

CHAPTER FOUR

Base Women

Where are the women on and around a military base? How did they get there? Who benefits from their being where they are? And what does each woman think about where she is on or near the base?

Start with a base laundress. She is most likely a civilian hired directly by the base command or indirectly by a private defense contractor. She might be the same nationality as most of the soldiers whose uniforms and sheets she is washing. Or she might be from the local community, but with quite a different nationality. She could even be from a distant country, a place from which the private contractor prefers to recruit its female workers. While working in the base's large laundry, she develops her own thoughts about what the military personnel on this base are doing with their deadly weaponry, but is careful not to express her political thoughts out loud. She may value her job, which is enabling her to support her children or to send money home to her parents. Or she may find the job exploitive but feel as though neither the officers in the base chain of command nor her profit-preoccupied contractor will listen to her. She knows there are other women on the base—women soldiers, pilots, or sailors; wives of male officers and enlisted men; and women who come onto the base secretly to have paid sex with some of the men. But she does not think of any of these women as her natural allies.¹

A military base is a complicated microworld dependent on diverse women: (a) women who live on the base, (b) women who work on the base but go home at night, (c) women who live outside the fence but are integral to what goes on inside the fence and to what military men and women do when they leave the base for recreation, and (d) women who may live far from a base but who are in almost daily contact with men on the base via the Internet. Paying attention to all these women makes one smarter about the international politics of military bases.

The United States today has more military bases outside its own borders than any other country.² One of the reasons so many people in other countries think the United States qualifies as an “empire” is its global network of military bases.³ Furthermore, the specification “outside its own borders” overlooks the American military bases on island territories controlled by the United States, territories whose residents do not have their own voting members in Congress and who do not have the right to vote in American presidential elections. These islands are places that other people might call colonies. Get out your atlas or spin your globe to find Guam. The Pacific island of Guam is rapidly becoming one of the most militarized places on the planet, owing to the U.S. military’s twenty-first-century buildup there. But the fact that most mainland Americans would be hard-pressed to find Guam on a map and have given scant thought to the women and men living on Guam only underscores the gendered international political reality of most military bases: their operations rely on particular dynamics between women and men, and yet most of those operations are defined as “off limits” to civilian scrutiny.⁴

The late twentieth century set a high-water mark in the spread of overseas military bases. The Soviet Union had scores of bases in East Germany, in Poland, and throughout its Baltic and western Asian regions. France and Britain maintained bases in their colonies and former colonies. The United States exercised control over many of the Pacific and Caribbean territories it had colonized at the end of the nineteenth century, as well as over those it captured from Japan at the end of World War II,

most notably Okinawa. Simultaneously, its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union became the justification for the American military to multiply its bases—with the support of Congress—in Iceland, western Europe, Central America, Turkey, South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan.

Twenty-five years later, in the early twenty-first century, the Soviet Union is no more, and most of its Baltic and eastern European bases have been shut down. However, today the Russian military has agreements with the government of Syria and with some of the former Soviet states to maintain its military bases on their territories: for instance, the large Russian naval base at Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The French government has lost its empire but still maintains military bases in several of its African former colonies, such as Gabon and Senegal, and has opened a new base in Mali. The British empire has shrunk to a mere shadow of its Victorian size, and a cost-conscious British government has continued to close many of its overseas bases. The British military's training base in Belize closed in 2010, while its bases in Germany are due to completely shut down by 2019.⁵

Occasionally, a shrinking empire simply has passed along its old bases to a new global power. Thus, in 2001, the Americans took over—and expanded—Camp Lemonnier, a former French military base in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa.⁶ In the next decade, justified by what Washington officials called their “war on terror,” the Defense Department created AFRICOM, a new military command structure (headquartered in Italy) for its operations in Africa: in Kenya, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.⁷ One of its newest bases is a drone base in Niger.⁸ Some of these U.S. bases in Africa are elaborate and large, others are tent cities. Each base depends on a formal agreement with the host country's current government, though some of those governments are politically weak; allowing the U.S. military to operate on their soil can jeopardize an already wobbly government's local legitimacy.

Similarly, the Pentagon took over and expanded a former British imperial base in the Indian Ocean territory of Diego Garcia, compelling its local

residents to abandon their homes.⁹ In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. military has bases in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Keeping friendly relationships with the autocratic monarchies of these three countries has meant that American officials have expressed only lukewarm support for Arab Spring sentiments and prodemocracy movements in these countries.

Every one of these bases has been and continues to be gendered. There are both women and men in uniform on most of these bases. There are contractors: mostly male contract workers on the small bases, but women contract workers, as well, on the larger bases. Each of the men and women—civilian and military—deployed to each base has relationships that extend beyond that base, intensified by the Internet, which affect how that man or woman thinks about what he or she is doing there. Even bases deliberately located far from local towns send out sociocultural ripples, shaping local people's gendered understandings of the nation, modernity, security, and citizenship.

That is, the workings and impacts of each base have been shaped by ideas and practices of masculinities and femininities, and by particular relationships (intended and unintended) between diverse women and men. Each base's commander and his (almost always *his*) superiors back home in the capital—Washington, Moscow, London, Paris—have crafted rules meant to bolster certain ideas about valued manliness and proper womanhood and to control scores of daily interactions between women and men.

Any base—no matter whether it is the base of a foreign military or a local military—is militarized not just because it houses soldiers; it is *militarized* insofar as most decisions are judged by a principal criterion: how well does this proposed rule or practice serve that military's priorities—not environmental priorities, not civilian democratic priorities, not racial justice priorities, not national development priorities, and not women's rights priorities. Every militarized ritual, rule, and arrangement has as its primary goal the effective operation of that country's military, including the smooth operation of the facility on which its soldiers, sailors, and pilots are based.

A military base does not need to be thoroughly militarized. Potentially, any base can be held accountable by civilian authorities for meeting other, nonmilitary goals. But that requires those civilians in office—and those in voting booths—to resist the appeals of militarized values, militarized civilian jobs, and militarized money. Many civilians do not. Insofar as civilian officials and civilian voters become militarized, they will come to see the military base's priorities as serving their own interests.¹⁰

Consequently, each of the basing policies designed to sustain a militarized base calls for a feminist enquiry. That, in turn, calls for exploring what are each policy's gendered intents and its gendered consequences:

- housing policies
- curfew policies
- civilian hiring policies
- commercial policies
- prostitution policies
- sexually-transmitted-diseases policies
- marriage policies
- sexuality policies
- race policies

That is only a partial list of military policy decisions intended in part to shape masculinities and femininities and to choreograph the interactions between women and men on and around any military base. There are more:

- environmental policies
- policing policies

- judicial policies
- sexual assault policies
- health care policies
- recreation policies
- alcohol policies
- morale policies
- child care policies
- domestic violence policies
- chaplaincy policies
- divorce policies

The combined list is long because managing a military base requires the management of myriad gendered, racialized, ranked, and nationalized relationships. Each of these military policies ensures that different groups of women are where they are supposed to be in the ideal universe of military effectiveness. Yet women on and around any military base cannot be treated as if they are homogeneous. Policies intended to control women have had to be fine-tuned to take account of their diversity, as seen through the eyes of commanders and civilian officials. The categories of women associated with military bases are complex and overlapping: young, single, white, Asian, Black, Latino (in the U.S. military's categorizing), older, married to officers, married to enlisted men, single parents, married parents, paid, unpaid, officers, enlisted, civilian, nursing, uniformed, on-base, off-base, deemed respectable, deemed not respectable. Some base policies have been intended to ensure that dissimilar women are unlikely to make common cause. Those policies frequently have been successful.

Nevertheless, military bases' gendered policies have not been fixed, either geographically or historically. Military officials (uniformed and civilian) have altered their gendered ways of doing things as ideas about each group of women have changed and as ideas about soldiering, about

masculinities, and about delicate interstate alliances also have changed. Government officials and commanders have redesigned or simply tweaked their policies, too, as they have tried to adapt when some women have radically altered their understandings of themselves, their rights, their interests, and their political capacities. Can ex-wives of generals today be dismissively shrugged off as easily as they could be by militaries thirty years ago? Can a base commander continue to assume that women working in discos around his base will never make common cause with the country's middle-class feminist activists?

In this sense, no military base has been stable in its gendered politics, even those whose fenced and walled boundaries seem to have remained stubbornly fixed over decades. To engage in a feminist analysis of any military base anyplace in the world means watching it through a gendered lens over time. Look for the persistent convictions. Look for the new meanings. Look for the confusions.¹¹

RACE AND SEX ON THE UNSINKABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible if its ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community's job market, schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children's games, adults' friendships, gossip, and senses of pride and security.

On any given day, therefore, only a handful of the scores of bases scattered around the world are the objects of dispute. Most have draped themselves in the camouflage of normalcy. Real estate agents, town officials, charity volunteers, bartenders, schoolchildren, local police, local journalists, religious clergy, building contractors, business owners, crime syndicates, tourism companies—all accept the base, its soldiers, and, if a large base, their civilian spouses and children as unremarkable givens. They may even see them as valuable, as good for their own well-being.

When the Pentagon decided to expand its Camp Lemonnier base in Djibouti, six hundred local civilian workers, mostly men, were hired for jobs in base construction and other expansion services.¹²

Likewise, rumors of a base closing—in Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, or Belize—can be the cause for local nationalist celebration. Yet, simultaneously, the expected closing can send shivers of economic alarm through a civilian community whose members have come to depend for their own economic well-being on base jobs and soldiers' spending. Thus, for instance, in Ecuador in 2008, when a nationalist popular movement and a newly elected nationalist president, Rafael Correa, compelled the U.S. Air Force to close its base at Manta, there were complicated local reactions. Some residents were thrilled, seeing the foreign-base closure as a victory for both demilitarization and Ecuadorian sovereignty; but other Ecuadorians worried about whether the economic gains and the sense of security they had perceived as flowing from the base's 450 personnel, and from the American spending, would be so easily replaced.¹³ That is, when any base is being closed, one needs to be curious about who among the local population—by political inclination, by economic class, and by gender—will feel vindicated and who will be anxious.

The normalcy that sustains a military base in a local community rests on finely tuned ideas about masculinity and femininity. If the fit between local and foreign men, and local and foreign women breaks down, the base may lose its protective camouflage of normalcy. It may become the target of nationalist resentment that could subvert the very structure of an international military alliance. On the other hand, when a base does not seem to provoke controversy is a time when gender politics are at work to keep the waters calm. That is, controversy—set off by a sexual assault, discovery of polluted water, escalating noise—can pull back the camouflage curtain to reveal gendered base dynamics that are usually invisible. However, one does not have to wait until a controversy breaks out to explore those base dynamics.¹⁴ One can conduct a feminist-informed

gender analysis of a base when routine reigns. Normalcy is always interesting to a feminist investigator.

“A friendly, unquestioning, geographically convenient but expendable launching point for the projections of U.S. military power” is what many British people believed their country had become in the 1980s.¹⁵ They felt as though their country, once a global power, had become less a sovereign nation than a land-based “aircraft carrier” for Americans’ Cold War armed forces. Between 1948, when American forces returned to postwar Britain, and 1986, the U.S. military created some 130 bases and facilities in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. They did this with the British government’s—often secret—acquiescence.¹⁶ Some of these installations were mere offices, hardly noticeable to the casual passerby. Others, like those at Greenham Common, Molesworth, Mildenhall, and Holy Loch, were full-fledged communities with elaborate facilities, heavy weaponry, and large workforces.

Most of the larger bases in Britain had their roots in the American installations that had been established during World War II. These were easier to reestablish during the Cold War precisely because they had become a familiar part of British life in the early 1940s. But even during World War II, local acceptance could not be taken for granted. Policy makers had to fashion racialized and gendered policies that would make the introduction of thousands of foreign soldiers palatable to local civilians, but do it in a way that would not offend the voters back home. In 1940s Britain this meant ensuring that British and American men could work together as allies, not sexual rivals.

During World War II, a potentially explosive topic of policy debate among British and American officers was how to manage the relations between African American male soldiers and white British women.¹⁷ During the course of the war, 130,000 Black American soldiers were stationed in Britain. Though they represented only a fraction of all the American troops based there, they became the focus of intense controversy—in village pubs, the press, Parliament, and war rooms. When

the first soldiers arrived in 1942, the American military was a segregated institution. However, Blacks had become a political force to be reckoned with in America; the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt had entered office indebted to thousands of Black voters in northern cities who had transferred their electoral support from the Republican to the Democratic Party.


British society in 1942 was overwhelmingly (though not totally) white, imbued with a sense of imperial superiority over the Asian and African peoples it still ruled. British armed forces had fought World War I, and were fighting World War II, with regiments mobilized in India, Africa, and the West Indies.¹⁸ When white male British officials during World War I sought to choreograph race and gender to wage that earlier war, they had thought sexually; they had worked hard to manipulate prostitution policies to wage what was then called the Great War.¹⁹ Two decades later, during the early 1940s, both the British and the American, male-led governments were ready with racial formulas when they sat down to talk about how to ensure that African American men stationed in Britain would relate to white British women in ways that would enhance the joint war effort.

White British women, however, had their own ideas. When they dated Black American soldiers, they made comparisons between African American and white British manhood. British women often found the former to be more polite, better company, and perhaps more “exotic.” By 1943, some white British women were giving birth to children fathered by African American GIs. Some were choosing to marry their Black American boyfriends. Certain male members of Winston Churchill’s cabinet became alarmed at what they considered a dangerous trend.

Top-level discussions already had begun in 1942. Three possible solutions were suggested in the all-white, all-male Cabinet sessions: (1) stop the U.S. government from sending any Black male soldiers to Britain, (2) if that were impossible, confine African American soldiers to certain coastal bases in Britain, or (3) if all else failed, press the American armed forces to send more African American women soldiers and Red Cross

volunteers to Britain so that Black male soldiers would not have to look to white British women for companionship.²⁰

None of these proposals proved feasible. The Allies' war effort depended too much on optimum use of human resources to keep over a hundred thousand American troops out of Britain or holed up in coastal towns. Furthermore, the postwar experience following World War I, when many British whites turned against West Indian Black men who had served as maritime workers in the port of Liverpool, suggested that coastal quarantining was no insurance against racial hostility. Finally, the American government refused to send thousands of African American women to Britain. Leaders of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) made it clear to the Roosevelt administration that they did not see such a plan as respectful of Black womanhood: Black women were volunteering for the U.S. Army to be soldiers, not sexual companions. Furthermore, some Britons did not think that the plan was wise; white British men might start dating the Black American women. In the end, only eight hundred African American military women were sent to Britain, and those not until 1945; they were members of the historic 6888th Central Postal Directory Battalion.²¹



FIGURES 14 AND 15. African American soldiers and their dates in one of London's "colored" clubs, probably the Bouillabaisse on New Compton Street, 1943. Photos: The Hulton Picture Company.

At the same time that British and American officials were hammering out complicated policies for racialized gendered relationships in wartime Britain, other male officials of the same allies were devising policies that

would allow the British government to enlist West Indian Afro-Caribbean and Indian women into the British military without their deployment upsetting the entrenched racial segregation that organized work and social life in Washington, D.C.²²

Back in Britain, attempts to prevent white British women from dating Black soldiers took the more diffuse forms of official and unofficial warnings directed at local white women. British women who went out with African American men stationed at nearby bases were warned that they were more likely to get VD. Women who dated Black soldiers were branded as “loose” or even traitorous to Britain. Whenever some infraction of disciplinary rules involved an African American soldier, the press was likely to specify his race. British parents who allowed their daughters to date Black GIs were portrayed by local British papers as “irresponsible.”

During the early years of the war, there was a widespread suspicion, expressed in British newspapers and by members of Parliament, that Black American soldiers were more likely than white GIs to be charged for sexual offenses such as rape and to receive harsher sentences if convicted. By 1945, while Blacks (the great majority of them male) constituted only 8 percent of all U.S. troops stationed in Europe, they represented 21 percent of all American servicemen convicted of crimes. When the criminal convictions are broken down by category, the discrepancies are even more startling: Black soldiers were 42 percent of those convicted of sex crimes.²³ Nonetheless, in August 1942, Britain’s Parliament passed the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, which gave the American authorities the right to try American soldiers for offenses committed on British soil. It was one step toward permitting the Americans to maintain their kind of racial-sexual system despite the unusual circumstances of wartime.

Many white Americans were afraid that if sexual relations between Black men and white women were allowed in wartime Britain, sexual segregation would be harder to maintain in postwar America. Governmental and press persuasion was hardly overwhelming in its

success, however. A Mass Observation survey, a British wartime public opinion poll, conducted in August 1943 revealed that only one in seven of the Britons questioned disapproved of marriages between Blacks and whites; 25 percent told interviewers that they had become more friendly toward Black people partly because of meeting African American soldiers.²⁴ Yet by the end of the war, and especially after the first babies had been born of white British women and Black soldiers, it took considerable social courage for a young white British woman to go out to a local pub with a Black soldier.

American military commanders were not passive in these racialized gendered wartime debates. General Dwight Eisenhower, senior U.S. commander in Europe, tolerated white-Black dating because he believed that the U.S.-British alliance would be harmed if American white officers tried to impose their segregationist “Jim Crow” conventions on the British. Other American male officers, however, thought that clashes between white and African American soldiers in Bristol and Leicester were due to white male soldiers’ justifiable resentment of Black troops “using up” the limited pool of local white women. Some American officers were also firmly opposed to “mixed” marriages and used their authority to prohibit men under their command from marrying British women. By the end of World War II, at least sixty thousand British women had filed applications with U.S. officials to emigrate to America as war brides.²⁵ Very few of those whose prospective husbands were Black were accepted by authorities. There appeared to be a “gentleman’s agreement” between British and American middle-level white male officials to forbid marriages between Black GIs and white British women. The Black soldier intent on marriage would be transferred and given a serious talking-to by his superior; the woman was counseled by an American military officer or a British welfare officer.²⁶

Whom male soldiers meet and whom they marry while stationed on overseas bases has continued to be an issue in the minds of U.S. military strategists. Their concern derives largely from a distrust of the motives of

the local women. American male soldiers seeking to marry Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, Okinawan, Filipino, and German women have been routinely discouraged, if not by commanders, then by military chaplains. Those women who have, nonetheless, married American male soldiers and become U.S. military wives have found that, on top of coping with the pressures and rules that shape the lives of all military wives, they have to cope with both American white citizens' responses to them and their own U.S.-based diaspora's often less than welcoming responses. In both cases, the responses are based on a common assumption that these women must have met their military husbands while working in a disco or massage parlor near an American overseas base.²⁷

Marriage, in other words, has been made integral to international security politics chiefly by those military strategists—uniformed and civilian, American, Canadian, British, Russian, Turkish, Japanese—who have become convinced that only a certain sort of militarized marriage, with a certain sort of wife, can ensure their country's military's smooth operation. Not taking seriously marriage politics—and the power wielded on its behalf—leaves one unable to fully comprehend international politics. Taking seriously the international politics of militarized marriages requires, in turn, a genuine curiosity about the lives and ideas of the diverse women married to male soldiers.

THE MILITARY WIVES “PROBLEM”

By the late 1960s, the American military base at Effingham had become an integral part of the social and economic life of nearby Long Crendon, a modest English village in Essex. The expansion of the base in the 1950s had wrought subtle but fundamental changes in townspeople's lives. The Americans started to hire local men and women and soon became one of the region's principal employers. More American soldiers arrived, bringing with them more wives and children. And with the families came American-style consumption: “air transports began to fly in to Effingham laden with

deep-freezers, washing machines, pressure- and microwave cookers, hi-fi equipment, Hoovers, electric organs and even Persian carpets.”²⁸ Some of the appliances made their way on to the flourishing local secondhand market. Still, the ideological spillover from the American model of family life was contained by the married soldiers’ preference for staying on the base, where the U.S. Defense Department provided everything to make them feel as though they had never left home.

This continued to be the model of base construction through the 1990s, as American overseas bases multiplied during the Cold War: the suburb with family houses, grass to mow, men employed as soldiers and civilian women as unpaid housewives.²⁹ Betty Friedan, the feminist who wrote the devastating critique of American white suburban women’s entrapment, would have recognized the Pentagon’s gendered community model immediately.³⁰

The American military strategists’ Cold War and post-Cold War thinking was this: keeping married soldiers happy on a foreign base required keeping soldiers’ wives happy or, if not happy, at least silently resigned. For a century both British and American military commanders had been weighing the advantages and disadvantages of allowing their soldiers to marry. It was a sometimes confusing calculus. On the one hand, they calculated, marriage raised the moral tenor of their male troops and cut down on their drunkenness, indebtedness, and venereal disease. On the other militarized hand, marriage might divide a soldier’s loyalty, making him slower to mobilize, while burdening the armed forces with responsibilities for maintaining housing, health care, and family harmony. The military marriage debate remains unsettled today not only in the United States but also in other countries whose governments depend on married male soldiers to carry out their national security and foreign policies and on the women their male soldiers have married to conform to the model of the Good Military Wife.³¹

Despite commanders’ ambivalence, the rising post-World War II need to accommodate male soldiers’ wives and children altered the nature of a

military base. No longer could a soldier's wife be as easily marginalized as she had been in earlier centuries, dismissed as merely a low-class "camp follower" living on the edge of military operations, cooking her husband's food, and doing his laundry in return for meager rations. There were too many of them now. And they were "respectable" women. For the British, Canadian, and American armed forces, which today have to recruit—and *keep*—large numbers of expensively trained male volunteers without the aid of compulsory male conscription, civilian wives' dissatisfaction with military life can produce worrisome manpower shortages. A dissatisfied wife will urge her husband not to reenlist. The washing machines and electric organs flown into the U.S. base at Effingham in the 1960s were early evidence of the American army's attempt to satisfy not only male soldiers but also their wives.

By 2010, there were seven hundred thousand civilian American women married to active-duty U.S. male military personnel. Some lived on overseas bases. Many lived on or near U.S. domestic bases. By the early twenty-first century, the U.S. military had become the most married force in the country's history: 58.7 percent of active-duty military personnel were married. The army had the highest proportion of married personnel; the marines the lowest. Of all heterosexual spouses of U.S. active-duty personnel, only 6.3 percent were men; 93.7 percent were women.³² As the Pentagon tried to adapt to life after the ending (in 2011) of the "Don't ask, don't tell" ban on openly gay and lesbian military personnel, it also had to adapt, base by base, to having more civilian married partners in same sex marriages demand access to the same benefits enjoyed by heterosexual spouses of military personnel.³³

Many women married to male soldiers have been content with the privileges that have come with living on a military base: low-cost housing, shopping discounts, access to medical care, a sense of shared values, and, for many African American military wives, less overt racism than experienced in society beyond the base. Many women married to American male soldiers also saw themselves as models of self-sacrificing feminized patriotism, enduring regimens, constant moves, virtual single parenting,

long spousal separations, and wartime fears for their husbands' safety. Some of the women deployed with their husbands to the larger U.S. overseas bases—for instance, in Britain, Germany, South Korea, and Japan—have also taken on the role of informal American ambassador, trying to represent what they saw to be the best of American values while living abroad. Their efforts have been open to varied interpretations in their host countries, appreciated by some local people but appearing to others to be just an updated feminized version of an older imperialism.³⁴

For those women who gained a sense of political purpose, community, security, and comfort from living as military wives on bases, there was a price to be paid: adherence to the military's gendered presumptions about proper femininity, good marriages, and ranked propriety. Central to this package has been the official presumption that a civilian wife would merge her loyalty to her soldier-husband with her uncritical loyalty to his employer, the government: the military's adversary was to be her adversary; her husband's rank would determine her friendships and her children's friendships. Living up to the military's model of the Good Military Wife also meant giving up aspirations for a career of one's own and, especially if one was married to an officer and was invested in his rise through the ranks, doing hours of unpaid volunteer work. Military wives' unpaid labor has been the glue that has made many a base a working "community." Such feminized, wifely volunteer work takes an even more prominent role when a woman follows her husband to an overseas base, because the opportunities abroad for a military wife to gain paid employment and pursue her own professional career have been particularly slim.³⁵

Military base commanders and their civilian superiors—from the early years of the Cold War through the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—have counted on most women to see the satisfactions that come from being an unpaid, loyal military wife as outweighing the frustrations.³⁶

It came, therefore, as an unwelcome surprise when, in the 1980s, a group of politically experienced wives and ex-wives of American male

military officers began to organize and speak out about what they saw as the unfairness of the Pentagon's gendered political marriage system. They found sympathizers in Congress, especially Representative Patricia Schroeder, a Democrat from Denver. These military wives steered clear of any discussions of the U.S. government's foreign policies; they talked about spousal benefits and divorce rules.

Among the early activists were older women who had fulfilled the model military wife role, many for up to twenty years, doing the unpaid work on countless bases that would be considered a plus when their officer-husbands came up for promotion. These women found that when their husbands filed for divorce in order to marry a usually younger woman, they would lose not only their marriages but also their housing, health benefits, and store discounts. Officials in the Pentagon had ruled that their divorcing husbands did not have to count these base benefits when calculating alimony. Initially, according to Carolyn Becraft, one of the politically active wives, the divorced women focused their anger on the young women who were marrying their officer-husbands. But as they got together to analyze their situations and to frame their political message, they realized that it was not the new wives who were their problem. It was the Pentagon officials. Those officials, these women concluded, cared more about their male officers' economic security than about civilian military wives' economic security. The result of their lobbying was a congressionally mandated change in the benefits accorded by the Pentagon to military spouses and ex-spouses.³⁷

Soon after, in the ongoing gendered political marital history of the U.S. military, women doing volunteer work on American bases around the United States and abroad began to speak out publicly about domestic violence, about male soldier-husbands beating their military wives. Although few of these women called themselves feminists, many were fully aware of the emergent battered women's movement in the United States. They had absorbed the lesson that wife abuse was not something any woman had to be ashamed about or had to silently endure. However, a military base turned out to be a very difficult environment in which to turn

violence of this sort into a legitimate issue.³⁸ First, most base commanders—and their Washington superiors—did not want to hear about it. They had other priorities. They expected military wives to cope. Second, these same officials frequently imagined that male soldiers were just acting out of stress, and stress was what soldiering was all about. Third, airing the realities of domestic violence on a base tarnished the reputation of that base, which would hurt the base commander's chances for his next promotion. Finally, and importantly, allowing domestic violence within their soldiers' homes to become a public issue was likely to raise the always thorny question of the culture of violence nurtured in the military as a whole. That certainly was not a question that senior officers wanted explored in the wider public arena.

Trying to break the silence shrouding violence against women is always a challenge. Breaking the culture of gendered silence on a military base was harder still. Feminized silence, it became clear, was a pillar of U.S. national security.

Despite the formidable obstacles, women working with military wives succeeded, by the 1990s, in getting congressional armed service committee members, especially women in Congress, to pressure the Defense Department to acknowledge the incidences of domestic violence in male soldiers' households. On the other hand, as activists would discover when, a decade later, they would try to get senior military officials to face up to their complicity in the epidemic of sexual violence perpetrated by male soldiers on their uniformed female comrades, the military's prioritizing of male soldiers' value and their complementary reliance on women's silence remains stubbornly entrenched.

Today, thousands of women married to male soldiers live in the United States on or near one of the Defense Department's many domestic bases. Some of the largest: Camp Pendleton, California; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Lewis-McChord, Washington; Fort Hood, Texas; Naval Air Station, Virginia; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Carson, Colorado. Each of these bases is as gendered as every U.S. base in South Korea, Turkey, Japan, Guam, Djibouti, and Germany. The women who live on or near these

domestic bases in the roles of military wives often feel pressured to stay silent about the hardships that have been part of the government waging its extended wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where bases were not created to accommodate spouses and children. Many of these women take part in wives' associations, but their activities frequently are shaped by the cautionary influence of the women married to the base's senior officers and by the expectations of base commanders, who make it clear that a wives' association's chief job is to help military wives cope; it is not to alter the way the base is run.

Among the American military wives living on or near domestic bases in the current political era who have spoken out publicly, despite these pressures, have been those women whose military husbands have returned from Afghanistan and Iraq severely wounded, physically and mentally. These civilian women have become a vocal presence on many domestic military bases, demanding from base commanders transparency, attention, resources, and candor. In breaking the silence expected of military wives, these women not only have made clearer the actual costs of these two wars but also have exposed the unfairness of camouflaging those costs by shifting them onto the shoulders of soldiers' civilian family members.³⁹

During the post-9/11 administration of President George W. Bush, a new concept in American overseas basing was developed, "the lily pad." Lily pad bases would be low-impact bases, overseas bases that still would require formal agreements with local host governments, but would have a smaller social and cultural "footprint."⁴⁰ No suburban housing, no lawns, no bowling allies, no golf courses, no discos outside the gates. And no wives.

For many local people living around American bases overseas, the lily pad formula might seem a welcome change. Bases would come with less heavy sociocultural baggage. There would be no questionable entertainment districts appealing to off-duty male soldiers outside the fence of a lily pad. Fewer American armored vehicles would race through a civilian town's busy streets. But the Pentagon's motivations appear to have less to do with sensitivity to local concerns than with shedding the

feminized dimensions of the big Cold War bases. Lily pads simultaneously offer smaller targets for local antibases protests. One consequence of the Pentagon's adoption of the lily pad basing strategy for the thousands of women married to American soldiers is that more of their husbands will be deployed far from home more of the time. Military wives who have experienced virtual single motherhood are due to experience more of it.

One source of political weakness hobbling those military wives seeking to change the sexist policies governing life on military bases has been the division between women as military wives, women as civilian base workers, women as military personnel, and women drawn into prostitution around military bases. The four groups of women, whom male military elites see as distinct, often share the same compartmentalized imagining of themselves. Women soldiers who launched their twenty-first-century campaign to make sexual assaults against women soldiers a national issue could have learned a lot by turning to activist military wives and to women in military prostitution for analysis and strategic advice.

IS A MILITARY BASE SECURE FOR WOMEN SOLDIERS?

Any military base—local or overseas—is a place where certain forms of masculinity are nurtured and rewarded, other forms disparaged or punished. Drill sergeants are often the chief molders and enforcers of the desired militarized masculinity—that is, a mode of acting out one's manhood that makes soldiering, especially combat soldiering, real or fantasized, a principal criterion against which to judge one's behavior and attitudes. This particular mode often accords primacy to toughness, skilled use of violence, presumption of an enemy, male camaraderie, submerging one's emotions, and discipline (being disciplined and demanding it of others). Beyond drill sergeants, many different actors on a base play their parts in shaping and encouraging certain militarized masculine attitudes and behaviors: chaplains, psychiatrists, commanders, midlevel officers, even wives. Off-base actors also can celebrate certain forms of manliness

while ridiculing others: fathers, legislators, media commentators, entertainers.

Nor is the privileged form of militarized masculinity universal. The nurtured and rewarded form of militarized masculinity can vary from country to country, with some country's militarized masculine norm being crafted to serve international peacekeeping, others to fit into humanitarian missions, while still others are intended to enhance combat roles. We know today that we need to investigate these differences, as well as commonalities, between, for instance, the diverse masculinities that are privileged and celebrated in the Irish, Japanese, Nigerian, Chinese, Swedish, British, United States, South Korean, Brazilian, Israeli, Bangladeshi, Fijian, and Canadian militaries. Each of these militarized masculine norms is wielded in particular domestic and foreign operations.⁴¹

A military woman has a personal stake in charting and making sense of which mode of masculinity is made the favored norm on the base to which she is assigned, whether in Texas or Bahrain. Knowing this could make her life rewarding and secure; not knowing it could put her career and her physical safety at risk.

Military women are virtually always a minority of all the uniformed personnel on any of their country's military bases, sometimes a very small minority. With many governments adjusting to the end of the Cold War by ending male conscription (what Americans call "the draft"), defense strategists and their legislative allies have had to devise ways to increase the numbers of women recruited into their government forces without jeopardizing the military's valuable image as a place where a man can prove his manliness. In 2013, among the militaries with the highest percentages of women in their ranks are those of Ukraine, Latvia, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. To understand each military—those with high proportions of women and those with the lowest proportions (such as the Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Turkish)—one needs to explore not only how uniformed women experience

pride, patriotism, and camaraderie but also how uniformed women experience sexual harassment and sexual assault.

In the United States, women have grown from just 2 percent of the active-duty military—during the U.S. war in Vietnam, in the 1970s—to 14.5 percent by the time of American troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. The branch with the highest percentage of active-duty women (thus the branch most reliant on women to fulfill its mission) is the air force, with 19 percent. The branch with the lowest percentage (and the one most resistant to women's participation) is the marines, with just 6.8 percent.

The gendered politics of any military can play out rather differently for uniformed women belonging to different social classes, ethnic groups, or racial groups. Among women in the current American military, the numbers of African American women have stood out: while African American women were just 12 percent of all the country's women, in 2011, they constituted 17.2 percent of all women who were active-duty military officers and 29.6 percent of all women in the military's active-duty enlisted ranks. Looking more closely, especially at differences among military branches, one notes that in that same year a stunning 39.1 percent of all women in the active-duty enlisted ranks of the army were African American women. That was more than three times their proportion of all women in the country's civilian population.⁴²

By contrast, Hispanic women, who were approximately 15 percent of all women in the U.S. population, appeared more likely to choose a different branch when they volunteered for the U.S. military. Hispanic women's proportion of all active-duty women, which has been steadily rising since 1990 as a result of the Pentagon's deliberate recruiting campaigns, reached its peak in the enlisted ranks of the marines: 19.6 percent. Asian and Pacific Islander American women accounted for only 4 percent of the total U.S. female population in 2011, but they constituted 20 percent of all women in the navy's enlisted ranks.⁴³

Owing to three decades of lobbying by American women in the military—especially women officers such as navy pilot Rosemary Mariner, working in collaboration with women members of the House of Representatives and

Senate—the Defense Department has gradually, usually begrudgingly, opened more and more types of military jobs to women.⁴⁴ American civilian feminists often have been ambivalent about investing their limited resources in challenging sexism inside the military because they have prioritized antiwar campaigns and worried that elevating women soldiers to “first-class citizenship” status would send the roots of already potent militarism even deeper into their country’s cultural soil. Nonetheless, since 1990, barrier after barrier to women’s military training and deployment has been dismantled; the latest change was the 2013 lifting of the Pentagon’s ban on women in combat roles. The U.S. military did not lead the way. Militaries of the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were out in front of the United States in ending their sexist bans on military women in the jobs that the Pentagon classifies (and, changing its mind, then reclassifies) as “combat.” Exactly how the opening of combat roles to women will be implemented in practice in the United States is a story yet to be told. Changing the formal rules of any institution is only the beginning of its gendered transformation and, by itself, is no guarantee that the institutional culture will become significantly less patriarchal.

At the same time that organizational sexist barriers have been lowered, there has been an upsurge in reported sexual assaults by U.S. military men on military women and on military men. Some feminist analysts have wondered aloud whether the increased reporting of violence against women inside the U.S. military has been at least in part a result of the increase in the proportions of women and their inching up the ranks and moving into the military’s most masculinized occupations. As in other spheres of many societies, some men have acted out their resentment of women’s advancements in arenas that until recently had been securely masculinized, by attacking women as “intruders.” Other feminists have warned that the recent upsurge in reporting should be treated quite separately from the actual incidences of sexual assault. They warn that many women soldiers in past eras have endured rape and attempted rape in silence, never thinking it was safe or useful to speak about those

assaults for the record. In any area of international politics, paying close attention to silences is a crucial investigatory strategy.

Violence against women, a central issue for women's advocates since the 1970s, was a topic that even feminist peace activists, wary of working for women's military equality, felt unambiguous about when it occurred inside the military. This was not a question of merely militarized careers or promotions. Thus, by 2013 a national campaign organized by women activists brought together military women, civilian feminists, journalists, documentary filmmakers, and women in Congress to challenge the Defense Department and the entire chain of command.⁴⁵ Together, they shone their spotlight on the military academies and on particular military bases (for instance, Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas). They forced the Veteran's Administration, a large federal institution whose officials for generations had collectively thought of their services as being intended only for male veterans, to vastly broaden their self-perception. In the middle of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to respond to the rising number of women veterans they were seeing as patients struggling with the aftereffects of sexual assault, the VA's health professionals scrambled to develop a new medical concept. They decided to call it "military sexual trauma." The VA then created special clinics around the country to provide care specifically for women veterans who were suffering from military sexual trauma, a subset of post-traumatic stress disorder. Military sexual trauma was brought on, according to these medical professionals, by having been raped by a fellow male soldier.⁴⁶

As the politics of American intramilitary sexual violence quickly intensified, the Defense Department was pressed to issue a report on both the incidence of reported sexual assaults and the survey results estimating the incidence of actual assaults. It estimated that reported sexual assaults were just the tip of the iceberg, that during just the fiscal year 2011 (that is, October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011), nineteen thousand military personnel had been sexually assaulted by their American military colleagues. During FY 2012, that number jumped to twenty-six thousand. The majority of those American military personnel said that they had been

assaulted by military men, often their superiors. Men made up 85 percent of the total active-duty personnel during this era. Women, though only 15 percent of the U.S. active-duty forces, were disproportionately assaulted. Women in the military were thus much more likely than men to be targeted by military men for attack. Most of the women and men who were subjected to sexual assaults did not report those assaults. Male victims told reporters that it was women coming forward to speak out about rapes that had given them the courage to overcome their years of secret shame and publicly tell their own stories.⁴⁷

On and off the record, military women told of being sexually assaulted when going to the latrines at night, when sleeping in their own barracks, when meeting with a superior officer in his office. Controversy soon swirled around the very notion, long cherished by American military officers, that the military's hierarchy itself—not civilian criminal justice authorities—is best equipped to investigate, prosecute, try, and punish its own personnel. Yet in practice, the sanctity of the “chain of command” had erected another, less visible wall around any already-fenced-off military base. It was a double fence that many women survivors of military rape felt had jeopardized their safety.

Rebekah Havrilla, a former army sergeant, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2013 that she had been raped by her male superior while she was deployed in Afghanistan in 2007. She did not report him: “I chose not to do a report of any kind because I had no faith in my chain of command.” Instead, Sergeant Havrilla had sought counsel from the army chaplain on her base. His response to her: “The rape was God’s will.” He urged her to go to church.⁴⁸

Two related questions frequently have gone unexplored during the debate over what to do to effectively prevent and prosecute sexual violence inside the American military. First, what, if any, are the causal linkages between, on the one hand, sexual violence perpetrated by men on women inside the military and, on the other, sexual violence perpetrated by U.S. military men against civilian women living around U.S. military bases at home and abroad? Second, how exactly do diverse men inside the

military absorb the masculinized idea that women are property to be used by men in ways that allegedly confirm their own manhood and simultaneously preserve the masculinized atmosphere in certain institutional spaces?

The two questions are analytically related: answering either question will help to answer the other. Failure to ask—and try to answer—these two related feminist analytical questions has meant that the politics of masculinity has been swept under the militarized rug. It also has meant that American military women rarely have tried to make common cause with women in other countries who have endured abuse as a consequence of U.S. soldiers being based abroad. Most often, sexual violence inside the military has been treated merely as a domestic issue. In reality, it has been a dynamic of international politics.

PROSTITUTION, WOMEN IN PROSTITUTION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL GENDERED POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Military men's sexualized relations with women—and other men's attempts to control those relations—have been a major thread running through international politics for at least the last two centuries. These sexualized relations include befriending, dating, marrying, purchasing sex, and coercing sex. The lines separating these five different sorts of relations often are blurred, yet at other times they are drawn in bold ink. What is odd is that this multistranded topic so rarely is explored by mainstream investigators of international politics and only makes headlines when it erupts into “scandal.” Topics treated merely as scandals, however, rarely alter conventional understandings of what is “international” and what counts as “politics.”

Military bases and women in prostitution have been assumed to go together, to be a “natural” twosome and thus unworthy of political investigation. In fact, it has taken calculated policies to sustain that alleged fit: policies to shape men's sexuality, to ensure battle readiness, to regulate

businesses, to structure women's economic opportunities, to influence military wives, to socialize women soldiers, and to design systems of policing, entertainment, and public health. It is striking that these policies have been so successfully made invisible around most bases, especially bases within the United States.⁴⁹

By the late nineteenth century the British government had troops deployed around the globe to sustain its empire.⁵⁰ These troops were not as likely to seek sexual liaisons with working-class white women as with colonized women of color—Chinese women in Hong Kong, Indian women in India, Egyptian women in Egypt. British officials had been thwarted in their efforts to control white working-class women's relationships with British military men in Britain. In the 1860s, in the wake of the disastrous Crimean War and at the behest of Britain's generals and admirals, the men in Parliament, in the name of protecting male soldiers and sailors, had passed the Contagious Diseases Acts. These militarized laws, a form of national security policy, mobilized Britain's civilian local policemen to arrest working-class women in army base towns and naval port towns whom those policemen suspected of being prostitutes. In practice, that was any working-class woman out at night on her own. The suspected women were compelled to undergo vaginal exams with the crudest of instruments. It was the Anti-Contagious Diseases Acts Campaign, led by British feminists of the Ladies National League, that (despite women being denied voting rights) effectively lobbied for twenty years to persuade the all-male Parliament of the unfairness of the Contagious Diseases Acts and to repeal them.⁵¹

British military officials were determined, however, not to lose control over Britain's colonial women. First, they refashioned marriage policies for soldiers, considering whether to allow British soldiers to marry Indian women: would such marriages harm or enhance military readiness and white settler morale? Some officials believed that if British soldiers were allowed to marry Indian women, they might be less likely to frequent prostitutes and thus, presumably, be less likely to pick up venereal

diseases. On the other hand, these men reasoned, such a policy of encouraging interracial marriage might jeopardize British men's sense of their own racial superiority. Second, colonial officials continued to enforce the equivalent of Contagious Diseases Acts outside Britain even after they had been repealed at home in the 1880s. These laws, called the Cantonment Acts, permitted colonial police authorities to conduct compulsory vaginal examinations on civilian women around imperial military bases for the sake of allowing British soldiers overseas to have sexual relations with colonial women without fear of contracting venereal disease.

In 1888, Josephine Butler, founder of Britain's politically effective Ladies National League, launched an international campaign calling for the abolition of the Cantonment Acts. Her new journal, *The Dawn*, criticized British male authorities' double standard: controlling women's allegedly immoral sexual behavior for the sake of protecting male soldiers' allegedly necessary sexual pleasures.⁵² Butler's movement was more feminist in its analysis than in its organization. Her chief abolitionist allies appear to have been British men and educated men in the colonized societies. Colonial women—a study in 1891 found that 90 percent of military prostitutes were impoverished local widows—were seen by most prostitution abolitionists as victims, though rarely as organizational allies with their own political ideas and resources.⁵³

Anti-Cantonment Acts campaigners were transnational activists, but they saw these policies from an imperial perspective: if such regulations were allowed to persist in India, they would provide lessons for military authorities in other British colonies and even in the colonies of rival imperial powers, such as the Netherlands, who also needed to station soldiers abroad, provide them with sexual access to colonial women, and yet ensure that the soldiers were physically fit enough to carry out their military duties for the empire. A letter written in 1888 to Butler by one of her Dutch campaigning correspondents in Indonesia (then under Dutch colonial rule) charts the international flow of militaries' prostitution strategies:

One of the official gentlemen quietly remarked that they thought of introducing the Anglo-Indian system of having separate tents inhabited by the licensed women in the camps. At present at a fixed hour in the evening the doors of the Barracks are opened in order to admit a certain number of these poor victims. I can scarcely record all that we have learned. Life in the Barracks is *morally horrible*. . . .

The fact stated here shows that the bad example set by the English government in India is infecting Java, and no doubt other Colonies of other nations, thus doubling and trebling our motives for urging the Abolition of the hideous Indian Ordinances and Cantonment Acts.⁵⁴

By 1895, Butler and her campaigners had persuaded the British government to repeal the Cantonment Acts. Nevertheless, her informants in the colonies reported that, despite the repeal, forced physical examinations of local women did not stop. *The Dawn* published letters from British military officers who expressed the widespread official view that such practices remained necessary. They were allegedly necessary for individual British soldiers (not for Indian soldiers; they seemed to have a strikingly lower incidence of VD, which puzzled their British commanders) and for the very well-being of the British empire. To this argument Josephine Butler editorially retorted, "We had not realized that the women of a conquered race, in the character of official prostitutes, constituted one of the bulwarks of our great Empire!"⁵⁵

In the twentieth century, governments of France, Japan, British, Russia, the United States, and Canada each attempted to enforce military and civilian practices that would sexually control women for the sake of sustaining their military's legitimacy while ensuring their male soldiers' morale and health.⁵⁶ The Japanese imperial army's policy of forcing Korean, Filipino, Taiwanese, Malaysian, and Indonesian women into sexual service in their military's "comfort stations," for the sake of allegedly bolstering male soldiers' morale, is perhaps the most famous forced prostitution system designed to wage World War II.⁵⁷

It was this World War II system that gave rise to the concept of "sexual slavery," a concept developed in the 1990s by Korean feminists. They argued, successfully, that such militarized forced prostitution should be understood as a war crime. The "sexual slavery" concept soon after

became crucial to those transnational feminists who worked to shed light on the specific sorts of sexual militarized abuse of women that had become integral to waging the 1990s wars both in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. That is, a woman who is forcibly made a “wife” of a warring soldier to be subjected to his repeated sexual violations is not a wife; she is not a prostitute. She is the victim of sexual slavery. These same feminist political and legal activists continued to campaign, persuading governments that “sexual slavery” should be internationally recognized as a prosecutable and punishable war crime. It was their conceptualizing and persuading that led to “sexual slavery” being explicitly listed among the war crimes prosecutable in The Hague before the newly established International War Crimes Court.

The infamous Japanese imperial “comfort women” system, however, was certainly not the only prostitution system used to wage World War II and to create its immediate postwar political systems of occupation.⁵⁸ Yet only now, six decades after the end of what Americans still call “the Good War,” are we beginning to understand the full scope of the American officials’ efforts to make prostitution, and women in prostitution, work for the war effort and for the establishment of the postwar occupation. Recognizing American officials’ World War II prostitution policies should not dilute the condemnation of the Japanese imperial army’s “comfort women” system. Rather, it should foster a sharp feminist-informed, cross-national, comparative investigation of the sexual politics designed to wage any war.

American officials’ World War II efforts to create racialized military prostitution systems included going to great lengths to set up brothels for African American male soldiers separate from those designated for white male soldiers—along wartime Hawaii’s famed Hotel Street, around the America occupying forces’ bases in postwar Germany, in postwar Korea, and in postwar Japan.⁵⁹ Similarly, feminist historian Mary Louise Roberts has uncovered evidence that in postinvasion Normandy, France, American male soldiers and their superiors created self-serving stereotypes of an oversexed French nation and, with it, a racially segregated brothel system. Chief among its damaging political consequences: sexualized conditions of

insecurity for many postwar French women, women whom the American men were supposedly there to liberate.⁶⁰ That is, the American military occupation era of the mid- to late 1940s, officially defined by Washington as a time of liberation and democratization, was in fact a time of energetic American racialized prostitution-policy-making.

The immediate post-World War II era did not mark the end of the U.S. military's prostitution system. Korean, Okinawan, and Filipina feminist researcher-activists have been teaching us about how racialized prostitution was a constant throughout the American military's conduct of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and its globally diffuse post-9/11 "war on terror."⁶¹ One of the most stubbornly entrenched beliefs held by many military male commanders has been that military-tolerated, organized prostitution protects "respectable" women. Takazato Suzuyo and her fellow activists who created the feminist group Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence have spent years documenting American military personnel's violence against civilian women and girls in an attempt to dispel this self-serving military myth.⁶²

CLOSING SUBIC: THE SUCCESS OF AN ANTIBASES MOVEMENT

Tues. 5—Rained all day

Wed. 6—Rained part of day. Got pay check.

Thurs. 7—Rained all day.⁶³

Thus wrote Jessie Anglum, wife of an American army officer, in her diary. She did not enjoy her stay in the Philippines. The year was 1901. The American army had been sent by President McKinley to quash a defiant Filipino insurgency. Filipino nationalists first fought the islands' Spanish colonizers and then resisted the Americans' plans to impose their own colonizing rule. Anglum played her own small part in putting down the Filipino insurgency. She was one of the first American military wives to

take the long voyage to join her husband in the Philippines. Once off the ship, she was put up in a Manila hotel. As the monsoon rains poured steadily outside the shutters, she was bored. Her husband spent most of his days on maneuvers against the insurgents. She went for occasional carriage rides and had tea with the few other American women then in Manila. But she did not want to be in the Philippines. She had sailed to Asia only out of wifely duty. She counted the days until her husband's tour was over. And she was happy when she could repack her trunks and sail back home.

There were no elaborate American bases when Jessie Anglum endured her damp hotel stay. But in the century following her arrival, the U.S. government made up for that deficiency. By the 1980s, the now-independent Philippines hosted a score of U.S. military facilities. Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base, both situated on the main island of Luzon, were the largest and were deemed by Pentagon strategists to be among the most crucial for American global defense. The two bases served as launching pads for the U.S. war in Vietnam and as a bulwark against Soviet power during the Cold War. Subic and Clark were designed to operate in coordination with U.S. Pacific bases in Hawaii, Guam, South Korea, and Okinawa.

The Pentagon's pan-Pacific vision provided an incentive in the 1990s for women activists in these five Pacific regions to create new political bonds with each other. Meeting at the UN women's conference in Beijing in 1995, they began to trade information, experiences, and strategies. They pieced together a portrait of how civilian women experienced the impacts of the U.S. military bases: prostitution, violence, police harassment, and environmental degradation. In meetings held over the next two decades, these antibases women-activists forged friendships and analyses—of security, of militarization, of insecurity, of peace, of violence, of patriarchy. Among the groups whose members met each other were Gabriela: Alliance of Filipino Women, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, the Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center, and the transnational feminist network Women for Genuine Security.⁶⁴ Their members made one of their

principal objectives the educating of American mainland citizens about the impacts their government's bases were having on women who must live with those bases. Given how little attention most mainland Americans pay either to overseas military bases or to Pacific island territories and Asian allies, this was a challenge.

During the years of the Cold War and the Vietnam War, Subic Bay Naval Base was the largest of these Pacific U.S. bases. It dominated the Philippines town of Olongapo. The mayor of Olongapo made the Subic Bay base commander one of his chief reference points when he made town policies. The U.S. Navy base was home for many of the 15,000 American military personnel and their families stationed in the Philippines. When an aircraft carrier docked, another 18,000 men poured into town. The base relied on civilian Filipino labor to keep it running. Workers were paid at lower rates than workers on American bases in South Korea or Japan, but for many Filipino men and women these base jobs provided a livelihood. By 1985, the U.S. military had become the second-largest employer in the Philippines, hiring over 40,000 Filipinos: 20,581 full-time workers, 14,249 contract workers, 5,064 domestic workers, and 1,746 concessionaries.⁶⁵

The social problem generated by the U.S. bases that attracted most Filipino feminists' and nationalists' attention was prostitution. Many Filipinos became convinced that U.S. military bases were responsible for creating or exacerbating conditions that promoted prostitution. Prostitution, violence against women, militarism (American and Filipino varieties), and the compromising of Philippines national sovereignty all seemed woven together. The arrival of AIDS in the Philippines in 1987 escalated nationalists' sense that the American-Philippines bases government-to-government agreement—called the Status of Forces Agreement (often colloquially referred to by its acronym, SOFA)—jeopardized, rather than strengthened, Filipinos' national security.

During the 1980s, especially as the Filipino prodemocracy movement gathered nationwide momentum, local Filipino women activists, including activist Catholic nuns, documented the living conditions of women around the large U.S. bases and provided spaces where women in prostitution

could seek nonjudgmental support. The activist researchers estimated that 6,000 to 9,000 women worked in the bases-dependent entertainment businesses, a number that could jump to 20,000 when an American aircraft carrier came into port and thousands of male sailors were granted leave. They recorded that most women in the sexualized clubs and massage parlors came to Olongapo from poor rural regions of the Philippines. They reported on the “ladies drinks” system used by bar owners to press women employees to persuade off-duty military men to buy more alcohol while purchasing expensive fruit drinks for the women. They explained the “bar fine” system, by which male customers paid the bar owner money for permission to take a woman outside the club to have sex.

These activist researchers also paid attention to the children born of American military fathers and Filipino civilian mothers. Of the approximately 30,000 children who were born of Filipino mothers and American fathers each year during the 1970s and 1980s, these activist researchers found, some 10,000 were thought to have become street children, many of them working as prostitutes servicing American male pedophiles. Unlike children born of American fathers and Vietnamese mothers during the U.S. war in Vietnam—when prostitution was rampant—the U.S. Congress did not grant these Filipino-American children visas to immigrate to the United States under its special post-Vietnam War “family reintegration” plan.⁶⁶

The Filipino researchers also documented the American base commanders’ policy that required Filipino public health clinics to set up VD and AIDS examinations for women in the surrounding entertainment businesses. Women who did not go through the exams, or who did not pass the exams, were denied their entertainment-worker licenses. American military men did not have to undergo such exams to get their off-base passes and mix with local Filipino women. The official presumption was that Filipino women infected American military men, never the other way round.⁶⁷



FIGURE 16. Filipino women working as entertainers around the U.S. Navy's Subic Bay base line up for compulsory VD and HIV/AIDS examinations, 1988. While the base was in operation, all such entertainers were required to undergo these examinations twice a month. Photo: Sandra Sturdevant.

A complex Filipino antibases movement succeeded in persuading the Philippines Senate to vote against renewing the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. In 1992, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base were closed.

Twenty years later, however, Filipino feminists in groups such as Gabriela were reporting that militarized prostitution was on the rise again,

as was American military men's abuse of local women. Even without its sprawling Subic Bay and Clark permanent bases, the U.S. Defense Department, in coordination with officials in Manila, was building up the American military presence in the Philippines. The justification no longer was the Soviet threat and the Cold War. Now the justification was expansionist China and the "global war on terror." Subic Bay was being refitted by a private American defense contractor to handle the visits of more American navy ships. More American soldiers were being deployed to the Philippines on what were termed "training" assignments. New Washington-Manila military agreements called these deployments "temporary rotations." This formula meant that both sides in the government-to-government agreement could avoid admitting that the Pentagon was establishing new bases in the Philippines, an admission that would stir up local controversy.⁶⁸

Prostitution has never been timeless. It is not the static "oldest profession." Women in prostitution, women working against the prostitution industry, men profiting from prostitution, men patronizing women in prostitution, and men who make military policies to mold prostitution to suit their militaries' needs—each of these five groups of actors lives in history. Each of them, no matter how seemingly powerless some of them are, help to reshape the local and international politics of prostitution and, thus, the ideas about and practices of masculinity as they underpin military bases.

Consequently, today one must stay alert to changes. One must become curious, for instance, about the women from both the Philippines and the former Soviet Union who voluntarily or unwillingly leave their countries to become the majority of women servicing American military men in and around the U.S. bases in South Korea, Guam, and Okinawa.⁶⁹ One also has to monitor how local feminists interact with nationalists in any movement to limit or close a foreign base: are the women in prostitution turned by nonfeminist nationalists into mere symbols of "national humiliation," or are these women invited to be active partners in any antibases campaign? Are

feminists pressed to sublimate their demands for the good of what nonfeminist nationalists think of as the nation?

Similarly, one must delve into the sexual politics that are integral to those American overseas bases in which military men are prohibited from “fraternizing”—that is, from having social relations with local civilian women. Nonfraternization is the Pentagon’s rule for many soldiers and sailors based on American bases, in, for instance, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Bahrain, and Niger. Where are the women, the civilian women, the uniformed women?

CONCLUSION

The closings of the Subic Bay and Clark bases in the Philippines have not been the only occasions when a local popular movement has persuaded a national government to end its basing agreement with the United States. Antibases movements have succeeded in Manta, Ecuador, and in Vieques, Puerto Rico.⁷⁰ The gendered politics inside each of these successful antibases movements has been distinct. In each of them, women as activists have been crucial to the mobilization and to the meanings adopted in opposition to the U.S. base. But not every antibases movement has made feminist understandings of sexism central to its strategies and its goals. In each of these movements, as well as those in South Korea and Okinawa—the latter two have not succeeded in persuading their governments to end their Status of Forces Agreement treaties with the United States—feminist local antibases activists have had to work constantly to ensure that nationalist ideas do not trump feminist ideas. Exploring these dynamics within any country’s antibases debate helps to clarify the complex workings of gendered ideas shaping the international politics of military alliances.

Perhaps the antibases popular movement in which feminist ideas—about masculinized politics and about alternative measures of security—have become most central has been the Greenham Common women’s peace

camp in southern England during the last years of the Cold War.⁷¹ From 1981 to 1989, a British women's peace encampment grew at Greenham Common, outside the fence protecting the U.S. Air Force base. The women who decided to camp outside the base at Greenham sparked a national debate among Britons over both the unequal alliance between the United States and Britain and the meaning of security—and security for whom—in the nuclear age. Still today, one can meet British women for whom “Greenham” was the turning point in their political lives. They will describe in detail camping in the cold winter mud, singing when arraigned in court, debating with each other for hours the meanings of peace and patriarchy—and family, motherhood, and sexuality. They will retell the story of propping up ladders to climb over the base fence on New Year's night in 1983 to dance atop the Americans' nuclear missile silo and getting out without being caught.

The women who camped at Greenham also will recall the pain of hearing police and some local people call them “dykes” and “whores.” Then they will tell of the excitement when thousands of women from all over Britain and Ireland came to Greenham to form a nine-mile human chain around the entire perimeter of the American base. An Irish woman who traveled from Dublin to join the Greenham chain remembered: “We joined hands and began to sing . . . to say: we will meet your violence with a loving embrace, for it is the surest way to defuse it. How strong I felt when I joined my voice to the waves of voices shouting ‘Freedom’ and when the echoes from so far away drifted across the base.”⁷²



FIGURE 17. Women peace campaigners dance on a cruise missile silo inside the U.S. Air Force base at Greenham Common, England, 1983. Photo: Raissa Page/Format.

Journalist Beatrix Campbell interviewed one British woman who thought of herself as a member of the Conservative Party, the party of Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister who was a chief backer of the U.S. base and its nuclear-headed missiles. But when this woman began thinking about the Greenham women's peace camp, she recalled that she had developed another sort of political understanding. She had cut her hair short to make it clear to her husband and sons that she identified with the Greenham women:

"Before Greenham I didn't realize that the Americans had got their missiles here. Then I realized. What cheek! It was the fuss the Greenham Common women made that made me realize. . . . The men in this house [her husband and two sons] think they're butch, queers." Did she? She thought for a moment. "No." Would it have bothered her if they were butch or if they were lesbians? She thought again. "No." Women irritated her men anyway, she said, not without affection. "They never stop talking about Land Rovers and bikes, and they've not finished their dinner before they're asking for their tea."⁷³

It was due largely to the Greenham Common peace camp women's activism, not just to the ending of the Cold War, that the British government decided that, when the Americans left Greenham, the land should not be given to the British military. Instead, it should revert to the local people to again become common agricultural land.⁷⁴

Running any military base—a local military's base or a foreign military's base; a base within the country's borders or a base operated time zones away; a NATO, African Union, or United Nations peacekeeping base; a private military company's base—is a complicated operation.⁷⁵ Moreover, many institutions that are not usually labeled "military bases" can be fruitfully studied for their similarly intense interactions of place, femininity, masculinity, and militarized purpose: for instance, the World War II encampment at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where women and men, whites and African Americans, worked and lived in racialized and gendered intimate secrecy to create the essential elements of the first atomic bomb.⁷⁶

Every military base depends for its operation on women occupying a range of social locations, performing quite different roles. To make visible that gendered base system, one must take seriously the lives and ideas of the military base laundress, the military wife, the woman in prostitution in a disco just outside the gates, a woman who is paid to sneak on base to have sex with a male soldier, the military enlisted woman and woman officer, and the woman who has become a public critic of the base. They are not natural allies. Many of these women may disagree with the others' assessments; they may not trust each other. But they all have interesting base stories to tell. Moreover, the separations between them are among the things that sustains that base.

To analyze any base as if it were simply the sum of its budget, its equipment, its land, its chain of command, its legal basis, and its mission is to seriously underestimate all the power that is used to manage it, all the ideas that are devised to underpin it, and all the policies that are implemented to keep it running smoothly. "Smoothly" is a measure of success in the eyes of the commanders and their uniformed and civilian

superiors, as well as in the eyes of any local civilians—mayors, police officers, business operators, employees—who see that base as good for their own security and well-being. “Smoothly” does not automatically translate into gender equality or women’s empowerment. “Smoothly” usually serves to perpetuate patriarchal international relations.

Hundreds of military bases run smoothly. Their operations are greased by daily humdrum. They do not make headlines. The unheadlined bases are as worthy of feminist-informed gendered analysis as the bases that become suddenly visible because of a scandal. International politics are composed of more than just crises and scandals. International politics can be humdrum, with power flowing unnoted and uncontested. Humdrum is political. Humdrum is gendered.