22 sociology theory questions (Durkheim, Emile ).short answers

Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 05

can only move as a group, even when separating himself from the original group. Society, for its part, certainly requires from each of its members, so long as they remain part of it, a uniformity of beliefs and practices. Yet, since it can lose a certain number of those subjected to it without its internal functioning being disturbed, because labour in society is not greatly divided up, it does not come out strongly against such reductions in its number. Likewise, where solidarity merely arises from similarities, the person who does not deviate unduly from the collective type is incorporated without resistance into the whole. There are no grounds for rejecting him and, if there is room, there are even reasons to attract him. But where society constitutes a system of differentiated parts com­ plementary to one another, new elements cannot be grafted on to the old ones without disturbing their harmony and changing these relationships. Consequently the organism resists intrusions that cannot occur without upsetting its balance.

11

Not only does mechanical solidarity generally bind men together less strongly than does organic solidarity, but, as we mount the scale of social evolution, it becomes increasingly looser.

In fact the strength of the social bonds that derive from this origin varies in accordance with the following three conditions: ( 1 ) The relationship between the extent of the common conscious­ ness and that of the individual consciousness. The social bonds are stronger the more completely the former overlaps with the latter. (2) The average intensity of the states of collective consciousness. The relationship between the extent of the common and individual consciousness assumed to be equal, the degree of intensity has more effect upon the individual the more energy it possesses. If, on the other hand, that intensity radiates only feebly, its capacity to steer the individual in a collective direction can only be feeble. Thus the more easily will he be able to go his own way, and solidarity will be less strong. (3) The degree of determinateness of these same states. Indeed the more beliefs and practices are clear-cut, the less room they allow for individual divergences. They act as uniform moulds in which we all cast, in a uniform fashion, our ideas and actions. Consensus is

1 06 The Function of the Division of Labour

therefore as perfect as possible; every consciousness beats as one. Conversely, the more general and indeterminate the rules of conduct and thought, the more individual reflection must intervene in applying the rules to particular cases. But such reflective thinking cannot be aroused without disagreements breaking out. As it varies in quality and quantity from one man to another, all that it generates is of this character. Centrifugal tendencies thus continue to inultiply at the expense of social cohesion and harmony in the workings of society.

On the other hand, strong, well-defined states of the common consciousness are at the root of penal law. We shall see that such states are fewer today than in the past, and the number pro­ gressively decreases the more societies approximate to our present type . Thus this is because the average intensity and degree of determinateness of the collective states have themselves diminished. To be sure, we cannot conclude from this fact that the overall area of the common consciousness has grown smaller in size, for it may be that the sector to which penal law corresponds has diminished and that the rest, on the contrary, has swollen in size. There can be less strong, well-defined states, and on the other hand, a greater number of others. But this growth, if it is real, is at the very most the equivalent of what has occurred in the individual consciousness, for at least this has grown, in the same proportion, correspondingly bigger. If there are more matters common to all, there are also many more that are personal to each individual. Indeed there are even grounds for believing that the latter have increased more than the others, for the dissimilarities among men have become more pronounced the more cultured they have become. We have j ust seen that specialised activities have developed more than the common consciousness. Thus it is at least probable that within each individual consciousness the personal sphere has become much larger than the other. In any case, the relationship between them has at the very most remained the sartte. As a result, from this viewpoint mechanical solidarity has gained nothing, even supposing that it has lost nothing either. On the other hand, if we therefore establish that the collective consciousness has become weaker and vaguer, we can rest assured that a weakening in this solidarity has occurred, since, of the three conditions on which its power of action depends, at least two lose some of their force, whilst the third remains unchanged.

Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 07

TABLE V. 1 Rules forbidding acts contrary to the sentiments of the collectivity

Serving general purposes

Religious sentiments

National sentiments

Domestic sentiments

Sentiments concerning sexual relationships

Sentiments concerning work

Various traditional sentiments

Sentiments relating to the organ

In so far as they are directly offended

{Positive (stipulating the practice of religion) Negative'· - relating to beliefs concerning

the divine concerning worship concerning the instruments of worship (sanctuary, priests) { Positive (affirmative civil obligations)

Negative (treason, civil war, etc.) { Positive: (a) paternal and filial (b) conjugal (c) relating to kinship in general

Negative: the same as above { incest - sodomy - improper alliances

{ forbidden unions: prostitution pu blic decency decency of behaviour towards minors {mendicancy vagrancy drunkenness" penal rules for work { relating to: certain vocational practices

burial food dress ceremonial practices of all kinds 1 high treason

plots against legitimate authority flagrant insults offering violence to authority -

rebellion

encroachment by individuals upon official functions - usurpation - public falsification

abuse of authority by officials and of the common consciousness

Indirectly12 various offences relating to a profession

frauds against the state acts of disobedience of every kind (administrative breaches of regulations)

1 0 8 The Function of the Division of Labour

Il Serving individual purposes

murder - wounding - suicide

Sentiments concerning the person of

individual freedom moral (pressure exerted { physical

through exercise of

the individual

honour

Sentiments concerning individual possessions

Sentiments concerning individuals in general, either in relation to their persons or their possessions

civil rights) { insults, slander, libel false witness { theft - swindling, breach of confidence

various types of fraud f counterfeiting - bankruptcy fire brigandage - pillage public health

To demonstrate this it would be no use for us to compare the number of rules entailing repressive sanctions in the different social types, for the number does not vary in exact proportion to the number of sentiments that the rules represent. Indeed the same sentiment can be offended in several different ways, and thus give rise to several different rules without becoming diversified as a result. Because there are now more ways in which property may be acquired, there are likewise more categories of theft. But the sentiment of respect for the property of others has not grown in consequence. Because the individual personality has developed and comprises more facets, there are more possible assaults that can be made upon it. But the sentiment that these offend remains unchanged. Thus we need, not to count the number of rules, but to group them into classes and sub-classes, depending on whether they relate to the same sentiment or to different ones, or to different varieties of the same sentiment. In this way we shall build \UP criminological types and their essential variations, the number of which is necessarily equal to the strong, well-defined states of the common consciousness. The more numerous the latter, the more also the number of species of crime and, as a result, the variations of the one reflect exactly those of the others. To crystallise these ideas we have incorporated in the table above [Table V . I ] the main types and the main varieties which have been iden tified in the different

Increasing Preponderance o/ Organic Solidarity 1 09

kinds of societies. Very clearly such a classification cannot be very complete, nor perfectly rigorous. Yet for the conclusions we are seeking to draw, it is more than sufficient and precise . Indeed it certainly includes all the present criminological types; we run the risk only of having omitted some of those that have disappeared. However, since we do in fact wish to show that their number has decreased, these omissions would provide merely one more argu­ ment in support of our proposition.

III

It suffices to cast a glance over this table to recognise that a large number of criminological types have gradually disappeared.

Nowadays the regulation of domestic life has almost entirely lost every trace of its penal character. We have only to except the prohibitions on adultery and bigamy. Even so, in the list of modern crimes adultery occupies a very exceptional place, since a husband has the right to remit the punishment from a wife who has been sentenced for it. As for the duties of other members of the family, no longer does any repressive sanction attach to them. Formerly this was not the case. The Ten Commandments impose a social obligation upon filial piety. Thus to strike one's parents,I3 to curse them,14 or to disobey one's father15 was punished by death.

In the Athenian city which, although belonging to the same type as the Roman city, nevertheless represents a more primitive variety of it, legislation upon this matter possessed the same character. Failure to observe family duties gave rise to a special charge, the 'YpaCPiJ 7TaXW<TEw�: 'Those who misused or insulted their parents or those of their lineage, and who did not provide them with the means of subsistence they required, nor obtain for them funeral rites consonant with the dignity of their families . . . might be prosecuted on a charge of 'YpacpfJ 7TaxW<TEW�.' 16 The duties of relatives towards an orphan child, whether boy or girl, had attached to them actions of the same kind. However, the appreciably less severe punishments applied to these crimes demonstrate that the sentiments to which they corresponded had not the same force or specificity in Athens as they had in Judea.17

Finally, in Rome there is apparent a further, even more marked deterioration. The sole family obligations written into the penal law

1 1 0 The Function of the Division of Labour

are those that bind the freed client slave to his master and vice versa . 1S As for other domestic misdemeanours, they are punished only by disciplinary measures taken by the father in the household. Certainly the authority he commands allows him to punish them severely . Yet when he exercises his power in this way it is not as a public official or magistrate entrusted with the task of enforcing respect among his household for the general law of the state, but rather does he act as an individual. 19 These kinds of breaches of the law thus tend to become purely private matters, ones in which society has no interest. Thus domestic sentiments gradually move out of the central domain of the common consciousness.2o

Sentiments dealing with the relationships between the sexes have also evolved in the same way. In the Pentateuch breaches of morals occupy a prominent place. A large number of acts that our legislation today no longer represses are treated as crimes: the debauching of the betrothed of another (Deuteronomy 2 2 : 2 3-7), sexual relations with a slave (Leviticus 1 9 : 20-2), the girl who upon marriage fraudulently passes herself off as a virgin (Deuteronomy 22: 1 3-21 ) , sodomy (Leviticus 1 8: 22), bestiality (Exodus 22: 1 9), prostitution (Leviticus 1 9 : 29) and more particularly the prostitu­ tion of the daughters of priests (Leviticus 2 1 : 1 9), incest - and Leviticus (Chapter 1 7) records no less than seventeen cases of incest. In addition, all these crimes are subject to very severe punishments - in most cases death. Already in Athenian law they are fewer in number: it merely visits punishment upon pederasty for gain, pimping, relations with an honourable female citizen outside marriage and, finally, incest, although we are poorly informed as to what constitutes an incestuous act. The punishments, moreover, were generally less harsh. In the Roman city the position is roughly the same, although the whole scope of this legislation is more vague . It may be said to have lost its prominence. 'Pederasty in the primitive city,' says Rein, 'without being specified in the law, was punished by the people, the censors of morals or the head of tHe family, by death, by a fine, or by public disgrace . ' 2l The same was roughly the case also for the crime of 'stuprum', or an illicit relationship with a married woman. A father had the right to punish his daughter. The people punished by a fine or exile the same crime when the charge was brought by the municipal magistrates.22 It certainly appears that the repression of these offences was already partly a domestic and private matter. Finally, nowadays these

Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 1 1

sentiments are no longer reflected in the penal law save in two cases: when they are publicly outraged or in the person of a minor who is incapable of defending himself.23

The category of penal rules we have designated under the heading various traditions really represents a host of different criminological types, corresponding to different collective senti­ ments. Progressively these have all, or almost all, disappeared. In simple societies, where tradition is all-powerful and where almost everything is held in common, the most puerile customs become categorical duties from force of habit. In Tonkin there are a very large number of breaches of convention that are more seriously punished than grave attacks upon society. 24 In China the doctor who has not written out his prescription in the set manner is punished.25 The Pentateuch is full of rules of the same kind. This is to leave out a very large number of semi-religious practices whose origin is clearly historical and whose whole strength derives from tradition: food,26 dress,27 and a host of details relating to economic life are subject in the Book to very extensive regulation .28 Up to a certain point the same held good for the Greek cities. 'The State ,' declares Fustel de Coulanges, 'exercised its tyranny even in most minor matters. At Locres the law prohibited men from drinking unadulterated wine. It was usual for dress invariably to be prescribed by the laws of each city. Spartan legislation regulated the coiffure of females, and that of Athens forbade them to take more than three dresses when going on a j ourney. In Rhodes the law forbade the shaving off of the beard. In Byzantium it punished by a fine anyone who possessed a razor in his home. On the other hand, in Sparta it required the moustache to be shaved off.' 29 But the number of all such offences is already much diminished. In Rome hardly any are cited save some relating to a few sumptuary regulations regarding women. Nowa­ days it would be difficult, I believe, to discover any at all in our law.

But the most considerable loss from the penal code is the one due to the total - or almost total - disappearance of religious crimes. Thus here is a whole host of sentiments that have ceased to be counted among the strong and well-defined states of the common consciousness. Certainly, if we content ourselves with comparing our legislation under this heading with that of lower types of society taken as a whole, this regression appears so marked that we may well doubt whether it is normal and lasting . Yet when we follow closely the development of the facts, we perceive that this elimina-

1 1 2 The Function of the Division of Labour

tion has occurred regularly and progressively. We see it becoming ever more absolute as one social type evolves into another, and con­ sequently it cannot be due to a temporary or random occurrence .

It would be impossible to list all the religious crimes that the Pentateuch delineates and represses. The Jews had to obey all the commandments of the law under threat of annihilation. ' He shall be cut off from his people because he has brought the word of the Lord into contempt and violated his command. ' 30 In this matter he was not only obliged to do nothing that was forbidden, but also to do all that was prescribed, to submit himself and his family to circumci­ sion, to keep the Sabbath and feast-days, etc. There is no need for us . to recall how numerous such prescriptions were and with what terrible punishments they were invested.

In Athens, the place occupied by religious crimes was still very prominent. There was a special charge, the 'YpmpT7 aO'e8eiar, designed to prosecute attacks upon the national religion . Its scope was certainly very extensive . 'According to all appearances, Attic law had not precisely defined the crimes and offences which were to be qualified as aO'E8eia, with the result that much was left to the judge's discretion .'31 However, the list of such crimes was certainly less lengthy than in Hebrew law. Moreover, they were all, or almost all, crimes of commission, rather than of refraining from action. The main ones cited are in fact the following : the denial of beliefs concerning the gods, their existence, and their role in human affairs; the profanation of festivals, sacrifices, games, temples and altars; the violation of the right of asylum, the failure to observe duties towards the dead, the omission or modification of ritual practices by the priest, the act of initiatin� lay persons into the secret of the mysteries, or of uprooting the' sacred olive-trees, the entering of temples by those to whom access was prohibited.32 Thus crime consisted not in failure to celebrate the cult, but in disturbing it by positive actions or words.33 Finally, it has not been proved that the introduction of new divinities regularly required authorisation Of was treated as impiety, although this charge could be so stretched naturally that it could occasionally have been brought in this case.34 Moreover, it is clear that the religious consciousness was destined to be less intolerant in the homeland of the Sophists and Socrates than in a theocratic society such as that of the Jews. For philosophy to take root there and develop, traditional beliefs had not to be so strong as to prevent it from flourishing.

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Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 1 3

At Rome such beliefs weigh even less heavily upon the con­ sciousness of individuals. Fustel de Coulanges has in point of fact emphasised the religious character of Roman society. Yet, com­ pared with earlier peoples, the Roman state was much less imbued with religious feeling.35 Political functions, which were separated very early on from religious functions, made these subordinate to them. 'Thanks to this preponderance of the political principle and the political character of the Roman religion the State only lent its support to religion in so far as the attacks against religion were indirectly a threat to itself. The religious beliefs of foreign states or of foreigners living within the Roman empire were tolerated, if they were kept within bounds and did not impinge too closely upon the State . ' 36 But the state intervened if its citizens turned to foreign gods and consequently harmed the national religion. ' However, this matter was treated less as a question of law than as a concern of higher administration. One intervened against these acts as circumstances required, by edicts warning against or prohibiting them, or by punishments which could even extend to the death penalty . ' 37 Religious trials certainly did not have so much importance in the criminal justice of Rome as of Athens. We do not find any j uridical institution analogous to that of the 'YPoupil a(]"E8Eia�.

Not only are crimes against religion more clearly determined and less numerous, but many of them have been downgraded by one or several degrees. In fact the Romans did not place them all on the same level, but distinguished sce/era expiabilia from sce/era inex­ piabilia. The former only required an expiation consisting of a sacrifice offered to the gods.38 Doubtless this sacrifice was a punishment, in the sense that the state could insist upon it being performed, since the taint that had blemished the guilty party contaminated society and ran the risk of drawing down upon it the wrath of the gods. However, it was a punishment of an entirely different nature than the death penalty, confiscation of property, or exile, etc. Such errors, which were so easily purged, were the same as those that the law of Athens had repressed with the greatest severity. They were: ( 1 ) The profaning of any locus sacer . (2) The profaning of any locus religiosus . (3) Divorce, in the case of marriage per confarreationem. (4) The sale of a son by such a marriage.

1 1 4 The Function of the Division of Labour

(5) The exposure of a dead person to the sun's rays. (6) The commission, even with no evil intent, of any one of the scelera inexpiabilia.

In Athens the profaning of temples, the slightest disturbance of religious ceremonies, occasionally even the smallest infringement of ritual,39 were subject to the supreme punishment.

In Rome there were no real punishments save those meted out for offences that were both grave and intentional. The sole scelera inexpiabilia were in fact the following: ( 1 ) Any intentional failure by public officials in their duty to consult the auguries or to perform the sacra , or indeed the profanation of the sacra . (2) Action by a magistrate to carry out a legis actio on a forbidden day, and this intentionally. (3) the intentional profaning of the feriae by actions that were prohibited in such cases. (4) Incest committed by a vestal virgin or with another vestal virgin.40

Christianity has often been reproached for its intolerance . However, in this respect it made a considerable advance over earlier religions. The religious consciousness in Christian societies, even when faith was at its zenith, only incited a penal reaction when a revolt against it consisted of some striking action, or when it was denied or attacked head-on. Separated from temporal existence much more completely than it was even in Rome, it could no longer impose its will with the same authority and had to confine itself much more to a defensive attitude. It no longer demanded repression for infringement of minutiae such as those just alluded to, but only when it was threatened on one of its basic principles. The number of these is not very great, for faith, as it became more spiritual, general and abstract, at the same time became more simple . Sacrilege, of which blasphemy is only one variation, heresy in its different forms - these are henceforth the sole religi�us crimes.41 Thus the list continues to grow shorter, thereby attestmg to the fact that the strong, well-defined sentiments are becoming fewer. Moreover, how could it be otherwise? Everyone would acknowledge that the Christian religion is the most idealistic that has ever existed. Thus it is made up of very broad and very general articles of faith much more than of special beliefs and well­ determined practices. This explains how it came about that the birth

l

Increasing Preponderance o/ Organic Solidarity 1 1 5

of free thinking within the Christian religion took place relatively early on. From its origins different schools of thought and even opposing sects were established. Christian societies had hardly begun to organise in the Middle Ages when scholasticism made its appearance, the first methodical attempt at reflective thinking, the first source of dissent. The rights of discussion are acknowledged in principle . We need not demonstrate that since then this movement has continued to grow stronger. Thus religious criminality ended up by disengaging itself completely, or almost completely, from the penal law.

IV

Thus there are a number of varieties of crime that have progressively disappeared, without any compensating factor, for no varieties that are absolutely new have arisen. We may forbid begging,42 but Athens punished idleness. There exist no societies where assaults upon national sentiments or national institutions have ever been tolerated. Indeed repression of such attacks seems formerly to have been even harsher, and consequently there is reason to believe that the corresponding sentiments have grown weaker. The crime of lese-majeste , which once could be interpreted in so many differing ways, is increasingly tending to die out.

However, it has occasionally been alleged that crimes against the person of an individual were not recognised among less-civilised peoples and that theft and murder were even honoured among them. Lombroso has recently attempted to revive this thesis. He maintains 'that crime among savages is not an exception, but the general rule . . . that nobody considers them [theft and murder] as a crime' .43 But in support of this statement he cites only a few sparse and equivocal facts which he interprets uncritically. Thus he is reduced to identifying theft with the practice of communism or international brigandry.44 Now, although property may not be shared out among all the members of the group, it does not follow at all that the right to theft is acknowledged. There cannot even be thieving save to the extent that the institution of property exists.45 Likewise, because a society does not find pillaging at the expense of neighbouring nations to be abhorrent, we cannot conclude that it tolerates the same practice in its internal relations and does not

1 1 6 The Function of the Division of Labour

protect its citizens from one another. So it is the absence of punishment for internal brigandry that must be established . It is true that there is a text of Diodorus and another of Aulus Gellus46 that might lead us to believe that such licence was permitted in ancient Egypt. But these texts are contradicted by everything that we know about Egyptian civilisation. Thonissen states very aptly, 'How can tolerance of theft be allowed in a country where . . . laws imposed the death penalty upon the person who lived upon his illicit gains, and where the mere alteration of weights and measures was punished by the cutting off of both hands? , 47 By a series of conj ectures48 we can seek to reconstitute the facts, which writers have reported inaccurately, although the inexactness of their account is unquestionable .

As for the acts of homicide that Lombroso refers to, these are always perpetrated in exceptional circumstances. Sometimes they are acts of war, sometimes religious sacrifices, or the result of the absolute power exercised either by a barbaric despot over his subjects, or by a father over his children. What would require to be demonstrated is the complete lack of any rules that in principle proscribe murder. Among these particularly exceptional examples not one bears out such a conclusion. The fact that, under special conditions, exceptions are allowed to this rule does not prove that the rule does not exist. Moreover, are not similar exceptions met with even in our contemporary societies? Is the general who dispatches a regiment to certain death in order to save the remainder of his army acting any differently from the priest who offers a victim up in sacrifice in order to assuage the national god? Does not killing take place in war? Does the husband who inflicts death upon his adulterous wife not enjoy, in certain cases, a relative immunity from punishment, even although such immunity is not absolute? The sympathy occasionally manifested towards murder­ ers and thieves is no less instructive. Individuals can admire the bravery of a man without his action being tolerated in principl�

Moreover, the conception that serves as the foundation for this doctrine is a contradiction in terms. It assumes, in fact, that primitive peoples are bereft of all morality. Now, from the first moment when men form together in a society, however rudimen­ tary it may be, there are necessarily rules that govern their relationships, and consequently a morality which, although not resembling our own, nevertheless exists. In addition, if there is a

...

Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 1 7

rule common to all these moral codes, it is certainly the one that forbids attacks against the person, for men who are similar to one another cannot live together without each feeling for his fellows a sympathy that revolts against acts of any kind that will bring suffering upon them.49

All that is true about the theory is firstly the fact that the laws that protected the person of the individual formerly excluded from their application a part of the population, viz ., children and slaves. Secondly, it is legitimate to believe that such protection is now afforded more zealously, and consequently that the collective sentiments that correspond to it have become stronger. But there is nothing in these two facts that invalidates our conclusion . If all the individuals who, in any capacity whatsoever, make up society are today protected to an equal extent, this greater mildness in morality is due, not to the emergence of a penal rule that is really new, but to the extension of the scope of an ancient rule. From the beginning there was a prohibition on attempts to take the life of any member of the group, but children and slaves were excluded from this category. Now that we no longer make such distinctions actions have become punishable that once were not criminal. But this is merely because there are more persons in society, and not because collective sentiments have increased in number. These have not grown, but the object to which they relate has done so. If however there are grounds for conceding that the respect of society for the individual has become stronger, it does not follow that the central area of the common consciousness has grown in size . No new elements have been brought into play, since this sentiment has existed from earliest times and has always been of sufficient strength not to suffer being harmed in any way. The only change that has occurred is that a primitive element has attained greater intensity. But this mere reinforcement cannot compensate for the numerous and severe losses that we have indicated.

Thus on the whole the common consciousness comprises ever fewer strong and well-defined sentiments. This is therefore the case because the average intensity and degree of determinateness of the collective states of feeling continue still to diminish, as we have just stated. Even the very limited increase that we have just observed only confirms this result. Indeed it is very remarkable that the sole collective sentiments that have gained in intensity are those that relate, not to social matters, but to the individual. For this to be so

1 1 8 The Function of the Division of Labour

the individual personality must have become a much more impor­ tant factor in the life of society. For it to have been able to acquire such importance it is not enough for the personal consciousness of each individual to have increased in absolute terms; it must have increased more than the common consciousness. The personal consciousness must have thrown off the yoke of the common consciousness, and consequently the latter must have lost its power to dominate and that determining action that it exerted from the beginning. If indeed the relationship between these two elements had remained unchanged, if both had developed in extent and vitality in the same proportion, the collective sentiments that relate to the individual would likewise have remained unchanged. Above all, they would not have been the sole sentiments to have grown. This is because they depend solely on the social value of the individual factor, which in turn is determined not by any absolute development of that factor, but by the relative size of the share that falls to him within the totality of social phenomena.

v

This proposition could be verified by utilising a method that we shall only sketch out briefly.

At the present time we do not possess any scientific conception of what religion is. In order to do so we would need to have dealt with the problem using the same comparative method that we have applied to the question of crime, and such an attempt has not yet been made. It has often been stated that at any moment in history religion has consisted of the set of beliefs and sentiments of every kind concerning man's links with a being or beings whose nature he regards as superior to his own. But such a definition is manifestly inadequate. In fact there are a host of rules of conduct' or ways of thinking that are certainly religious and that, however, apply t? relationships of a totally different kind. Religion prohibits the Jew from eating certain kinds of meat and lays down that he must dress in a prescribed fashion. It imposes upon him this or that view regarding the nature of men and things, and regarding the origin of the world. Often it regulates legal, moral and economic relation­ ships. Its sphere of action thus extends far beyond man's communi­ cation with the divine . We are assured, moreover, that there exists

Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 1 9

at least one religion without a god.50 This single fact alone, were it firmly established, would suffice to demonstrate that we have no right to define religion as a function of the notion of God. Finally, if the extraordinary authority that the believer attributes to the divinity can account for the special prestige attached to everything that is religious, it remains to be explained how men have been led to ascribe such an authority to a being who, on the admission of everybody, is in many, if not all cases, a figment of their imagina­ tion . Nothing proceeds from nothing. Thus the force that the being possesses must come from somewhere, and consequently the above formula does not inform us about the essence of the phenomenon.

Yet, setting this element on one side, the sole characteristic that is apparently shared equally by all religious ideas and sentiments is that they are common to a certain number of individuals living together. Moreover, their average intensity is fairly high. Indeed it is invariably the fact that when a somewhat strong conviction is shared by a single community of people it inevitably assumes a religious character. It inspires in the individual consciousness the same reverential respect as religious beliefs proper. Thus it is extremely probable - but this brief outline doubtless cannot constitute a rigorous proof - that likewise religion corresponds to a very central domain of the common consciousness. It is true that such a domain would have to be mapped out, distinguishing it from the area that corresponds to penal law, with which, moreover, it frequently wholly or partly overlaps. These are problems that have to be studied, but whose solution is not directly relevant to the very feasible conjecture we have j ust made.

Yet if there is one truth that history has incontrovertibly settled, it is that religion extends over an ever diminishing area of social life . Originally, it extended to everything; everything social was religi­ ous - the two words were synonymous. Then gradually political, economic and scientific functions broke free from the religious function, becoming separate entities and taking on more and more a markedly temporal character. God, if we may express it in such a way, from being at first present in every human relationship, has progressively withdrawn. He leaves the world to men and their quarrels. At least, if He continues to rule it, it is from on high and afar off, and the effect that He exercises, becoming more general and indeterminate, leaves freer rein for human forces. The indi­ vidual thus feels, and he is in reality, much less acted upon ; he

1 20 The Function of the Division of Labour

becomes more a source of spontaneous activity. In short, not only is the sphere of religion not increasing at the same time as that of the temporal world, nor in the same proportion, but it is continually diminishing. This regression did not begin at any precise moment in history, but one can follow the phases of its development from the very origins of social evolution . It is therefore bound up with the basic conditions for the development of societies and thus demon­ strates that there is a constantly decreasing number of beliefs and collective sentiments that are both sufficiently collective and strong enough to assume a religious character. This means that the average intensity of the common consciousness is itself weakening.

This demonstration has one advantage over the previous one: it allows it to be established that the same law of regression applies to the representative element in the common consciousness as it does to the affective element. Through the penal law we can reach only phenomena that relate to the sensibility, whereas religion embraces not only feelings but also ideas and doctrines.

The decrease in the number of proverbs, adages and sayings as societies develop is still further proof that the collective repre­ sentations are also becoming less determinate .

Among primitive peoples, in fact, maxims of this kind are very numerous. According to Ellis, 'The Ewe-speaking peoples like most races of West Africa, have a large collection of proverbs, one, at least, being provided for almost every circumstance in life ; a peculiarity which is common to most peoples who have made but little progress in civilization.' 51

More advanced societies are only slightly fertile in this way during the preliminary phases of their existence. Later not only are no new proverbs coined, but the old ones gradually fade away, lose their proper meaning, and end up by not being understood at all. This clearly shows that it is above all in lower societies that they are most favoured, and that today they only succeed in maintaining their currency among the lower classes.52 But a proverb is the concen, trated expression of a collective idea or feeling, relating to a

'

determinate class of objects. Beliefs and feelings of this kind cannot even exist without their crystallising in this form. As every thought tends to find the expression that is most adequate for it, if it is common to a certain number of individuals it necessarily ends up by being encapsulated in a formula that is equally common to them all. Any lasting function fashions an organ for itself in its own image.

l

Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 2 1

Thus it is wrong to have adduced our inclination for realism and our scientific outlook to explain the decline in proverbs. In conversa­ tional language we do not pay much attention to precision nor so disdain imagery. On the contrary, we relish greatly the old proverbs that we have preserved. Moreover, the image is not an element inherent in a proverb . It is one of the ways - yet not the only one - in which the thought of the collectivity is epitomised. Yet these brief formulas end up by being too constricting to contain the diversity of individual sentiments. Their unity no longer chimes with the divergences that have occurred. Thus they only sustain their existence successfully by taking on a more general meaning, and gradually die out. The organ becomes atrophied because the function is no longer exercised, that is, because there are fewer collective representations sufficiently well-defined to be enclosed within any determinate form.

Thus everything goes to prove that the evolution of the common consciousness proceeds along the lines we have indicated. Very possibly it progresses less than does the individual consciousness. In any case it becomes weaker and vaguer as a whole. The collective type loses some of its prominence, its forms become more abstract and imprecise. Undoubtedly, if this decline were, as we are often inclined to believe, an original product of our most recent civilisa­ tion and a unique event in the history of societies, we might ask whether it would last. But in fact it has continued uninterruptedly from earliest times. This is what we set out to demonstrate. Individualism and free thinking are of no recent date, neither from 1 789, the Reformation, scholasticism, the collapse of Graeco­ Latin polytheism, nor the fall of oriental theocracies. They are a phenomenon that has no fixed starting point but one that has developed unceasingly throughout history. Their development is undoubtedly not linear. The new societies that replace extinct social types never embark on their course at the very spot where the others came to a halt. How could that be possible? What the child continues is not the old age or the years of maturity of his parents, but their own childhood. Thus if we wish to take stock of the course that has been run we must consider successive societies only at the same stage of their existence . We must, for example, compare the Christian societies of the Middle Ages with primitive Rome, and the latter with the original Greek cities, etc. We then find that this progress or, if you like, this regression, has been accomplished, so to

1 22 The Function of the Division of Labour

speak, without any break in continuity. Thus an iron law exists against which it would be absurd to revolt.

Moreover, this is not to say that the common consciousness is threatened with total disappearance. But it increasingly comprises modes of thinking and feeling of a very general, indeterminate nature, which leave room for an increasing multitude of individual acts of dissent. There is indeed one area in which the common consciousness has grown stronger, becoming more clearly deline­ ated, viz. , in its view of the individual. As all the other beliefs and practices assume less and less religious a character, the individual becomes the object of a sort of religion. We carry on the worship of the dignity of the human person, which, like all strong acts of worship, has already acquired its superstitions. If you like, therefore it is indeed a common faith . Yet first of all, it is only possible because of the collapse of other faiths and consequently it cannot engender the same results as that multiplicity of extinct beliefs . There is no compensation. Moreover, if the faith is common because it is shared among the community, it is individual in its object. If it impels every will towards the same end, that end is not a social one. Thus it holds a wholly exceptional position within the collective consciousness. It is indeed from society that it draws all this strength, but it is not to society that it binds us: it is to ourselves. Thus it does not constitute a truly social link. This is why theorists have been j ustly reproached with effecting the dissolution of society, because they have made this sentiment the exclusive basis for their moral doctrine. We may therefore conclude by affirming that all those social links resulting from similarity are growing progressively weaker.

This law alone suffices to demonstrate the absolute grandeur of the part played by the division of labour. Indeed, since mechanical solidarity is growing ever weaker, social life proper must either diminish or another form of solidarity must emerge gradually to take the place of the one that is disappearing. We have to choose. In vain is it maintained that the collective consciousness is growing aI'\d becoming stronger with that of individuals. We have j ust proved that these two factors vary in inverse proportion to each other. Yet social progress does not consist in a process of continual dissolution - quite the opposite : the more we evolve, the more societies develop a profound feeling of themselves and their unity. Thus there must indeed be some other social link to bring about this result. And there can be no other save that which derives from the division of labour.

1

Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity 1 2 3

If, moreover, we recall that even where i t is most resistant, mechanical solidarity does not bind men together with the same strength as does the division of labour, and also that its sphere of action does not embrace most of present-day social phenomena, it will become even more evident that social solidarity is tending to become exclusively organic. It is the division of labour that is increasingly fulfilling the role that once fell to the common consciousness. This is mainly what holds together social entities in the higher types of society.

This is a function of the division of labour that is important, but in a different way from that normally acknowledged by economists.

Notes

1 . H . Spencer, Principles of Sociology (London) vo!. 11, p. 282. 2 . Fustel d e Coulanges, Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne

France, pt. 1 , p. 352. 3 . Waitz, Anthropologie der Naturvolker, vo!. I , p p . 3 5 9-60. 4. Spencer, Principles of Sociology , vo!. I , pp 505-6. 5. In the same way we shall see in Chapter VII that the bond that joins

the individual to his family is the stronger and the more difficult to break, the more domestic labour is divided up.

6. L. H. Morgan, A ncient Society (London, 1 870) p. 80. 7. Denys of Halicarnassus, vo!. I , p. 9. Cf. Accarias, Precis de droit

romain , vo\. I, § 5 1 . 8. This fact is in no way irreconcilable with another one, viz., that in

these societies the foreigner is an object of repUlsion. He causes these feelings so long as he remains a foreigner. What we are saying is that he easily loses this status of being a foreigner once he is naturalised.

9. In the same way we shall see in Chapter VII that the intrusion of foreigners into the society of the family is the more easy the less domestic labour is divided up.

1 0 . W e term positive those sentiments that impose positive actions, such as the practice of religion. Negative sentiments merely entail absten­ tion. Thus between them there are only differences in degree. Such differences are, however, important, for they indicate two points in development.

1 1 . It is likely that other motives come into play in our condemnation of drunkenness, in particular the disgust inspired by the state of degradation in which the drunken person naturally finds himself.

1 2. Under this heading we place those acts that owe their criminal character to the power of reaction inhering in the organ of conscious­ ness, common at least in part. An exact separation between these two sub-classes is, moreover, difficult to make.

The Division of Labour in Society

Emile Durkheim With an introduction by Lewis Coser

Translated by W. D. Halls

M MACMILLAN

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,

Introduction © Lewis Coser 1984 Translation © The Macmillan Press Ltd 1984

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

First published 1984 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire R021 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

ISBN 0-333-3398� hardcover ISBN 0-333-33981-9 paperback

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Reprinted 1988, 1989, 1993, 1994

Printed in China

Contents

Translator's Note Introduction (byLewis Coser) Preface to the First Edition Preface to the Second Edition Introduction

BOOK I THE FUNCTION OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

vii ix

xxv xxxi

1

Chapter I: The Method of Determining This Function 11 Chapter 11: Mechanical Solidarity, or Solidarity by Similarities 31 Chapter Ill: Solidarity Arising from the Division of Labour, or Organic Solidarity 68 Chapter IV: Another Proof of the Preceding Theory 88 Chapter V: The Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity and its Consequences 101 Chapter VI: The Increasing preponderance of Organic Solidarity and its Consequences (cont.) 126 Chapter VII: Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity 149

BOOK 11 THE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS Chapter I: The Progress of the Division of Labour and of Happiness 179 Chapter 11: The Causes 200 Chapter Ill: Secondary Factors 226 Chapter IV: SecQndary Factors (cont.) 246 Chapter V: Consequences of the Foregoing 269

vi Contents

BOOK III THE ABNORMAL FORMS

Chapter I: The Anomic Division of Labour Chapter II: The Forced Division of Labour Chapter Ill: Another Abnormal Form

Conclusion

Index

291 310 323

329

343