Imagined Interactions and memorable messages

Article

On the Functions of Imagined Interactions in Night Dreams

Judson H. Eldredge1, James M. Honeycutt1, Richard C. White1, and Matthew Standige1

Abstract

Imagined interactions (IIs) are a form of mental imagery and daydreaming in which

people imagine conversations or other interactions with significant others. IIs serve

six intrapersonal communication functions including catharsis, rehearsal, self-under-

standing, compensation, conflict-linkage, and relational maintenance. IIs are an

important form of cognition that effects both message production and message

interpretation. Daydreams and night dreams have traditionally been thought of as

distinct processes, but more recently, they have been theorized as points along a

continuum of consciousness. We investigated whether the functions of IIs are also

served by interactive night dreams. Results reveal intriguing similarities and differ-

ences in the functions of interactive daydreams and interactive might dreams. In

addition, we found these dreams had overwhelmingly negative affect as opposed

to positive, neutral, or mixed affect. Results are discussed in terms of continuity

theory.

Keywords

dreams, daydreams, imagined interactions

Why do we dream? Why in the middle of the night does our body secret a paralytic agent that holds us prisoner while we are forced to watch “mental movies” that are intense surreal approximations of waking life? Why are we sometimes later able to recall these dream experiences, and sometimes not?

Imagination, Cognition and

Personality: Consciousness in

Theory, Research, and Clinical

Practice

2016, Vol. 35(3) 244–257

! The Author(s) 2015

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DOI: 10.1177/0276236615595231

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1Department of Communication Studies, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Judson H. Eldredge, Department of Communication Studies, Louisiana State University, 136 Coates

Hall, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Researchers and laypeople alike are unable to definitely answer the fundamental question of why we dream.

Usually, questions about why people have mind/body processes can be answered from an evolutionary perspective. If you know what the function of a process is, you can understand why nature would select for that process. Answering why from an evolutionary perspective requires understanding the functionality of processes. For instance, neither laypeople nor researchers would have to waste much time on the question “why do people have legs and walk?” because the function of legs and walking is so obvious. Legs and walking help us move around our environment. So it is obvious why nature would select for the advantages conferred by legs as a structure and walking as a process.

Neuroscientific research suggests that in the earlier stages of sleep, we dream to help us remember important things about real experiences from our waking life by rehearsing new experiences at about 10 times normal speed (Bendor & Wilson, 2012). However, researchers are unable to agree on the purpose of dreams in the later stage of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, which are the sometimes very surreal and sometimes very realistic dream experiences we later recall in waking life. One place to look for the function of REM dreams is in daydreams, which are better understood because the volitionally/intentionality of daydreams makes the functions easier to identify. We think of daydreaming as something we “do,” but we think of night dreams as something that “happens to us.” This article suggest that at least some of the functions of REM night dreams might be the same as the well-known functions of a certain type of daydream called an imagined interaction (II).

IIs are a type of daydreaming and social cognition involving mental imagery that are theoretically grounded in symbolic interactionism and script theory in which individuals imagine conversations with significant others for a variety of purposes (Honeycutt, 2003). Cognitive scripts are a type of automatic pilot providing guidelines on how to act when one encounters new situations (Honeycutt & Bryan, 2011). Scripts are activated mindlessly and created through IIs as people envision contingency plans for actions and engage in routine activ- ities. The term imagined interaction is strategically used instead of “imaginary conversation” or “internal dialogue” because IIs is a broader concept that takes into account nonverbal and verbal imagery. Visual imagery reflects the scene of the interaction (e.g., office, den, and car). Verbal imagery reflects lines of dia- logue imagined by the self and by others.

IIs have some similarities to more fantastical daydreams (i.e., “I’m having coffee with Scarlett Johansson”); an II distinguishes itself from fantasy by apply- ing only to conversational partners that the individual has a high likelihood of actually interacting with. In other words, the only way the above scenario might be considered an II is if you actually did know Scarlett Johansson personally and might actually have coffee with her. Because neither of these is true for most of

Eldredge et al. 245

us, this interaction in a daydream would be classified as fantasy rather than as an II.

IIs have 14 features: 8 attributes and 6 functions. The attributes are properties that IIs have. The functions are the purposes that IIs serve in helping people process everyday life cognitively, or how people “use” IIs.

There are eight attributes of IIs. Early research referred to these attributes as characteristics, but over time, the term attribute is a better term because attributes reflect traits and characteristics. The first attribute is frequency, or how often a person has IIs in general. This attribute ranges from rarely to quite frequently. The second attribute is proactivity, or whether the II takes place before the actual interaction. This attribute correlates highly with the rehearsal function discussed earlier (Bodie, Honeycutt, & Vickery, 2013). The third attribute is retroactivity, or whether the II takes place after the interaction. Any flashback or replaying of a conversation is characterized by retroactivity. Proactivity and retroactivity are not mutually exclusive in cases like conflict- linkage IIs that take place between instances of repetitive conflict that may be indistinguishable. The fourth attribute is discrepancy, or how similar to or dif- ferent the II is from the actual interaction. A highly discrepant II means that the real conversation did not go at all like the imagined one. An II with low dis- crepancy would be one that did not line up well with how things actually went. The fifth attribute is self-dominance, or who is the more prominent communica- tor in the II. An II that is high in self-dominance is one in which the individual having the II does most of the talking. An II that is low in self-dominance is one that is more focused on imagining the responses of the interaction partner.

The sixth attribute is variety, referring to the variety of interaction partners and topics. Similarly, dreams may be repetitive as well as diversified. The seventh attribute is valence, which is a measure of how positive or negative the emotions associated with the II are. Low valence reflects negative emotions caused by the II, and high valence reflects positive emotions. The final attribute is specificity, which is a measure of how detailed the verbal or visual imagery in the II.

The first function of IIs is relational maintenance. When people use IIs to keep a relationship alive and healthy, they are using the relational maintenance func- tion of IIs. The second function of IIs is conflict-linkage. This function helps explain why some individuals remember conflicts that are many years old and seem to have a hard time “letting go.” The third function of IIs is rehearsal. People use the rehearsal function to plan what they are going to say before a conversation begins. During rehearsal IIs, people don’t simply plan their own communication; they also attempt to anticipate the actions of their conversa- tional partner. The fourth function is self-understanding. People use this function when they are attempting to clarify or refine their own thoughts and beliefs. The fifth function is catharsis. When the II provides an emotional release, or helps people get something off their chest, the II is being used for catharsis. This function helps people deal with stress and tension release.

246 Imagination, Cognition and Personality 35(3)

The final function is compensation. When people are unable to communicate with the other person in reality, but still want to experience communication, they are using the II for the compensation function. Compensation IIs can occur in long-distance relationships, or when the II partner is deceased.

IIs are related to personality. Honeycutt (2003) found that the II attribute of discrepancy was negatively related to extraversion. In other words, introverts, due to their comparative lack of social interaction, were less likely to imagine accurate conversations. Strelow and Davidson (2002) found that introverts reported significantly more vividness in mental imagery than their extraverted counterparts. Honeycutt, Choi, and DeBerry (2009) found a relationship between communication apprehension (CA) and IIs. They found in the particu- lar that the II function of catharsis was a significant predictor of high levels of CA. They also found that increased levels of II discrepancy were significantly associated with CA across four CA contexts.

Honeycutt and Keaton (2012–2013) found that having more specific, fre- quent, and pleasant IIs was positively associated with relational satisfaction. In addition, increased uses of proactive and retroactive IIs aided the ability of IIs to predict relational quality. In addition, relational satisfaction was simul- taneously predicted by extraversion and being a judger based on the Myers– Brigg personality inventory in which judging reflect placing a premium on orga- nized environments, competence, performance, and independence.

A study by Honeycutt, Pence, and Gearhart (2012–2013) examined the asso- ciations between II attributes and the Big Five personality traits. In terms of personality, IIs have trait attributes to the extent they are enduring and stable across similar conditions. Conversely, they can also be measured in terms of state attributes in which their usage would be higher or lower depending on the particular context. The Big Five personality traits include the following: neur- oticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.

The data reveal that frequency and proactivity of IIs are correlated with lack of neuroticism and openness. Neuroticism is also correlated with egocentrism, depression, and anxiety. High anxiety is characterized by being more worrisome in general, and it is from this assumption that the correlation is explained. Highly anxious people would indeed have less frequent IIs as means to predict their believed unstable environment. In addition, frequency was correlated with openness. The assumption that these researchers made is that openness and frequency are correlated because these people are extraverts. Analysis of that assumption proved true, as the correlation between extraversion and openness was significant. Indeed, people who are extraverted are more likely to imagine themselves frequently interacting with other individuals. Indeed, personality attributes are continuously manifested in night dreams.

Other research has revealed an association between narcissism and IIs (Honeycutt, Pence, & Gearhart, 2013). A profile of a narcissist emerges in

Eldredge et al. 247

terms of the attributes and functions of their IIs. A narcissist appears to have a lot of IIs that are moderately discrepant from actual interaction, somewhat specific in their imagery and self-dominant in their IIs. In addition, narcissism is characterized by IIs that reflect conflict, lack of compensation, and reflect relational maintenance.

Honeycutt (2003) discusses how IIs constitute a type of mental imagery invol- ving daydreaming and intrapersonal communication. Intrapersonal communi- cation includes cognition, calculating, planning, self-monologue as well as dialogue (Honeycutt, 2010). From an evolutionary point of view, Jordania (2009) proposes that intrapersonal communication was created to avoid silence because as social creatures we may feel anxiety and helpless in isolation. From an evolutionary point of view, security was provided in numbers and sharing of work as opposed to isolation. Relatedly, the psychological and psychiatric con- sequences of solitary confinement are noteworthy including depression, mutila- tion, and anxiety (Arrigo & Bullock, 2008; Smith, 2008).

Because IIs are a form of intrapersonal communication, these intrapersonal IIs go on to shape interpersonal communication patterns as well (Honeycutt & Bryan, 2011). These movies in our heads are important cognitions that shape the way we see and interact with the world. For example, mental imagery can also influence how happy you are in your relationships (Tower, 1986). Clashing imagery is a recipe for relational strife. According to Tower (1986), “a great deal of the outcome of a marriage is a direct function of the imagery of the people involved in it, their methods of using that imagery, and their capa- cities for changing it with experience” (p. 216). Imagery impacts the scripts and expectations you have for your romantic relationship(s). According to Honeycutt and Bryan (2011), when used often enough, IIs create cognitive scripts that the individual will follow when encountering unfamiliar situ- ations with similar qualities to the II. Thus, the type of IIs one has will influence one’s outward behavior as well as one’s internal states. The way a relationship is represented in the mind acts as a guide to interpreting the behavior of the other. If you see your relationship as one of happiness and equality, you’ll interpret a discussion about what to watch on TV as an attempt to accommodate and please both parties. If you see your relationship as a power-struggle, you’ll interpret the same conversation as a covert strug- gle to exert dominance.

Honeycutt (2008) argues that relationships exist as much in the minds of the relational partners as in the actual, observable interactions between those indi- viduals. So in addition to examining relationships through the interactional behavior of partners, one can also study relationships from solely within the minds of the individuals. For instance, Honeycutt and Bryan (2011) argue that the idea of relational stages exists in the mind of the individual and is largely derived from past experience and IIs.

248 Imagination, Cognition and Personality 35(3)

Night Dreams

People have wondered about dreams for probably as long as they have won- dered about anything. Among the earliest writings, we have addressed dreams. Even as early as genesis 40:8 in the Bible, the people tell Joseph “‘We have had dreams, and there is no one to interpret them.’ And Joseph said to them, ‘Do not interpretations belong to God? Please tell them to me’.” Although dreams are thought to have meaning of some sort throughout history, some scholarship posits the delusion hypothesis and denies that dreams have any meaning at all. A more recent incarnation of this argument is the activation-synthesis hypothesis, which says that dreams are simply a random synthesis of brain processes that activate during REM sleep; they don’t mean anything.

Dreams are defined as instances of mental activity during sleep. They are a central aspect of the human experience, as every human being experiences dreams every night (Aserinsky & Kleitman, 1953; Wittmann & Schredl, 2004). Large amounts of empirical evidence support the continuity hypothesis of dreaming, which states that dreams are heavily influenced by waking-life actions, feelings, thoughts, and other stimuli (Schredl, 2003). This evidence has been confirmed in studies analyzing dream content, including the frequency of appearances from romantic partners (Schredl & Reinhard, 2008), vague emo- tions such as stress, and images of major life events such as divorce (Cartwright & Lamberg, 2000). Social activities and interactions are represented more often in dreams than cognitive activities are (Schredl, 2000).

Similarity Between Night Dreams and Daydreams

Dreams and daydreams, while uniquely categorized, share many similar qualities and can be considered to be part of a continuum (Hartmann, 1998). They both deal with the subject’s emotions and concerns and are influenced by exposure to stimuli such as words being spoken during the event (Klinger, 1990). The con- temporary theory of dreaming (Hartmann, 2000) states that there are no rigid boundaries between the mental states of wakefulness, daydreaming, and dream- ing. That in reality the variations in consciousness between wakefulness, day- dreaming, and night dreaming are simply positions on a continuum of consciousness defined by the relative looseness or tightness of associations in the brain. During wakefulness, associations are at their tightest, but mental functioning at the “dreaming” end of the continuum is hyper-connective, mean- ing very loosely associated material in the mind is brought together based on the dreamer’s underlying emotions. This characteristic allows for dreams to become simulations of the real world, often involving aspects of the dreamer’s life that they consider especially essential. In cases such as this, dreams are referred to as “big dreams,” which are defined as rare but significant dreaming experiences that have a strong and lasting effect on the dreamer’s waking

Eldredge et al. 249

life (Bulkeley & Hartmann, 2011). Dreams such as this are classified into four subcategories: (a) memorable dreams; (b) dreams that are labeled as “import- ant” by the dreamer; (c) dreams that are labeled as “significant” by the dreamer; and (d) “impactful” dreams, which have an impact on the dreamer’s life.

Daydreams are a form of thought and mental imagery that our consciousness takes part in creating, along with perceptions, memories, internal commentaries, and working or operant thoughts. Like night dreams, daydreams are a very common aspect of human life. Even more so than night dreams, however, day- dreams make up a substantial portion of our everyday lives. It is estimated that we spend anywhere from 50% to 70% of our waking hours daydreaming (Klinger, 1990). These thoughts and images lack clear-cut boundaries and accordingly, daydreams are frequently influenced by our other mental processes. This results in daydreams frequently being classified as “reactions” to waking- life experiences and stimuli (Klinger, 1990). While feelings and thoughts in waking life are heavily influential over the content of dreams, they cannot be characterized by the immediate responsiveness that daydreams have. It is this immediacy that causes daydreams to represent cognitive activities such as per- forming mundane tasks more than night dreams do (Schredl, 2000). As scholars have noted, we don’t do mundane tasks like arithmetic in our dreams.

There is a substantial body of literature indicating that daydreams and night dreams fundamentally differ in terms of intensity and valence. Dreams are shown to be much more strongly influenced by emotions than daydreams are (Hartmann, 1998). The frequency of negative emotions is much higher in recalled night dreams, with fear, terror, helplessness, and vulnerability being reported as contextualizing dreams more often than any other set of emotions (Hartmann, 2011; Hartmann, Kunzendorf, Rosen, & Grace, 2001). Daydreams frequently involve more positive emotions, and the regular occurrence of nega- tive emotions in daydreams may be influenced by atypical characteristics such as high levels of depression and suicidality (Selby, Anestis, & Joiner, 2007). Daydreams have been stigmatized throughout many different cultures, to a greater extent than night dreams have. Many people have associated frequent daydreaming with immaturity, maladjustment, and even mental disorders such as schizophrenia (Klinger, 1990).

Rationale and Research Question

The continuity theory of dreaming (Schredl, 2003) suggests that night dreams are related to our waking life. The contemporary theory of dreaming (Hartmann, 2000) suggests that night dreams aren’t really that different from daydreams. In light of this, it makes sense to look for the function of night dreams by looking for well-known functions of daydreams like IIs. So, we ask:

RQ: Do night dreams perform II functions?

250 Imagination, Cognition and Personality 35(3)

Method

Participants

The participants were recruited using a Qualtrix survey in which students received course credit following institutional review board procedures. The sample consisted of 122 people from psychology and communication courses at a large southern university. The sample ranged in age from 18 to 35, and the mean age was 20.87 (SD¼ 2.26). Thirty-four were men and 85 were women and three did not report gender. Students received credit worth 3% of their final grade through the research participation system.

Procedures

This study was part of a larger program of research on night dreams, so not all of these lab procedures were required by this study. However, the full procedure is described herein, to allow analyses of any part of the procedure that may have primed the subjects for certain responses. Subjects arrived at the lab and were greeted by a research assistant (RA) who obtained consent and informed the subject that they should list three negative and three positive dreams they can remember and rate on a scale how positive or negative each dream was. Next, the subject rested for 5min on a couch to ensure a resting heart rate while the RAs selected the most positive and the most negative dream the subject rated and flipped a coin to randomize the order in which subjects would be asked to describe their most positive and most negative dreams. After the resting period, subjects were fitted with devices that measured heart rate and heart rate variability and asked to verbally describe the positive and negative dreams in randomized order while being videotaped. Afterwards, subjects were seated at a computer and asked to respond to several self-report measures, including demo- graphics. Most importantly for this study, the subjects were asked to describe an interactive dream, meaning one that had verbal interaction with another person in their life. Additionally important for this study, they were asked to describe whether this dream meant anything for their waking life. After the self-report phase, subjects were debriefed, given a mental health handout, and released.

Data Coding

Data were coded in two phases. In the first phase, the coders coded some basic data about the dream, like who the interaction person was and whether the six individual II functions were present. In the first phase of coding, judgments were made based only on the narrative description of the dream. In the second phase of coding, judgments were made based on both the dream narrative and the subject’s answer to the question “Did this dream have any meaning for your life?” In the first coding phase, reliability was low for certain items as indicated

Eldredge et al. 251

for the self-understanding function (see Table 1). However, this result is not terribly surprising after considering a few methodological and theoretical factors.

First and most important is the theoretical reason why low reliability is expected when asking coders to make judgments about II functions from dream narratives alone. The narratives lack the context coders require. For example, take this dream: “I was standing on the rim of the Grand Canyon arguing with my mom when she fell off and died.” It is difficult to determine what the function of this dream might be from this alone, and coders were unable to. However, once provided with the dreamer’s own inter- pretation of what the dream meant, in this case, “it helped me remember how much I loved my mom and that I needed to make up with her after the fight we had yesterday,” the functions become clear.

There are also methodological factors that affect intercoder reliability for this study. First, this is binary data that has a tendency to be unforgiving in terms of Krippendorff’s alpha because expected agreement is highest with binary data. Further complicating this is the issue of rarity, where minor disagreements gen- erate very low alphas when one choice in a binary decision is rare. This was true for compensation, which was present only in two of the 15 dreams coded for intercoder reliability, which is actually higher than the rarity of 8% in the overall sample.

Results and Discussion

The results of this study indicate night dreams that include interaction with others do indeed serve II functions for dreamers (see Table 2). Perhaps more interesting than the frequency of the individual functions is that the overwhelm- ing majority (71.7%) of interactive night dreams in the sample served at least one II function. In addition, a series of binomial tests revealed statistical signifi- cance in which each function was scored as present (1) or absent (0). A plurality

Table 1. Intercoder Reliability (Krippendorff’s Alpha).

Dream narrative only With meaning

Conflict-linkage .625 .739*

Relational maintenance .474 .775*

Rehearsal .388 1.00*

Catharsis .136 .739*

Self understanding .046 .58

Compensation �.024 .133

Note. Bold¼ reliability increased when considering meaning.

*Sufficiently high reliability.

252 Imagination, Cognition and Personality 35(3)

(43.1%) served more than one II function. The most commonly represented II function was self-understanding, which is not surprising because self-under- standing is a good companion function to many of the other functions, and indeed self-understanding was also the most likely to be found when another function was also present. This tendency for self-understanding to be coded as a companion function also probably accounts for its lower intercoder reliability. The least frequent function in the sample was compensation. However, two factors might account for this. One is that this sample has a very young mean age of 20. As a result, it is possible that the experience of losing a loved one is underrepresented in this young sample. There is research on the use of IIs in grieving and helping to preserve memories of the deceased (Ford, 2010). We are currently conducting cross-cultural studies on the use of IIs in grieving and the relationship to spirituality.

Another interpretation is that compensation is the most definitionally strict of all the functions when being coded because the dreamer must explicitly state that the interaction partner in the dream is someone who no longer have access to in waking life. If the dreamer doesn’t make this explicit, then the dream is not coded for compensation, so it is possible our procedures missed some compen- sation. In addition, when compensation did occur, it seemed to be accompanied by a particularly strong emotional response. In addition to seeing this in sub- jects, one of our RAs noted,

I, too, have this type of imagined interactions on a weekly basis. My father passed

away almost eight years ago and I frequently have the dream that he is still alive

and with us. It is so realistic and life-like that I, like the subject, wake up every time

believing this information to be true.

Another important finding of this study came not from our research question directly, but through our practical attempts to develop a reliable coding method

Table 2. Percent of Dreams in the Sample Containing Each II Function.

Percentage

Conflict-linkage 18.6

Relational maintenance 30.1

Rehearsal 20.4

Catharsis 24.8

Self understanding 41.6

Compensation 13.3

Note. Nine cases were removed from analyses because the content of the dream narrative

could not be coded (e.g., “The dream I told you about earlier” was removed). All binomial

tests were significant except for self-understanding. II¼ imagined interaction.

Eldredge et al. 253

for assessing the frequency of II functions in night dreams. By coding in two phases, we were able to establish that even when coders receive the same train- ing, apply the same rules, and are able to agree when the dreamer supplies context, they are not able to agree based on the narrative of the dream alone.

In addition, there are several interesting general findings. We found these dreams had overwhelmingly negative affect (42.0%) versus positive (18.8%), neutral (11.6%), or mixed (27.7%, �2 (3)¼ 23.00, p¼ .000). However, future research might investigate the relationship between affect and II functions in night dreams.

Also, there was a notable lack of personification, which was present only in two (1.8%) of the dreams (binomial test p¼ .000). Based on seeing some per- sonification in pilot studies, we expected there to be more interactions where the partner is a personification (e.g., “I was talking to a burrito but I knew it was my mom”). However, the interaction partners were very specifically identified and were almost always embodied as themselves.

Limitations

The exploratory nature of this study with a small sample size and large number of binary outcome variables limits the use of inferential statistics in this study. Future confirmatory studies might use a larger sample size and or utilize differ- ent outcome variables that are more conducive to inferential statistics.

Practical Applications

The results of this study are of interest to practitioners as well as theorists and researchers. Practitioners have attempted to, and been asked to, interpret dreams since well before Nebuchadnezzar told the Chaldean “magicians, enchanters and sorcerers” . . . “if you do not make known to me the dream and its interpretation, you shall be torn limb from limb, and your houses shall be laid in ruins” (Daniel 2). In this study, we examined what dreams “mean” in the sense that we asked trained coders to agree on whether the dream was perform- ing a certain function or not. They were unable to do so without additional information about what the dreamer thought the dream meant. This is consist- ent with the modern practice of dream work. In fact, what separates the modern practice of dream work from the old style dream interpretation Nebuchadnezzar expected of his advisors is the acknowledgment that the meaning of dreams can come only through the dreamer’s own interpretation. The results of this study validate the practice of dream work and help explain why neither trained coders nor the Chaldean sorcerers were successful in determining the meaning of dreams from the dream alone. No one but the dreamer can provide the required context for understanding how the dream functions in their life. That central tenet of dream work is one of the major findings of this study. In addition, this

254 Imagination, Cognition and Personality 35(3)

study supports the idea that dreams do mean something in waking life. Dreams are a way we communicate with ourselves. If dreams are meaningless as the activation-synthesis hypothesis would have us believe, then why do we see the same structure of functionality in interactive night dreams that happen to us automatically as we do in interactive daydreams that we do volitionally? Because we see the same functionality, that suggests that dreams are not meaningless and that we use them just like we use daydreams.

Conclusion

This study provides interesting results for scholars approaching this topic from the dream perspective or the communication perspective. From the perspective of those who study dreams, this study sheds new light on how night dreams function. These results suggest that at least some of the functions of night dreams are the same as II functions in daydreams. From the perspective of those who study communication, this is an important extension of II theory and indeed of intrapersonal communication as a whole. These results suggest that intrapersonal communication isn’t just a process we do volitionally while awake, but in fact, intrapersonal communication is also a process that happens to us automatically while we sleep. Finding that night dreams also serve II functions illustrates the importance of intrapersonal communication as a process and IIs as a theory by showing that they occur in similar predictable ways in multiple states of consciousness.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication

of this article.

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Author Biographies

Judson H. Eldredge is a doctoral candidate at Louisiana State University under the direction of LSU Distinguished Professor James M. Honeycutt.

James M. Honeycutt is a professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Louisiana State University.

Richard C. White is a doctoral candidate at Louisiana State University.

Matthew Standige is a master’s candidate at Louisiana State University under the direction of James M. Honeycutt.

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