22 sociology theory questions (Durkheim, Emile ).short answers

Chapter III

Solidarity Arising from the ,'

Division of Labour, or

Organic Solidarity

I

The very nature of the restitutory sanction is sufficient to show that the social solidarity to which that law corresponds is of a completely different kind.

The distinguishing mark of this sanction is that it is not expiatory, but comes down to a mere restoration of the 'status quo ante'. Suffering in proportion to the offence is not inflicted upon the one who has broken the law or failed to acknowledge it ; he is merely condemned to submit to it. If certain acts have already been performed, the judge restores them to what they s' uld be. He pronounces what the law is, but does not talk of p ishment. Damages awarded have no penal character: they are simply eans of putting back the clock so as to restore the past, so far as pos . le, to its normal state. It is true that Tarde believed that he had discovered a kind of civil penal law in the awarding of costs, which are always borne by the losing party. 1 Yet taken in this sense the term has no more than a metaphorical value. For there to be punishment there should at least be some proportionality between the punishment and the wrong, and for this one would have to establish exactly the degree of seriousness of the wrong. In fa� the loser of the case pays its costs even when his intentions were innocent and he is guilty of nothing more than ignorance. The reasons for this rule therefore seem to be entirely different. Since justice is not administered free, it seems equitable that the costs should be borne by the one who has occasioned them. Moreover, although it is possible that the prospect of such costs may stop the overhasty litigant, this is not enough for them to be considered a

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Organic Solidarity 69

punishment. The fear of ruin that is normally consequent upon idleness and neglect may cause the businessman to be energetic and diligent. Yet ruin, in the exact connotation of the term, is not the penal sanction for his shortcomings.

Failure to observe these rules is not even sanctioned by a diffused form of punishment. The plaintiff who has lost his case is not disgraced, nor is his honour impugned. We can even envisage these rules being different from what they are without any feel­ ing of repugnance. The idea that murder can be tolerated sets us up in arms, but we very readily accept that the law of inherit­ ance might be modified, and many even conceive that it could be abolished. At least it is a question that we are not unwilling to discuss. Likewise, we agree without difficulty that the laws regard­ ing easements or usufruct might be framed differently, or that the mutual obligations of buyer and vendor might be deter­ mined in another way, and that administrative functions might be allocated according to different principles. Since these prescriptions do not correspond to any feeling within us, and as generally we do not know their scientific justification, since this science does not yet exist, they have no deep roots in most of us. Doubtless there are exceptions. We do not tolerate the idea that an undertaking entered into that is contrary to morals or obtained either by violence or fraud can bind the contracting parties. Thus when public opinion is faced with cases of this kind it shows itself less indifferent than we have just asserted, and it adds its disapprobation to the legal sanction, causing it to weigh more heavily. This is because there are no clear-cut partitions between the various domains of moral life. On the contrary, they form a continuum, and consequently adjacent areas exist where different characteristics may be found at one and the same time. Nevertheless the proposition we have enunciated remains true in the overwhelming majority of cases. It demonstrates that rules where sanctions are restitutory either constitute no part at all of the collective consciousness, or subsist in it in only a weak state. Repressive law corresponds to what is the heart and centre of the common consciousness . Purely moral rules are already a less central part of it. Lastly, restitutory law springs from the farthest zones of consciousness and extends well beyond them. The more it becomes truly itself, the more it takes its distance.

This characteristic is moreover evinced in the way that it functions. Whereas repressive law tends to stay diffused throughout

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70 The Function of the Division of Labour

society, restitutory law sets up for itself ever more specialized bodies: consular courts, and industrial and administrative tribunals of every kind. Even in its most general sector, that of civil law , it is brought into use only by special officials - magistrates, lawyers, etc., who have been equipped for their role by a very special kind of training.

But although these rules are more or less outside the collective consciousness, they do not merely concern private individuals. If this were the case, restitutory law would have nothing in common with social solidarity, for the relationships it regulates would join individuals to one another without their being linked to society. They would be mere events of private life, as are, for .instance, relationships of friendship. Yet it is far from the case that society is absent from this sphere of legal activity. Generally it is true that it does not intervene by itself and of its own volition: it must be solicited to do so by the parties concerned. Yet although it has to be invoked, its intervention is none the less the essential cog in the mechanism, since it alone causes that mechanism to function. It is society that declares what the law is, through its body of representa­ tives.

However, it has been maintained that this role is in no way an especially social one, but comes down to being that of a conciliator of private interests. Consequently it has been held that any private individual could fulfil it, and that if society adopted it, this was solely for reasons of convenience. Yet it is wholly inaccurate to make society a kind of third-party arbitrator between the other parties. When it is induced to intervene it is not to reconcile the interests of individuals. It does not investigate what may be the most advan­ tageous solution for the protagonists, nor does it suggest a compromise. But it does apply to the particular case submitted to it the general and traditional rules of the law. Yet the law is pre-eminently a social matter, whose object is absolutely different from the interests ofthe litigants. The judge who examines a �ivorce petition is not concerned to know whether this form of separation is really desirable for the husband and wife, but whether the causes invoked for it fall into one of the categories stipulated by law.

Yet to assess accurately the importance of the intervention by society it must be observed not only at the moment when the sanction is applied, or when the relationship that has been upset is restored, but also when it is instituted.

Organic Solidarity 71

Social action i s in fact necessary either to lay a foundation for, or to modify, a number of legal relationships regulated by this form of law, and which the assent of the interested parties is not adequate enough either to institute or alter. Of this nature are those relationships in particular that concern personal status. Although marriage is a contract, the partners can neither draw it up nor rescind it at will. The same holds good for all other domestic relationships, and a fortiori for all those regulated by administrative law. It is true that obligations that are properly contractual can be entered into or abrogated by the mere will to agreement of the parties. Yet we must bear in mind that, if a contract has binding force, it is society which confers that force. Let us assume that it does not give its blessing to the obligations that have been contracted; these then become pure promises possessing only moral authority.2 Every contract therefore assumes that behind the parties who bind each other, society is there, quite prepared to intervene and to enforce respect for any undertakings entered into . Thus it only bestows this obligatory force upon contracts that have a social value in themselves, that is, those that are in conformity with the rules of law. We shall even occasionally see that its intervention is still more positive . It is therefore present in every relationship determined by restitutory law, even in ones that appear the most completely private, and its presence, although not felt, at least under normal conditions, is no less essential.3

Since the rules where sanctions are restitutory do not involve the common consciousness, the relationships that they determine are not of the sort that affect everyone indiscriminately. This means that they are instituted directly, not between the individual and society, but between limited and particular elements in society, which they link to one another. Yet on the other hand, since society is not absent it must necessarily indeed be concerned to some extent, and feel some repercussions. Then, depending upon the intensity with which it feels them, it intervenes at a greater or lesser distance, and more or less actively, through the mediation of special bodies whose task it is to represent it. . )'hese relationships are therefore very different from those regulated by repressive law, for the latter join directly, without any intermediary, the individual consciousness to that of society, that is, the individual himself to society.

But these relationships can assume two very different forms.

72 The Function of the Division of Labour

Sometimes they are negative and come down to a mere abstention; at other times they are positive, or ones affording co-operation. To the two categories of rules that determine either kind of relationship correspond two kinds of social solidarity between which a distinc­ tion must be drawn.

11

The negative relationship that may serve as a model for the others is that which joins a thing to a person.

Things in fact are a part of society, just as persons are, and play a specific part in it. Thus their relationship to the body social needs to be determined. So we may say that there exists a solidarity of things whose nature is special enough to be outwardly interpreted in legal consequences of a very particular character.

lurisconsults in fact distinguish between two kinds of rights: they term one kind 'real' , the other 'personal' . The right of property and mortgage belongs to the first kind, the right to credit to the second kind. What characterises 'real' rights is that they alone give rise to a right of preference and succession. In this case the right that I possess over something is exclusive of any other that might be established after mine. If, for example, a property has been successively mortgaged to two creditors, the second mortgage cannot in any way restrict the rights acquired under the first. Moreover, if my debtor disposes of the thing over which I possess a mortgage right, this is in no way affected, but the third party acquiring it is obliged to pay me or to surrender what he has acquired. Now, for this to be the case, the legal bond must link directly, without the mediation of any third person, the thing specific to me in my legal status. This privileged situation is thus the consequence of the solidarity peculiar to things. When, on the contrary, the right is personal, the person under an obligatiQ,fl to me can, by contracting new obligations, give me co-creditors whose right is equal to mine and, although I possess as surety all my debtor's goods, if he disposes of them they are removed from my surety by being no longer part of his estate . This is because no special relationship exists between these goods and myself, but one between the person of their owner and myself.4

We can thus see what this 'real' form of solidarity consists of: it

Organic Solidarity 77

are all part of the same society, still incohesive, i t i s true, but one becoming increasingly conscious of itself. What has been termed the balance of power in Europe marks the beginning of the organisation of that society.

It is customary to distinguish carefully between justice and charity, that is, the mere respect of others' rights, from every act that goes beyond that purely negative virtue. In both these kinds of practices may be seen two independent strata of ethics: justice, by itself, might constitute its basic foundation; charity might be its crowning glory. The distinction is such a radical one that, according to the protagonists of a certain kind of ethics, justice alone is needful for the smooth functioning of social life . Altruism is scarcely more than a private virtue, which it is laudable for the individual to pursue, but which society can very well do without. Many even view its intervention in public life with some disquiet. From what was stated previously we can see just how far this conception is from according with the facts. In reality, for men to acknowledge and mutually guarantee the rights of one another, they must first have a mutual liking, and have some reason that makes them clin� to one another and to the single society of which they form a part. Justice is filled with charity, or to employ once more our expression, negative solidarity is only the emanation of another solidarity that is positive in nature : it is the repercussion of social feelings in the sphere of 'real' rights which come from a different source. Thus there is nothing specific about justice, but it is the necessary accompani­ ment to every kind of solidarity. It is necessarily encountered everywhere men live a life in common, whether this results from the social division of labour or from the attraction of like to like.

III

If the rules just discussed are separated from restitutory law, what remains constitutes a system that is no less well defined, and includes domestic law, contractual law, commercial law, procedural law, and administrative and constitutional law. The relationships that are regulated by these laws are of a nature entirely different from the preceding ones; they express a positive contribution, a co-operation deriving essentially from the division of labour.

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78 The Function of the Division of Labour

The questions resolved by domestic law may be reduced to the fOllowing two types: (1) Who is entrusted with the different domestic functions? Who is the spouse, who the father, who the legitimate child, who the guardian, etc.? (2) What is the normal type of these functions and their relation­ ships? The stipulations laid down to meet the first of these questions are those that determine the status and conditions required to contract a marriage, the necessary formalities for the marriage to be a valid one, the conditions regarding legitimate, illegitimate and adoptive children, the mode of selecting a guardian, etc.

On the other hand, it is the second question that is settled by the section on the respective laws and duties relating to husband and wife, on the state of their relationship in case of divorce, nullity or separation (including division of property), on the powers of the father, on the legal consequences of adoption, on administration by a guardian and on his relationship with his ward, on the role of the family council vis-a-vis guardian and ward, on the role of parents in the case of suspension of civil rights, and on the constitution of a board of guardians.

This section of civil law has therefore as its purpose the deter­ mination of how the various family functions are allocated and what should be the relationship of each function to the others. Their significance is that they express the special solidarity that unites the members of a family as the result of the domestic division of labour. It is true that we are scarcely accustomed to conceiving the family in this light. It is very often believed that what brings about this cohesion is exclusively a commonality of sentiments and beliefs. Indeed there are so many matters shared in common between the members of the family group that the special character of the tasks incumbent upon each member easily eludes us. This prompted Comte to declare that domestic union excludes 'any thou�ht of direct and common co-operation towards any common goal'.7 But the legal organisation of the family whose essential traits we have just briefly recalled, demonstrates the reality of these functional differences and their importance . The history of the family from its origins shows in fact a mere uninterrupted movement towards dissociation, in the course of which these various functions, at first undivided and overlapping, have gradually separated out and been

Organic Solidarity 79

constituted independently, being distributed among the various relatives according to sex, age and dependent relationships, so as to make each relative a specialised functionary in domestic society.8 Far from being only an ancillary and secondary phenomenon, this family division of labour, on the contrary, dominates the whole of the development of the family.

The relationship of the division of labour to contractual law is no less marked.

The contract is indeed the supreme legal expression of co­ operation. It is true that there exist so-called 'benevolent' contracts that bind only one of the parties. If I make an unconditional gift to another person, if I assume voluntarily the trusteeship of some object, or a power of attorney, there ensue for me precise, clear-cut obligations. Yet no real co-operation between the contracting parties exists since burdens are laid upon one of them alone. Yet

i, co-operation is not entirely absent from the phenomenon; it is }: merely gratuitous or unilateral. For instance, what is a gift if not an

exchange without reciprocal obligations? These kinds of contract are therefore merely a variation of contracts of a truly co-operative nature.

Moreover, they are very rare, for it is only exceptionally that gratuitous acts fall under legal regulation. As for the other contracts, which comprise the overwhelming majority, the obliga­ tions to which they give rise are correlative, either through reciprocal obligations or through services previously rendered. The undertaking entered into by the one party stems either from that entered into by the other, or from a service already performed by the latter. 9 Now such reciprocity is only possible where co-operation exists and this in turn does not occur without the division of labour. To co-operate, in fact, is to share with one another a common task. If this task is subdivided into tasks qualitatively similar, although indispensable to one another, there is a simple or first-level division of labour. If they are different in kind, there is composite division of labour, or specialisation proper.

This latter form of co-operation is moreover the one that the contract by far the most usually expresses. The only one of different significance is the contract of association, and also perhaps the marriage contract, in so far as it determines the share in household expenses to be contributed by husband and wife . Even for this to be the case, the contract of association must place all associates on the

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80 The Function of the Division of Labour

same level, with identical contributions and functions. But this is a case which never exactly occurs in matrimonial relations, because of the division of labour between husband and wife . Against these rare kinds of contract let us contrast the innumerable contracts whose purpose is to harmonise functions that are special and different: contracts between buyer and seller, exchange contracts, contracts between employers and workers, between hirer and person hiring, between lender and borrower, between the repository and the depositor, between innkeeper and traveller, between one enjoying a power of attorney and his mandatory, between the creditor and the pledge given by the debtor, etc. In general, the contract is the symbol of exchange. Thus not unjustifiably Spencer was able to term a contract physiological, one like that which at every moment occurs in the exchange of substances between the different organs of the living body.1O Now it is plain that exchange always assumes some more or less developed division of labour. It is true that the contracts we have just mentioned are still of a somewhat general character. But we must not forget that law only draws the general contours, the main features of social relationships, those that are to be found identical in the different spheres of collective life. Thus each one of these types of contract assumes a host of others, more specialised, of which it is, as it were, the common blueprint, but which at the same time regulates the others, those in which relationships are established between more specialised functions. Thus despite the relative simplicity of this scheme, it is enough to demonstrate the extreme complexity of the facts that it epitomises.

Moreover, this specialisation of functions is directly manifest in the commercial code, which especially regulates contracts specific to commerce: contracts between agent and principal, between carrier and consignor, between the bearer of a bill of exchange and the drawer, between shipowner and creditors, or shipowner and captain and crew, between the freighting agency and the charterer, between lender and borrower in a contract duly legally engtossed, between insurer and insured. Yet here again a great gap exists between the comparatively general nature of the legal prescriptions and the diversity of special functions whose relationships are regulated by these, as is shown by the important position accorded in commercial law to custom.

Where the commercial code does not regulate contracts proper, it determines what certain special functions must be, such as those of

Organic Solidarity 81

the stockbroker, the dealer, the ship's captain, the receiver in a case of bankruptcy, so as to ensure solidarity in all the various parts of the commercial system.

Procedural law, whether this be criminal, civil or commercial, plays the same role in the legal system. The sanctions of legal rules of all kinds can only be applied through a certain number of ancillary functions, such as those of magistrates, defence lawyers, solicitors, jurors, plaintiffs and defendants. Procedures decide the manner in which the functions must be applied and relate to one another. It states what they should be and what is the role of each one in the general life of the corpus of the law.

It seems to us that, in a rational classification of legal rules, procedural law should be considered merely as a variety of administrative law: we do not see what rational difference separates the administration of justice from the rest of administration. Whatever the rights or wrongs of this viewpoint, administrative law proper regulates ill-defined functions that are termed administra­ tive,ll just as procedural law does judicial functions. It determines what their normal type is, and their relationships either with one another or with the diffused functions of society. One would only need to except a certain number of rules which are generally classified under this heading, although they are penal in character.12 Finally, constitutional law performs the same role for governmental functions.

It may well be surprising to see classified under the same heading administrative and political law with what is usually termed private law . Yet firstly, such a connection is needed if the nature of the sanctions is taken as the basis for classification. Nor does it seem possible for us to adopt any other system if we wish to proceed scientifically. Moreover, to separate completely these two kinds of law we would have to admit that private law really exists, whereas we believe that all law is public, because all law is social. All the functions of society are social, just as all the functions of an organism are organic. The economic functions, just like the others, are also of this character. Moreover, even among the most diffuse functions there are none that are not to some extent subject to the effects of the machinery of government. Thus from this viewpoint between them there is no more than a difference in degree.

To sum up: the relationships that are regulated by co-operative law, with its restitutory sanctions, and the solidarity these

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82 The Function of the Division of Labour

relationships express, result from the social division of labour. Moreover, it is explicable that, in general, co-operative rel�tion­ ships do not carry with them any other form of sanctions. Indeed, special tasks, by their very nature, are exempt from the effects of the collective consciousness. This is because if something is to be the object of shared sentiments, the first condition is that it should be shared, that is, present in every consciousness, and that each individual may be able to conceive of it from a single, identical viewpoint. Doubtless, so long as functions are of a certain general nature, everyone can have some feeling for them. Yet the more specific they become the more also the number is restricted of those who are aware of each and every function. Consequently the more they overflow beyond the common consciousness. The rules that determine them cannot therefore possess that superior force and transcendent authority which, when it suffers harm, exacts expia­ tion. It is indeed also from public opinion that their authority springs, just as do penal rules, but from an opinion that is specific to certain sectors of society.

Moreover, even in those special circles where the rules are applied, and where consequently they are evoked in the minds of people, they do not reflect any very acute feelings, nor even in most cases any kind of emotional state . For, since they determine the manner in which the different functions should work together in the various combinations of circumstances that may arise, the objects to which they relate are not ever-present in the consciousness. We are not always having to administer a guardianship or a trusteeship,I3 nor having to exercise our rights as creditor or buyer, etc. Above all, we do not have to exercise them in particular conditions. But the states of consciousness are strong only in so far as they are permanent. The infringement of these rules does not therefore touch to the quick the common spirit of society, nor, at least usually, that of these special groups. Consequently the infringement cannot \ provoke more than a very moderate reaction. All that we reqdire is for the functions to work together in a regular fashion. Thus if this regularity is disturbed, we are satisfied if it is re-established. This is most certainly not to say that the development of the division of labour cannot have repercussions in the penal law. There are, as we already know, administrative and governmental functions where certain relationships are regulated by repressive law, because of the special character marking the organ of the common consciousness

Organic Solidarity 83

and everything appertaining to it . In yet other cases, the bonds of solidarity linking certain social functions may be such that once they are broken repercussions occur that are sufficiently general to provoke a reaction of punishment. But for reasons we have already stated, these consequences are exceptional.

In the end this law plays a part analogous in society to that of the nervous system in the organism. That system, in effect, has the task of regulating the various bodily functions in such a way that they work harmoniously together. Thus it expresses in a very natural way the degree of concentration that the organism has reached as a result of the physiological division of labour. Therefore we can at the different levels of the animal scale ascertain the measure of that concentration according to the development of the nervous system. Likewise this means that we can ascertain the measure of concentra­ tion that a society has reached through the social division of labour, according to the development of co-operative law with its restitu­ tory sanctions. One can foresee that such a criterion will be of great utility to us.

IV

Since negative solidarity on its own brings about no integration, and since, moreover, there is nothing specific in it, we shall identify only two kinds of positive solidarity, distinguished by the following characteristics: ( 1 ) The first kind links the individual directly to society without any intermediary. With the second kind he depends upon society because he depends upon the parts that go to constitute it. (2) In the two cases, society is not viewed from the same perspective. In the first, the term is used to denote a more or less organised society composed of beliefs and sentiments common to all the members of the group: this is the collective type. On the contrary, in the second case the society to which we are solidly joined is a system of different and special functions united by definite relationships. Moreover, these two societies are really one. They are two facets of one and the same reality, but which none the less need to be distinguished from each other. (3) From this second difference there arises another which will serve to allow us to characterise and delineate the features of these two kinds of solidarity.

84 The Function of the Division of Labour

The first kind can only be strong to the extent that the ideas and tendencies common to all members of the society exceed in number and intensity those that appertain personally to each one of those members. The greater this excess, the more active this kind of society is. Now what constitutes our personality is that which each one of us possesses that is peculiar and characteristic, what distinguishes it from others. This solidarity can therefore only increase in inverse relationship to the personality. As we have said, there is in the consciousness of each one of us two consciousnesses: one that we share in common with our group in its entirety, which is consequently not ourselves, but society living and acting within us; the other that, on the contrary, represents us alone in what is personal and distinctive about us, what makes us an individuaJ.l4 The solidarity that derives from similarities is at its maximum when the collective consciousness completely envelops our total con­ sciousness, coinciding with it at every point. At that moment our individuality is zero. That individuality cannot arise until the community fills us less completely. Here there are two opposing forces, the one centripetal, the other centrifugal, which cannot increase at the same time. We cannot ourselves develop simultane­ ously in two so opposing directions. If we have a strong inclination to think and act for ourselves we cannot be strongly inclined to think and act like other people . If the ideal is to create for ourselves a special, personal image, this cannot mean to be like everyone else. Moreover, at the very moment when this solidarity exerts its effect, our personality, it may be said by definition, disappears, for we are no longer ourselves, but a collective being.

The social molecules that can only cohere in this one manner cannot therefore move as a unit save in so far as they lack any movement Qf their own, as do the molecules of inorganic bodies. This is why we suggest that this kind of solidarity should be called mechanical. The word does not mean that the solidarity is produced by mechanical and artificial means. We only use this term for �t by analogy with the cohesion that links together the elements of raw materials, in contrast to that which encompasses the unity of living organisms. What finally justifies the use of this term is the fact that the bond that thus unites the individual with society is completely analogous to that which links the thing to the person. The individual consciousness, considered from this viewpoint, is simply a depen­ dency of the collective type, and follows all its motions, just as the

Organic Solidarity 85

object possessed follows those which its owner imposes upon it. In societies where this solidarity is highly developed the individual, as we shall see later, does not belong to himself; he is literally a thing at the disposal of society. Thus, in these same social types, personal rights are still not yet distinguished from 'real' rights.

The situation is entirely different in the case of solidarity that brings about the division of labour. Whereas the other solidarity implies that individuals resemble one another, the latter assumes that they are different from one another. The former type is only possible in so far as the individual personality is absorbed into the collective personality; the latter is only possible if each one of us has a sphere of action that is peculiarly our own, and consequently a personality. Thus the collective consciousness leaves uncovered a part of the individual consciousness, so that there may be estab­ lished in it those special functions that it cannot regulate. The more extensive this free area is, the stronger the cohesion that arises from this solidarity. Indeed, on the one hand each one of us depends more intimately upon society the more labour is divided up, and on the other, the activity of each one of us is correspondingly more specialised, the more personal it is. Doubtless, however circum­ scribed that activity may be, it is never completely original . Even in the exercise of our profession we conform to usages and practices that are common to us all within our corporation. Yet even in this case, the burden that we bear is in a different way less heavy than when the whole of society bears down upon us, and this leaves much more room for the free play of our initiative . Here, then, the individuality of the whole grows at the same time as that of the parts. Society becomes more effective in moving in concert, at the same time as each of its elements has more movements that are peculiarly its own. This solidarity resembles that observed in the higher animals. In fact each organ has its own special characteristics and autonomy, yet the greater the unity of the organism, the more marked the individualisation of the parts. Using this analogy, we propose to call 'organic' the solidarity that is due to the division of labour.

At the same time this chapter and the preceding one provide us with the means of estimating the part played by each one of these two social links in the overall, common result which by different ways they contribute in producing. In fact we know under what external forms these two kinds of solidarity are symbolised, that is,

86 The Function of the Division of Labour

what is the corpus of legal rules corresponding to each one. Consequently to know their respective importance within a given social type, it is enough to compare the respective extent of the two kinds of law that express them, since the law always varies with the social relationships that it regulates.15

Notes

1 . Tarde, Criminalite comparee (Alcan, Paris) p. 1 13 . 2 . Even that moral authority derives from custom, and hence from

society. 3. We must confine ourselves here to these general remarks, common to

every form of restitutory law. Numerous demonstrations of this truth will be found later (Chapter VII) for that part of law that corresponds to the solidarity engendered by the division of labour.

4. It has sometimes been stated that the status of father or son, etc. was the object of 'real' rights (cf. Ortolan, Instituts , vol. I, p. 660). But

, such forms of status are only abstract symbols of various rights, some 'real' (for example, a father's right over the fortune of his under-age children), others personal.

5. Arts 1 382-1386 of the Civil Code. To these might be linked the articles concerning the reclaiming of a debt.

6. A contracting party who fails to fulfil his undertakings is also obliged to indemnify the other party. But in that case the damages awarded serve as a sanction for a positive bond. It is not because he has committed any harm that the breaker of a contract pays, but for not having carried out his obligation.

7. A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, vol . IV, p. 419. 8. For further development of this point, cf. Chapter VII. 9. For instance, in the case of a loan with interest.

10. H. Spencer, Principles of Ethics (London, 1893). 1 1 . W e have retained the expression normally used. But it would require

to be defined, and this we are not able to do. All in all, it seems to us that these functions are those placed directly under the influence of governmental authorities. But many distinctions would have to be made.

12 . Also, those that concern the 'real' rights of legally constituted bodies ('personnes morales') of an administrative kind, for the relationships that they determine are negative ones.

13 . This i s why the law that regulates .the relationships of domestic functions is not penal in character, although its functions are fairly general.

14. Nevertheless these two consciousnesses are not regions of ourselves that are 'geographically' distinct, for they interpenetrate each other at every point.

Organic Solidarity 87

1 5 . To clarify ideas, in the table that follows we develop the classification of legal rules that is implicit in this chapter and the preceding one:

Negative or abstaining relationships

Positive or co-operative relationships

I . Rules with an organised, repressive sanction. (A classification will be found in the next chapter.)

H. Rules with a restitutory sanction determining different relationships.

Of a thing to a person

Of persons to one another

I {

Right to property in its various forms (personal estate, real estate, etc.)

Various procedures of the right of property (estate charges, usufruct, etc.)

Determined by the normal exercise of 'real' rights Determined by the illegal violation of ' real' rights.

Between domestic functions

Between diffused economic functions

Administrative functions

Governmental functions

{ 1 {

Contractual relationships in general. Special contracts.

One to another. With governmental functions. With functions diffused throughout society.

One to another. With administrative functions. With diffused political functions.

The Division of Labour in Society

Emile Durkheim With an introduction by Lewis Coser

Translated by W. D. Halls

M MACMILLAN

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Introduction © Lewis Coser 1984 Translation © The Macmillan Press Ltd 1984

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.

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Reprinted 1988, 1989, 1993, 1994

Printed in China

Contents

Translator's Note Introduction (byLewis Coser) Preface to the First Edition Preface to the Second Edition Introduction

BOOK I THE FUNCTION OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

vii ix

xxv xxxi

1

Chapter I: The Method of Determining This Function 11 Chapter 11: Mechanical Solidarity, or Solidarity by Similarities 31 Chapter Ill: Solidarity Arising from the Division of Labour, or Organic Solidarity 68 Chapter IV: Another Proof of the Preceding Theory 88 Chapter V: The Increasing Preponderance of Organic Solidarity and its Consequences 101 Chapter VI: The Increasing preponderance of Organic Solidarity and its Consequences (cont.) 126 Chapter VII: Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity 149

BOOK 11 THE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS Chapter I: The Progress of the Division of Labour and of Happiness 179 Chapter 11: The Causes 200 Chapter Ill: Secondary Factors 226 Chapter IV: SecQndary Factors (cont.) 246 Chapter V: Consequences of the Foregoing 269

vi Contents

BOOK III THE ABNORMAL FORMS

Chapter I: The Anomic Division of Labour Chapter II: The Forced Division of Labour Chapter Ill: Another Abnormal Form

Conclusion

Index

291 310 323

329

343