peace and security in east asia

Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs

Michael McDevitt

Asia Policy, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 69-93 (Article)

Published by National Bureau of Asian Research DOI: 10.1353/asp.2006.0011

For additional information about this article

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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asp/summary/v001/1.mcdevitt.html

asia p olicy, number 1 (january 2006 ), 69–93

Michael McDevitt (Rear Admiral, retired) is Vice President and Director of the Center for Naval Analyses at the CNA Corporation. These views are his own and do not represent the views of the CNA Corporation. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

keywords: taiwan; china; united states; japan; foreign relations

Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs

Michael McDevitt

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execu tive summary

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This essay explores how Taiwan has been able to seize the political initiative from China, Japan, and the United States.

main argument Taiwan has attained this leverage due to the interrelationship of four factors: • Strategic considerations stemming from Taiwan’s geographic position lead

Tokyo and Washington to prefer the status quo, while leading China to strive for reunification. China’s increasing military power, however, may suggest a Chinese intention to change the status quo.

• Shared democratic values and the fact that the “democracy issue” has great- ly prolonged the timetable for reunification give Taipei political influence in both Washington and Tokyo.

• China’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in its relationship with Washington, and cause the United States to plan for the worst.

• Taiwan is a litmus test of U.S. credibility as an ally, a condition that in turn creates a perception on the island that U.S. military backing is uncondi- tional.

policy implications • Taipei’s high-risk diplomatic approach carries with it the very real possibil-

ity of miscalculation, which could easily lead to great power conflict.

• The United States would benefit from exploring with Beijing ways in which to demilitarize the issue of Taiwan independence so that the threat of great power conflict over Taiwan is greatly moderated.

• Tensions may eventually lessen substantially if Beijing can be encouraged to substitute political deterrence for military deterrence.

• In order to ensure that the U.S. position in the region would survive a Taipei-provoked conflict should the United States choose not to become directly involved, Washington can undertake extensive talks with Japan de- signed to ensure that Japan does not lose confidence in Washington.

organization of the essay The first four sections of the essay respectively explore the four factors of the complex U.S.-Taiwan-Japan-China relationship outlined above:

Geostrategic Issues and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Democracy in Taiwan: The Influence of Democratic Values . . . . . . . . . . . 77 China’s Policy of Threatening the Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 The Symbolic Importance of Taiwan to U.S. Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

A conclusion (p. 91) summarizes the report and offers policy implications.

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T he year 2005 has turned out to be a more difficult period for Sino-U.S. relations than many observers anticipated. A series of trade issues, in particular the growing trade deficit and concerns over the lack of Chinese enforcement of WTO intellectual property obligations, have combined with both concerns regarding China’s currency being overvalued and growing geo- strategic anxiety over China’s rise and its military modernization to shift the policy spotlight away from Taiwan as a potential “troublemaker” and place it squarely on Beijing.

This is quite a change from the winter of 2004–05 when Beijing’s policy focus changed from considerations related to when reunification with Taiwan ought to take place, to a policy of halting moves toward independence by the government in Taipei. Much to the gratification of the White House, Beijing has gone along with the U.S. policy of no unilateral changes to the cross-Strait status quo. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s president Chen Shui-bian has become more restrained in his ambitions to redefine Taiwan’s constitutional structure in a way that presages de jure independence for Taiwan. As a result, an equilib- rium exists (albeit an uneasy one), and the atmosphere of near crisis prevalent not quite a year ago has abated.

Looking back, one of the fascinating aspects of the existing relationship between Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and the United States is the degree to which the Chen Shui-bian administration in Taipei has managed to seize the political initiative and put the three great powers of Northeast Asia in a reactive mode. Unfortunately, the way by which a small nation of only 23 million people has been able to accomplish this feat of dip- lomatic jujitsu is by stoking the coals of Taiwanese nationalism on the island to a point just short of crisis with the PRC. Washington and Tokyo have not been amused by the willingness of Taipei to play diplomatic “chicken” with Beijing because the stakes of a miscalculation by either side are so high for all concerned. The purpose of this paper is to explore this situation and consider alternatives that could reduce the possibility of Taiwanese “provocations” elic- iting great power responses.

The main argument is that Taiwan’s leverage is derived from four inter- related factors, which are examined respectively in the first four sections of the paper:

Strategic considerations stemming from Taiwan’s geographic position in Northeast Asia lead Tokyo and Washington to prefer the status quo, while leading China to strive for reunification. The increasing power of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), however, is making both Japan

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and the United States nervous regarding China’s ability to coerce a change in the status quo in the near future.

Shared democratic values and the fact that the “democracy issue” has greatly prolonged the timetable for reunification give Taipei political influence in both Washington and Tokyo.

China’s constant threats of force actually empower Taipei in its rela- tionship with Washington, and cause the United States to plan for the worst.

Taiwan is a litmus test of U.S. credibility as an ally, a condition that in turn creates a perception on the island that U.S. military backing can be relied upon unconditionally. The United States should work to ensure that the U.S. position in the region, and the value of the United States to Asian nations as the balancer against China, would survive a Taipei-provoked conflict should the United States choose not to become directly involved. Washington can strive to achieve this by undertaking extensive consultations with Japan designed to ensure that Tokyo does not lose confidence in Washington and that the U.S.- Japan alliance remains strong.

While Taipei has been effective in drawing the United States into a de facto military alliance, and has caused Beijing to shift its Taiwan policy from reunification to halting independence (which is another way of supporting the status quo), Taipei’s high-risk strategy carries with it the very real possibil- ity of miscalculation.

Because miscalculation could lead to great power conflict, it is important to try to demilitarize the Taiwan issue. A conclusion thus offers a summary of recommendations necessary to achieve such a demilitarization. As one sce- nario, tensions may eventually lessen substantially if Beijing begins to substi- tute political deterrence for military deterrence. In addition, the United States and Japan should seek ways to mitigate the possible impact on U.S. credibility if Washington decided not to intervene militarily should Taiwan recklessly and foolishly precipitate a crisis with China.

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geostrategic issues and considerations

Of the four factors, geography is the only element of strategy that does not change. Geography, to a very large degree, determines strategic interests and dictates the strategic choices in most national policies.

Taiwan’s Strategic Impor tance to the PRC

When East Asia is considered in its totality—i.e., both continental and maritime domains, it is clear that China dominates the continent. This has been the case ever since Mao Zedong drove the U.S.-backed Nationalist Chi- nese allies off the continent in 1949 and U.S. forces were fought to a standstill on the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953. During the United States’ last land war in Asia, the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration refused to countenance a number of seemingly sensible military actions against North Vietnam lest such moves draw the PRC directly into the war. Moreover, Viet- namese and Russian military capabilities have declined precipitously in the past two decades, and while the Indian army has made great strides since the 1962 Sino-Indian border skirmish, extreme Himalayan terrain ensures a secure buffer against a major invasion in either direction. On the continent, China is militarily supreme.

A very different situation exists, however, on the PRC’s maritime frontier. Here, the United States and its island and archipelagic allies—including Japan and Taiwan—predominate. This has been an area of strategic vulnerability ever since China first encountered the West (including Westernized Japan) in the nineteenth century, and remains so today. Since defeating its only rival for primacy, Japan, in World War II, the United States has been the dominant military power in littoral Asia.

From Beijing’s vantage point, the combination of the Ryukyu chain and Taiwan effectively act as a picket fence around the East China Sea, potentially constraining either access to the eastern seaboard of central and northern China (including Shanghai) or egress for PRC maritime traffic to the Pacific Ocean. James Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to China, accurately noted that Taiwan “is the cork in China’s bottle.” Taiwan falling into the PRC’s hands would “end what China feels to be a blockade on its ability to control its sur- rounding seas.”�

� Ambassador James Lilley, quoted in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002), 22.

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Taiwan is Strategically Impor tant to Tokyo

Tokyo has long been aware that the location of Taiwan has made the is- land strategically important to Japan. It was the Imperial Japanese Navy that persuaded the Japanese government to insist on the annexation of Taiwan in 1895; Japanese naval strategists believed that in order to become a “Western” industrialized society, Meiji Japan would require maritime trade to bring raw materials to Japan and to transport Japanese goods to countries around the world. As early as 1879, when Tokyo asserted sovereignty over the Ryukyu kingdom by unilaterally annexing this island chain,� Japanese strategists rec- ognized the importance of having control over the islands spread along the major sea lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia.�

One hundred and ten years has not changed this geostrategic reality. As a major trading and energy-importing nation, Tokyo still realizes that Japan’s economic viability is dependent on the maritime trade routes from the Mid- dle East and Southeast Asia that pass through waters proximate to Taiwan. Because a hostile power in possession of Taiwan could easily disrupt maritime traffic bound for Japan, Taiwan is strategically significant to Japan.

Japan’s vulnerability to economic isolation is not simply a conceptual problem for Tokyo. The U.S. submarine campaign in World War II, which succeeded in economically isolating Japan, is a historical reminder of the im- portance of preventing a disruption to maritime commerce. Hisahiko Oka- zaki has been explicit in spelling out the strategic implications of the PRC annexation of Taiwan: such a development would not only compromise the sea lanes upon which Japan’s Middle Eastern oil imports travel (e.g., the Bashi Channel east of Taiwan), but also give China improved leverage in its rela- tionship with Southeast Asia, which could have an indirect impact on Japan’s significant economic interests in that region.�

� The island chain includes Okinawa and stretches southward all the way to Taiwan. � The Ryukyu kingdom had been a Chinese tributary since 1372 and concurrently a district of the

Southern Japanese Satsuma domain since 1609. When negotiations between Tokyo and Peking to resolve the status proved fruitless, Japan unilaterally annexed them. See S.C.M. Paine, The Sino- Japanese War of �89�–�895: Perceptions, Power and Primacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 90–91.

� Hisahiko Okazaki, “The Strategic Value of Taiwan” (paper prepared for U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Trilat- eral Strategic Dialogue, Tokyo, March 2, 2003) • http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst. While Okazaki’s interpretation may be a bit overdrawn, many Japanese do share his view.

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Taiwan’s Value for U.S. Hedging Strateg y

Official U.S. policy has no explicit geostrategic caveats regarding reuni- fication so long as any such unification is peacefully achieved with the con- sent of the people of Taiwan. There is no question, however, that as long as the long-term impact on regional stability occasioned by China’s rise remains unclear, perpetuation of the status quo makes geostrategic sense. The history of World War II is a reminder to the United States that Taiwan’s geographic position in East Asia is important. Japanese air power launched from bases in Taiwan destroyed General Douglas MacArthur’s air force at Luzon in De- cember 1941, and greatly facilitated the Japanese conquest of the Philippines.5 Thus, PLA naval and air bases on the east coast of Taiwan would permit China to project power more easily throughout littoral East Asia, and provide the PRC with the ability to interrupt seaborne commerce destined for Northeast Asia. With Taiwan and its Pratas island group in PRC hands—along with the Paracels seized from Vietnam in 1974 and many of the Spratly islands, China would have territorial sea and economic exclusion zone claims to large chunks of the South China Sea.

Impact of China’s Rise on Cross-Strait Stability

The difficult reality for Taiwan is that it is always going to be only one hundred miles from China, is always going to be one-fiftieth the size of China in terms of population, and is always going to be hugely disadvantaged in terms of the size of military establishments, long-term military potential, and the resources available for defense. Finally, as an island nation with few natu- ral resources, Taiwan is always going to be dependent on maritime imports.

Taiwan has not been swallowed up over the past half-century largely be- cause the Taiwan Strait presents a natural barrier to the power of the PLA, and because other great naval powers have helped to keep Chinese air and naval power on the west side of the strait. The Japanese were so much more militar- ily advanced than China in the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War that they could promise to march on Beijing if their demands—including the annexation of Taiwan—were not met. Fifty-five years later it was the United States that was strong enough to underwrite Taiwan’s security and permit the Republic of China (ROC) to survive.

5 H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April �9�� (Annapo- lis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1982), 146–48. Willmott provides an excellent assessment of the impact of Japanese airpower flying from Formosa at the start of World War II.

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During much of the Cold War, when China’s military potential was ei- ther focused on the threat from the Soviet Union or was consumed by do- mestic unrest (such as the “Cultural Revolution”) the defense establishment remained wedded to a doctrine of “People’s War.” The United States was thus able to fulfill its defense obligation with the U.S. forces then stationed in East Asia, which were principally responsible for the defense of Japan or Korea. Taiwan did not require a large separate increment of “dedicated” U.S. military power. In this sense the defense of Taiwan was an “economy of force” com- mitment—a situation that soon will no longer be true due to steady improve- ments in the PLA. Soon, the cross-Strait balance will no longer grossly favor the combined capabilities of the United States and Taiwan.

The PLA’s single-minded focus on Taiwan in recent years has, however, given the PLA the military capabilities necessary to reach Taiwan in a way that was not possible in earlier decades. The Chinese military is beginning to match Taiwan’s qualitatively superior capabilities with equally, or nearly as advanced, Russian systems. As the December 2004 PRC defense white paper makes clear, the PLA is investing more in naval and air forces for the express purpose of establishing air and sea control over the seaward approaches to the PRC.� If not balanced by increased U.S and Taiwanese capabilities, the PLA’s modernization will inevitably change the defense equation for both Taiwan and the United States.

Summar y

In sum, Taiwan’s geographic position creates geostrategic interests on the part of the United States and Japan that are different from those of the main- land. Washington and Tokyo’s interests favor perpetuation of the status quo so long as the nature of a “risen China” remains an open question and the PRC’s military modernization has the potential to destabilize the region. Neither the United States nor Japan is likely to press Taiwan on the issue of reunification. Tokyo and Washington will be content so long as Taipei does not go beyond the status quo and seek permanent separation of Taiwan and the mainland.

� State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in �00�, Beijing, December 2006, 6.

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demo cracy in taiwan: the influence of demo cratic values

In 1986 President Chiang Ching-kuo decided to gradually rollback Kuomintang (KMT) authoritarian rule in Taiwan. Once in place, these po- litical reforms resulted in a fairly rapid dismantlement of the institutions of repression. By 1996 Taiwan could boast of having a very lively democratic system. The 2000 elections actually resulted in a change in ruling party, and Chen Shui-bian—who had been jailed for democratic activism decades ear- lier—became president.

Democratic Values and the United States

This democratization process has had a major impact on the relationship with the United States by broadening Taiwan’s political support to both major U.S. political parties. As Richard Bush writes: “Previously, American liberals had criticized the KMT for its repressive rule. Now the island was a poster child for American values, made all the more prominent by the fact that po- litical repression was still the order of the day across the Taiwan Strait.”�

Democracy and reunification • The advent of democracy in Taiwan has also made it much more politically difficult for Washington to push Taipei into a unification dialogue in order to bring an end to Washington’s 50-year security obligation. One of the most significant consequences of democracy took place in 1991, when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui approved a set of Guidelines for National Reunification. In retrospect, this change put the is- land on a very different political trajectory in that Taipei dropped the pretense that the ROC represented the only legitimate government of China. As long as the PRC and the ROC each claimed to represent the true Chinese state and each aimed to reunify the country under its own political model, there was no dispute regarding concepts of “one China.” Each side asserted it would end the Chinese civil war by “recovering” the territory occupied by the other.

Instead, Taipei’s new guidelines accepted the PRC as the legitimate gov- ernment of the part of China that Beijing controlled. This move effectively nullified the underlying premise of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué that “Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that it is a part of China.” As Harry Harding has stated, “Taiwan basically abandoned the vision of one country, one legitimate government that had

� Richard C. Bush, “The United States and Taiwan” (paper presented at the International Conference on the United Nations and Taiwan, New Century Institute, September 2003), 6.

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been pursued by Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and for that matter Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.”8 The 1991 Guidelines for National Reuni- fication softened the political blow of backing away from the old formulation of “one China” by stating that the ROC still envisioned a “one country, one system” future but only when the PRC had become “democratic, free, and equitably prosperous”—just like Taiwan.

The notion of reunification only when the mainland becomes democratic is implicit—but not explicit—U.S. policy as well. The U.S. policy of support- ing no unilateral changes to the status quo was articulated in the oval office by President Bush in the presence of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao. This policy in effect means that the people of Taiwan have a veto over any reunification scheme with which they do not agree. Polls in Taiwan have repeatedly indi- cated that the citizens of Taiwan are not interested in reuniting with a main- land that is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Ironically, while applauding this presidential statement as a warning to Chen Shui-bian, Beijing was also endorsing a policy that does not promise any near-term reso- lution of this issue. That Beijing would be pleased over preservation of the status quo is testimony to how much Chen Shui-bian has managed to change the terms of the cross-Strait debate.

While the status quo may satisfy Washington over the long term and Bei- jing in the near term, the leadership in Taiwan remains distinctly unsatisfied. The status quo does not meet the growing desire of Taiwan’s polity for greater international recognition of its democratic success. President Chen Shui-bian captured this desire in a 2004 speech on Taiwan’s National Day: “There is no reason that the 23 million people of Taiwan should continue to be ‘politically isolated’ and remain as international nomads without due acknowledgement. Taiwan must stand tall on the international stage, with parity and dignity.”9

The Bush administration • In the early years of the first term of George W. Bush, the administration made conscious efforts to show U.S. sympathy regarding Taiwan’s anomalous situation—the island is a full-blown democ- racy recognized by only a handful of insignificant countries, and excluded from virtually all international institutions that require “statehood” as a cri- terion for membership. By the middle of 2003 the Bush administration was characterized as “… pursuing a policy toward Taiwan that was more heavily

8 Harry Harding, “‘One China’ or ‘One Option’: The Contending Formulas for Relations across the Taiwan Strait,” (lecture, Asian Affairs Committee of the Association of the Bar of New York, November 1, 2000), reprinted in the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations Newsletter, March 2001.

9 For a printed version of Chen’s speech, see “President Chen’s National Day Address,” Taiwan Up- date 5, no. 11 (October 29, 2004), 5 • http://www.tecro.org/taipei_update/pdf-issues/102904.pdf.

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weighted toward Taiwan than at any time since U.S. normalization of relations with the PRC.”�0

What this meant in practice was a decision to allow Chen Shui-bian to make an extended transit stop in the United States, including visits with two dozen members of Congress and attending public functions and meetings with local elected officials. Taiwan’s Vice President Annette Lu, an outspoken independence advocate, was also permitted the same transit privileges. In a remarkable departure from previous practice, Taiwan’s defense minister was authorized to visit the United States to attend a conference in Florida orga- nized explicitly so he and his sizable entourage would be able to meet with an array of various defense contractors as well as with the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and other officials from the Department of Defense (DoD). The administration also approved a Taiwan arms sales package that included submarines, something no previous administration was willing to authorize.��

Although having made an unprecedented good faith effort to both posi- tively acknowledge Taiwan’s democracy and give the island more “interna- tional space,” the Bush administration’s enthusiasm for the Chen administra- tion began to wane in late summer of 2003. President Chen announced that he was planning to resolve some of the island’s most difficult policy debates through the process of national referenda. This immediately provoked con- cern in Beijing because the CCP leadership is convinced that the referenda process is a slippery slope that will inevitably lead to a national referendum on independence—something Beijing absolutely opposes, seeing it as a concrete step toward de jure independence. A referendum could legitimize a declara- tion of independence as an act that reflects the will of the people of Taiwan.��

Because Beijing was concerned, Washington—deeply embroiled as it was in Afghanistan and Iraq—was also concerned. The Bush administration feared that Chen Shui-bian had embarked on a course that would eventu- ally undermine stability across the Taiwan Strait. The last thing Washington wanted was another crisis on its hands. Washington was especially concerned because Chen was persisting in this course despite signals sent from the high-

�0 “Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress (updated July 16, 2003), CRS–12.

�� Worth remembering is that, due to successful PRC economic and diplomatic pressure, no country except the United States is willing to sell arms to Taiwan.

�� The author most recently discussed the slippery slope metaphor with a delegation from a variety of Chinese think tanks in May 2004 during an extended meeting focused on the Taiwan issue. This has long been a Chinese concern and has been reinforced of late by the series of incremental steps taken by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian toward de jure independence.

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est levels in the U.S. government that Taiwan should not go forward with a plan that could lead to a crisis. Chen’s attitude regarding Washington’s warn- ings was that he would not bow to pressure from Washington: “Taiwan is not a province of one country nor is it a state of another … I don’t think a democratic country can oppose our democratic ideals.”�� From Washington’s perspective, Chen was ignoring U.S. interests, a development which was espe- cially irksome given how far the Bush administration had gone to expand the range of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Chen’s statement captures perfectly how the issue of shared democratic values empowers Taiwan when it deals with Washington. By seizing the moral high ground, Chen made it difficult for Washington to be too publicly criti- cal of the direction in which Chen appeared to be heading, namely making changes to Taiwan’s constitution. Private and diplomatic interventions fell on deaf ears. By brushing aside Washington’s worries over provoking a cri- sis with Beijing, Chen Shui-bian was apparently willing to ignore President Bush’s concerns over Taiwan’s actions provoking a conflict with China. As- sistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly stated in Capitol Hill testimony: “Because the possibility for the United States to become involved in a cross strait conflict is very real, the President knows that American lives are potentially at risk.”��

Ten months after the March 2004 election in Taiwan, Chen himself suf- fered a political setback. In the December 2004 parliamentary elections, the people of Taiwan did not grant President Chen and his pan-Green coalition the majority in the Legislative Yuan that Chen was seeking. The election re- sults were a relief to many China and Taiwan experts in the United States, both in and out of government, because the results seemed to demonstrate that the people of Taiwan were willing to restrain President Chen and his pan- Green alliance from going too far and risking conflict with the PRC.

These same experts remain worried, however, that continued assertive steps by Taipei, even if considered incremental, to seek a more independent status would pose a potentially explosive and unpredictable series of chal- lenges to stability. Such a development could in turn lead to an escalation of

�� John Pomfret, “Taiwanese Leader Condemns Beijing’s ‘One China’ Policy; Chen Dismisses Fear in U.S. of Rising Tension,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2003, A18.

�� Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, testimony to the House International Relations Committee, April 21, 2004 • http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/ 2004/042101.htm. One of the many important points made by Kelly in his testimony was that “there are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan considers pos- sible changes to its constitution.”

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tensions and possible conflict between the PRC and the United States that neither side desires.�5

On January 22, 2005 a new element may have been introduced into the democratic values equation. President Bush’s inaugural address may have re- energized Taipei’s democratic value leverage by making clear that the goal of U.S. foreign policy is to spread democracy. This statement was surely greeted with smiles in Taipei because such an articulation comports nicely with Tai- pei’s two-year-old initiative to promote an Asia-Pacific Democracy Alliance. In commenting on the implications of the inaugural address, Robert Kagan notes that: “In Asia, too, we may be on the threshold of a strategic reevaluation that places democratic allies, not China, at the core of American strategy.”��

Democratic Values and Japan

Japan is very conscious of PRC sensitivities regarding Taiwan. Japan’s of- ficial policy is found in a joint Sino-Japan communiqué: “the Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is the unalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand …”�� At the same time, Japan has also made an effort to maintain strong informal ties with Taipei.

Taiwan, for its part, has assiduously cultivated better ties with Japan, both to enhance the island’s security and to try and gain greater international space. President Chen has attempted to build upon the foundation of historic and cultural connections between Japan and Taiwan, and—replicating the re- lationship with Washington—make democratic political values the predomi- nate factor of the relationship.

Starting in the mid-1990s, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui became an ob- ject of intense scrutiny by the Japanese mass media because of his charisma and intense admiration of Japan. Lee is from the generation of Taiwanese who remember Japanese colonial rule fondly. He himself was a graduate of a pres- tigious Japanese university, served in the Japanese military during World War II,�8 and speaks fluent Japanese. Historical and cultural ties have easily blend-

�5 On December 5, 2004 the Foreign Service Institute and CNA sponsored a seminar exercise on cross-Strait issues, during which this point was emphasized by U.S. experts.

�� Robert Kagan, “A Higher Realism,” Washington Post, January 23, 2005, B7. �� Quoted in Lam Peng-er and Ja Ian Chong, “Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Affinity and Reality,”

Asian Affairs: An American Review 30, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 249. This article contains an excellent discussion of all facets pertaining to the Taiwan-Japan relationship.

�8 Ibid., 256–59. Some 200,000 Taiwanese fought in the Imperial Japanese Army, suffering an esti- mated 30,000 dead.

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ed with democratic values to create a generally sympathetic Japanese political attitude toward Taiwan. Shared democratic values make it easier for pro-Tai- wan Japanese politicians to offer overt support of Taiwan even at times when official Japanese policy may be more favorably disposed toward Beijing.

Prime Minister Koizumi came up through the ranks of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as a member of the Mori faction, a group with a rep- utation for being pro-Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, in late 2002 Japan changed its policy guidelines regarding travel to Taiwan by government officials in order to permit division chiefs and even higher-ranking officials to visit the island on a case-by-case basis. Throughout 2003 Taipei and Tokyo took a series of relatively minor steps designed to improve political relations. These efforts culminated in a private visit in December 2003 by former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to Taipei, where he met with President Chen.�9

Despite closer political relationships, Tokyo shares Washington’s alarm regarding Chen’s insistence on taking steps toward constitutional revision that will be certain to aggravate Beijing. Japan is conscious of the fact that any conflict in the Taiwan Strait that involves the United States will require that U.S. forces utilize facilities in Okinawa and perhaps elsewhere in the southern Ryukyus. Though Taiwan was not specifically mentioned in the 1997 U.S.-Ja- pan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, which mentioned the vague term of “area around Japan,” the above scenario would directly involve Japan.

Tokyo has been willing of late to make much more explicit its concerns regarding conflict over Taiwan. In the February 19, 2005 joint U.S.-Japanese statement on shared strategic goals following the “2+2” meeting (secretaries of state and defense meeting with their Japanese counterparts), Washington and Tokyo made clear that they had discussed the Taiwan issue. The official statement called for a peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait and for China to become more militarily transparent. The fact that Tai- wan was explicitly mentioned was noteworthy and suggests that Tokyo is be- coming much more concerned over China’s ability to use military muscle to coerce Taiwan.�0

Like Washington, there is a strong values-based aspect of Tokyo’s rela- tionship with Taiwan. Economic linkages also remain strong, of course, but the values-based relationship has a connection to Japan’s past that is unique. While China continues to berate Japan over the “history question,” Taiwan

�9 David Fouse, “Japan-Taiwan Relations: A Case of Tempered Optimism,” A Special Assessment: Asia’s Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, October 2004), 4–6.

�0 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005 • http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm.

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both values and publicly embraces its historic relationship with Tokyo. Tai- wan represents the only “success story” to emerge from Japan’s imperialistic history during the first half of the twentieth century. Japanese can consider their colonial activities in Taiwan with pride, or at least not shame.��

The particular combination of geographic proximity, a positive historic memory, and shared democratic values all contribute to Taipei’s ability to in- fluence Japanese public opinion. Over the years this ability has led Japan to adopt a more congenial Taiwan policy.

china’s policy of threatening the use of force

While Taiwan’s dynamic democracy and quest for international space will continue to feature in the geopolitical landscape, this dynamism need not in- evitably lead to war. The reality is that Beijing is the only party that constantly threatens the use of force—in effect keeping its finger on the trigger of conflict. The PRC claims to desire a peaceful resolution; according to China, Beijing has only emphasized forcible alternatives because Taipei would otherwise choose independence. By implication, this suggests that Beijing would back away from forcible alternatives if Taipei would refrain from initiatives that make Beijing worry about de jure independence. This section will examine the validity of this pretext.

How Taiwan “Benefits” from Saber Rattling

The Chen administration would prefer to change the status quo peace- fully, ideally with the blessing of Beijing or even unilaterally without the risk of war. Taiwan’s ruling government is inhibited from doing so because Beijing will not agree to a peaceful separation. Since 1991 the political leaders of Tai- wan have been able to operate just below the PRC’s use-of-force threshold, have gradually cultivated a distinct Taiwanese identity, and have diminished public sentiment on the island for eventual political reunification with the mainland. Unfortunately, this dangerous political strategy keeps the Taiwan

�� David M. Finkelstein has written that, “During the half century the people of Taiwan lived a regimented and often repressive existence as second-class citizens within the Japanese colonial empire. At the same time, however, the same spirit and resolve which Meiji modernizers exhibited at home was applied in their first colonial possession. Japan quickly transformed an underdevel- oped and all but neglected frontier area on the fringe of the Ch’ing empire into a relatively modern, economically developed, and self sufficient island whose standard of living in Asia was second only to the Japanese themselves.” David M. Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, �9�9–�950: From Abandonment to Salvation (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1993), 46–47.

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Strait crisis pot at a near boil, and is slowly alienating Washington and keep- ing Beijing in a near constant state of agitation.

This strategy has, however, had some success. Because of Taipei’s in- cremental approach toward creating a separate Taiwanese political identity, Beijing’s policy has changed focus from promoting reunification to simply preventing Taiwanese independence. Taipei’s short-term success may in fact signal a pyrrhic victory, however, since these gains have provided focus and a sense of urgency for PRC military modernization and, as a result, is increas- ing the prospect of cross-Strait conflict.

While Taipei’s efforts agitate Washington, Taipei derives its greatest le- verage through manipulating Beijing and causing the CCP leadership to feel a need to constantly rattle sabers. With every rattle, U.S. officials fear that Beijing’s use of force is more, rather than less, likely. As the perceived threat to Taiwan grows, Washington becomes even more involved in planning for Taiwan’s defense. As a result, Washington has taken a number of steps, includ- ing: agreeing to sell previously prohibited sophisticated weapons to Taiwan, reestablishing previously prohibited military contacts with the ROC military, actively examining how China might attack Taiwan, and actively consider- ing what courses of action the United States should pursue in the event of a Chinese attack. In the security realm, Taipei and Washington have become markedly more cooperative over the past five years.

PRC Militar y Modernization

The PRC is being very systematic in its approach to military modern- ization.�� David Finkelstein has written: “Years from now we will look back at the 1990s, especially the period from 1995 to 2000 as the point when the PLA dedicated itself in earnest to becoming a more professional military organization and a more operationally competent organization.”�� The Chi- nese military is putting in place a series of regulations that are remarkable in

�� For a good summation of current developments in Chinese military modernization, see U.S. Department of Defense, “FY–04 Report on PRC Military Power,” May 29, 2004. For analysis by non-DOD experts, see James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces the Fu- ture (Armonk, NY: American Enterprise Institute and M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the ��st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 1999); Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, eds., China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Capabilities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).

�� David Finkelstein (presentation to the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Chinese Mili- tary Modernization, September 24, 2002).

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scope and ambition.�� Wide-ranging reforms focus on the examination of new operational concepts, the modernization of the PLA’s weapons, integration of state-of-the-art technologies, rethinking command and control relation- ships, personnel recruitment and retention, professional military education, and improving logistics. The PLA is at last beginning to reap the benefits of China’s economic development and resulting growing wealth. The PLA’s bal- listic missile force provides China with a military capability for which there are still no proven defenses; Beijing today has the ability to punish Taiwan immediately should the island declare independence.�5

An Alternative to the Use of Force

The combination of growing military capabilities on one side of the Tai- wan Strait and an energetic, highly nationalist democracy on the other side creates a powerful incentive for Beijing to employ its new capabilities. To dis- courage the use of force, either Chen Shui-bian must stop inciting the PRC or Beijing must consider alternative approaches.

In terms of the latter, one approach would be to make better use of diplo- macy. China’s rising economic power has actually led to tremendous growth in Beijing’s global political and diplomatic influence. The PRC can now ex- ert great leverage by granting or withholding business opportunities, and by negotiating between many potential suppliers for the purchase of high- end first-world manufactured goods. Perhaps the most dramatic example of political leverage derived from economic clout was the proposed lifting of the economic sanctions on the sale of military equipment to China that was imposed by the European Union (EU) following the Tiananmen incident in 1989. Sustained diplomatic effort by the United States over the past twelve months to persuade the EU to refrain from rolling back the sanctions actually seemed to be failing—until Beijing persisted in passing anti-secession legis- lation authorizing the use of force, the EU was on the verge of revoking the sanctions. True, Beijing’s apparent misstep has made Washington’s concerns more credible to Europeans. Both Germany and France still argue, however, that lifting the sanctions is a necessary symbolic step in recognizing China’s

�� To illustrate this point, Appendix II of the 2002 Defense White Paper includes a four-page list of the new laws and regulations promulgated since 2000 alone.

�5 The Patriot PAC–3 missile defense system has been fielded and shows potential, but has yet to prove itself against a large number of incoming missiles. The Taiwan of today is not in much better shape than England was against German V-2 ballistic missiles during World War II. The best thing for Taiwan to do is traditional “entrenchment and bomb-proofing.”

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status as a rising power. Moreover, as China has pointed out, the sanctions are an impediment to greater economic cooperation.��

The PRC’s increasing global influence thus now provides Beijing with a credible substitute for its “use-of-force” policy as a means to deter Taiwan independence.�� Beijing could use its diplomatic influence to gain a commit- ment from nations around the world to announce official statements of non- recognition in the event that Taiwan declared independence, thereby making threats of force from the PRC unnecessary. If Taiwan declared independence and was not recognized, and in the process lost even its unofficial representa- tion in major capitals around the world, the island’s international situation would be much worse than it is today. The PRC’s growing military, instead of being actively brandished, would instead be a latent reality. Beijing would thus be pursuing a policy reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt’s maxim, “speak softly, but carry a big stick.”

At least conceptually, such a course of action would reduce the leverage that Chen Shui-bian and his pan-Green coalition currently wields. The im- pact that such a change in policy would have on public opinion in Taiwan is difficult to assess; certainly such a change in PRC tactics would help shift the debate in Taiwan from the current focus on independence as an end in itself to a consideration of how Taiwan could sustain such independence if unrec- ognized by the international community. Such a development would force politicians to confront the reality that Taiwan is not likely to ever become a de jure independent state without the explicit acquiescence of Beijing, something that no one thinks will be forthcoming. Finally, by backing away from overt threats to use force, China would also reduce the likelihood of becoming em- broiled in a conflict with the United States and Japan over Taiwan.

�� Frank Umbach, statement, December 2004, to the Symposia on Transatlantic Perspectives on Economic and Security Relations with China, U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, 108th Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, 83–85 • http://www.uscc.gov. See also Daniel Dombey and Guy Dinsmore, “EU and U.S. Seek to Defuse China Tensions,” Financial Times, Janu- ary 31, 2005 • http://news.ft.com/cms/s/b617aa84-73b4-11d9-b705-00000e2511c8.html.

�� As noted above, China has already been able to deter arms sales to Taiwan from every country other than the United States.

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the symbolic importance of taiwan to u.s. credibility

For well over a century, the United States has proclaimed itself a Pacific power. Even though the United States is not Asian in a geographic sense, U.S. commitment to the region is an enduring one for the sake of both Asia and the United States. As Colin Powell stated in June 2003: the U.S. is “a Pacific Power” and “we will not yield our strategic position in Asia.”�8

A fundamental interest for Washington today is the preservation of re- gional stability, which in turn requires forward-deployed U.S. forces in the region. As noted in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the United States remains committed to a presence in East Asia that is strong enough to “deter forward without massive reinforcement” in order to maintain stability; stability, in turn, is the sine qua non for economic development, which then creates prosperity.�9 This fundamental strategic goal can only be accomplished through the United States’ bilateral alliance system. Alliances are the bedrock of the U.S. strategic position in Asia because access to bases and facilities, es- pecially those in Japan and Korea, allows the United States to maintain large numbers of U.S. forces permanently in the region.

When the basing agreement between the Philippines and the United States was abrogated in 1992, however, the United States lost access to crucial air hubs on the periphery of Asia. This loss has made U.S. defense commit- ments to maritime Southeast Asia, as well as to Taiwan, much more difficult to sustain. Without these Philippine airfields, U.S. ability to introduce hundreds of land-based aircraft into the region is constrained; with the exception of Japan, the United States lacks facilities within “untanked” range of the Taiwan Straits from which to operate. The loss of these airbases in the Philippines provides a cautionary example of how domestic politics in nations hosting U.S. forces can undercut U.S. strategic interests and defense commitments. When the reliability of U.S. commitment is called into question, or when the perceived need for a U.S. presence is not compelling enough to overcome the drawbacks of a U.S. presence, democratic allies might request the departure of U.S. forces from that country.

�8 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner,” June 10, 2002 • http://www.asiasociety.org/ speeches/powell.html.

�9 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2000, 4.

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Is Taiwan a Litmus Test?

The point of the preceding discussion is to provide a context for consid- ering how Taiwan may be viewed by Asian governments as a litmus test for U.S. reliability as a stabilizing presence. The United States demands much of its Japanese and Korean alliance partners—including financial support, some degree of extraterritoriality for U.S. military personnel stationed in allied na- tions, inconveniences inflicted upon local populations caused by U.S. training activities, and de facto U.S. sovereignty over base facilities.

Would such allies be willing to accept the “costs” of U.S. bases if the Unit- ed States was perceived as either unreliable or unwilling to come to the aid of an ally that was threatened or attacked by China? Would U.S. credibility and reliability as an ally be called into question if Beijing could successfully force Taipei to reunify, or even force Taipei—against the popular will of the people of Taiwan—to begin discussions leading to reunification? Governments in Tokyo and Seoul, and certainly elsewhere in the region, might conclude that relying upon the United States to balance China and guarantee national se- curity in the case of an assertive China is a very high-risk, low pay-off strat- egy. After all, sentiment in Japan and South Korea might reason that China is always going to be a close neighbor, whereas the Pacific Ocean separates the United States from Asia. If the United States was unable or unwilling to de- fend Taiwan—a de facto ally much praised for its democratic success, why put up with all the problems and costs associated with a U.S. presence?

Asian nations do have other alternatives. One is to consider how best to live peacefully alongside China without a U.S. military presence in the region. Beijing has been promoting the idea that bilateral military alliances are relics of the Cold War. Perhaps Beijing is correct. Maybe the 50-year-old alliance- based security architecture that Washington still espouses has outlived its use- fulness. Perhaps the way forward for Asia is what China sees as a new concept of security, one based on collectivism, non-intervention, and dialogue. China disavows attempts to exclude the United States from the economic life of Asia, and instead claims to be simply calling into question Washington’s assertion that a U.S. military presence in Asia provides stability.

Credibility—Vietnam Then and Taiwan Now

Predictions of the dire implications for U.S. interests over any loss of U.S. credibility are not new. Arguments for staying the course in Vietnam in the 1960s were often based on the preservation of credibility. Following the stra- tegic defeat in Vietnam, however, there was no noticeably negative impact on

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either the U.S. position in Asia or on U.S. credibility in general. If Washing- ton’s credibility survived Vietnam, why would it not also survive the loss of Taiwan? Is Taiwan really that much of a litmus test, especially if rash action on Taipei’s part was widely perceived as having precipitated a PRC use of force?

Both conflicts began as an ideologically driven civil war over whether communism would be the political system that unified the country. In the Taiwan scenario, China has since replaced political ideology with sovereignty as the rationale for reunification—the so-called “one country, two systems” policy. Taipei and Washington, on the other hand, still consider political ide- ology as central. One must bear in mind, however, that the PRC does not claim sovereignty over other nations of Asia. Perhaps then a failure in the face of the sovereignty dispute over Taiwan would, like Vietnam, not result in a loss of credibility. This might be especially true since all of the countries of Asia have signed on to the “one China” principle, effectively siding with Beijing in the dispute.

In contrasting Vietnam and Taiwan for insights into the issue of credibil- ity, the more salient consideration is likely to revolve around the differences in influence and power between North Vietnam in the 1970s and China today. North Vietnam was never perceived as a military threat to all of East Asia.�0 China, on the other hand, poses a potential threat to the interests of U.S. al- lies who host U.S. bases, particularly Japan. It is Japan that hosts the most important bases for the forward deployment of U.S. power, and if those bases were to be shut down (as in the Philippines), the United States’ entire strategic approach to East Asia would have to be rethought. Because Japanese bases make a substantial forward presence possible (and such a presence is how the United States preserves stability), the most important aspect of the credibility issue is its impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Given Japan’s strategic concerns over Taiwan falling into the PRC’s hands, Tokyo would likely be deeply conflicted should Taiwan provoke China to use force and should the United States choose to stand aside. On the one hand, U.S. involvement would require the use of Japanese bases, which would di- rectly involve Japan in the conflict. On the other hand, if the United States does not respond, would Japanese confidence in its ally be affected? In this case, Washington would have to communicate clearly to Japan that any U.S. failure to go to war with the PRC as a result of Taiwanese miscalculation and rashness is unrelated to Washingon’s treaty obligation to defend Japan, includ-

�0 North Vietnam may have been viewed as a threat to Southeast Asia perhaps, but certainly not to Northeast Asia, where U.S. allies have resided.

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ing in the case of any Chinese aggression against Japan. Tokyo might also insist that Washington become unequivocal in its willingness to support Japa- nese claims to the disputed islands and other areas claimed by both Tokyo and Beijing.

Washington and Tokyo have recently decided to put in place a regular process for addressing this issue as an aspect of what they term “common strategic objectives.” This is a good venue for discussions related to the full range of Taiwan conflict scenarios.�� At one level uniformed officers could explore alternative scenarios, including the full spectrum of possible options ranging from a PRC “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack to a Taiwan-precipitated crisis. Concurrently, at the policy level of government the strategic and policy implications associated with the range of alternatives needs to be explored, perhaps in a series of so-called “seminar scenario exercises.” Given both the political sensitivities in Japan and Beijing’s likely adverse reaction, these are the sorts of issues that must be explored behind a veil of secrecy.

Credibility and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

The issue of U.S. credibility with allies other than Japan must also be con- sidered. In the case of South Korea, so long as North Korea remains a mili- tary threat and the U.S. continues to be committed militarily to the defense of South Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance would probably survive if the United States opted not to fight in a Taipei-provoked crisis with Beijing. Seoul, like Tokyo, would probably be pulled in two different directions. South Korea would be grateful for not having to choose between China and the United States regarding the use of U.S. bases in Korea, but would have to deal with anxiety concerning the value of the U.S. commitment to the ROK in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The current plans to greatly reduce the U.S. Army presence in the ROK do have the potential to cast doubt on U.S. reliability should the United States choose to stand aside in a crisis instigated by Taipei. So long as U.S. ground forces are deployed along the demilitarized zone—a place where they would be involved almost immediately in combat with any invading North Korean army—there is little doubt concerning U.S. willingness to become involved. Indeed, as long as South Korea believes it must deter North Korea, Seoul has no other choice but to rely on the U.S. al- liance in order to make deterrence credible.

�� “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee.”

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Credibility from Taiwan’s Perspective

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the credibility issue concerns the per- ception in Taipei. Taiwan authorities seem to have convinced themselves that, regardless of the circumstances, they can count on U.S. intervention should China attack. On a number of occasions during visits to Taipei, I have been told that the United States would not dare to stand aside due to worries of a loss of credibility—even if Taiwan had provoked the crisis. The importance of U.S. regional credibility would weigh too heavily.

Whether or not such impressions are correct, the illusion of unconditional U.S. backing frees Taipei from the precautionary measures of thinking through the consequences of provoking the PRC. This may be why Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in a television interview, responded to the question, “Will we defend Taiwan from China if they attack?” with the following comment:

We have the requirement with the Taiwan Relations Act to keep sufficient forces in the Pacific to be able to deter an attack, [but] we are not required to defend. These are questions that reside with the U.S. Congress, who has to declare an act of war.��

Although contradicting the 2001 statement of the Bush administration that the United States would defend Taiwan at any cost, Armitage’s reply was intended to introduce a degree of uncertainty in the minds of ROC leaders in Taipei, and to regain a degree of ambiguity in U.S. strategic intentions. This last statement still leaves the issue of U.S. credibility hanging. Would Washington believe the defense of Taiwan necessary in order to preserve U.S. standing and influence in East Asia? So long as the U.S.-Japan alliance remains firm and U.S. forces maintain access to bases in Japan, issues surrounding U.S. cred- ibility in the face of a rising China will not likely undermine the U.S. position in East Asia.

conclusion

This paper has examined the interrelated factors contributing to Taipei’s ability to manipulate the cross-Strait political dialogue. This co-optation has placed the United States, China, and Japan in positions where they must re- spond to Taipei. Japan and the United States would likely be more than happy with an indefinite perpetuation of the current status quo, as long as economic exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland continue to improve. China,

�� Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, interview by Charlie Rose, PBS, December 20, 2004.

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until recently, has not been satisfied with the status quo. A mere four years ago Beijing was so impatient with the lack of progress toward reunification that it was threatening to pre-emptively attack Taiwan. That impatience has since disappeared (at least publicly), to be replaced by a policy geared toward halting Taiwan independence—which is merely another way of supporting the current status quo.

Of the four factors examined in this paper, the first was the geostrategic relationship of the four parties. Neither Taiwan, the United States, or Japan have any interest in changing the current political situation through reunifica- tion. Taipei is disinterested because the island does not want to be absorbed into China. The United States and Japan are disinterested because they are strategically satisfied with the status quo so long as the PRC’s future impact on power relationships in East Asia remains uncertain.

None of the three parties involved should want to change the second factor, the shared democratic values between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. Democracy on Taiwan demonstrates not only that Chinese people can thrive in a democratic political environment, but also that the Chinese do value personal freedoms associated with democracy as much as any other people on earth.

The success of democracy in Taiwan has changed everything in the cross- Strait relationship. Taiwan is even more secure now that political change on the island has tipped the political balance in the United States in favor of sup- port for an “embattled” democracy. Yet, paradoxically, democratization has also increased Taiwan’s peril, as the DPP and pan-Green coalition continue to associate democracy and de jure independence in a way that threatens Bei- jing with the specter of permanent separation. Shared democratic values can, however, only go so far; they do not bestow upon Taipei the privilege of ignor- ing the national security interests of democratic partners.

The PRC’s threat to use force is the third and most important factor ad- dressed by this paper. Beijing must certainly realize by now that while the threat of force is enough to scare the Taiwanese away from a declaration of independence, it is not enough to make the island desire reunification. In fact, the threat of force actually contributes to a perpetuation of the status quo. Over the long term, the threat of force is a losing proposition. It milita- rizes the situation and makes the prospect of great power conflict over Taiwan a very real possibility. The PRC’s growing global influence provides Beijing with a credible substitute for a militant policy as a way to deter Taiwan inde- pendence. By backing away from overt pledges of using force, China would also reduce the threat of conflict with both the United States and Japan over

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Taiwan. While not being able to resolve the issue of reunification, a diplomatic approach would go a long way toward demilitarizing the issue.

Finally, the issue of U.S. credibility in the face of a PRC attack on Tai- wan is one that demands more thought. This author was among those who applauded President Bush’s introduction of strategic clarity into the Taiwan situation in 2001 with his “do whatever it took” statement because it was a direct way to address Beijing’s pre-emptive policy, otherwise known as the “third if,” (i.e., China would attack if Taiwan refused to get serious about re- unification). What the Bush administration did not immediately do, however, was to make sure that Taipei did not interpret this as a blank check. It is in Washington’s interests that Taiwan be in doubt over whether the United States would underwrite the island’s security regardless of how provocatively Taipei acted toward Beijing.

This paper has sought to examine the issue of credibility more closely to determine if such a conclusion is accurate. Would U.S. interests be at risk if Washington did not intervene in the event that Taiwan provokes a conflict? In my analysis, the key is Japan. The United States should work to ensure that the U.S. position in the region and its value to Asian nations as the bal- ancer against China would survive any lack of response to a Taipei-provoked conflict. Washington can strive to achieve this by undertaking extensive con- sultations with Japan that are designed to ensure that Tokyo does not lose confidence in Washington and that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong. Bilateral U.S.-Japanese discussions on the issue should take place before any such scenario occurs.

On balance, the fact that Taipei has been able to manipulate the PRC, the United States, and (to a lesser extent) Japan, is not a desirable situation for any of the three major powers involved. By subtly changing the status quo so that all three major powers are now committed to preserving it, Taipei may have actually introduced some stability into the situation. Much remains to be done, however, in order to ensure that Taipei’s strategy does not further change the status quo in a way that would precipitate a war. Japan has an im- portant role to play by making clear that it will not support an independent Taiwan against the wishes of Beijing; the PRC has the leading role to play by seizing the opportunity to move away from threats of force. Washington needs to ensure that Taipei understands that the United States will not under- write foolish or reckless behavior that jeopardizes U.S. national interests.