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Energy Policy

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Turkey and the changing energy geopolitics of Eurasia

Emre Erşena,⁎, Mitat Çelikpalab

a Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey b Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey

A R T I C L E I N F O

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy Energy Oil and natural gas pipelines Southern gas corridor Turkish stream Eurasian geopolitics

A B S T R A C T

While Turkey's geographical location is usually viewed as a major advantage in the energy sphere, since many countries in its immediate neighbourhood require active Turkish collaboration in order to export or import oil and natural gas via economically feasible pipeline projects, the ongoing political, economic and military conflicts between the same global and regional actors not only negatively affect the development of the energy trans- portation routes in Eurasia, but also present a major foreign policy challenge for Ankara that has traditionally sought to maintain a careful balance in its relations with the West and Russia. The goal of this article is to elaborate on the influence of such geopolitical factors in evaluating Turkey's role in terms of the oil and natural gas pipelines that are either planned or already under construction to connect the various sub-regions of Eurasia. Employing a traditional geopolitical approach, it seeks to understand what kind of geopolitical factors come into play regarding Turkey's role in the changing energy geopolitics of Eurasia and in what ways these geopolitical factors strengthen or weaken Turkey's objective to be perceived as a regional energy hub by other actors.

1. Introduction

The study of energy resources, since they are tradable commodities, normally falls under the domain of the discipline of economics which tend to emphasize liberal concepts like mutual gains and inter- dependence. In fact, it was Keohane (1984), one of the leading figures of the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, who first brought the study of oil to the discipline of international relations (IR) in the 1980s. Ir- onically, however, in the IR literature, the issue of energy has been quite frequently associated with traditional geopolitical approaches that highlight core realist notions such as domination, rivalry and conflict. Dannreuther (2013, 85) defines this realist outlook simply as “classical energy geopolitics”, while for Kaplan (2018), “just as there are military geopolitics, diplomatic geopolitics and economic geopo- litics, there is also energy geopolitics … [as] natural resources and the trade routes that bring those resources to consumers is central to the study of geography.”

The prevalence of such a realist outlook regarding the energy stu- dies in IR is mainly due to the fact that most of the energy consumed in the world is still based on non-renewable sources. In 2016, for instance, oil accounted for almost 33% of the global energy consumption, while the share of natural gas and coal were around 24% and 28% respec- tively (BP, 2017). This means that the countries and regions where these resources are found in abundance possess a significant advantage

in international politics. More importantly, states or actors that exercise control over the extraction of the energy resources as well as their transportation to foreign markets obtain a substantial degree of influ- ence over the regional and global political balances. In this sense, en- ergy can be viewed as an issue in which geography is highly intertwined with power politics.

The tendency to view geography as an instrument of power politics is most evident in traditional geopolitical theories. In fact, by reducing geography to something that might be conquered or distributed in order to accumulate power, traditional geopolitics becomes almost identical with the realist theory of IR (Sloan and Gray, 1999). It also simplifies the world map for policymakers by placing a powerful emphasis on size, distance and other physical attributes of territories that can be subdued by traditional factors of power such as a state's military strength (Cohen, 1994). This is an important reason for the ever- growing appeal of traditional geopolitical approaches in the field of foreign policy.

Although Eurasia is the geographical name given to the large landmass of Europe and Asia, which hosts almost seventy percent of the world's population, it is also regarded as one of the fundamental con- cepts in traditional geopolitical thinking as the symbol of land power and thus a key for global supremacy. As also argued by Grigas (2017, 12) “the geopolitical notion of Eurasia is possibly more important than the geographic one and has for decades, if not centuries, intrigued

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.01.036 Received 5 October 2018; Received in revised form 22 January 2019; Accepted 23 January 2019

⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (E. Erşen), [email protected] (M. Çelikpala).

Energy Policy 128 (2019) 584–592

Available online 29 January 2019 0301-4215/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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famous thinkers, even as its definition varied greatly from the vantage points of different countries.” British geographer Halford J. Mackinder is probably the most important figure who helped the popularization of the concept of Eurasia through his theory of the “Heartland” – the northern-central part of Eurasia which he initially called the “geo- graphical pivot of history” (Mackinder, 1904). Mackinder's vision greatly influenced the IR studies in the 20th century. Sempa (2002) for instance argues that “the continuing struggle for Eurasian mastery was the geopolitical essence of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War … [and] the Great Power struggles of the twenty-first century will likely repeat this pattern.” A similar argument is also no- ticed in the hugely popular work of Brzezinski (1997) that compares Eurasia to a “grand chessboard” – a geopolitical stage on which the global players of the post-Cold War period struggle for predominance.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many IR studies have em- phasized the rising significance of the energy pipelines in the new geopolitical landscape in Eurasia. This is mainly because the final de- cision on the route of an oil or natural gas pipeline is taken in line with not only economic, but also political considerations which also largely influence the future plans for the development of alternative routes (Mitchell et al., 2001, 90). Given that most of the world's oil and natural gas reserves are located in the sub-regions of the Eurasian super- continent, the transportation of these resources to foreign markets has been perceived by many pundits as the theme of a “New Great Game” taking place between various global and regional actors (Edwards, 2003; Menon, 2003; Weitz, 2006; Kim and Blank, 2016). O’Hara (2004, 148) even revised Mackinder's famous dictum as “who controls the export routes, controls the oil and gas [and] who controls the oil and gas, controls the Heartland” in light of the changing Eurasian energy geopolitics of the 21st century.

Turkey is undoubtedly one of the key countries in the energy geo- politics of Eurasia, since it is strategically located at the meeting point of Europe and Asia. Although it does not possess substantial energy resources, this unique geographical position enables Turkey to present itself as an energy bridge, corridor, centre or hub in the region. In fact, since the early 1990s, the Turkish policymakers have frequently made reference to these geopolitical roles interchangeably in order to high- light their country's strategic importance in Eurasia (Aras and Görener, 2010). Especially in the last few years, there has been a significant rise in the number of academic studies seeking to explore Turkey's growing importance in the energy geopolitics of Eurasia – particularly in light of the intensified competition between the EU and Russia over natural gas pipelines (Austvik and Rzayeva, 2017; İpek, 2017a; Bilgin, 2015; İşeri, 2015; Schröder, 2017). Yet, it should be noted that most of these studies either vaguely touch upon or largely underestimate the role of geopo- litical considerations in the formulation of Turkey's energy policies (Kısacık and Kaya, 2017). In addition, they focus on only one or two of Turkey's neighbouring regions rather than embracing a more compre- hensive geographical outlook which evaluates the changing role of Turkey in the energy geopolitics of almost all of the sub-regions of the Eurasian supercontinent – i.e. Europe, Russia, Balkans, Caspian, Middle East and East Mediterranean (Demiryol, 2018a; Ediger and Durmaz, 2016; Winrow, 2016).

The goal of this article is to elaborate on the influence of geopoli- tical factors in assessing Turkey's role in terms of the oil and natural gas pipelines that are either planned or already under construction to connect the various sub-regions of Eurasia. The article argues that while Turkey's geographical location is usually viewed as a major advantage in the energy sphere, since many countries in its immediate neigh- bourhood require active Turkish collaboration in order to export or import oil and natural gas via economically feasible pipeline projects, the ongoing political, economic and military conflicts between the same global and regional actors not only negatively affect the development of the energy transportation routes in Eurasia, but also present a major foreign policy challenge for Ankara that has traditionally sought to maintain a careful balance in its relations with the West and Russia. In

short, it can be claimed that its geographical location can both be a blessing and curse for Turkey within the context of the changing energy geopolitics of Eurasia.

It should be particularly noted that much like the general trend in the IR literature, traditional geopolitical considerations play a very significant role in the shaping of the debates about the issue of energy in Turkish foreign policy. Especially the unresolved territorial, ethnic and religious conflicts in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood have a major influence on the Turkish leaders’ perceptions towards the Eurasian energy geopolitics. For this reason, the article chooses to mainly focus on the impact of these conflicts on Turkey's policies in the field of energy in general and oil and natural gas pipelines in particular. The critical geopolitical approach is only employed when the article discusses the development of the “energy hub” discourse of the Turkish policymakers – i.e. the promotion of Turkey as a regional energy hub in Eurasia. Considering that critical geopolitics does not position itself as a problem-solving theory, its relevance for policy outcomes and/or re- commendations with regard to energy is much more limited in com- parison with traditional geopolitical approaches.

What kind of geopolitical factors come into play regarding Turkey's role in the changing energy geopolitics of Eurasia and in what ways do these geopolitical factors strengthen or weaken Turkey's objective to be perceived as a regional energy hub by other actors? In order to answer these two crucial questions, the first section of the article provides an overview of Turkey's rising energy demand as well as its desire to play a more prominent role in the Eurasian energy geopolitics. In the second and third sections, the EU's Southern Gas Corridor initiative and Russia's Turkish Stream project are discussed in terms of their sig- nificance for Turkey's foreign policy priorities in the field of energy. The last section elaborates on other pipeline projects in the Caspian, Middle East and East Mediterranean regions which have lately become more pronounced by the Turkish leaders in order to highlight Turkey's role as an emerging energy hub in Eurasia.

2. Turkey's energy strategy

With a population over 80 million and a growing economy which currently ranks as the seventeenth in the world, Turkey's energy con- sumption has increased quite rapidly in the post-Cold War period. The figures provided by the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) indicate that the energy demand in the country has grown by an average of around 6% in the past decade, which is the highest among all OECD member states and second-highest in the world after China (MENR, 2010; İpek, 2017a, 174). It should be noted, however, that Turkey is an energy dependent country which creates a very significant challenge for the Turkish policymakers. Given that the International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security as “the un- interrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price,” An- kara's main objective is to find reliable sources from which energy can be supplied with reasonable prices and without any major risk of in- terruption (IEA, 2018). Yet, this is not an easy task considering that Turkey currently imports around 75% of its primary energy supply, which is mainly composed of oil and natural gas (TPAO, 2016). In the first half of 2017, the country's import dependency in oil was estimated to be more than 92%, while this figure was around 99% for natural gas (MENR, 2018a).

Natural gas imports are particularly an important concern for Turkey's energy security as the consumption has increased almost ten- fold in the period between 1992 and 2002 (Winrow, 2014, 4). In 2016, Turkey purchased around 46 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from other countries, which signifies an almost 50% increase in ten years (Enerji Atlası, 2018). According to the Energy Market Regulatory Board's (EMRB) estimates, the natural gas consumption in the country is expected to rise to 54 bcm in 2018 (EPDK, 2018). Roughly one-third of this amount is used for electricity generation, which makes the issue even more sensitive for Turkey's energy security (MENR, 2018b). In

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2017, Turkey imported around 52% of its natural gas from Russia, 17% from Iran and 12% from Azerbaijan via four pipelines which have a total capacity of 46.6 bcm: Russia-Turkey Pipeline (Western Route), Blue Stream Pipeline, Iran-Turkey Pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Pipeline. The remaining 13% of Turkey's energy consumption relies on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from Algeria, Qatar and Nigeria (EPDK, 2017a). In crude oil, almost 50% of Turkey's im- ports come from Iran, 22% from Iraq, 10% from Russia and 12% from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (EPDK, 2017b).

Reducing Turkey's dependence on imported energy sources, se- curing the energy supply and improving energy efficiency are among the main objectives of the 2014–2019 strategic plan prepared by the MENR. Yet, the plan also has significant geopolitical implications as it emphasizes Turkey's objective to become an energy hub between Europe and Asia (MENR, 2014). This strategic goal is also highlighted in the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which indicates that “Turkey aims to strengthen its position between East- West and South-North energy corridors” (MFA, 2018). The Turkish officials’ interest in promoting their country as a key actor in the energy geopolitics of Eurasia is not groundless considering that its geo- graphical position gives Turkey the opportunity to play an important role in connecting the energy consumers in Europe with the energy suppliers in the Middle East and Russia as well as the Caspian and Eastern Mediterranean regions. It is estimated that 73% of the proven oil reserves and 72% of the proven gas reserves in the world are located in Turkey's neighbourhood (Bilgin, 2010). This makes Turkey an im- portant energy corridor for the European market, which accounted for almost 20% of the global oil consumption and 29% of the global natural gas consumption in 2015 (Berk et al., 2017, 142).

In addition to its unique geographical position between Europe and Asia, Turkey also has the advantage of controlling the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. In 2016, around 3% of the global oil supply –mainly from Russia – was estimated to be shipped through the Turkish straits (IEA, 2016). According to the figures provided by the Russian Transneft Company, only in 2014, the amount of oil exported from Russia's Black Sea terminals totalled 24.6 million tons (Sputnik News, 2015b). This also enables Turkey to present itself as a key transit state – a geopolitical role which is also acknowledged by the EU authorities in their Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) Strategy (European Commission, 2010). The joint declaration of the Turkey-EU High Level Energy Dia- logue meeting in 2015 went even one step further and defined Turkey as “a natural energy bridge and an energy hub between energy sources in the Middle Eastern and Caspian Regions and European Union (EU) energy markets” (European Commission, 2015).

Concepts like bridge, hub, centre, transit and corridor have been in frequent use – quite often interchangeably – since the early 1990s to make reference to Turkey's growing importance in the energy geopo- litics of Eurasia (Öner Tangör and Schröder, 2017). Although the Iraq- Turkey (also known as Kirkuk-Yumurtalık) oil pipeline became opera- tional as early as 1977 and Turkey has bought natural gas from Russia via the Western Route pipeline since 1987, the country's geopolitical role as an energy bridge between Europe and Asia was highlighted by the Turkish and Western officials particularly in the post-Cold War period. The idea behind the East-West Energy Corridor project, which was heavily promoted by the U.S. in the 1990s, was to transport the rich oil and natural gas resources of the Caspian basin to Europe via pipe- lines passing through Turkey. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipe- line and the BTE natural gas pipeline which became operational in the 2006–2007 period received strong backing from the U.S. leaders mainly because they were perceived as key geopolitical instruments in limiting the traditionally strong Russian influence over the newly independent countries of the region. Such energy projects have also enabled the emergence of a strategic partnership between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus.

Turkey's role as an energy bridge in Eurasia received another sig- nificant boost when the Iran-Turkey natural gas pipeline came into

operation in 2001 and the Blue Stream pipeline started to carry sig- nificant amounts of Russian natural gas for Turkish consumption after 2003. In 2007, the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) pipeline was also completed with the goal of transporting considerable volumes of Azerbaijani natural gas to the European market. Plans were also developed to construct a Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline in order to connect Turkmenistan with the East-West Energy Corridor, however, the project failed to materialize. In the field of crude oil transportation, on the other hand, Turkey has achieved to consolidate its role as a transit state between Europe and Asia thanks to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık and BTC pipelines, which both carry oil to the Turkish Mediterranean port in Ceyhan and together have a total annual capacity of 121 million tonnes (IEA, 2016). It is estimated that more than two billion barrels of oil have been shipped from the Ceyhan terminal since 2006 in addition to the considerable volumes of oil carried by tankers through the Turkish straits (Dünya, 2017).

Yet, beginning with the 2000s, Turkish officials have been less sa- tisfied with the role of a transit state and started to emphasize their desire to make Turkey a regional energy hub – i.e. a genuine trade centre bringing together the suppliers and consumers where the price of energy would also be determined. This is definitely a much more am- bitious geopolitical role compared with a transit which “signifies that the passage country owns the transmitting pipelines, for which it re- ceives rent” or a corridor which means that the passage country is merely a geographical bridge for the transportation of energy (Öner Tangör and Schröder, 2017, 186). As also emphasized by Grigas (2017, 19) “the position of transit states is often further complicated by the fact that they themselves can be dependent for gas imports on the same country for which they serve transit functions.”

Although the idea of turning Turkey into an energy hub was pro- moted by a number of Turkish political leaders such as Süleyman Demirel and İsmail Cem in the second half of 1990s, the geopolitical views of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as Turkey's foreign minister (2009–2014) and prime minister (2014–2016), seem to have played an important part in this transformation. Criticizing the traditional geo- political depiction of Turkey as a bridge mainly because it signifies an inactive and passive role, Davutoğlu (2008, 78) promoted the concept of “central country” which asserted a much more prominent place for Turkey in world politics (MFA, 2013). In this regard, during the period of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments in the 2000s, “the successful operation of natural gas and oil pipelines that run in various directions through the Turkish territory” was perceived as a primary target for Turkish policymakers (Davutoğlu, 2008, 92). This perception is perhaps best represented by the depiction of former Turkish energy minister Taner Yıldız (2010, 36), who wrote, “Turkey can be more than a bridge; it has the potential to become a regional centre between Asia and Europe. The core of Turkey's energy policy is circular and the diameter of this circle is equal to the world's diameter.”

The discussion about whether Turkey should be regarded as a bridge or a centre in Eurasia also reflects the discursive nature of geopolitics as such roles are largely constructed in order to serve spe- cific political interests (Bilgin, 2007; Yanık, 2009). It also falls into the domain of critical geopolitics which aims “to examine how it is that international politics are imagined spatially or geographically and in so doing to uncover the politics involved in writing the geography of global space” (Sharp, 2003, 333). It can be argued in this regard that the geopolitical representation of Turkey as an energy hub in the po- litical discourse evolved mainly in line with the JDP leaders’ conviction that being a transit country was no more sufficient and a greater degree of influence in the energy flows in Eurasia was crucial to promote Turkey as a central country in world politics (Aykaç, 2017).

The Russia-Ukraine natural gas crises of 2006 and 2009 provided a very suitable geopolitical environment for the Turkish leaders to work towards the realization of this ambitious goal. As the EU and Russia started to look for alternative routes for energy pipelines, Turkey's political leverage vis-à-vis both actors increased significantly not only

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due to its favourable geographical location as a transit country, but also its economic potential as a large natural gas importer in the region. Both the EU's SGC initiative and Russia's Turkish Stream project in this regard have offered Turkey the chance to find additional sources for its rising domestic energy demand, while generating major economic benefits. More importantly, its decision to participate in these two competing projects at the same time has provided Ankara with the opportunity to play a more prominent role in the energy geopolitics of Eurasia.

3. Southern Gas Corridor

Although it is currently the second largest energy consumer in the world after the U.S., more than half of the EU's energy consumption comes from imported sources. According to the figures provided by Eurostat (2018a), the EU member states imported around 90% of their crude oil and almost 70% of their natural gas in 2015. The share of natural gas in the energy mix of the EU in particular has increased quite significantly throughout the 2000s. Currently, natural gas accounts for almost 25% of the EU's total primary energy consumption and ac- cording to the IEA estimates the amount of natural gas consumed by the EU countries is expected to increase to more than 600 bcm in 2035 (Eurostat, 2018b; IEA, 2012).

A significant portion of the natural gas imported by the EU is sup- plied via pipelines, although especially in the last few years the share of LNG imports have also increased. Around one third of the EU's natural gas imports come from Russia, while Norway and Algeria have also been important suppliers (Eurostat, 2018a). In 2016, for instance, it is estimated that the Russian company Gazprom sold around 179 bcm of natural gas to the European market (Gazprom Export, 2018). Yet, Russia's dominance in the EU natural gas supply caused serious con- cerns in Brussels regarding the future of its energy security. The issue of overdependence on Russia becomes even more complicated when one considers that around half of the EU natural gas imports from Russia are carried via pipelines passing through Ukraine. In the winter of 2006 and 2009, many European countries confronted temporary interruptions in the gas flow due to the pricing disputes between Moscow and Kiev. Analysts viewed these crises as an indication of Russia's intention to use its energy resources as a political instrument to exert pressure not only on Ukraine, but also the EU (Mayr, 2006; Independent, 2009). The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 also sent strong signals to Wes- tern governments about Moscow's rising assertiveness towards the pro- Western countries in the former Soviet space.

SGC initiative was launched by the EU in 2008 mainly as a response to these geopolitical challenges (EUR-Lex, 2008). The primary goal of the initiative was the diversification of the EU's natural gas sources in order to ensure its energy security. Constructing pipelines to transport substantial amounts of natural gas from non-Russian sources was a crucial aspect of the SGC. In this regard, the Nabucco pipeline which was initiated in 2002 by the governments of Turkey, Bulgaria, Ro- mania, Hungary and Austria became the main project of the EU. The originally 3300 km pipeline was planned to carry more than 30 bcm of natural gas annually from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions.

Turkey had its own rationale for joining a project like Nabucco, which challenged Russia's superiority over the transportation of natural gas to Europe. First of all, it became dependent on Russian natural gas like many other European countries especially after the inauguration of the Blue Stream pipeline. In 2006, Russia was supplying almost 65% of Turkey's natural gas. Therefore, the implications of the Russia-Ukraine natural gas disputes caused serious concerns in Turkey regarding its growing dependence on the Russian energy. And secondly, the Nabucco project was perceived by the Turkish leaders as a significant instrument in the promotion of Turkey's role as an energy hub in Eurasia.

The overlapping of such geopolitical interests of the EU and Turkey resulted with the signing of the intergovernmental agreement for the Nabucco pipeline in July 2009. Yet, despite the strong backing it

received from the U.S., the project had to be abandoned in 2013 due to the financial weaknesses of the consortium as well as the rising con- cerns regarding its commercial feasibility (Koranyi and Sartori, 2014). A particularly important issue was the lack of sufficient resources, since none of the potential suppliers except Azerbaijan was committed to the project (Wigen, 2012). The radically altered market conditions and economic recession in Europe following the Eurozone financial crisis eventually compelled the EU leaders to reconsider their SGC strategy in 2013 (Siddi, 2017, 57).

Currently, the EU's revised SGC initiative is based on the completion of several pipeline projects (BP, 2018). The BTE pipeline (also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline) which already carries around 6 bcm of natural gas from the Shah Deniz I field of Azerbaijan to Turkey has been operational since 2007. Following its expansion within the framework of the SGC, this pipeline is planned to be connected with the Trans Anatolian pipeline (TANAP), the intergovernmental agreement of which was signed in 2012 between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The con- struction of TANAP started in 2015 and finished in 2018. The pipeline will annually deliver 6 bcm of natural gas from the Shah Deniz II field for Turkish domestic consumption, while the remaining 10 bcm is going to be transferred to Europe via the Trans Adriatic pipeline (TAP) that runs from Greece via Albania to Italy. The BTE-TANAP-TAP route which is the backbone of the SGC is expected to become fully opera- tional in 2020.

Stretching over 3500 km and requiring an investment of around 45 billion dollars, the SGC is crucial for the EU's plans for decreasing its dependence on the Russian energy. It also greatly benefits Azerbaijan as it finally obtains the chance to export large volumes of natural gas to the European market. There are already plans to increase the capacity of TANAP so that it can supply the EU with 23 bcm of gas in 2023 (Socor, 2012). It is also claimed that in the longer term TANAP can be expanded in order to carry natural gas to Europe from Iran, Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Such a development is also expected to transform Turkey into an “effective regional gas-trading hub” (Sartori, 2017, 104). Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) already holds a 30% share in TANAP, which makes the project even more im- portant in terms of the Turkish leaders’ energy hub discourse (Milliyet, 2015).

It should be indicated, however, that even when the SGC starts to function, the EU's dependence on the Russian natural gas will not di- minish significantly considering that the amount of gas to be carried via the SGC pipelines would still be quite small compared with the gas the EU currently imports from Russia. More importantly, the progress in the EU's plans to diversify its energy sources is largely dependent on the constantly shifting geopolitical balances in Eurasia. It should be re- called for instance that Russia fought a war with Georgia in August 2008 and recognized Georgia's two breakaway republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow also continues to have a significant degree of influence over the ongoing talks between Baku and Yerevan for the resolution of the Nagorno–Karabakh dispute. As also signified by the intense fighting that took place between the military forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia in April 2016, the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus is highly fragile, which can also negatively affect the func- tioning of the SGC.

The SGC is also criticized for hampering the normative dimension of the EU's efforts in the region. In 2015, for instance, the European Parliament sharply criticized Azerbaijan on the grounds that it “has suffered the greatest decline in democratic governance in all of Eurasia over the past ten years” (European Parliament, 2015). It should also be noted that the SGC will effectively deprive Ukraine of the Russian transit fees, which clearly contradicts the EU's objective to support Kyiv in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests (Reuters, 2015). Con- sidering that the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the transit fees paid by Gazprom, it is not clear how Kyiv can resist the increasing Russian political and economic pressure without this income, especially when it is recalled that Crimea is annexed by Russia and the separatists

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in the Donbas region continue to receive strong backing from Moscow. Finally, the position of Turkey should be taken into consideration.

In addition to the problems in Turkey's EU membership process which has been almost frozen in the last few years, new disagreements have emerged in Ankara's relations with both Washington and Brussels fol- lowing the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. Although Turkey is still committed to collaborate with the EU in the SGC, it also sig- nificantly develops its political and economic ties with Russia and takes important steps for the realization of the Turkish Stream pipeline, which is regarded by many as the most important competitor of the SGC initiative. It can be argued in this regard that the trajectory of Turkey's problematic relations with the EU as well as its rapprochement with Russia will significantly influence the development of a genuine Turkish-EU energy partnership in the longer term.

4. Turkish Stream

As one of the world's leading energy producers, Russia's economic growth in the last decade has largely been driven by its oil and natural gas sales which account for more than one-third of its federal revenues. Petroleum, crude oil and natural gas alone constituted roughly 70% of all the Russian exports in 2016 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). On the other hand, Russia currently sends 60% of its crude oil exports and more than 75% of its natural gas exports to the European countries (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). Although there has been a remarkable increase in the Russian oil and natural gas sales to China and other Asian countries in the last few years, analysts believe the developments regarding the European en- ergy market will continue to determine Moscow's strategies in the foreseeable future (Holodny, 2015; Bradshow, 2014).

One of Russia's key objectives is to maintain its dominance in the European natural gas supplies. Apart from the discovery of shale gas and increasing share of LNG in the EU's gas imports, Gazprom's influ- ence in Europe has also been threatened by the tensions between Russia and Ukraine since the 2005–2006 period. As a result, Moscow in- troduced two major pipeline projects in order to reduce its dependence on the Ukrainian route. The Nord Stream pipeline connecting Russia directly with Germany via the Baltic Sea was completed in 2011 with an annual capacity of 55 bcm. The inauguration of this pipeline enabled Russia to significantly reduce the amount of natural gas it sent to Europe via the Ukrainian route. In 2015, for instance, around 40% of the Russian gas exports to Europe transited Ukraine, which signified an almost 25% drop compared with 2011 (Berk et al., 2017, 152).

Moscow's second pipeline project to by-pass Ukraine was the “South Stream”, which was introduced in 2007 mainly as a response to the EU's Nabucco scheme. The South Stream pipeline was planned to annually transport 63 bcm of Russian natural gas to Austria via the Black Sea and territories of Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia. Although its construction began at the end of 2012 and Gazprom invested almost 4.5 billion dollars, the project was cancelled by Moscow following its ra- pidly deteriorating relations with the EU in the aftermath of the in- cidents in Ukraine in 2014. Yet, even if the crisis in Ukraine had not escalated the way it did after the Euromaidan protests, prospects for the completion of the South Stream were not very promising as the European Commission already decided in December 2013 that the project “did not comply with the EU's Third Energy Package which required the unbundling of energy generation from energy transmis- sion” (Siddi, 2017, 60; Euractiv, 2013). Eventually, under the pressure of the EU authorities, the Bulgarian government decided to suspend its participation in the South Stream, which inevitably brought the end of the project.

The cancellation of the South Stream was officially acknowledged by Russian President Vladimir Putin during his official visit to Ankara in December 2014 (President of Russia, 2014). In the same visit, Putin announced Moscow's intention to replace the South Stream with a new project that included the construction of four parallel strings directly

between Russia and Turkey under the Black Sea with a total annual capacity of 63 bcm. One of these strings was planned to transport around 16 bcm of gas annually for Turkish domestic consumption, while the other three would carry Russian gas to the European market. Unlike the South Stream, however, the pipeline would end at the Turkish-Greek border in order to enable Gazprom to avoid the costs of constructing additional pipelines in the territories of EU countries as well as the requirements to comply with EU energy regulations (Siddi, 2017, 62; Ulchenko, 2015).

Later dubbed the Turkish Stream (or TurkStream), Russia's new project was warmly welcomed by Ankara, since it was designed to re- place the Western Route pipeline passing through Ukraine and guar- antee the uninterrupted flow of Russian natural gas to the Turkish market regardless of the geopolitical tensions between Moscow and Kyiv. Ankara's participation in the project was not surprising con- sidering that it had already permitted the South Stream pipeline to pass through the Turkish exclusive economic zone in 2009. Although such a decision seemed to be contradicting with Ankara's commitments to the SGC, the Turkish officials made it clear that they viewed the SGC and Turkish Stream as complementary projects in their quest to make Turkey a regional energy hub in Eurasia. Former energy minister Yıldız, for instance, said Turkey did not see these two as rival projects given that the rising natural gas demand of the EU countries required the construction of both the SGC and Turkish Stream at the same time (TANAP, 2015).

The Turkish Stream also gave Gazprom the chance to consolidate its links with Turkey, which has become its second biggest customer in Europe after Germany. In 2015, Gazprom initiated another project – the Nord Stream 2 – that aimed to supply Germany with additional 55 bcm of Russian gas through a pipeline to be built in parallel to the first Nord Stream pipeline. Russia expects its reliance on Ukraine as a transit country to completely end once the Turkish Stream and Nord Stream 2 are inaugurated. Considering that the existing contracts between Russia and Ukraine will expire in 2019, Gazprom's chief objective is to make sure that these two projects are completed as soon as possible without any delay.

Yet, geopolitical issues have once again caused significant obstacles for Moscow's pipeline plans. In November 2015, for instance, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Turkish-Syrian border on the grounds that it was violating the Turkish airspace. While Moscow re- taliated with harsh economic sanctions against Ankara, the Turkish Stream project was suspended due to the growing rift between the two countries (Erşen, 2017). It took almost seven months to normalize the Turkish–Russian political and economic relations. Following their re- conciliation in the summer of 2016, the two countries decided to re- sume the Turkish Stream project and finally signed an intergovern- mental agreement in October 2016. The construction of the pipeline started in May 2017 and the offshore section of the 1800-km project was completed in November 2018.

The Turkish-Russian crisis demonstrated that the bilateral economic ties between the two countries could easily be threatened by their differences regarding geopolitical issues. Although their relations sig- nificantly improved in the last couple years, it should be noted that Ankara and Moscow still have serious disagreements about the future of Syria as well as other regional problems like the situation in Nagorno–Karabakh and Crimea (Çelikpala, 2015). Concerns about Turkey's energy dependence on Russia are also far from being over. It has been estimated for instance that Turkey imported around 245 bcm of natural gas from Russia in the 2005–2017 period which roughly makes up 55% of the total Turkish natural gas imports (Demiryol, 2018b, 1444). Although Turkey's economic importance has been rising for Russia in the last few decades, the energy relationship between the two countries is often described as a case of “asymmetric inter- dependence” where Ankara is the less privileged partner (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2016; Köstem, 2018). Considering that Turkey's first nuclear power plant is also being constructed by the Russian state company

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Rosatom, analysts argue that it would be very difficult for Ankara to decrease its dependence on the Russian energy in the short-term espe- cially once the Turkish Stream pipeline starts functioning (Deutsche Welle, 2017).

Another geopolitical obstacle for the Russian pipeline projects is the ongoing problems between the EU and Moscow. In reaction to Russia's annexation of Crimea and the alleged Russian role in the Donbas region of Ukraine, the EU has been implementing economic sanctions against Moscow since March 2014. Poland and some other Eastern European countries have been particularly critical about Germany's enthusiasm to continue the Nord Stream 2 project despite the EU sanctions. In March 2016, for instance, nine EU countries signed a letter against the Nord Stream 2 project and warned that it could “pose certain risks for energy security” of Europe (EU Observer, 2016). In November 2017, Denmark even passed a law allowing the government to prevent the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from going through its territorial waters on the grounds of security and foreign policy (Reuters, 2017a).

The Turkish Stream has also been negatively affected by the de- velopments in the Russia-EU relations. Although the foreign ministers of Hungary, Serbia, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey signed a declaration of intent in April 2015 to support the project, the EU has so far not shown strong signs of interest in buying natural gas from this new route (Sputnik News, 2015a). As a result, in October 2015, Gazprom decided to downgrade the project and construct two – instead of four – strings each with a capacity of 15.75 bcm of natural gas (Daily Sabah, 2015). Yet, despite this revision, the fate of the second Turkish Stream pipeline which is planned to carry gas to the European market will be de- termined by the shifts in Moscow's relations with the EU.

5. Other pipeline projects

Apart from to the ongoing SGC and Turkish Stream projects, there are also plans to build new pipelines or expand the existing ones to transport oil and natural gas to Europe from the Middle East, Caspian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean region via the Turkish territories. One possible option is to connect Iran with the SGC project, since currently around one fifth of Turkey's natural gas is supplied via the Tabriz- Erzurum pipeline that became operational in 2001. Yet, this is not an easy task considering that the vast natural gas fields are located in the southern part of Iran and the modernization of the country's poor gas infrastructure requires huge investment particularly from the West (Pollak and Schubert, 2017, 76).

Although the nuclear deal signed between Tehran and the P5+1 countries in 2015 opened a window of opportunity for Western in- vestments, prospects do not look very bright due to the toughening stance of the Trump administration towards Iran (The Washington Times, 2018). The geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East also weakens the diplomatic efforts to create a breakthrough in Iran's relations with the West. At the same time, Tehran is currently more focused on its rapidly rising domestic gas demand. Using its own domestic needs as an excuse, it even repeatedly stopped its natural gas deliveries to Turkey in the past decade. In return, Ankara has taken Tehran to the International Court of Arbitration due to conflicts about the price, volume and re- liability of the Iranian gas (Hürriyet, 2017).

The idea of integrating Turkmenistan with the SGC also looks un- realistic under the current conditions. Although Turkey signed a fra- mework agreement with Turkmenistan in 1998 and plans for a Trans Caspian pipeline have remained on the EU's agenda ever since, the project could not take start due to the unresolved disputes regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea as well as the disagreements between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over issues like transport, transit and infrastructure. In the meantime, like other Central Asian countries Turkmenistan signed important oil and natural gas deals with China. Inaugurated in 2009, the Central Asia-China pipeline, for instance, has been carrying considerable amounts of Turkmen gas to China which account for almost half of the Chinese gas imports (McLean, 2015, 175).

Another project that was introduced by Ankara with the hope of boosting its chances of becoming an energy hub was the construction of a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Northern Iraq (Paasche and Mansurbeg, 2014). For this purpose, a sales agreement was signed with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in November 2013 and BOTAŞ reportedly started to work on a pipeline to transport natural gas from the region (Interfax Global Energy, 2013). It should also be noted that the KRG began exporting oil to Turkey via trucks in 2011, while a new pipeline was inaugurated almost two years later to carry oil from the Taq Taq and Tawke oil fields in Northern Iraq to the Turkish port in Ceyhan (Genel Energy, 2018).

Despite these developments, the energy deals between Turkey and the KRG have been rejected by the central government in Baghdad which had serious disputes with Erbil about the production and export of the oil and natural gas resources in Northern Iraq. The issue also strained Ankara's relations with Baghdad until 2014, when the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq dra- matically changed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East (İpek, 2017b). A few years later, just as the ISIL threat was significantly weakened by the joint efforts of the regional and international actors, this time the KRG leadership's decision to declare independence by a referendum caused a crisis in Erbil's relations not only with Baghdad, but also with Ankara which was particularly concerned about the im- plications of such a development on its own struggle with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

As the KRG became increasingly isolated by Turkey, Iran and Iraq due to the independence referendum, it decided to sign an agreement with the Russian company Rosneft in September 2017 for the con- struction of a natural gas pipeline (Reuters, 2017b). One month later, Rosneft also bought 60% of the shares of the main oil pipeline in Northern Iraq (RFERL, 2017). Although these developments seem to have weakened Turkey's plans to become a transit for the Northern Iraqi resources in the near future, it should be indicated that the im- proving political relations between Ankara and Baghdad in the wake of the Kurdish independence referendum may open a window of oppor- tunity for cooperation between the two countries in the field of energy (Habertürk, 2017).

Turkey has also been closely watching the developments in the East Mediterranean region which holds significant gas reserves particularly in the maritime areas of Cyprus, Israel and Egypt (Grigoriadis, 2014). In 2010, a report prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the region contained a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet (around 3400 bcm) of natural gas (U.S. Geological Survey, 2010). The offshore Tamar and Leviathan fields discovered in the exclusive economic zone of Israel in the 2009–2010 period are estimated to hold around 900 bcm. The gas extracted from the Tamar field already started to supply Israel's domestic market in 2013.

While the initial estimates for the offshore Aphrodite field dis- covered in 2011 in the south of Cyprus were 200 bcm, this figure was later revised as 110–120 bcm, which prompted Nicosia to cancel its plans to develop an onshore LNG export facility and join efforts with Tel Aviv to export its natural gas to the foreign markets. One of the most important potential customers was Egypt, however, the discovery of the Zohr field in the Egyptian zone of the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 has drastically changed the energy picture in the region as the field holds an estimated 850 bcm and largely reduces Egypt's domestic demand for gas.

The EU can be a lucrative market for the natural gas exports of Tel Aviv and Nicosia, but first they need to reach an agreement on the route of an underwater pipeline. In January 2016, the two countries an- nounced their intention to build a pipeline to Greece, but the cost of the project is considerably high with almost 20 billion dollars and there are significant logistical and geological difficulties that need to be resolved (Reuters, 2016). In comparison, a pipeline to be constructed from Israel via Cyprus to Turkey would be considerably shorter and cheaper, which would also help Ankara in its objective to diversify its natural gas

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resources. Yet, Ankara's unresolved problems with Tel Aviv and Nicosia have

so far prevented an agreement on this issue. The failure of all the dip- lomatic efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus issue is the greatest obstacle. Ankara argues that the island's natural resources belong to both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and therefore Nicosia does not have the right to exercise control over the offshore hydro- carbon resources all by itself. In 2011, the Turkish government made a continental shelf delimitation agreement with the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in response to Nicosia's steps to find natural gas in the offshore blocks (MFA, 2011). Three years later, tensions between Ankara and Nicosia escalated once again when Turkish warships escorted a research vessel searching for hydrocarbons in the disputed waters (Hürriyet, 2014). It should also be noted that the Greek Cypriot government has been blocking the opening of six chap- ters – including the energy chapter – in Turkey's EU membership talks, which further weaken the efforts to mend the ties between Ankara and Nicosia.

Until their decision to restore diplomatic ties with each other in June 2016, the Turkish–Israeli relations were also in a crisis due to the Mavi Marmara incident of 2010, when the Israeli military forces in- tervened and killed a number of Turkish nationals on the board of a ship carrying aid to the Gaza Strip. One of the main factors that fa- cilitated the reconciliation process between Ankara and Tel Aviv was the possibility of a gas pipeline to be built from the Leviathan gas field to Turkey (Winrow, 2016). Two Turkish companies participated in 2014 in a tender for the construction of a pipeline to Turkey (Hürriyet Daily News, 2014). However, the economic relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have been overshadowed by their disagreements re- garding the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. Most recently, Turkish–Israeli relations were strained once again due to Ankara's support to the Pa- lestinians against Trump administration's decision to carry the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem (Daily Sabah, 2017). Coupled with the failure of the latest round of UN-led diplomatic talks for a lasting solution of the Cyprus issue, the prospects look even less promising today for the realization of an Israel–Cyprus–Turkey gas pipeline.

6. Conclusion

Turkey's chances for becoming an energy hub in Eurasia in the near future are challenged by some significant problems. Some analysts argue that neither TANAP nor Turkish Stream offer a price setting mechanism or even transit revenues, which makes Turkey merely a corridor rather than a hub (Özdemir, 2017, 119). Turkey's rising energy dependence to Russia is another problem which will most likely become even more significant after the completion of the Turkish Stream and Akkuyu nuclear power plant. There are also important issues that need to be addressed regarding the liberalization of Turkey's natural gas market. Difficulties in breaking the monopoly of BOTAŞ in particular cause significant problems for competition and transparency (Tunçalp, 2015; Bilgin, 2015). BOTAŞ’s understanding of a regional energy hub has also been criticized for being quite reductive and simply exploiting Turkey's “geographical position to buy gas at one price and then re-sell it at a much higher price” (Berk et al., 2017, 156). However, unless such problems are resolved, Turkey will most likely remain simply as a transit country for Russian and Azerbaijani gas, which resembles the role Ukraine has been playing for many years in the energy geopolitics of Eurasia.

The natural gas price has been another major point of disagreement between Ankara and Moscow. In 2015, BOTAŞ even made an appeal to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) against Gazprom to re- ceive a more than 10% discount in the natural gas price. Following a three-year deadlock on this issue, Russia finally agreed to the Turkish terms in May 2018, although the price reduction would only be valid for the 2015–2016 period. Within the framework of this new Turkish–Russian deal, Ankara accepted to issue a permission for the

construction of the land-based section of the second string of the Turkish Stream. Yet, as also indicated by this price dispute, it seems that the progress in the Turkish Stream project will be closely related with Ankara and Moscow's ability to quickly resolve their disagreements arising from their diverging economic interests in the energy sphere.

Geopolitical problems are even more important roadblocks standing in the way of the realization of Turkey's energy plans. As also indicated by Winrow (2009, 2) “it is not possible to separate natural gas issues from sensitive political and geopolitical matters.” This is particularly true for a potential energy hub considering that wars, terrorism and conflict zones in its immediate neighbourhood can all negatively in- fluence the energy pipelines trespassing the home country (Dieke and Schröder, 2017, 20). Although Turkey has a significant advantage as it is geographically in close proximity to regions that hold rich oil and natural gas resources, almost all of these regions are plagued with significant disputes. This also undermines the plans to turn Turkey into an energy hub, since even the pipelines under construction are not free from potential geopolitical risks – in particular the risk of a military escalation between various regional and global actors.

To its south, the extremely complicated crisis in Syria will most likely continue to shape the trajectory of Turkey's political and eco- nomic relations not only with the countries of the region, but also with global actors like the U.S., EU and Russia. Apart from the intensified U.S.-Russian geopolitical competition in the Middle East, the constantly shifting balances in Syria may endanger the future of both the ongoing and potential pipeline projects that are promoted by Turkey. The Middle East is also a scene of other potentially dangerous issues such as the escalating Saudi–Iranian regional rivalry, unresolved Israeli–Palestinian dispute, international terrorism and chronic political instability in countries like Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Lebanon.

To its north and east, the so-called “frozen conflicts” in Nagorno–Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea and Donbas may also cause significant problems for Turkey's pipeline plans. Although Turkish–Russian relations have been improving in the last couple of years, disagreements about such regional problems may trigger a new confrontation between the two countries. Currently, Turkey continues to develop a trilateral strategic partnership with Azerbaijan and Georgia as well as its bilateral relations with Ukraine, while Russia has been strengthening its political and military ties with Armenia and the two breakaway republics of Georgia. The unresolved problems between the countries of the region in this regard pose an important geopolitical risk particularly to the SGC project.

Finally, to its west, Ankara is constrained by the impacts of the escalating tensions in Russia's relations with the EU and NATO. Although Turkey has not joined the Western economic sanctions against Moscow after the crisis in Ukraine, these sanctions can still negatively affect grand energy projects like Turkish Stream and Akkuyu nuclear power plant because of their destabilizing effect on the Russian economy. In addition, the possible extension of the sanctions to include people or companies in charge of the Russian energy projects in Turkey is another significant risk. Following a cautious policy of balance be- tween the EU and Russia in this regard will be quite important parti- cularly in the short term for the realization of Ankara's objectives in the sphere of energy pipelines.

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