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To what extent are the Southeast Asian party systems that emerged in the third
wave of democratization well institutionalised?
Introduction
Throughout the latter half of the 1990s, Southeast Asia presented a glowing opportunity for
the pursuit of democracy. The region witnessed radical political transformations in four
countries: the Philippines (1986), Thailand (1992), Cambodia (1993), and Indonesia (1998)
(Priyandita 2014: 13). Of these four countries only the political systems of the Philippines,
Thailand and Indonesia have come to significant fruition, all enjoying the classification of a
“democracy in consolidation” in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2018).
Unfortunately, scholars are generally in agreement that the backdrop of these countries is
still bleak (Peou 2014: 20; Ginsburg 2008: 2; Hicken 2006: 3). None of these countries
meet the criteria of a smooth functioning democracy. A “well institutionalized” party system,
however, has the potential to promote the efficiency of such democratic institutions and
subsequently contribute to their functioning and legitimacy (Croissant and Volkel 2012:
236). Thus examining the level of party system institutionalisation (PSI) of these countries
is integral to our understanding of democratic survival in the region.
This paper will examine the levels of PSI in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, since
their respective democratic transitions, to ultimately answer how well institutionalised they
really are. It will consider the effect of the GDP growth rate, the type of regime present, and
the implemented electoral system to explain why a country is or is not well institutionalized.
A Most Similar Systems (MSS) design analysis will be executed in the study of this small-n
research question as these three countries are not only neighbours, but experienced
democratization concurrently. The study will begin with a Literature Review that will outline
the hypotheses of this paper. The aforementioned variables will then be explained in further
detail and analysed in the third section. Finally, a conclusion will be presented in the fourth
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section, including an overview of these findings and their implications on the future of PSI in
Southeast Asia.
For the purpose of examining how well institutionalized these party systems are, one must
affirm the respective definitions of party system and PSI. A party system, as defined by
Mainwaring and Torcal (2005: 5), is a set of parties that interact in patterned ways. In
accordance with this definition, more than two parties should compete for governance, with
regularities in the distribution of electoral support (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005: 5; Hicken
2006: 5). This measure of stability ultimately manifests in PSI. The highly contested nature
of the term often renders PSI challenging to refine (Casal Bértoa 2011: 61). The dimension
of stability, however, is widely recognised in its many definitions, with Huntington (1968:
12), deeming PSI “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and
stability”. Thus my template for evaluating the party systems of Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines is the concept of PSI defined by Casal Bertoa (2017: 407) as the “process by
which the patterns of inter-party competition become stable, predictable and routinised over
time”.
To ensure a comprehensive analysis of PSI, one must have a sufficient grasp of the context
within which the selected countries’ party systems operate. Southeast Asia’s involvement in
the third wave of democratization began in 1986 with the removal of the dictator Ferdinand
Marcos through the people’s power movement in the Philippines (Shin 2016: 4). In 1992
Thailand followed suit and re-established democratic rule when mass protests ousted the
military-supported government (Williams 2012: 16). Finally in 1999, Indonesia ended three
decades of Suharto’s personal dictatorship and thereafter held democratic elections to
become one of the largest third-wave democracies in the region (Ginsburg 2008: 3;
Croissant and Volkel 2012: 242). In recent years, however, the region has been marked by
a fragmented state of democratic development. Despite starting along a positive trajectory,
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Indonesia’s progress appears beset by growing extremist Islamist politics (Baswedan 2004:
670). Likewise in the Philippines, since Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency, his
perceived authoritarian style of governance has been put under the microscope. Duterte is
labelled a threat to the nation’s liberal democracy, particularly following his signature war
on drugs where more than 4,000 people were allegedly killed (Boehringer 2017: 234).
Circumstances in Thailand for the past four years, have left any prospect of democratic
consolidation in jeopardy. Scholars have sighted the occurrence of a democratic recession
(Lindman 2017: 4; Chamber 2015: 14) since a military coup, headed by Prayut-o-cha,
delayed the holding of new elections (Hicken 2016: 1).
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Literature Review
As of late, the study of party system types and PSI in transitional Southeast Asian
democracies have secured limited comparative analysis (Ufen, 2012; Croissant and Volkel,
2012; Hicken, 2006). Scholars tend to view Thailand and the Philippines as stuck in an
inchoate state, and consider Indonesia well institutionalized, relative to the rest of the
region (Croissant and Volkel 2012: 249).
Economic prosperity has long been seen to shape the process of PSI in new democracies,
either in Latin America (Remmer, 1993; Mainwaring, 1999) or Eastern Europe (Tavits,
2005). Economic suffering is perceived to result in party instability as voters lose faith in
incumbents, held responsible for the course of the economy, and seek new political
alternatives (Casal Bértoa, 2011). A healthy economy may reduce electoral volatility by
solidifying support for the status quo, making volatility an inverse linear function of the
strength of economic performance (Roberts and Wibbels 1999: 577).
Mainwaring and Torcal’s investigation (2005: 5) presents empirical evidence that boosts this
argument. They identified that a $1,000 increase in per capita GDP produces a decrease of
1.29% in electoral volatility. Casal Bértoa’s findings (2011: 21) additionally affirm that only
once a certain threshold of wealth is crossed. party systems will remain institutionalized.
The absence of such integral characteristics hamper the chances of economically
underdeveloped nations in obtaining high levels of PSI. While a vast amount of research has
been undertaken into the influence of economic performance on PSI, the larger part of
these analyses do not concentrate on this relationship in the region of Southeast Asia.
Croissant and Volkel (2012: 259) speculated that a country’s economic performance may
carry more explanatory weight than the institutional variables they investigated. Theoretical
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and empirical evidence suggests that a relationship does exist, rendering it an interesting
prospect for successful PSI in these budding democracies.
H1: As a country’s economy prospers, the level of PSI is more likely to increase.
Analyses based on careful studies of many prominent presidential systems have found that
parliamentarism is more conducive to a stable democracy than presidentialist party systems
(Mainwaring, 1990). Linz’s seminal study (1990: 52) maintained that presidentialist party
systems tend to be a hindrance in nations that bear deep political cleavages and numerous
political parties. The demand for authority and predictability within a party system would
seem to favour presidentialism. Unexpected developments, however, are more likely to
come into fruition in such a system, such as the death of the incumbent or the exercise of
questionable judgment under the pressure of unruly circumstances (Linz 1990: 55). This
predicament, however, is not always an eventuality of a presidential system. Despite
Thailand’s parliamentary system, for example, the military triumphantly overthrew elected
governments in both 2006 and 2014 (Unger and Mahakanjana 2016: 2). The junta is now
deeply embedded in Thai life, with little desire to adhere to the conventions of a
parliamentary system.
The work of Linz (1990) spurred further study into the relationship between the type of
regime present in a country and its effects on party system stability (Mainwaring and
Shugart 1997: 449; Tsebelis 1995: 291), as it was devoid of certain empirical evidence,
ergo confirming the need for greater research and reflection. Przeworksi et al. (2000), using
an event history modelling method, found that presidential regimes are more prone to
breakdown than those that are parliamentary. Ufen (2012) investigated the exact effect of
the type of regime on PSI, and likewise discovered that presidentialist systems further the
personalization of politics, therefore lowering the degree of PSI. Whether this is the case
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with respect to Southeast Asian countries is relatively unexplored, highlighting the
importance of assessing how appropriate these arguments truly are.
H2: Presidential party systems are more likely to foster low levels of PSI than parliamentary
systems.
Scholars largely recognise the significance of a country’s electoral system to the process of
institutionalization, particularly in party systems that are yet to reach a stage of
consolidation (Mainwaring, 1999). Duverger’s Law, outlined in “Political Parties” (1954),
gave birth to the notion that the type of electoral system will essentially predispose the
number of parties present in a political system. For Duverger, a system of proportional
representation breeds multipartism while a single-member majoritarian system usually
constitutes a two-party system. One would expect these systems to have higher levels of
disproportionality, resulting in a small number of effective parties in parliament. Ufen
(2012: 463) and Hicken (2006: 20) agree that electoral rules affect the way in which
institutionalization unfolds. Hicken (2006: 20) maintains that a proportional system with a
large district magnitude is more likely to produce greater correspondence between party
positions and voter preferences than restrictive electoral rules evidenced by plurality-rule
elections, such as First Past the Post.
Hicken (2006) in fact concludes his study by suggesting that much more needs to be done
to tease out the varied effects of political institutions on PSI, a desire that this study aims to
meet by investigating the influence of electoral systems on PSI. The Philippines and
Thailand have both chosen mixed member electoral systems during the past decade.
Indonesia started with a PR system with closed lists, then switched to open lists in 2004,
and recently introduced a 2.5% threshold for the 2009 elections (Croissant and Volkel 2012:
252). It will be intriguing to assess the impact of these recent developments on the level of
the country’s PSI. Hoffman (2005: 231) notably points out that countries involved in the
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third wave of democracy may find the choice of an electoral system among the most
important issues in structuring a stable government. As Thailand, the Philippines and
Indonesia meet his criteria of a third wave democracy, it is pivotal to examine the impact of
their respective electoral systems to evaluate whether they ultimately made the right
decision.
H3: Countries with lower electoral disproportionality due to a proportional electoral system
are more likely to be well institutionalized.
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Data and methodology:
This study will examine how well institutionalized the party systems of Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines are since their respective democratic transitions. As it will only research
three countries, a small-n analysis will be utilized to ensure that depth is not compromised
in their examination. A small-n analysis will not only grant a thorough assessment, rather
than a generalized view, but will be an ideal method for the research of this region. The
consolidation of democracy in Southeast Asian party systems has been tenuous to say the
least, with certain polities finding themselves under siege by corrupt elites or an entrenched
military. A small-n analysis will aid the study in accounting for such discrepancies that could
influence the levels of PSI, as examining fewer countries allows research to be more focused
in nature. This case selection is based upon a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), as all
three countries democratized in the Third Wave, are close in proximity and share an
authoritarian past.
Independent Variable:
The independent variables that will be considered in order to explain differing levels of
institutionalization are economic prosperity, type of regime and electoral disproportionality.
As utilized by Tavits (2005) in her assessment of economic voting on electoral volatility, this
study will analyse economic prosperity through the examination of the GDP growth rate of
all three countries. This indicator is a comprehensive measure of economic health. It
constitutes yearly averages and is measured 12 months before an election, facilitating the
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testing of short-term economic fluctuations on PSI. Moreover, the data required for the
completion of this measurement can be easily sourced from the World Bank Database.
The type of regime present will be measured by looking at the “government type” of each
country classified in the CIA World Factbook (2018). This pool of data is especially
conducive to the examination of Southeast Asia as it is regularly updated and keeps track of
recent political developments. For example, although Thailand is formally deemed a
constitutional monarchy, the CIA Factbook (2018) acknowledges that a recent military coup
has hindered the prospect of its continuation.
In order to achieve values of electoral disproportionality for each party system, this essay
will utilize Gallagher’s Index. The index uses the method of Least Squares, “LSq”, which
involves calculating the square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference between
percent of votes and percent of seats for each political party competing in an election
(Gallagher 1991: 33). It is hence a measure of the degree of distortion that exists between
the share of votes obtained by each party and the share of seats that it gains. It discerns
this disproportionality from all parties collectively in an election by calculating one precise
score ranging from 1 to 100. This score can be acquired for any election from any electoral
system, permitting a complete comparative analysis of the chosen countries in this study.
Dependent Variable:
The level of PSI will be operationalized through the use of two essential indicators: Electoral
Volatility, and the Effective Number of Electoral Parties. These devices have been selected
as they provide a clear insight into the stability of party systems, a fundamental feature of a
well institutionalized country.
Pedersen’s Index of electoral volatility demonstrates how stable interaction patterns of
electoral parties and coalitions are in relation to one another within the system (Meleshevich
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2007: 98). It refers to the degree to which there is variation in aggregate party vote shares
from one election to another (Hicken 2006: 8). In a stable pattern of inter-party competition
one would expect to see the same set of parties receiving a consistent level of support from
election to election. Given the central role of elections in the process of party system change
(Pedersen 1979: 5), examining the evolving patterns of electoral strength among the
selected Southeast Asian Countries will help us answer how stable their systems have
become since democratization. As prior discussed, stability is the cornerstone of a well
institutionalized system, and measuring the electoral volatility will directly reveal whether
these party systems meet this criteria. As the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia are
relatively young democracies, this indicator will take into account their sporadic electoral
behavior.
While measuring electoral volatility is suitable for testing the first two proposed hypotheses
in this study, examining the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) is undoubtedly
more appropriate for evaluating the impact of electoral disproportionality on PSI. The
concept of ENEP was promulgated by Laakso and Taagepera (1979: 10), and can be
calculated from a share of votes cast in an election. To conclusively carry out the procedure
one must square the vote shares of individual parties, add them together and divide the
result from the number one (Laakso and Taagepera 1979: 27). Although ENEP is a frequent
operationalization for the fragmentation of a party system, it can additionally confirm the
effect of electoral systems on PSI by indicating the number of “effective” parties present
following an election. According to Duverger’s Law (1954: 217), for example, one would
assume that a majoritarian electoral system is more likely to favor a two-party system,
resulting in a lower number of ENEP and therefore a high level of PSI.
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Analysis
H1: As a country’s economy prospers, the level of PSI is more likely to increase.
Figure 1. Electoral Volatility (EV) and GDP Growth in Indonesia 1999-2016
Source: Volatility data -‐ Higashikata, T. and Kawamura, K. (2015) “Voting Behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 Religious Cleavage or Economic Performance?” (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620455) GDP Growth – World Bank Open Data (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ID)
0
1
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3
4
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6
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10
15
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25
30
35
19 99
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20 01
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20 15
20 16
G D P G ro w th (a nn
ua l %
)
Pe de
rs en
V al ue
Year
EV
GDP Growth
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Figure 2. Electoral Volatility (EV) and GDP Growth in Thailand 2001-2011
Figure 3. Electoral Volatility (EV) and GDP Growth in Philippines 1998-2016
Source: Volatility data – “IPU PARLINE Database On National Parliaments” (http://archive.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp) GDP Growth – World Bank Open Data (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=TH)
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G D P G ro w th (a nn
ua l %
)
Pe de
rs en
V al ue
Year
EV
GDP Growth
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On the whole, the data presented in Figures 1 and 3 reinforce the first hypothesis of this
study. They present enough evidence to suggest that a negative correlation exists between
GDP growth rate and electoral volatility, i.e. as GDP growth increases the electoral volatility
decreases. Although in Figure 2 a low rate of GDP growth could seem to peak Thailand’s
electoral volatility, this trend is not consistent throughout. A gradual decrease in GDP
growth, beginning in 2004, could cause electoral volatility to significantly increase from 6.6
to 70.7 in 2005. A change of this magnitude, however, is unlikely to occur as a result of
economic dissatisfaction. Voters undoubtedly sought a considerable change in political
representation, but it is possible that this change was motivated by alternative points of
contention. Electoral volatility drops to 13.6 in 2007, and during this time GDP growth
severely fluctuates. The electorate may have responded to these economic changes in
-‐1
0
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G D P G ro w th (a nn
ua l %
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Pe de
rs en
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Year
EV
GDP growth
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forthcoming elections, however, a democratic election is yet to take place since 2011. It is
thus impossible to analyze the validity or longevity of this relationship in Thailand.
The findings displayed in Figure 1, however, confirm that this relationship is particularly
evident in Indonesia. From 1999 to 2004, GDP growth rate remains substantially low,
ranging from 0.8 to 4.9. During this period Indonesia’s electoral volatility score is at its
highest recorded level of 28.7. This pattern continues for the course of this data set. A
sharp increase in GDP growth from 4.6 in 2009 to 6.2 in 2010 has a stabilizing effect on
electoral volatility which only drops from 26.6 in 2009, to 26.3 in 2014. Figure 3 proves to
be the most clear example of this correlation. While the GDP growth rate is generally low
from 1998-2003, the electoral volatility score of the Philippines appears to be at its highest
at 60.05. The latter half of the data is harder to analyze as the GDP growth fluctuates at an
unprecedented rate from 2007 to 2009. As it begins to stabilize in 2012 however, electoral
volatility gradually decreases in 2013 to 33.9. Thus from these findings it can be said that
the first hypothesis of this study stands true in both Indonesia and the Philippines. It is clear
that when GDP growth rate was particularly high, exemplified in Figures 1 and 3, the
respective electoral volatility scores began to decline. A high GDP growth rate can thus
bring a sense of stability to these party systems, which is the crux of successful
institutionalization. It is challenging to draw such conclusive findings from Thailand due to
the lack of electoral data. This absence is in itself a reflection of the country’s limited
progress towards institutionalization since democratization.
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H2: Presidential party systems are more likely to foster low levels of PSI than
parliamentary systems.
Figure 4. Average Electoral Volatility (1996-2016) in Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia
Source: Volatility data – “IPU PARLINE Database On National Parliaments”
(http://archive.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp)
The data displayed in Figure 4 does not support the hypothesis that presidential systems
are more likely to promote low levels of PSI than parliamentary systems. The Philippines
boasts an especially high average electoral volatility score of 43, which is to be expected
from a presidential republic. What was also expected was a lower electoral volatility score
for Thailand, considering its status as a parliamentary system. Thailand’s average score,
however, was 34 and surprisingly higher than Indonesia’s score of 26. The presidential
republic of Indonesia was naturally predicted to have a considerably higher electoral
volatility score, following Linz’s argument (1990: 52) that presidentialism is not
synonymous with stability, but this did not prove to be the case.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Average Electoral Volaflity
Co un
tr y
Parliamentary System Presidential Republic
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Thus, while the presence of a presidential system may prove to be an obstacle towards
institutionalization in the Philippines, this hypothesis is not valid in the cases of Thailand and
Indonesia. One would expect Thailand, as a parliamentary system, to be well
institutionalized in comparison to the presidential systems of Indonesia and Philippines.
Unfortunately, this outcome does not reveal itself in Figure 4. Its electoral volatility score is
almost as high as that of the Philippines, and is a considerable 8 points higher than
Indonesia, which enjoys the lowest score. Indonesia additionally refrains from conforming to
the suggested hypothesis. Despite possessing a presidential system, it achieves the lowest
average electoral volatility score. Overall, the Philippines is the only case where a
presidential system has a high electoral volatility score. This relationship does not occur in
Indonesia or Thailand. The influence of the type of regime on levels of PSI is thus negligible
as it is only apparent in one of three cases, which could be an anomaly.
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H3: Countries with lower electoral disproportionality, due to a proportional
electoral system, are more likely to be well institutionalized.
Figure 5. Electoral systems and disproportionality in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand
Indonesia (1999-
2014)
Philippines (1998-
2016)
Thailand (1996-2011)
Type of Electoral
System
PR System: Open
Party List
Mixed system: Closed
party list (59 seats) &
First Past the Post
(238 seats)
Mixed system: Party List
(125 seats) & First Past the
Post (375 seats)
Electoral
disproportionality
(Lsq)
3.97 8.73 8.16
Average Effective
Number of
Electoral Parties
(ENEP)
5.95 3.94 2.87
In the data presented in Figure 3, there is a clear disparity in the disproportionality scores
of the Philippines and Thailand when compared to the score of Indonesia. This divergence is
undoubtedly owed to Indonesia’s proportional electoral system, as opposed to the mixed
majoritarian/plurality systems of the both the Philippines and Thailand. Indonesia scores the
lowest, at 3.97, while the other two party systems bear similar scores of 8.73 and 8.16.
These findings lend support to the final hypothesis of this study, as there is a clear trend in
that electoral systems with majoritarian elements are less institutionalized than those that
are proportional and enjoy a lower score of electoral disproportionality.
The data revealed from the Effective Number of Electoral Parties index additionally
underscores this hypothesis. Thailand, with one of the most disproportional electoral
Source: Disproportionality and ENEP data – “Republic of the Philippines Commission on Elections” (https://www.comelec.gov.ph/) & “IPU PARLINE Database on National Governments” (http://archive.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp)
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systems, has the lowest number of effective parties at 2.87, highlighting how weakly
institutionalized it is. With only two parties fighting for governance, there are a limited
number of political avenues facilitating representation, and the threat of one-party
dominance can have destabilizing effect on the party system. This proved to be a reality in
Thailand. The military, frustrated with the endless, and arguably corrupt rule of the
Shinawatras, orchestrated a coup solidifying control of the political system (Baker 2016:
388). While Indonesia’s number of effective parties is relatively large, at 5.95, following this
hypothesis, it still seems to be the most institutionalized system. Indonesia may be an
extreme multiparty system but with balance among parties, implying a sense of stability
and hence a relatively high degree of institutionalization. The Philippines, which has an even
higher disproportionality score than Thailand, surprisingly has a secure number of effective
parties, thus this hypothesis may not be applicable to its party system. A high
disproportionality should indicate a low number of effective parties, but this is not the case
with the Philippines which has an ENEP score of 3.94. Thus the data disclosed in Figure 5
only supports our hypothesis to a certain extent, as it stands true for just two of the three
examined countries.
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Conclusion
The examination of Southeast Asia has very much revealed the importance of PSI to the
continuation of democracy in the region. Although no hypothesis in this study was confirmed
in its entirety, the most obvious explanation for how well institutionalized the chosen
countries are would have to be in their respective GDP growth rates. A high GDP growth
rate almost always witnessed a drop in electoral volatility, enhancing the institutionalization
of a country. A key issue in this analysis was the lack of electoral data present for Thailand.
If elections, as promised, occur in 2019, one may be able to identify a clear trend in this
relationship. Analysing a combination of structural and institutional variables proved to be
particularly interesting. From the outset of this study, the literature suggested that the role
of institutional variables such as the type of electoral system or regime would have a
significant impact on levels of PSI (Przeworski et al., 2000; Hicken 2006). This notion,
however, was dispelled by the majority of my results. The influence of the type of regime on
institutionalization was barely distinguishable, and the type of electoral system only
somewhat influenced PSI.
Out of the three countries, it must be said that Indonesia possessed the highest degree of
institutionalization. It achieved the lowest average electoral volatility, indicating the
presence of a balanced and stable party system. Its high number of effective parties could
indicate the presence of a cleavage-based party system, which should perhaps be
researched in further studies determining the causes of its PSI. The Philippines and
Thailand, from what can be seen, bear highly volatile and unpredictable systems. The
prospect of successful institutionalization is indeed more hopeful in the Philippines. Its
effective number of electoral parties, 3.94, suggests that a healthy party system is not
beyond reach. An improvement in volatility would aid the attainment of a system similar to
that of Indonesia’s. The current political situation in Thailand does paint a dire picture of its
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future. The completion of an electoral cycle in 2019 would certainly improve chances of
democratization, however unreliable its likelihood may be. Overall, through this study it
became apparent that these young democracies still have a long way to progress before
they reach desirable stages of consolidation.
Word count: 4292
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