Crisis Communication Problem Solving Research Paper

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Creative Communication Problem-Solving Report

Dr. Stephen Flaherty

Ohio University MEM department

Athens, OH 45701

Dear Dr. Flaherty:

Subject: BP oil spill creative communication problem-solving

The following report addresses the BP oil spill and how to communicate accurate information during a crisis such as this. In this report, I summarize the communication problem and research I conducted to better understand the situation and crisis communication, and then I propose communication solutions and an implementation plan.

I appreciate being assigned with the task of researching this communication challenge. This study has granted me the opportunity to research the problem and address the issue with relevant information. I have gained a new perspective on the topic and feel that I could effectively communicate in a crisis situation.

Should you wish to discuss this project further, please contact me via e-mail at [email protected]

Sincerely,

/sld

Attachment

Executive Summary

The purpose of this paper is to play the role of an engineering consultant that is assigned with developing a plan to clearly communicate the technical causes that resulted in the BP Deepwater catastrophe to the non-technical stakeholders, such as shareholders, politicians, lenders, government agencies, and victims. The objective was to identify the crisis communication problem, create a plan for researching these details in order to develop a creative solution, and produce this research report that explains the communication problem and provides a solution and implementation plan recommended based off of the research. This paper is composed of an introduction, summary of the problem, summary of the research, proposed solution, proposed implementation plan, and a conclusion. In the introduction, the disaster is described and the purpose of the paper is explained.

The report first explains the problems and complexity of the BP disaster and the various possible causes of the catastrophe and the difficulty in communicating the technical aspects of the problem to non-technical stakeholders. It addresses the eight technical issues that failed and eventually led to the explosion. The non-technical issues and causes are also briefly addressed. The summary of research describes the need for researching the technical issues of the BP oil spill in order to gain a basic understanding of the technical failures; and also addresses the research conducted to provide an effective communication solution and implementation plan.

In this report, there is a proposed solution for the before mentioned problem. The solution is simple in theory but challenging to execute. A simple, non-technical explanation of the technical issues can be found in the ‘proposed solution’ section of the report and is accompanied with a brief list of technical solutions to prevent another like this from ever happening. The solution is based on the research done for this project.

The implementation plan in this report explains the importance of crisis communication. An effective crisis communication plan is the key to managing the outcomes after a disaster. It is important to provide stakeholders with enough information throughout the process, in a timely, respectful, and calculated manner. Using dirty or negative tactics can ruin the reputation of the organizations and people involved. The goal of a crisis communicator is to right any wrongs, mitigate negative outcomes, and repair reputations by keeping the stakeholders and victims properly informed. The four basic steps in this crisis communication plan are: take responsibility, inform the stakeholders, communicate courses of action, and bolster and redress.

Based off of the research, this plan should result in positive outcomes.

Table of Contents

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Introduction Error: Reference source not found

Summary of the Problem Error: Reference source not found

Summary of the Research 6

Proposed Solution 7-8

Proposed Implementation Plan……………………………………………………………….8-9

Conclusion 9

Works Cited Page 10

Appendix Figure 1 11

Appendix Figure 2 11

Introduction

On 20 April, 2010 a drilling rig named the Deepwater Horizon, performing an exploratory expedition in the Macondo Prospect of the Gulf of Mexico, exploded and sank. As a result, eleven rig workers lost their lives. This disaster caused millions of barrels of oil to flow from the well, causing one of the largest wildlife disasters ever. Multiple investigations into the disaster came to the conclusion that eight failures most likely caused the disaster, along with poor safety practices, training, and decision making. The well was finally capped on 15 July 2010. This report seeks to communicate the technical issues that caused the catastrophic oil spill to non-technical stakeholders such as shareholders, politicians, government agencies, and lenders.

Summary of the Problem

The problem is that this is not a simple crisis to address. There are tons of people, companies, and government agencies involved and the complete cause of the disaster cannot be easily explained. Investigations into the technical causes have concluded that there were most likely eight reasons for the catastrophic failure, but they are very complicated to understand and communicate to non-technical people. Also, these conclusions aren’t based on one hundred percent certainty. There are also non-technical factors that led to the disaster, such as neglect, lack of knowledge, finances, poor decision making, and poor communication.

The technical findings that led to the disaster are difficult to the non-technical lay-person, and even people that are not familiar with deep-water drilling. It is important to effectively communicate the problem and its underlying issues, and that will be addressed in a later section. It will be difficult to explain the underlying issues here, but the following are short descriptions of the eight causes that BP provided in their report Deepwater Horizon accident investigation report (2010):

1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons

2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons

3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established

4. The influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser

5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well

6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig

7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition

8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal well

There were also some organizational and interpersonal problems that led to the total system failure. The managers made decisions that ignored safety in caution in favor of staying on schedule and making a profit, so leadership could be a cause. Many of the rig workers were not trained or were complacent due to long periods of working in certain unsafe conditions. Finally, poor communication played a role in what led to a chain reaction that caused the event — some words of wisdom did not make it into enough peoples’ ears to warrant and reactions that may have prevented the disaster.

Summary of the Research

My first goal was to understand deep-water oil drilling and what caused the disaster. Research on the technologies used by BP, Transocean, and Halliburton helped me understand the complexity of the situation, but this led me to realize that this disaster was a freak accident that could have been prevented at many points of time leading up to the disaster. I researched investigation reports, government reports and even watched a documentary to get a better understanding of the disaster. A person must fully understand a complex idea before he or she can describe it simply, and that is what I was set out to do in order to effectively communicate the disaster to stakeholders.

It was important to have a basic understanding of deep-water oil drilling, the technology used in the industry, physics, and chemistry. Many of the ideas and technologies were directly connected or part of a system, like the technical causes annotated in the previous section. Through my research I encountered the following:

· Annulus

· Hydrocarbons

· Nitrified foam cement

· Oil wells

· Wellbores

· Shoe tracks

· Pressure tests

· Float collars

· Blowout Protectors

· Risers

· Mud gas separators

· And many more concepts that combine with the previous and result in a complex process

As you can see, these are not everyday concepts and technologies and are difficult to explain, so it took hours of research for me to gain a basic understanding. I had to come up with an effective way of communicating this crisis to the stakeholders. See figure 1 of the appendix for a diagram of the well.

In order to effectively communicate this crisis and the complexity involved, I had to research techniques for crisis communication techniques. My research led to several scholarly articles that described multiple ways to effectively communicate in various different kinds of crises. In my studies, I came across various techniques that state the dos and don’ts of crisis communication and one of the biggest recommendations is to not deny involvement in a disaster such as this and take responsibility. Another key point is to provide as much information to the stakeholders as clearly and often as possible. My research has prepared me to successfully provide a solution and recommendation.

Proposed Solution

The solution is clear but challenging: address the stakeholders, describe the situation in layman’s terms, and present a recommended course of action. A brief description of the situation should suffice and can be explained as so:

This incident was the result of a complex series of events that trigged a disaster. Multiple parties were involved (including BP, Halliburton, and Transocean) and many decisions were made that led up to the disaster. There were many organizational, interpersonal, and technical problems that came into play, and I intend to cover the technical problems in more detail. Let it be known that poor communication, decision making, and safety practices all played a role in this disaster — negligence was often the course of action in lieu of safety and caution, all for the sake of profits.

On April 19, 2010, cement had been pumped into the wellbore to prevent oil and gas from leaking out of the well and into the pipe. This cement did not seal and it is concluded that there were flaws in the cement formulation, quality assurance, and risk estimates. It was also determined that the mechanical valves — that also prevent oil and gas from leaking into the pipe — failed and did not prevent oil and gas from traveling up the pipe to the surface. The crew aboard the Deepwater Horizon conducted multiple tests to determine if the well was sealed but the results were misinterpreted and the crew continued working with the assumption that the well was sealed, and later began to pump seawater into the well as part of normal operations. This introduction of seawater caused the pressure to change and an influx of oil and gas into the wellbore.

Approximately an hour before the explosion, the flow of oil and gas began to increase enough that a leak should have been detected in the real-time pressure test, but the team made the incorrect assumption that the change in pressure was not a leak. Minutes before the explosion gas and mud began to flow onto the rig and the crew attempted to shut a valve in the blowout preventer, a mechanical device used to prevent oil and gas from blowing out of a well. The crew could have safely diverted the mud and gas over the side of the rig, but this action did not happen and the flow was instead diverted to a small device called the mud-gas separator. The small device quickly became overwhelmed and gas flowed into the rig. The system that detects gas on the rig, alerts the crew, and attempts to divert the gas away from areas with ignition sources failed. The gas spread into the rig and ignited, causing a massive explosion.

The explosion severed the control line links used by the crew to close the safety valves in the blowout preventer. The blowout preventer was outfitted with two separate systems that should have automatically sealed the well in the event of the loss of hydraulic pressure, electric power, and communications from the rig. It was discovered that the two systems were likely faulty during the time of the incident and did not seal the well. One was found to have a faulty solenoid and the other had dead batteries. There was an attempt to seal the well 33 hours after the explosion using a remotely operated vehicle but this also failed. With all of this being said, our course of action is to fix the problem, aid those that are impacted, and ensure everyone that this will never happen again.

It is important to understand the complexities of the problem to answer and pressing questions from the stakeholders, but keep the overall explanations simple. Recognize that the details were explained without being overly complex or complicated. It is also recommended that a course of action be presented to the stakeholders to ensure that the situation is being handled properly and one like it will never happen again. There are popular solutions for preventing a disaster of this scale from happening again in the future, but the full details are beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the popular solutions I have discovered in my research are:

· Adding a second blind shear to the BOP

· Independent BOP activation control that is triggered by audio

· More visual data from the BOPs, such as ram positions, contents of tubes, etc.

· Complete off-site transmission of data

· Real-time modeling of fluids and pressures in tubular (simulations)

Proposed Implementation Plan

It is crucial to communicate often and effectively with the victims and stakeholders during a time of crisis. Waiting too long can be devastating, as rumors and false information will begin to circulate and ruin the reputation of the organization and parties involved. Also, poor delivery of the information, or even poor information, is a big risk. It is important to factually address the situation in a tone that is confident yet sympathizing. It is important to have a good crisis management team with an assigned spokesperson ready to quickly and effectively respond to a crisis such as this. A proper plan should be in place with the right methods, steps, and contingencies. It may be worthwhile to negotiate with stakeholders and other parties and is necessary or recommended to work with government agencies. The main goal should be to communicate in a way in which will reduce negatives outcomes, such as anger, retaliation, costs, ruined reputations, etc. The following is a general plan of crisis communication course of action in this case:

1. Take responsibility, do not blame others or deny responsibility.

2. Inform the stakeholders of what occurred, provide a thorough threat assessment.

3. Communicate the course of action.

4. Bolster and redress.

The first step to crisis communication is taking responsibility and apologizing. Acknowledge and express that other parties and organizations (Halliburton, Transocean, etc.) were involved, but your organization will take responsibility for this disaster. Denial and blaming others can have a negative impact on the reputation of the organization and its people. Using dirty or negative tactics can be offensive to everyone involved. Showing competence and integrity will keep reputations intact and instill confidence in the victims and stakeholders. They need to know what caused this disaster, the description found in the previsions section so that they can better understand how the problem will be corrected and prevented from ever happening again. The stakeholders have to be reminded that deep-water oil drilling will safely continue and that it is in the best interests of the parties involved to carry on with drilling operations. Just in 2009, deep-water oil production increased approximately 46% and gas production approximately 10%. See the figure 2 in the appendix.

Move into action fast. It may be recommended to overact in a crisis on a scale such as this one. Bolster the initiative to correct this problem and prevent one like it from ever happening again in the future. The victims and stakeholders will want a quick and smooth resolution and will desire confidence in the safety and prevention of this type of disaster more than ever. Addressing the victims and their concerns, and frequent communication backed by evidence-based information is the key. The key in this situation is to show sympathy while repaying and repairing the damages done those who were impacted by this disaster. Also, make sure that the actions being taken match the words being spoken.

Conclusion

Researching this project and coming up with a solution to this complex problem has been a rewarding experience for me. I believe that effective crisis communication is important because I have seen first-hand the chaos and heightened emotions that bad communication can cause. I would hope that I do not have to develop this type of solution in a real world situation but I know it is a realistic probability and is best to be prepared, which I feel that I am now. It amazes me how poorly organizations handle crises these days. I would recommend that companies like BP and government agencies implement better crisis communication plans.

References

Ingersoll, C., Locke, R. M., & Reavis, C. (3 april 2012). BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010. 10(110), 2-28. Retrieved March 3, 2018, from http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/

Graham, B., Rielly, W. K., Bienecke, F., Boesch, D. F., Garcia, T. D., Murray, C. A., & Ulmer, F. (2011, January 1). Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. Retrieved March 4, 2018, from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf

(Report to the President)

Coombs, W. T. (2015). The value of communication during a crisis: Insights from strategic communication research. Business Horizons,58(2), 141-148. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2014.10.003

Johnston, T. M., & Goggin, S. N. (2015). Presidential Confidence in Crisis: Blame, Media, and the BP Oil Spill. Presidential Studies Quarterly,45(3), 467-489. doi:10.1111/psq.12206

Gregory, D. (6 october 2008). Communicating in a crisis: A risk management issue? Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning,3(1), 31-37. Retrieved March 4, 2018.

Knight, M. (2013). Communicating in a Crisis. Business Communication Quarterly,76(1), 3-4. doi: 10.1177/1080569913478583

Home | Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. (n.d.). Retrieved March 04, 2018, from https://www.bsee.gov/

BP. (2010, September 8). Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report: Executive Summary. Retrieved March 4, 2018, from https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/sustainability/issue-reports/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report_Executive_summary.pdf

Appendix

Figure 1: Macondo Well (www.bp.com)

Figure 2: GOM OCS Deepwater Production, % of Total (www.data.bsee.gov)

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