Epicurus, Principal Doctrines

Epicurus, Principal Doctrines

Translated by Peter Saint-Andre

1. That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so

that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness).[1]

2. Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is

nothing to us.

3. The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is

present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.[2]

4. Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain

that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights

that exceed their pains.

5. It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live

wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live

joyously.[3]

6. It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the

sort of men who can give one courage).[4]

7. Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be

safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if

not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is

naturally appropriate.

8. No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them

disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.

9. If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one’s

nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.

10. If the things that produced the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears

about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits

of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled

with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad).

11. If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled

us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and

desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural.[5]

12. It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about

the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to

experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural.

13. It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below

the earth and in general about the boundless unknown.

14. Although some measure of safety from others comes from the power to fight them off and from

abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.[6]

15. Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion are

boundless.

16. Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life

the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason.

17. One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and

confusion.[7]

18. As soon as the pain produced by the lack of something is removed, pleasure in the flesh is not

increased but only embellished. Yet the limit of enjoyment in the mind is produced by reasoning out

these very things and similar things, which once provoked the greatest fears in the mind.

19. Infinite time and finite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through

reasoning.

20. The flesh assumes that the limits of joy are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only

through infinite time. But the mind, reasoning out the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving

fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time; yet

the mind does not flee from joy, nor when events cause it to exit from life does it look back as if it

has missed any aspect of the best life.[8]

21. One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of

something and to make one’s entire life complete; so that there is no need for the things that are

achieved through struggle.[9]

22. You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are

referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion.[10]

23. If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you

declare to be false.

24. If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will

happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your

thoughts, you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as

a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions

you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you

will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and

is not correct.

25. If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead

turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then

your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

26. The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to

reject when they are hard to achieve or when they seem to produce harm.

27. Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one’s entire life, by far the

greatest is friendship.[11]

28. The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security

amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship.

29. Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are

unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).

30. Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense

exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but

because of the groundless opinions of humankind.

31. Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed.[12]

32. With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one

another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have

neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.

33. Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed,

which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place.[13]

34. Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not

avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing.

35. It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something

contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so

countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.

36. In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with

respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for

all.[14]

37. Among things that are thought to be just, that which has been witnessed to bring mutual advantage

among companions has the nature of justice, whether or not it is the same for everyone. But if

someone legislates something whose results are not in accord with what brings mutual advantage

among companions, then it does not have the nature of justice. And if what brings advantage

according to justice changes, but for some time fits our basic grasp of justice, then for that time it is

just, at least to the person who is not confused by empty prattle but instead looks to the facts.[15]

38. When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be

in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do

change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought

mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not

bring advantage they were not just.

39. The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who

has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but

who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away

anything that is not advantageous.

40. All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with

each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they

do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away.[16]

Notes

[1] The Greek word μάκαρ, translated here as "blissful", could also be translated as "blessed" or as

"completely happy".

[2] The word ἡδονή is often translated solely as "pleasure"; however, depending on the context I

also translate it as "delight", "joy", or "enjoyment" because the Greek word ἡδονή refers to any

physical, emotional, or mental state that is filled with sweetness (ἡδύς), whereas the English word

"pleasure" carries stronger connotations of a purely physical state (although compare phrases such as

"the pleasures of philosophy"). Furthermore, although there is no hard and fast distinction between

ἄλγος as bodily pain and λυπούμενος as mental distress, the former word tends to be used more in

relation to the body and the latter more in relation to the mind or emotions.

[3] The word φρονίμως, translated here as "wisely", derives from the word for practical wisdom;

although it is often translated as "prudently", that word is no longer commonly used in current

English and to the modern ear sounds positively Victorian, which is why I have opted to translate

φρονίμως as "wisely". The word καλῶς, translated here as "beautifully", has many meanings,

including "nobly" and "honorably"; however, the root meaning of καλός is "beauty" in either the

aesthetic or the ethical sense. On the word δικαίως as "rightly" instead of "justly", see the note to

Principal Doctrine #17 [note 7]. It is not clear what Epicurus means by "this" when he says

"whoever lacks this cannot live joyously"; I take that phrase to mean that one cannot live joyously if

one lacks the integration or harmony of wisdom, beauty, and rightness.

[4] The phrase "taking courage" translates the verb θαρρεῖν, which is derived from the word for

courage, daring, boldness, or confidence.

[5] I translate the word φυσιολογία as "the study of what is natural".

[6] The word ἡσυχία, translated here as "solitude", can also mean "quietude" or "stillness"

(translations that would also be quite consistent with the philosophy of Epicurus). The phrase

"breaking away from the herd" is my attempt to render the Greek phrase ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν,

which means literally "departing from the many" (οἱ πολλοί are "the masses"—a phrase so useful it

has been transliterated directly in English as "hoi polloi"). Note also that although the received text

reads ἐκχωρήσεως ("departing"), the Greek word ἐκχορήσεως means "stepping out from the chorus"

and thus draws a vivid contrast between the vibrant leading characters and the stolid mass of citizens

in ancient Greek tragedies; scribal error could account for a change from omicron to omega here,

especially because ἐκχορήσεως is much less common than ἐκχωρήσεως.

[7] I have expanded the translation here to capture several meanings of the key terms:

ἀταρακτότατος means "utterly without disturbance" and by extension steady or serene, whereas

πλείστης ταραχῆς means full of trouble, disorder, or tumult (expanded here to "full of trouble and

confusion"). The words ὁ δίκαιος and ὁ ἄδικος are often translated "the just man" and "the unjust

man", but the modern concept of justice is almost purely social whereas the Greek word δίκαιος has

a wider range of meaning that encompasses what is right, fitting, balanced, ordered, decent, civilized,

and the like; I have attempted to capture this ambiguity through the phrases "one who acts aright"

and "one who goes astray".

[8] In the Greek, this paragraph is written in the past tense. Because it is confusing to read that way,

I have rendered it in the present tense.

[9] The word ἀγών, translated here as "struggle", originally referred to the contests pursued by

athletes at public festivals such as the Olympic games; Epicurus is not necessarily counselling against

personal discipline (such as that involved in learning true philosophy), but against the trials and

dangers of action in the public arena.

[10] Here the translated phrase "trouble and confusion" reflects the Greek words ἀκρισία (literally

"indistinctness") and ταραχή (literally "trouble", "disorder", or "tumult").

[11] The concept of μακαρία, translated here as "complete happiness", is also referenced in Principal

Doctrine #1 when Epicurus speaks of the gods.

[12] The word σύμβολον refers to a covenant, contract, or other mutual agreement, especially (in a

legal sense) a treaty between two city-states to safeguard trading between them. The verb βλάπτω

means to hurt or damage someone or something, but not in a way that reflects willful injustice or

wrongdoing (for which the verb ἀδικέω is used).

[13] The word συνθήκη, translated here as "compact", means essentially the same as the word

σύμβολον from Principal Doctrine #31.

[14] The word κοινωνία means a fellowship, an association, a partnership, a community; I have

chosen to translate συμφέρον ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ as "what is mutually advantageous

among companions" to emphasize the sense of a shared venture that is implicit in the Greek verb

κοινωνέω.

[15] The Greek phrase τιθέναι νόμον means to make legislation; here Epicurus contrasts man-made

legislation with natural justice, which in somewhat old-fashioned English we might call natural law.

The word πρόληψις has a special meaning in the philosophy of Epicurus: it is the basic grasp that

one has of a concept.

[16] Somewhat reluctantly, I have translated the word οἰκειότης (from the Greek word for

household) as "fellowship". I say reluctantly because my preferred translation is the obsolete English

word "frith", which referred to the bonds of mutual loyalty and trust between family members,

kinsmen, and friends, as well as the resulting feeling of mutual security. Unfortunately, the word

"frith" has passed out of common usage and therefore is not appropriate for a modern translation of

Epicurus (although the concept it identifies deserves to be resurrected). Other alternatives might

include "intimacy", "kindliness", "friendly relations", "friendliness", "sense of community", even

"sense of belonging".