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BUSINESS CULTURE’S INFLUENCE ON NEGOTIATORS’ ETHICAL IDEOLOGIES AND JUDGMENT: AN EIGHT-COUNTRY STUDY

David L. Alexander , Jamal A. Al-Khatib, Mohamad I. Al-Habib, Naima Bogari, and Najah Salamah

As international business grows, focus on ethical business practices intensifies and insight into negotiators’ attitudes towards unethical negotiating practices is essential. Using a sample of managers from eight countries, we find evidence that a country’s business culture affects the distribution of ethical orientations/positions. Similar distributions are found among countries with similar business cultures versus national cultures (e.g., we find Japanese negotiators similar to U.S. negotiators and differing from Chinese negotiators). We then find ethical orientations and ethical positions drive perceptions of the appropriateness of using various unethical negotiating tactics—important insights for hiring and training negotiators and preparing for cross-cultural negotiations.

Individual and business ethics have become a major con- cern for corporate executives globally because ethical lapses can significantly harm their company’s bottom line. Examples of this harm abound in the business press. In the US, for example, Volkswagen agreed to pay more than $10 billion to its customers and more than $4 billion to regulators after admitting it included software in its diesel cars that sensed when emission tests were in progress and altered engine operations to fake improved performance (Associated Press, 2017). Barclays Bank was fined £290 million after some of its derivatives traders

around the world including in London, New York, and Tokyo were found to have attempted to rig the London inter-bank offered rate (Libor) (BBC News, 2013). Corruption is a huge drain on the global economy as world-wide bribery takes in roughly $1 trillion annually (World Bank, 2004). Alarmingly (as a recent investigative profile finds) intermediaries working for Western coun- tries often don’t face demands from corrupt foreign offi- cials but rather work to corrupt those officials “starting off with small gifts and shopping sprees and eventually hook- ing them on major graft” (Baumann, Grim, & Blumenthal, 2016).

Given the stakes involved as opportunities for international trade and business grow around the world, insights into the ethical ideologies and moral philosophies of global marketing executives and those working for/with them in negotiations and the potential impact of those ethical ideologies on the use of unethical negotiating practices have become a managerial imperative. For firms seeking to develop effective and efficient international trade relationships, success depends on developing insights into how their counterparts approach those relationships and the negotiations that define them. Negotiation, as “a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise” (Lax & Sebenius, 1986: p. 11), sees negotiators come to the table with the objec- tive of achieving their own goals which often

David L. Alexander (Ph.D., Duke University), Associate Professor of Marketing, Opus College of Business, University of St. Thomas, Minneapolis, MN, USA, dlalexan- [email protected].

Jamal A. Al-Khatib (Ph.D., University of Mississippi), Professor of Marketing, Opus College of Business, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN, USA, [email protected].

Mohamad I. Al-Habib (Ph.D., University of Mississippi), Associate Professor of Marketing, Faculty of Economics and Administration, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, [email protected].

Naima Bogari (Ph.D., University of Huddersfield), Associate Professor of Marketing, Faculty of Economics and Administration, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, [email protected].

Najah Salamah (Ph.D., University of Huddersfield), Assistant Professor of Marketing, Faculty of Economics and Administration, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, [email protected].

Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/mmtp.

Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, vol. 27, no. 3 (Summer 2019), pp. 312–330. Copyright � Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

ISSN: 1069–6679 (print) / ISSN 1944–7175 (online) DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10696679.2019.1615841

conflict with the goals of their counterparts. These goals and the resulting conflict can cause negotia- tors to utilize unethical negotiating tactics (e.g., lying, making false promises). To make good deci- sions during negotiations in a global context, it is important that negotiators and their managers understand their negotiation counterparts’ ethical orientations, how those orientations impact percep- tions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics, and so how their counterparts’ actions may differ from their own—especially across country borders.

While the negotiation literature offers many studies dealing with managing the negotiation process, the literature is still relatively thin in addressing the spe- cific role of ethics in the negotiation process (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000). Negotiators in a global context must develop an understanding of how their counterparts from different countries differ from them in how they think and behave (Thelen & Zhuplev, 2001). This study is unique and contributes in this endeavor in that we look for (and find) evi- dence that a country’s business culture (distinct from its national culture) affects individuals’ ethical ideolo- gies. We expect that as people gain experience within their country’s business environment and its particular industrial structure, their ethical ideology adjusts to conform to the country’s resulting business culture. This implies that the distribution of ethical ideologies among individuals in a country will be similar to the distribution in countries with similar business cultures —so, for example, we find negotiators in Japan are similar to negotiators in the United States and differ from those in China.

We use a sample of 1,314 marketing managers with budgetary and personnel responsibility (and so likely to engage in negotiations) in a range of industries from eight countries (i.e., Belgium, China, Egypt, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States (US)) to explore the effect of a country’s business culture on individuals’ ethical ideol- ogy. We find similarities in the distribution of ethical ideologies among countries with similar business cul- tures. Having data for individuals from a range of busi- ness cultures and countries, allows us to then examine how ethical positions (i.e., absolutism, exceptionism, situationism, and subjectivism) affect individuals’ per- ceptions of the appropriateness of using various

unethical negotiating tactics in predictable ways—con- firming the value of understanding individuals’ ethical positions when hiring and training negotiators and then preparing for and conducting global business negotiations.

In the paragraphs below, we review the literature on ethical ideologies/positions and their expected effect on perceptions of the appropriateness of using various unethical negotiating tactics. We then discuss the rela- tionship between a country’s business culture and its distribution of ethical positions. Next, we review expec- tations for how individuals’ ethical orientation along idealism and relativism dimensions affect perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics and the predictable ways in which ethical posi- tions differ in those perceptions. Finally, we review the study methodology and results, discuss the implications of our findings for researchers and practitioners, and directions for future research are provided.

ETHICAL IDEOLOGIES

Theories of business ethics

Positive business ethics theories (e.g., Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hofstede & Vitell, 1986, 1992, 2006; Rest, 1986; Treviño, 1986) propose that people apply their ethical rules when confronted with decisions that challenge their ethics. Jones (1991) offers a synthesis of these business ethics theories in an effort to develop a framework that adequately explains differences in ethical behavior. His model builds on Rest’s (1986) four-stage model with ethical issues arising from the environment (social, cultural, economic, organiza- tional) leading to recognition of a moral issue, making a moral judgment, establishing moral intent, and finally engaging in moral behavior. Each of these steps is influenced by the characteristics of the moral issue (i.e., its moral intensity) (Jones, 1991). At the same time, it is possible that a moral issue may not be recognized—leading to amoral decision making (Hofstede & Vitell, 1986; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Ferrell and Gresham (1985) posit that the emer- gence of an ethical issue directly impacts individual decision-making moderated by individual, social, and opportunity factors leading to behavior. Hunt and Vitell (1986) (referred to as the H-V model), on the other hand, propose a decision-making model with

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both deontological and teleological evaluations pre- ceding moral judgments that then lead to moral inten- tions and finally moral behavior.

Positive business models differ from normative models in that they describe what is actually happen- ing in an organization rather than what should hap- pen (Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000). Most normative ethical theories in moral philosophy can be classified as deontological or teleological (Murphy & Laczniak, 1981). Hunt and Vitell (1986: p. 6) assert that the fundamental difference between deontological the- ories and teleological theories is their focus: deontolo- gical theories focus on individuals’ actions or behaviors and teleological theories focus on the con- sequences of the actions or behaviors. For deontolo- gists, “certain features of the act itself other than the value it brings into existence” determine its righteous- ness (Frankena, 1963, p. 14 in Hofstede & Vitell, 1986: p. 6). For teleologists, “there is one and only one basic or ultimate right-making characteristic, namely, the comparative value (nonmoral) of what is, probably will be, or is intended to be brought into being” (Frankena, 1963, p. 14 in Hofstede & Vitell, 1986: p. 6).

Forsyth (1980) presents a taxonomy of ethical ideol- ogies that shares similarities with the H-V model. In the H-V model (Hofstede & Vitell, 1986), an individual engages in a deontological evaluation of the evoked set of alternatives that can be employed to resolve a perceived ethical problem and a teleological analysis of the consequences of those alternatives to make an ethical judgment, form an intention, and then engage in an action or behavior. Forsyth (1980) proposes that variations in moral judgements can be described by looking along two basic independent dimensions of ethical orientations: relativism and idealism. Relativism is the degree to which an individual rejects universal moral rules when making ethical judgments. Similar to deontologists, relativistic individuals are concerned with more than the value an action might bring and consider an act’s alignment with universal moral rules when drawing conclusions about moral questions. That said, relativistic individuals “reject the possibility of formulating or relying on universal moral rules when drawing conclusions about moral questions” (Forsyth, 1980: p. 175). Similar to teleolo- gists, idealistic individuals are concerned with the con- sequences or outcomes that can be obtained in a

situation. Idealism is conceptualized as the degree to which individuals “assume that desirable conse- quences can, with the ‘right’ action, always be obtained” (Forsyth, 1980: p. 176).

Ethics positions theory

In introducing Ethics Position Theory, Forsyth (1980) argues that the idealism and relativism dimensions are independent of each other and so can be dichoto- mized (i.e., individuals can be classified as high or low on each dimension) and crossed to identify four distinct ethical positions that individuals adopt with respect to ethical decision-making: exceptionist, sub- jectivist, absolutist, and situationist (Figure 1). These positions “result from a lifetime of experience con- fronting and resolving moral issues” (Forsyth and O’Boyle Jr. 2011: p. 354). We briefly describe each of these ethics positions below.

Exceptionists

Score low in idealism and low in relativism. They accept that some harm may be inevitable among the available actions while being guided by universal principles. Exceptionists are typically pragmatists who act in ways that are consistent with moral rules but are open to excep- tions to these rules (and accept actions that harm others) if the overall positive consequences of the action outweigh the negative outcomes. As such, exceptionists are likely to apply utilitarian principles (i.e., the greatest good for the greatest number) than deontological principles (Forsyth, 1980; Tansey, Brown, Hyman, & Dawson, 1994).

Subjectivists

Score low on idealism and high on relativism. They accept that the available actions will likely result in harm to others but that such harm is not always unethical. Rather than being constrained by universal moral principles, subjectivists’ appraisals are based on personal values and perspectives. They are likely to base their ethical judgments, in part, on what they personally stand to gain or lose. In this respect, this ethical position is similar to ethical egoism.

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Absolutists

Score high on idealism and low on relativism. They believe in universal moral laws and that, with the right action, positive outcomes/consequences can be attained for all involved. As a result, absolutists believe that by following universal moral rules, they can always achieve the best possible outcomes. As highly idealistic indivi- duals, absolutists are also likely to consider issues of justice, fairness, and humanitarianism in their evalua- tion of ethical issues (Tansey et al., 1994).

Situationists

Score high on idealism and high on relativism. They are skeptical of universal moral rules but like absolutists believe that positive outcomes/consequences can be attained for all concerned. Situationists are more likely to base ethical judgments on a particular action’s utility within the present context rather than on an abstract ethical code. At the same time, they are concerned that actions not harm others. As a result, situationists work

for the best outcomes for everyone regardless of whether conventional moral rules are violated.

Forsyth’s research has shown that individuals who have different ethical ideologies tend to differ in informa- tion processing regarding non-business ethical dilemmas (Forsyth, 1985; Forsyth & Pope, 1984) and in ethical judg- ments regarding non-business ethical dilemmas (Forsyth, 1980, 1981; Forsyth & Berger, 1982). Several studies have investigated the impact of ethical ideologies on ethical beliefs amongst US and foreign consumers (Al-Khatib, Vitell, & Rawwas, 1997; Chan, Wong, & Leung, 1998; Erffmeyer, Keillor, & LeClair, 1999; McHoskey et al., 1999; Van Kenhove, Vermeir, & Verniers, 2001). Despite the apparent relevance of individual’s ethical ideology to the ethical decision-making process, until recently there has been relatively little research regarding its impact on ethical decision making regarding business issues. Forsyth (1992) suggests that individual’s ethical ideology should be relevant to their consideration of ethical issues in busi- ness, and research has found that individual’s ethical ideology affects their ethical judgments regarding busi- ness issues (Al-Khatib et al., 2011; Barnett, Bass, &

Figure 1 Ethics Positions

Source: Forsyth et al. (2008)

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Brown, 1994; Forsyth, O’Boyle Jr. and McDaniel 2008; Malshe, Al-Khatib, & Sailors, 2010; Tansey et al., 1994).

Business culture’s influence on ethical orientation

The present study seeks to extend the exploration of ethical ideology within the field of business ethics by examining 1) similarities/differences in the distribution of ethical positions across countries and 2) the predict- ability of relationships between ethical positions and ethical judgments in negotiations across countries. Previous research on similarities in ethical orientations across countries has often used Hofstede’s (2001) dimen- sions of national culture including individualism/collec- tivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity/femininity (e.g., Franke & Nadler, 2008; Volkema, 2004). Using these dimensions to predict simi- larities, negotiators in Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt would be expected to be similar in their ethi- cal orientations and ethical positions.

We instead look at the effect of business culture on ethical orientations across countries. Drawing heavily from the work of Fukuyama (1995), we see business culture as an outgrowth of a country’s industrial struc- ture—itself an outgrowth of the trust engendered by its available social capital. Fukuyama (1995) proposes that differences in sociability and the social capital allowing people “to trust one another and cooperate in the for- mation of new groups and associations” (p. 90) lead to differences in industrial structure and the resulting approaches to political economy and states: “The most important form of sociability from an economic stand- point is the ability of strangers (that is, non-kin) to trust one another and work together in new forms of organi- zation” (p. 91). In this view, trust reduces transaction costs (e.g., governance structure complexity) so that high-trust societies are able to adopt corporate forms of organization characterized by large, professionally-man- aged corporations. Low-trust societies, on the other hand, tend toward familial-based organizations charac- terized by smaller scale and often state involvement in the direction of economic activity.

According to Fukuyama (1995), “The primary impact of spontaneous sociability would appear to be not on growth rates but on industrial structure—that is, the number and importance of large versus small corpora- tions in a national economy and the ways in which they

interact” (p. 95). He notes that the most obvious differ- ence among countries is their industrial structure and proposes that these differences are the result of differ- ences in the social capital available to societies for the formation of new groups. Social capital is a resource in a theory of rational action, like physical capital and human capital, that enables actors to take some action and while physical and human capital are created and embedded in forms (physical or human), social capital is created and embedded in the relations among indivi- duals and all three forms of capital then enable produc- tive activity (Coleman, 1988).

Fukuyama (1995) observes that countries like Germany, Japan, and the United States are characterized by networks of voluntary, non-kinship associations that create the high-trust social capital needed “to form large- scale, hierarchical, professionally managed corporations in which ownership was dispersed and separated from management” (p. 91). He notes that countries like France, Italy, and China, on the other hand, are character- ized by strong familial/kinship associations that create low-trust social capital leading to the formation of smaller businesses/organizations and inhibiting the formation of large-scale businesses. He also noted that some countries lack both strong voluntary and familial associations and so lack the social capital needed to form strong corporate or familial businesses. This, what we call “no-trust” social capital, situation creates environments where the stron- gest community structures are criminal organizations.

Deshpande and Webster (1989) define business cul- ture (as a pattern of organizational culture) as “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that helps indivi- duals understand organizational functioning and thus provide them norms for behavior in the organization” (p. 4). We expect that the business culture that devel- ops in countries with different industrial structures will differ significantly. Individuals in countries char- acterized by large-scale, professionally managed busi- nesses (referred to as high-trust countries because of their preponderance of high-trust social capital) are expected to be more pragmatic and more principled. They likely understand that “sweetheart deals” are inappropriate and so harmful decision outcomes are likely regardless of effort and actions. At the same time, individuals in these countries likely have more alternatives available to them and so their evoked set of alternatives is more likely to include options with positive outcomes for all. Individuals overall, then,

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show more moderate levels of idealism. At the same time, individuals are likely to be less relativistic because the business culture emphasizes trust across voluntary associations leading to highly principled expectations for decision-making. We expect that indi- viduals in high-trust countries will skew towards abso- lutism (high in idealism, low in relativism) and exceptionism (low in idealism, low in relativism) as a result.

Those in countries characterized by small-scale businesses with state support for some large-scale businesses (referred to as low-trust countries because of their preponderance of low-trust, family/kin association-based social capital), on the other hand, are expected to see opportunities to push boundaries and find outcomes that benefit all involved. Individuals are more idealistic because more outcomes are viewed as positive for all involved. At the same time, individuals are also more relativistic because decisions are seen from family/kin association or political contexts rather than in terms of moral absolutes. As such, indivi- duals in low-trust countries should skew towards situationism (high in idealism, high in relativism).

Individuals in countries characterized by small- scale businesses, a dearth of trust enabling social capital and likely with strong criminal/corrupt organizations (referred to as no-trust countries because of their lack of trust enabling social capi- tal) likely face the constant presence of corruption making them less idealistic. In these countries, individuals’ relativism is a function of their cultural beliefs, so for example, someone in a deeply reli- gious society is likely to be lower in relativism than someone in a Marxist (and so nominally atheist) society. Overall then, individuals in no-trust coun- tries should skew towards exceptionism (low in idealism, low in relativism) and subjectivism (low in idealism, high in relativism).

Formally, we propose:

H1: The distribution of ethical positions among individuals should be similar for countries with simi- lar industrial structures and levels of trust-related social capital. a. The ethical positions of individuals in high-trust countries should skew towards absolutism and exceptionism.

b. The ethical positions of individuals in low-trust countries should skew towards situationism. c. The ethical positions of individuals in no-trust countries should skew towards exceptionism and subjectivism.

ETHICAL IDEOLOGIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF UNETHICAL NEGOTIATING TACTICS

Given that the distribution of ethical positions among people in a country should be similar to the distribu- tions in other countries with similar business cultures, it is important to understand exactly how individuals’ ethical orientation and ethical position impact their ethical business decision-making. To that end, we con- sider how ethical ideology influences perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tac- tics. We expect that by teasing apart the separate effects of ethical orientation (i.e., the separate effects of idealism and relativism) and ethical position across countries, we will replicate previous research on the effects of idealism and relativism and add to our knowledge by showing predictable relationships among the effects of ethical positions.

Ethical orientations and perceptions of unethical negotiating tactics

When negotiating, parties to the process attempt to reach mutually beneficial outcomes, while each simultaneously tries to meet their own goals. This goal asymmetry may lead participants to use ques- tionable/unethical negotiating tactics that they per- ceive as effective means for influencing or persuading their counterpart (Banas & Parks, 2002). Several studies have examined perceptions of various negotiating tactics and their relationship to different relational and individual factors (Al- Khatib et al., 2011; Banas & Parks, 2002; Forsyth et al., 2008; Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson et al., 2000; Volkema & Fleury, 2002). Elahee and Brooks (2004), for example, showed an inverse rela- tionship between trust and the use of unethical negotiating tactics.

In business situations, research has generally found “idealism is associated with firm moral convictions, whereas relativism suggests ethical leniency” (Forsyth

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et al., 2008: p. 816). For example, with respect to budgetary practices, idealists showed less questionable behavior but relativists showed more (Douglas & Weir, 2005). Individuals high in idealism and low in relati- vism showed higher levels of honesty and integrity and perceived ethics and social responsibilities as more important than individuals low in idealism and high in relativism (Singhapakdi, Kraft, Vitell, & Rallapalli, 1995; Vitell, Nwachukwu, & Barnes, 1993). Ethical ideology and perceptions of the appropriate- ness of questionable negotiating tactics are correlated (Banas & Parks, 2002). In a meta-analysis of research over 30 years, Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño (2010) find idealism lessens and relativism increases unethical intention/behavior.

Among individuals contemplating the appropriate- ness of using unethical negotiating tactics, we expect that higher idealism is associated with more negative perceptions of the appropriateness of using those tactics while higher relativism is associated with more positive perceptions of their use. These basic relationships between ethical dimensions and perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics should hold across people within and across countries.

Formally, we propose:

H2. As an individual’s idealism increases their per- ceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics decreases.

H3. As an individual’s relativism increases their perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics increases.

Relationships among ethical positions

For negotiators preparing to engage with counterparts in other countries (or even their own country), under- standing how people with different ethical positions approach ethical decision-making and the resulting differences across those ethical positions is important. An American absolutist, for example, should under- stand how a Chinese or an American situationist will approach a negotiation so they can prepare appropri- ately in advance of the start of those negotiations.

Forsyth (1980) argues that idealism and relativism are independent ethical dimensions. As such, individual ethical positions may enhance or dampen the effects of

idealism and relativism on perceptions of the appropri- ateness of using unethical negotiating tactics that we have proposed in H2 and H3. That is, if idealism and relativism are independent, we should expect to see pre- dictable relative differences among the four ethical posi- tions on the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics. Forsyth (1980) identifies those high in idealism and low in relativism as absolutists. Their position on these two ethical dimensions each reinforces the dampening effect of that ethical orientation on per- ceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical nego- tiating tactics. As such, among the four ethical positions, absolutists should perceive unethical negotiating tactics as the least appropriate for use. Subjectivists, on the other hand, hold the opposite positions on both ethical dimensions. Being low in idealism and high in relativism reinforces the enhancing influence of that ethical orien- tation on perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics. As such, among the four ethical positions, subjectivists should perceive unethical negotiating tactics as the most appropriate for use.

Exceptionists and situationists, because they are high or low on both ethical dimensions are expected to see a counter-balancing of the effects of idealism and relativism on perceptions of the appropriateness of unethical nego- tiating tactics as proposed in H2 and H3. For exceptionists, lowering idealism increases perceptions of appropriate- ness while lowering relativism decreases those percep- tions. For situationists, increasing idealism lowers perceptionsofappropriatenesswhileincreasingrelativism increases those perceptions. These counter-balancing effects of the ethical orientations are expected to result in exceptionists and situationists showing similar percep- tions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiat- ing tactics. These perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics, then, should be lower than the appropriateness perceptions of subjecti- vists and higher than the appropriateness perceptions of absolutists.

The effects of ethical position and the relationships among those positions should hold within and across countries. That said, the business culture in each coun- try influences the distribution of ethical positions within that country—meaning that not all ethical positions may be present in a country.

Formally, we propose:

H4. Relative to the other ethical positions identified by Forsyth (1980):

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a. Absolutists perceive unethical negotiating tactics as the least appropriate for use. b. Subjectivists perceive unethical negotiating tactics as the most appropriate for use. c. Exceptionists and situationists do not significantly differ in their perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics and each perceive the tactics as more appropriate for use than do abso- lutists and less appropriate for use than do subjectivists.

METHOD AND RESULTS

Sampling

Testing our hypotheses requires access to a dataset drawn from actual business decision-makers across a range of countries representing the different busi- ness cultures about which we hypothesize. We con- structed a sample of 1,314 marketing managers with budgetary and personnel responsibility (and so who likely engage in negotiations or manage/ work with those who do) from 8 countries using data collected for and used in other projects. Outside the US, given the challenges in obtaining random sampling of individuals in these countries, judgmental sampling as suggested by Tuncalp (1988) and Bhuaian, Abdul-Muhmin, and Kim (2002) was used to identify appropriate samples of 200 marketing executives in each country (300 in the UAE). The individuals were selected from a wide variety of demographic and socio-economic backgrounds. Specifically, every attempt was made to have a broad distribution across the demo- graphic categories of gender, age and education. Participation in the study was restricted to citizens of their respective nations. Local “data captains” were selected in each nation and trained in data collection techniques by two of the study’s authors and academic collaborators in the sampled coun- tries. Since information regarding non-respondents was not provided, it is difficult to discern if any non-response biases exist. However, it has been argued in prior studies of cultural phenomena across borders (e.g., Shane, Venkataraman, & MacMillan, 1995) that no theoretical evidence exists that suggest a significant non-response bias influence on culturally generated data.

Those identified were contacted about the purpose of the research study and given procedural instruc- tions for participating in the study. One week later the survey instrument was delivered by hand in the morning and picked up at the end of that day. In the US, on the other hand, a sample of 300 marketing executives was identified from the membership list of the Institute of Supply Chain Management. A web link was emailed to these marketing executives who were then able to complete the survey instrument online. A total of 1,314 completed and usable sur- veys were received. Table 1 provides a summary of the demographic profile of the sample. Roughly 81% of the respondents earned a college or a graduate degree, the majority were men (70.5%), having approximately six years of experience in their cur- rent positions and employed by large companies (average employer size is 1,244 employees).

Measurement

The self-administered survey consisted of three sec- tions. The first section contained basic demo- graphic characteristics. Section two focused on ethical ideologies measured using the Ethics Position Questionnaire developed and validated by Forsyth (1980). The section consists of twenty items designed to measure idealism (10 items) and relativism (10 items). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with each item using a five-point Likert format where a 5 indicated strong agreement with a statement. All questions were worded in a positive direction. The final section contained the 16-item/five-factor Self- Reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies (SINS) scale developed and validated by Robinson et al. (2000). Volkema (2004), in a nine-country study of the impact of several socio-economic fac- tors on the perceptions of inappropriate negotiat- ing tactics, found that the traditional competitive bargaining tactic was perceived to be the most appropriate and the most likely tactic of all five negotiating tactics to be used by respondents from each of the nine countries studied. Based on this finding, the present study excludes traditional com- petitive bargaining from the analysis. Respondents also completed items used for other projects and so are excluded here.

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The back-translation method was used to translate the survey from the source language (English) to the target languages. The translated English version was checked for cross-cultural equivalency and accuracy. Table 2 provides each construct, source of the mea- surement scale, sample statement and the present study’s reliability coefficients. All scales achieved acceptable levels of reliability (Peter, 1979).

Results

Testing our hypothesis (H1) that the distribution of ethical positions among individuals should be similar for countries with similar industrial structures and levels of trust-related social capital requires first classi- fying each country in our dataset as either a high-trust, low-trust, or no-trust country. We started with the classifications made by Fukuyama (1995) who identi- fied the US and Japan as high-trust countries and China as a low-trust country. We then used profiles in the CIA World Factbook (CIA, 2017) to classify the

Table 1 Sample Demographic Profile

Variable

US

n = 254

UAE

n = 208

Saudi

n = 198

Russia

n = 138

Japan

n = 102

China

n = 111

Belgium

n = 153

Egypt

n = 150

Total

n = 1314

Highest level of education:

High school or less – 1.8% 15.5% – 1.1% – – – –

Some college 6.0% 8.3% 47.3% 6.7% 19.8% 38.3% 30.8% 20.2% 18.8%

College degree 42.9% 76.9% 35.1% 92.6% 58.2% 42.6% 35.6% 64.9% 65.6%

Graduate degree 51.2% 13.0% 2.0% .7% 20.9% 19.2% 33.6% 2.1% 15.6%

Gender:

Male 80.2% 69.8% 97.9% 58.2% 49.5% 63.1% 61.4% 61.3% 70.5%

Female 19.8% 30.2% 2.0% 41.8% 50.5% 36.9% 38.6% 38.7% 29.5%

Age 49.82 38.57 38.61 39.44 38.18 43.95 39.6 43.39 42.30

Years in your current position 8.83 4.42 6.49 5.43 5.31 7.66 5.33 2.76 5.96

Number of employees in your

organization

6.02 3521.63 2079.50 146.47 2711.72 63.99 39.72 1592.03 1244.95

Table 2 Study Measures and Reliabilities

Construct Source

Number

of items Sample item

Cronbach’s Alpha

Relativism Forsyth

(1980)

10 What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another. .78

Idealism Forsyth

(1980)

10 Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks

might be.

.86

Information

Misrepresentation

Robinson et

al. (2000)

4 Intentionally misrepresent the progress of negotiations to your constituency in

order to make your own position appear stronger.

.79

False Promises Robinson et

al. (2000)

3 In return for concessions from your opponent now, offer to make future

concessions which you know you will not follow through on.

.80

Attacking

Opponents

Robinson et

al. (2000)

3 Attempt to get your opponent fired from his/her position so that a new person

will take his/her place.

.77

Inappropriate

Information

Gathering

Robinson et

al. (2000)

3 Gain information about an opponents’ negotiating position by paying your friends, associates, and contacts to get this information for you.

.80

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remaining countries in our dataset. Russia, with its communist history and continued state involvement in the economy and presence of a few large-scale busi- nesses (indirectly controlled by the state) was classified as a low-trust country. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were classified as low-trust countries because of the heavy involvement of the governments in each country’s economy through their control of oil revenues and investments in specific areas to increase job opportu- nities. Egypt was classified as a no-trust country because of the predominance of small businesses, the weakness/unsustainability of public finances, and the uncertain political, security, and policy environment. We classified Belgium as a high-trust country because of its well-diversified economy driven by its geographi- cally central location and strong links with companies in the EU countries surrounding it and its lack of state backing of specific companies/industries.

As a simple, informal initial test of the H1 proposi- tions with respect to the distribution of ethical posi- tions in countries with similar industrial structures and levels of trust-related social capital, we visually examined scatter plots for each country that mapped respondents by their reported idealism and relativism scores (Figure 2). The scatter plots show different pat- terns for each country but with similarities in the dis- tribution of individuals’ idealism and relativism among countries in the same business culture clusters. As predicted by H1a-c, the distribution of idealism and relativism in high-trust countries (i.e., US and Japan) skews towards absolutism, in low-trust countries (i.e., China, Russia, and to some degree the UAE) skews towards situationism, and in no-trust countries (i.e., Egypt) skews towards exceptionism. The distribution in Belgium and Saudi Arabia do not visually show clear skewing towards a particular ethical position.

Next, per Forsyth (1980), we classified individual respondents as either high or low on idealism and relativism so we could assign them to an ethical posi- tion. In measuring idealism and relativism, we used a 5-point response scale with “neutral” as the mid-point. We coded the data with neutral as zero (so the data range from −2 to 2). Forsyth’s (1980) typology pro- poses absolute rather than relative perspectives on the ethical positions. That is, someone is either high or low in idealism/relativism in absolute terms rather than high or low relative to others in a country. As such, we classified individual’s scores above zero as

being high on a dimension and scores below zero as being low on that dimension. Individuals who score zero then are indeterminate for that dimension. To account for measurement error in respondents’ use of the scale, we classified respondents whose score was within 5% of neutral on the scale as indeterminate on that dimension (i.e., scores that ranged from −0.10 to 0.10). Respondents were then assigned to an ethical position based on their idealism and relativism classi- fications. If a respondent was classified as indetermi- nate on one or both ethical orientation dimensions, they were classified as indeterminate with respect to ethical position. Roughly 26% of respondents were classified as indeterminate with Japan and Saudi Arabia (21%) having the fewest and Belgium (36%) having the most indeterminate respondents.

As a further test of H1, we then looked at the frequency of high and low idealistic and relativistic individuals in each country (Table 3) among respondents not indetermi- nate with respect to ethical position. These data show that the majority of respondents in all countries except Egypt were categorized as high in idealism. For relativism, on the other hand, the US, Japan, and Egypt show a majority with low relativism with the other five countries showing a majority with high relativism. Consistent with H1, when we examine similarities in the distribution of ethical ideologies across countries (crossing dominant orienta- tions), we find countries with similar industrial structures and levels of trust-related social capital have the same dominant ethical ideology: supporting H1a, the US and Japan are absolutists (High in idealism/Low in relativism); supporting H1b, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China are situationists (H/H); supporting H1c, Egypt is excep- tionist (L/L). Counter to our expectations in H1a, how- ever, Belgium shows situationist (H/H) dominance rather than aligning with the US and Japan. Belgium is unique because of its division into Flemish and Walloon cultural camps which may explain this alignment with the low- trust countries (e.g., Al-Khatib et al., 2011).

Finally, looking at the distribution of the ethical positions assigned to respondents in each country (Table 4), offers further support for H1. Supporting H1a, absolutists and exceptionists predominate in high-trust countries; supporting H1b, situationists pre- dominate in low-trust countries; and supporting H1c, exceptionists predominate in no-trust countries. Belgium is something of an outlier here as well in that there is a plurality rather than majority of

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Figure 2 Idealism by Relativism Country Scatter Plots

322 Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice

absolutists and exceptionists among individuals assigned an ethical position.

Given the distribution of ethical positions across countries, it is important to understand the relative effects the different positions have on individuals’ attitudes toward using unethical negotiating tactics. To that end, we tested our propositions that idealism decreases (H2) and relativism increases (H3) percep- tions of the appropriateness of using unethical nego- tiating tactics. There are, of course, many different negotiating tactics and negotiation contexts resulting in differences in perceptions of ethicality and of the potential severity of unethical behavior. Robinson et al. (2000) developed the Self-reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies (SINS) scale in an effort “to determine the perceived appropriateness of marginally ethical tactics in a ‘neutral’ context, and the willing- ness of respondents to use those tactics” (p. 650–51). The SINS scale contains 16 items and identifies a five-

factor model with each factor identifying as an unethi- cal negotiating tactic. In our analyses, we use the four unethical negotiating tactics seen as least appropriate in negotiations in prior research (Volkema, 2004) and test our hypotheses against each of these tactics. The unethical negotiating tactics in the SINS scale included in our analyses are (1) making false promises (three items), (2) misrepresenting information/position to the opponent (four items), (3) attacking an opponent’s network (three items), and (4) inappropriate informa- tion gathering (three items) (Robinson et al., 2000). Information on these scales is provided in Table 2. We expect H2, H3, and H4 hold for each of these unethical negotiating tactics/factors.

To test H2 and H3, for each of the unethical nego- tiating tactics, we regressed perceptions of the appro- priateness of using the tactic against respondent’s idealism and relativism scores while controlling for respondent’s country using the complete dataset

Table 3 Level of Idealism and Relativism by Country

Idealism Relativism Dominant

Low High Low High Orientation

United States 31.4% 68.6% 75.7% 24.3% H/L

Japan 8.6% 91.4% 64.2% 35.8% H/L

Belgium 31.6% 68.4% 39.8% 60.2% H/H

China 5.0% 95.0% 8.8% 91.3% H/H

Russia 18.3% 81.7% 31.7% 68.3% H/H

United Arab

Emirates

9.1% 90.9% 42.9% 57.1% H/H

Saudi Arabia 10.2% 89.8% 40.1% 59.9% H/H

Egypt 100.0% 0.0% 88.9% 11.1% L/L

Table 4 Frequency of Ethical Ideology by Country

Absolutist Exceptionist Situationist Subjectivist

United

States

95 51.4% 45 24.3% 32 17.3% 13 7.0%

Japan 48 59.3% 4 4.9% 26 32.1% 3 3.7%

Belgium 38 38.8% 1 1.0% 29 29.6% 30 30.6%

China 7 8.8% 0 0.0% 69 86.3% 4 5.0%

Russia 27 26.0% 6 5.8% 58 55.8% 13 12.5%

United Arab

Emirates

66 42.9% 0 0.0% 74 48.1% 14 9.1%

Saudi Arabia 61 38.9% 2 1.3% 80 51.0% 14 8.9%

Egypt 0 0.0% 104 88.9% 0 0.0% 13 11.1%

Table 5 Ethical Orientation’s Effect on Perceptions of Unethical Negotiation Tactics’ Appropriateness

Unethical

Negotiating Tactic Idealism Relativism

Making False Promises b = − .43, t(1304) = − 9.17, p < .01 b = .55, t(1304) = 12.17, p < .01

Information Misrepresentation b = − .48, t(1304) = − 10.20, p < .01 b = .51, t(1304) = 11.09, p < .01

Attacking Opponent Network b = − .54, t(1304) = − 11.41, p < .01 b = .44, t(1304) = 9.49, p < .01

Inappropriate Information Gathering b = − .47, t(1304) = − 9.71, p < .01 b = .44, t(1304) = 9.27, p < .01

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(including those classified as indeterminate). Table 5 summarizes the results. Supporting H2, idealism decreased perceptions of the appropriateness of using each of the four unethical negotiating tactics. Idealism showed its strongest effect on the tactic of attacking an opponent’s network where a one point increase on the idealism scale lowered perceptions of the appropriate- ness of using the tactic by 0.54 points on the tactic’s scale (t(1304) = − 11.41, p < .01). Idealism showed its weakest effect on the tactic of making false promises where a one point increase on the idealism scale low- ered perceptions of the appropriateness of using the tactic by 0.43 points on the tactic’s scale (t (1304) = − 9.17, p < .01). Supporting H3, relativism increased perceptions of the appropriateness of using each of the tactics. Relativism showed its strongest effect on the tactic of making false promises where a one point increase on the relativism scale increased perceptions of the appropriateness of using the tactic by 0.55 points on the tactic’s scale (t(1304) = 12.17, p < .01). Relativism showed its weakest effect on the tactic of attacking an opponent’s network where a one point increase on the relativism scale increased percep- tions of the appropriateness of using the tactic by 0.44 points on the tactic’s scale (t(1304) = 9.49, p < .01).

Finding support for both H2 and H3, we next tested H4’s propositions on the relationships between and among the ethical positions’ effects on attitudes towards using unethical negotiating tactics. To test the relationships between the ethical positions we used a series of planned contrasts on an ANOVA exam- ining the effect of the ethical positions on perceptions of the appropriateness of using each of our four focal unethical negotiating tactics while controlling for respondent’s country. We included all respondents in the data set (including those classified as indetermi- nate). Table 6 summarizes the results of the conducted planned contrasts for each of the unethical negotiat- ing tactics described below. H4 hypothesizes a linear relationship among the ethical positions’ perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiating tactics with absolutists perceiving use of these tactics as least appropriate (H4a), subjectivists perceiving them as most appropriate (H4b), and exceptionists and situationists falling between the two (H4c). We used planned contrasts to test this linear relationship among the ethical positions’ perceptions of the appro- priateness of using each of the four unethical

T a b le

6 R e la ti v e E ff e ct

o f E th ic a l Id e o lo g y o n P e rc e p ti o n s o f U n e th ic a l N e g o ti a ti o n T a ct ic s’

A p p ro p ri a te n e ss

P la n n e d C o n tr a st s

U n e th ic a l N e g o ti a ti o n T a ct ic

L in e a r

R e la ti o n sh

ip E x ce p ti o n is t ≠ S it u a ti o n is t

A b so

lu ti st

< E x ce p ti o n is t/

S it u a ti o n is t

S u b je ct iv is t > E x ce p ti o n is t/

S it u a ti o n is t

M a k in g

F a ls e P ro m is e s

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 1 4 2 .2 3 ,

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 0 .4 6 ,

p > .4 9

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 7 4 .1 8 ,

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 5 1 .2 8 ,

p < .0 1

In fo rm

a ti o n M is re p re se n ta ti o n

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 1 6 9 .1 3 ,

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 3 .6 0 ,

p > .0 5

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 1 2 5 .1 7 ,

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 3 0 .6 8 ,

p < .0 1

A tt a ck in g O p p o n e n t

N e tw

o rk

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 1 1 9 .4 3 ,

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 0 .1 0 ,

p > .7 4

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 8 5 .1 9 ,

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 2 7 .5 6 ,

p < .0 1

In a p p ro p ri a te

In fo rm

a ti o n G a th e ri n g

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 1 3 3 .9 3

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 1 .0 6 ,

p > .3 0

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 8 2 .6 2 ,

p < .0 1

F (1 ,1 3 0 2 ) = 3 3 .6 0 ,

p < .0 1

324 Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice

negotiating tactics. Supporting H4, the linear relation- ship was significant for each tactic (F (1,1302) = {119.43 ~ 169.13}, all p’s < .01).

Next, we used planned contrasts to test the compo- nents of H4. First, we used planned contrasts to test whether exceptionists and situationists differed in their effect on perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiation tactics (H4c predicts that they do not differ). The hypothesis that exceptionists and situa- tionists had significantly different effects on perceptions of appropriateness was rejected for each of the unethical negotiating tactics (F(1,1302) = {0.10 ~ 3.60}, all p’s > .05). Then we tested the relationship between the appropriate- ness perceptions of exceptionists and situationists and subjectivists and then absolutists looking for support for the remainder of H4c and also for H4a and H4b. We used planned contrasts to test the hypothesis that subjectivists’ appropriateness perceptions were significantly different from and greater than the appropriateness perceptions of exceptionists/situationists and accepted this hypoth- esis for each of the unethical negotiation tactics (F (1,1302) = {27.56 ~ 51.28}, all p’s < .01). Then, we used planned contrasts to test the hypothesis that absolutists’ appropriateness perceptions were significantly different from and lower than the appropriateness perceptions of exceptionists/situationists and accepted this hypothesis for each of the unethical negotiating tactics (F (1,1302) = {74.18 ~ 125.17}, all p’s < .01). These results provide support for the remaining part of H4c and the partial order transitivity supports H4a and H4b (among the ethical positions, absolutists perceive using unethical negotiating tactics as least appropriate and subjectivists perceive using them as most appropriate).

DISCUSSION

Business negotiations are challenging in that nego- tiating parties come to the table with their own goals which likely conflict with those of their coun- terparts. Throughout a negotiation there are oppor- tunities for negotiators to try and gain an upper hand by using unethical negotiating tactics. To make good decisions during negotiations, it is important that negotiators and their managers understand their negotiating counterparts’ ethical orientations, how those orientations impact percep- tions of the appropriateness of using unethical

negotiating tactics, and so how their counterparts’ actions may differ from their own. This is espe- cially important in a global context where indivi- duals bring influences from their home country and its business culture to their interactions.

The present study adds to our understanding of cross-cultural differences in perceptions of the appropriateness of unethical negotiating tactics by considering how a country’s business culture (resulting from its industrial structure and trust- related social capital) affects ethical orientations and the distribution of ethical positions across countries. A country’s business culture seems parti- cularly important in influencing people’s ethical ideologies because these ideologies develop as peo- ple confront and resolve ethical dilemmas through- out their business careers (Forsyth & O’Boyle, 2011). We looked at the industrial structure and trust-related social capital levels and resulting busi- ness culture in a country and predicted how it would influence individuals’ idealism and relati- vism. Countries with similar industrial structures and trust-related social capital should show simila- rities in business culture and so here, using data from experienced marketing managers from eight countries who work in a variety of industries, we find similarities in the distribution of ethical orien- tations and ethical positions among individuals in those similar countries.

Those in countries characterized by small-scale businesses, a dearth of trust enabling social capital and likely with strong criminal/corrupt organiza- tions (Egypt in our sample) were low in idealism likely as a result of the constant presence of corrup- tion and low in relativism likely as a result of the strength of Islam in the country (Barnett, Bass, & Brown, 1996) and so skewed towards exceptionism. Those in countries characterized by small-scale businesses with state support for some large-scale businesses and a preponderance of low-trust, family/kin association-based social capital (China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) likely see oppor- tunities to push boundaries and find outcomes that benefit all—showing higher idealism and higher relativism and skewing towards situationism. Those in countries characterized by large-scale, pro- fessionally managed businesses (Japan, Belgium and the US) were low in relativism likely because of the

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highly principled expectations for business deci- sion-making and high in idealism likely because more alternatives are available increasing the opportunities for finding outcomes that benefit all.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

The impact of ethical ideologies on perceptions of the appropriateness of using unethical negotiation tactics along with the similarities in the distribu- tion of ethical orientations and ethical positions among individuals in countries with similar indus- trial structure and trust-related social capital have important ramifications for 1.) organizations iden- tifying candidates for positions requiring negotia- tions (whether national or international), 2.) organizations training negotiators in negotiation tactics, and 3.) managers and negotiators preparing to engage in negotiations. While our studies are exploratory and generalizations are limited given our sampling method, we believe these results have implications for managers and researchers that are worth reviewing.

Implications for hiring

In developing a taxonomy of ethical ideologies, Forsyth (1980) offers four mutually exclusive and exhaustive personal moral philosophies that allow the categorization of individuals by their underlying ethical theories. For organizations hiring or assigning individuals into roles that involve negotiation, our research reinforces the value of these categories for understanding how an individual approaches ethical decision-making and so their appropriateness for a negotiating role. Previous research has tended to use Forsyth’s (1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) to make relative assessments of the level of a respon- dent’s idealism and relativism (e.g., using median splits) in order to determine their ethical position lim- iting the available insights (e.g., Banas & Parks, 2002; Tansey et al., 1994). Our sample, on the other hand, is broad enough to allow us to make absolute judge- ments of level of idealism and relativism using the EPQ and so test and validate Forsyth’s (1980) original predictions (H4).

For companies operating in multiple countries, the insights gained about the effect a country’s business

culture has on the distribution of ethical ideologies in that country should prove useful. Rather than consid- ering the traditional national culture (e.g., Hofstede’s (1980) five cultural dimensions) in recruiting and remote office decisions, matching candidates on the business culture resulting from their country’s indus- trial structure and social capital is more likely to pro- duce a fit on ethical ideology (H1). For example, American companies are more likely to find absolutist candidates like their employees in other high-trust countries like Japan or Germany than in low-trust companies like China or France.

Implications for training

Given the strong relationship found here between ide- alism, relativism, ethical position and perceptions of the appropriateness of unethical negotiating techni- ques, ethics position and the EPQ should be valuable tools in preparing and assessing training of negotiators in ethical decision making. In preparing ethics train- ing, focusing on approaches that increase idealism and reduce relativism and so reinforcing absolutism should work to minimize unethical behavior. Using the EPQ to identify the ethical position of trainees in advance allows training programs to be customized to focus on changing the specific aspects of an individual’s perso- nal moral theories that are most likely to lead to con- sideration or use of unethical negotiating tactics. Tansey et al. (1994) suggest that the EPQ is then a useful tool for evaluating changes in ethical decision- making after ethics training.

Perhaps the most interesting implication of the links between business culture and ethical ideology is the expectation that one’s ethical ideology evolves as one faces and resolves moral issues (Forsyth & O’Boyle, 2011). This suggests that as individuals gain experi- ence in the business culture of a country (and an organization), their moral theories change in ways that can make them more or less suited for roles invol- ving negotiation. Prior research has found an associa- tion between work environment and moral judgment (for a review, see Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Moral reasoning scores are different across fields/func- tions and decline with age/experience (Elm & Nichols, 1993; Lampe & Finn, 1992; Ponemon, 1990, 1992). This suggests the value of continuing ethics training at all levels in an organization and that the EPQ and

326 Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice

ethics positions are valuable tools for identifying can- didates for that training.

For multi-national companies looking to identify individuals for global leadership positions, the EPQ and ethical positions offer an added tool for selection into leadership development/training programs. While lea- ders’ capacity for moral reasoning appears to be linked to perceptions of those individuals as transformational leaders (Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butcher, & Milner, 2002), higher moral reasoning isn’t predictive of who emerges as the leader in a decision-making group (Dukerich, Nichols, Elm, & Vollrath, 1990). As compa- nies develop their strategies for leadership development, the business culture in the countries they operate in and recruit from offer an initial insight into the ethical train- ing challenges that might arise.

Implications for preparation

Previous research has shown the effect of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions (Forsyth et al., 2008; Volkema, 2004) on ethical attitudes in a country. Our research encourages negotiators to also consider the business culture of a country too. For example, an American marketing manager preparing for a negotia- tion with counterparts in Japan using traditional cul- tural similarities might expect Japanese negotiators to show situationism like those in China or other Asian countries. Considering business culture instead would result in the American negotiator preparing to negoti- ate with a Japanese counterpart understanding that the Japanese ethical ideology is likely to be similar to the American.

Our results also highlight the importance of negotia- tors’ ethical orientation on the approaches to negotiating as well. As idealism increases and relativism decreases, individuals become less likely to view the use of unethical negotiating tactics as appropriate. Negotiators who have adopted an absolutist ethical position (high on idealism, low on relativism) are the least likely to view unethical negotiation tactics as appropriate. The negotiators who are most likely to have a positive view of the appropriate- ness of unethical negotiating tactics are those with a sub- jectivist ethical position being low in idealism and high in relativism. Negotiators whose ethical orientation differs from that of absolutists or subjectivists on one dimension of ethical orientation (either idealism or relativism) adopt either the exceptionist or situationist ethical position.

Exceptionists and situationists share similar views of the appropriateness of unethical negotiating tactics but view using the tactics more positively than absolutists and less positively than subjectivists.

For negotiators, the relationships among the ethi- cal positions are useful because they provide a rela- tive perspective on how to approach any negotiation. A negotiator who recognizes their own ethical position can work to gauge the ethical posi- tion of their counterpart and adjust their approach accordingly. Our results offer a starting point by identifying the likely ethical positions of negotiators from countries with specific industrial structures and levels of trust-related social capital. Negotiators should, as they get to know their counterpart, work to identify that counterpart’s ethical position—are they high or low (in absolute terms) on idealism and relativism.

LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Limitations of the sampling method

As with any exploratory study in cross-cultural ethics, limitations are inevitable. Risks must be taken, how- ever, in order to extend our current boundaries of knowledge. The present study sample limits the gen- eralizability of the findings. Future studies should attempt to obtain data from a more random sample. Social desirability bias may have been a factor in response to some of the questions (despite the fact that every attempt was made to prevent against this influence). Some respondents may have simply pro- vided the socially desirable response in order to appear ethical. The likelihood of such a possibility has been expressed by other cross-cultural researchers in busi- ness and marketing ethics (Al-Khatib et al., 1997). Future studies should examine the inclusion of mea- sures for controlling such bias.

Future research

There are many potential areas for future research. Future research should be conducted to test the gen- eralizability of the results of this study by exploring ethical positions for negotiators in other countries, especially those with low levels of trust-related social capital and an industrial structure dominated by small

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businesses and strong criminal social structures. Our results indicate that individuals preparing for negotia- tions in the Arab region or East Asia, for example, cannot assume their counterparts across countries will adopt the same ethical position. Future research should look at other culturally similar regions for simi- lar results based on business culture.

Future research should also examine other dimen- sions of business culture and their relationship to ethi- cal orientation and position. We have assumed that the industrial structure and level of trust-related social capital in a country influences the business culture and people’s ethical orientation. Future research should also examine entrepreneurialism and brand/corporate reputation dimensions as well, as both are likely to change how individuals view the potential outcomes of different alternatives. Future research should exam- ine the interactions between dimensions of business culture (e.g., industrial structure, importance of brand/ corporate reputation, entrepreneurialism) and Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of culture to understand both how business culture develops and evolves over time and how this interaction enhances or under- mines similarities in ethical positions across countries.

Finally, while there has been rich development of positive business ethics models (e.g., Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hofstede & Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991), some question whether modeling ethical decision making differently than other decision making adds value to the endeavor (Elm, Nichols, & Radin, 2012). Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, and Mayer (2012), following the work of Bandura (1990, 1999, 2002)), suggest that an important dri- ver of unethical behavior is “an individual’s pro- pensity to morally disengage—that is, an individual difference in the way that people cognitively pro- cess decisions and behavior with ethical import that allows those inclined to morally disengage to behave unethically without feeling distress” (p. 2). Future research should examine the effect of ideal- ism and relativism on the processes leading to moral disengagement.

ORCID

David L. Alexander http://orcid.org/0000-0001- 6328-2744

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