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4_Policy Analysis Army Future Combat System.doc

Central Michigan University

Master of Science in Administration (MSA) Program

Course Title: MSA 600 Administration Research and Report Methods

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A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ARMY’S FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS) PROGRAM

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A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ARMY’S FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS) PROGRAM

MSA 600 Administrative Research and Report Methods

Submitted by:

[Student Name]

Project Instructor:

[Professor Name]

[Submission Date]

Table of Contents

Page Number

List of Tables ii

List of Figures ii

Chapter 1 Problem Definition 1

Chapter 2 Literature Review 7

Chapter 3 Research Methodology 15

Chapter 4 Data Analysis [Future]

Chapter 5 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations [Future]

Terminology and Definitions Page 18

References Pages 19-22

Appendix A Permission to Conduct Study

Appendix B Transmittal Letter/Survey Instructions

Appendix C Survey/Interview Questions

Chapter 1

Problem Definition

Administrative Problem

"We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war. Power is increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information; safety is gained in stealth; and forces are projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons.”

Governor George Bush at the Citadel, September 1999

Background

In October 1999, the U.S. Army launched its Future Combat System program (Feickert, 2005, p CRS-1). Commonly referred to as “FCS”, it was the brainchild of General Eric Shinseki, then Chief of Staff of the Army. Since that time, the FCS program has become the Army’s premiere, multi-year, multi-billion dollar modernization and acquisition program, designed to transform the Army’s ground combat units by radically upgrading their war fighting capabilities. General Shinseki intended for the program to make units lighter (in weight), so they would require less time to deploy (transport) to a military theater preceding the start of a conflict. The faster the U.S. could build up combat forces in a military theater, the quicker it could begin fighting; thereby decreasing the time an adversary had available to react to the U.S. buildup of forces. In the case of the February 1991, Gulf War, it took the U.S. Army almost six full months of transporting units to the Saudi Arabia desert before it had built up enough combat power to begin the war and ultimately liberate Kuwait. General Shinseki understood that in future wars the U.S. could not afford to spend six months building combat power in a far away land before its Army was ready to start hostilities. He knew that if the U.S. Army were to remain relevant long in the 21st Century, then it would need to decrease the weight of its combat units in order to increase the speed at which they could deploy.

The main factor limiting rapid deployment of current Army units is the weight of its vehicles, primarily its M1 tanks and M2 infantry fighting vehicles. General Shinseki believed that by replacing the Army’s fleet of heavy weight combat vehicles with lighter ones, the Army could deploy (transport) its combat units to a military theater (i.e., the Iraq Theater) much more quickly than it had in the past. The latest version of the M1 tank weighs over 68 tons, and with armor add-ons, an M2 weighs in at 36 tons (U.S. Army, Weapons Systems 07-08, 2007).

Figure 1.1 M1 Tank and M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)

Source: (M1 photo obtained from http://www.army-technology.com, Nov 2007. M2 photo obtained from http://www.globalsecurity.org, Nov 2007)

Due to their weight of heavy combat vehicles like the M1 and M2, the U.S. military can only move a very small number of these combat vehicles into a military theater by air. This situation necessitates the acquisition of lighter vehicles. To that end, the FCS program is proposing to design and acquire a fleet of much lighter armored vehicle using new – some as yet unproven – concepts. These new vehicles will begin replacing the M1 tank and M2 infantry fighting vehicles in 2015.

In 2005 the Army announced a major business restructuring of the FCS program (U.S. Army Public Affairs, 2005). Between 1999 and 2003 a series of problematic programming issues, unanticipated projected cost increases, and technology feasibility anxieties began to emerge, which led to members of Congress raising concerns with the program. In turn, this pressured Army leadership to take action and make corrections to the program. In August 2003, the new Army Chief of Staff, then General Peter Schoomaker, reacted by modifying the Army’s long-range development strategy and directed that individual FCS technologies start being inserted into the current Army force (current Army units) “as soon as they became available instead of waiting a decade or more before they could be integrated into other FCS platforms and technologies under development” (Feickert, 2005, p CRS-3). However, criticism of the FCS program continued, caused in part by the lead systems integrator approach the Army was taking in allowing Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to subcontract major design and build phases of the program’s hardware and software projects. Lead systems integrator approaches were relatively new to the government at that time, and not well understood for the value they offer in managing a large, complex program.

In response to continued criticisms, the Army reviewed the program in early 2005 and announced a major restructuring effort in April of that year. Improvements were made in regard to how contractual, programmatic and managerial processes were handled within the program (U.S. Army Public Affairs, 2005). The Army also took the opportunity to formally link FCS to its Army Modular Force Initiative through its Future Combat Force Strategy (U.S. Army Public Affairs, 2005). Part of the restructuring included the addition of scheduled in-depth reviews of the program at least three times a year by the Army Secretary and Army Chief of Staff. Additional changes added new oversight requirements to be carried out by the Army’s Audit Agency, Army Science Board, and an outside panel of advisors who are chartered to conduct “periodic independent cost, schedule and technical viability assessments” (U.S. Army Public Affairs, 2005).

Throughout the FCS program’s history however, one primary issue has emerged as both central to its success and emblematic of its potential for failure. This is the issue of the FCS lightweight common armored vehicle scheduled to replace the Army’s current armored vehicles, vehicles such as the M1 tank and M2 infantry fighting vehicle. While the overall goal of FCS as originally outlined in 1999 by General Shinseki is a lighter, and therefore more deployable Army, many doubt a lightweight armored vehicle can survive on the modern battlefield. For example, there are multiple reasons why the current M1 tank weighs 68 tons. To begin with, a massive chassis is required in order to carry its huge turret and 120mm main gun. Another reason is that thick armor is required to protect it from enemy rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and roadside bombs seen in Iraq and Afghanistan (called improvised explosive devices, or IEDs).

The Army intends for the FCS program to produce a common, lighter weight, armored vehicle to replace today’s heavy armored vehicles. This new FCS armored vehicle will come in eight different variants, from tank to battlefield ambulance, and is scheduled to begin low rate initial production as early as 2010. By 2015 the Army plans for at least one active duty unit, called a Brigade Combat Team, to be fully equipped with FCS vehicles (Program Manager, FCS Brigade Combat Team, 2007, p 4).

Questions however, remain on whether or not a significantly lighter armored vehicle can survive on the extremely lethal modern battlefield. For example, current threats encountered by armored vehicles in Iraq involve large buried IEDs (dug into roads which explode as a vehicle rolls over them), anti-tank mines, RPGs, and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). Explosively formed penetrators are essentially an anti-tank mine that is stood up alongside a road and aimed to explode as a vehicle passes by. These devices attempt to penetrate the side of an armored vehicle, where it is traditionally less protected and more vulnerable.

The planned FCS armored vehicle will compensate for its smaller weight and less armor (than today’s vehicles) by employing a combination of explosive reactive armor and an active vehicle protection system. Explosive reactive armor is comprised of small, metal, explosives-filled boxes attached to the side of the vehicle, which are designed to explode outward when struck by an enemy round. In contrast, an active protection system consists of a small 3600 radar atop a vehicle that can spot large incoming projectiles such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). When it senses an inbound RPG it shoots into the air (in the RPG’s flight path) a hand grenade size explosive that either knocks the RPG off course and away from the vehicle or destroys it altogether. While explosive reactive armor has been used successfully on the battlefield by various armies for about two decades, there is currently not a single active protection system used by any army. Several countries have plans to implement active protection systems on their armored vehicles in the future, but none do so today. At this time, active protection systems are still untested in battle.

Figure 1.2 The eight planned Army FCS vehicle variants

Source: (U.S. Army FCS Program Manager, Brigade Combat Team, 2007, Overview White Paper)

The problem the FCS program finds itself in today is primarily a question of whether or not its planned lighter weight armored vehicle will be an effective replacement for today’s heavier, better protected vehicles. The Army predicts that these new lighter FCS armored vehicles will translate into increased strategic mobility. Strategic mobility directly relates to the time it takes to move military forces to an overseas military theater. An FCS armored vehicle is projected to weight no more than 27 tons. This lighter weight will mean more of them can be moved by U.S. Air Force (USAF) cargo aircraft, thereby achieving greater strategic mobility for Army units. For example, whereas a USAF C-5 cargo aircraft can currently carry no more than one 68 ton M1 tank, the same aircraft will be able to carry three FCS vehicles. Of course, armored vehicles are rarely transported from the United States to a military theater via aircraft. Currently, they are more often than not, transported by ship. It is unknown, then, if the reduction in weight will result in the anticipated attendant increase in strategic mobility for Army units equipped with FCS vehicles.

Figure 1.3 The two primary FCS vehicle variants Source: (U.S. Army FCS Program Manager, Brigade Combat Team, 2007, Overview White Paper)

A second major consideration for FCS is whether or not a common vehicle can satisfy all eight different vehicle variant requirements. Will the FCS program be able to create at least a common chassis (normally called a “hull” when referring to a tank)? A common armored vehicle chassis, consisting of the lower portion of the vehicle (tracks, drive train, suspension, driver and crew compartments), is the current goal for the FCS vehicle. At first glance it would seem logical that a common chassis could work for all eight variants, but there may be limitations or special requirements, which might prevent a common chassis from being utilized. Of course, having a common chassis, one sharing 60-70% commonality in parts among all variants, would be a significant step towards reducing the amount of spare parts unit maintenance crews must carry in the field. Another advantage of a common vehicle chassis is that support units equipped with this vehicle would be able to keep pace with combat units.

In fact, the concept of creating a commonality among systems has already taken hold in the U.S. Marine Corps. The Marine Corps started a major upgrade to their AH-1Z Super Cobra and UH-1Y Huey helicopter aircraft in 2004. The program has a goal of 84% parts commonality between the Cobra and Huey airframes. Because of this commonality, the Marine Corps is expecting to save at least $3 billion in operating and support costs over the next 30 years (the lifespan of these two aircraft types) (Chisholm, 2002).

However, one question that immediately comes to mind in regard to FCS is if the benefits of a common vehicle chassis really are as good as they seem, then why hasn’t another Army already produced such a vehicle? Perhaps until now, armored vehicle technologies (engines, drive trains, and suspensions) were not far enough advanced to allow for the creation of a common chassis. Or perhaps there are legitimate reasons – already learned by other armies – why the concept is not feasible. For example, main battle tanks are built especially heavy to withstand the powerful recoil shock created by their large main guns (120mm for the M1). Smaller vehicles like the M2 infantry fighting vehicle would not be able to withstand the powerful recoil forces of a 120mm gun mounted in its turret. With the FCS program, the Army is betting heavily that vehicle commonality is both practicable and technologically feasible.

The third major consideration for FCS deals with its eight vehicle variant types. The FCS program’s plan of having only eight armored vehicle variants is a decrease in the total number of vehicle types used in today’s force. For instance, in addition to the eight variants proposed, current units also have armored engineer vehicles, armored air defense vehicles, and armored rocket firing vehicles. In fact, the Army’s engineer branch alone operates three different types (variants) of armored vehicles: the Grizzly obstacle removal vehicle, the Wolverine bridge laying vehicle, and the M9 combat earthmover. How will FCS equipped units breech battlefield obstacles if they do not have dedicated engineer vehicles capable of reducing (removing) complex battlefield obstacles?

A fourth area of interest for FCS concerns the potential need for additional built-in vehicle features. Given the rapid pace of technological development, what types of additional features or capabilities could benefit these vehicles? For example, without a designated air defense variant, FCS equipped units will be unable to defend themselves from air attack. The current Army force uses a modified M2 infantry fighting vehicle called the Linebacker in a dedicated air defense role. The Linebacker fires Stinger air defense missiles to destroy low flying aircraft such as enemy helicopters and ground attack planes. If the eight FCS vehicle variants do not include a dedicated air defense variant, then what special features, or modifications, would be required to them in order to ensure a unit can defend itself from air attack?

Finally, if the common armored vehicle is to be successful, it must be able to operate in any operational environment. Army acquisition history is replete with examples of failed major weapons system programs, due to their inability to support the force, given the environment at the time. One example this is the Crusader 155 mm self-propelled artillery system program, terminated by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld May 8, 2002. At the time, Rumsfeld said Crusader was, “…a system that was originally designed in a different strategic context” (Smith, 2002). In other words, Crusader was not designed to operate in the asymmetric threat environment of the early 21st Century.

Therefore, the projected threat environment for 2015 must be taken into account. Military programs are often analyzed in terms of their effectiveness at countering a particular threat, or adversary. However, when the Army’s first FCS equipped unit becomes operational in 2015, it is likely that one, single, coherent adversary will not exist. Instead, we can anticipate several potential adversaries among state and non-state actors. In fact, the U.S. has not faced an easily definable, coherent adversary since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. So what will the threat environment look like in 2015? Much has been written on the subject and many theories have been put forward, and through this debate five consistent themes have emerged.

First, there exists a high likelihood of an enemy utilizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against U.S. forces on a future battlefield. If, at some point, the U.S. decides to disarm WMD-capable countries such as North Korea or Iran, then any U.S. ground invasion to do so will likely be met by the enemy’s use of chemicals, biological agents, or even nuclear materials. Friendly units may find themselves fighting on what the military calls a “dirty battlefield”. This situation will require Army forces to have the best individual and vehicular protection equipment, preventing dangerous WMD exposure.

Another emerging theme is that the speed of our adversaries to conduct combat operations on the future battlefield will be even greater than in the last war. In his October 23, 2007, address to over 800 military officers attending the Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Command and General Staff College, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, reiterated this point when he

stated:

“Well, I’ll tell you what I believe in terms of the future of war fighting.

I think we’re going to have to be faster, more flexible, more

adaptable, more lethal, more precise, [have] less [of a permanent]

footprint, [and be] more mobile…”(U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

and Fort Leavenworth, 2007).

Admiral Mullen’s comment highlights that senior military leaders – and there is none higher than him – understand that the near real time speed of television and cell phone communications available to enemy military and civilian leaders and terrorists require that U.S. Army forces on the future battlefield be able to conduct military operations at an even quicker pace than today if they are to stay ahead of an adversary’s decision making cycle.

The third emerging theme on what the threat environment will look like in 2015 indicates the al-Qaeda terrorist network will still be a threat to the U.S. at that time. Deeply entrenched in northwest Pakistan, al-Qaeda’s senior leaders remain consistently able to recruit new terrorist members from throughout both the Middle East and western world, train them in military skills at Pakistan terrorist training camps, and then make plans for their use in terrorist operations capable of reaching around the globe. Of course, a major contributing factor aiding the al-Qaeda network’s recruitment campaign in the Middle East is continued U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the American presence there provides justification for continued jihadist recruitment. Undoubtedly, the flame of Islamic extremism will burn itself out over time, but it will likely be at least one generation – and maybe even two generations – before the world sees an end to this cultural disease.

The fourth emerging theme for the 2015 threat environment predicts that Army units will be required to operate at great distances from their higher headquarters. Already in both Iraq and Afghanistan Army units are responsible for areas as large as hundreds of square miles. Likely future conflicts in remote areas such as North Korea, Iran, and northwest Pakistan will require FCS equipped units to operate at even greater distances than today, requiring them to evacuate their wounded soldiers, communicate, and conduct resupply operations over long distances into remote areas. The need to evacuate wounded personnel (casualties) over great distances in order to reach a medical treatment facility will be a result of this increased range and mobility of FCS enabled units. Units will also need the ability to communicate over vast distances, requiring use of either encrypted tactical satellite radios or satellite phones. Safely moving resupply convoys along road networks running through enemy infested areas will be another challenge in this environment, demanding that FCS enabled units have the overwhelming firepower and tactical mobility to transit these distances safely.

The final emerging theme defining the 2015 threat environment is the notion of disruptive technology. It is expected by some military industry analysts that between now and 2015, adversarial countries will continue to develop disruptive military technologies designed to “offset traditional U.S. military advantages” (Spacewar.com, 2006). A form of asymmetric warfare, potential adversaries create disruptive technologies in an attempt to “use relatively inexpensive, but highly disruptive technologies to impede…better equipped and better trained US forces” (Zhong, 2007). Examples of disruptive technologies include: 1) ground based GPS signal jammers which attempt to prevent Army forces from finding their exact location, 2) computer network attacks designed to disable a network through overloading it with useless data, 3) electromagnetic pulse attacks against military communications and other equipment by the explosion of a high-powered microwave weapon, and 4) use of anti-satellite weapons capable of destroying communications, navigation, or intelligence gathering satellites.

With $3.7 billion requested by the Army for the FCS program in the 2008 defense budget, and an overall lifetime cost of potentially $200-300 billion, there is real pressure on the FCS program to design and produce an effective FCS common armored vehicle (Garamone, 2007). Additionally, over the past decade several large Army programs have been terminated, due to either poor program management, large unexpected cost increases, or over reliance on critical technologies, which were unable to mature quickly enough. This has led to stringent oversight and monitoring of FCS by congressional officials as they attempt to keep a close eye on the program and ensure it produces the promised common armored vehicle its program charter promises. Failure to do so means the Army will have to keep and maintain its fleet of heavy M1 and M2 armored vehicles, a fleet with reduced ability to deploy overseas.

Research Problem

Begun in 1999, the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) program was the brainchild of then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki. The Army will spend almost $4 billion on the program in fiscal year 2008. One of its central goals is the development of a lightweight common armored vehicle to replace the heavier, less deployable M1 tank and M2 infantry fighting vehicle. Program managers plan to create eight different variants of the vehicle. Given this, the primary research problem of this study is, will the FCS program be effective when implemented in 2015? In order to answer this central problem, three secondary questions (sub-problems) will also be addressed. First, will a lightweight (approximately 27 ton) common armored vehicle be survivable on the modern battlefield? Second, will a common vehicle benefit the Army? And third, what additional vehicle variants are needed?

Research Objective

The primary intended audience for this study is the U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) Program Management Office at Fort Bliss, Texas. The results of this study will further the development of the FCS program’s common armored vehicle, as well as bringing to light significant problem areas with the planned eight vehicle variants – and at a much earlier time than these areas would have naturally arisen in the normal progression of the program’s development. Additionally, study recommendations effecting Army doctrine will be forwarded the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

The potential importance of this study cannot be underestimated. Benefits derived from this project will be significant. Changes implemented as a result of this study will impact all Army FCS equipped units; approximately one half of the total active Army force will be impacted. Conclusions reached in this paper will lead to changes in force design, new technology developments, and doctrinal changes in how Army units train and fight in the 21st Century. Identified capability gaps between those which FCS vehicles are required to possess, and their actual capability will come to light as a result of this research project. These conclusions will be of tremendous value to the FCS Program Management Office. Study results will stimulate debate among military and civilian FCS program managers, discussions that could lead to changes in overall FCS program objectives and/or vehicle design. Additionally, with respect to time, the study of this subject now (2008) will be of strategic significance, and have strategic advantages, to the FCS program. While the first FCS equipped units become operational in early 2015, senior decision makers will be making final “capability decisions” in the 2008-2010 timeframe. Capability gaps identified now, help focus FCS program development on the most critically important priorities, saving time and resources in the long-term. If not addressed now (2008), problems concerning the survivability, feasibility, and capability of the FCS common armored vehicle may threaten the very survival of the Army’s FCS program, as well as the success of FCS equipped Army combat units on the future battlefield.

Scope

This study evaluates certain selected aspects of the U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS program is an extremely large and complex, multi-year, multi-billion dollar program consisting of many sub-organizations and processes. However, the focus of this study is specifically on the technological issues concerning the program’s planned common armored vehicle. Still in the design phase, the vehicle is projected to be a lightweight (near 27 ton) armored vehicle to replace the Army’s current M1 tank and M2 infantry fighting vehicle – and the M2’s many variants. Only three specific aspects of the FCS vehicle are studied in this research paper: survivability, feasibility, and variant types.

Other aspects of the FCS program are not studied in this particular effort. Specifically, issues concerning whether or not the M1 and M2 should be totally removed from the Army’s inventory or kept for potential use on a future battlefield once FCS vehicles are fielded are not be studied. In addition, this study limits its comparisons between current M1/M2 vehicles and planned FCS replacements to those comparisons absolutely necessary. Finally, this research makes no attempt to analyze the current structure of today’s Army combat units, nor make recommendations on any aspects.

- Mounted Combat System - Replaces the M1 tank

- Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Replaces the M2 IFV