Paper 3

Scenario Mutability and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame

Former Student

Florida International University

Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: You can begin this section with the general phrase “Study Two”. In Paper IV, this section will come immediately after the short discussion for Study One, so it will flow nicely from what you already did in prior papers

Although most of the general population engages in counterfactual thinking, the number of counterfactual thoughts created varies between people. This is because the development of numerous counterfactual thoughts is determined by the overall mutability of a situation as well as the distinct differences between individuals (Alquist et al., 2015). For example, people who have an inclination for structuring situations in meaningful, integrated ways, or more aptly put, have a high need for cognition, are more prone to elaborate on presented information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Therefore, these individuals might be more likely to participate in the generation of counterfactual thoughts than individuals who typically avoid effortful cognitive activity, or have a low need for cognition (Sargent, 2004). Despite the fact that several studies have researched scenario mutability and need for cognition, no prior findings have examined the influence these two variables have on the assignment of blame. The primary focus of our second study, therefore, is to analyze the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct Need for Cognition of each subject.

On a related note, an experiment conducted by Wevodau et al. (2014) found a substantial positive association between NFC and the allocation of blame. The researchers found that that highly motivated individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive processing tend to assign more culpability than cognitively reserved individuals.

In pursuance of scenario changeability and NFC, study two analyzed the extent of culpability placed on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct need for cognition of each subject. Fortunately, we measured whether participants were high or low in NFC in study one, so in study two we looked at whether being high or low in NFC impacted the way participants perceived the guilt of the cab driver. Note that we dropped the neutral condition since it provided results nearly identical to the unchangeable condition.

We have one additional analysis for Study Two, though this includes two main effects and one interaction for the dependent variable “level of blame”. Here, we predicted a main effect for condition such that those in the changeable condition should find more blame than those in the unchangeable condition. This follows from study one, where participants blamed the taxi driver more when his cab made it safely across the bridge than when he passed safely. We also predicted a NFC main effect for blame wherein those high in NFC would find more blame than those low in NFC. That is, thinking deeply about the accident might elevate blameworthiness assessments compared to thinking shallowly. More important, we predicted an interaction of condition and NFC on blame such that participants find the taxi driver more blameworthy in the high NFC and changeable condition compared to all other conditions. Low NFC and unchangeable participants should produce the lowest levels of blame.

Methods Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: As you can see, since we are simply reanalyzing data from our original data collection phase, this section is pretty short. Just make sure to highlight your second independent variable, the main dependent variable you intend to analyze, and your different set of participants

Participants

One hundred and sixty subjects, 90% (n = 144) university students, were recruited to participate in study two. Of these 160 participants, 33% (n = 52) were male and 67% (n = 108) were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 64 with an average of 22.38 years (SD = 5.14). Our sample population consisted of 76% Hispanic Americans (n = 122), 9% African Americans (n = 15), 9% Caucasians (n = 14), 3% Asian American (n = 5), and 3% Others (n = 4). See Table 6. Comment by Ryan Winter: Note that this student started with Table 6. She had 5 tables for Study One (including a t-Test, which you were not required to do), so her next table number sequentially is 6. Your will probably be Table 5.

Materials and Procedure

In this follow-up analysis, all study material are identical to that in study one. That is, the Study Two participants are the same participants used in study one, and thus they had already read the story involving the taxi and thee paraplegic couple (though in Study Two we included only the changeable and unchangeable conditions, dropping the neutral condition (as it did not differ from the unchangeable condition in Study One). The most important difference in Study Two was our focus on a previously unanalyzed Need For Cognition independent variable. That is, in study one we ascertained whether participants were high versus low in NFC by asking them whether they enjoyed thinking deeply when making decisions or if they preferred going with their gut reactions. We labeled the formed High NFC and the latter Low NFC. Nothing else differed from Study One.

Although we collected several different dependent variables during Study One, the one we are most interested in pursuing in Study Two is whether participants blame the taxi driver on a scale ranging from 1 (no blame at all) to 9 (total blame). We will assess blame across the four conditions of our 2 X 2 factorial design: High NFC and changeable, High NFC and unchangeable, Low NFC and changeable, and Low NFC and unchangeable.

Results Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: I only need one additional analysis from you in Paper IV, but it MUST be a 2 X 2 ANOVA. I expect to see F tests for both main effects (as well as means and SDs). I also expect to see an interaction F test. If significant, follow-up with simple effects tests!

To test our first dependent variable, we ran a 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA with NFC (high vs. low) and scenario condition (changeable vs. unchangeable) as our independent variables and the perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver as our dependent variable. Results demonstrated no significant main effect for NFC on perceived blame, F(1, 152) = 1.69, p = .196. This means that there was no meaningful differences in the assignment of culpability between the high-NFC (M = 3.72, SD = 2.44) and low-NFC group (M = 4.12, SD = 2.49). There was, however, a significant main effect for scenario condition, F(1, 152) = 3.98, p = .048. Participants in the changeable condition (M = 4.27, SD = 2.35) perceived the taxi driver to be more blameworthy for the couple’s death than participants in the unchangeable condition (M = 3.56, SD = 2.47). Unfortunately, there was no interaction of NFC and scenario, F(1, 152) = 0.00, p = .985, meaning that perceived culpability did not significantly differ among high NFC changeable participants (M = 4.04, SD = 2.28), high NFC unchangeable participants (M = 3.27, SD = 2.44), low NFC changeable participants (M = 4.56, SD = 2.44), and low NFC unchangeable participants (M = 3.77, SD = 2.51). See Table 7.

Discussion Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: The study two discussion is pretty short once again. Just describe your results, but use plain English this time!

Although study two posited that Need for Cognition would impact participants and their assessment of blame, results did not fully support this contention. With regard to blame, Need for Cognition did not result in main effects. That is, despite predictions to the contrary, those high in NFC did not blame the taxi driver any more than those low in NFC. Nor did NCF interact with scenario, despite our prediction that those high NFC would find the most blame when given the changeable scenario compared to unchangeable scenario. However, scenario did show a significant main effect such that participants found more blame for the taxi driver in the changeable condition than the unchangeable condition.

References Comment by Ryan Winter: References do start on their own page. Here, the student included all eight of her references. I recommend this, though only three are required for Paper III. In Paper IV, you will have to have all eight anyway, so this will save some time (plus you might get feedback on ones that look wrong!)

Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., Baumeister, R. F., Daly, M., & Stillman, T. F. (2015). The making of might-have-beens: Effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(2), 268-283. doi:

10.1177/0146167214563673

Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 42(1), 116-131. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116

Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13

Curseu, P. L. (2006). Need for cognition and rationality in decision-making. Studia

Psychologica, 48(2), 141-156.

Gilbert, E. A., Tenney, E. R., Holland, C. R., & Spellman, B. A. (2015). Counterfactuals, control, and causation: Why knowledgeable people get blamed more. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(5), 643-658. doi: 10.1177/0146167215572137

McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about controllable events. Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 1071-1078. doi: 10.3758/BF03209355

Sargent, M. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts support for punitive responses to crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(11), 1485-1493. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264481

Strobel, A., Fleischhauer, M., Enge, S., & Strobel A. (2015). Explicit and implicit need for cognition and bottom-up/top-down attention allocation. Journal of Research in Personality, 55, 10-13. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2014.11.002

Wevodau, A. L., Cramer, R. J., Clark, John W., I.,II, & Kehn, A. (2014). The role of emotion and cognition in juror perceptions of victim impact statements. Social Justice Research, 27(1), 45-66. doi: 10.1007/s11211-014-0203-9

Table 1

Demographics – Study One

Table 2

Crosstabs and Chi Square – Study One

Table 3

ANOVA Blame – Study One

Table 4

ANOVA Number of Counterfactuals – Study One

Table 5

t-Test “Was the accident avoidable?” – Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: Note that you may not run a t-Test in your study. If you do, make sure to include both the group statistics and the independent samples t-Test tables! Comment by Ryan Winter: If your t-Table goes onto multiple lines, that is okay. This student just deleted a few columns from the t-Test to make it fit the page, but if your t-Table goes over into other rows, that is okay.

Table 6

Demographics – Study Two

Table 7

2 X 2 ANOVA Perceived Blameworthiness – Study Two