Week 3 ETC

Contingency Planning: Emergency Preparedness for Terrorist Attacks

Hsiao-Ming WANG Department of Criminal Justice

University of Houston-Downtown Houston, TX 77002, USA

ABSTRACT

The terrorist attack is one type of emergency caused by humans. This emergency is rare, but can cause catastrophic effects. In the aftermath of 9-1 I , it is proprietary security personnel’s responsibility to help every employee get back to “business as normal” while at the same time, being prepared for possible terrorist attacks. An up-to-date contingency plan is expected to help security managers to fulfill this role. Security managers should reassess or develop the contingency plan by using the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) guidebook. They are encouraged to adopt the Homeland Security Advisory System, or alternatively to develop a simple color- coded system, to response the threats of terrorist attack in stages. They are suggested to consider three factors-top executive’s commitment, adequate trainings, and coordination with public agencies-in the planning.

Keywords: Emergency Management, Emergency Preparedness, Contingency Planning, Terrorist Attacks.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorist attacks against the United States on September 1 1,2001 awakened Americans to a need for security, a need that seemed to have faded away after the end of the Cold War. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security reflects this

awakening. This newly-instituted agency takes the responsibility of reducing the loss of life and property from terrorist attacks and natural disasters through an emergency management program. The Department developed the Homeland Security Advisory System to signal foreseeable threats, and incorporated within its structure the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an independent agency of the U S . government to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to civil emergencies, to ensure emergency preparedness.

Although the government has the legal responsibility to provide leadership i n emergency preparedness to all disasters including terrorist attacks, “the private sector is a significant stakeholder in emergency preparedness initiatives” [ I ] . While government facilities and high-prolile landmarks are high-risk targets, terrorists may also attack corporate amenities such as shopping malls, refineries, and utilities. Many American businesses have proprietary security force to protect persons and assets against crime and disaster.’ To what extent in-house security is well prepared for terrorist attacks is worth a reassessment.

Business is usually able to take into account those threats arising from within the market, but not those threats arising from outside the system such as terrorism [;I. There is a possibiiity that proprietary security did not pay enough attention to threats arising from outside the system such as terrorist attacks when they develop their emergency

’ As of 1990, the employees of private security industry i n the United States are around 1,493300. Proprietary security employed 528,000 consisting of 35.4% of total private security personnel [2].

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management program.* A firm that fails to take into account the threats arising from outside the system such as terrorism runs risks of protecting its assets [ 5 ] .

Further, contingency plans in business are more likely focused on facility fires, technological failures, natural disasters (hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, and floods), and human emergencies (kidnapping, workplace violence, and bomb threats). Even if the contingency plan takes into account the threat of terrorist attacks, it is more likely not up-to-date [6].

To sum up. as a response to the event of 9- 11, this essay urges that a reassessment of emergency preparedness is necessary, and maintains that a comprehensive contingency plan must take into account the terrorist attacks, a threat arising from outside the market system.

EMERGENCY MANAGMENET AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Emergency management is “the process of preparing for, mitigating, responding to and recovering from an emergency” [ 7 ] . In the context of emergency management, contingency planning is an essential component, but it is not the only element. Emergency management also includes training, conducting drills, testing equipment and coordinating activities with the community [8].

Technologically, contingency planning is the first step of emergency preparedness focusing on the prevention or mitigation of

*There is no available data regarding this issue. However, one empirical research on prisons planning for specific types of emergencies indicated that only 14% of responders took into account urban riots, a threat arising from outside the system, and none of them took terrorism into consideration [4].

undesirable events. A contingency plan consists of“one or more sets of procedures that lay out in greater detail the specific tasks of the responders” [9]. An appropriate contingency plan helps businesses prepare for the worst.

DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

Despite its long history, it is often difficult to define terrorism. Different persons, agencies, and disciplines tend to use different definitions from their own perspectives [IO]. Combs pointed out this issue when she stated:

[Tlerrorism is a political as well as a legal and a military issue, its definition i n modern terms has been slow to evolve. Not that there are not numerous definitions available-there are hundreds. But few o f t h e m are of sufficient legal scholarship to be useful in international law, and most of those which are legally useful lack the necessary ambiguity for political acceptance [ l I ] .

Any student who had a course in research methods would know. a prublem with defining concepts could be very serious. In daily life, people quite often use different terms to refer to the same event. On the other hand, it is also very likely that people use the same word to refer to different things, Thus, clarifying abstract concepts will be the essential first step to avoid confusion [12].

It is unnecessary in this essay to examine various definitions of terrorism because most textbooks in this subject already have done so (e.g., Simonsen and Spindlove.

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2004; White, 2003). However, this essay defines terrorism from a security management perspective as “a form of political or criminal violence using military tactics to change behavior through fear.” This definition should allow security managers to move beyond confusions and to focus on the prevention of military-style attacks against innocent people in a noncombat area [13].

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

Terrorism has a long history. but contemporary terrorism can be traced back to the national liberation or social revolution after the World War I1 such as Menachem Begin in Israel, Mao Tse-Tung in China, Ho Chi-Minh in Vietnam, and Fidel Castro in Cuba [14]. The backdrops ofthose campaigns may be different, but they all share one commonality-they all involved using terrorist attacks against a much stronger enemy at one time. If they would not ever use terrorist attacks, their goals could be very difficult, if not possible, to reach when their forces were relatively weak. This historical footnote highlights a very important characteristic of contemporary terrorism. That is, terrorism is a feasible alternative tool for relatively weak countries or groups to fight against a strong force.

This unique characteristic leads to the observation that we have lived in the “age of terrorism” from the late 1960s to the present. Several factors contribute to the prevalence of terrorism in the modern society [ 151. The first factor is the innovation in transportation and communication. The introduction of cross-continent jets made all people. including terrorists, able to travel across different countries expediently. As a result, contemporary terrorists can strike an international target as their choice. For

example, before the 9-1 1, Al-Qaeda conducted several campaigns of terror in various places such as Aden, Yemen (hotel bombing in 1992), New York City (World Trade Center bombing in 1993). Mogadishu, Somalia (fighting with U S . Army in 1993), Manila, Philippines (Operation Bojinka i n 1994), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (car bombing of U.S. military personnel), Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, Tanzania (bombing U.S. embassies i n 1998), Strasbourg, and France (foiled bombing plot in 2000) [16]. These places are worldwide across North America. Europe, Asia, and Africa, and were made possible by the facilitation of commercial jets. AI Qaeda’s attack on 9-1 1 was not only taking commercial jets as a transportation tool but also expanded the role of airplanes as guided missiles.

On the other hand, the invention of television also facilitated terrorist needs of publicity. One terrorist goal is to instill fear and anxiety in other people. If no one knows about the terrorist attack, it will not produce fear. Sinionsen and Spindlove assert that “the need for publicity often drives target selection; the greater the symbolic value of the target, the more publicity the attacks brings to the terrorists and the more fear it generates” [17]. This reasoning explains why terrorists selected 1972 Olympic Games and the 1978 World Cup Soccer tournament i n Argentina as targets. In both events, it was estimated that at least 800 million people were watching the TV broadcast [ 181. Furthermore, the media is more likely to use a sensational tradition in their coverage of the terrorist incidents [19]. The effect of fear would be enhanced in this situation.

Sometimes the effect of innovation of transportation and coinmuilication exist simultaneously. The tragedy of 9-1 1 exemplifies this issue. The image of one jet

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hitting the Twin Tower terrified a lot of people when they watched the live picture on TV. Many people are siill fearful of traveling today. The Assassins, a radical Shiite sect, which waged a terrorist campaign to advance its religious belief between the late 11 and the 13 centuries, would never dream of this publicity effect POI.

The second factor enhancing contemporary terrorism is the development of weapons. In the ancient time, daggers were common weapons for most terrorists. Not too long ago, terrorists still relied on pistols or sniper rifles. Today, terrorists have a long line of choices ranged from nukes and dirty bombs to biological weapons. In addition, damages caused by contemporary weapons are much more severe than before. Thus, more fear will be produced.

The third factor contributing to more terrorism today is the anti-American hostility and the values that the United States symbolizes. During the Cold War, evidence surfaced that the Soviet Union supported terrorism [21]. After the collapse of Soviet Union, the United States became the most powerful country in the world. Today the U S . shifts its attention to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. To these countries, terrorism seems the most feasible alternative to defeat the United States.

According to the above factors, reasonable proprietary security managers would predict that as long as the United States remains the strongest country in the world and continually promotes its values, the conflict between the United States and other countries will continue to exist. Furthermore, other countries will repeatedly adopt terrorism against the U S . in an easier (because of innovation of transportation and

communication) and more powerful (because of development of weapons) way.

“DUAL USE” O F CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Terrorist attacks are rare, but may have catastrophic effects. I n risk terms, terrorist attacks are events with low frequency but occasional high impact. Security managers need to prepare for the worst; hence a contingency plan in response to terrorist attacks is essential. However, one concept is worth clarifying. In terms of emergency management, contingency planning is unrelated to the prevention of terrorism per se, because this mission is absolutely beyond the capacity of pi-oprietary security. Instead. the contingency planning is used to prevent businesses from terrorist attacks and to minimize the damage if the incident happened.

Orient (1985) argued that eincrgcncy preparedness could be of “dual use” i n natural disasters and civil defense measures for nuclear war. After she reviewed Swiss and Russian models of emergency preparedness, she found that there is a “relationship between preparedness for natural, technologic, and military disasters” [22]. I n Orient’s work, the concept military disaster refers to the nuclear attacks. Orient did not directly mention terrorist attacks. However. one component of terrorism is using military tactics. Traditionally, terrorists use six tactics: bombing, hijacking, arson, assault, kidnapping, and taking hostages [23]. Recent incidents indicated that the terrorist arsenal also includes potential threats of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons [24]. Thus, Orient’s argument is still meaningful for proprietary security in the present context.

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WHY CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORKS?

While Orient’s argument, based on practical models, draws a parallel between natural, technologic, and military disasters in terms of emergency preparedness, it did not provide any theoretical backdrops. To fill this gap, this essay reviews two related criminological theories: Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activities Theory. It is hoped that this preliminary review can provide a theoretical reasoning why emergency preparedness would work i n preventing businesses from terrorist attacks.

In criminology, Rational Choice Theory distinguishes criminal activity as “offense specific.” It predicts, “Criminal acts will be avoided if (1) potential targets are carefully guarded, (2) the means to commit crime are controlled, and (3) potentially offenders are carefully monitored” [25]. Similarly, Routine Activities Theory also provides a significant implication i n crime prevention. Basically, Routine Activities Theory maintains that the volume and distribution of predatory crime are closely related to the interaction of three variables: the availability of suitable targets, the absence of capable guardians, and presence of motivated offenders [26]. The best approach to prevent crime (or being victimized) is to increase the presence of capable guardians and to decrease the availability of suitable targets, because most people individually can do almost nothing to prevent the presence of motivated offenders.

Terrorism could be considered as a predatory crime because it may cause the loss of life and property damages. According to both Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activities Theory, terrorist attacks may be avoided by either increasing the presence of capable guardians or ’

decreasing the availability of suitable targets. For example, after the event of 9- 1 I , the deployment of National Guards at airports is a typical measure of increasing the presence of capable guardians. However, the cost of this measure was enormous. Millions of dollars was spent for overtime payments. From a financial standpoint,, it is impossible for governments to provide terrorist protection all the time to all business and industry . Thus, for proprietary security managers, decreasing the availability of suitable hirgels through the contingency planning seems the feasible option.

FEMA ANI) CONTINGENCY PLANNING

With the hope of helping American businesses and industry to be prepared for emergencies, FEMA published a guidebook entitled “Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry” [27]. This 78-page manual consists of four sections. The first section identifies f o ~ i r steps i n the planning process. Step one is to establish a planning team. Step two is to analyze capabilities and hazards (i.e., risk analysis). Step three is to develop the plan. The last step is to implement the plan with a focus on training. The second section addresses emergency management considerations including direction and control, communications, life safety, property protection, community outreach, recovery and restoration, as well as administration and logistics. The third section provides hazard-specific information about the connnon hazards most facilities may face such as fires, hazardous materials incidents, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, severe winter storms, earthqualtes, and technological emergencies. The final sectipn gives additional infoormation sources. Because each business and industry usually has its own unique environment,

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contingency planning must be tailored to fit the site. The FEMA’s manual can be a reasonable starting point for proprietary security managers in assessing or developing their own contingency plans.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Response to a contingency can take place all at once or in stages. Certain urgent situations such as fires need immediate response because of no advance warning. Some emergencies such as hurricanes can be responding in stages according to foreseeable threats. Terrorist attacks are often without advance warnings. However, after 9-1 I , the Homeland Security Department provides the Homeland Security Advisory System to signal foreseeable threats. To ensure that employees are better informed, security managers may incorporate this system into the contingency plan to make appropriate responses in stages.

Alternatively, security managers can develop a simple color-coded system. For example, Georgia Institute of Technology uses four colors-green, yellow, red, and black-to represent the different level of threats. Green represents normal. Yellow means “access controlled,” under which security would increase patrols and identification would be checked at entrances. Red indicates “restricted access” by using one entrance of each building with bag checking and visitors escorting. Black is the highest alert, meaning that the campus would be closed. No one would be allowed into the facilities except emergency personnel [28].

RELATED FACTORS OF A SUCCESSFUL CONTIGENCY PLAN

Top Executive’s Commitment

As almost all security personnel know, the commitment from the top authority is always the key to a successful security management. Obviously. there is no exception in the context of contingency planning. Hildreth (2002) encouraged to form a “contingency management team,” and to include the top executive as the team leader [29]. He stated that sometimes the cost of a response to a specific emergency might exceed the value of the assets at risk. Thus, a response is conditioned by the perceptions of management and ownership.

This relationship between contingency planning and top executive’s commitment is not additive but multiple I t can be illustrated by a formula as P(S) = C x CP. where P(S): the probability of a successfnl contingency planning; C: the coefficient of top executive’s commitment; CP: the coefficient of the appropriateness of a specific contingency plan.

The probability ranges between 0 and 1. Zero means that the contingency planning absolutely does not work, while 1 means that the contingency planning definitely works. Both coefficients also range between 0 and 1, Full commitment equals 1 . whcreas no commitinent equals 0. A perfect contingency plan equals 1, while a null contingency plan equals 0. The quality of a contingency plan is decided by the extent of knowledge of a security manager. 111 the case of a perfect plan (CP = 1) but without the support from the top (C = O), the chance of success i n contingency planning will be 0. This mathematic concept illuminates the

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importance of top executive’s commitment. Security managers should not only work on the plan itself, but also the need to earn top management’s pledge.

Training

Emergency response training is a type of exercise that employees will hopefully never have to use, but it is the vital element of a successful contingency planning [30]. Many studies suggested that emergency response training is a crucial factor of successful contingency planning. For example. the U.S. Bureau of Prison (BOP) set up a committee to exam its emergency preparedness system in 1995. The BOP committee found that the system worked and training programs contributed to the success ~311.

I n addition, Downs (2002) in her article regarding training in responses to bio- terrorism also argued that an effective response to a terrorist attack “requires prepared, well-trained local responders.” She maintained that there are five competency levels in terms of training: employee awareness, responder awareness. operations technicians, specialists. and incident command [32]. This essay asserts that the responder awareness is the bottom line of competency for proprietary security personnel. In most circumstances, proprietary security employees need immediate response to emergencies such as terrorist attacks. They should specifically know the emergency response plans and procedures for their facilities and, most important, their roles as planned [33].

Emergency response training should be given during new employee orientation and continue during regularly scheduled in services [34]. For example, Amoco uses several methods to maintain the emergency

response personnel; one ofthem is to conduct four drills per year [35]. Further. emergency response training should let response personnel understanding that emergency response is a 24-hour-and-7-day mission. A project of emergency preparedness for individual public health workers found that employees of regular hoursiweekday works are less likely prepared Cor round-the-clock response to emergencies [ 3 6 ] .

Coordination with Agencies

Proprietary security and public agencies are mutual dependent. Their relationship is effective cooperation rather than one of friction or competition [37]. An effective contingency plan definitely cannot exist without the support from public agencies. I n the study of the BOP’S emergency preparedness, the committee found that support from federal. state and local agencies is essential because it eased the burden on BOP staff [B].

The coordination with public agencies should be maintained on a regular basis. Competent security personnel should not wait until the emergency to contact their counterparts. They should call or visit thcse agencies to introduce themselves and to obtain one or two names as contacts. if this has not been done already.

CONCLUSION

This essay argues that the terrorist attack is one type of emergency caused by humans. This emergency is rare, but can have catastrophic effects. I n the aftermath of 9- 1 1, it is proprietary security personnel’s responsibility to help every employees get back to business as normal while being prepared for possible future terrorist attacks.

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An up-to-date contingency plan is expected to help security managers to fulfill this role.

The contingency planning is the first step of emergency preparedness. I t has “dual iise.“ A good contingency plan helps the business to prepare for the worst including the natural disasters and terrorist attacks. In addition. according to Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activities Theory in criminology, an appropriate contingency plan can also minimize the opportunity of being attacked.

The disaster of 9-1 1 makes the necessity of reassessing, if there is one, or developing the contingency plan. FEMA’s guidebook can be a reasonable starting point for security managers in assessing or developing their own contingency plans. The plan is encouraged to adopt the Homeland Security Advisory System, or alternatively to develop a simple color-coded system, to respond to the threats of terrorist attack i n stages. Finally. the Contingency planning must consider three factors: top executive’s commitment, adequate training, and coordination with public agencies. They all contribute to the success of contingency planning.

REFERENCES

[ I ] E.M. Gordon, “Leadership Commitment to Strong Emergency Management,” Spectrum: The Journal of Stote Government p. 9, Fall 2001. [2] K.M. Hess & H.M. Wroblesji, Iniroduction to Privute Securily, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1996. [3] J.H. Powell, “Bring Terrorism into the Strategic Debate: An Expanded Characterization of Strategic Threats to Firms,” Security Journal, vol. 15, no.3, pp. 21-35,2002, [4] R.M. Freeman, “The Real Event Model or the Organizational Convenience Model?’

The Prison Journcrl, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 152- 165, 1998. [5] Powell, op cit. [6] T. Anderson. “A Year of Reassessment.” Security Muncrgenienl, vol. 47, no. I . pp. 61 - 65,2003. 171 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Manageiiiem Guide for Business and Industry, Washington, D.C., p. 6, w~\.w.~eina.~ov/librarv/bizindex.slitni, accessed on July 28. 2003. [8] Ibid. [9] J.J. Fay, Contemporury Security hlcrnugement. Boston: Butterworth- Heinemann, p. 244, 2002. [lo] J.R. White, Terrorism, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2003. [ I I ] C.C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty- Firs1 Century, Upper Saddle River, N J : Prentice-Hall, p. 6. 1997. [I21 M. G. h4axfield & E. Babbie, I<eseurch il.lt./hodsfi~fo,. Criminul Jusrice trnd Criminoloa. Belmont. CA: Wadswortl~Tlioiiisoii. 200 1 . [ I ; ] White. op cit. [I41 J . Weinzierl, ”Terrorism: Its Origin and History” i n Understcrnding Terrorism, edited by A.A. Nyatepe-Coo & D. Zeisler- Vralsted, Upper Saddle River, N J : Prentice- Hall. pp. 61-93, 2003. [I51 Ibid. [I61 White, op cit. Azano, Harry J. (2001). “Will the New Threat Result i n Real Change?” Security Munogement 45(12): 173-4. [ 171 C.E. Simoiisen, & J.R. Spitidlove, Terrorism Todup, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 12, 2002. [ 181 Weinzierl, op cit. [ 191 K. Cousins & P. Brunt. “Terrorism. Tourism and the Media.” Security Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 19-32,2002. [20] Weinzierl, op cit. [21] B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

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[22] J.M. Orient. “Disaster Preparedness: An

Inlevnu1 Medicine vol. 103, no. 6, pp. 937- 940, 1985. [23] B. Jenkins. Internationtrl Terrorisnr The Other World War, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1985. [24] White, op cit. 1251 L.J. Siegel, Criminology, Belmont, CA: WadswortWThomson, p. 117,2004. [26] L. Cohen, Lawrence & M. Felson, “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach,” American Sociologicul Review, vol. 44, pp. 588-608, 1979. [27] Federal Emergency Management Agency, op cit. [28] R.F. Lang, “Rewriting the Book on Emergency Response,” Secuvily Management, vol. 46, no. 9, pp. 73-82, 2002. [29] D. Hildreth, “Master Your Disaster,” Security Munagement. vol. 46, no. 6, pp. 76- 82,2002. [30] R. C. Shroll, “Emergency Response Training,” Professional Safety, pp. 16-21, December 2002. [31] M.B. Cooksey &P.M. Carlson, “Emergency Preparedness: A BOP follow- up Report.” Corrections Today, vol. 59, no. I , pp, 34-36, 1997. [32] K.E. Downs, “Training Requirements and Opportunities in Planning Responses to Bioterrorism,” Americnn Journul uf Heulth- System Phurmucy, vol. 59, pp. 1331-1332, 2002. [33] K. Gebbie & J. Merrill, “Public Health Worker Competencies for Emergency Response,” Journal of Public Health Munugenzent Practice, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 73-

[34] D.J. Middaugh, “Maintaining Management During Disaster” MEDSURG Nursing, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 125-127,2003. 1351 S.L. Harowitz, “Rebuilding on Security’s Solid Foundation.” Security

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[36] Gebbie & Merrill. op cit. [37] C. A . Sennewald. Effective Security Management, Boston: Butterworth- Heinemann, 1998. [38] Cooksey & Carlson. op cit.

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81,2002. ..

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