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EMA 305: Principles of Emergency Management

Week 7 Lecture: Flexibility

Scope:

In this session, we discuss why our proactive approaches sometimes fall short in disasters,

thereby exposing the need for flexibility. We define the concept of flexibility as well as other

related terms. The session explores how planning and flexibility are related and it uses 9/11 as a

case study to illustrate examples of improvisation and creativity. The session concludes with a

discussion about the application of flexibility in all phases of emergency management.

Why might mitigating and planning for disasters be insufficient for effective emergency

management?

As noted earlier in the course, proactive planning through anticipatory mitigation and

preparedness measures is an important principle of emergency management. Rising disasters –

in terms of frequency or impact – cannot be reversed unless emergency management becomes

more proactive.

Proactive planning helps communities to identify what types of disasters may occur and how bad

they might be. Planning enables emergency managers to determine what functions will be

performed after a disaster and who will be responsible for accomplishing them. Planning

increases the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency management. It helps emergency

managers to reduce the loss of life, physical destruction and social disruption while utilizing the

least amount of resources.

When discussing the need for flexibility we need to ask the questions: Will proactive planning

limit all disasters? Should emergency managers rely on proactive planning alone? Are there

reasons why emergency managers may need to depart from emergency operations plans and

standard operating procedures?

First, it will be impossible to eliminate all disasters. Professor David A. McEntire (University of

North Texas) states in his article “Revolutionary and Evolutionary Change in Emergency

Management” (2005):

 Most scholars agree that we will have more and worse natural and technological disasters in

the future.

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 Social, political and economic factors around the world indicate an increased likelihood of

terrorist attacks.

 People occupy dangerous areas (because they often provide benefits in terms of employment,

resources and recreation) and this increases disaster vulnerability.

 Even though some areas are less hazardous than others, there are no hazard-free areas on

earth.

 Our best efforts at mitigation and preparedness have fallen short at times.

 Steps to reverse rising risk will not be easily or quickly achieved.

 Humans lack omniscience about hazards and disasters.

 Citizens are apathetic about disasters and emergency management.

 There are many priorities in societies which downplay the need for emergency management.

 Identifying which hazards to focus on or the correct balance among policies is an extremely

challenging proposition.

 There is serious tension between policies created by leaders and citizens (should experts or

civilians determine emergency management policy?).

 Some of the solutions to disaster problems may ironically exacerbate them (e.g., protecting

the environment by preventing the use of controlled fires in wooded lands infested with bark

beetles may ironically augment future forest fires and harm our physical surroundings

further).

Second, disasters also unfold in unpredictable and dynamic ways, which may limit preparedness

measures and render standard operating procedures useless.

 Key leaders may be killed in the disaster, requiring others to make important decisions.

 Fire fighters may become victims to the disaster (e.g., the station may collapse making

deployment of vehicles and personnel impossible).

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 Roads and bridges may be damaged in a disaster, making evacuation from impacted areas

impossible.

 Power outages associated with disasters leave communications equipment inoperable.

 First responders and medical personnel will quickly become overwhelmed in major public

health emergencies.

 The inability of the mass media to broadcast after some disasters may necessitate alternative

ways to share information with the public.

 The large number of mass fatalities will certainly burden county coroners and body storage

facilities.

 The arrival of unanticipated supplies will necessitate sorting, storage and distribution.

 The altruistic behavior of citizens will require novel ways to harness their potential benefits

while limiting the strain they put on disaster organizations.

 The sheer number of people needing relief may alter routine ways of providing federal

disaster assistance.

Define flexibility and terms related to this concept.

As can be seen from the example above, “Under some circumstances . . . in dealing with less

routine tasks, emergency organizations need to preserve an ability to respond flexibly, and,

where necessary, and ability to improvise appropriate counter-measures for the special needs of

an unanticipated situation which threatens to become a crisis” (Turner 1994, 87). For instance,

“Human and material resources may have to be moved around because there are too

many in some locations and not enough in others. Even in the best of cases, at least some

degree of confusion about appropriate courses of action is inevitable, because conditions

and needs can change quickly during the emergency period. Emergency managers must

recognize the need for flexibility and know that, if need be, there is more than one way to

get the job done” (Kreps 1991, 34).

So what is “flexibility?” Dictionary.com defines flexibility as “susceptible of modification or

adaptation; adaptable.” Synonyms include: pliable, elastic, supple.

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Flexibility, in terms of emergency management, might therefore suggest an attitude of accepting

the need for adjustment. It is related to improvisation, innovation and creativity. Considered as

a noun, an improvisation is a transformation of some original model. Considered as a verb,

improvisation is composing in real time that begins with embellishments of a simple model, but

increasingly feeds on these embellishments themselves to move farther from the original melody

and closer to a new composition. Whether treated as a noun or a verb, improvisation is a guided

activity whose guidance comes from elapsed patterns discovered retrospectively” (Kendra and

Wachtendorf 2003, 126). “To improvise is to organize for emergency response during an event.

Improvisation implies that various domains of responsibility and the way in which they are to be

performed may have to be worked out on the spot” (Kreps 1991, 34).

Kendra and Wachtendorf state “We have adopted a fairly broad definition of innovation,

essentially referring to any new and creative program, procedure, or technique that a community

implements to meet the demands of their environment” (2006, 323).

Creativity, according to these scholars, is believed to include the development of “new

alternatives with elements that achieve fundamental objectives in ways previously unseen. This,

a creative alternative has both elements of novelty and effectiveness” (Kendra and Wachtendorf

2003, 123).

Flexibility, improvisation, innovation and creativity all have to do with adjustments of previously

designed means to accomplish anticipated goals.

The relationship between proactive planning and reactive flexibility:

Those studying or working in emergency management should be aware of the complex

relationship between flexibility (and/or improvisation and creativity) and preparedness/planning.

Several scholars have helped us to understand this convoluted relationship.

The lack of planning increases the need for flexibility. “When there has been very little planning

for an emergency, the ability to improvise assumes singular importance” (Kreps 1991, 31).

Planning does not prevent flexibility. Effective emergency management requires flexibility.

Because emergency managers have to adapt plans to circumstances, innovate, and improvise

when necessary, rigid plans and organizational structures are to be avoided. The plan is a

starting place rather than an immutable guide to action. In a healthy emergency management

environment, officials have the discretion to interpret plans and responds to circumstances.

Craig Fugate, [former] emergency management director for the state of Florida [and current

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Administrator of FEMA], has argued, for example, that although the Incident Command System

(ICS) is useful for structuring response efforts, it is only a tool and may have to be adapted to

circumstances. Fugate has also observed that “ICS zealots” can actually hamper response

operations by limiting flexibility (Waugh 2007, 18).

Plans should allow flexibility. “Effective emergency planning should identify the response

actions most likely to be appropriate in an emergency. However, it should also encourage

improvisation based on continuing assessment of the emergency by response personnel. . . . The

EOP should emphasize flexibility so that responders can improvise as the situation demands”

(Perry and Lindell 2007, 55).

Planning often improves flexibility. Even a modest level of preparedness, however, clearly

makes a difference and enhances any necessary improvisation” (Kreps 1991, 31).

Flexibility should not eclipse planning. Flexibility does not mean, however, that there are no

rules governing actions. Understanding the boundaries of authority and action requires

knowledge of the legal, social, and political context of emergency management, which

emergency managers gain through a combination of experience and education” (Waugh 2007,

18).

Both planning and flexibility are required. “Without preparedness, emergency management

loses clarity and efficiency in meeting essential disaster-related demand. Without improvisation,

emergency management loses flexibility in the face of changing conditions” (Kreps 1991, 33).

“Improvisation and preparedness are not opposites; ideally, they go hand in hand” (Kreps 1991,

34).

Planning and flexibility improve emergency management. “Even though an EOP should identify

the actions that are most likely to be appropriate, it also should emphasize flexibility. Those

involved must be encouraged to improvise based on their assessment of disaster demands (Kreps

1991). Much emphasis has been given to the idea that careful planning promotes quicker

response. Rapid response is important. However it is not the only objective of emergency

planning. The appropriateness of response is as important as the speed of response (Quarantelli

1977)” (Lindell, Prater and Perry 2007, 264).

Examples of flexibility after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

As can be seen, both planning and flexibility are important for emergency management.

However, Barry A. Turner, in his article “Flexibility and Improvisation in Emergency

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Response,” argues that disasters generate special, and often unforeseen, problems for those

involved in emergency management.

One way of thinking about a crisis is to regard it as a challenge to, or as a breakdown of, the

meaning which would normally be attributed to the incident being dealt with. One portion of the

world comes to be overturned, disrupted, shattered, transformed and even ideas about who has

authority or who is in control may be radically changed” (Turner 1994, 87).

Put differently, the unique demands of non-routine disasters alter the merit of anticipated

response activities. The size, complexity and dynamic nature of such events make some plans

inoperable.

Such disastrous situations can be mishandled if inflexibility exists.

“Emergency situations in the contemporary world – in cities, in industrial plants, in transport

systems – are often complex and difficult to comprehend, especially when they evolve

turbulently over time. In such conditions, an inflexible response or an over-reliance on some

pre-ordained recipe can increase danger rather than eliminating it. When staff fail to recognize

that existing systems are inappropriate or breaking down, or [if they fail] to acknowledge that the

routines being adopted are inadequate, a hazardous degree of inflexibility exists” (Turner 1994,

87).

“A major example of such a perilous ‘managerial’ inflexibility in a military situation has been

provided by a recent, extended analysis of a failure of military strategy. In October 1917, in one

of the last, tragic battles of World War I, the ‘catastrophe’ of Caporetto, the Italian High

Command clung to an inflexible and outdated view of the ‘proper’ way to conduct a battle. They

did not recognize that, by this stage of the conflict, the Germany army had itself adopted a more

flexible battlefield strategy” (Turner 1994, 86).

Impervious to more informed assessments of likely outcomes from those on the ground, the High

Command insisted upon playing out is pre-arranged routines with the result that the battle was

disastrously lost and a large number of Italian soldiers [were] slaughtered unnecessarily” (Turner

1994, 86).

These mistakes need not be repeated in disasters. For instance,

“The alternative to such disastrous rigidity is a strategy of responsive flexibility, in which the

routines, skills and procedures deployed to deal with a given emergency are used in ways which

are sensitive to its changing meaning and implications. Before any action can be taken in a

shifting, bewildering crisis, some kind of adjustment of understanding is necessary. And, since

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the essence of improvisation is the re-forming of meaning, organizations developing responsive

flexibility need to learn how they can start to deal with wholly novel or unique situations by

making adjustments to their understanding.” (Turner 1994, 86).

“Under some circumstances . . . in dealing with less routine kinds of primary tasks, emergency

organizations need to preserve an ability to respond flexibly, and, where necessary, an ability to

improvise appropriate counter-measures for the special needs of an unanticipated situation which

threatens to become a crisis” (Turner 1994, 87).

Indeed, “there has been a constant theme of disaster situations characterized by unexpected

adaptations, improvisations, and the emergence of new forms of social organization, usually

designated as emergence” (Dynes 2003, 17).

The response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York clearly illustrates the importance of

flexibility. This occurred in several ways.

Shutting down of airspace. Once it was learned that terrorists had flown planes into high rise

buildings, President Bush ordered all planes to be grounded (so as to prevent recurrence). This

necessitated that aircraft land at the nearest airport (in contrast to their scheduled destination).

Passenger sheltering. As passengers disembarked planes, they suddenly found themselves in

unanticipated locations with no place to stay. In some locations, thousands of citizens opened up

their homes to complete strangers until they were able to get back in the air.

Evacuation of Manhattan. When the World Trade Center towers collapsed and dangerous fumes

billowed over the Southern tip of New York City, officials and citizens desired an evacuation of

the island. Because roads, bridges and tunnels were locked down, an emergent group of ferries,

tug boats, cruise lines and Coast Guard ships were used to move people to New Jersey and other

areas.

Emergency response. Surviving fire fighters and police officers felt an urgent need to search and

rescue those trapped under the collapsed rubble. Unfortunately, they lacked the proper

equipment to do so in a safe manner (because their engines had been destroyed in the collapse).

Fire fighters and police went to a nearby sporting goods store and were given gloves, socks,

masks and other equipment that would protect them while searching for their fallen peers.

Logistical support. Urban Search and Rescue Teams arrived from around the nation to

participate in emergency response activities after the terrorist attacks. Because there was no

place large enough to house them, the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center was opened for them.

The American Red Cross, Salvation Army and restaurants provided food for the teams.

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Medical care. Because thousands of people were in the buildings at the time of the collapse, it

was feared that hospitals would be inundated with patients. A military ship, the U.S.S. Comfort,

was brought in as a backup facility. Although the services were not needed to any large degree

(because most of the victims had died), the exercise illustrated a great deal of ingenuity.

Security. Because it was feared that additional attacks would occur in or around ground zero, a

security check point was established at ground zero. Only authorized persons were allowed into

this area. National Guard members and National Rent a Fence helped to secure the perimeter.

The security corridor was impressive due to the size of the restricted area.

Reconstitution of the EOC. New York City’s emergency operations center was evacuated and

gutted by fire due to the collapse of the World Trade Center towers (it was located in building 7).

A peer on the Hudson River was scheduled to be used for a disasters exercise the day after 9/11.

This was quickly converted to a makeshift EOC, and it included tables, chairs, computers,

phones, and other equipment donated by the private sector.

Resource management. New York City was scheduled to have E-Team software installed on

their computers a few weeks after 9/11 occurred. In light of this major disaster, E-Team

personnel worked with emergency management officials to install the software and train staff on

its use immediately after 9/11. This helped the city manage donations coming in from around

the world.

Communications and infrastructure repair. The loss of phone and power services created big

problems for emergency workers at ground zero. Telephone companies brought in cell towers to

help police and fire personnel communicate. 20 miles of electric shunting was also laid down on

the roads temporarily by ConEd to meet the power needs of emergency response personnel.

Recovery of lost office space. Millions of square feet of office space were lost when the World

Trade Center towers collapsed. Some competitors which lost space opened up their offices to

allow their peers to work until their own buildings could be acquired.

Ask the students if they are aware of any other activities after 9/11 that illustrate flexibility in

response. Allow them time to respond and thank them for their examples.

When the discussion wanes, restate the benefit of flexibility in 9/11.

Kendra and Wachtendorf have defined this flexible response in terms of resilience. Resilience is

“an overall label to describe the ideas since it conveys sustaining a shock without breaking and

also suggests some notion of bouncing back from a disruption. Resilience does convey that

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something new has emerged which is improvised and adaptive in rapidly changing and usually

ambiguous conditions” (Dynes 2003, 17).

Kathleen Tierney, a respected research at the University of Colorado, also states “The lesson

here is that the response to the September 11th tragedy was so effective because it was not

centrally directed and controlled. Indeed, it was flexible, adaptive and focused on handling

problems as they emerged” (in Dynes 2003, 20).

At this point in the lecture, the professor may wish to give students an assignment since it is

related to the benefit of flexibility (see Attachment A). Alternatively, the professor may

distribute this assignment and/or the assignment in Attachment B at the end of class.

How flexibility is related to each phase of emergency management.

Although we have discussed flexibility in terms of response operations, it is not limited to this

phase of disaster. Flexibility is related to all activities in emergency management.

Jim Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf relay the fact that “Innovation, too, is a recurring theme of

disaster studies, though often more implicitly understood than explicitly mentioned. If people

are under threat from a known hazardous condition, what do they do to change that condition?

And if people do, indeed, experience a disaster, what do they do to manage its effects? Hence

the study of innovation in communities is central to the study of disaster, and innovation in

communities is itself central to mitigating hazard, responding to emergencies and disasters, and

recovering afterward” (2006, 316).

They state “We are looking principally at innovation as a capacity or a process, rather than at the

product . . . . The emphasis is on a departure from an established way of conceiving danger. This

departure could include new ways of thinking about potential perils, developing strategies for

mitigating them in advance, becoming better prepared for threats that eventually result in

disaster, and responding to disastrous events when they occur” (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2006,

318).

They note further that “We find it useful in discussing innovation to divide the disaster time

frame into three phases: pre-impact, trans-impact and post-impact. The time that is available for

innovating is perhaps the single greatest difference in the nature of innovation across disaster

phases. In the pre-impact phase, there is time for weighing options, considering different

strategies for reducing disaster, and evaluating and adjusting new methods or techniques as their

effects are observed. . . . Innovations in the trans-impact phase (immediately before, during and

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after impact) include not just those that are policy oriented but also those that are operationally

oriented, made under great time pressure and sometimes more appropriately referred to as certain

forms of improvisations . . . . The post-impact phase, early and long-term recovery, also includes

operationally oriented innovations but may in addition include innovative approaches for

handling some of the difficult decisions to be made during this phase, such as whether or how to

rebuild damaged areas” (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2006, 320-321).

Innovation may occur in mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery phases.

Mitigation. “Project Impact stressed education, outreach, partnership building, and a sustained

emphasis on measures that individuals as well as government could take to reduce their risk. . . .

After the hazard was identified it was publicized through brochures, public service

announcements and advertisements, educational programs in the schools, and even through

direct communication, such as door-to-door public awareness campaigns by local scout troops or

other organizations, inserts in pay stubs and electric bills, sporting events through partnership

with NASCAR, and disaster expos. . . . Although implemented to varying degrees of success

across the country, effective communities attempted to transcend conflict between their

constituents by emphasizing shared risk . . . . The programs there were initiated under Project

Impact were not necessarily, in themselves, new ideas. They were often the kinds of ground-

level efforts that most disaster researchers have come to believe are important in community-

level mitigation, and they often did not differ from other kinds of community development

initiatives . . . . But all these aforementioned initiatives were deployed in new ways, and for new

purposes, and their ambition was to foster new thinking within the community . . . . The various

initiatives marked real departures from customary ways of regarding and using the natural

environment” (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2006, 322-323).

Preparedness. After the 1976 Tangshan earthquake in China, the city “implemented a number of

mitigation and preparedness initiatives – a seismic monitoring system; projects considering the

significance of water level and animal behavior; trained civilian observers; and anti-seismic

construction techniques (Mitchell 2004, 4-6). Innovation is important in communities’ efforts to

be less vulnerable or more resilient” (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2006, 325-326).

Response. “In the trans-impact phase, minutes, hours, or a few days is the more likely span for

innovating, as emergency managers assess the situation and adapt plans for the general disaster

envisioned in advance to the specific disaster unfolding before them. Or, as might also happen,

they must develop plans for contingencies not imagined at all. Responding to disaster is likely to

yield innovative techniques or procedures that are new to those people, but given the urgency of

time they are likely to also be, more accurately, improvisations, or combinations of new and

existing knowledge made in real time (Weick, 1998). One may be tempted to say that large

complex disasters generate more improvisations than smaller events, but lesser events require

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improvisation, too. In fact, Tierney (2002a) argues that if an event does not require

improvisation, it is not a disaster, so that improvisation is actually a distinguishing feature of

disaster. . . . One such creative improvisation strategy was the emergent waterborne evacuation

of several hundred thousand commuters and others from Lower Manhattan using a wide range of

vessels not previously involved in any evacuation planning efforts or schema. . . . In fact,

significant dimensions of the operation were developed in the earliest stages of the response, as

when the USCG and local harbor pilots developed a traffic management plan for vessels around

the tip of Manhattan” (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2006, 324).

Recovery. “There are examples, however, of successful recovery innovations. One such short-

term recovery approach was undertaken by the City of Santa Cruz, California after the 1989

Loma Prieta earthquake. The city suffered widespread damage to both structures and

infrastructure, but also damage to its downtown business district. Faced with the need to

reestablish commerce for local businesses in the short term, at first in response to business

closures and later in reaction to customer leakage, the city countered the leakage trend by

establishing pavilion tents to temporarily house dislocated businesses. Added support from labor

unions and Vision Santa Cruz – a downtown recovery group with representatives from the

private and public sector was well as the community at large – was instrumental in the pavilion’s

quick construction and overwhelming success. Indeed, the pavilions allowed businesses to take

advantage of important holiday season sales. Respondents reported a synergy and market-like or

‘festive’ atmosphere in tent pavilions. Santa Cruz engaged in numerous promotional activities to

attract customers to the city and to rebuild community spirit, including a promotional Christmas

rally and a ‘shake, rattle and Roll’ celebration” (Kendra and Wachendorf 2006, 324-325).

As can be seen, flexibility is vitally important not only in response, but for all aspects of

emergency management. It is imperative if emergency managers are to be successful.

References

Dynes, Russel R. (2003). “Finding Order in Disorder: Continuities in the 9-11 Response.”

International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 21 (3): 9-23.

Kendra, James M. and Tricia Wachtendorf. (2006). “Community Innovation and Disasters.” Pp.

316-334 in Rodriguez, Havidan, Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes (eds.)

Handbook of Disaster Research. Springer, New York.

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Kendra, James M. and Tricia Wachtendorf. (2003). “Elements of Resilience After the World

Trade Center Disaster: Reconstituting New York City’s Emergency Operations Center.”

Disasters 27 (1): 37-53.

Lindell, Michael K., Carla Prater and Ronald W. Perry. (2007). Introduction to Emergency

Management. Wiley: Hoboken, N.J.

McEntire, David A. (2005). “Revolutionary and Evolutionary Change in Emergency

Management: Assessing the Need for a Paradigm Shift and the Possibility of Progress in

the Profession.” Paper presented at the FEMA Higher Education Conference, June 8th.

See http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/educonference05.asp.

Perry, Ronald W. and Michael K. Lindell. (2007). Emergency Planning. Wiley: Hoboken, N.J.

Turner, Barry A. (2004). “Flexibility and Improvisation in Emergency Response.” Disaster

Management. 6 (2): 84-89.

Waugh, William L. Jr. (2007). “Local Emergency Management in the post-9/11 World” Pp. 3-21

in Waugh, William L. Jr. and Kathleen Tierney, Emergency Management: Principles and

Practice for Local Government (2nd Edition), ICMA: Washington, D.C.