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The Nonproliferation Review

ISSN: 1073-6700 (Print) 1746-1766 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpr20

Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons: implications for addressing nuclear, biological, and chemical threats

Philipp C. Bleek & Nicholas J. Kramer

To cite this article: Philipp C. Bleek & Nicholas J. Kramer (2016) Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons: implications for addressing nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, The Nonproliferation Review, 23:1-2, 197-230, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2016.1196853

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1196853

Published online: 08 Sep 2016.

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Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons: implications for addressing nuclear, biological, and chemical threats Philipp C. Bleek and Nicholas J. Kramer

ABSTRACT The 2013–14 disarmament of Syria’s chemical-weapons capabilities was a rare bright spot in a brutal civil war with no end in sight. The remarkable US-led, international effort to bring Damascus into the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, inventory its capabilities, and then verifiably destroy them is a fascinating and, to date, largely untold story. A substantial US government interagency effort centered in the Defense Department laid the diplomatic, technical, and procedural foundations for Syria’s disarmament in the year prior to the August 2013 chemical-weapons attack in Ghouta that galvanized Syria’s subsequent disarmament. An intrinsically interesting case, Syria’s chemical-weapons disarmament has important implications for possible future WMD elimination operations elsewhere.

KEYWORDS Syria; chemical weapons; elimination; disarmament; Chemical Weapons Convention; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

On August 17, 2014, on a ship in international waters, US military and civilian govern- mental personnel, cooperating with a coalition of partner states and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), rendered unusable the final batch of Syrian-declared sulfur mustard agent. That day marked one of the final steps in a remarkable US-led, international effort to eliminate Syria’s chemical-weapons (CW) capa- bilities, a rare bright spot in a brutal civil war with no end currently in sight. Syria was one of the few remaining states with an offensive chemical-weapons program. Aspects of how it was brought into the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), had its capabilities inventoried, and then verifiably destroyed have been told elsewhere. But key elements remain largely untold, especially the internal US government effort that laid the ground- work for a successful international mission to destroy Syria’s declared CW program.

The interagency effort to prepare the diplomatic, technical, and procedural foundations for Syria’s disarmament began in the year prior to the August 2013 CW attacks against civilians in Ghouta that outraged the world. In addition to being intrinsically interesting, the case also has implications for how Washington and others plan and may carry out WMD elimination operations elsewhere, for example in the context of a North Korean contingency.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on Syria’s CW program. The subsequent section fleshes out the events that led to the decision to disman- tle it, followed by a robust discussion of how that dismantlement was carried out. Lessons

© 2016 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

CONTACT Philipp C. Bleek [email protected]

NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, 2016 VOL. 23, NOS. 1–2, 197–230 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1196853

learned are elaborated, and the article concludes by articulating broader policy implications.

Syria’s chemical (as well as nuclear and biological) weapons capabilities

Until mid-2012, Syria would not acknowledge that it possessed offensive CW capabilities. That changed briefly on July 23, 2012, when Jihad Makdissi, the Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman, provided the most direct confirmation to date of Syria’s CW program. Fearing a military intervention in support of the growing anti-regime opposition, Makdissi threa- tened to use the country’s chemical and biological weapons against any external aggres- sor.1 He asserted that Syria would never use CW against its citizens, as the regime reserved such weapons solely for foreign aggressors and the generals tightly controlled them.2 In a move befitting the Syrian regime’s characteristic secrecy surrounding its CW program, it attempted to mask Makdissi’s admission by insisting that it had been mis- interpreted.3 The “misunderstood” foreign ministry representative dutifully took to Twitter to walk back his statement.4 Just six months later, the first of a string of allegations surfaced that the Syrian regime had used chemical agents against fellow Syrians in the country’s bloody civil war.

At the time of Makdissi’s statement, Syria’s CW program was—and had been for some time—an open secret in the international community. Syria refused to admit the pro- gram’s existence, while simultaneously alluding to its CW capability in thinly veiled threats. Publicly available Western and Israeli declassified intelligence assessments alleged that Syria had large stockpiles of blister and nerve agent, primarily mustard, sarin, and VX. Annual unclassified “Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions” reports (commonly referred to as “721 reports” in reference to the requirement detailed in the Intelligence Authoriz- ation Act for Fiscal Year 1997) prepared by the US intelligence community for the US Congress have stated since 2006 that the Syrian military was capable of delivering some of these agents, including sarin, via ballistic missiles and aircraft.5 Western and Israeli intelligence agencies portrayed the program as large, sophisticated, and mostly indigenous, excepting certain key components which were procured through illicit networks. At the time of the program’s dismantlement, which began near the end of 2013, these earlier assessments proved quite accurate.6

Although it later grew into a largely autonomous program, Syria’s CW program received its initial components from others. Hafez al Assad, an Arab nationalist and Ba’athist, seized power in a military coup in Syria in 1970. Along with Egypt and Jordan, Syria was still reeling from its decisive loss against Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel seized Gaza, the West Bank, the Sinai, and Syria’s Golan Heights in a humiliating defeat for Arab states. Syria received a variety of decontamination equipment from the Soviet Union during the postwar period, as well as personal protective gear and vehicles equipped with protective capabilities, to protect from chemical-warfare reprisals.7

In preparation for the 1973 Arab campaign that attempted to regain the 1967 territorial losses—alternatively known as the October War, the Ramadan War, or the Yom Kippur War—Egypt reportedly provided Syria with chemical artillery munitions.8

Perhaps meant as a deterrent, the munitions were never used, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) may have even captured a portion of the arsenal in the conflict.9 Syria’s

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first CW capability resulted from the providence of aggrieved allies, not from indigenous political aspirations or technical proficiency.

The dramatic defeat in the 1973 October War did, however, energize Hafez al Assad to develop a domestically produced and controlled strategic deterrent.10 The Arab Alliance Pact of 1950 had now twice failed to deter or defeat Israel.11 The IDF not only repelled Syrian forces’ advance into the Golan but also threatened Damascus by advancing into Syria with two divisions. Furthermore, by this period, Syria and the rest of the Arab states had become aware of Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.12 It appears that the final impetus for Assad’s decisive new defense policy direction came with the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979.13 No longer content to rely on outside guaran- tors for Syria’s security, he concluded that it was time for Syria to achieve “strategic parity”—or some semblance of a counterbalance—vis-à-vis Israel’s conventional and nuclear superiority.14 Among the options by which Syria could potentially raise the cost of Israel’s employing its superior capabilities, a chemical program was judged to be the most expedient and least expensive.15

As it lacked the necessary domestic technological base and expertise, the Syrian regime both overtly and covertly sought external aid for its nascent CW program. Under the aus- pices of scientific research, Assad created in the early 1970s a chemical-warfare program concealed in the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS), a new Syrian gov- ernment agency.16 According to an Israeli analyst, the Syrian president issued a directive in 1973 officially authorizing relations between CERS and the Syrian Army.17 Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, CERS received dual-use technology, know-how, and precur- sors for Syria’s CW program. Egypt, Iran, Russia, and Western companies each provided some level of support for the program, either wittingly or unwittingly.18 The German magazine Stern alleged in May 1996 that US intelligence officials had informed their German counterparts of German firms’ involvement in constructing a poison-gas factory near Aleppo.19 In another case, the British government revealed in 2014 that by 1986, Syria had obtained from the United Kingdom the requisite technology and hundreds of tons of precursors—specifically trimethyl phosphite, dimethyl phosphite, and hydrogen fluoride—to produce sarin.20 Syria’s domestic capability was progressing considerably through its combination of overt and covert methods.

In the 1980s and 1990s, external events forced Syria toward a more fully independent program and deeper reliance on illicit networks. First, Syria’s patron, the Soviet Union, moved away from Syria politically when the USSR backed Iraq—and not Syria’s ally, Iran —in the Iran-Iraq War.21 Then in 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed a law preventing the export of precursors to Syria.22 At the end of that decade, Syria’s diminished relationship with the USSR was dealt a further blow by the complete collapse of the Soviet Union.23

Finally, in 1997, the CWC went into effect with near universality, making Syria’s ability to acquire the necessary precursors and technology more difficult and the need for secrecy all the more essential. Syria’s dependence on illicit networks grew, as did its relationship with governments on the margins of the international system.

While Syria was secretly building a domestic CW capability, it also was developing an indigenous missile program capable of delivering CW. The 1982 Israeli-Lebanese War played a significant role in motivating the desire for a missile capability.24 During the con- flict, Syria—Lebanon’s patron—found its air force easily overwhelmed by Israel.25 A major Syrian weakness had been exposed: Syrian pilots and planes could not be relied upon to

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deliver an equivalent reprisal for an Israeli attack. In light of this, Syria decided to bypass the vulnerabilities of its air force and acquire a missile arsenal. Just as it had begun its CW program, Syria started by acquiring missile technology from foreign sources; Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea were the chief suppliers of Syria’s missile technology.26 By 2011, Syria had an array of ballistic missiles that could be launched from both fixed and mobile platforms. Although not its sole means of CW delivery, Syria’s most important platform was its array of Scud missiles. Syria initially received the Scud-B from North Korea and subsequently the Scud-C from Iran.27 With Iran’s and North Korea’s help, Syria eventually developed a domestic production capability for both of these missiles.28 In 2000, Syria was reported to have acquired from North Korea a variant of the Scud-D missile with modern guidance technology, which allowed it to more precisely target Israeli cities.29 For its line of Scuds, Syria is thought to have had hundreds of chemical warheads.30

It is difficult to discern from public records when, if ever, Syria’s leaders believed their CW provided them with some measure of “strategic parity” vis-à-vis Israel. An Israeli analyst observed that Syrian officials’ statements by the late 1980s reveal a marked differ- ence from those of the 1970s.31 In 1989, while speaking to Le Monde during the CWC negotiations, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al Sharaa argued that chemical weapons could only be relinquished within a broader regional context of all WMD elimination, an allusion to Israel’s nuclear weapons.32 Furthermore, in 1990, Hafez al Assad said that “Israel is still superior technologically; and it is capable of inflicting on the Arabs human disasters in case of war. But the Arabs can, with what they have, inflict the same disasters on it.”33 During this period, the Syrian regime continued to make similar statements, calculatedly vague in order to keep their program’s strengths and weaknesses a mystery to their enemies. But Syrian thinking appears to have subsequently shifted; in October 2013, shortly after the country acceded to the CWC, Bashar al Assad— Hafez’s son and successor—admitted Syria’s chemical weapons had lost their deterrent effect, largely due to Israel’s protective measures against a CW attack, and that his coun- try’s conventional missile arsenal had assumed the deterrent role.34

Despite steady progress, Syria’s CW program had experienced setbacks that cast doubt over just how sophisticated it had become. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported one such setback on September 17, 2007. According to unnamed Syrian defense officials, an explosion occurred in a laboratory adjacent to a chemical-agent storage facility, located in a Syrian military camp in Aleppo, possibly al Safir, during a test to weaponize a Scud-C missile with a mustard-gas warhead on July 26, 2007.35 Another account of the incident claimed that an explosion took place on the production line for agent com- ponents, and indicated that sabotage was a possible culprit for the accident.36 Yet another account was more suggestive of sabotage, implying a senior Israeli cabinet official tipped his hand by lauding the accident as “a marvelous mishap.”37 In this version of the story, the accident purportedly took place on the production line of VX warhead com- ponents.38 Despite the disparities, all these accounts tend to agree that the explosion led to a fatal catastrophe with hundreds injured, and which required a major clean-up oper- ation.39 Al Safir is a significant production, storage, and missile base; accordingly, such a mishap, even among uncertain claims of sabotage, could suggest that Syria’s CW program faced challenges weaponizing its stockpile for missiles, despite the intelligence assessments at that time.

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In the late 1990s and 2000s, Syria undertook amodernization and survivability effort for its program. The Syrian regime hardened its various production and storage facilities and launch sites around the country.40 An Israeli analyst reported that, as of 2002, Syria had mobile missile units and hardened silos to protect its means of delivery, and that additional missile silos were being constructed with Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian assistance.41

Furthermore, production facilities were hardened andmoved underground to protect them from aerial bombardment.42 The Israeli bombing and destruction of a camouflaged Syrian nuclear facility at al Kibar in September of 2007 dramatically highlighted the importance of continuing to reinforce the program’s survivability. Jane’s DefenceWeekly published claims from an unnamed diplomatic source in 2005 that Syria, assisted by Iran, was expanding its production facilities for precursors of VX, sarin, and mustard agent in the hopes of achiev- ing independent production. In 2009, Jane’s reported that Syria was upgrading and expand- ing its al Safir facility, based on the analysis of seven satellite images.43

While Syria’s CW program appears to have been developed as the regime’s primary deterrent, the country also engaged in some covert biological and nuclear weapons- related activity. Since 2001, 721 reports to Congress assessed Syria as pursuing a biological-warfare capability.44 These judgments appear to be based in part on the size and sophistication of Syria’s pharmaceutical industry, the largest in the Arab world.45 A 2006 intelligence report assessed that Syria had been unable to weaponize biological agents.46 However, Makdissi’s July 2012 press conference appeared to also confirm the existence of Syrian biological weapons.47 Notwithstanding the technical underpinnings for a program, Syria appears to date incapable of adapting its industrial capability to weap- onize pathogens, but the same is not true of biological toxins. According to a revision of Syria’s initial declaration to the CWC, the regime acknowledged the existence of ricin facilities—at least one at al Maliha—and stockpiles of purified toxin, which implies Syria’s ambitions were not exclusive to a CW program and raises suspicions about the scope of its biological-weapon program.48

Syria also apparently attempted for more than a decade to acquire a covert nuclear program. As with its early CW program, it pursued the construction of a secret nuclear program with the help of an external actor: in this case, North Korea. A major obstacle to a Syrian nuclear weapon was and remains the lack of a uranium enrichment or pluto- nium production and separation capability.49 Syria does have a Chinese-built miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR), a low-power (∼30 kilowatt) research reactor used pri- marily for neutron activation analysis, education, and training. The reactor has a core con- sisting of about one kilogram of highly enriched uranium (enriched to 90 percent or greater), far less material than would be required for a single nuclear weapon.50 The reactor is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, but it is unclear if it has been visited by the IAEA since the civil war started. In 2009, the IAEA found undeclared, chemically processed uranium in the MNSR. Syria subsequently pro- vided information on previously unreported small-scale uranium conversion and irradiation activities at the MNSR.51 A conversion plan for the MNSR to operate on 12 percent low-enriched uranium was launched in 2005 as a cooperative project between the IAEA, China, and the United States. Conversion of the reactor has been delayed, however, by the civil war.52 More relevant to its apparent weapons ambitions, Syria attempted—with North Korean assistance—to build a secret nuclear reactor, capable of producing plutonium of a quantity and character appropriate for weapons, outside

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IAEA safeguards at al Kibar; in 2007, Israel bombed and destroyed the reactor, prompting a cover-up effort by the Syrian regime to hide evidence of its existence.53 Despite its appar- ent efforts, Syria appears to have made only limited progress toward a nuclear-weapon capability.

Taken together, on the eve of the Arab Spring, this history finds Syria in varying stages of WMD development. Its nascent nuclear-weapon capability was mostly destroyed while its bio-warfare program appears to have been limited. However, according to Western and Israeli analysts, Syria had constructed the most sophisticated CW program in the Middle East. From OPCW reports to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the progress of the dismantlement, Syria provided information on forty-one facilities at twenty-three sites: eighteen CW production facilities (including filling facilities), twelve CW storage facilities, eight mobile filling units, and three generically termed “chemical weapons-related facili- ties.”54 Syria also declared approximately 1,040 metric tons (MT) of Category 1 chemicals (7 different chemicals; largely binary CW precursors), approximately 260 MT of Category 2 chemicals (13 different chemicals), and approximately 1,260 unfilled chemical munitions.55

In early 2011, as protests spread and turned violent in other Arab countries, Syria sat on a large and sophisticated stockpile of chemical weapons. And although the program was conceived and nurtured in opposition to an external rival, the temptation to repurpose it for domestic use as the regime felt increasingly threatened by opposition forces must have been too great. As Laura Holgate, the National Security Council (NSC) senior director under whose purview the preparations for and execution of the elimination took place, later noted, “The regime’s use of chemical weapons bears no resemblance to the CW concept that drove its development and acquisition. Assad’s chemical arsenal was designed to be used in strategic attacks against its neighbors, creating truly massive casualties. But his CW experts took the components of that arsenal and improvised small-scale devices for use against insurgents.”56

Syria’s decision to dismantle its chemical weapons capabilities

Syria’s chemical disarmament was a secondary effect of events caused by the Syrian civil war and broader regional turmoil. The protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, which came to be known collectively as the Arab Spring, inspired the protests in Syria. Yet events unique to the Syrian context ultimately turned Syria’s domestic political pro- tests into outright civil war. Despite years of investment in its CW program—including considerable financial expenditure and a delicate deception strategy—as well as whatever deterrent value Syrian leaders believed it provided, events apparently raised the cost of retaining the program far too high. Under pressure from allies and under threat from foes, the Syrian regime acquiesced and announced, on September 10, 2013, that it would join the CWC and declare the full scope of its CW stockpile and facilities.

The sweeping series of domestic protests against longtime Middle Eastern regimes began on December 17, 2010, when a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire in front of a municipal building in Tunis.57 Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation sparked wide- spread anti-regime protests in Tunisia that led to the ouster of dictator Zine al Abidine Ben Ali. In the following months, protests spread to Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Egypt.58 In January 2011, as protests were held in Cairo’s Tahrir Square against the Hosni

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Mubarak regime, Bashar al Assad—who had succeeded his father as Syrian ruler in 2000— conducted an interview with the Wall Street Journal.59 In the interview, he discussed the regional protests and suggested Syria remained immune to such internal dynamics: “Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be strongly linked to the beliefs of the people.… If you did not see the need for reform before what happened in Egypt and Tunisia, it is too late to do any reform.… [W]e are outside of this; at the end we are not Tunisians and we are not Egyptians.…We are not a copy of each other.”60

Syria was not immune. Three weeks later, peaceful protestors began demanding reforms. The younger Assad halfheartedly relented in the press; meanwhile, his security apparatus continued its repressive tactics. Violent protests eventually erupted in Syria after security forces detained fifteen school-age boys for writing the Arabic phrase “the people want the fall of the regime” on a wall in Deraa—the same slogan chanted by protestors in Cairo prior to Mubarak’s overthrow.61 The boys were returned to their families several days later, after having been interrogated and clearly tortured.62 From that March of 2011, the cycle of protests and regime retribution escalated quickly. Every major Syrian city, from coastal Latakia to northern Aleppo and the heart of regime rule in southeastern Damascus, witnessed anti-regime protests. On July 29, 2011, a group of defected Syrian military officers formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and by November, virtually no Syrian demonstration was peaceful.63 The Syrian civil war had begun, and by April of 2012, it had settled into a bloodletting between opposition forces and remaining regime loyalists.

On August 18, 2011, President Barack Obama and European leaders publicly called for Bashar al Assad to step down.64 What followed was a public discussion in the United States about the desirability and feasibility of more direct engagement, including identify- ing and arming moderate rebels or conducting airstrikes. Over the next year, a military intervention in Syria became a fixture in the foreign-policy portions of US presidential debates as the 2012 Republican and Democratic campaigns intensified. In the third pre- sidential debate on October 22, 2012, which was specifically dedicated to foreign policy, the candidates mentioned Syria twenty-nine times—more often than Russia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—and the candidates clarified their positions on intervention: President Obama took a cautious stance toward intervention, while candidate Mitt Romney appeared rela- tively more willing to commit US forces.65 In the meantime, hedging its bets on a more decisive strategy until after the election, the Obama administration imposed sanctions against the regime.

While the US debate on Syria continued, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Libya, justifying its air campaign on humanitarian grounds. Speak- ing at the National Defense University (NDU) on March 28, 2011, President Obama out- lined the military action in Libya, declaring its aim to “protect the Libyan people from immediate danger, and to establish a no-fly zone.”66 These airstrikes and the no-fly zone aided Libyan rebel forces in overthrowing the Muammar Qaddafi regime, culminat- ing in the dictator’s death on October 20, 2011.67 Both the speech and the military action that followed were interpreted by some as messages to the Syrian regime about what might prompt a US response and what form that response could take.

Meanwhile, as NATO was bombing Libyan targets, the Syrian opposition was picking up steam and, in July of 2012, initiated Operation Damascus Volcano.68 The opposition had achieved widespread success in occupying northern portions of Syria and capturing strategic parts of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Arab regimes were falling—some due

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primarily to internal forces (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen) and another with the aid of Western powers (Libya)—and the United States continued to seriously consider military interven- tion in Syria. It was then that Jihad Makdissi gave what was then the most explicit and public acknowledgement of the country’s WMD capabilities.

Roughly one month after Makdissi’s July 2012 statement, during unscripted remarks to theWhite House Press Corps, President Obama drew a “red line” against CW use or trans- fer. When journalist Chuck Todd of NBC News questioned the president about his latest thinking on military force and the safekeeping of Syria’s CW arsenal, President Obama stated:

We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of CW moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.69

In a follow-up question, Todd asked for confirmation that the president believed Syria’s CW arsenal to be safe.70 The president responded:

In a situation this volatile, I wouldn’t say that I am absolutely confident. What I’m saying is we’re monitoring that situation very carefully. We have put together a range of contingency plans. We have communicated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region that that’s a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculations significantly.71

The same red line had been mentioned earlier in the month by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but only regarding the use of CW, not in reference to their transfer or safeguard- ing.72 The president reaffirmed the red line on several additional occasions, including in a December 3, 2012, NDU address.73

Later that month, the first suspected CW attacks reportedly took place in Homs, alle- gations that were reported in the US press the following month.74 Precisely what occurred, including who carried it out, remained publicly contested.75 The White House responded by downplaying the incident, releasing a statement noting, “The reporting we have seen from media sources regarding alleged chemical weapons incidents in Syria has not been consistent with what we believe to be true about the Syrian chemical weapons program.”76

In the spring of 2013, the Syrian regime struck back against the opposition’s offensive, which had been making advances for almost a year across the north.77 The regime moved to seize and control strategic villages on opposition supply routes and to secure a route from Damascus to the regime’s coastal stronghold.78 The offensive focused on al Qusayr, a town situated across the border from Lebanon along the main road to Homs —a rebel stronghold—used for supplies.79 During the regime’s offensive in March and April, a number of additional allegations of CW use surfaced. One of the alleged attacks occurred on March 19 in Khan al Assal near Aleppo; the Syrian regime claimed, in a letter to the UN secretary-general, that it had been perpetrated by the opposition.80

In the same letter dated March 20, Syria’s deputy prime minister requested the sec- retary-general establish an impartial and independent investigation of the allegation.81

On March 21, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established a UN mission to investigate the allegations.82 Although Syria was not a party to the CWC, it was a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical (and, anachronistically, “bacterio- logical”) weapons, permitting an investigation of the incidents using the mechanism

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provided for in UN General Assembly resolution 42/37.83 That same day, Ban received a letter from France and the United Kingdom requesting a mission be established to inves- tigate incidents that occurred in Khan al Assal, Otaiba, and Homs.84 On March 26, Ban appointed Sweden’s Åke Sellström as head of the mission. Ban also requested the OPCW, the CWC’s implementing body, put its resources at his disposal for the purposes of the investigation.85 Consequently, the UN team, led by Sellström and consisting of fifteen OPCW experts and five World Health Organization experts, deployed to Cyprus in April to prepare for entrance into Syria.86

Meanwhile, the United States and European powers responded to the allegations of attacks by launching their own investigations designed to meet a high standard of evi- dence. Unlike the December 2012 Homs attack, the responsible party and type of agent involved in the March and April allegations were less ambiguous. In early June, the French and British both announced that samples taken from the sites of the March and April allegations contained sarin; France went further and assigned responsibility for one of the attacks to the Syrian regime.87 These announcements came shortly after the UN investigation team released a report saying it had “reasonable grounds” to suspect a chemical toxin was used in at least four occasions, based on fact-finding investigations it had conducted in Turkey.88 On June 13, theWhite House announced the US intelligence community had “high confidence” that the Syrian regime had used CW over the past year, basing its assessment on reports of Syrian officials planning and executing attacks, includ- ing information on the time, location, and means of attack, as well as samples from victims that tested positive for sarin.89 The US intelligence community estimated that 100–150 people died in the attacks.90 The United States followed this announcement with a letter to the UN secretary-general alleging that the Syrian regime had used CW in April and May.91 France also provided a letter alleging that another attack had occurred in April.92

After a long negotiation process over the scope of the investigation, the UN mission travelled to Damascus on August 18, 2013, to begin its fact-finding mission there.93 In the final agreement, the investigation team could only investigate three incidents: Khan al Assal, Saraqeb, and Sheikh Maqsoud.94 These areas were in contested territory, and the UN team was unable to conduct an on-site assessment.95 Strangely, though, with the UN investigation team now in Damascus, the unambiguous lethality of Syria’s CW arsenal was revealed. In the early morning hours of August 21, 2013, Syrian Army units launched 330 mm and M-140 rockets armed with sarin into Ghouta, a suburb northwest of Damascus.96 The attack left roughly 1,400 dead, predominantly civilians.97 The regime then conducted an artillery barrage on the area and set fires in an effort to cover up the attack.98 The scale and horrific results of the attack significantly increased pressure for a response by the international community.

Early UN efforts to assess culpability were hampered by the Assad regime’s unwilling- ness to allow missions such a broad mandate. Eventually, the United States released an intelligence assessment implicating the regime.99 The French released a more thorough accounting that also assigned clear responsibility to Assad.100 From the US adminis- tration’s handling of reporters’ questions about Assad’s direct involvement, it appears a Syrian military commander may have acted in contravention to or without explicit approval from political elites.101 Regardless, Western governments were determined to hold Assad, as the commander-in-chief of the Syrian armed forces, accountable.102 For

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their part, both the Assad regime and Russia claimed it was the opposition forces that had used CW in Ghouta.

The United Nations, Europe, and the United States wanted the joint UN team in Damascus to investigate the Ghouta attack. Meanwhile, the US administration was reportedly discussing possible responses, including military strikes, and engaging allies and regional states.103 On August 29, 2013, in a blow to Western unity, the British parliament voted against a UK military strike. The Obama administration was reportedly still mulling over its military options.104 In the meantime, US warships were moved into position in the Mediterranean.105 The British vote apparently gave the US administration pause. Following an August 31, 2013, meeting with key advisors, President Obama was widely expected to authorize military strikes, but instead appeared to punt, announcing that, although he had decided on a limited military strike to deter further CW use by the regime and to uphold international norms, he would first seek Congressional approval.106

In the interim, Secretary of State John Kerry was in London to garner support for mili- tary action. At a joint press conference on September 9 with British Foreign Minister William Hague, Secretary Kerry was asked “… is there anything at this point that [Assad’s] government could do or offer that would stop an attack?”107 Kerry’s response appeared off-the-cuff, though it was also consistent with a conversation President Obama had apparently had with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin just a few days earlier. “Sure. He could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the inter- national community in the next week. Turn it over, all of it, without delay, and allow a full and total accounting for that. But he isn’t about to do it, and it can’t be done, obviously.”108 Although based on earlier internal US government discussions, the evidence to date does not suggest that Kerry’s comments were planned.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov seized on the comment. That same day, Lavrov proposed an agreement between the United States, Russia, and Assad that did just what Kerry suggested, but in a lengthier timeframe.109 Acquiescing to significant behind-the- scenes pressure from its Russian patron, and also fearful of even limited US airstrikes and the possibility they might catalyze further outside engagement, the Assad regime agreed to give up its hard-won CW capability. It was a striking decision, since the regime presumably assessed the capability to have both tactical and strategic value. The regime’s precise decision calculus remains ambiguous.

The next day, September 12, 2013, Syria acceded to the CWC.110 In its accession letter, the government said it would observe its CWC obligations immediately, as opposed to thirty days from the date of accession, as stipulated in the treaty. On the same day, Lavrov and Kerry met to hammer out an agreement on how to destroy Syria’s CW arsenal and program.111 Two days later, the United States and Russia announced a Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons.112 Consequently, on September 20, Syria submitted its initial declaration to the OPCW as per the CWC, meeting its first obligation as the 190th state party.113 Less than twenty days later, the OPCW disarmament team arrived in Damascus to begin the process of dismantling Syria’s CW program.114

The rapid movement toward eliminating Syria’s CW capability was only possible because of extensive intra- and interagency efforts within the US government, especially in the year prior, as well as robust engagement with allies, partners, and international

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organizations. Those efforts are described in the section that follows, which delves into the run-up to and implementation of the effort.

How the CW elimination took place

Interest in and concern about Syria’s CW predated the civil war. The country’s CW program had in fact “been the subject of intense scrutiny from the US intelligence com- munity for many years” preceding—but certainly heightened by—the outbreak of the ongoing civil war.115 And as the war continued and intensified, so did the level of concern and efforts to monitor the program and to prepare for various contingencies.

Focal points of activity related to Syrian CW within the US government included the White House, Defense and State departments, and the intelligence community.116 The White House NSC exercised its statutory coordination function, but given the perceived importance and sensitivity of the issues, was also quite hands-on in managing the relevant day-to-day—or more accurately, given the tempo of NSCmeetings, week-to-week—activi- ties of the agencies.

Administration officials appear to have been most concerned about the regime’s losing control of CW, and their consequent internal or external use by non-regime actors.117 Sec- ondarily, there appears to have been concern that the regime would use its CW externally, such as in retaliation against regional states for their involvement in the conflict.118 This concernwas apparently secondary, not because an external attack would be inconsequential, but because the Syrian regime was assessed to be deterrable, with little to gain and much to lose by conducting such an external attack. Third, there appears to have been concern about the regime’s use of CW domestically in the context of the civil war.119 This seems to have been a lesser concern, at least until evidence started to emerge that it was in fact occurring, due to the perception that CW use provided only limited tactical or strategic advantages at most, with considerable risk of galvanizing engagement by outside actors.120

The intelligence community had long tracked Syrian CW capabilities, but as the civil war intensified in 2011, the intelligence community “launched a major effort to character- ize and counter the Syrian chemical weapons threat,” an effort that intensified as the con- flict worsened.121 Intelligence played what appears to have been a key role in the administration’s assessment that preparations for significant attacks were underway, enabling the United States and others in the international community to intervene to stop some attacks from occurring.122 Clearly these efforts were not always successful, as demonstrated by the large-scale attack in late August 2013.123

As one of the few states in the world that remained outside of the CWC—and was believed to possess robust CW stockpiles—Syria’s chemical weapons had long been a topic of diplomatic engagement. As the civil war intensified, so did the State Department’s engagement with states and international organizations. Although the White House played crucial leadership and coordination roles, and other agencies—including the State Department—had important responsibilities, the most substantial efforts took place within the Department of Defense (DOD), whose extensive military-to-military and military-to-civilian channels engaged on various aspects of the Syrian CW issue.124

This was due to the high likelihood that a Syrian CW contingency would occur in a mili- tary context, requiring DOD’s operational capabilities and resources as well as its diplo- matic relationships.

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Within the Pentagon, there were various focal points of activity, many precisely what one would expect based on organizational flowcharts. For example, the Office of the Sec- retary of Defense’s policy group grappled with the big picture, including how Syrian CW affected Syria’s relationships with various regional states. The uniformed military con- ducted planning against contingencies. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) served as a day-to-day focal point for tracking and preparing to respond to developments. NDU’s Center for the Study of WMD, a research entity, conducted classified conferences and tabletop exercises to help officials better understand the policy challenges they were facing and find potential solutions.

All these entities were also involved in an unusual Pentagon-based interagency task force whose activities were ultimately crucial to the elimination of Syria’s declared CW program. That group had its genesis in fall 2012, when then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter grew concerned that the department was unprepared to deal with a range of Syrian CW-related contingencies. Carter tasked Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall, who in turn tasked Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Andy Weber, to oversee the establishment and efforts of the then-classified Syria Chemi- cal Weapons Senior Integration Group (also known as the SIG).125 That group became a focal point for the development of technology that proved crucial to disarming Syrian CW, though it also served as a departmental and interagency hub for significant elements of the broader effort to manage Syrian CW-related risks.

An advisory body, DOD’s Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), had been another focal point in the US government on Syrian CW contingencies and how best to prepare for them. Beginning in the summer of 2012, the group had advised the department to take stronger preparatory action. After more extensive assessments in the fall of 2012, TRAC issued more urgent and concrete recommendations in the first weeks of 2013 on how DOD should prepare for Syrian contingencies.

In January 2013, the Pentagon-based SIG began convening senior leaders from across DOD, together with significant interagency participation, every two weeks—though the operational tempo fluctuated at times—to work through technical and policy options to respond to a range of contingencies, assess capabilities needed and available, to foresee and overcome bureaucratic obstacles—particularly related to resources and authorities —and to ensure that these efforts were informed by the broader policy and diplomatic context. Although some of the most intense efforts to grapple with Syrian CW contingen- cies occurred within the SIG, that work also occurred within intra- and interagency pro- cesses, which both informed and were informed by the SIG’s efforts.

Efforts in DOD and across the US government were informed by detailed, multisource intelligence-community assessments that appear to have been remarkably accurate.126 As Weber later noted, “We had done the math based on exquisite intelligence. The intelli- gence-community deserves tremendous credit for watching the Syrian CW program for decades. We actually, based on the intelligence, tailored the [CW destruction] capability to the Syrian stockpile because we knew it was in bulk liquid, primarily not stored in filled munitions, which would have required a different technology.”127 Intelligence assess- ments characterized the size and characteristics of Syria’s stockpile, facilities, and person- nel, and attempted to track the disposition of the stockpile in as timely a fashion as possible, a challenging task as Syria at times relocated portions of the stockpile in an

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apparent effort to keep it secure.128 Despite some apparent close calls, the worst fear of administration officials—that the regime would lose control of its CW—appears not to have materialized.129

The primary focus of the SIG was rapid development and acquisition of capabilities that gave DOD—and the US government more broadly—options to address a range of contin- gencies. That work took advantage of rapid acquisition processes developed previously to support the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Elements of these efforts remain classified, but US government officials have described the core work at length in public settings.130 One key gap in extant US and allied capabilities was the lack of a mobile bulk CW destruction capability. Early in its operation, and after exploring a range of extant and potential CW destruction technol- ogies, the SIG sought to address this gap by ordering the rapid development, within six months, of a bulk CW destruction capability that was as geographically and user-neutral as possible and compliant with all relevant international treaties and US safety and environmental standards.131

Within that remarkably short timeframe, the Army’s Edgewood Chemical and Biologi- cal Center (ECBC) developed a new system called the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System (FDHS) to destroy the bulk of Syria’s chemical agents and their binary components.132

The fast-track acquisition project was initiated in February 2013 and the first fully func- tional unit was demonstrated to working-level government officials on June 30, 2013, and a few days thereafter to senior officials.

Design, procurement, fabrication, testing, and training were carried out by a team from ECBC, the US Army Chemical Materials Activity, DTRA, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, and the US Army Contracting Command. Although the specific system was novel, the neutralization or hydrolysis approach it employed was relatively simple, well known, and widely utilized. The US government had employed hydrolysis on an industrial scale to destroy declared US CW stocks, in com- pliance with the CWC, at both Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland and Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana. Elsewhere, incineration also had been employed for chemi- cal-agent destruction.

To both support and complement internal US government efforts, Washington engaged allies, friends, and partners on the Syrian CW issue. Some close allies were directly engaged on CW-destruction capabilities they possessed, and at least one played a significant role in US development efforts.133 In a September 2014 public event intended to both celebrate and learn the lessons from the Syrian CW elimination, Laura Holgate nicely summed up important parts of this engagement as well as internal US government discussions:

In the year leading up to the [August 2013] Damascus attack, we were engaged in concentric circles of fretting. We were fretting at least weekly around my [office]… and more often than that in Deputies and Principals’ Committee meetings in the Situation Room. We were fret- ting with our P3 [US, UK, and France] partners, and eventually we added Canada and Germany to a slightly larger fretting circle. We fretted in separate conversations with Russia, with Israel, with Jordan, and with Turkey. Some people called this planning. And because we didn’t feel that our traditional partners—and potential victims—in Europe were adequately alive to the threat and the need for response, we created a series of meetings first held in Prague to fret with an even wider circle of partners. We were fretting then about intentional CW attacks on Turkey or Jordan or attacks on rebels near borders that

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accidentally spilled out of Syrian territory. We were fretting about how to get samples out of Syria and into the hands of credible testing labs so the US was not the only voice claiming instances of use. We were fretting about the theft of weapons or chemicals by rebels or acci- dental attacks by rebels on CW sites and whether it was more dangerous to reveal those sites to the rebels or to keep them hidden. We were fretting about terrorist access to weapons, materials, and experts, and clandestine removal across borders—and we still worry about that, but in a different way. We were fretting about how to secure the chemical stocks if Syria began to dissolve and how to destroy chemicals and precursors to keep them out of the hands of anyone who might use them in the chaos of a disintegrating state. There were not very many good answers to these kinds of questions.134

Quiet conversations occurred with various regional states about providing them with information, training, and equipment to bolster their capabilities and to reassure them. For example, the United States provided chemical- and biological-defense training and equipment, border-security assistance, and other relevant support to Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon through its Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and chemical and bio- logical defense and crisis response were part of the 2012 and 2013 iterations of the annual two-week Eager Lion military exercises in Jordan.135

Over the same period, the Department of State reached out to the Syrian opposition groups that had been the beneficiaries of US assistance to help them identify and protect any chemical facilities they overran.136 Also in that timeframe, DOD sent a team of experts to Jordan to develop a host of options to prevent Assad’s CW from falling into terrorists’ hands.137 Part of DOD’s effort involved a $70 million program to train Jordanian security forces to cope with a cross-border attack involving CW and to identify and interdict any weapons that might cross Jordan’s borders.138

In August 2012, Senator Richard Lugar, wrapping up an almost four-decades-long con- gressional career, had visited Russia in the context of Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts, and suggested that Washington and Moscow collaborate on the destruction of Syria’s CW program. Soon thereafter, the two governments initiated a regular dialogue to try to flesh out a shared vision of key tasks in a possible destruction effort “if asked” by the Syrian government. That dialogue was initiated by the US national security advisor in a meeting with her Russian counterpart, and then evolved into a series of what the United States characterized as “technical exchanges” to try to reduce political barriers to cooperation.139 The United States downgraded its representation to technical experts co-led by an NSC director and a deputy assistant secretary of defense, while Russia sent a deputy national security advisor to lead its technical team.

The US-Russian dialogues involved both sharing of specific information and discussion of generic tasks associated with the cooperative dismantlement of a CW program. For example, the United States shared with Russia a detailed assessment of Syria’s CW capabili- ties, which it assessed—correctly, it appears in retrospect—as being an order of magnitude larger than Russia’s assessment (whether the information Russia shared was disingenuous remains unclear).140 To cite another example, Russia shared assessments suggesting that specific CW attacks were the responsibility of rebels rather than the Syrian regime, as it later also claimed with regard to the far larger August 21, 2013 attacks.141

As for the discussion of generic tasks, a focal point for that conversation was a so-called “Universal Matrix,” a document intended to capture the various steps required to coopera- tively dismantle a CW program if asked, a caveat the Americans were careful to

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consistently insert, mindful of Russian sensitivities.142 Some reporting has mistakenly suggested this document was a roadmap for the subsequent elimination effort, but it was far too generic to serve that purpose.143

The primary benefit of the year of diplomatic engagement between the United States and Russia appears to have been to establish rapport and better understand sensitivities on both sides, rather than to plan in a way that was subsequently actionable.144 As Laura Holgate later put it: “The quiet consultations with Russia, led by the National Secur- ity Council and the Russian Security Council, proved invaluable in creating a common understanding, and a personal familiarity, that became the basis for the September 2013 elimination framework.”145 When Russian and US diplomats arrived in Geneva to nego- tiate an agreement, the two sides were still far apart on critical questions, including the size of Assad’s arsenal and the wording of a UN resolution to authorize its dismantlement.

On September 10, 2013, France began drafting a UNSC resolution building on Lavrov’s September 9 proposal that Syria would place its CW under international control and, in return, the United States would not attack Syria.146 The draft resolution supported the international community’s supervision of Syria’s CW dismantlement, but included defini- tive language requiring those responsible for the attack to stand trial in The Hague at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and for the resolution to be adopted under Chapter VII, which would provide the legal authority for punitive measures—economic and mili- tary—should Syria renege on the implementation.147 Meanwhile, Secretary Kerry, having been convinced of Russia’s sincerity as a result of nine calls from Lavrov about Russia’s proposal to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, flew to Geneva to begin earnest nego- tiations with Russia.148

In prepared remarks prior to the meeting, Kerry laid out the US position: “It has to be real. It has to be comprehensive. It has to be verifiable. It has to be credible. It has to be timely and implemented in a timely fashion. And finally, there ought to be consequences if it doesn’t take place.” Obama added, in his own press conference, that the agreement needed to be “verifiable and enforceable.”149 Lavrov had not prepared any remarks for the public prior to the meeting.

As negotiations kicked off on a Thursday, the biggest impediment to a final agreement was the continuing difference between the two sides’ assessment of the scale and scope of Syria’s CW capabilities.150 This assessment was to be the basis for the United States and Russia to determine the reliability of the Syrian regime’s declaration and the subsequent destruction strategy. The Russians believed the program was much smaller than the roughly 1,000 tons of chemicals and precursors estimated by the US delegation.151

Additionally, Russia was not willing to accept the strong wording in the French draft res- olution regarding trial at the ICC and punitive measures in the case that Syria became uncooperative.152

The two sides closed the gap rapidly over the course of two days.153 Russia decided to agree with the US assessment of the types and amounts of chemicals as well as the scale of the program.154 Differences remained, though, particularly over how to collect and dis- mantle the weapons, as well as the wording of the UN resolution. Lavrov, questioning whether a deal could be struck, began packing to leave Friday night, which would have effectively ended the negotiations.155 Kerry reportedly demonstrated his resolve to Lavrov at lunch by saying that he was prepared to work as many hours as necessary to achieve an agreement.156 Kerry also pressed Lavrov with word of a news story that the

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United Nations would release its findings from the Ghouta investigation on Monday, Sep- tember 16, declaring that a chemical attack had taken place and that it was massive.157

After Lavrov received more guidance from Moscow, the two sides were able to come to an agreement over the UN resolution, weakening the language regarding the ICC and punitive measures. The two sides reportedly came to agreement poolside with Kerry going back to his room and making changes on his iPad.158

On September 14, 2013, the two sides announced a general framework agreement on the elimination of Syria’s CW, with plenty of room tomaneuver in executing the dismantlement process.159 The agreement left the specifics of implementation to be decided later. Instead, the agreement focused on two aspects of the future dismantlement: the timeline and the super- vision of the process. On September 16, the UN investigation team released the report from its examination of the Ghouta attack with a note from the secretary-general condemning the attacks as a war crime and a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.160 UN Security Council Resolution 2118 was adopted eleven days later, on September 27, awarding the US-Russian agreement international legitimacy, and differing from the original resolution introduced by France in two significant ways.161 First, the resolution was not passed under Chapter VII authority, effectively delaying the authorization for punitive action for a time when Syria actually failed to cooperate as opposed to preauthorizing member states to take punitive steps for Syria’s use of CW. Second, the resolution dropped any mention of the ICC and only “[expressed] its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable.”162

In addition, the resolution included language that amounted to exceptions to normal CWC obligations for Syria and CWCmembers willing to participate in the dismantlement and destruction process. For example, Syria would not be obligated to finance the entire destruction of its CW; nor would the Syrian government be responsible for destroying its CW (with the exception of 133 tons of isopropanol), as is normally a state’s obligation upon acceding to the CWC.163 Instead, the resolution permitted the transfer of Syria’s CW to other CWC member states to complete the destruction.164

With the agreement finalized and the UNSC resolution passed, the practical question remained of how to carry out the unprecedented process of dismantling a CW program under wartime conditions. Questions such as who would physically render the chemicals neutral and the specifics of how were left for a later date. Just as vexing was answering how OPCW inspection teams would be protected while verifying Syria’s declaration amid a civil war. Furthermore, Syria had already declared to the OPCW that it could not afford to pay for the destruction of its program as required under the CWC; who would pay for the program to be destroyed?165 The agreement between the United States and Russia left these specifics to be decided later, but did call for an ambitious time- line, which was widely interpreted by experts as unachievable and impractical.166 The timeline required OPCW inspections and destruction of production and filling/mixing equipment by November 2013, while mid-2014 was established as the deadline for the complete elimination of all CW-related material and equipment.167

In the meantime, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü established the OPCW Trust Fund for Syria, which eventually would be converted into the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons, to help pay for Syria’s disarmament.168 Syria would pay for the destruction of facilities, transportation, and security, but would not pay for its CW to be destroyed outside of the country.169 Eventually, more than twenty-

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five states donated, and as of August 24, 2015, the fund totaled €50.3 million.170 Despite DOD’s being the lead agency, due to legislative restrictions on spending cooperative threat reduction funds, money from the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund was allocated to the OPCW to support its efforts. There was no shortage of donors or willingness to help with financing. However, as the international community made pro- gress in convincing Assad to relinquish his CW materials for destruction abroad, finding a country willing to accept Syria’s chemical agents and precursors for destruction proved more formidable.

Due to the tight timeline, finding a host for the neutralization of Syria’s most toxic chemicals became an immediate priority. The request went out to twelve states for help in destroying Syria’s toxic chemicals.171 The frontrunners—Italy, Jordan, France, Belgium, Norway, Russia, and Germany—all considered hosting the destruction of Syria’s CW, but ultimately decided not to do so.172 On October 25, 2013, Norway was the first to decline.173 Despite having technical expertise, Norway cited its lack of a hydrolysis capability, being at full capacity for burning organic waste, and lack of a suitable port as reasons why it could not meet the request.174 Additionally, Norway would have faced time constraints and legal challenges.175 France and Belgium were approached because of their expertise with mustard agent and ongoing efforts to destroy abandoned weapons fromWorld War I, but both declined.176 Russia said it was already overwhelmed with the destruction of its own CW.177 Finally, on November 25, Albania, the last country pursued as a possible candidate because of its recent experience destroying mustard agent, rejected the idea after facing public protests in Tirana opposing the initial agreement with the United States to destroy Assad’s CW on Albanian soil.178 Essentially, all efforts were stymied because of “not-in-my-backyard” politics. With all the possible candidates exhausted, on November 28, the United States announced it could neutralize the worst of Syria’s CW aboard the MV Cape Ray in international waters in the Mediterranean and then deliver the resulting waste to commercial incineration facilities. Syria’s chemical precursors that could be treated without an initial neutralization process would be trans- ported directly to incinerators in the United States and Europe.179

Over the next six weeks, the experts who designed and would operate two FDHS units and their support systems transformed the US Ready Reserve Force’s MV Cape Ray, a roll- on/roll-off freighter, into a self-contained, seaborne chemical-agent neutralization facility. On December 2, two operational FDHS units were taken from ECBC in Maryland to Portsmouth, Virginia, and fitted on the main deck of the Cape Ray.180 A third system was kept on the ship for parts.181 Two-hundred-and-sixty-nine International Standard Organization containers (isocontainers), approximately 200 of which were empty and would be filled with waste and the rest filled with reagent, were split between the five decks of the ship.182 The reagent was held in isocontainers on the main trailer deck and upper deck for the neutralization of bulk sarin precursors and mustard agent.183 When empty, the isocontainers could be repurposed to house effluent.184 The spar deck, upper deck, lower trailer deck, and the tank top held isocontainers for storage of effluent.185

The main trailer deck also accommodated a decontamination area. The FDHS units were held in pressurized tents to mitigate the operational risks of a leak.186 The ship also had a command-and-control center for operations and an onboard laboratory to test the effluent to ensure the chemicals were destroyed according to CWC standards and to facilitate their final processing in commercial facilities.187 OPCW inspectors

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were aboard for the duration to ensure treaty-compliant destruction. Crews rehearsed the operation of the system in and near Portsmouth, Virginia, and later in Rota, Spain, before commencing neutralization.188 On Monday, January 27, 2014, the MV Cape Ray set sail to Rota to await the removal of Syria’s chemical agents and precursors.189

While the Cape Ray was being configured and setting sail to Rota, the final plan to destroy Syria’s CW came together. The OPCWwould train and certify Syrian military per- sonnel in the proper handling and packaging of the chemicals at their current locations for transportation.190 The agents and precursors would then be trucked from twelve locations to the Syrian port of Latakia where they would be loaded on one of two ships, the Danish civilian cargo ship MV Ark Futura and the Norwegian MV Taiko.191 Both ships, for secur- ity reasons, would remain off the coast near Cyprus, and only transit in and out of the port of Latakia when shipments of CW materials were ready to be loaded. While in Syrian ter- ritorial waters, naval vessels from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China would provide security escorts.192 Additionally, warships from Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom would provide continuous security to the cargo ships until the chemicals were off-loaded at their respective ports.193

The Ark Futura would receive 581 tons of the sarin precursor known as DF and 19.8 tons of sulfur mustard for transfer to the Cape Ray.194 Additionally, it would receive approximately 150 tons of VX and VM precursors to be destroyed at a commercial incin- erator run by the environmental services company Veolia at Ellesmere Port in Cheshire, England.195 Concurrently, the Taiko would be loaded with 130 metric tons of precursor chemicals to be delivered to the port of HaminaKotka in Finland, to be incinerated by the company Ekokem in the town of Riihimäki, just north of Helsinki.196 Additionally, the Taiko would receive several hundred tons of precursor chemicals to be incinerated at a Veolia Environmental Services facility just outside of Houston, Texas.197 Meanwhile, the remainder of Syria’s CW, around 133 tons of isopropanol, a precursor to sarin, would be destroyed in Syria and verified by the OPCW.198

The Cape Ray would wait in port at Rota while the Ark Futura was being loaded. After the last of the chemicals were loaded on the Ark Futura at Latakia, the two ships would meet at the port of Gioia in Tauro, Italy, to transfer the DF and sulfur mustard to the Cape Ray.199 The Cape Ray would then sail from Italy into international waters in the Mediterranean to neutralize the toxic chemicals while the Ark Futura headed to March- wood Military Port near Southampton, England, to deliver approximately 150 tons of the VX and VM precursors to be destroyed at Ellesmere Port.200

The crew of the Cape Ray estimated the process would take sixty to ninety days to render the chemicals neutral.201 The two FDHS units would operate in parallel, twenty- four hours a day, with planned downtime to perform maintenance.202 The estimate fac- tored in inclement weather, which could slow operations.203 Once the chemicals were ren- dered neutral, the Cape Ray would then sail to Bremerhaven, Germany, to deliver the sulfur-mustard effluent for incineration at a German government-run incinerator near Münster.204 Then the Cape Ray would sail on to Finland to deliver the DF effluent to be burned at the Ekokem facility.205

Despite about five months of delays, which the Assad regime blamed on security con- cerns regarding the roads used to transport the chemicals to Latakia as well as a host of other reasons, the plan was largely completed according to design. However, each delay drew accusations by the international community that Assad was purposefully obstructing

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the process in order to remain an indispensable interlocutor. Logically, Assad might have been expected to do just that, being just cooperative enough to avoid more serious conse- quences and delay completion of the destruction process to preserve the need to deal with him. It is possible that, behind the scenes, various coercive international measures were employed, perhaps through the Russians, or by Washington through other channels, to convince Assad to deliver his CW.

The Syrian regime met one of its key responsibilities: destroying the 133 tons of isopro- panol byMay 22, 2014.206 The last of Syria’s declared CW left Latakia on theDanish ship on June 23, 2014, according to an OPCWpress release, putting the deadline established for the destruction of Syria’s CW in the first half of 2014 just out of reach.207 By July 3, the transfer of sulfur mustard and DF to the Cape Ray was complete.208 The Cape Ray began neutraliz- ing the chemicals four days later in international waters, starting with the DF.209 By July 18, the crew had neutralized 15 percent of the 600 tons of agent and precursor.210 Three weeks later, on August 11, 100 percent of the DF had been neutralized and the crew began neu- tralizing the sulfur mustard.211 On August 17, after forty-two days of operation, the Cape Ray completed neutralization of all chemicals with only minor issues: a small kitchen fire; a minor leak of reagent, which never escaped the protective enclosure of the FDHS on the main deck; and dehydration among the crew.212 The Cape Ray sailed to Germany and then to Finland, delivering the effluents for incineration.213

Destruction of the effluents from the Cape Ray was complete by June 17, 2015.214

Meanwhile, the precursors left on board the Ark Futura and the precursors loaded on the Taika were delivered to their respective incinerators. According to the April 22, 2016, progress report from the OPCW to the UNSC, all declared CW were destroyed and only three of the twenty-seven declared CW facilities remained to be verified and destroyed.215 As the latest update by the director-general of the OPCW to the UN Security Council suggested, Syria’s disarmament was largely successful, given the hostile conditions in Syria, tight timeline, and other constraints.

Lingering questions amid ongoing attacks

However, Western governments, the United Nations, and the OPCW were and remain concerned with the extent of the Assad regime’s truthfulness. Sigrid Kaag, the head of the OPCW-UN mission in Syria, highlighted discrepancies in the “realm of paperwork” and “discrepancies in volumes” at the September 2014 press conference concluding the Joint Mission.216 Discrepancies are not unusual during the course of verifying an initial declaration, and Syria’s declaration was no different, particularly because Syria’s was based on estimates instead of exact measured quantities. In April of 2014, Syria submitted a “more specific list” that disclosed an accounting difference between its original docu- ment and this new, more accurate record.217

While some omissions and discrepancies appeared to be benign, others seemed like willful attempts to mislead the inspectors and the international community, or delay the destruction of the program. As of the conclusion of the Joint Mission, Syria had yet to destroy seven hangars and five tunnels linked to its CW production, storage, and filling, missing a key deadline.218 Then in September of 2014, Syria revised its declaration yet again to include three previously undeclared facilities: a research and development facility for the toxin ricin, a plant to produce ricin that had been destroyed before Syria

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joined the CWC, and a laboratory where CW research had been conducted.219 This second revision came after statements were made in June by US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power, highlighting the need for continued attention to Syria’s CW program: “… the international community must give its urgent attention to serious out- standing issues related to the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program… . We must also resolve discrepancies and omissions related to the Syrian government’s declaration of its CW program, and we must ensure the destruction of all of Syria’s chemical weapons pro- duction facilities.”220

The most alarming and suspicious discovery of all was revealed on May 9, 2015, when the OPCW announced that its inspectors had found traces of chemicals used to produce sarin and VX at a military research site not previously declared.221 Experts from the OPCW found the traces in December and January, according to a European Union state- ment.222 These findings called into question whether Syria wholly disarmed and whether it intended to fully honor its CWC commitments.

At least as disconcertingly, during this period, the Assad regime also repeatedly used chlorine gas in attacks against opposition-controlled areas in blatant violation of its CWC commitment. Chlorine is so widely used for industrial purposes that it is not specifi- cally controlled under the CWC, but its use as a weapon contravenes the treaty just as much as the use of more stringently controlled agents would. The first allegations of a chlorine-gas attack by the regime surfaced in the spring of 2014, while the disarmament was still getting underway. Regime helicopters allegedly dropped barrel bombs filled with chlorine on a town north of Homs called Kafr Zeta on April 11, 2014.223 A video sur- faced the next month purporting to show chlorine gas floating in the streets of Kafr Zeta from additional attacks.224 The United Nations asked the OPCW to conduct a fact-finding mission to determine if chlorine had indeed been used.225 The mission attempted to visit Kafr Zeta in May 2014 to conduct the investigation, but was attacked and had to turn back. The investigation was instead completed through interviews conducted outside Syria, and in September of 2014, the investigators concluded with “compelling confirmation” that chlorine had been used “systematically and repeatedly” in the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta.226

The Assad regime continued to use chlorine barrel bombs throughout the rest of 2014, prompting a UN response in March of 2015. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2209 on March 6, 2015, condemning the Syrian regime’s use of chlorine gas and signaling its intent to use Chapter VII in the event of a reoccurrence.227 The Assad regime resumed its chlorine attacks shortly after the resolution was adopted by bombing Idlib in northern Syria with chlorine from March 16 to March 31.228 The United Nations promised strong action, but nothing came of the rhetoric.

Assad’s ongoing chlorine attacks prompted the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in the summer of 2015 to request testimony from the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), which had treated victims of the attacks. SAMS provided the committee with a dossier documenting thirty-one separate attacks from March 16 to June 9.229 Dr. Mohamed Tennari, the SAMS lead medical coordinator in Idlib province, testified to the committee on June 17.230 According to Tennari and the dossier, all the attacks had the same modus operandi: crude chlorine barrel bombs dropped from helicop- ters.231 The dossier estimated that, over the course of these three months, approximately 530 people sought medical treatment and ten others were killed in the attacks, though

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presumably many were killed by shrapnel rather than chlorine, which requires large doses to have severe effects, dissipates quickly, and is both visible and produces physical symptoms at lower doses, which signal the victim(s) to flee and thus avoid inhaling larger doses.

As of September 10, 2015, Syria remained persistent in its use of chlorine, particularly in the north around Aleppo, exceeding sixty such barrel bomb attacks.232 The OPCW has investigated numerous incidents and determined with “a high degree of confidence that chlorine has been used repeatedly and systematically as a weapon” in Syria.233 Meanwhile, a new development has caused heightened concern among the international community as the Islamic State (IS) organization attacked Kurds in Syria and Iraq with mustard agent.234

German intelligence and the US military have confirmed mustard use against Kurds, and, according to both states’ intelligence communities, it is possible that IS is making the agent itself in captured labs at the University of Mosul in Iraq, though others have suggested the agent could have been seized from either Syrian or Iraqi stocks.235 In response to the numerous chemical attacks taking place in Syria, the United Nations launched a special investigation on August 27, 2015, into CW use in Syria.236 The UN Fact-Finding Mission, in a report published in November 2015, confirmed mustard exposure in two victims in Marea in August 2015 and concluded that incidents in the Idlib province “likely involved the use of one or more toxic chemicals—probably containing the element chlorine—as a weapon.”237

Despite considerable caveats to the success of the disarmament effort, these develop- ments do not wholly undermine the remarkable achievement that much of the regime’s CW capabilities have been cooperatively destroyed. That the Syrian regime—and now IS—has been willing to repeatedly employ rudimentary CW, despite widespread con- demnation and threats of punitive action, only reinforces the importance of ridding the region of far more threatening weapons such as sarin and VX, as well as sophisticated delivery methods, and, additionally, the importance of reinforcing the non-use norm.

Lessons learned from the elimination of Syria’s declared chemical weapons

Several lessons can be gleaned from the effort to prepare for and eliminate Syria’s CW. The next section highlights three of these: the utility of anticipating needs and acting in a timely, proactive way; the importance of effective coordination within and between agencies and with other states and international organizations; and the need to recognize and respond appropriately to uncertainty.

Anticipating needs and acting in a timely, proactive way

The successful elimination of Syria’s declared CW capabilities hinged on the groundwork laid by US government officials, in collaboration with partners in other governments and international organizations, in the year prior to the August 2013 attacks that unexpectedly provided that elimination opportunity. The concrete preparatory actions taken—especially the rapid development and fielding of a new technology—proved to be crucial catalysts for overcoming intra- and interagency and international barriers to action.

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These preparatory efforts were undertaken because key officials assessed that it was plausible, perhaps even likely, that opportunities or imperatives to address various Syrian CW-related contingencies would arise. When they did, failing to capitalize on them could both represent missed opportunities as well as entail significant risks and costs. Being prepared to capitalize on such opportunities requires preparatory actions that are feasible politically, bureaucratically, technically, and financially.

In the case of Syria, this was a gamble, and it bears emphasizing that it might well have played out differently, with different post facto perceptions of the efforts undertaken. Given the relatively modest scope of those efforts, many might have viewed them as a prudent but unnecessary hedge. The financial resources expended were modest, and there- fore unlikely to attract serious criticism, especially in the context of far larger budgets for both WMD-related threats and defense more broadly. But leaders within the US govern- ment and in other states and international organizations expended considerable band- width. These very significant efforts had some positive externalities beyond Syria. US- Russian engagement had value in its own right within a difficult broader relationship. And within the US government as well as within other governments and international organizations, preparing for Syrian CW contingencies strengthened capabilities poten- tially applicable elsewhere.

The preparatory effort had to overcome significant resistance. Bureaucracies often have a status-quo bias, and deviating from the status quo is often perceived as risky. There were also lively disagreements about how best to prepare and, most importantly—unsurpris- ingly to anyone with government experience—who would or would not be doing the pre- paring. This was a particular challenge in the effort to lay the groundwork for Syrian CW contingencies: although the work had to be parceled out within and across departments, someone had to be assigned key efforts, and that necessarily raised hackles among those who viewed themselves as competitors for limited resources, especially bureaucratic “turf.”238 One tactic that helped overcome bureaucratic inertia in this case was the estab- lishment of a novel body outside the usual government structures, the SIG. But because bureaucracies can view such measures as disempowering, such a tactic is not appropriate in all situations, and hinges in particular on support from senior officials and a situation the warrants the effort such novel structures necessarily entail.

Recognizing and responding appropriately to uncertainty

Planning for Syrian CW contingencies necessarily took place under conditions of con- siderable uncertainty. Those uncertainties could be reduced to some extent; for example, the intelligence community was able to provide high-confidence assessments of the makeup of Syria’s CW stocks, which turned out to be quite accurate. But there were still huge uncertainties, including about the particular contingencies that might arise.

The preparatory effort sought to plan for a range of contingencies, rather than highly specific circumstances that might or might not have arisen.239 These contingencies ranged from small-scale scenarios, such as the possibility that a particular facility might need to be targeted or that a regional state might come into control of a facility, to the possi- bility that the Syrian regimemight cooperate to eliminate its entireCWcapability. Relatedly, an effortwasmade to plan anddevelop responses as generically as possible, along the lines of a strategy for planning and procurement articulated by former Secretary of the Navy

218 P.C. BLEEK AND N.J. KRAMER

Richard Danzig. Danzig has argued that, given inherent limitations in our ability to predict the future accurately, it is a mistake to develop highly specific, inflexible technologies designed in response to very particular predictions of future needs.240 Instead, Danzig argues for more generic, flexible, modular technologies and postponing decisions on specialization as long as possible. The FDHS was an example of just the sort of technology Danzig has advocated, since it was relatively simple, extremely flexible in where it could be deployed, and close to user-neutral, i.e., capable of being operated by various personnel, including those associated with foreign allies and partners. Stretching Danzig’s point a little, many of the diplomatic engagements also had a similarly generic character, in ways that ultimately appeared helpful. For example, the US-Russian technical dialogue also had a fairly generic character, in part because of the obvious political sensitivities associated with greater specifics. The so-called Universal Matrix, the document the United States shared with Russia as a catalyst to dialogue, was a generic set of steps associated with the elimination of a CW arsenal, with no specific association with Syria or the particular capa- bilities of the United States, Russia, or others. Such a generic approach sufficed, as opposed to tailoring a plan to fit a very particular contingency.

Relatedly, during a government briefing of the project that produced this special issue, a number of key participants cautioned against the impulse to create a specific playbook or plan for how future elimination efforts might be conducted. Instead, they urged lessons from Syria and other cases be integrated into frameworks or checklists that provide gui- dance on how to think about elimination contingencies.241

Effectively coordinating intra-agency, interagency, and international actors

SuccessfulWMDelimination hinges on high levels of functional coordination—as ultimately occurred in Syria, but as has also occurred, in different contexts and to varying degrees of success, in the former Soviet Union, Iraq, and Libya. Coordination is relevant to many facets of elimination efforts, including technical means, legal and regulatory compliance, logistical support, and the identification of resources. This coordination must occur within the political and diplomatic constraints of involved states and international organizations. Understanding and planning for these complexities and sensitivities is crucial to effective WMD elimination preparation and implementation.

Some of the most crucial coordination occurred within and between agencies, especially within DOD, where key focal points of activity spanned offices and the civil-military divide. Interagency coordination was also crucial, and much of it occurred directly between offices in key agencies—especially in the Defense and State Departments— rather than being mediated by the White House NSC staff. There was also a strong NSC process, both to coordinate but also to manage much of the process, given the per- ceived importance and political sensitivity of the issues. (Whether that merits the wide- spread criticism of an increasingly “operational NSC” staff allegedly micromanaging US foreign-policy making is a separate topic, but even if it raises other issues, NSC staff efforts in this case appear to have been effective.) Both intra-agency coordination within the Pentagon and interagency coordination between various agencies took place within the unusual structure of the SIG, which in some respects had the character of a par- allel NSC process, albeit a bounded one.

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Coordination occurred with various states, including allies and partners, and with international organizations. The United States and United Kingdom have an unusually close relationship, and they engaged to explore potential technical solutions to the CW- elimination challenge. US-Russian engagement was crucial, as discussed at length above. Various regional countries were also engaged, even if how the elimination ulti- mately played out depended less on their cooperation. Not surprisingly, some of these engagements were easier than others.

Finally, coordination with international organizations—and their state constituents— was crucial. The OPCW played a crucial role, including some involvement prior to the elimination effort and a key role in supporting and verifying that effort once it com- menced. Diplomacy at the UN Security Council was also important, and Russia’s willing- ness to engage there was essential.

This painstaking coordination took time and effort and was often frustrating for the participants. But as one key participant later noted, protecting spaces for disagreement —for airing disagreements and for working through them—was crucial to the success of the effort.242 One of the authors, who helped staff the SIG while serving in the Pentagon, was struck by the degree to which both success and failure in intra-agency, interagency, and international cooperation hinged on personalities and personal relationships, rather than formal bureaucratic structures. Of course, these observations are hardly unique to the Syrian case, and will be familiar to anyone who has spent time serving in government or other large organizations.

Conclusions

The elimination of Syria’s declared CW capabilities is an achievement worth celebrating, a small bright spot in a horrific conflict that otherwise offers little grounds for optimism. As LauraHolgate later put it, “These accomplishments representmajor victories for the people of Syria, for Syria’s neighbors, and for the international normative and legal regime against chemical weapons and their use.” But she also noted that “CW use does not occur in a vacuum. We can’t lose sight of the ongoing struggles and devastation of the Syrian people and the burdens on the neighbors who are absorbing the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. Chemical weapons are only one of the insults perpetrated on the Syrian people by the Assad regime. The regime’s use of these awful weapons needs to be understood in the broader context of indiscriminate killing, denial of humanitarian assist- ance, and flouting of the will of the United Nations and the international community.”243

For a host of reasons, the Syrian CW elimination described above was unique. But not- withstanding that uniqueness, the experience also holds lessons for preparing for and effec- tively addressing WMD-elimination contingencies, lessons which are elaborated above.

For example, North Korea is thought to possess robust nuclear-, biological-, and chemical-weapons capabilities, and has an extremely antagonistic relationship with much of the outside world. It might stumble into or intentionally provoke a large-scale conflict that would lead to the demise of its current regime, or it might be internally desta- bilized, or it might decide to give up its nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities in some dramatically changed future context. Should any of those developments come to pass, the United States and others may one day be pulled into another WMD-elimination contingency. One can imagine various scenarios where North Korean disarmament was

220 P.C. BLEEK AND N.J. KRAMER

more coerced or cooperative, where the country was more or less cooperative, and where third parties, including China, were more or less involved.

Alternately, IS has apparently developed at least a crude CW production capability, in addition to perhaps coming into possession of stocks from the former Syrian, Iraqi, or Libyan arsenals, as well as having access to toxic industrial chemicals like chlorine. The group has been employing these capabilities in conflict, albeit so far with only modest success. Its ambition appears to be to expand these capabilities, raising fears that it may employ them not only locally but also externally. At some point, these and other actions may trigger a backlash by regional or external actors, and various elimination con- tingencies are plausible.

The Syrian experience, in all its technical, diplomatic, and bureaucratic nuance, can shed important light on how the United States and others should prepare now to confront such contingencies, which are arguably a matter not of if, but of when.

Acknowledgements

The authors are deeply grateful to colleagues who supported their efforts to recount and learn the lessons of the remarkable Syrian CW-elimination effort. More broadly, they are grateful to all those, in the US and other governments and international organizations, whose hard work to prepare for Syrian CW contingencies paid off so robustly. Philipp Bleek also thanks the Council on Foreign Relations and the Stanton Foundation for the Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship in Nuclear Security that enabled the government service on which this article draws.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policies or positions of any of their current or past employers or funders, including the US Government, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, or Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Notes

1. Neil MacFarquhar and Eric Schmitt, “Syria Threatens Chemical Attack on Foreign Force,” New York Times, July 23, 2012, <www.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/world/middleeast/ chemical-weapons-wont-be-used-in-rebellion-syria-says.html>.

2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Jihad Makdissi, Twitter post, July 23, 2012, 7:08 AM, <https://twitter.com/Makdissi>. 5. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the

Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2006,”Central Intelligence Agency, 2006.

6. Brian Lessenberry, “Intelligence Integration and the Syrian CW Threat,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 18, 2015, <http://csis.org/publication/intelligence- integration-and-syrian-cw-threat>; “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons: One Year Later,” Panel hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 10, 2014, <www.csis.org/events/destroying-syria%E2%80%99s-chemical-weapons-one-year-later>.

7. W. Seth Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East,” Policy Focus No. 9, December 1988, p. 4, <www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus9.pdf>.

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8. Ibid. 9. M. Zuhair Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and

Motivations,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1997), p. 104, <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/ diab51.pdf>; Statement in US House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, May 17, 1984, p. H4088.

10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., p. 107. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., p. 108. 15. Dany Shoham, “Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria’s Ultimate Weapons,” Middle East Quarterly 9

(Summer 2002), <www.meforum.org/493/guile-gas-and-germs-syrias-ultimate-weapons>. 16. Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East.” 17. Shoham, “Guile, Gas and Germs.” 18. Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East.” 19. M. Zuhair Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons,” p. 106. 20. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Country Profiles: Syria—Chemical,”

Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2014, <www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/chemical/>. 21. Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons

Proliferation (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 208. 22. Ibid., p. 211. 23. Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons,” p. 108. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Dany Shoham, “Poisoned Missiles: Syria’s Doomsday Deterrent,” Middle East Quarterly 9

(Fall 2002), <www.meforum.org/510/poisoned-missiles-syrias-doomsday-deterrent>. 27. Ibid. 28. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Country Profiles: Syria—Missiles,”

Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2014, <www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/delivery-systems/>. 29. Shoham, “Poisoned Missiles: Syria’s Doomsday Deterrent.” 30. Ibid. 31. Shoham, “Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria’s Ultimate Weapons.” 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Elie Chalhoub, “Assad: Hamas Has Betrayed Us Repeatedly, But… ,” Al-Akhbar English,

October 14, 2013, <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17324>. 35. Robin Hughes, “Explosion aborts CW project run by Iran and Syria,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,

September 17, 2007. 36. Ronen Bergman, Juliane von Mittelstaedt, Matthias Schepp, and Holger Stark, “Israel’s Red

Line: Fate of Syrian Chemical Weapons May Trigger War,” Spiegel Online International, July 31, 2012, <www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-prepares-plans-to-neutralize-syrian- chemical-weapons-a-847203.html>.

37. Ronen Bergman, “Tracing Back Syria’s Chemical Weapons Stockpile to Gulf War,” Al- Monitor, August 24, 2012, <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/08/syrias-chemical- warfare-arsenal.html>.

38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Shoham, “Poisoned Missiles: Syria’s Doomsday Deterrent.” 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Robin Hughes, “Iran Aids Syria’s CW Programme,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,October 21, 2005;

Bhupendra Jasani, “Chemical Romance: Syria’s Unconventional Affair Develops,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 17, 2009.

222 P.C. BLEEK AND N.J. KRAMER

44. Director of Central Intelligence Nonproliferation Center, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology, Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 30 June 2000,” Central Intelligence Agency, 2001.

45. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Country Profiles: Syria—Biological,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated July 2014, <www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/ biological/>.

46. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating toWeapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Con- ventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2006.”

47. “Syria Chemical Weapons Warning: Threat or Reassurance?” The Week UK, July 24, 2012, <www.theweek.co.uk/middle-east/syria-uprising/48124/syria-chemical-weapons-warning- threat-or-reassurance>.

48. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “Letter dated 26 November 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2014/ 853, November 28, 2013, p. 4; Catherine Dill, “Spotlight On Syria’s Biological Weapons,” Arms Control Wonk, February 8, 2016, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201010/ guest-post-spotlight-on-syrias-biological-weapons/>.

49. “Country Profiles: Syria—Nuclear,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated July 2014, <www. nti.org/country-profiles/syria/nuclear/>.

50. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “CRP on Conversion of Miniature Neutron Source Research Reactors (MNSR) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU),” n.d., <www.iaea. org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Technical-Areas/RRS/mnsr.html>.

51. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, GOV/2010/11, February 18, 2010, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2010-11.pdf>.

52. Frank N. von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Emad Kiyaei, Harold A. Feiveson, and Zia Mian, “Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Research Report No. 11, International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013, <http://fissilematerials.org/library/ rr11.pdf>; and Barbara Slavin, “Syria agrees to return highly enriched uranium to China,” Al-Monitor, April 22, 2015, <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/syria-give-up- highly-enriched-uranium.html>.

53. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating toWeapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Con- ventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2011,” Washington, DC, 2011.

54. OPCW, “Letter dated 28 October 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2013/629, October 28, 2013, p. 9, <www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_629.pdf>. US government officials have described the regime’s declared stocks as “1300 tons of declared agent and related materials.” “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.”

55. Dominique Anelli, “Removal and Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” presented at the 2014 Jonathan Tucker Conference on Chemical and Biological Arms, December 12, 2014, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, <www.armscontrol. org/files/Panel2.1_Anelli_TuckerConference.pdf>; OPCW, “Progress In The Elimination Of The Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme,” EC-M-35/DG.1, November 25, 2013, p. 2, <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-35/ecm35dg01_e_.pdf>.

56. “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” 57. Kareem Fahim, “Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia,” New York Times, January

21, 2011, <www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html>. 58. Fred H. Lawson, Global Security Watch: Syria (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013), p. 79. 59. “Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011,

<www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894>. 60. Ibid. 61. Lawson, Global Security Watch: Syria, p. 80.

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62. Ibid., pp. 80-81. 63. Ibid., p. 87. 64. Jason Ukman and Liz Sly, “Obama: Syrian President Assad must step down,” Washington

Post, August 18, 2011, <www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ obama-syrian-president-assad-must-step-down/2011/08/18/gIQAM75UNJ_blog.html>.

65. Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, “Transcript of the Third Presidential Candidates Debate at Lynn University,” October, 22, 2012, <http://debates.org/index.php?page=october-22-2012- the-third-obama-romney-presidential-debate>.

66. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya,”White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington DC, March 28, 2011, <www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>.

67. Caryle Murphy and Tara Bahrampour, “For longtime autocrat, a violent end,” Washington Post, October 20, 2011, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/moammar-gaddafi- confirmed-dead-in-libya/2010/09/21/gIQAFOCV0L_story.html>.

68. Lawson, Global Security Watch: Syria, p. 99. 69. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,” White House

Office of the Press Secretary, Washington DC, August 20, 2012, <www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps>.

70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Shawna Thomas, “Obama draws ‘red line’ for Syria on chemical and biological weapons,”

NBC News, August 20, 2012, <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/20/13379062- obama-draws-red-line-for-syria-on-chemical-and-biological-weapons>.

73. Peter Baker and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Warns Syria on Chemical Weapons,” New York Times, December 3, 2012, <www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/middleeast/nato- prepares-missile-defenses-for-turkey.html>.

74. Josh Rogin, “Exclusive: Secret State Department cable: Chemical weapons used in Syria,” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2013, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/15/exclusive-secret- state-department-cable-chemical-weapons-used-in-syria/>.

75. Raffi Khatchadourian, “The Case of Agent 15: Did Syria Use a Chemical Weapon?” The New Yorker (January 13, 2016), <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-case-of-agent- 15-did-syria-use-a-nerve-agent>.

76. Michael R. Gordon, “Consulate Supported Claim of Syria Gas Attack, Report Says,” New York Times, January 16, 2013.

77. Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Syria’s Military Opposition: How Effective, United or Extremist?” Policy Focus No. 128, September 2013, pp. 3-4.

78. Ibid., p. 4. 79. Ibid. 80. Yuta Kawashima, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2015,” Arms

Control Association, May 2015, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian- Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

81. United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, “Final Report,” December 13, 2013, <https://unoda-web.s3. amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/report.pdf>.

82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. 87. Liz Sly, “France says it is ‘certain’ that Syrian government has used sarin gas,” Washington

Post, June 4, 2013, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/un-report-says-syria- atrocities-mount/2013/06/04/95ab5c46-cd2e-11e2-8573-3baeea6a2647_story.html>.

88. Ibid.

224 P.C. BLEEK AND N.J. KRAMER

89. Ben Rhodes, “Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 13, 2013, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/13/statement-deputy- national-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben->.

90. Ibid. 91. United Nations Mission, “Final Report.” 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid. 96. Human Rights Watch, “Attacks on Ghouta: Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in

Syria,” September 10, 2013, <www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta/analysis- alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria>.

97. The White House, “U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemi- cal Weapons on August 21, 2013,” August 30, 2013, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august- 21>.

98. French Defense Ministry, “Syria/Syrian chemical programme—National executive summary of declassified intelligence,” September 2013, p. 5, <www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/ Syrian_Chemical_Programme.pdf>.

99. The White House, “U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemi- cal Weapons on August 21, 2013.”

100. French Defense Ministry, “Syria/Syrian chemical programme.” 101. Barbara Starr, “U.S. Source: Intercepts show Syrian military officials talked about chemical

attack afterward,” CNN, August 29, 2013, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/29/u-s- source-intercepts-show-syrian-military-officials-talked-about-chemical-attack-afterward/>.

102. Ibid. 103. Ben Hubbard, Mark Mazzetti, and Mark Landler, “Blasts in the Night, a Smell, and a Flood of

Syrian Victims,” New York Times, August 27, 2013. 104. Ben Hubbard, “Signs of Chemical Attack Detailed by Aid Group,” New York Times, August

25, 2013. 105. Ibid. 106. Peter Baker and Jonathan Weisman, “Slowing March to Military Action, Obama Seeks Syria

Vote in Congress,” New York Times, September 1, 2013. 107. John Kerry, “Remarks with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Hague,” US Department of

State, September 9, 2013, <www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213956.htm>. 108. Ibid. 109. Peter Baker and Michael R. Gordon, “An Unlikely Evolution, From Casual Proposal to Poss-

ible Resolution,” New York Times, September 10, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/ world/middleeast/Syria-An-Unlikely-Evolution.html>.

110. Kawashima, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2015.” 111. Paul Richter and Sergei L. Loiko, “Assad makes new demands as Kerry, Lavrov meet on

chemical weapons,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 2013, <http://articles.latimes.com/ 2013/sep/12/world/la-fg-us-syria-20130913>.

112. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms,” New York Times, September 14, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/ syria-talks.html>.

113. Kawashima, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2015.” 114. Ibid. 115. Lessenberry, “Intelligence Integration and the Syrian CW Threat.” 116. “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” 117. Kevin Baron, “Panetta: We’ve Lost Track of Some Syrian Chemical Weapons,” Foreign Policy,

September 28, 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/28/panetta-weve-lost-track-of- some-syrian-chemical-weapons/>.

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118. Ibid. 119. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,” White House

Office of the Press Secretary, Washington DC, August 20, 2012, <www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps>.

120. “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” 121. Ibid. Precisely what “counter” refers to in this context remains unclear. 122. Ibid. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid. 125. The Syria Chemical Weapons Senior Integration Group was established drawing on prior

precedents, including the department’s Warfighter Senior Integration Group, with which it should not be confused.

126. Lessenberry, “Intelligence Integration and the CW Syrian Threat;” “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.”

127. “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” 128. Ibid. 129. Ibid. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. 132. For more on the technical solutions to WMD elimination challenges, see in this volume

Christine Parthemore, “Technology in Context: Lessons from the Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” pp. 83–99.

133. Lessenberry, “Intelligence Integration and the Syrian CW Threat;” “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.”

134. Ibid. 135. Ernesto Londoño, “U.S. military team in Jordan planning ways to deal with Syria’s chemical

weapons,” Washington Post, June 18, 2013, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/us-military-team-in-jordan-planning-ways-to-deal-with-syrias-chemical-weapons/ 2013/06/18/f295e5ae-d4fc-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html>.

136. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Says 75,000 Troops Might Be Needed to Seize Syria Chemical Arms,” New York Times, November 15, 2012, <www.nytimes.com/2012/11/ 16/world/middleeast/pentagon-sees-seizing-syria-chemical-arms-as-vast-task.html?_r=0>.

137. Ibid. 138. Londoño, “U.S. military team in Jordan planning ways to deal with Syria’s chemical weapons.” 139. “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” 140. Lessenberry, “Intelligence Integration and the Syrian CW Threat;” “Destroying Syria’s

Chemical Weapons.” 141. Rick Gladstone, “Russia Says Study Suggests Syria Rebels Used Sarin,” New York Times, July

9, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/world/middleeast/russia-says-study-suggests-syria- rebels-used-sarin.html>; Vladimir V. Putin, “A Plea for Caution from Russia,” New York Times, September 11, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for- caution-from-russia-on-syria.html>.

142. The US-Russian framework agreement concluded in September 2013 that paved the way for the Syrian CW elimination explicitly noted, “The two parties agree to utilize the ‘universal matrix,’ developed in the course of consultations by our two National Security Councils, as the basis for an actionable plan.” “Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” September 14, 2013, <http://m.state.gov/md214247.htm>.

143. Cheryl Rofer, “The Persistence of Memes,” Nuclear Diner, February 23, 2016, <https:// nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2016/02/23/the-persistence-of-memes/>

144. “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” 145. Ibid. 146. Pamela Falk, “Crisis diplomacy 101: the Kerry-Lavrov Syria meeting,” CBS News, September

12, 2013, <www.cbsnews.com/news/crisis-diplomacy-101-the-kerry-lavrov-syria-meeting/>.

226 P.C. BLEEK AND N.J. KRAMER

147. Angelique Chrisafis and Julian Borger, “Syria conflict: France to seek tough UN resolution on chemical weapons,” Guardian, September 10, 2013, <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ sep/10/syria-conflict-france-un-resolution-chemical>. For more on the implications of Security Council actions under Chapter VII, see also in this volume, Robert A. Friedman, “Legal Aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Contingencies,” pp. 61–82.

148. Simon Limage, “Remarks by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the 2014 Jonathan Tucker Confer- ence on Chemical and Biological Arms Control,” Washington DC, December 12, 2014, <www.armscontrol.org/events/2014-12-12/The-2014-Jonathan-Tucker-Conference-on- Chemical-and-Biological-Arms-Control#Panel2>.

149. John Kerry, “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” US Department of State, September 12, 2013, <www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214156.htm>; Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and Amir Sabah Al-Sabah of Kuwait After Bilateral Meeting,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, September 13, 2013, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/13/remarks-president-obama- and-amir-sabah-al-sabah-kuwait-after-bilateral-m>.

150. Karen DeYoung, “How the United States, Russia arrived at deal on Syria’s chemical weapons,” Washington Post, September 16, 2013, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/how-the-united-states-russia-arrived-at-deal-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/ 2013/09/15/c851cd1e-1e5b-11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_story.html>.

151. Peter Baker and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S.-Russia Talks on Syria’s Arms Make Progress,” New York Times, September 13, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/world/middleeast/ us-wont-insist-un-resolution-threaten-force-on-syria-officials-say.html?pagewanted=all&_ r=1>.

152. Angelique Chrisafis and Julian Borger, “Syria conflict: France to Seek Tough UN Resolution on Chemical Weapons,” Guardian, September 10, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2013/sep/10/syria-conflict-france-un-resolution-chemical>.

153. Karen DeYoung, “How the United States, Russia arrived at deal on Syria’s chemical weapons.” 154. Ibid. 155. Ibid. 156. Ibid. 157. Ibid. 158. Ibid. 159. Office of the Spokesperson, “Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons,”

Department of State, September 14, 2013, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247. htm>.

160. UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, “Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013,” September 13, 2013, <www.un.org/disarmament/content/ slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf>.

161. UN Security Council, “Press Release: Security Council Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2118,” September 27, 2013, <www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11135.doc.htm>.

162. Ibid. 163. Jean-Pascal Zanders, “Syria’s CW disarmament: spill-over effects for Middle East,” The

Trench, March 13, 2015, <www.the-trench.org/me-spill-over-effects/>. 164. Ibid. For more on the legal contours of the Syrian CW disarmament, see, in this volume,

Robert A. Friedman, “Legal Aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Contin- gencies,” pp. 61–82.

165. Paul F. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead,” Arms Control Today, December 14, 2014, <www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2014_12/Features/ Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Destruction-Taking-Stock-And-Looking-Ahead>.

NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 227

166. Amy E. Smithson. “How to Dismantle a Chemical Bomb: Lessons for the United Nations in Syria,” Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2013, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2013-09- 18/how-dismantle-chemical-bomb>.

167. Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, “Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” September 14, 2013, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247. htm>.

168. Nina Notman, “Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons,” Chemistry World, May 21, 2014, <www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2014/05/syrian-chemical-weapons-feature>.

169. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.” 170. OPCW, Note by the Director General, “Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical

Weapons Programme,” EC-80/DG.4, August 24, 2015, <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ EC/80/en/ec80dg04_e_.pdf>.

171. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.” 172. Ibid. 173. Valeria Criscione, “Why Norway won’t destroy Syria’s chemical weapons,” Christian Science

Monitor, October 25, 2013, <www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/1025/Why-Norway- won-t-destroy-Syria-s-chemical-weapons>.

174. Ibid. 175. Ibid. 176. David Blair and David Hopkins, “Belgium becomes fourth country to refuse to destroy Syria’s

chemical arsenal,” Telegraph, November 18, 2013, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ middleeast/syria/10458469/Belgium-becomes-fourth-country-to-refuse-to-destroy-Syrias- chemical-arsenal.html>.

177. Associated Press, “Albania rejects US request to host disposal of Syria’s chemical weapons,” Guardian, November 15, 2013, <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/albania-rejects- request-disposal-syrian-chemical-weapons>.

178. David Blair, “Albania joins list of countries to reject Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile,” November 18, 2013, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10457684/ Albania-joins-list-of-countries-to-reject-Syrias-chemical-weapons-stockpile.html>.

179. Mark Urban, “Syrian chemical weapons set to be destroyed at sea,” BBC, November 28, 2013, <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25146980>.

180. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.” 181. Ibid. 182. Defense.gov, “MV Cape Ray FDHS,” July 8, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/home/

features/video/player.aspx?Q9m8mMxwCxI>. 183. Ibid. 184. Ibid. 185. Defense.gov, “Cape Ray Field Deployable Hydrolysis System Operations,” 2014, <http://

archive.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0114_caperay/pdfs/JPME_CapeRay_FDHS_ 011014_1630.pdf>.

186. Defense.gov, “Cape Ray Field Deployable Hydrolysis System Virtual Tour,” July 2, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/video/player.aspx?lejtV4_4iwY>.

187. Defense.gov, “MV Cape Ray Laboratory Tour,” July 8, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/ home/features/video/player.aspx?1_3IoO6SGZ0>.

188. Defense.gov, “MV Cape Ray Disposal Practice,” July 8, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/ home/features/video/player.aspx?QSlmh4Fsv4E>.

189. Jon Harper, “MV Cape Ray on its way to neutralize Syria’s chemical weapons,” Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2014, <www.stripes.com/news/us/mv-cape-ray-on-its-way-to-neutralize- syria-s-chemical-weapons-1.264339>.

190. Lizzy Davies, “Italian mayor dismayed as port chosen for Syrian chemical weapons transfer,” Guardian, January 16, 2014, <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/italian-mayor-port- gioia-tauro-syrian-chemical-weapons>.

191. Notman, “Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons.”

228 P.C. BLEEK AND N.J. KRAMER

192. OPCW, “Frequently Asked Questions: How the chemical components of Syria’s chemical warfare stockpile are being destroyed,” <www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/frequently- asked-questions/>.

193. Ibid; Notman, “Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons.” 194. Ibid. 195. Ibid. 196. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.” 197. Ibid. 198. Notman, “Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons.” 199. Ibid. 200. Ibid. 201. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.” 202. Jean-Pascal Zanders, “Sea-based destruction of Syria’s CW proposed,” The Trench, Decem-

ber 5, 2013, <www.the-trench.org/sea-based-destruction-of-syrias-cw-proposed/>. 203. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.” 204. Notman, “Eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons.” 205. Ibid. 206. OPCW, “Press release: Update on Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction and the Fact-

Finding Mission into Alleged Chlorine Gas Attacks,” May 22, 2014, <www.opcw.org/ news/article/update-on-syrian-chemical-weapons-destruction-and-the-fact-finding- mission-into-alleged-chlorine-gas/>.

207. OPCW, “Announcement to media on last consignment of chemicals leaving Syria,” June 23, 2014, <www.opcw.org/news/article/announcement-to-media-on-last-consignment-of- chemicals-leaving-syria/>.

208. Defense.gov, “Transfer of Syrian Chemicals to Cape Ray is Complete,” DoD News, July 3, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122620>.

209. Jim Garamone, “Cape Ray Begins Neutralizing Syrian Chemical Materials,” DoD News, July 7, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122620>.

210. Terri Moon Cronk, “Cape Ray Continues Neutralizing Syrian Chemical Materials,” DoD News, July 18, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122708>.

211. Cheryl Pellerin, “75 Percent of Syria Chemical Materials Reported Destroyed,” DoD News, August 11, 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122898>.

212. Walker, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead.” 213. Ibid. 214. OPCW, “Disposal of effluents from neutralised Syrian chemical weapons completed,”

June 17, 2015, <www.opcw.org/news/article/disposal-of-effluents-from-neutralised-syrian- chemical-weapons-completed/>.

215. OPCW, Note by the Director General, “Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme,” EC-82/DG.5, April 22, 2016, <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/ 82/en/ec82dg05_e_.pdf >.

216. Sigrid Kaag, “Sigrid Kaag (Joint OPCW-UNMission) on Syria - Press Conference (4 Septem- ber 2014),” UN Web TV, September 4, 2014, <http://webtv.un.org/watch/sigrid-kaag-joint- opcw-un-mission-on-syria-press-conference-4-september-2014/3767596756001>.

217. Dominic Evans and Anthony Deutsch, “Syria submits more ’detailed’ list of chemical weapons,” Reuters, April 17, 2014, <www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-chemicalweapons- idUSBREA3G1C920140417>.

218. Kaag, “Sigrid Kaag (Joint OPCW-UN Mission) on Syria - Press Conference (4 September 2014).”

219. Anthony Deutsch, “Syria reveals more chemical weapons facilities to watchdog – sources,” Reuters, September 17, 2014, <www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-chemicalweapons- exclusiv-idUSKBN0HC1GA20140917>.

220. Samantha Power, “Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representa- tive to the United Nations, on the Removal of Chemical Weapons Materials from Syria,” New York, June 23, 2014, <http://usun.state.gov/remarks/6093>.

NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 229

221. Anthony Deutsch, “UN inspectors find undeclared sarin-linked chemicals at Syrian military site,” Telegraph, May 9, 2015, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/ 11594763/UN-inspectors-find-undeclared-sarin-linked-chemicals-at-Syrian-military-site.html>.

222. Ibid. 223. Oliver Holmes, “Syria video shows chlorine gas floating in streets: activists,” Reuters, May 23,

2015, <www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-chlorine-idUSBREA4M08V20140523>. 224. Ibid. 225. Ibid. 226. OPCW, “OPCW Fact Finding Mission: ‘Compelling Confirmation’ That Chlorine Gas Used

as Weapon in Syria,” September 10, 2014, <www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-fact-finding- mission-compelling-confirmation-that-chlorine-gas-used-as-weapon-in-syria/>.

227. UN Security Council, “Adopting Resolution 2209 (2015), Security Council Condemns Use of Chlorine Gas as Weapon in Syria,”March 6, 2015, <www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11810.doc. htm>.

228. Jett Goldsmith, “Chemical Crisis: A Timeline of CWAttacks in Syria’s Civil War,” Bellingcat, April 27, 2015, <www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/04/27/chemical-crisis-a-timeline-of- cw-attacks-in-syrias-civil-war/>.

229. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “House witnesses describe use of chlorine gas in barrel bombs by Assad regime in Syria,” Washington Post, June 17, 2015, <www.washingtonpost.com/news/ checkpoint/wp/2015/06/17/house-witnesses-describe-use-of-chlorine-gas-in-barrel-bombs- by-assad-regime-in-syria/>.

230. Alice Ross and Shiv Malik, “Syrian doctors to show the US evidence of Assad’s use of chemi- cal weapons,” Guardian, June 16, 2015, <www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/16/syria- assad-regime-is-weaponising-chlorine-us-congress-to-hear>.

231. Ibid. 232. Ian Pannell, “Syria civilians still under chemical attack,” BBC, September 10, 2015, <www.

bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34212324>. 233. Ibid. 234. Associated Press, “German intelligence confirms ISIS used mustard gas in Iraq, says news

report,” Guardian, September 7, 2015, <www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/ german-intelligence-confirms-isis-used-mustard-gas-in-iraq-says-news-report>.

235. Andrew Tilghman, “U.S. confirms Islamic State use of chemical weapons,” Military Times, August 21, 2015, <www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/08/21/isis-used-mustard-gas- makhmour-against-kurds/32116637/>; Debora MacKenzie, “ISIS could be using decades-old mustard gas in Syria,” New Scientist, September 15, 2015, accessed March 5, 2016, <www. newscientist.com/article/dn28174-isis-could-be-using-decades-old-mustard-gas-in-syria/>.

236. Ibid. 237. OPCW, “Further Reports Of The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission In Syria,” Decision, Novem-

ber 23, 2015, accessed April 17, 2016, <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-50/en/ ecm50dec01_e_.pdf>.

238. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic Books, 1991).

239. Andy Weber and Christine L. Parthemore, “Innovation in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Arms Control Today (July/August 2015), <www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_ 0708/Features/Innovation-in-Countering-Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction>.

240. Richard Danzig, “Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Prediction and National Security,” Center for a New American Security (October 2011) <www.cnas.org/sites/ default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Prediction_Danzig.pdf>.

241. Interagency briefing hosted by Office of Threat Reduction and Arms Control, Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, March 15, 2016.

242. Ibid. 243. “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons.”

230 P.C. BLEEK AND N.J. KRAMER

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