Communities,’ ” Journal of Law and Economics 57 (2014): 951.

84. Bianca Bersani, “An Examination of First and Second Generation Immigrant Off ending Trajectories,” Justice Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2014): 315–43. See also Pew, “Crime Rises among Second-Generation Immigrants as Th ey Assimilate,” October 15, 2013.

85. Whitman, Harsh Justice, 46. 86. See ibid., 79; Adam Liptak, “U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs Th at of Other

Nations,” New York Times, April 23, 2008.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 0 – 2 1 4 • 3 2 7

87. Alexander, New Jim Crow, 158–59. 88. Sentencing Project, “Trends in U.S. Corrections,” December 2015. 89. Th e United Kingdom is an exception in this area, as it has defi ed European

Court of Human Rights decisions on prisoners’ voting rights. 90. Whitman, Harsh Justice, 198. 91. Forman, “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration,” 36–45. 92. Elizabeth Hinton, Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, and Vesla Weaver, “Did Blacks

Really Endorse the 1994 Crime Bill?,” New York Times, April 13, 2016. 93. See Kate Stith and Steve Koh, “Th e Politics of Sentencing Reform: Th e

Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,” Wake Forest Law Review 28 (1993): 233–90.

94. Forman, “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration,” 58–59. 95. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prisoners in 2014”; Death Penalty Informa-

tion Center, “Execution Database,” accessed August 22, 2016, www.deathpenaltyinfo .org/views-executions.

96. Hetey and Eberhardt, “Racial Disparities in Incarceration.” 97. Forman, “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration,” 64. 98. Pew, “One in 100: Behind Bars in America,” February 28, 2008. 99. Garland, Culture of Control, 99, 197. See also Lee Epstein, William Landes,

and Richard Posner, “How Business Fares at the Supreme Court,” Minnesota Law Review 97 (2013): 1471–72.

100. Will, “More Prisoners, Less Crime.” 101. Regarding the interrelated evolution of capitalism and penitentiary systems

since the nineteenth century, see Bernard Harcourt, Th e Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of the Natural Order (Harvard University Press, 2011).

102. Mugambi Jouet, “In Prison Debate, Race Overshadows Poverty,” Salon, March 1, 2013.

103. Wilkinson and Pickett, Spirit Level, 148–50. 104. Ibid., 155. 105. Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Why Doesn’t the

US Have a European-Style Welfare State?” (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1933, 2001), 56. Loïc Wacquant further discusses the relation- ship between harsh attitudes toward both poverty and crime in Prisons of Poverty (University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

106. Wilkinson and Pickett, Spirit Level, 246. 107. Hamilton Project, “Ten Economic Facts about Crime and Incarceration in

the United States,” Brookings Institution, May 1, 2014, 13. 108. Suzanne Kirchhoff , “Economic Impacts of Prison Growth,” Congressional

Research Service, April 13, 2010. 109. See, for example, Maples v. Th omas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012) (noting that law-

yers in capital cases are “undercompensated”); David Ovalle, “New Fee Rules Rile South Florida Defense Lawyers,” Miami Herald, June 23, 2012; Joseph Slobodzian, “Philadelphia Courts Increase Pay for Capital Defense,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 29, 2012.

3 2 8 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 4 – 2 1 9

110. Sandra Day O’Connor, speech to the Minnesota Women Lawyers Associa- tion, July 2, 2001.

111. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, speech at the University of the District of Columbia, April 9, 2001.

112. See Pew, “Religious Groups’ Views on Evolution,” February 4, 2009; National Center for Science Education, “Statements from Religious Organizations on Evolu- tion,” http://ncse.com/media/voices/religion; Death Penalty Information Center, “Offi cial Religious Statements on the Death Penalty,” http://deathpenaltyinfo .org/religion-and-death-penalty#state.

113. Assemblies of God, “Capital Punishment,” accessed May 5, 2016, www.ag .org/top/Beliefs/contempissues_08_capital_ punish.cfm.

114. “Death Penalty | Gallup Historical Trends,” www.gallup.com/poll/1606 /death-penalty.aspx.

115. Stephen Prothero, Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know about Religion—and Doesn’t (Harper, 2007), 38.

116. See, for instance, Bart Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted: Revealing the Hidden Contradictions of the Bible (and Why We Don’t Know about Th em) (Harper, 2010).

117. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

118. Antonin Scalia, “God’s Justice and Ours,” First Th ings, May 2002. 119. Douglas Martin, “W. J. Stuntz, Who Stimulated Legal Minds, Dies at 52,”

New York Times, March 20, 2011. 120. Empirical evidence does not suggest that faith-based rehabilitation pro-

grams are more eff ective than secular ones. Alexander Volokh, “Do Faith-Based Prisons Work?,” Alabama Law Review 63 (2011): 43–95.

121. Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 122. “Th e few countries in which juveniles were previously reported to be serving

life sentences without parole have either changed their laws or explained that juve- nile off enders can apply for parole.” Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International et al., 3–4, in Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).

123. Sentencing Project, “Juvenile Life without Parole: An Overview,” July 1, 2016.

124. Oral arguments in Jackson v. Hobbs, companion case to Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), March 20, 2012.

125. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 126. Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). 127. Mugambi Jouet, “Th e Exceptional Absence of Human Rights as a Principle

in American Law,” Pace Law Review 34, no. 2 (2014): 705–8. 128. Noémie Buff ault, “Prisons: La France, championne des fouilles au corps

abusives,” Rue89, September 7, 2011. 129. Whitman, Harsh Justice, 76. 130. Institute for Criminal Policy Research, “World Prison Brief.” 131. Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “US:

‘Four Decades in Solitary Confi nement Can Only Be Described as Torture’—UN

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 9 – 2 2 2 • 3 2 9

Rights Expert,” October 7, 2013; Amnesty International, “Th e Edge of Endurance: Prison Conditions in California’s Security Housing Units” (2012).

132. International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School, American Civil Liberties Union, and Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcer- ated Mothers, “Th e Shackling of Incarcerated Pregnant Women: A Human Rights Violation Committed Regularly in the United States” (August 2013).

133. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, “Th e Jurisprudence of Dignity,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 160, no. 1 (2011): 169–233.

134. For a broader analysis, see Jouet, “Exceptional Absence of Human Rights.” 135. Samuel Moyn, Th e Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap, 2010),

63. 136. Gallup found 61 percent support in 2015: “Death Penalty | Gallup Histori-

cal Trends,” www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx. However, Pew found that support had dropped to 49 percent in 2016 from 56 percent in 2015: “Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More Th an Four Decades,” September 29, 2016.

137. Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 10–11, 23. 138. BBC, “Support for Death Penalty Drops Below 50% for the First Time,”

March 26, 2015. 139. Jean-Baptiste de Montvalon et Gérard Courtois, “Une France moins pessi-

miste où les idées du FN s’enracinent,” Le Monde, May 6, 2015. 140. Swedish Wire, “Sweden Enjoys 100 Years without Executions,” November

23, 2010. 141. Alexander Bickel coined “the counter-majoritarian diffi culty” to refer to the

question of whether courts can legitimately overturn legislation supported by a democratic majority: Th e Least Dangerous Branch: Th e Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 16.

142. Th is language stems from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), 101, an infl uen- tial precedent. We will see in the next chapter that in the twenty-fi rst century the justices have showed growing interest in international human rights standards.

143. Amnesty International, “Death Sentences and Executions in 2013” (2014). 144. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238

(1972). If Gregg had gone the other way, it might have permanently abolished capital punishment and ended the debate about American exceptionalism in this area. See Carol Steiker, “Capital Punishment,” 86.

145. Amnesty International, “List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries.”

146. Death Penalty Information Center, “Th e 2% Death Penalty: How a Minor- ity of Counties Produce Most Death Cases at Enormous Costs to All” (2013).

147. National Research Council of the National Academies, “Deterrence and the Death Penalty” (2012).

148. Death Penalty Information Center, “States without the Death Penalty Have Had Consistently Lower Murder Rates,” www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/deterrence- states-without-death-penalty-have-had-consistently-lower-murder-rates.

149. See generally Steiker and Steiker, “No More Tinkering,” 419–20.

3 3 0 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 2 2 – 2 2 6

150. Judge Arthur Alarcón and Paula Mitchell, “Executing the Will of the Vot- ers?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-billion-Dollar Death Penalty Debacle,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 44 (2011): S41–S224. See also Carol Williams, “Death Penalty Costs California $184 Million a Year, Study Says,” Los Angeles Times, June 20, 2011.

151. Death Penalty Information Center, “Innocence and the Death Penalty,” as of October 16, 2016, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty.

152. See generally Innocence Project, “Causes,” w w w.innocenceproject .org/#causes.

153. O’Connor, speech to the Minnesota Women Lawyers Association, July 2, 2001, quoted in Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 164.

154. “Death Penalty | Gallup Historical Trends,” 2015 data. 155. Death Penalty Information Center, “Execution Database.” 156. Culture is not set in stone. American attitudes toward executions have

changed over time and will probably continue to evolve. See David Garland, “Capital Punishment and American Culture,” Punishment and Society 7 (2005): 365–66.

157. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726 (2015). 158. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Capital Punishment, 2013—Statistical

Tables,” December 19, 2014, 14. 159. See, for example, Daniel Wood, “Death Row: Does Personal Reform

Count?,” Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 2005. 160. Denis Diderot, “Letter on the Blind for the Use of Th ose Who See” (1749),

in Diderot’s Early Philosophical Works, trans. and ed. Margaret Jourdain (Open Court, 1916), 81.

161. Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 51. 162. Austin Sarat, When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American

Condition (Princeton University Press, 2002), Chapter 3, “Killing Me Soft ly.” 163. David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in the Age of

Abolition (Belknap, 2010), 11–12. 164. Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 11. 165. Swedish Wire, “Sweden Enjoys 100 Years without Executions.” 166. Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 59–62. 167. For example, see Kathleen Garcia, “Death Penalty Hurts—Not Helps—

Families of Murder Victims,” Nashua Telegraph, March 28, 2010. 168. Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 1, 48. 169. Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation, “Voices,” accessed October

16, 2016, www.mvfr.org/mvfr_voices. 170. Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 56, 62. 171. According to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 13,741 murders and non-

negligent manslaughters occurred in 2013. 172. See generally Steiker and Steiker, “No More Tinkering.” 173. Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972). 174. Zimring, Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, 56.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 2 6 – 2 2 8 • 3 31

175. A journalist then interviewed me. See Associated Press, “Georgia Man Executed for 1983 Rape and Murder of 2-Year-Old Niece,” Access North Georgia, July 19, 2004.

176. Th e “poisonous cocktail” metaphor invites consideration of the multiple factors that scholars have suggested explain the exceptional harshness of American law, some of which are beyond this book’s scope.

177. Zachary Elkins, “Rewrite the Second Amendment,” New York Times, April 4, 2013; Elkins and Tom Ginsburg, “U.S. Gun Rights Truly Are American Excep- tionalism,” Bloomberg View, March 7, 2013. Th e constitutions of Haiti and Iran also mention guns, although Elkins and Ginsburg found their provisions too ambiguous to include in the tally for the Comparative Constitutions Project. People in various other nations have relatively broad access to fi rearms, but it is not a constitutional right for them. See PolitiFact, “Marco Rubio Says Second Amendment Is Unique in Speech to NR A,” April 29, 2014.

178. Canada and Ireland are exceptions, as their people are “only” six times less likely to be killed by fi rearms than Americans. U.N. Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, “Per- centage of Homicides by Firearm, Number of Homicides by Firearm and Homicide by Firearm Rate per 100,000 Population” (2008–10 data), accessed October 16, 2016, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Homicides_by _ fi rearms.xls. See also PolitiFact, “ ‘Americans Are 20 Times as Likely to Die from Gun Violence as Citizens of Other Civilized Countries,’ Says Author Lisa Bloom,” January 17, 2014.

179. U.N. Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, “Percentage of Homicides by Firearm” (2010 data).

180. William Krouse, “Gun Control Legislation,” Congressional Research Service, November 14, 2012, 8–10.

181. “Guns | Gallup Historical Trends,” www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns .aspx.

182. See David Chen, “Bloomberg Says Out-of-State Gun Show Dealers Oft en Violate Law,” New York Times, October 7, 2009.

183. PolitiFact, “Frank Lautenberg Claims a Loophole Allows Individuals Con- victed of Domestic Violence to Purchase Guns,” May 3, 2012.

184. Melody Gutierrez, “Gov. Jerry Brown Signs 6 Gun-Control Bills, Vetoes 5,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 1, 2016.

185. Laura Vozzella, “McDonnell Signs Bill Lift ing One-Handgun-per-Month Limit,” Washington Post, February 28, 2012.

186. Ian Urbina, “Fearing Obama Agenda, States Push to Loosen Gun Laws,” New York Times, February 23, 2010.

187. Th e shooter’s gun purchase should technically have been barred because of his mental illness, but Virginia failed to adequately comply with federal guidelines. Michael Luo, “Cho’s Mental Illness Should Have Blocked Gun Sale,” New York Times, April 20, 2007.

188. Nick Carbone, “Colorado Th eater Shooter Carried 4 Guns, All Obtained Legally,” Time, July 21, 2012.

3 3 2 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 2 8 – 2 3 1

189. Tim Steller, “Gun Used in Shooting Spree Bought at Tucson Store,” Ari- zona Daily Star, January 9, 2011.

190. Michael Luo, “Felons Finding It Easy to Regain Gun Rights,” New York Times, November 13, 2011; Luo, “Some with Histories of Mental Illness Petition to Get Th eir Gun Rights Back,” New York Times, July 2, 2011.

191. Small Arms Survey, “Estimating Civilian Owned Firearms” (2011). 192. For instance, see “Packing Guns in the Daycare Center,” New York Times,

November 30, 2015. Research indicates that such laws worsen gun violence. See John Donohue III, Abhay Aneja, and Alexandria Zhang, “Th e Impact of Right to Carry Laws and the NRC Report: Th e Latest Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy” (Stanford Law and Economics Online Working Paper No. 461, Septem- ber 4, 2014).

193. Gallup, “Despite Criticism, NR A Still Enjoys Majority Support in U.S.,” October 22, 2015.

194. Nicholas Confessore, Michael Cooper, and Michael Luo, “Silent since Shootings, N.R.A. Could Face Challenge to Political Power,” New York Times, December 17, 2012.

195. See Glenn Reynolds and Brannon Denning, “Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts,” Northwestern University Law Review 102 (2008): 2035–44.

196. Adam Liptak, “A Liberal Case for Gun Rights Sways Judiciary,” New York Times, May 6, 2007; Jill Lepore, “Battleground America,” New Yorker, April 23, 2012.

197. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Heller concerned Washington D.C., but the court extended the ruling to the states in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

198. Gallup, “Americans Want Stricter Gun Laws, Still Oppose Bans,” Decem- ber 27, 2012.

199. Chris Cillizza and Scott Clement, “President Obama Has the Public on His Side on Gun Proposals,” Washington Post, January 17, 2013.

200. Fairleigh Dickinson University PublicMind Poll, “Beliefs about Sandy Hook Cover-Up, Coming Revolution Underlie Divide on Gun Control,” May 1, 2013.

201. Jerome Karabel and Daniel Laurison, “An Exceptional Nation? American Political Values in Comparative Perspective” (Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper 136–12, University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 29–32.

202. I am referring here not simply to U.S. law but also to the disinclination to prosecute and punish police offi cers who unjustifi ably kill suspects.

203. Jamiles Lartey, “US Police Kill More in Days Th an Other Countries Do in Years,” Guardian, June 9, 2015.

204. Republican presidential primary debate, Simi Valley, CA, September 7, 2011.

205. Ryan Lizza, “Th e Duel,” New Yorker, February 1, 2016. 206. Leo Damrosch, Tocqueville’s Discovery of America (Farrar, Straus and Gir-

oux, 2010), 169. 207. Gallup, “Americans Want Stricter Gun Laws.”

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 3 2 – 2 3 5 • 3 3 3

8 . A M E R I C A A N D T H E W O R L D

1. Peter Galbraith, Th e End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End (Simon and Schuster, 2007), 83.

2. Kurt Eichenwald, 500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars (Simon and Schuster, 2012), 459–61.

3. Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), “Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War,” October 2, 2003, 6; Rick Shenkman, Just How Stupid Are We? Facing the Truth about the American Voter (Basic, 2009), 6.

4. Joby Warrick, Black Flags: Th e Rise of ISIS (Doubleday, 2015), 76–80,104–5; Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Th rall, introduction to Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?, ed. Cramer and Th rall (Routledge, 2012), 1; John Duffi eld, “Oil and the Decision to Invade Iraq,” in ibid., 154.

5. Jane Cramer and Edward Duggan, “In Pursuit of Primacy,” in Cramer and Th rall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?, 206–7.

6. Besides skepticism of the Bush administration’s intelligence, geopolitical interests partly shaped the French government’s opposition to the war. Evidence suggests that France contemplated joining the invasion if it had seemed in its advan- tage. John Vinocur, “A Diff erent Take on France’s Role in Iraq,” New York Times, March 20, 2007.

7. Tony Blair’s controversial decision to join the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq is a notable exception to this trend.

8. Andrew Gelman, Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Ameri- cans Vote the Way Th ey Do (Princeton University Press, 2010), 114–15; Gallup, “Fewer in U.S. View Iraq, Afghanistan Wars as Mistakes,” June 12, 2015.

9. CNN-ORC Poll, March 4, 2016, available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn /2016/images/03/04/rel4d.-.threats.draft .guantanamo.pdf.

10. Associated Press–NORC Center for Public Aff airs Research, “Balancing Act: Th e Public’s Take on Civil Liberties and Security,” September 2013.

11. Andrew Moravcsik, “Th e Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” in Ameri- can Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton University Press, 2005), 187.

12. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPu9RhMIQdg. 13. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pwe-pA6TaZk&nohtml5. 14. Gallup, “Americans See U.S. as Exceptional,” December 22, 2010. A later

poll found a decline in the share of Americans convinced of U.S. superiority, though this may be due to other factors, as Chapter 1 notes. See Pew, “Most Americans Th ink the U.S. Is Great, but Fewer Th ink It’s the Greatest,” July 2, 2014.

15. Scott Shane, “Th e Opiate of Exceptionalism,” New York Times, October 19, 2012.

16. Alexis de Tocqueville to his mother, May, 14, 1831, quoted in Leo Damrosch, Tocqueville’s Discovery of America (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 23.

17. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Bantam, 2000), 457.

3 3 4 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 3 6 – 2 4 1

18. Pew, “Th e American–Western European Values Gap,” November 17, 2011. 19. Public Religion Research Institute, “Most Americans Believe Protests Make

the Country Better,” June 23, 2015. 20. Alan Abramowitz, Th e Polarized Public? Why American Government Is So

Dysfunctional (Pearson, 2013), 10–11. 21. Robert Ferguson, Th e American Enlightenment, 1750–1820 (Harvard Univer-

sity Press, 1997), 79. 22. “Letter of Th omas Jeff erson to John Banister, Junior” (October 15, 1785), in

A. J. Morrison, Th e Beginnings of Public Education in Virginia, 1776–1860: Study of Secondary Schools in Relation to the State Literary Fund (D. Bottom, superintendent of public printing, 1917), 20.

23. John Archdale, A New Description of Th at Fertile and Pleasant Province of Carolina (1707), quoted in Jack Greene, Th e Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity fr om 1492 to 1800 (University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 76. See also Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (Hill and Wang, 1995), 11.

24. “Bras d’honneur: Longuet assure avoir voulu s’opposer au ‘procès de la colo- nisation’ en Algérie,” Le Monde, November 1, 2012.

25. Pew, “U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey,” September 2010. 26. Bryan Bender and Sasha Issenberg, “Palin Not Well Traveled outside US,”

Boston Globe, September 3, 2008. 27. Passport Canada / Passeport Canada, “International Comparison of Pass-

port-Issuing Authorities” (2012). See also U.S. Department of State, “Valid Passports in Circulation (1989–Present),” report in “Passport Statistics,” https://travel.state .gov/content/passports/en/passports/statistics.html.

28. Natalie Avon, “Why More Americans Don’t Travel Abroad,” CNN, Febru- ary 4, 2011.

29. Shenkman, Just How Stupid Are We?, 22. 30. Andrew Romano, “How Ignorant Are Americans?,” Newsweek, March 20, 2011. 31. Shenkman, Just How Stupid Are We?, 21. 32. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington

Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (Simon and Schus- ter, 2010), 109.

33. See generally Shanto Iyengar, James Curran, Anker Brink Lund, Inka Salovaara-Moring, Kyu Hahn, and Sharon Coen, “Cross-National versus Individ- ual-Level Diff erences in Political Information: A Media Systems Perspective,” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 20, no. 3 (2010): 299–300.

34. Charles Lockhart, Th e Roots of American Exceptionalism: Institutions, Cul- ture and Policies (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), ix.

35. John Kingdon, America the Unusual (Worth, 1999), ix. 36. Jerome Karabel and Daniel Laurison, “An Exceptional Nation? American

Political Values in Comparative Perspective” (Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper 136–12, University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 22–23, 30.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 4 1 – 2 4 6 • 3 3 5

37. Gallup, “Americans See U.S. as Exceptional.” 38. Harris Interactive, “Most Republicans Th ink the U.S. Health Care System

Is the Best in the World, Democrats Disagree,” March 20, 2008. 39. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002). 40. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Brave New Judicial World,” in Ignatieff , Ameri-

can Exceptionalism and Human Rights, 277–303. 41. “A Respect for World Opinion,” New York Times, August 2, 2010. 42. Joseph Ellis, “Immaculate Misconception and the Supreme Court,” Wash-

ington Post, May 7, 2010. 43. Gelman, Red State, Blue State, 114–15. 44. Marc Hetherington and Johnathan Weiler, Authoritarianism and Polariza-

tion in American Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27–28. 45. Gallup, “Fewer in U.S. View Iraq, Afghanistan Wars as Mistakes.” 46. Robert Pape and James Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: Th e Explosion of Global

Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (University of Chicago Press, 2010), 2. 47. Ibid. 48. Rukmini Callimachi and Jim Yardley, “From Amateur to Ruthless Jihadist

in France,” New York Times, January 17, 2015. 49. Maxime Vaudano, “La France était dans le viseur de l’État islamique bien

avant les frappes en Syrie,” Le Monde, November 19, 2015. 50. Madjid Zerrouky, “La France n’est pas l’un des premiers fournisseurs de

djihadistes,” Le Monde, June 12, 2015. 51. Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American

War and Diplomacy (Anchor, 2012), 603–4. 52. Media Matters, “Beck Hosted Rosenberg to Discuss Briefi ng of White

House,” October 19, 2006. 53. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (Simon and Schuster, 2004), 379. 54. Eichenwald, 500 Days, 459–61. 55. Warrick, Black Flags, 93. 56. Julian Baggini, “In God We Must,” Slate, February 5, 2012. 57. “Company Off ers to Stop Putting Biblical References on Military Scopes,”

CNN, January 21, 2010. 58. George H. W. Bush, All the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings

(Simon and Schuster, 2014), 501. See also David Holmes, Th e Faiths of the Founding Fathers (Oxford University Press, 2006), 177.

59. Richard Cooper, “General Casts War in Religious Terms,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2003.

60. Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting bin Laden,” New Yorker, August 8, 2011. 61. Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, 10–11, 20–26. 62. Th omas Ricks, Fiasco: Th e American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin,

2007), 238–39, 264–67, 270–97. 63. Fred Kaplan, Th e Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the

American Way of War (Simon and Schuster, 2013).

3 3 6 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 4 6 – 2 5 1

64. Malcolm Byrne, ed., “CIA Confi rms Role in 1953 Iran Coup,” National Security Archive, George Washington University, August 19, 2013.

65. Colin Powell, My American Journey (Ballantine, 2003), 338. 66. Testimony of Tony Blair before the Iraq Inquiry commission, January 29,

2010. 67. See generally Cramer and Th rall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?, 1;

Ricks, Fiasco, 90–94; “In 2003, U.S. Experts Doubted Key Iraq War Claim,” Reu- ters, December 11, 2014.

68. A 2006 scholarly survey of 227 experts on U.S. foreign policy and interna- tional relations is instructive. Th e vast majority concluded that the Bush administra- tion did not truly believe its own rhetoric about Iraq being a genuine WMD or ter- rorism threat. Cramer and Th rall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?, 3–7, 24.

69. Ron Suskind, Th e Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (Simon and Schuster, 2004), 70–86, 96, 187–88, 258. Regarding geopolitical interests, see also Duffi eld, “Oil and the Decision to Invade Iraq,” 144–66.

70. Colin Powell, It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership (Harper, 2014), 217–18; George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (HarperLuxe, 2007), 464.

71. Joel Roberts, “Plan for Iraq Began on 9/11,” CBS News, September 4, 2002. 72. Ricks, Fiasco, 40, 66–67. 73. Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: Th e Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000

(Oxford University Press, 2008), 183–88, 244 n. 3. 74. PIPA, “Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War,” 6; Shenkman, Just

How Stupid Are We?, 6. 75. Karabel and Laurison, “Exceptional Nation?,” 22–23, 29–32. 76. U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Iraqi Freedom fatalities, November

25, 2016, available at www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf; Amy Hagopian, Abraham Flaxman, Tim Takaro, Sahar Esa Al Shatari, Julie Rajaratnam, Stan Becker, Alison Levin-Rector, et al., “Mortality in Iraq Associated with the 2003–2011 War and Occupation: Findings from a National Cluster Sample Survey by the University Collaborative Iraq Mortality Study,” PLOS Medicine, October 15, 2013.

77. John Tirman, Th e Deaths of Others: Th e Fate of Civilians in America’s Wars (Oxford University Press, 2012), 3, 167–68.

78. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “History and National Stupidity,” New York Review of Books, April 27, 2006.

79. Duffi eld, “Oil and the Decision to Invade Iraq,” 154; Warrick, Black Flags, 76–80, 104–5.

80. Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, 22–23. 81. Justifi cations were stronger for invading Afghanistan than Iraq, as the Tali-

ban regime had sheltered Al-Qaeda. But America was not fi ghting for its “freedom” in Afghanistan either.

82. “Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan,” BBC, September 16, 2004. See also Asli Bâli, “Justice under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq,”

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 5 1 – 2 5 9 • 3 3 7

Yale Journal of International Law 30 (2005): 433: “Th is war was widely considered illegal under both international law and the rules of the prevailing international peace and security system established (largely by the United States) in the post–World War II era.”

83. See generally Bâli, “Justice under Occupation,” 433; Moravcsik, “U.S. Human Rights Policy,” 184.

84. Naturally, that does not mean that no human rights violations exist in these countries.

85. Harold Hongju Koh, “America’s Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism,” in Igna- tieff , American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, 118.

86. Moravcsik, “U.S. Human Rights Policy,” 184. 87. Ibid., 178–79, 192; John Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemp-

tionalism, and Global Governance,” in Ignatieff , American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, 323.

88. Robert Marquand, “Dutch Still Wincing at Bush-Era ‘Invasion of Th e Hague Act,’ ” Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 2009.

89. Moravcsik, “U.S. Human Rights Policy,” 187. 90. France is another exception among Western democracies in this area. See

International Court of Justice, “Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory,” www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3.

91. Th is vote was on May 20, 2009. 92. Connie Bruck, “Why Obama Has Failed to Close Guantánamo,” New

Yorker, August 1, 2016. 93. “Presidential Candidates Compete over Th eir Embrace of Torture,” Econo-

mist, February 13, 2016; Emmarie Huetteman, “Senate Panel’s Republicans Dismiss Torture Report as ‘Partisan,’ ” New York Times, December 9, 2014; “On Torture, Romney’s Wrong,” Los Angeles Times, October 3, 2012.

94. Associated Press–NORC Center for Public Aff airs Research, “Balancing Act.” 95. Matt Sledge, “Obama, Romney Both Promise an Increase in Military

Spending,” Huffi ngton Post, October 23, 2012. 96. PolitiFact, “Ron Paul Says U.S. Has Military Personnel in 130 Nations and

900 Overseas Bases,” September 14, 2011. 97. Gallup, “Americans Less Likely to See U.S. as No. 1 Militarily,” February 15,

2016. 98. Dwight Eisenhower, farewell address, January 17, 1961. 99. Peter Finn and Anne Kornblut, “Obama Creates Indefi nite Detention Sys-

tem for Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay,” Washington Post, March 8, 2011. 100. Glenn Greenwald, “Obama Wins the Right to Detain People with No

Habeas Review,” Salon, May 21, 2010. 101. Barack Obama, interviewed on Charlie Rose, PBS, June 16, 2013. 102. Andrew Bacevich, “Non-believer,” New Republic, July 7, 2010. 103. Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” Foreign Aff airs,

November–December 2001. 104. Matthew Rosenberg and Michael Shear, “In Reversal, Obama Says U.S.

Troops Will Stay in Afghanistan to 2017,” New York Times, October 16, 2015. See

3 3 8 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 5 9 – 2 6 2

also Rosenberg, “Taliban Run into Trouble on Battlefi eld, but Money Flows Just the Same,” New York Times, June 13, 2014; Azam Ahmed, “Taliban Making Military Gains in Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 26, 2014; Rod Norland, “Study Finds Sharp Rise in Attacks by Taliban,” New York Times, April 19, 2013.

105. Akmal Dawi, “Despite Massive Taliban Death Toll No Drop in Insur- gency,” VOA News, March 6, 2014; Aamir Latif, “Taliban Finds Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistan’s Tribal Refugee Camps,” U.S. News and World Report, Febru- ary 9, 2009.

106. For instance, see Dylan Welch, “Women, Girls Increasingly Victims in Afghan War, U.N. Says,” Reuters, February 19, 2013; Alissa Rubin, “Record Number of Afghan Civilians Died in 2011, Mostly in Insurgent Attacks, U.N. Says,” New York Times, February 4, 2012.

107. Jami Forbes and Brian Dudley, “Increase in Taliban Eff orts to Recruit from Afghan Government and Security Forces,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 2013.

108. International Human Rights and Confl ict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), “Living under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Paki- stan,” September 2012, 10–12.

109. Tirman’s Deaths of Others discusses this issue at length. 110. International Human Rights and Confl ict Resolution Clinic and Global

Justice Clinic, “Living under Drones,” vi–vii. 111. Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda’: Th e Civilian

Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen” (2013). See also Amnesty International, “Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan” (2013).

112. International Human Rights and Confl ict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice Clinic, “Living under Drones,” vii-viii, 131–37; Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda,’ ” 24–27.

113. Anne Barnard and Neil MacFarquar, “Paris and Mali Attacks Expose Lethal Qaeda-ISIS Rivalry,” New York Times, November 20, 2015.

114. Ryan Lizza, “Th e Duel,” New Yorker, February 1, 2016. 115. Finn and Kornblut, “Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay”; Greenwald, “No

Habeas Review,” Salon, May 21, 2010; “Obama to Appeal Detainee Ruling,” New York Times, April 10, 2009; Charlie Savage, “Obama Upholds Detainee Policy in Afghanistan,” New York Times, February 21, 2009.

116. Documented on Th e Daily Show, June 15, 2010.

C O N C L U S I O N

1. In particular, recall the discussion of Lawrence v. Texas and “Don’t ask, don’t tell” in Chapter 4.

2. See the data discussed in Chapter 3, including Gallup, “In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human Origins,” June 1, 2014; Pew, “Life in 2050,” June 22, 2010.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 6 2 – 2 6 4 • 3 3 9

3. See generally Robert Pape and James Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: Th e Explo- sion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (University of Chicago Press, 2010).

4. Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, trans. George Lawrence (Double- day, 1971), 271–72, quoted in Leo Damrosch, Tocqueville’s Discovery of America (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 140.

5. Th e vast majority of hate crimes appear to have been perpetrated by Trump supporters, although Trump supporters also faced abuse. See generally Southern Poverty Law Center, “More Th an 400 Incidents of Hateful Harassment and Intimi- dation Since the Election,” November 15, 2016; Eric Lichtblau, “U.S. Hate Crimes Surge 6%, Fueled by Attacks on Muslims,” New York Times, November 14, 2016.

6. PolitiFact, “Pro-Clinton Super PAC Ad Says Trump ‘Mocked’ Disabled Reporter; Evidence Supports Claim,” June 13, 2016.

7. Th e campaign’s anti-bullying message was strategically announced by Melania Trump, to “soft en her husband’s coarse image” with a view toward “swaying unde- cided voters and women who have been wary of the Republican nominee.” Alan Rappeport, “Melania Trump, Solo in Pennsylvania, Tries to Smooth Husband’s Rough Edges,” New York Times, November 3, 2016.

8. Source: U.S. Census. 9. United States Census Bureau, “2010 Census Shows Nation’s Hispanic Popu-

lation Grew Four Times Faster Th an Total U.S. Population,” May 26, 2011. 10. United States Census Bureau, “2010 Census Shows Asians Are Fastest-

Growing Race Group,” March 21, 2012. 11. Christopher Ingraham, “Chris Rock Is Right: White Americans Are a Lot

Less Racist Th an Th ey Used to Be,” Washington Post, December 1, 2014. 12. United States Census Bureau, “2010 Census Shows Interracial and Intereth-

nic Married Couples Grew by 28 Percent over Decade,” April 25, 2012. 13. “Th e Success of the Voter Fraud Myth,” New York Times, September 19,

2016. 14. Justin Levitt, “A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds

31 Credible Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast,” Washington Post, August 6, 2014. See also John Ahlquist, Kenneth Mayer, and Simon Jackman, “Alien Abduc- tion and Voter Impersonation in the 2012 U.S. General Election: Evidence from a Survey List Experiment,” Election Law Journal 13, no. 4 (2014): 460–75.

15. Lee Drutman, “How Race and Identity Became the Central Dividing Line in American Politics,” Vox, August 30, 2016.

16. Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: Th e Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, 2nd ed. (Russell Sage, 2016), 289–90.

17. Jeff Guo, “Yes, Working Class Whites Really Did Make Trump Win. No, It Wasn’t Simply Economic Anxiety,” Washington Post, November 11, 2016.

18. See, for example, David Fahrenthold, “Trump Boasts about His Philan- thropy. But His Giving Falls Short of His Words,” Washington Post, October 29, 2016; Alexandra Berzon, “Donald Trump’s Business Plan Left a Trail of Unpaid Bills,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2016; Steve Reilly, “Hundreds Allege Donald

3 4 0 • N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 6 5 – 2 7 2

Trump Doesn’t Pay His Bills,” USA Today, June 9, 2016; Rosalind Helderman, “Trump Agrees to $25 Million Settlement in Trump University Fraud Cases,” Washington Post, November 18, 2016; David Fahrenthold, “Trump Foundation Admits to Violating Ban on ‘Self-Dealing,’ New Filing to IRS Shows,” Washington Post, November 22, 2015.

19. Chris Cillizza, “Th e 13 Most Amazing Findings in the 2016 Exit Poll,” Wash- ington Post, November 10, 2016.

20. Emma Kate-Symons, “Misogynist Anti-Hillary Paraphernalia and Calls for Jail Time Feature Heavily at R NC,” New York Times, July 19, 2016.

21. George Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Eerdmans, 1990), 59–60.

22. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 24. See the dissent of Justices Breyer and Ginsburg in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct.

2726 (2015), discussed in Chapter 7. 25. Bill O’Reilly, “Is America Sliding towards Socialism?,” Fox News, February

20, 2009. 26. Michael Norton and Dan Ariely, “Building a Better America—One Wealth

Quintile at a Time,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, no. 1 (2011): 9–12. Wealth inequality has increased in Sweden in recent decades, as in other European nations. Th omas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Belknap, 2014), 344.

27. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, Th e Spirit Level: Why Greater Equal- ity Makes Societies Stronger (Bloomsbury, 2010), 183–84.

28. Ibid., 246. 29. Cass Sunstein, Th e Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfi nished Revolution and

Why We Need It More Th an Ever (Basic, 2004), 3. 30. Mugambi Jouet, “Does American Exceptionalism Foster American

Decline?,” Truthout, February 5, 2013. 31. Naturally, environmental and other factors partially or fully beyond human

control can contribute to the rise and fall of civilizations. See Jared Diamond, Col- lapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (Penguin, 2011).

32. Gallup, “Americans See U.S. as Exceptional,” December 22, 2010; Public Religion Research Institute, “Most Americans Believe Protests Make the Country Better,” June 23, 2015.

33. “Country Comparison: Exports,” in Central Intelligence Agency, Th e World Factbook (2016).

34. See, for example, the following article in Xinhua, a media agency run by the Chinese government: “China Hits Back with Report on U.S. Human Rights Record,” April 21, 2014.

35. Scott Shane, “U.S. Practiced Torture aft er 9/11, Nonpartisan Review Con- cludes,” New York Times, April 16, 2013.

36. Scott Shane, “China Inspired Interrogations at Guantánamo,” New York Times, July 2, 2008.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 7 2 – 2 7 3 • 3 41

37. Cullen Murphy, God’s Jury: Th e Inquisition and the Making of the Modern World (Houghton Miffl in, 2012), 92–94.

38. See generally Griff Witte and Simon Denyer, “Aft er Trump’s Victory, the World Is Left to Wonder: What Happened to America?,” Washington Post, Novem- ber 9, 2016; Jean-Philippe Rémy, “Cette Afrique qui vote Trump en secret,” Le Monde, November 10, 2016; WIN/Gallup International, “Global Poll on the Ameri- can Election,” October 4, 2016.

39. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Bantam, 2000), 27.

This page intentionally left blank

343

abortion, 8–9, 27, 80, 104, 167, 294n136; Catholic Church teachings about, 118; Christian fundamentalist hostility to, 102, 110; “culture wars” and, 33, 114–17, 124, 127–29, 173; discretionary right to, 36, 37; international treaties and, 253; legality in the United States, 114; legalized in France (1975), 42, 128; rape and incest cases, 115, 127, 177; state laws on, 115; Tea Party opposition to, 174. See also Roe v. Wade

Abramowitz, Alan, 32, 117 abstinence-only sexual education, 36, 80,

102, 114, 129, 266; and George W. Bush, 133

Adams, John, 21, 58, 83, 121 Adams, John Quincy, 60 Adams, Samuel, 84 Aff ordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), 25,

30, 66–67, 70, 75, 146, 157–62, 171, 264; contraception covered by insurance, 115–16; denounced by Republicans, 6, 39, 66–67, 144, 159–60, 162, 169, 171; false claims about, 43, 66–67, 171; irrational fear of, 46, 66–67, 159–60, 171–72; King v. Burwell case and, 65, 172; pharmaceutical industry and, 152–53, 160; as “socialized medicine,” 6, 66–67, 178; “tyranny” associated with, 66–68, 159–60; vow to repeal, 31, 42, 67, 144, 169, 171

Afghanistan, U.S.-led war in, 52, 238, 239, 250, 251, 336n81; Christian funda men- talism and, 245; civilian deaths and, 247; Obama’s intensifi cation of, 255, 258–59

Africa, 13, 14, 39, 191, 235, 240–41 African-Americans, 51, 147, 178, 181, 252;

associated with “welfare,” 188, 189–190; Christianity of, 89, 91, 98; criminal justice system and, 200, 207–12; disen- franchisement of, 210; mass incarcer- ation of, 207–209; Obama as fi rst black president, 12, 26, 39, 66, 188–89, 192, 261; as percentage of American population, 13, 191–92, 210–11, 264

Alexander, Michelle, 208, 211 Al-Qaeda, 62, 177, 278n20; in Afghanistan,

258, 336n81; Hussein lumped together with, 62, 232, 233, 242, 251

American Dream, 9, 171, 179–186, 213 American exceptionalism, 4–5, 18, 22–23,

71–72, 169, 262–63, 273; criminal justice system and, 3–4, 194–95; “culture wars” and, 117; decline and, 39–42; demagogy and, 23–27, 78–79, 263; as faith in greatness of the United States, 20; history of concept, 21–27, 281n8; international laws/institutions and, 252; market fundamentalism and, 151, 175; media mentions of, 20; partisan redefi nition of, 4–5, 7, 20,

I N D E X

Page numbers in italic refer to illustrations.

3 4 4 • I N D E X

American exceptionalism (continued) 23–27, 263; polarization of American

society and, 6–7, 21, 27; possible end of, 263–67; religion and, 8, 35–37, 80, 92, 113; roots of, 6, 22–23, 281n8

American Revolution, 48, 58, 96 Anglican Church (Church of England,

Episcopal Church), 102, 110, 119, 135, 215 Annan, Kofi , 239, 240, 251 anti-intellectualism, 7, 14, 40, 42, 73, 263;

Christian fundamentalism and, 9, 81, 86, 173, 215; conspiracy theories and, 63–73, 78–79; criminal justice and, 195, 203; disinformation and, 63; economic interests and, 169, 170; in European politics, 76; extremism and, 78; historical roots of, 46–59; infl uence in the South, 8, 44–45; Iraq war and, 233; poor quality of public education and, 52; in U.S. politics generally, 45–46, 59–63. See also conspiracy theories, disinformation, and propaganda

anti-Semitism, 33, 77 Archdale, John, 237 Asia, 13, 39, 191, 235, 272 Asian-Americans, 186, 264 Assemblies of God, 215–16 atheism, 64, 84, 92; in America

(population percentage), 90, 297n57; church–state separation and, 122; Soviet Union and, 140, 248; Tocqueville on, 98; unacceptability in American politicians, 99, 300n107

Atwater, Lee, 187–88 Australia, 6, 17, 95, 142; belief in God

(population percentage), 90; Christian fundamentalism absent in, 81, 88, 100; conservatives in, 165; death penalty abolished in, 220; health care spending, 160; homicide by fi rearms in, 229; incar- ceration rate, 4, 202; liberal American worldview and, 27; modernist worldview in, 114; political parties in, 164

“Axis of Evil,” 244, 246

Bachman, Rep. Michele, 94, 112, 125, 151, 160; on “Obamacare,” 188; on social and fi scal conservatism, 174–75

Bachus, Spencer, 156 Bannon, Stephen, 69, 177 Baptists, 102 Bartels, Larry, 62, 170, 173, 320n89 Beck, Glenn, 68, 177, 188 Benedict X VI, Pope, 93, 118, 303n20 Benghazi plot, 7 Berlusconi, Silvio, 77, 249 Bible, 82, 85, 88, 100, 142; Book of

Revelation, 83, 95, 96; death penalty and interpretation of, 215–16; economics and, 178; King James Bible, 121; “Manifest Destiny” and, 22; scholarly research on, 86; sex and gender roles in, 125; sexual morality in, 135; Ten Commandments, 115, 120, 123

Bible, belief in literal veracity of, 7, 21, 36, 89, 97, 298n71; absence in Europe, 81, 99; age of the earth, 115; Christians in disagreement with, 80, 87; creationism and, 101; ideological purity and, 173; polls and intensity of belief, 109; Bill Clinton and, 105; Tea Party activists and, 174

Bible Belt, 17, 32, 80, 113, 132, 195 Biden, Joe, 119, 229, 245 “big government,” 34, 143, 147, 151, 176;

blamed for 2008 fi nancial crisis, 156; economic interests of voters and, 172; Tea Party opposition to, 174, 189; white Southerners’ distrust of, 191

Bin Laden, Usama, 245, 248, 259 “birtherism.” See conspiracy theories,

disinformation, and propaganda Bismarck, Otto von, 165 Black Lives Matter, 33, 205 Blair, Tony, 61, 247, 249, 333n7 Boehner, John, 20, 30, 49, 50, 54; accuracy

of statements by, 75; “Obamacare” attacked by, 68; Obama conspiracy theories and, 65; “small business” of, 171

Bolton, John, 253 “both-sides-ism,” 30, 31 BP oil spill (Gulf of Mexico, 2010), 34, 150 Brady v. Maryland (1963), 197 Brat, David, 30, 176 Breitbart News website, 69, 177, 266

I N D E X • 3 4 5

Brennan, Justice William, 209 “Brexit” referendum (2016), 76 Breyer, Justice Stephen, 224 Brill, Steven, 158, 159 Britain (United Kingdom), 38, 49, 93, 161,

246, 270, 303n28; belief in God (population percentage), 90; British Empire, 21, 270; Conservative Party in, 137–38; death penalty abolished in, 220; exit from European Union (“Brexit”), 76; health care spending, 160; homicide by fi rearms in, 229; incarceration rate, 4, 202, 277n7; Iraq invasion and, 247, 333n7; military budget of, 257; race and criminal justice in, 210; United Nations and, 252

Brown, Gov. Jerry, 204, 228 Brownback, Sam, 112, 119, 176 Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 147,

198 Bryan, William Jennings, 179 Buddhists, 89, 122 Burger, Chief Justice Warren, 198, 229 Bush, George H. W., 141, 200, 245 Bush, George W., 7, 41, 63, 99, 125;

abstinence-only sex education and, 133; anti-intellectualism of, 59, 61–62; apocalyptic biblical prophecies and, 94, 95, 111, 232, 244; Christian fundamentalism of, 112, 175; climate change and, 72; death penalty and, 200; disinformation and, 250–51; division of American society under, 20–21; European views of, 38; gay and reproductive rights opposed by, 123– 24; as governor of Texas, 16, 45, 138, 220; as hardline conservative, 30, 265–66; income level of supporters, 170; international law and, 253, 254; 9/11 conspiracy about, 68; parochialism of, 240–41; popular vote lost by, 192; privileged life of, 183; reelection (2004), 28; religious beliefs of, 105; strategic political use of religion, 138–39, 141; taxes and, 62, 70, 170; torture used by, 11, 34, 272, 278n13; “War on Terror” and, 61, 96, 233, 234, 244, 254. See also Iraq, invasion of

Bush, Jeb, 20, 24, 70, 232; accuracy of statements by, 75; Catholicism of, 119; on Planned Parenthood, 116

Cahn, Naomi, 125 Cain, Herman, 46, 48, 64–65, 177, 241 California, 15, 54, 99, 101; capital

punishment in, 222; overcrowded prisons of, 204; “three-strikes” law, 11, 199

Cameron, David, 137 Camus, Albert, 3 Canada, 6, 17, 20, 72, 95, 161, 238;

Christian fundamentalism absent in, 81, 88, 100; conservatives in, 165; death penalty abolished in, 220; health care spending, 160; homicide by fi rearms in, 229; incarceration rate, 4, 323n22; labor unions in, 147; liberal American worldview and, 27; modernist worldview in, 114; political parties in, 164; social mobility in, 180

Cantor, Eric, 30, 176 capitalism, 20, 46, 69, 165, 181, 264; China

and, 271; Christianity and, 176; wealth inequality and, 144–45, 152

capital punishment. See death penalty Carbone, June, 125 Carson, Ben, 43, 68, 75, 112, 176 Carter, Jimmy, 140, 141, 178–79, 189 Catholic Church, 85, 110, 128; Catholic

schools, 121; conservatism of, 118; death penalty opposed by, 215, 217; as sociopolitical institution, 102

Catholics, 87, 89, 93, 97, 99, 101; benefi ts of faith expected by, 100; end of divide with Protestants, 119; evangelical Christians compared with, 118–19; LGBTQ rights and, 98; nativist riots against Catholic immigrants, 103, 121

Charismatic Christianity, 89 Cheney, Dick, 242, 256 China, 1, 46, 169, 221, 241; democratic

principles and, 271–72; human rights treaties and, 252; military budget of, 256, 257; United Nations and, 252

Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 33 Chirac, Jacques, 94, 244, 249

3 4 6 • I N D E X

Christian fundamentalism, 5, 8, 14, 36, 42, 80–82; abortion and, 127; absent in Europe, 81, 88, 266; American view of religious liberty and, 104–105; anti- intellectualism and, 9, 81, 86, 173, 215; apocalyptic biblical prophecies and, 88, 94–96, 245, 262; climate change and, 111, 115, 174, 215; creationism and, 86–88, 92–94, 114, 262; criminal justice and, 195; “culture wars” and, 40; division with moderate faith, 88–92; evolution from Enlightenment to Christian fundamentalism, 82–88; as exception in Western world, 8, 35–37, 80, 92, 113; extremism and, 78; impact on American society, 8–9, 81–82, 109–12; indoctrination to, 100–102; Iraq war and, 81, 94–96, 111, 232, 233, 244–45, 299n85; market funda- mentalism and, 178–79; origin of “fundamentalism” term, 86; paro- chialism and, 241; political impact of, 9; religious illiteracy of, 96–97; rise of evangelicalism, 84–86; secular public education resented by, 53; split of American Protestantism, 86–88; Trump campaign and, 9, 112, 262, 302n153. See also evangelical Christians; religion

Christianity, 37, 80, 82–84, 99, 120; born- again, 89, 112, 138, 177; capitalism and, 176; Great Awakenings, 85; liberal- moderate, 36, 88. See also Catholics; Protestants

Christie, Chris, 29, 184 Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission (2010), 10, 153, 166, 312n78

civil rights, 147, 188, 191, 198, 220, 285n68; Democratic Party and, 32, 147; gay rights compared to, 117

Civil War, 6, 16, 188, 281n8 climate change, 7, 21, 36, 37, 44, 45, 72, 73,

75, 111, 278n14; alleged myth and hoax of, 31, 43, 71–73, 111, 115, 174, 215, 262; Christian fundamentalism and, 9, 111, 115, 174; Fox News viewers and, 69; Kyoto Protocol and, 72, 239, 240

Clinton, Bill, 39, 72, 77, 104–5, 132, 189; criminal justice and, 3, 200, 205; “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and, 136–37; death penalty and, 200; international law and, 254; strategic political use of religion, 140, 141

Clinton, Hillary, 3, 28, 33, 77, 99, 302n153; accuracy of statements by, 75; “American exceptionalism” invoked by, 26; criminal justice and, 3, 204, 205; death penalty and, 201; European views of, 38; health care reform of, 39; income level of supporters, 169; Iraq invasion supported by, 232; Obama conspiracy theories and, 65; popular vote in 2016 election won by, 41; Protestantism of, 119; strategic political use of religion, 142; traditional gender roles and, 131–32; vote of minorities and, 264; wealth inequality and, 143, 144, 152

Coburn, Sen. Tom, 162, 178, 188, 230 Coe, Kevin, 140 Cold War, 94, 111, 120, 140, 248 Collins, Francis, 92 colonialism, European, 236, 237–38, 249,

258, 270 communism, 8, 22, 51, 146, 164–65;

“American exceptionalism” phrase, origins of, 22–23, 281n8; Chinese Communist Party, 272; dissidents and protest against, 248; individual rights under, 167; U.S. Communist Party, 22, 23

Condorcet, Marquis de, 48 Congress, U.S., 27, 142, 147, 161, 171, 257;

fi nancial regulation and, 157; partisan polarization of, 7, 144; wealth inequality and, 152. See also House of Representatives; Senate

conservatism, American, 5, 17, 42, 68, 264; climate change and, ix, 31, 71; crea- tionism embraced by, 94; democracy and, 164–67; growing radicalism of, 6; market fundamentalism and, 151, 175; mood swings of public opinion and, 286n96; as outlier in Western world, 6, 34–39, 267; sexual prudishness of,

I N D E X • 3 4 7

129–130; ultratraditionalist worldview and, 80, 114. See also traditionalist worldview

conspiracy theories, disinformation, and propaganda, ix, 7, 8, 31, 43, 44, 51, 63–73, 75–76, 79, 141, 144, 159–60, 168–69, 188, 207, 241, 244, 261, 263– 64, 267; anti-immigrant, 76, 210; climate change and, 31, 43, 71–73, 111, 115, 174, 215, 262; creationism and, 94; democracy and, 63, 73–76; economic interests of voters and, 171; Iraq invasion and, 7, 250–51; by left ists, 31, 68; normalization of, 7, 79, 266; of Republican Party, 75–76, 266; Obama’s “forged” birth certifi cate, ix, 5, 20, 26, 29, 43, 45, 64–66, 78, 188, 261; Obama as secret Muslim, 5, 20, 26, 64–66, 78, 141, 172, 261; “socialized medicine” and, 6, 7, 15, 66–67, 75, 109, 146, 161– 62, 174, 241; “tyranny” of Obama administration, 68–71. See also anti-intellectualism

Constitution, U.S., 40, 49, 124, 144, 255, 269; church–state separation and, 120; death penalty and, 221; Eighth Amendment, 11, 199, 209, 218, 221; First Amendment, 120, 121, 122, 123, 139; infl uence on constitutions of other nations, 48, 241–42, 269; institutional gridlock and, 40–41, 71–72, 145, 192–93; Nineteenth Amendment, 124; origi- nalism doctrine and, 242; ratifi cation of treaties and, 40, 71–72, 233, 251–55; religious liberty and, 103, 108; Second Amendment, 227, 228–29, 230

contraception, 8–9, 36, 80, 131, 177; birth- control pill, 124; Catholic Church teachings about, 118; Christian fundamentalist hostility to, 110; family model in blue states and, 125–26; insurance coverage for, 115–16; “morning-aft er pill,” 116–17; public funding for, 126, 131, 133–34; public health insurance and, 37–38

Copenhagen Accord, 72, 255 creationism, 37, 53, 92–94, 101, 298n68; age

of the earth and, 115; Scopes “Monkey

Trial” and, 86, 179, 267; teaching of, 92–93, 123, 176. See also evolution, theory of

Crèvecœur, J. Hector St. John de, 47, 48 criminal justice, 7, 12, 44, 112; degen-

eration of, 195–207; human rights and, 218–21, 222, 224–25, 262; lynchings, 195, 208; as microcosm of American exceptionalism, 3–4, 9–11, 194–95, 207, 262; prison-industrial complex, 2, 167, 277n4; in red and blue states, 37, 195; “War on Drugs” and, 1, 208. See also death penalty; mass incarceration

Cruz, Ted, 20, 24, 28, 278n13; on the American Dream, 183; on divine origin of constitutional rights, 176; evangelical Christianity of, 112, 116, 302n153; Iowa caucus (2016) and, 43; “Obamacare” attacked by, 70; Obama conspiracy theories and, 65; strategic political use of religion, 142; torture supported by, 256; war plans of, 260

Cuba, 4, 77, 196 “culture wars,” 8, 33, 113–14, 123–24;

feminism and, 124–27; gay rights and, 134–38; of the Obama years, 114–17; sexual morality and, 129–34; strategic political use of religion and, 138–142; voters’ economic concerns and, 173; war over abortion, 127–29

Czechia, 90

Darwin, Charles, 86, 92 “death panels,” 7, 45, 66 death penalty, 1, 10, 23, 110, 129, 178–79,

214, 221–27; abolition of, 38, 195, 206, 211, 267, 268; Christian faith and, 15; Democratic Party leaders and, 37; human rights and, 219; opposition to, 226–27; popular support for, 220–21, 221–26, 329n136; racism and, 208–9

Declaration of Independence, 48, 49, 120–21

de Gaulle, Charles, 236 Déguignet, Jean-Marie, 50–51 DeLay, Tom, 112, 175–76 DeMint, Jim, 174

3 4 8 • I N D E X

democracy, 79, 86, 110, 271; anti- intellectualism and, 48, 49, 50; anti- intellectual populism as loss for, 73–76; conservative conception of, 164–67; economic failures of, 162–64; emergence from the Enlightenment, 7–8, 82; in Europe, 103; illiberal, 273; populism and, 60; religion and, 123; restricted 19th-century notions of, 46; voter turnout and, 193; without human rights, 207. See also social democracy

Democracy in America (Tocqueville), 6 Democratic Party, 2, 16, 19, 187, 280n1;

American Dream and, 182–83; anti- intellectual politicians in, 63; chauvinism and, 241; Citizens United decision opposed by, 153; conservative Democrats, 32; criminal justice and, 200, 203, 211; “culture wars” and, 114, 115; economic agenda of, 143, 265; foreign policy and, 233–34; gay marriage and, 136; international law/ institutions and, 252, 255; Iraq invasion and, 242; left ward shift of, 5; New Deal coalition, 32, 147; “Obamacare” and, 75, 160; partisan polarization and, 27–34, 284n46; race and class of supporters, 170, 173, 178; racial segregation and, 147; regional divide and, 114; religion and, 80, 91; Senate majority under Obama, 73–74; strategic political use of religion, 139, 140; winner-take-all economics and, 265

Denmark, 38, 99, 161; belief in God (population percentage), 90; GDP (gross domestic product) of, 163; homicide by fi rearms in, 229; social mobility in, 180

Diderot, Denis, 84n, 225 DiIulio, John, 61–62, 201, 324n36 disinformation. See conspiracy theories,

disinformation, and propaganda Disraeli, Benjamin, 165 Dodd-Frank Act, 157 “dog whistles,” 5, 26, 187, 189 Domke, David, 140 “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, 136–37, 178 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, 3

Douglass, Frederick, 51, 211 D’Souza, Dinesh, 177 Dukakis, Michael, 200 Dylan, Bob, 58, 98

education, 9, 33, 52–54, 81, 100; church– state separation and, 121; creationism in public schools, 93–94; evangelical revivalist view of, 85; populist attitude toward, 43; quality of American universities, 12, 15, 240; skepticism of, 7, 8, 47–48, 63, 79

egalitarianism, 6, 8, 46–47, 53, 172 Ehrenreich, Barbara, 185 Ehrman, Bart, 96, 216 Eisenhower, Dwight, 40, 60, 70, 77, 146,

257; on religious freedom, 107; strategic political use of religion, 140, 141

Electoral College, 28, 41, 192, 193 Engels, Friedrich, 164 Enlightenment, 8, 43, 48, 59–60, 98, 110,

167; American Enlightenment, 49, 57, 261, 288n26; anti-Christian attitudes during, 104; in France, 84, 225; religion and U.S. Founding Fathers, 82–84

Environmental Protection Agency, 72, 146 environmental regulation, 36, 37, 71–73,

164, 263, 265 Episcopal Church. See Anglican Church Equal Rights Amendment (ER A), 124–25 Europe: American Revolution and, 48;

anti-intellectualism in, 50–51; belief in God (population percentage), 90; Christian fundamentalism absent in, 88, 266; colonial empires of, 49, 270; conservatives in, 16, 164, 267; crime compared to United States, 11, 195, 196; death penalty abolished in, 220; demagogy and extremism in, 76–78; Eastern, 6n; elementary education in, 52–53; emigration to America from, 33, 181; European Union, 38, 76, 78, 266; evolution of democracy in, 8; far-right movements in, 38, 76–78, 191, 266–67, 273; feudalism in, 46, 181; health care system in, 34, 191; immigration into, 13; liberal American worldview and, 27, 80, 267; “old Europe” epithet during Iraq

I N D E X • 3 4 9

War, 233, 249; racial attitudes in, 13, 51, 77–78, 191, 210, 266; right-wing parties in, 42, 76–78; seen as “socialist,” 20, 24, 25; wealth inequality in, 162–63

evangelical Christians, 56, 80, 91, 101–2; apocalyptic biblical prophecies and, 94–96; biblical literalism and, 86–88, 92–93, 101; climate change skepticism and, 73; “culture wars” and, 113, 118–19, 123, 125, 131, 133, 135; economic agenda of religious right and, 175, 178; educa- tion as obstacle to faith, 49; evolu- tionary theory rejected by, 86–88, 92–93; Founding Fathers and, 84; Jesus Movement ( Jesus People), 97–98; media attention to, 109; as percentage of American population, 88–89; practical faith of, 100; progressive reform movements and, 87; rise of, 84–86; Trump campaign and, 9, 82, 112, 142. See also Christian fundamentalism

evolution, theory of, 36, 37, 53, 86, 88, 92–93; Catholic Church and, 93; Christian fundamentalist hostility to, 101, 173, 215; liberal/moderate support for, 104; mainline Protestantism and, 110; Scopes “Monkey Trial” and, 86, 179, 267. See also creationism

Falwell, Rev. Jerry, 95, 109, 111–12, 116, 140 Falwell, Rev. Jerry, Jr., 142 “family values,” 123, 132, 134 Farage, Nigel, 77 far-right ideology, 112, 154, 237–38, 266–

67, 273 fascism, 8, 28–29, 51, 143 federalism, 40, 192 feminism, 95, 98, 124–27, 177, 198 Ferguson crisis, 7, 33 feudalism, 46, 181, 186 fi libuster rule, 40, 41, 72, 192, 255, 292n103 fi nancial crisis (2008), 7, 143, 150, 154–57,

174 fi nancial regulation, 21, 25, 35, 36, 78, 143, 156 Finland, 160, 180, 229 Fiorina, Morris, 31, 32, 33, 117, 284n46,

285n68

Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 21, 57 foreign policy, 7, 12, 44, 233–34, 242–43;

of Bush (George W.) administration, 25, 38, 242–43, 244–48, 251, 254, 256, 258, 260; Christian fundamentalism and, 9, 94–95, 244–45; good-versus- evil narrative and, 243–48; isolationist, 234; lessons of history and, 248–251; of Obama administration, 34, 255–60; unilateral, 38, 251–55

Fosdick, Harry Emerson, 87–88 Founding Fathers, U.S., 21, 43, 47, 48,

59–60, 81; American Enlightenment and, 48–49; American exceptionalism and, 263; culture of violence in America and, 230; nationalism and, 236–37; national religion avoided by, 103, 121; Religious Enlightenment and, 82–84, 85

Fox News, 24, 34, 68–69, 105, 269, 285n73 France, 14–15, 17, 38, 103, 113, 246;

abortion legalized in (1975), 42, 128; anti-intellectualism in, 50–51, 76, 288n33; belief in God (population percentage), 90; Catholicism in, 91; Christian fundamentalism absent in, 80, 294n136; colonialism and colonial wars of, 49, 237, 250, 270; conservatives in, 114, 185, 237; female suff rage in, 124; Front National (FN) party, 77, 191, 266, 294nn135–136; gay marriage legalized in (2013), 136; GDP (gross domestic product) of, 163; health care in, 160, 161; human rights record of, 219; incarceration rate, 4, 196, 277n7; Iraq war opposed by, 233, 243, 249, 333n6; justice system in, 324n37; labor unions in, 147; medical costs in, 158; military budget of, 257; national chauvinism in, 236; private lives and sexuality of politicians in, 132, 307n97; race and criminal justice in, 210; religious skepticism in, 84; social mobility in, 180; state secularism (laïcité), 119; United Nations and, 252; university education in, 53–54, 240; Vichy regime, 51; wealth inequality in, 163

3 5 0 • I N D E X

Francis, Pope, 93 Frank, Th omas, 173 Franklin, Benjamin, 49, 58, 83 Freedom Caucus, 30 French Revolution, 48, 96 Freudianism, 86 Front National (FN) (French political

party), 77, 191, 266, 294nn135–136. See also Le Pen, Jean-Marie; Le Pen, Marine

Garland, David, 199 Gates, Henry Louis, 51 Gault, In re (1967), 198 gay marriage (same-sex marriage), 40, 56,

95, 113; reform beyond legalization, 268; Supreme Court ruling in favor of, 114, 115, 116

gay rights, 7, 80, 104, 117, 123–24; broader implications of, 134–38; Christian fundamentalist hostility to, 102; “culture wars” and, 117, 124, 173; partisan polarization and, 33, 285n68; religious divide and, 118; Tea Party opposition to, 174. See also homosexuality; LGBTQ people/issues

Gelman, Andrew, 171, 320n89 Germany, 38, 128, 161, 270; belief in God

(population percentage), 90; East and West Germany, 248; GDP (gross domestic product) of, 163; health care spending, 158, 160; homicide by fi rearms in, 229; incarceration rate, 4, 202; Iraq war opposed by, 233, 249; military budget of, 257; race and criminal justice in, 210; social mobility in, 180

gerrymandering, 27, 282nn27–28 GI Bill, 190 Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 198 Giff ords, Rep. Gabrielle, 228 Gillard, Julia, 132, 142 Gingrich, Newt, 24, 30, 68, 189 Ginsburg, Justice Ruth Bader, 214, 218,

224 Giuliani, Rudolph, 24, 29 Glass-Steagall Act (1933), 155 globalism, 12, 234–35

global warming. See climate change God Strategy, Th e (Domke and Coe), 140 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 248 Gore, Al, 38, 41 government shutdown (2013), 27–28 Graham, Billy, 178, 245 Great Awakenings, 85 Great Depression, 25, 40, 145, 155 Great Gatsby, Th e (Fitzgerald), 21 Great Recession, 7, 174 Greene, Jack, 181 Greenspan, Alan, 155–56 Guantánamo camp, 11, 12, 25, 219–220,

257, 265; human rights and closing of, 268; liberal–conservative divide and, 233; Obama’s failure to close, 255, 256, 260; opposition to, 36

Gulf War (1991), 96, 247 guns: countries with constitutional right

to bear arms, 227, 331n177; culture of violence in America and, 230–31; homicide by fi rearms, 227, 229; lax gun control, 10–11, 20, 166, 194, 228, 231; mass/school shootings, 176, 228; Second Amendment and, 227, 228–29, 230

Haley, Nikki, 132 Hall, Ralph, 72, 115 Hamilton, Alexander, 83–84, 230 Hannity, Sean, 24 Harding, Matt, 234 Harris, Sam, 105 Hatch, Sen. Orrin, 160 hate crimes, 188, 263, 339n5 health care, 6, 12, 20, 31, 129, 143, 262;

American Dream and, 183; expanded access to, 265; health care reform, 7, 13, 34, 35, 69, 268; history of eff orts toward universal health insurance, 146; Medicaid, 320n99; medical costs and, 168; as pillar of democracy, 165; in prison, 10; public’s ignorance about, 67, 291n85; single-payer system, 34; Supreme Court and, 172; universal health care in Western world and international community, 6, 36, 39, 42, 164; wealth inequality and absence of,

I N D E X • 3 51

157–162. See also Aff ordable Care Act; Medicare; “socialized medicine”

Henry, Patrick, 84 Heritage Foundation, 25, 67, 174, 180 Hetherington, Marc, 117, 285n68 Hindus, 89, 97, 103, 122 Hispanics. See Latinos Hitler, Adolf, 77, 157, 233, 249 Hobby Lobby (2014) Supreme Court

decision, 116 Hofer, Norbert, 77 Hofstadter, Richard, 47, 48, 53, 70; on

“conspiratorial fantasy,” 72; on religious ultratraditionalists, 101, 112

Hollande, François, 77, 132, 243 Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell, 144 Holocaust, 13n, 77, 128, 239 homophobia, 123, 135 homosexuality, 8–9, 33, 80, 175; Catholic

Church teachings about, 118; Christian fundamentalist hostility to, 101, 110; patriarchy and, 134; tolerance of, 36, 177. See also gay rights

House of Representatives, 30, 120, 152, 155, 156. See also Congress, U.S.

Houston, Charles Hamilton, 147 Hubbard, L. Ron, 108 Huckabee, Mike, 64–65, 68, 112, 125, 177 human rights, 5, 7, 11–12, 21, 110, 201–202,

233; in China, 272; death penalty and, 220, 222, 224; democracy and, 218–221; European Court of Human Rights, 13, 136, 210, 219; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 255; international treaties, 40; United Nations and, 252; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 220; U.S. prison system and, 11, 194

Hungary, 78, 261n Hunter, James Davidson, 117 Hussein, Saddam, 247, 248; lumped

together with Al-Qaeda, 62, 232, 233, 242, 251; secular dictatorship of, 62

ignorance, 7, 43, 44, 51, 52, 79, 81, 97, 239–241. See also anti-intellectualism

immigration, 5, 78, 87; as divisive issue in Western world, 38; emigration to

Europe from former colonies, 191; European attitudes toward, 13, 51, 77–78, 191, 210, 266; nativist riots against Catholic immigrants, 103, 121; xenophobia and perceived threat of, 3, 33, 43, 207, 209–10

incarceration rate, U.S., 1, 8, 204, 277n1; increase to world-record levels, 39–40; in international comparison, 4, 10, 196, 277n7, 323n22; juvenile incarceration rate, 202. See also mass incarceration

India, 64, 97, 257 individualism, 6, 165, 166, 167, 194, 263 Inhofe, Sen. James, 72, 111, 115 “intelligent design,” 92–93, 93, 176. See also

creationism International Criminal Court (ICC),

253–55, 268 international law, 12, 36, 252–53 internet. See mass media Iran, 1, 124, 196, 221, 252; in “Axis of Evil,”

246; incarceration rate, 4; nuclear deal with, 65

Iraq, invasion of (2003), 12, 25, 34, 57, 139, 238, 278n20; alleged alliance between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, 62, 232, 233, 242, 251; apocalyptic biblical prophecies and, 94–96, 111, 232, 244, 299n85; Bush’s ignorance and, 45, 232–33; Christian fundamentalism and, 81, 94–96, 111, 232, 233, 244–45, 299n85; civilian deaths in, 247, 250; consequences of war in, 45, 62, 232, 233, 262, 270; false intelligence and, 7, 62, 232, 233, 247–48, 333n6; Fox News viewers and, 69; insurgency and counterinsurgency in, 245–46; Middle East destabilized by, 45, 232, 262; opposition to, 36, 233, 242, 258; references to World War II and, 249; rise of ISIS and, 232, 242, 250, 262; terrorists radicalized by, 243, 259; Vietnam War comparison, 40, 250–51; weapons of mass destruction and, 62, 232, 278n20

Ireland, 42, 128; belief in God (population percentage), 90, 91; homicide by fi rearms in, 229; incarceration rate, 196

3 5 2 • I N D E X

ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), 45, 62, 243, 260, 278n20; Iraq war and, 232, 242, 250, 262; Obama conspiracy theories and, 65

Islam, 92, 97; caricatures of Muhammad in Charlie Hebdo, 104; fundamentalist, 245; Koran, 97, 101, 238; as object of intolerance in the West, 88. See also Muslims

Islamism, 5, 26, 45, 246 Israel, 94, 95 Italy: belief in God (population

percentage), 90, 91; female suff rage in, 124; health care spending, 160; incarceration rate, 4, 196; labor unions in, 147

Jackson, Andrew, 60 Jacoby, Susan, 47, 52 Japan, 39, 61, 249, 269, 324n37; health care

spending, 160; incarceration rate, 4; military budget of, 257

Jay, John, 84 Jeff erson, Th omas, 49, 58, 60, 84;

American nationalism and, 236–37; views of religion, 82–83, 121

Jehovah’s Witnesses, 89, 101 Jesus Christ, 9, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 91,

94–95, 96–97, 98, 106, 107, 111, 112, 138, 141, 178, 216

Jesus Movement ( Jesus People), 97–98 Jews, 87, 89, 99, 103, 217; Christian

apocalypticism and, 94–95; church– state separation and, 122; in Europe, 191

Jim Crow segregation, 124, 147, 211 Jindal, Bobby, 177 John Paul II, Pope, 248 Johnson, Lyndon B., 141, 146, 147, 148

Kagan, Justice Elena, 241 Katrina, Hurricane, 7, 95 Katz, Lawrence, 53 Kennedy, John F. ( JFK), 60–61, 77, 119,

141, 176 Kennedy, Justice Anthony, 127, 153 Kenya, 14, 17, 20, 64, 65, 250 Kerry, John, 38, 141 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 58, 191, 211, 226

Kingdon, John, 16, 169, 240 King v. Burwell (2015), 65, 172, 321n114 Koch brothers, 151, 171 Korea, North, 1, 221, 252 Korea, South, 39, 160 Korean War, 250, 272 Krugman, Paul, 156 Ku Klux Klan, 189 Kyoto Protocol, 72, 239, 240, 255

labor unions, 147, 178, 186 Lafayette, Marquis de, 48 laissez-faire economics, 6, 145, 155, 173–74 LaPierre, Wayne, 228 Latin America, 39, 322n1 Latinos, 186, 189–190, 265; criminal justice

system and, 194, 200, 207, 208, 326n70; increasing population of, 264

Lawrence v. Texas (2003), 136 League of Nations, 251–52 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 77, 266 Le Pen, Marine, 77, 266, 294n136 Le Pen, Marion Maréchal, 294n136 LGBTQ people/issues, 5, 40, 95, 134, 262,

268; Catholic Church and, 98; legal victories under Obama, 114. See also gay rights

liberalism, American, 6, 17, 68, 74, 264, 267; dominant worldview of Western nations and, 34–38; evolution accepted by, 94; modernist worldview of, 80; mood swings of public opinion and, 286n96; sexual openness of, 129–130. See also modernist worldview

Lieberman, Joe, 99 Lim, Elvin, 62, 63 Limbaugh, Rush, 70, 117, 188 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 6–7, 23, 165, 169,

186 Lockhart, Charles, 240 López, Ian Haney, 187 Lovestone, Jay, 22–23, 281n8 Luhrmann, Tanya, 97, 100, 101–102 Luther, Martin, 52, 81, 97, 105 Lutheran Church, 110, 215

Madison, James, 49, 83, 121 Maher, Bill, 105

I N D E X • 3 5 3

Malcolm X, 51, 58 “Manifest Destiny,” 21–22 Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 197 market fundamentalism, 34, 150–51, 173;

economic agenda of religious right and, 175–79; overlap with religious fundamentalism, 173–75

Marshall, Th urgood, 147, 211 Marx, Karl, 164 Marxism, 22 Massachusetts Bay Colony, 102 mass incarceration, 2, 3, 9, 207; draconian

sentencing and, 198–99; drug off enses and, 204–205; human rights and, 219; private prisons, 214; prosecutors and, 196; racial discrimination and, 207–12; reform and, 204; religion and, 213–17; rise of, 195–96; state prison population, 198; violent crimes and, 205, 227; wealth inequality and, 212–13. See also criminal justice; incarceration rate, U.S.

mass media, 44, 59, 79, 177, 234, 266 May, Th eresa, 164 McCain, John, 29, 45, 54, 137, 278n13; on

abortion, 127; European views of, 38; on “Don’t ask, don’t tell,” 137; Obama conspiracy theories and, 64; Palin and, 29, 45; as presidential candidate, 29, 168, 317n32; torture rejected by, 256

McCarthy, Sen. Joseph, 60 McCarthyism, 70 McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 209 McConnell, Mitch, 256, 278n13 Medicare, 67, 146, 160–61, 162, 190 Merkel, Angela, 120, 164 Mexico, 4, 16, 18, 39, 209–10, 227, 238 middle class, 5, 9, 16, 62, 180; African-

American, 187; American insularity and, 238; benefi ts of welfare state for, 190; lack of universal health care and, 169; New Deal and, 143; “new New Deal” and, 192; stagnated income of, 185; support for Trump among, 168; wealth inequality and, 148, 162–63, 186

Middle East, 9, 13, 95, 243, 248; apocalyptic biblical prophecies and, 36, 38, 105, 111; destabilized by Iraq War, 262

military-industrial complex, 257 Milk, Harvey, 58, 135 Milošević, Slobodan, 240, 253 Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 197 modernist worldview, 87, 88, 98, 113–14;

“culture wars” and, 117; as norm in Western nations, 114. See also “culture wars”; liberalism, American

Moody, Dwight, 85 Moore, Roy, 120, 123 Moral Majority, 112 Mormons, 89, 98, 99, 101, 301n134; benefi ts

of faith expected by, 100; entry into American mainstream, 106–108

MSNBC, 34, 68–69, 285n73 Mubarak, Hosni, 246 Mullen, Adm. Mike, 137 Muslims, 13, 25, 78, 103, 217; claim of

Obama as secret Muslim, 5, 20, 26, 64–66, 78, 141, 172, 261; in Europe, 13, 88; in France, 104, 119, 219, 243; as percentage of American population, 89; Sunni–Shiite division, 45, 232; Trump’s call to ban Muslims from America, ix, 31, 33; unacceptability of Muslims as American politicians, 99. See also Islam

Mussolini, Benito, 28–29, 77

nationalism, 21–22, 23–26, 159, 235–38, 240, 241, 270

National Rifl e Association (NR A), 10, 228, 229

National Security Agency (NSA), 258 Native Americans (Indians), 21, 22, 46, 48,

181, 182; defeat of Indians seen as part of divine plan, 237; in Mormon theology, 106–7; religious beliefs of, 122

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 239, 250

Nazism (National Socialism), 8, 51, 68, 159, 191, 249

Netherlands, 17–18, 49, 78, 114; belief in God (population percentage), 90; far right in, 74, 78; health care spending, 160; incarceration rate, 4; race and criminal justice in, 210; sexual freedom in, 130

3 5 4 • I N D E X

New Deal, 32, 41, 108, 148, 184, 192, 269; conservative acceptance of, 146; denounced as “fascism,” 143, 147; Glass-Steagall Act (1933) and, 155; race and class in relation to, 190; Supreme Court and, 145

New Jim Crow, Th e (Alexander), 208 New York, 1–3, 162, 194, 204, 277n5, 277n7 New Zealand, 6, 17, 95; American

fundamentalist proselytizing in, 93; Christian fundamentalism absent in, 81, 88, 100; conservatives in, 165; death penalty abolished in, 220; female suff rage in, 124; health care spending, 160; incarceration rate, 4; liberal American worldview and, 27; mod- ernist worldview in, 114; political parties in, 164

1984 (Orwell), 79, 172 Nixon, Richard, 25, 60, 62, 146;

environmental regulation and, 73; health insurance supported by, 67; strategic political use of religion, 140, 141; Supreme Court and, 198

Norquist, Grover, 150 North/Northern states, 6, 41, 88, 180 Norway, 38, 163, 180, 196

Obama, Barack, 12–13, 14, 77, 131, 133, 280n1; accuracy of statements by, 75; “American exceptionalism” invoked by, 26, 235; anti-intellectual critics of, 48, 54; “apology tour” of, 25; Bush counterter- rorism policies continued by, 255–56, 258, 260; climate change and, 71, 73, 234; conspiracy theories about forged birth certifi cate and Islamism of, ix, 5, 20, 26, 29, 43, 45, 64–66, 78, 141, 172, 188, 261; “culture wars” under, 114–17; death penalty and, 200–201; division of American society under, 20–21, 27; economic program of, 188; electoral victories of, 27–28, 63, 264; European views of, 38; as fi rst black president, 12, 26, 39, 66, 188–89, 192, 261; foreign policy of, 233–34, 243, 245; gay marriage issue and, 138; as global citizen, 238; health care reform of, 13, 30, 34, 35, 148,

157, 161, 241, 321n114; international com munity and, 39; partisan redefi - nition of “American exceptionalism” and, 4–5, 7, 20, 23–27; as presidential candidate, 168, 317n32; race relations under, 33; religious beliefs of, 105; Republican obstructionism and, 40, 41, 71–72, 73–74, 150, 169, 188, 189, 265–66; as “socialist,” 41, 164, 175, 176; strategic political use of religion, 139, 141; Supreme Court and, 28, 241; surveil- lance state and, 258; “tyranny” of Obama administration, 67–71, 75; use of torture discontinued by, 40, 256; vote of minorities and, 264; Wall Street economy and, 156–57; “War on Terror” and, 254; wealth inequality and, 149–150

“Obamacare.” See Aff ordable Care Act Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), 134, 136 Occupy Wall Street, 172 O’Connor, Justice Sandra Day, 127, 199,

223, 323n27 O’Neill, Paul, 61, 247 Orbán, Viktor, 77, 261n O’Reilly, Bill, 269 Orwell, George, 79, 166, 172

Paine, Th omas, 47, 49, 84 Pakistan, 245 Palin, Sarah, 12, 29, 45, 238, 265; anti-

intellectualism of, 59, 63, 86; Christian fundamentalism of, 86, 105, 112, 177; conspiracy theories and, 64; on “death panels,” 66; far-right economic views of, 177; feminism invoked by, 126; Obama criticized/mocked by, 48, 188

Pape, Robert, 242–43 Paris Agreement (2015), 71–72, 73 patriarchy, 98, 110, 123, 124–27, 129, 130,

134, 261–62, 265 patriotism, 235–38. See also nationalism Paul, Sen. Rand, 184 Paxton, Robert, 29 Pence, Mike, 92, 116, 176, 298n68 Perry, Rick, 16, 25, 45, 73, 177; Christian

fundamentalism of, 112; as death penalty supporter, 230

Pétain, Marshal Philippe, 77

I N D E X • 3 5 5

Petraeus, Gen. David, 137, 246 Piketty, Th omas, 163 Pilgrims, 102 Planned Parenthood, 7, 116, 175 Pledge of Allegiance, 19, 80, 120, 122 plutocracy, 151–54 Poland, 42, 90, 91, 128 polarization, partisan, 5–6, 27, 79, 144,

286n85; American Dream and, 182–85; anti-intellectual populism and, 74; in international comparison, 34–38; liberals and conservatives in diff erent worlds, 27–34; religion and, 88, 118–19

police shootings, 10, 33, 206–207, 230, 280n43

populism, 6, 8, 50; anti-intellectualism and, 74; Jacksonian, 60; Trump as far-right populist, 29, 31

pornography, 112 Portugal, 42, 49, 90, 128 Powell, Colin, 247–48 presidential election (2016), ix–x, 3, 5, 28,

30–31, 43, 46, 67, 263–67; criminal justice and, 3, 207; Clinton and, 132, 142, 154, 205, 261, 265; Democratic Party platform, 206; polarization of American society and, 144; race and class of voters, 168, 169, 316n7; racial divisions and, 265; religion and, ix, 9, 112, 116, 142; Republican National Convention, 74, 207; Republican Party platform, 72, 115, 206; Republican primary candidates, 43, 46, 126; Sanders campaign, 30–31, 142, 160–61, 164, 172; Trump and, xi–x, 28–29, 43, 127, 144, 154, 168–69, 230, 263

presidential elections, 170, 173; of 1952, 60; of 1980, 140; of 1988, 200; of 2008, 168, 317n32; of 2012, 116, 150, 151

Princeton Th eological Seminary, 88 PRISM program, 258 progress, 8, 11, 13, 42; American expansion

and, 21; historical cycles and, 40, 264 Progressive movement, 144 propaganda. See conspiracy theories,

disinformation, and propaganda

Protestants, 119, 131; mainline, 89, 110, 118, 217; Protestant Reformation, 52, 81, 85, 97, 105; split of American Protestantism, 86–88, 98, 118

Prothero, Stephen, 97 Puritans, 102 Putin, Vladimir, 29, 74, 77, 244, 267,

273

Quakers, 98, 102, 215

race, 6, 186–192; criminal justice system and, 206–207; economic solidarity hindered by race divisions, 9; mass incarceration and, 207–12; partisan polarization and, 32; police shootings and, 10

racism, 12, 28, 33, 51, 98, 253; dog whistle politics and, 23–27, 187; in Europe, 13, 51, 191, 210, 266; institutional and systemic, 3, 12–13, 191–92, 207–12

Reagan, Ronald, 23, 54, 70, 94, 125, 169; on the American Revolution, 237; apocalyptic biblical prophecies and, 111; “big government” opposed by, 147, 165; on capital punishment, 225; Christian fundamentalism and, 112, 140, 175; Cold War and, 248; on national health insurance, 162; strategic political use of religion, 140–41, 141

Reconstruction period, 7, 27 Rehnquist, Chief Justice William, 124–25,

136, 198 religion, 6, 8, 44; death penalty and,

214–17; deism, 82, 83, 84, 99; education as obstacle to faith, 49; historical evolution in America, 82–88; moral society and, 98–100; movement of new faiths into mainstream, 106–108; national chauvinism and, 19, 241; partisan polarization and, 32, 33; Pledge of Allegiance and, 19; politicians’ strategic use of, 138–142; religious affi liations in America, 89; secular government in relation to, 102–104; sociopolitical role in the

3 5 6 • I N D E X

religion (continued) United States, 34–35; U.S. Founding

Fathers and, 82–84. See also Christian fundamentalism; separation of church and state

reproductive rights, 21, 80, 123–24, 127–34 Republican Party (G.O.P.), 2, 19, 278n13,

280n1; American Dream and, 182–85; “American exceptionalism” and, 4–5, 7, 20, 23–27, 39; anti-intellectualism in, 43, 45–46, 49–50, 54, 59–76, 78–79; as the “anti-science party,” 115; chau vinism and, 241; Christian fundamen talism and, 80, 111, 112, 114–16, 178, 302n153; Citizens United decision supported by, 153, 312n78; climate change and, 5, 71–73, 115, 278n14, 292n101; criminal justice and, 203, 204; “culture wars” and, 114–15; establishment of, 29–30, 31, 74, 75; extremism and rightward shift of, 5–6, 28–34, 78–79, 69–70, 127, 144, 147, 267; foreign policy and, 233–34; gerrymandering and, 27; international law/institutions and, 252, 255; Iraq invasion and, 242; liberal Republicans, 32, 74; nationalism and, 238; New Deal and, 143, 146; “Obamacare” denounced by, 31, 42, 66–68, 144, 159–60, 162, 169, 171, 264; Obama conspiracy theories and party leadership, 65; obstruc- tionism of, 40, 41, 71–72, 73–74, 150, 169, 188, 189, 265–66; partisan polarization and, 27–34, 284n46; race and class of supporters, 170, 316n7; rate of support for gay marriage, 136; regional divide and, 114; “Southern Strategy” of, 187–88; strategic political use of religion, 139; taxation policy of, 150; Tea Party infl uence on, 172, 317n27; wealth inequality and, 143, 152

Rice University, 15, 44, 54–56, 91 Roberts, Chief Justice John, 125, 134, 153,

154, 198 Robertson, Pat, 95, 109 Roe v. Wade (1973), 42, 127, 267 Romney, Mitt, 20, 25, 28, 31, 278n13;

abortion politics and, 116–17, 303n11; American exceptionalism invoked by,

24, 235, 236; European views of, 38; on government dependence, 184; health insurance supported by, 67, 161; Mormon faith of, 107, 108; on Obama and welfare reform, 189; Obama conspiracy theories and, 65; religious beliefs of, 105; “small business” of, 171; torture supported by, 256; on war against the Taliban, 260; wealth inequality and, 151–52

Roosevelt, Eleanor, 11, 220 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR), 32, 77,

140, 141, 166, 270; New Deal and, 143, 269; “Second Bill of Rights” proposition of, 145, 148, 268, 269; Supreme Court and, 145, 309n18

Roosevelt, Th eodore, 60, 77 Rubio, Marco, 20, 24, 112, 134, 278n13; on

“big government,” 156; on earth’s age, 115; on religion and government, 176; torture supported by, 256

Rumsfeld, Donald, 248 Russia, 4, 6n, 252, 256, 257 Rwanda, genocide in, 225 Ryan, Paul, 28, 151, 162, 167, 171, 177–78;

on class and social mobility, 180; “A Roadmap for America’s Future,” 184

Sanders, Bernie, 30–31, 142, 172, 302n153; accuracy of statements by, 75; as “democratic socialist,” 164; health care proposals of, 160–61, 314n118; wealth inequality and, 144

Sanger, Margaret, 58 Santorum, Rick, 24, 54, 65, 116;

Catholicism of, 119; Christian fundamentalism of, 112; on class in America, 180; global warming rejected by, 111; “Obamacare” attacked by, 66; on teaching of creationism, 176

Sarkozy, Nicolas, 76–77, 164, 185, 293n129 Saudi Arabia, 1, 221, 246, 252, 257 Scalia, Justice Antonin, 28, 90, 119, 136,

209, 216–17, 304n44 Scandinavia, 196; penal practices in, 213,

221. See also Denmark; Norway; Sweden

Scheff er, David, 254

I N D E X • 3 5 7

Schlafl y, Phyllis, 124 science, 7, 9, 14, 21, 262; American religion

and, 80, 81, 100; anti-intellectual poli- ticians and, 60; blended with religious faith, 92, 297n66; Christian funda- mentalist hostility to, 87; climate change and, 71, 72–73; practicality and, 47

Scientology, Church of, 108–9 Scopes “Monkey Trial” (1925), 86, 179, 267 Senate, 40, 41, 120, 192, 256; science

committee, 115; treaty ratifi cation procedure and, 72, 254–55. See also Congress, U.S.

separation of church and state, 9, 81, 93, 103, 119–122; confl icts over secularism, 120–22; JFK’s speech on, 176; liberal modernist support for, 80; traditionalist desire for more religion in government, 122–23

separation of powers, 40, 192 September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, 52, 95,

112, 177, 234, 239; orchestrated from Afghanistan, 258, 336n81; “War on Terror” and, 260

sex, 7, 9, 177; “culture wars” and, 8–9; moralizing attitudes toward, 129–134; premarital, 101, 110, 113, 129, 131, 174; sexual revolution, 14, 129, 198

sexism, 28, 123, 126–27, 130, 265 sexual education, abstinence-only, 36, 80,

102, 114, 129, 133, 266; opposed by religious Americans, 122–23; poor women and, 123

Shapiro, Fred, 281n8 Sikhs, 103 “Silent Majority,” 198 slavery, 22, 41, 46, 48, 182, 211, 237 Smith, Adam, 47 Smith, Joseph, 105, 106, 107, 301n136 Snowden, Edward, 23, 258 social Darwinism, 179 social democracy, 164, 165, 210, 269–70 socialism, 164–65 “socialized medicine,” 6, 7, 15, 30, 75, 146;

Christian fundamentalism and, 109; conspiracy theories about, 66–67; political divide and, 241. See also Aff ordable Care Act; health care

social media, 59, 69, 79 Social Security, 31, 144, 146, 190 South Africa, 4, 39 Southern Baptist Convention, 105, 110, 215 South/Southern states, 6, 15, 16, 29, 31, 32,

41, 171, 180, 230–31; African-American evangelicals in, 178; anti-intellectualism in, 8, 44–45; attitudes toward edu- cation, 44, 47; Christian funda- mentalism in, 88, 91; electoral college system and, 41; harsh justice and capital punishment in, 1, 37, 195, 196, 208, 209, 222, 225–26; lag of education in, 53; lynchings in, 208; partisan polarization in, 31; racism, segregation, and slavery in, 32, 41 37, 147, 187, 189, 208, 209, 252; Republican Party support in, 32, 147, 187; social mobility in, 180; Trump supporters in, 171

Soviet Union (USSR), 68, 111, 159, 164, 239; collapse of, 248, 271; propaganda in, 51

Spain, 42, 49, 128, 249; belief in God (population percentage), 90; Franco regime, 51; health care spending, 160; homicide by fi rearms in, 229

Spinoza, Baruch, 84n, 168 Stalin, Joseph, 22, 68, 239, 281n8 “Star-Spangled Banner, Th e” (U.S.

national anthem), 19, 34–35, 194 “states’ rights,” 26, 187, 188 stem-cell research, 102 Stephanson, Anders, 21–22 Stevenson, Adlai, 60 Stevenson, Bryan, 3–4 Stiglitz, Joseph, 35, 151, 156, 175 Stuntz, William, 217 Super PACs (political action committees),

153, 154 Supreme Court, 11, 28, 41, 90, 124, 144;

Catholic justices of, 119; church–state separation and, 93, 120, 122; criminal justice and, 197–98, 199, 204, 221; death penalty cases and, 37, 214, 218, 267; gay marriage and, 114, 115, 116; gun control and, 229; human rights and, 220, 221, 329n142; Roosevelt’s New Deal and, 145, 309n18

3 5 8 • I N D E X

Supreme Court cases: Brady v. Maryland (1963), 197; Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 147, 198; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), 10, 143, 153; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 198; Hobby Lobby (2014), 116; King v. Burwell (2015), 65, 172, 321n114; Lawrence v. Texas (2003), 136; Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 197; McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 209; Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 197; Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), 134, 136; In re Gault (1967), 198; Roe v. Wade (1973), 42, 127, 267

Sweden, 38, 99, 161, 270; belief in God (population percentage), 90; GDP (gross domestic product) of, 163; health care spending, 160; incarceration rate, 4, 196, 202, 277n7; social mobility in, 180; support for death penalty in, 221, 225; wealth distribution in, 269, 340n26

swing states, 34, 193, 322n118 Switzerland, 163, 324n37 Syria, 243, 252

Taiwan, 39 Taliban, 52, 239, 240, 258–59, 260, 336n81 talk radio, 69. See also mass media Tauzin, Rep. Billy, 152–53 taxation, 35, 70, 71, 143, 144; “Bush tax

cuts,” 62, 170; Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 268; health care and, 161; proposal to abolish federal income tax, 174; tax cuts for the wealthy, 36, 151, 168, 264–65; tax rates of the wealthy, 70, 71, 146, 269

Tea Party, 16, 25, 30, 74, 265, 280n1; American Dream and, 180; anti- intellectualism and, 63; “big govern- ment” denounced by, 25, 171, 174; fi nancial crisis of 2008 and, 154; health care reform opposed by, 165–66; igno- rance about taxes, 70; infl uence on the Republican Party (G.O.P.), 172, 317n27; minimal government position of, 151, 171; moneyed interests and, 171; Obama conspiracy theories and, 45, 63, 64; perceived as extreme/far right, 36; racial politics and, 189

television (TV), 58–59, 63, 69, 105. See also mass media

Tenet, George, 247–48 terrorism, 34, 40, 65, 243, 259. See also

“War on Terror” Texas, 15–16, 45, 54, 80, 91, 193; Bush

(George W.) as governor of, 16, 45, 138; capital punishment in, 222, 224; conception of morality in, 113; sexual mores in, 131; state laws on abortion, 115; three-strikes law, 199

Th omas, Justice Clarence, 119, 136 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 6, 8, 17, 22, 263,

273; on American justice, 195, 322n4; on anti-intellectualism in America, 47; on culture of violence in America, 230–31; on national chauvinism, 235; praise for the United States, 22, 48, 263, 273; on religion in America, 80, 84, 98, 103; on value of equality in America, 46–47

torture, 5, 12, 31, 38; Bush administration’s use of, 11, 34, 272, 278n13; U.S. methods copied from Chinese communists, 272; U.S. methods mirroring Spanish Inquisition, 272

“tough on crime” movement, 2, 3, 8, 202, 203, 205

traditionalist worldview, 9, 112, 113–14, 117, 126, 135–36. See also “culture wars”; conservatism, American

Truman, Harry, 77, 140, 141, 146 Trump, Donald, 3, 20, 28, 40, 178, 234,

238; abortion politics and, 116; accuracy of statements by, 75, 76; advisors and associates of, 69, 177; American Dream and, 182; “American exceptionalism” and, 24, 26; anti-establishment image of, ix, 30, 31; anti-intellectualism of, 59, 262; bigoted presidential campaign of, 3, 33, 65, 188, 207, 261, 263–65; business empire of, 152, 168–69, 264; Christian fundamentalism and, ix, 9, 112, 262, 302n153; on climate change as “hoax,” 73; contradictory statements of, 26, 79, 144, 309n7; conspiracy theories and disinformation of, ix, 7, 29, 31, 43, 65, 73, 75–76, 79, 144, 168–69, 188, 207,

I N D E X • 3 5 9

261, 263–64; corruption and fraud of, 152, 168–69, 264; criminal justice and, 3, 207; criticized by Republican establishment, 29; on deportation of Mexicans, 209–10; division of American society under, 20–21; election of 2016 and, 28–29; evangelical Christian support for, 9, 82, 112, 142; executive power at disposal of, 260; ignorance of policy-making, 50, 266; machismo and misogyny of, 126–27; “Make America Great Again” slogan, 26, 263; Muslim immigrants vilifi ed by, ix, 7, 33, 66; “Obamacare” attacked by, 67, 70, 158, 169; perceived as extreme/ far right, 36; popular vote lost by, 192; as populist, 29, 31, 42, 144, 168–69, 183, 230, 263–67; post-election rhetoric of, 266; Putin and, 74, 267, 273; race and class of supporters, 168, 169, 316n7; racial politics and, 3, 188–89, 207; as reality TV star, 58, 263; Russian support for, 38, 74, 267, 273; torture supported by, 5, 230, 256, 278n13; unfavorable popular opinions of, 265; vow to assassinate terrorists, 259–260; wealth inequality and, 152, 168–69, 183

Trump, Melania, 339n7 two-party system, 32

Ukraine, 74 unilateralism, 39, 251–55 United Nations (U.N.), 17–18, 36, 72, 124,

219, 239; Human Rights Commission, 11; international criminal tribunals, 253–55; League of Nations’ failure and, 252; women’s rights and, 125, 253

United States: absence of universal health care in, 6, 10, 35, 66–67, 157–62, 268; belief in God (population percentage), 90; capital punishment retained by, 221–27; class-based society in, 186; continental expansion of, 21–22; contradictions of, 13–14, 44, 52–59, 66, 124, 129–130, 261–62; decline of, 39–42, 270–73; Enlightenment and founding of, 49; as fi rst modern democracy, 7–8, 46–49, 167, 181;

health care spending, 160; homicide by fi rearms in, 227, 229; human rights and, 11–12, 218–21; insularity of, 234–35, 238–242; intellectual life in, 57–58; labor unions in, 147; military budget of, 23, 256, 257; polarization in, 5–6, 27–39; religiosity in, 34–35; religious affi liations in, 89, 297n57; as “shining city upon a hill,” 5, 23; United Nations and, 252

Valls, Manuel, 77 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 182 Veil, Simone, 128 Vietnam War, 40, 52, 97, 191, 242, 250, 271 Voltaire, 83, 84n, 176 voter turnout, 192–93, 322n117

Walker, Scott, 24, 65, 112, 176 Wall Street, 34, 154–57, 166, 178 warfare, 21, 129, 233, 245, 251, 258;

America’s wars since World War II, 250; Christian fundamentalism and, 81, 94–96, 111, 232, 233, 244–45, 299n85; European reservations about, 249

“War on Crime,” 11 “War on Drugs,” 1, 208 “War on Terror,” 7, 11, 16, 233, 234, 244;

Christian fundamentalism and, 81, 94–96, 111, 232, 233, 244–45, 299n85; as endless struggle, 259; Iraq invasion and, 61, 251; use of torture in, 31. See also terrorism

Warren, Chief Justice Earl, 197, 198 Warren, Rick, 101, 102 Washington, George, 84, 114 wealth inequality, 9–10, 31, 39, 44, 71, 149,

170–72, 186, 262; acuteness in the United States, 143, 172, 308n1; American Dream and, 180, 183; anti- intellectualism and, 170, 172; decline of public education and, 53; democracy and, 162–64; market fundamentalism and, 150–164, 173–75; mass incarceration and, 213–14; social contract and, 144–150; technological skills and, 148, 310n35; Wall street economy and, 154–57

3 6 0 • I N D E X

welfare state, 164, 169, 184, 320n89; in Europe, 35, 180, 191; middle class and, 190; “welfare” as racially charged word, 188

Western world (the West), 6, 27, 117, 210, 241; attitudes toward immigration, 17; Christian fundamentalism mostly absent in, 81, 173; criminal justice in, 3, 196; defi ned, 6n, 322n1; demagogy and extremism in, 78; economic agenda of political parties in, 164; far-right pop ulism in, 266; liberal American world view and, 6, 34–38; modernist worldview as norm in, 114; public TV broadcasting in, 69; wealth inequality in, 71

What’s the Matter with Kansas? (Frank), 173

Whitman, James, 210 Wilders, Geert, 74, 77 Will, George F., 213 Wilson, Woodrow, 251 Winthrop, John, 23

women, 5, 46; abortion war and, 127–29; American women and gender equality, 261–62; feminism and, 124–27. See also “culture wars”; feminism; patriarchy

working class, 5, 62, 148, 168, 169, 186, 192, 316n7

World War I, 96, 234, 251 World War II, 61, 70, 96, 108, 146, 234;

American citizens’ ignorance about, 239; genocide during, 13n, 225; human rights standards aft er, 220; League of Nations’ failure and, 252; role in debate over 2003 Iraq invasion, 249–50; surge of immi- gration to Europe following, 186

xenophobia. See immigration

Yellen, Janet, 157 Yemen, 221, 255, 259 Yugoslavia, genocide in, 225, 253–54

Zimring, Frank, 225 Zuckerman, Phil, 99