Ethics in the News

Dr. Milsky

PHIL 213-13

22 April 2020

Don’t Name Your Son “Sue”, Unless You Want Him to Be Tough

Comedian Amy Schumer recently revealed that she and her husband had to change the

name of their 11-month old son, from Gene Attell Fischer to Gene David Fischer. “Attell” was

chosen for the child’s middle name as a tribute to their friend and fellow comedian, Dave Attell.

Eventually, it was brought to the couple’s attention that, when said together, Gene Attell is

remarkably similar to “genital”, a name sure to subject the child to ridicule in the future. David

was chosen as the alternate middle name, as Dave Attell’s first name and the middle name of

Schumer’s father. This story exemplifies an important but often overlooked question of rights,

autonomy, and morality: how do you ethically name your child? This paper will examine a few

points regarding ethical naming, beginning with a detailed description of the definition and

implications of a name, followed by an explanation of what rights a child has regarding his or her

own name, and concluding with a refutation of both practical and philosophical objections to the

posited claims. A full analysis of the issue, incorporating arguments of Kantian philosophy and

the rights of individuals, reveals that initial naming should be minimally-descriptive and generic

in order to protect them from the harm that can come from improper names, as well as not to

negatively impact the autonomy and identity formation of the child. An allowance should be

given for the choosing or receiving of a new name later in life that is reflective of the identity of

the individual.

The first point that must be understood is the nature of a name. The Merriam-Webster

definition of a name is “a word or phrase that constitutes the distinctive designation of a person

or thing” (“Name”). It is the label by which we refer to people, places, and things. This has some

philosophical significance; there is power in labels and the effects that they have on persons.

They give identity to people, and class inclusion. If a person is homosexual, that is not just the

label by which we understand them, but a group to which they belong. If a person is Irish, it

reflects the nation from which they hail and a piece of their identity as well. Labels can be

harmful: if one is labeled a felon, that will negatively reflect how individuals (and society as a

whole) perceive them, closing off opportunities and providing a basis for judgment based on the

label and not the qualities or traits of the individual which may defy that label. Labels can be

helpful as well; if one is labeled an “executive chef”, that label will open up employment

opportunities and potentially afford one greater prestige than someone without that label. If a

name is a label, it necessarily follows that a name has the same power over a person’s

opportunities, autonomy, class inclusion, and how they are perceived (and to extent, treated) by

others.

The next point to consider is the distinct rights of the child. Both, as individuals, have the

right to autonomy, to make decisions for themselves and act according to their own needs,

desires, and pleasures. An incorrect or inappropriate label is an affront to that autonomy.

Consider the transsexual, born a biological male with a stereotypically male name, who identifies

as female. The name is an affront to this individual, inappropriately labeling them as something

they are not, and in many cases causing emotional distress. These individuals often choose new

names for themselves, reflecting the gender which they identify as. Consider the biological male

who does identify as male, but was given a stereotypically female name. Country artist Johnny

Cash has an amusing song titled “A Boy Named Sue”, in which he recounts the tale of a boy

abandoned by his father, who named him Sue in order to ensure he would be bullied, and in

doing so toughen him up (Cash). “Sue” eventually makes up with his estranged father years later,

understanding his “different point of view”, but then explains that if he has a son he’ll name him

“Bill, or George, or anything but Sue. I still hate that awful name” (Cash). His name not only

disagreed with his identity, it got him ridiculed and bullied as well. Children have the right to a

name that reflects their identity, does not subject them to negative repercussions, and does not

restrict their autonomy.

There are a few major objections to this notion. The first are practical concerns: if the

child is to choose a name, then what is it to be called in the years before it is able to choose for

itself? Further, what if the child at some point in its lifespan wishes to change its name? How

many names are we to allow? Fortunately, there already exist cultural traditions and practices to

show us the answer. In Native American tradition, for example, a young child is often referred to

with a name no more complex than “Dan’s son”, or “Mary’s daughter”. Later on, the child

receives a new name, often given based on the personality, characteristics, or achievements of

the individual. This happens at puberty in some traditions, adulthood in others. Similarly, in

Chinese tradition, individuals can be given or can choose for themselves a “courtesy name”, and

are formally known and referred to by their courtesy name, with their given name reserved for

close family and important elders. Even religious traditions have a precedent for name changes:

when Catholics receive the sacrament of Confirmation, a formal acknowledgement of their

“adulthood” in the eyes of the Church, they are instructed to choose for themselves a new name,

often one associated with a saint with whom they identify and whom they wish to take on as a

patron. Current social culture has its own form already in place, by which “nicknames” are given

or chosen to individuals, often more indicative of their personalities and identities than their

given names. It stands to reason, given this evidence, that this can be applied in modern practice,

with a simple, minimally-descript name by which to refer to the child until it can explore,

develop, and establish its own sense of identity and choose a new name appropriate for its

identity, and that new names and labels can be used as needed to be properly reflective as such.

The second objection revolves around the rights of the parents. As the parents are the

ones creating, raising, and with ultimate responsibility for the child, it follows they have the right

to name the child as they deem appropriate. This allows for the passing down of the “family

name”, which is often revered by families who take pride in their unique names and the heritage

represented by them. In the same manner that we choose names for other things we own or

create, such as pets, cars, and artwork, parents can choose names for their children. This

objection is inherently flawed, however, as it suggests that the child is the “property” of the

parents, and not a unique individual worth due consideration as a “valuable other”. It is a direct

violation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative: the child is treated as a means,

an object to be acted upon, and not a person whose own rights deserve consideration. The child’s

rights should be considered; they should be the “ends” of any action taking by the parents, to

include naming. To that end, naming should always be done reflective of the individual’s identity

and not whatever identity the parents should desire or intend to impose on the child, regardless of

beneficent intent.

Further, the notion that parents have the right to name their child whatever they like

presents the direct risk of harm to the child as a result of their name. The boy named Mohammad

who grows up to reject his parents’ religion may grow to hate his name’s origin. The girl named

Fannie may be ridiculed because her name is now commonly used to refer to a person’s rear end

(or a woman’s genitalia, if in England or Australia). If parents have the right to name children as

they wished, that would mean they have the right to give their children names which could cause

them harm or distress. This conflicts with the child’s rights to safety, security, and mental well-

being, which supersede opposing rights. These properties are necessary for the achievement of

autonomy, which quality is the essential aspect of Kant’s categorical imperative. An attack on

autonomy is to consider one as a means, whereas due consideration of autonomy is to consider

one as an ends, a “valuable other”.

It would seem that Amy Schumer did the right thing in changing her child’s name. In

doing so, she has taken steps to reduce the potential harm that could come to the child in the

future due to his name. Names are labels, and labels have power over those subject to them. They

can hurt or help, and in either case have an impact on one’s identity and autonomy, which is not

permissible according to the second formulation of the categorical imperative. To that end,

“given” names should be minimally-descriptive, and individuals who wish to choose new names

more reflective of their own identities should be accommodated with all possible respect and

acceptance. Traditional and modern practices already in place can act as a guide, by which

children and adults are given freedom to be known as they choose.

Works Cited

Cash, Johnny. “A Boy Named Sue.” At San Quentin, Columbia, 1969. Youtube,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOHPuY88Ry4

“Name.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/name. Accessed 22 Apr. 2020.

Respers France, Lisa. “Amy Schumer changed her son’s name because it sounded like ‘genital’.”

CNN Entertainment, 15 April 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/entertainment/

amy-schumer-son-name-trnd/index.html. Accessed 19 April 2020.