Assignment - Organizational Reflection

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Emotional Incompetence or Gender-Based Stereotyping?

Dan S. Chiaburu Barbara Gray The Pennsylvania State University

The authors used a critical incident interview provided by a female manager and her statements (e.g., “I’m very ineffective emotionally”) as a starting point of an alternative analysis of the term emotional competence. Using reflexive inquiry and deconstruction, the authors argue that terms such as emotional competence, rather than being a reflection of something perceivable as a quality of the subject, are socially produced using language. However, such language is not value free and neutral but—based on the analysis—gendered and subject to power differentials. The authors elaborate on how such terms tend to be regarded as naturalized and reified in more conventional studies and on the implications for organizational members and organizational change.

Keywords: emotion; gender; deconstruction; emotional competence; emotional intelligence

The linguistic and ideational construction of management competencies is so deeply entrenched in our vocabularies of organization and management that its meaning is rarely examined. Similarly, the importance of emotional competence has more recently been examined and is gaining similar standing as a management truism (cf. Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002) in an attempt to delineate a repertoire of behaviors distin- guishing competent from ineffective managerial practice. These behaviors have been

Dan S. Chiaburu is a PhD candidate in the Smeal College of Business at The Pennsylvania State University.

Barbara Gray is professor of organizational behavior and director of the Center for Research in Conflict and Negotiation in the Smeal College of Business at The Pennsylvania State University.

THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, Vol. 44 No. 3, September 2008 293-314 DOI: 10.1177/0021886308316704 © 2008 NTL Institute

touted as the keys to managerial success in both the academic and popular literatures (Goleman et al., 2002), and instruments for assessing them have been proposed (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002; Sala, 2002). However, missing from the landscape are critical and reflexive inquiries (e.g., Calás & Smircich, 1991; Garnsey & Rees, 1996) that penetrate beyond the labels attached to the terms management competence and emotional competence and explore how these labels are constructed, maintained, and interpreted and the consequences for organizations of doing so.

The present exploration centers on emotional competence and is built around sev- eral questions, organized around two directions of inquiry. First, how do notions such as “competent manager” and “emotional competence” come into being? What are the discursive mechanisms contributing to their formation? Second, are such constructions of meaning universal and invariant across individuals and groups (i.e., males vs. females, researchers vs. practitioners)? Because such explorations are dif- ficult to execute if one uses methods that remain on the surface of the text, we use a deconstructive analytic strategy (Derrida, 1992; Foucault, 1991; Lyotard, 1984) aimed at unpacking meaning (Kilduff & Kelemen, 2004) intertwined with a reflex- ive rather than descriptive or prescriptive approach (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000; Calás & Smircich, 1999; Cunliffe, 2003) to answer these questions. Such an eleva- tion beyond immediate, mundane, naturalized, and “given” constructions is perhaps a sine qua non condition for unpacking alternative interpretations, illuminating cor- ners that otherwise remain obscure, and bringing to the surface issues that are oth- erwise exiled from the “normal” discourse on management and organization. These methods enable us to notice things that became naturalized because of our habitua- tion with them (Calás & Smircich, 1999; Foucault, 1988).

In the hope of illuminating how meaning about emotional competence in the managerial domain is constructed and perpetuated, we reanalyze an interview that illustrates the method used to validate managerial competence models (Boyatzis, 1998). However, rather than relying on the preexisting coding scheme (Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer & Spencer, 1993), we engage in an alternative analysis of this man- agerial narrative. Our analysis differs from the original one not only in method but also in other important respects. Specifically, first, we analyze portions of an inter- view left without interpretation in the original analysis. Second, we deconstruct the preexisting coding used by Boyatzis (1998) to interpret this event, and we suggest some possible assumptions about emotional competence embedded in it.

Our study contributes to both theory and practice. From a theoretical standpoint, we explore emotional competence, a term with wide circulation in the contemporary managerial and organization vocabularies. From one perspective, such an exploration complements conventional (e.g., Shippmann et al., 2000) or critical studies on com- petencies (e.g., Collin, 1989) by adding a focus on the construal process. More impor- tant, we illustrate the consequences of reification, objectification, and naturalization of abstract concepts such as emotional competence. Our exploration suggests that such uncritical acceptance of particular views as universal might promote a gendered view of managerial and emotional competence (Calás & Smircich, 1996; Garnsey & Rees, 1996; Gray, 1994; J. Martin, 1990) and create uniformity, conformity, and erosion of individuality within managerial practice. Our aim is to contribute to theory by an

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effort to disrupt the naturalized order of things as sometimes presented or implied in more conventional studies, call attention to their gendered implications for organi- zations and their members, and recommend strategies for ameliorating any negative organizational or individual consequences from such construals.

Both our analysis and the topic respond to calls to examine the power dynamics behind texts and to engage in research by using less conventional and more reflex- ive positions and methodologies (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Kilduff & Mehra, 1997; Van Maanen, 1988). Alternatively, and perhaps more important, we provide an example of a “different form of writing theory,” one allowing for the emergence of a “different theoretical ‘voice’” (Calás & Smircich, 1999, p. 650). From a practical perspective, our exploration not only provides a point of departure for individual reflection but raises questions for organizational change as well. As individuals and organizations strive to assess and improve managerial and especially emotional com- petence, understanding how these terms are manufactured, connected, and utilized for practical purposes can illuminate (and help to eliminate) situations in which con- struals about emotional competence privilege some individuals over others in organi- zations. Reflecting on the role of one’s own as well as others’ emotionality (or lack thereof) in the construction of competence assessments may provide such users with increased awareness of their own complicity in perpetuating stereotypes associated with emotionality or in restricting potentially beneficial organizational outcomes (Callister, Gray, Gibson, Schweitzer, & Tan, 2008). Such reflection can potentially lead to a richer decision set, more alternatives for action, and greater efficacy for managers and their employees.

Our study unfolds as follows. To create a context for our exploration, we provide a selective history of the competency movement and of the emergence of the emo- tional competence in the next section. This is followed by a description of the methodological assumptions undergirding the study. We then present our inquiry, followed by comments on the construction of emotional competence, limitations, and suggestions for future research.

MANAGERIAL AND EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

In a widely cited article, Harvard psychologist David McClelland (1973) announced the failure of intelligence testing in predicting occupational success and advocated instead the need to introduce competence testing. This line of work subsequently generated several more detailed texts around the issue of the “competent manager” and “managerial competency” (Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer & Spencer, 1993). In this stream of work, emotionality (as it applies to business settings) has been associated with taking distance from emotions. Rationality (rather than emotionality) is the pre- ferred model for competent conduct. Emotional expression is viewed as undesirable and disruptive as this example from the negotiation arena reveals: “Emotional involvement on one side of an issue makes it difficult to achieve the detachment nec- essary to think up wise ways of meeting the interests of both sides” (Fisher & Ury,

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1981, p. 62). This kind of stance can be traced back to the Stoics of ancient Greece, who “argued that thinking was reliable but that feelings were too subjective, idio- syncratic, and unreliable to be used in constructive ways by society” (Ciarrochi, Forgas, & Mayer, 2001, p. xii).

This view is at least partially continued in the early work on managerial compe- tence by Boyatzis (1982) and Spencer and Spencer (1993), who popularized man- agerial competency models. While acknowledging a role for emotional expression, they view competent emotional expression as involving a significant amount of con- trol, or at least differential displays of emotions inside versus outside organizational settings. For instance, the following example is offered on how to distinguish criti- cal incidents originating from managers showing superior emotional competence from those offered by managers displaying average emotional competence. Managers with superior emotional competence show high levels of emotional or behavioral control: “I knew I was getting upset, so I went out for coffee and walked around until I calmed down. When I went back to the meeting, I was calm and collected” (Spencer & Spencer, 1993, p. 139). Conversely, managers coded as having average emotional competence do not control their emotions: “I blew my stack, pounded on the desk and told him to get the hell out” (Spencer & Spencer, 1993, p. 139). Here the alternatives are painted as either blowing up or controlling emotion by leaving the scene. Recent studies on emotion regulation in organizations however emphasize simultaneous control and expression of anger. As Frijda (1986) suggested, “People not only have emotions, they also handle them. . . . Regulation is an essential component of the emotion process” (pp. 401, 405). Regulation or controlled expres- sion of emotion has been linked with positive organizational outcomes (Callister et al., 2008; Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003).

Two streams of objection to managerial competence approaches have emerged however. One stresses the fact that competencies lack clear definitions; are generic; are limited only to skills, behaviors, and traits; and are poorly validated (Burgoyne, 1993; Collin, 1989). A second grew out of work on emotional intelligence. Eschewing the idea that intelligence consists of only cognitive prowess and attendant rational behavior, Gardner (1983) argued for multiple forms of intelligence includ- ing “the capacity to perceive and symbolize emotions” (Ciarrochi et al., 2001, p. 5). This view has evolved into a more recent orientation toward emotional intelligence or emotional competence that views emotions as abilities that can be precisely tested. During the mid-1990s, however, debates between researchers in the emotional competence and emotional intelligence streams became evident, culminating in two prominent but divergent perspectives: an ability-based view (e.g., Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990) and a managerial or leadership competence–based perspective (e.g., Goleman et al., 2002). Some of the differences are definitional—emotion-based abilities can be tested, whereas behaviors or competencies can be observed—and lead to different forms of assessment: the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002) for the ability-based view and the Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI; Sala, 2002), a multirater instrument, for the managerial competence perspective. Currently, debates between both directions of inquiry con- tinue. For example, researchers argue whether ability-based emotional intelligence

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can be measured and whether it predicts work outcomes beyond general intelli- gence and personality (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). Despite this, the term emotional intelligence has become popular as a managerial and leadership tool, and Goleman and his coauthors (2002) offered a series of bestsellers packed with prac- tical managerial advice. Although these recent approaches pay greater heed to emo- tional expression in organizations, debate continues about what emotional intelligence and competence are and how they should be measured (e.g., Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Boyatzis & Sala, 2004). In addition, research suggesting positive outcomes from emotional expression (Callister et al., 2008; Glomb & Hulin, 1997; Tafrate, Kassinove, & Dundin, 2002) or using emotion as a means to achieve self-interested goals (Kilduff & Chiaburu, 2007) in organizations is also emerging that challenges current notions of emotion regulation.

Focusing primarily on the emotional competence line of research, our arguments are framed more generally: They speak to how emotions are defined, presented, and interpreted in organizational settings and how they are constructed by researchers. We draw on four primary theoretical premises for our critique. First, like emotional intel- ligence researchers, we problematize the positioning of emotion in contrast with and perhaps in subordination to rationality (Mumby & Putnam, 1992). Second, we ques- tion the apparent commodification of emotion in organizations embedded in notions of emotional regulation (Fineman, 2000). Third, we object to the positioning of emo- tional competence and intelligence as universal rather than subject to interpretation within historical circumstances (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; J. Martin, 1990). Fourth, we raise concerns about organizational practices that may privilege those individuals with what are perceived to be high levels of emotional competence and emotional intelligence (e.g., Fineman, 2004; Gray, 1994). These theoretical perspec- tives inform our focus and analytic approach, which is described in more detail in the following. Thus, rather than entering the multiple definitional and analytic debates (see Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005, for a review), we focus on how emotional competence is constructed. Similar to authors reflecting on how emotions are socially constructed either by researchers or by individuals (Fineman, 2004; Garnsey & Rees, 1996), we explore such construal processes and their concomitant impact on the individuals involved and on managerial and organizational change in particular.

OUR ANALYTICAL APPROACH: DECONSTRUCTION AND REFLEXIVE INQUIRY

Conventional theoretical and analytic work consisting of “representational approaches to knowledge production rests on a privileging of the consciousness of the researcher who is deemed capable of discovering the ‘truth’ about the world of man- agement and organizations through a series of representations” (Knights, 1992, p. 515). Conversely, poststructural and postmodern approaches such as deconstruction and reflexive analysis use less conventional methods (Cunliffe, 2003; Kilduff, 1993; Knights, 1992; J. Martin, 1990; Mumby & Putnam, 1992). These approaches assist in abstracting the researchers’ thinking from the immediate, from the (en)closure operated by definitions or text, and examine such re-presentations and how they are generated.

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In such analytical activities, epistemological, ontological, and methodological posi- tions are openly recognized as being embedded in the researcher; attempts to present or describe such methods bring to the fore the researchers, in a well-known postmod- ern problematization of the author (Knights, 1992). Consequently, if texts are not rep- resentations of the world “out there” but rather discursive constructions, a process of reversal can take place. The transparent becomes obscure, the representational becomes constructed; one explanation becomes a multiplicity of explanations. Texts intended to illuminate a topic can actually obscure it given their inherent inability to exhaust the multiplicity of meanings.

Reflexive techniques are ideal to uncover alternative interpretations for the con- cept of emotional competence because of their versatility in exposing contradictions, unsettling assumptions, and adoption of “a ‘suspicious’ stance” toward their subject (Cunliffe, 2003, p. 992). According to Kilduff (1993),

A deconstructive reading opens up the text to renewed debate concerning the limits of the text and the relationship between the explicit and hidden textual levels. In investigating the limits of the text, the critic asks: . . . Why are certain themes never questioned, whereas other themes are condemned? Why, given a set of premises, are certain conclusions not reached? The aim of such questions is not to point out textual errors but to help the reader to understand the extent to which the text’s objec- tivity and persuasiveness depend on a set of strategic exclusions [emphasis added]. (p. 15)

Deconstruction is especially helpful when it relies on eventalization, described as

rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment established what subsequently counts as being self-evident, univer- sal and necessary. In this sense, one is indeed affecting a sort of multiplication or pluralization of causes. (Foucault, 1991, p. 76)

Thus, eventalization encourages a multiplicity of explanations compared to more reductionist approaches of conventional research where the tendency is to isolate a limited number of causes or relationships. It also makes “visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all” (Foucault, 1991, p. 76).

Because our intention is to examine how emotional competence is constructed, we utilized deconstruction and the specific focus on eventalization, coupled with a reflexive approach. To do so, we had to attend to both factual information on which claims of competence or incompetence are based and to the methodological and interpretive filters used by previous researchers to arrive at their conclusion as well as examine the limits of our interpretations.

THE METHOD, FROM A CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

From a conventional perspective, our method of analysis was structured around several issues. Specifically, we reanalyzed an interview provided by Boyatzis (1998) who used it as an illustration for the coding scheme for assessing managerial

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competencies (Boyatzis, 1982). The interview with “Mary Simpson,” an MBA student entering the program, presents three critical incidents and their related coding, with explanations for why coding decisions were made for specific segments. A reanalysis and reflection on the interview text and on the coding allows focusing precisely on portions of text that remained uncoded in the original work, supposedly because of their lack of relevance from the perspective of the preexisting coding scheme. In what follows, we present the results of the investigation, providing a reanalysis of the orig- inal interview (Boyatzis, 1998) using the N-Vivo software package.

The original text records the results of a management assessment and develop- ment session (Boyatzis, 1998). Students participating in a required MBA course (leadership assessment and development) are interviewed; the 1-hour audiotaped sessions contain several critical incidents representing self-identified instances of managerial work thought of as particularly effective or ineffective. For more details on the complete assessment process and instruments, we refer the reader to Boyatzis, Stubbs, and Taylor (2002, pp. 152-153). After transcription, the interviews are coded by trained coders using an a priori coding scheme leading to the discovery of spe- cific managerial competencies (Boyatzis, 1982, 1998).

In what follows, we describe how the interviewee constructs a negative incident by providing a work situation that she thinks she handled ineffectively (Boyatzis, 1998, Incident 2, p. 116). We focus on the only interview that describes an unsuc- cessful incident; the other two describe successful events and thus were not of inter- est to our reanalysis. The original coding of the interview as presented by the author (Boyatzis, 1998) is presented in Figure 1 and described in more detail in the next section. Our alternative interpretation of the same interview, based on key in vivo text (i.e., verbatim reproduction of words used by the respondent; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), appears in Figure 2. Labels for the boxes in Figure 2 represent second-order coding. All the statements in the boxes presented in Figure 2 (except the titles) rep- resent verbatim extracts from the interview. A description of the coding process and the resulting contrasts between the two interpretations appears in the next section.

DECONSTRUCTING THE MARY SIMPSON INTERVIEW: CAPTIVITY IN A GENDERED DISCOURSE

Mary’s self evaluation as “ineffective emotionally.” The incident that gives rise to Mary Simpson’s reported incompetence involves a malfunctioning in the com- puter system that puts it down for longer than usual while the system manager (Mary) is on vacation. In her subsequent interaction with the programmer analyst, who is one of the employees responsible for restoring the system, Mary describes her behavior as “getting more curt,” “pouncing on him,” and using sarcastic remarks such as “thanks a lot, I really appreciate it.” As a result of this interaction, Mary char- acterizes herself as “very ineffective emotionally” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 116).

Interestingly, the description of this incident is prefaced by an apparently inco- herent explanation placed at the beginning of the interview in which Mary feels the need to provide some context to her interpretation of the (negative) incident. This

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differs from the other two (positive) incidents for which no prefaces were offered. Instead, they start in a matter-of-fact language and plunge directly into behaviors related to specific projects. Conversely, the interview describing the negative inci- dent opens with a rather long explanation positioned before the main story. “I think to preface an ineffective one for me,” says Mary Simpson. “I’m a person that, I need time to think about something. I’m not fast at anything. I don’t read fast. I don’t think fast, and it’s not that I don’t want to, I just, I don’t seem to be able to.” Mary pre- sents somewhat contradictory statements here however because on one hand, she claims that she is not “fast at anything” but on the other, she reports reactive behav- ior: “When you’re dealing with another human being, or it’s a very heated situation, I tend to react versus sitting back.” In finalizing her preface, the female manager qualifies the last statement by saying, “I react, but it’s not really the way that I am.” Mary’s opening conveys a strong self-evaluative tone (“I’m very ineffective”), apparently in response to her noncompliance with a possible normative situation (“I don’t seem able to,” “not that I don’t want to”), resulting in a dissociation from the situation (“it’s not really the way I am”). It is also worth noting that this preface is left uncoded in the original interpretation of the text (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 116).

The preface of Mary Simpson is an important point in our reading of the text because it provides a hiatus from the rest of the narrative, similar to what J. Martin (1990) called discontinuities—“places where the text is disrupted, where a contra- diction or a glimpse of meaningless reveals a subtext that may be inconsistent with the texts’ apparent message” (p. 345). Moreover, when reading such contradictory statements in a receptive state of mind and with the objective of illuminating more obscure corners and opening up the text to new interpretations (Kilduff & Kelemen, 2004), new connections are possible. It is as if the system manager cannot manage her self in the face of a presumed normative expectation.

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Although she says she listened and did not say anything at first, she then says she “got piqued at him.”

Although she says it is not typical of her, she does say she was “pouncing on him” and “giving him a heck.”

She also later got feedback from her boss after the person had lunch with her boss.

She goes on in the following segment of the interview to describe how she was getting increasingly “curt” with him. She lost

control Not coded for self-control

Coder’s interpretation of the event

Coder’s interpretation of the critical incident and explanatory notes

Coder’s decision to

code

FIGURE 1: Analysis of Mary Simpson’s Emotional Competence According to Boyatzis (1998) NOTE: Interpretation provided in Boyatzis (1998, p. 125). The text in the solid boxes is verbatim from Boyatzis. The text in dashed boxes is our explanation of the coding process. In the coding system provided by Boyatzis, not being coded for a competency is interpreted as a need to develop that specific competency.

Problematizing Mary’s “ineffectiveness.” Mary’s potential ineffectiveness in handling the situation notwithstanding, there are several other components that can shed new light on the incident in which she describes herself as ineffective. First, the segment where the female manager describes the main part of the incident is coded in the original coding system as “she lost control [emphasis added]” (see behavioral cod- ing scheme and indicators from Boyatzis, 1998, in Figure 1). Based on the compe- tency model then, one of the components of emotional competence is maintaining control: Such self-disciplined employees need to control their emotions and to care- fully select what they display, to whom, and in what settings. The importance of con- trol over subordinates as a normative injunction is also well illustrated in one of Mary Simpson’s statements, “I seem to be ineffective in showing the people the way I really want them to see an issue.” It is also worth mentioning that being in control (or having power over the other person or the situation) is typically a characteristic associated with masculinity (Gilligan, 1982), and the focal manager in this incident, a woman, seems to be very uncomfortable with not living up to this masculine stan- dard and apparently concerned that the critical ingredient of emotional control is missing from her managerial repertoire.

A further illustration of how the issue is framed is provided by Mary’s subordi- nate during a lunch with Mary’s manager: “I don’t really understand her that well,” “I don’t understand her moods”1 (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 117). It is interesting that the male subordinate, who was at least in part responsible for the incident, attributes the poor quality of the interaction to the female manager’s moods instead of to some- thing else (e.g., his inability to read others’ emotions). Would this attribution be made if his boss were another male? Would he go to lunch if the boss of his boss were a female? These are questions worth asking because they might illuminate the bases of his attributions but remain unanswered in the original text.

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Normative Statements (General)

I tend to be more afraid to be wrong I seem to be ineffective in showing people the way I really want them to see an issue It’s good that I recognize it I have the ability to come off that way I should have been praising him for doing the best he could do

Evaluative Statements (General)

I tend to react versus sitting back Ineffectiveness might be my emotions It makes me very ineffective I’m very ineffective emotionally

Emotional Suppression

I react, but it’s not really the way that I am So I’m quiet I don’t mean to be that way I felt really bad about it Vowed to be calmer under a crisis Often times I beat my head against the wall

Normative Statements (Gender-based)

It is a male situation as well There’s now ego involved

Evaluative Statements (Gender-based)

I, a woman trying to make my way into the business world

FIGURE 2: Recoding of the Critical Incident Interview NOTE: Titles of boxes represent second-order coding; labels inside the boxes represent in vivo (first- order) coding. Our coding is largely based on the portions of text left uncoded in the original text (Boyatzis, 1998, pp. 116-124).

In analyzing this incident, we have speculated so far that it can be understood, at least in part, in terms of male-gendered expectations about appropriate behavior, an interpretation that is recognized by Mary herself. In a description of her interaction with another male operations person, who seems to be the main person responsible for handling such incidents related to system failures, Mary describes the situation in the following words:

It’s a male situation as well. I mean, there’s now ego involved, and I, a woman, trying to make my way into the business world, and oftentimes I beat my head against the wall. And that’s not always true, it doesn’t always happen, but when it does, I don’t handle it well, so I’m very ineffective emo- tionally. So my ineffectiveness might be my emotions that are the case. (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 117)

Interestingly however, the segment containing this description is coded by the per- son analyzing this interview as “pattern recognition” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 125).2 It seems to matter little in this coding system that the interviewee experienced the dynamics as gendered and reported behaving in a way that also reflects perceived power differentials. That is, the female manager in this situation seems to be seriously affected by events that would perhaps appear inconsequential to a male manager. The idea that she seems to go to great lengths to adapt (to the extent of labeling herself as emotionally ineffective) to a situation where, by her description, there is male ego involved is not captured in the original coding.3 The fact that Mary (as a woman) felt obliged to blame herself in deference to a display of ego by her subordinate, however, suggests male privilege at work in this incident (McIntosh, 1988). This implies that involvement of male ego is considered normal in the business world while expression of ego for female managers is expected to assume a subdued and adaptive stance. This exemplifies Kaufman’s (1987) claim that “the ego is a definition of oneself formed within a given social and psychological environment and within what Gayle Rubin [1983] calls a specific sex-gender system” (p. 12). According to our reanalysis (see Figure 2), a situation interpreted as involving male ego (a normative statement that is situation based) generates contradictions and inner conflicts for this female manager (e.g., “I beat my head up against the wall” implies self-attribution of responsibility and failure) and leads to self-depreciation (“I’m very ineffective emotionally”; Boyatzis, 1998, p. 117) in deference to male-privileged norms. These interpretations parallel those provided by Garnsey and Rees (1996) in a study of texts presenting business opportunities for women in the United Kingdom, where linguistic strategies in that dis- course served to reinforce the conclusion that women’s failure to reach managerial positions was “largely the result of their own shortcomings” (p. 1056).

An alternative reading of this text could also suggest a more systemic level expla- nation: Specifically, human resource techniques (e.g., including competency models, a tool for managing human resources)—as well as contemporary understandings on effective management—are constructed according to dominant understandings of masculinity that privilege certain employees over others, and these are mainly men (see the review of Dickens, 1998, as well as earlier arguments by Calás and Smircich, 1993, and Simpson, 1997).

In addition to the interpretation of self-depreciation mentioned earlier, psycho- logical interpretations related to emotional suppression or passive-aggressive behav-

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ior are also plausible. In fact, the female manager in this incident explained that she “vowed to be calmer under a crisis” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 119) and resolved her issues with the programmer-analyst by using competencies such as flexibility and negotia- tion (Boyatzis, 1998, pp. 125-126), basically by having a lunch meeting and “putting their cards on the table” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 126). Although more speculative at this point, it is logical to propose that if it were a male manager reflecting on a situation involving a mild display of anger or a curt statement to a subordinate, it is less likely that he would have seen it as problematic or initiated a meeting to clear the air. This interpretation is consistent with other studies that demonstrate assimilation of women with communal rather than agentic characteristics (Rudman & Glick, 2001; see also Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007, for a theoretical review) and continuous rein- forcement of this stereotype through social roles (Abele, 2003).

Central to our reanalysis of Mary Simpson’s negative incident is her assertion “I’m very ineffective emotionally” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 117), which is a strong eval- uative statement, likely to lead to subsequent emotionally suppressive behavior (e.g., “vowed to be calmer under a crisis,” Boyatzis, 1998, p. 119). Thus, the female man- ager in this interview perceives herself as inadequate in the specific work setting and situation. But is she? And if she is, what are the possible reasons? Under the con- ventional management competency paradigm, the female manager in this interview is simply deemed ineffective. Indeed, in the coding notes, the analyst of this inter- view writes in a matter-of-fact manner, “Note 15: Not coded for self control. She lost control” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 125). Using a deconstructive process, however, allows us to use the strategy of binary opposites, used to uncover the marginalized, the silenced, or at least the less evident aspects of the text. Using this approach, we see that the opposite of reason, emotion, is depreciated. Reason, control, and an appear- ance of professionalism are clearly privileged; emotion, lack of control, and the risk of appearing unprofessional are marginalized (Gray, 1994).

The fact that reason is privileged is also clearly seen in the way the person ana- lyzing the account chooses to code it. First, a label is assigned to the specific inci- dent (e.g., “not coded for self control”) allowing not only labeling but also delegitimizing Mary’s behavior (“she lost control”). Second, the descriptive sen- tences are brief and matter of fact (reproduced in Figure 1). Third, the coder does the best to legitimize the choice of coding by stating “she [the female manager] also later got feedback from her boss after the person [the analyst programmer] had lunch with her boss” in an effort to provide support for the specific label. In reality, a care- ful reading of the interaction of the female manager with her boss does not reveal the existence of any negative feedback or reprimand (see Boyatzis, 1998, p. 118).

We have seen what “I’m very ineffective emotionally” can mean viewed through the lens of competency management. What else can it mean when read in deconstructive and reflexive mode? The subject in this case, a working subject, seems to say, “as I am, as I behave, I am no good to the organization, I am not effective, I need to change.” The desire to change does not seem to flow from a desire for personal self- development or self-actualization. The female manager is compelled to change by the subtle but omnipresent coercion of organization and gender-based norms that favor rationality, masculinity, and control (Deetz, 1992; Gray, 1994) and by repression or

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marginalization of emotion (Fineman, 2004; Hearn, 1993; Lutz, 1996; Mumby & Putnam, 1992; Putnam & Mumby, 1993). An even deeper, more subtle reading of the text might be that Mary is speaking for the organization writ large. If her I is read as a personification of the organization, then her statement can be an indictment of the organization for its inability to constructively handle (i.e., control) emotion.

To counter the dangers associated with unrestrained emotionality, organizations seek to normalize and regulate emotion (Fineman, 2000; Gross & John, 2003; Hochschild, 1983; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988) and the organizational behavior of indi- viduals; hence, the injunction “I vowed to be calmer under a crisis” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 119), which reflects the imperatives to comply with the organizational and gender- based norms for emotional display. In the words of Lyotard (1974/1993), procedures work best “when they make individuals ‘want’ what the system needs in order to per- form well” (p. 62). Although well taken, Lyotard’s observation does not go far enough. One needs also to consider the double imperative levied against women who display strong emotions at work. Women are expected to behave like men (and not display weakness), but if they cross an imaginary line with respect to aggression, they are no longer considered feminine (Dooley, 1987). Indeed, researchers state that such normative tactics related to anger displays are both disciplinary and divisionary.

First, it is disciplinary in that it punishes women who do not conform, and it discourages women from ever transgressing in the first place. Second, it is divisionary because it divides groups of women into those who can’t control their anger and those who cannot or choose not to. Those who control their anger, at least in public, are described as “dignified,” “sophisticated,” or “mature,” pointing to the role of power (via class distinctions) in the cultural ideology about gender and emotion. (Citrin, Roberts, & Fredrickson, 2004, p. 212)

Emotions indicating loss of control, such as in the case of Mary Simpson, are in gen- eral marginalized in organizations, which seem to function according to prescription indicating that such emotions should be suppressed or at least not expressed indis- criminately. The emotional competence literature has a fair share of managers who are presented as emotionally competent because they are careful to blow steam off line (“walked around until I calmed down”; Spencer & Spencer, 1993, p. 139) or simply suppress emotion (“I was really mad. But, you know, I had to restrain myself. I wanted to punch him in the nose”; Spencer & Spencer, 1993, p. 80). Is, then, con- trol the best route? And asking broader questions: Are suppression, lack of expres- sion, or differential expression of emotion universal? Do they apply equally to males and females? Are they equally applicable to managers and subordinates, to those high and low in status? Probably not. Whereas Mary Simpson cannot display even moderate anger, male political figures such as Churchill are said to use expressions of anger to obtain desired outcomes, and anger is routinely displayed by those in power (Tiedens, 2001). The female manager in this case seems to be captive in a web of stereotypes. Mary’s banging her head against the wall might be attributed to exist- ing frameworks of “competitive masculinity” discursively constructed, reproduced, and normalized in work settings (Garnsey & Rees, 1996) and because of the instan- tiation of norms of rationality and work centrality (Collison & Hearn, 1994; Whitehead, 1998) in organizations, points not raised in the original analysis.

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THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

In considering the potential theoretical impact of our analysis, one has to be reminded that poststructuralist works adopt a less conventional perspective of what is a contribution and at whom it might be directed (Calás & Smircich, 1999). This point is aptly stated in another study,

This paper fails to offer a direct contribution to mainstream organizational research, in the usual sense that the word “contribution” is used. Such a contribution would, in effect, be using a feminist perspective as “a special-interest glamorization of mainstream discourse” (Spivak, 1987, p. 130). (J. Martin, 1990, p. 356)

Similarly, we believe that not all analytical enterprises map directly into instru- mental and functional organizational changes or into cumulative findings that would edify some theoretical grand narrative (Lyotard, 1974/1993). We see emotional com- petence as discursively created by powerful others, constructed by reification of abstract events, enforced through rhetorical devices, and naturalized through lack of examination of alternative accounts. This perspective is consistent with other decon- structive analyses, including the ones of a traditional management text (Organizations; Kilduff, 1993), of organizational taboos (J. Martin, 1990), of bounded rationality (Mumby & Putnam, 1992), of power/knowledge in human resources management (Knights, 1992), or of gender in organizations (Alvesson & Billing, 1997). The poten- tial usefulness of such theorizing resides in uncovering the constituting mechanisms of emotional competence. Once they are uncovered, it is tempting to want to use such knowledge to propose program, policy, or project revisions, but doing so without con- comitant change of the discourse itself would be futile.

That said, we believe that this article presents several potential contributions. First, we emphasize the relativity of concepts such as emotional competence and their embeddedness in their historical context. Second, we delineate that such con- struals are not power and gender neutral. In this case, the female manager seems to adapt to and comply with a masculine order of things. Our findings echo similar statements, made along similar lines, by other researchers:

We contend that concepts like administrative man and bounded rationality are contingent terms that should not be accepted as the final vocabulary of organizational behavior. Such concepts do not provide any insight that is closer to reality than other constructs. However, these concepts produce and reproduce a political agenda that makes certain ways of knowing privileged over others. (Mumby & Putnam, 1992, p. 482)

Although limited in scope at this point, investigations such as the present one are not negligible. They can add to more conventional studies of emotion in the work- place by offering a perspective on gendered emotion (Gray, 1994; Mumby & Putnam, 1992). Such enterprises might not be considered useful by researchers engaged in outlining theorizing principles or suggesting unified paradigms of orga- nizational science. However, eventalization, presenting a singularity, questioning the self-evident and the universal and deconstructing the necessary (Foucault, 1991, p. 76), and reflection on traditional concepts such as bounded rationality (Mumby &

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Putnam, 1992) as historical contingencies are valuable. They open a space for ques- tioning the current order of things and illuminate the potential for oppression in organizational practices (McIntosh, 1988).

In addition to objecting to how emotional competencies are constructed and rei- fied, we also take issue with some of the methods used by researchers to “discover” competencies and their attendant attempts to legitimize these methods. From a legit- imizing perspective, researchers claim that “research to develop competency models is a ‘discovery of grounded theory’ approach” (Spencer & Spencer, 1993, p. 135), citing as support the classic by Glaser and Strauss (1967). However, as we illustrate in our analysis, the methods used to create competencies (managerial or emotional) deviate from the spirit of grounded theory, which advocates allowing for findings to emerge from the text rather than imposing meaning on it and to privilege the voice of the subject, at least in first-order analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). By inquiring more deeply into what is not said (Garnsey & Rees, 1996), however, researchers can and need to analyze their own defenses and clearly delineate the values and assump- tions of their research.

We also argue that use of top-down methods of analysis can lead to representa- tions congruent with existing power structures and perpetuate existing power differ- entials (Schiebinger, 1999). This is where deconstructive and reflexive approaches can be useful tools for counterpoint inquiry. Given that issues related to gender and power surfaced in our reanalysis, researchers examining managerial and emotional competencies can derive richer interpretations if their coding books (and their hermeneutical filters) are expanded to include these categories. Other categories cap- turing differences (e.g., race or ethnicity, social class) or disparity (i.e., differences in concentration of valued social assets; Harrison & Klein, 2007) may also be inter- esting and productive to consider for inclusion. Although coding systems cannot be exhaustive, using a reflexive approach to revisit their initial interpretations could prove advantageous for researchers. For example, they might use oppositional logic in which meaning is created by an interplay between presence and absence (in our case, what is coded vs. what is not coded; for a broader discussion see Cunliffe, 2003). This is important not only for capturing the immediate phenomenon (“Not coded for self control. She lost control”; Boyatzis, 1998, p. 125) but also to explore more deeply the causes of the incident and to derive more efficient personal and struc- tural solutions. In general, iterative processes where bottom-up, grounded, inductive approaches inform and refine top-down deductive ones in an iterative process can significantly broaden the scope of the conclusions.

PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION

Practical implications are usually directed toward managers or other organiza- tional agents who, based on the information provided, are supposed to improve their awareness, decision making, and competence and spill over onto some teleologically based project. We believe, however, the main potential beneficiaries of our analysis are individuals who occupy managerial roles and are interested in improving their

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emotional competence. They can be prompted by our analysis to reflect on their own self-construal process and to the limitations of accepting, promoting, and modeling a preexistent template of emotional competence that favors bounded emotionality or elaborate displays of emotion (J. Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 1998; Mumby & Putnam, 1992). Uncovering such processes can have important implications, as indi- viduals might realize the existence of options other than those prefabricated in organizational models of self-construal and emotional competence. Relaxing the assumptions about rationality enables consideration of alternative modes of conduct that may have emancipatory potential (Habermas, 1992). For example, some male scholars have decried the victimization of men and women that results from expung- ing emotion from narratives of men’s experiences (Bergman, 1990), and feminist scholars have offered appealing conceptualizations of organizations in which emo- tionality was embraced instead of suppressed (Gray, 1994; Mumby & Putnam, 1992). In addition, on a more general level, by following the parallel analytical steps outlined here, individuals can also glean by example how their narrative may be dis- torted to fit specific preexisting models, which then restrict their choice set and alter- natives for action. Although such actions may not immediately modify some deeply entrenched mental models, they can at least increase awareness and in time have a broadening influence.

It is worth mentioning that such practical implications are generated from what may appear to be an isolated, marginal, and unimportant case. We believe that such apparently obscure cases can have a catalytic role, perhaps best illustrated by Foucault’s response to an interviewer questioning his preoccupation with obscure figures and processes:

I deal with obscure figures and processes for two reasons: the political and social process by which the Western European societies were put in order are not very apparent, have been forgotten, or have become habitual. . . . But most of them once scandalized people. It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are part of their landscape—that people think are universal—are the result of some very precise historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made. (R. Martin, 1988, p. 11)

Beyond individual implications, the mode of interpretation presented here can inform managers attempting to implement organizational change initiatives (e.g., improve emotional competence of their employees) and for researchers who use managerial assessment tools such as the one described here. Interactions among coworkers have been shown to be a critical factor in enhancing or eroding perfor- mance (Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008), and effective expression of emotions such as anger influences both individual- and organizational-level outcomes (Callister et al., 2008). Consequently, managers and subordinates need effective skills for both expressing and responding to emotions, especially in situations when they do not have the luxury to “walk around until [they] calmed down” (Spencer & Spencer, 1993, p. 139). Resilience in emotionally charged events is not likely to develop from only dealing with emotions off line (Spencer & Spencer, 1993) or simply willing oneself to do better in the future (“vowed to be calmer under a crisis”; Boyatzis, 1998, p. 119). Failure to recognize and allow for emotionality in organizations (e.g., by attempting

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to suppress it) is likely to reinforce the emotional experience and could even lead to more overt hostility (Robinson & Bennett, 1997). Thus, if managers become aware that both rigid control and expressive suppression of emotion are less effective than, for example, cognitive reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003), better routes to intraper- sonal change can be offered to employees.

Finally, we hope that our article stimulates reconsideration of the current methods used to assess emotional competence (both by academics and practitioners). Such a reexamination needs a more reflexive stance and the utilization of deconstructive processes to question to what extent gender-based assumptions about emotional expression may unconsciously be informing competence criteria. Researchers can also use a more refined mode of interpretation when categorizing, coding, rating, and otherwise deciding on another’s level of (emotional) competence. For example, beyond the stern directive to improve emotional self-control (i.e., “not coded for self-control”; Boyatzis, 1998, p. 125), careful scrutiny of the attributions and the self-construal processes underlying coding schemes is needed as well as of the sub- tle messages that are potentially being reinforced about emotional expression through the use of such assessments. For instance, suppose the coder of the incident (“pattern recognition”; Boyatzis, 1998, p. 125) had been primed to classify Mary’s emotional expression as understandable—for example, a natural part of organiza- tional life—rather than ineffective and her self-deprecation discouraged rather than judged. And in addition, suppose that Mary had even been encouraged to find a way to examine how she could have expressed her emotion more effectively. How might this have changed Mary’s confidence as a manager and her ability to communicate effectively with her subordinate? Two points are critical here. First, casting out emo- tionality has gender implications for organizations. For example, as long as subtle messages are being transmitted throughout organizations that women’s and minori- ties’ inability to succeed is largely produced by their own shortcomings (Garnsey & Rees, 1996), greater equality and potential efficacy in the managerial ranks cannot be achieved. Second, if developing emotional competence is a goal for both men and women in the organizations, traditional conceptions of “masculinity” embedded in organizational culture need revision (for further exploration of this topic, see Calás & Smircich, 1993; Dickens, 1998; Ely, 2003; Gray, 1994).

PROBLEMATIZING THE AUTHORS: REFLEXIVE CLARIFICATIONS

Although we elaborated at length on several alternative (and by no means privi- leged) accounts for how emotional incompetence is coded by the female manager and by those assessing her, we are yet to touch upon another type of reflexivity. Deconstructive and reflexive accounts are characterized by transparency; reflexive researchers “engage in at least one self-referential loop by acknowledging and inter- rogating the impact of their own ontological and epistemological assumptions on their research strategy” (Cunliffe, 2003, p. 992).

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The first author’s anchoring in a broader European intellectual tradition (where intellectuals oftentimes challenge rather than support the status quo) and his direct experience of the limits of change in centrally planned organizations and totalitarian regimes (Chiaburu, 2006) informs his reading of the Mary Simpson case. Central to this article is also his firsthand experience with the interplay between what is cap- tured and what is left out in managerial assessments executed via critical incident interviews (e.g., Chiaburu & Chicus, 2000). Overall, these sharpened an attention to what is glossed over, not coded, left out, and ignored and prompted a search for alter- native explanations.

The vantage point of the second author is informed by a long academic career in business and academia including several experiences of being the first “woman” to do “X” in the organization (e.g., hold a particular position, achieve tenure, etc.). Consequently, over her career she has experienced firsthand less than subtle dis- couragement for expressing both negative and positive emotions in the workplace. In addition, her experience as a mediator, group facilitator, and conflict resolver has highlighted the importance of addressing rather than sidestepping the emotional con- tent of a dispute. Her interest in feminist critique and in highlighting discriminatory organizational practices is reflected in previous work (Gray, 1989, 1994).

Should the alternative explanation provided here be different if the authors’ sep- arate and collective experience would have revealed a different texture? We are inclined to respond in the affirmative and hasten to add that such alternative readings would also be enriching because of their unique vantage point and the potential implications resulting from them.

LIMITATIONS

If regarded from a conventional perspective, this exploration might be described by more traditional researchers as subject to a number of limitations. Among them are the subjectivity of the researchers, utilization of imprecise methods, and quasi- absence of generalization. However, from a less conventional perspective such lim- itations might actually present real strengths. As with prior research (Foldy, 2006; Kilduff, 1993), our intention is to unsettle, to provide alternative ways of thinking by focusing on either what is unspoken or unseen or on what is in plain view but that became, by habituation, naturalized, crystallized, all too familiar, and accepted as “given.” We recognize, however, that our exploration might have benefited from ana- lyzing more cases and including interviews of both males and females. Although we attempted to find more cases (texts of complete coded interviews in both published and unpublished work, including dissertations), we were unsuccessful. Such explo- rations might, however, open avenues for future investigations.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Whereas progress in enterprises such as the present one can be perceived as related to just another modernistic project, it is important to continue this line of research by

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inquiring deeper into the self-construal processes and the utilization of technologies of power to generate preexisting menus of sense-making options for organizational members. This can lead to a deeper understanding of how meaning is manufactured, disseminated, and utilized. Indeed, it would be interesting to elaborate not on the cap- tivity of managerial workers in temporal (work schedule) or spatial (workplace) enclo- sures but on how managers are captivated and—indeed—seduced by reified and naturalized systems of meaning (Calás & Smircich, 1991). Future work might exam- ine in more detail the role of cognitive framing (positive outcome or negative outcome) and of gender in decisions to engage in self-stereotyping or, more important, other- stereotyping, to attribute emotional incompetence (“she lost control”) to specific behaviors. For example, system justification theory proposes that low power individu- als often justify, support, and maintain systems that keep them in subordination. This is often done through the internalization of the dominant discourse and the resulting misperception of one’s oppression within a hierarchy, a phenomenon accentuated by low status, gender, and ethnic membership (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994). Future explo- rations can then examine if an equivalent type of self-stereotyping (of emotional incompetence) would be used by a male manager who engages in similar emotional expressions or if such expressions are perhaps self-censored by males who have been socialized to suppress them (Bergman, 1990). In addition, future investigators can explore whether self-stereotyping in the emotional domain is based on internalizing dominant views. These examinations can extend beyond the explanation presented here. Much like emotional competence, gender is “created and recreated” (Billing & Alvesson, 2000, p. 153) by structural factors, and broader examinations of whether and how the construction of organizational systems including human resource and organi- zational practices (Calás & Smircich, 1993; Dickens, 1998; Ely, 2003; Gray, 1994) are gendered can considerably broaden the scope of the arguments presented here.

In conclusion, studies such as ours have the potential to open new spaces for dis- cussion and question issues related to what is natural, given, unquestionable, and self-evident in organizations. Deconstruction and a reflexive approach opened up the text toward one possible interpretation: subjection to a gendered discourse. Other explanations or interpretive facets are also possible and indeed desirable. By exam- ining other incidents of “incompetence” at work, subsequent research should exam- ine alternate explanations for the locus of perceived incompetence (e.g., whether it is the result of a personal attribute or more culturally based). To the extent existing narratives capture and encapsulate individuals such as Mary Simpson (and perhaps many others) in their net of meaning, power, and tacit constraints, efforts aimed at mapping such systems in more detail represent time well spent.

NOTES

1. Statements presented by Mary Simpson in her interview, as recalled from a discussion with her boss, who informed her on what transpired during his lunch with her subordinate.

2. Pattern recognition is defined as “observing discrepancies, trends, and interrelationships in data or sees crucial differences between current situation and things that have happened before” (Spencer & Spencer, 1993, p. 71).

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3. In explaining the coding of this segment, the coder stated:

Pattern recognition. [S]he relates the dynamics of this situation to a woman trying to “make my way in the business world” while male egos are involved. The current reluctance of the operations person and programmer-analyst to deal with her directly are positions she attributes to “male ego.” She also goes on to describe how she is ineffective when these types of situations arise. The latter provides another theme or pattern that she identifies in this situation. (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 125)

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