****For C. Owens Only****

Imperfect Federalism 537

Imperfect Federalism: Th e Intergovernmental

Partnership for Homeland Security

Th e terror attacks of September 11, 2001, posed a set of

security challenges for the nation ’ s cities that the increas-

ingly decentralized federal system was poorly prepared to

meet. Although it was generally agreed that domestic

security required a close intergovernmental partnership,

strong national leadership and support were lacking in

creating and guiding this partnership. To make matters

more diffi cult, political considerations in Congress gener-

ally trumped the assessment of security risks in the distri-

bution of federal fi scal aid. Th is article explores the

strains in the intergovernmental homeland security part-

nership, their causes, and eff orts to adapt and reform.

Despite some progress toward a more rational public

administration of homeland security, the partnership still

refl ects the defi ciencies of imperfect federalism.

T he terror attacks of 9/11 exposed a federal

system that was ill-prepared to craft and im-

plement a coherent program to protect the

nation ’ s cities. Although the national government was

able to mount an eff ective military campaign in

Afghanistan less than a month after the attacks, put-

ting in place a program for domestic security that

brought expertise to bear, allocated responsibilities,

and shared costs fairly posed a set of challenges to the

complex, decentralized division of functions among

levels of government that had evolved over the prior

three decades.

National security is a fundamental responsibility of

the central government, but given the nature of ter-

rorism as a highly localized phe-

nomenon, the homeland aspect

of the war against terror requires

a close, cooperative intergovern-

mental partnership. During the

fi rst three years after the terror

attacks in New York City and

Washington, D.C., however,

strong and clear national leader-

ship was lacking in certain cru-

cial areas, creating an aura of uncertainty and

frustration at the state and local levels. Furthermore,

Congress often seemed propelled more by political

considerations, seeking to fashion a partnership, than

by security concerns. Finally, the local government

partners in particular were made to bear heavy fi scal,

administrative, and decision-making burdens that,

according to many local offi cials, stretched and often

exceeded their resources and capabilities. Th e result

was a partnership marked by substantial strains

rather than a sense of unity of purpose in the face of

external threat.

Although questions remain about the focus of na-

tional leadership, as well as the nature of local capa-

bilities, priorities, and readiness along the fi rst line of

defense against terror, the federal partnership has

shown a certain resilient, though perhaps limited

capacity to adapt, change, and improve. Th ese limits

suggest that the case of homeland security raises ques-

tions about the costs and challenges of protecting

American towns and cities through the loose arrange-

ment of a highly decentralized federal partnership.

The Intergovernmental System at the Moment of 9/11 When the terror attacks occurred on September 11,

2001, Washington ’ s relations with the nation ’ s cities

had traced an arc from the assertion of a broad-

ranging national interest in the state of urban

America and the rapidly expanding fi scal assistance

that accompanied it during the heyday of the Great

Society programs to what Pietro Nivola has called

the era of “ tense command-

ments ” — the conjunction of a

growing body of federal man-

dates imposed on state and local

government administrative prac-

tices, coupled with diminished

intergovernmental aid ( Nivola

2002 ). Deaf to the fi scal crisis

taking hold in the states and

diffi dent toward the cities and

their problems, the federal government in 2001 was

no longer predisposed or well-positioned to lead and

Peter Eisinger is the Henry Cohen

Professor at the Milano Graduate School of

Management and Urban Policy at the New

School. He has also taught at Wayne State

University and the University of Wisconsin.

He is the author or coauthor of seven books

and numerous articles and monographs.

E-mail: [email protected] .

Enhancing Homeland Security from a Public Administration Perspective

Peter Eisinger New School University

…given the nature of terrorism as a highly localized phenom- enon, the homeland aspect of

the war against terror requires a close, cooperative intergovern-

mental partnership.

538 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006

support a close intergovernmental partnership ( Behn

and Keating 2004 ).

Th e repudiation of the Great Society model of intense

federal involvement in urban aff airs, programmatically

and fi scally, began with President Richard M. Nixon ’ s

eff orts to devolve responsibilities to local government

through block grants ( Conlan 1998 ). Th is devolution,

which continued during the Reagan and Clinton

years, signaled a diminution of federal interest in

urban problems ( Eisinger 1998 ). But paradoxically,

this trend coexisted with an explosion of unfunded

mandates as Washington sought increasingly to

“ dabble in the minutiae of education programs, mu-

nicipal staffi ng practices … and other issues customar-

ily of local interest ” ( Nivola 2002, 155 ). Th us, at the

turn of the new century, there was some confusion as

to the proper scope and nature of national and subna-

tional roles. Was it Washington ’ s role to be an admin-

istrative standard setter but not a fi scal supporter for

local government? Was the local role to adjust to this

new era of fi scal self-reliance, as long as local govern-

ments met federal standards in running their schools

and treating wastewater and hiring the disabled?

Would Washington no longer take on the responsi-

bility of articulating the grand goals of the good (or

great) society or enlist cities in the march toward

its realization?

After 9/11, as Nivola observes, the federal government

was at a crossroads. Homeland security seemed to

demand a strong, central guiding and supportive

presence, but Washington had long since eschewed

such a role in favor of devolution. Local and state

governments, more and more on their own fi scally,

were reluctant partners in the implementation of

federal standards — most recently, for example, with

regard to the No Child Left Behind education reform

( Greenblatt 2004 ). Homeland security required a

diff erent mind-set from all parties.

The Expectation of a Security Partnership Th ere is a general and unquestioned expectation in the

United States that in times of major crisis, responsibil-

ity for mobilizing a response falls to Washington

( Krane 2002 ). Th e obligations of the national govern-

ment have always been clear in the case of foreign

wars, but the challenge of foreign terrorism on Ameri-

can soil necessarily involves substantial new roles for

subnational governments. Local governments in par-

ticular are the locus of the nation ’ s primary law en-

forcement agencies, and they furnish communities

with fi re protection, public health services, and emer-

gency medical personnel. “ All acts of terrorism are

local, ” observed Congressman John Tierney (D-MA)

during hearings before a House subcommittee, “ so

each of our communities must be fully prepared in

crisis response and consequence management ”

(U.S. Congress 2002; see also Savitch 2003 ). 1

Nevertheless, public offi cials at all levels of govern-

ment have recognized that local governments as fi rst

responders to acts of terror cannot be left on their

own, not only because questions of national security

are at stake but also because the burdens of vigilance

have propelled cities and counties into areas of plan-

ning, public health, and law enforcement for which

they have little preparation, inadequate resources, and

no precedents. Th us, responding to terror requires a

partnership among all three levels of government

(DHS 2004, 15; U.S. Congress 2002). Th e federal

role in the partnership is distinctive: Specifi cally, the

“ incremental costs of responding to the additional

national security threat posed by terrorism are appro-

priately a federal responsibility, ” according to a report

by the Council on Foreign Relations (2003, 10), and

so, too, is the creation of a national response plan

(U.S. Congress 2002). Th us, as the dimensions of the

security task began to take shape, state and local gov-

ernments, which had grown accustomed to running

their aff airs in a highly decentralized federal system,

nevertheless looked to Washington for guidance on

how to respond to diff erent alert levels, money to

cover the costs of response, and a fair allocation of

intergovernmental aid based on risk ( Khademian

2004 ). None of these was immediately forthcoming.

Washington ’ s Response to the Challenge of Local Security Mobilization for security on the domestic front began,

as far as state and local governments were concerned,

on the wrong note. Shortly after the attacks on

New York City and Washington, D.C., President George

W. Bush established a Homeland Security Council in

the Executive Offi ce of the President, but no represen-

tatives from state or local governments were invited to

join ( Krane 2002 ). Although cities immediately began

to develop their own security plans on an ad hoc

basis and assign law enforcement personnel to guard

vulnerable infrastructure, 2 Congress did not provide

any federal funds to defray these outlays until March

2003, a year and a half after the attacks, nor did the

Homeland Security Council provide any guidance for

local planning or strategies to begin taking on new

homeland security responsibilities.

A rough framework and program precedents for an

intergovernmental partnership were, in fact, in place

before the attacks. During the early 1950s, the Offi ce

of Civil Defense had funneled money to local govern-

ments to train personnel and to establish emergency

operations centers in case of a nuclear attack. Forty

years later, Congress passed the Staff ord Act of 1993, 3

which authorized the Federal Emergency Manage-

ment Agency to reimburse state and local govern-

ments for costs incurred responding to a severe

disaster. And in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City

bombing in 1996, Congress authorized training and

equipment money for local fi rst responders in the

Imperfect Federalism 539

nation ’ s largest cities through the Defense against

Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (also known as the

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment). Th en, in 2000,

Congress passed the Firefi ghter Investment and Re-

sponse Enhancement (FIRE) Act, which established

the Assistance to Firefi ghters program. To some in

Washington, the failure to build a coherent security

partnership based on the experiences of this hodge-

podge of programs suggested “ an absence of central

focus, ” a “ lack of a cohesive eff ort, ” and problems of

“ coordination and fragmentation in federal prepared-

ness programs, ” all of which made for “ confusion at

the state and local levels ” and an inability to “ eff ec-

tively partner with the federal government ” (GAO

2002, 2).

After 9/11, Congress doubled the funding of the

existing FIRE program, which provided grants to local

fi re departments for training and equipment. 4 From

the outset, however, critics complained that the ad-

ministration of the program was plagued by bottle-

necks and infl exibility and that the funding was

distributed inequitably (CRS 2004b; Khademian

2004 ). An analysis conducted during early 2004 by

the offi ce of Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)

found that of the approximately $1.2 billion appropri-

ated between 2001 and 2003, $115 million had not

yet been distributed. Five months into fi scal year

2004, none of the $746 million authorized in that

funding round had been distributed (CRS 2004a;

Maloney 2004).

Th e FIRE grants were distributed in response to ap-

plications, and they were subject to a $750,000 cap

for any one fi re department. 5 Th e cap meant that the

amount of money available to any fi re department was

not primarily a function of the city ’ s size or the level

of threat the city faced. Besides, that sum did not go

far in providing equipment for a major urban fi re

department, though it may have provided amply for a

small department ’ s needs.

Th e cap, which was increased in 2004 to benefi t larger

jurisdictions, was nevertheless designed both to ensure

funding for smaller places, whatever their vulnerabil-

ity level, and to distribute the money widely across the

country — that is, to many rather than a few congres-

sional districts. Th is has meant that money is more

easily spread to less populous states, which are less

likely targets of international terrorism. Th us, Mon-

tana, North Dakota, and Vermont received $9.33,

$8.67, and $8.50 per capita, respectively, in FIRE

grants made through February 2004, whereas Califor-

nia, Texas, and New York received only $.86, $1.34,

and $1.79 per capita (CRS 2004d). New York City

itself received only $.09 per capita (Maloney 2004).

According to the analysis done by Representative

Maloney ’ s offi ce, there is evidence of a partisan bias in

the distribution of these grants, although she does not

explore other possible explanations for the pattern.

Her data show, nevertheless, that in fi scal years 2001

and 2003, 19.3 percent and 18 percent of Democratic

congressional districts, respectively, received no FIRE

awards, compared to 6.3 percent and 3.1 percent of

Republican districts. Among the districts that did

receive money, Democratic districts received only 75

percent and 81 percent (respectively, by fi scal year) of

the amount received by Republican districts in the

two fi scal years analyzed. Th e state with the highest

level of funding in 2003 and the greatest increase

between 2001 and 2003 was Pennsylvania, home of

the fi rst secretary of the Department of Homeland

Security, Tom Ridge (Maloney 2004).

With the passage of the Patriot Act in October 2001,

the Offi ce for State and Local Domestic Preparedness —

then a part of the Justice Department but later

transferred to the new Department of Homeland

Security as the Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness

(ODP) — was authorized to make new grants to state

and local governments to help them prepare for and

respond to acts of terrorism. Shortly after providing

money for the FIRE grants in 2003, Congress used

the appropriations process to authorize a series of

other programs that channeled money to state and

local governments for equipment, training, and plan-

ning. Th e largest of these were the State Homeland

Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Urban

Area Security Initiative (UASI). Each of these provides

money to local governments through the states.

Th rough fi scal year 2005, appropriations for all of the

state and local homeland security programs estab-

lished in the aftermath of 9/11 averaged slightly more

than $3.5 billion annually.

At the beginning, the administration of these new

programs was plagued by birthing pains. Incomplete

or outdated emergency planning at the state level

frequently caused the ODP to delay the release of

funds to the states (GAO 2004). States, obligated to

re-grant 80 percent of the funds to local governments

by set deadlines, deemed themselves in compliance at

the moment they agreed to allocate a specifi c amount

to a particular jurisdiction rather than when the

money was actually transferred. Months often passed

before any funds reached their fi nal destination. Th us,

as late as June 2004, nearly two years after the funding

for the series of new federal grant programs was ap-

proved, 24 percent of 231 cities surveyed by the U.S.

Conference of Mayors reported that they had been

told to expect funding but had not yet received any

(U.S. Conference of Mayors 2004). Th e states were

not the only bottleneck. In some cases, delays were

the fault of local governments: Lacking a clear idea of

how to use the money, city councils would delay,

sometimes for months, voting to accept the grant

from the state (GAO 2004).

540 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006

Technical administrative constraints on local govern-

ments emerged as critical issues in the partnership.

Local offi cials believed that these constraints compro-

mised their eff ectiveness as partners. In all of the

grants, except a minor program that permits states to

hire emergency planners, Congress restricted spending

to equipment, training, and planning costs. Local

governments were not allowed to spend the money for

new personnel or overtime. 6 Mayors complained that

the war on terror had stretched their police depart-

ments beyond capacity. For example, the federal

Transportation Security Administration mandated

that local police forces must provide security at air-

ports under municipal control. For example, accord-

ing to Cleveland mayor Jane Campbell, that city had

to increase its police allocation at Cleveland Hopkins

International Airport from 26 to 47, but it could not

use homeland security grants to hire new offi cers to

replace those who had been moved from other duties

(pers. comm., September 24, 2004). Many cities were

concerned that they could not use federal money to

replace members of their fi re and police departments

who had been called to active duty with the National

Guard for the war in Iraq. Other mayors, such as

David Cicilline, mayor of Providence Rhode Island,

worried about the Bush administration ’ s attempts to

cut or eliminate the Clinton-era COPS (Community

Oriented Policing Services) program, which provided

federal funds to hire additional police offi cers (pers.

comm., September 24, 2004; U.S. Conference of

Mayors 2005).

As cities fi nally began to receive money, a persistent

but signifi cant minority complained that they were

prevented, either by state rules or federal restrictions,

from spending the funds according to their own pri-

orities. Th ree surveys of slightly diff erent groups of

cities conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors

between September 2003 and June 2004 found that

just over one-third of the cities surveyed each time

indicated that the uses of the funds permitted would

not cover their security priorities (U.S. Conference of

Mayors 2003, 2004a, 2004b). Th e most common

complaint was that federal funds could not be used to

pay for police overtime, a burden for cities whenever

the Department of Homeland Security raised the

national alert level. Other complaints had to do with

forcing cities to buy equipment mandated by the state

that local offi cials believed was not vital (U.S. Confer-

ence of Mayors 2004).

Technical administrative constraints on local govern-

ments that arose from spending the grants were a

source of discontent in the partnership. Th e most

diffi cult issue for local government had to do with the

requirements of the federal Cash Management Act of

1990, which required cities that received federal funds

to spend their own money for homeland security

purposes and wait for federal reimbursement. Some

cities simply did not have the cash on hand. Others

found the wait for reimbursement, sometimes several

months, a hardship.

Like the FIRE grants, the new homeland security

funds were allocated without reference to a national

security plan ( Khademian 2004 ). To guarantee that

any grant monies would be broadly distributed, the

Patriot Act requires that each state be allocated no less

than 0.75 percent of the total appropriated in each

fi scal year. Th us, the distribution formula for the

SHSGP begins from this base for each state ($12.75

million per state in fi scal year 2004) and then takes

population into account. No measure of risk or special

vulnerability is included in the distribution formula.

Although population is a key element in the formula,

the basic funding fl oor still means that funds are

disproportionately distributed to smaller states. Wyo-

ming, Vermont, Alaska, and North Dakota were the

winners in fi scal year 2005 — they received $18.23,

$15.28, $14.99, and $14.48 per capita, respectively —

whereas Texas, Florida, California, New York, Ohio,

Pennsylvania, and Illinois all received less than $3 per

capita. As a result, small towns in rural states are

“ awash in federal money, ” according to a New York

Times report ( Murphy 2004 ). For example, Juneau,

Alaska — population 31,000 — has spent nearly $1

million on a robot for deactivating bombs, decon-

tamination equipment, night-vision goggles, emer-

gency back-up radio system, and other goods for

possible emergencies, even though it is “ an isolated

town … that virtually shuts down when the last cruise

ship leaves in September. ”

Th e only risk-based grant is the UASI, which is ex-

empt from the Patriot Act ’ s minimum-distribution

requirement. According to Tracy Trotman, counsel for

the Department of Homeland Security, “ Th reat drives

the allocation of these funds ” (interview, February 10,

2005). Th is was only partially true during the early

funding rounds. Th is program is a grant to the na-

tion ’ s 50 most vulnerable cities, a determination made

by a formula that initially took population, popula-

tion density, and the presence of critical infrastructure

into account. Despite the population element in the

initial formula, the early rounds of funding produced

some curious per capita disparities. In fi scal year 2004,

for example, New Haven, Connecticut, received more

than $77.00 per capita, proportionally more than any

other city, whereas New York, Los Angeles, and Chi-

cago, all cities considered more likely terrorist targets,

received $5.84, $7.61, and $11.72 per capita, respec-

tively. Smaller cities, some of them highly improbable

candidates for a terrorist attack, such as Santa Ana,

Louisville, Tampa, Baton Rouge, and Buff alo, all

received more than $30 per capita in UASI funding.

Critics, including the authors of the 9/11 report,

began to call for a program that could more carefully

Imperfect Federalism 541

target high-risk cities (CFR 2003; CRS 2004b;

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004,

396 ). In 2005, the ODP added two elements to

the formula to develop a fi ner assessment of local

vulnerabilities: the number of hoaxes or false threats

of terror incidents a city had experienced and the

number of open threat cases. 7 Seven cities, including

New Haven, were removed from the list of recipients

entirely, and seven new ones were added. Total fund-

ing for fi scal year 2005 was increased, and per capita

disparities were smoothed out, though not eliminated.

New York City was the biggest winner: Its UASI

funding increased from $46.7 million in 2004 to

$213.9 million in 2005, raising its per capita receipts

from under $6.00 to $27.71. Los Angeles, Chicago,

and San Diego also saw increases, and Tampa, Jersey

City, Buff alo, and Louisville, among others, saw de-

creases. Although the ODP has sought to introduce

risk factors into the funding formulas of other grant

programs, Congress has insisted on maintaining

the distributional requirement in all but the UASI

program (Tracy Trotman, interview, February 10,

2005). 8

Th e federal role in the homeland security partnership

is a mix of highly centralized control and the sort of

diffi dence that has come to characterize more routine

intergovernmental relations, or

what Christopher Hoene of the

National League of Cities has

called “ fend-for-yourself federal-

ism ” ( Hoene 2003 ). Th is mix is

evident in Congress ’ s insis-

tence — in the face of local com-

plaints — that grants be spent

only on equipment and training

but, at the same time, its refusal

to establish standards for fi rst

responders that pertain, for example, to performance

goals, operational procedures, or equipment specifi ca-

tions (CRS 2003b).

Diffi dence was also on display in the federal govern-

ment ’ s reluctance to advise cities on how to plan for a

possible terrorist attack or what steps to take when the

DHS raises the national alert level. Th e color-code

system was established by the DHS in March 2002.

In the succeeding two years, the alert level was raised

from yellow to orange fi ve times. 9 Th e DHS has not

explained the specifi c information that triggers a rise

in the alert status, frustrating local offi cials who feel

they are left in the dark, and it is rare that specifi c

localities are given special warnings when their par-

ticular risk is heightened. Some local offi cials have

complained that the DHS does not inform them of

alert changes in a timely way, reporting that they fi rst

hear from CNN or other news media that the country

is under a heightened alert (CRS 2003a). Cities are

left to their own devices and instincts about what

specifi c measures to take because Washington provides

no defi ned response protocol. Some jurisdictions

cancel police vacations, activate surveillance cameras,

increase mass transit patrols, and so on, whereas

others do not always taken increased alert warnings

seriously. In Wisconsin, for example, one county

established a command center in response to an

orange alert but never staff ed it ( Dresang 2003 ).

To summarize, the local government “ bill of particu-

lar irritants ” regarding the nature of the homeland

security partnership with the federal government is a

long one. Although the post – 9/11 situation clearly

called for a coherent security strategy articulated by

strong central leadership, with local government

playing a crucial and willing supporting role, local

offi cials believed that they were left too much to

their own devices and made to bear a disproportion-

ate fi scal burden. City leaders did not understand

why they were not included at the outset as mem-

bers of the Homeland Security Council, and they

were angry that federal funding to off set high local

outlays was so long in coming. When it fi nally

came, many regarded it as inadequate, and they did

not expect matters to improve. One estimate sug-

gests that if 2003 levels of federal assistance were

sustained, those funds would provide only about

one-third of what is needed to

cover the costs of training and

equipment over the next fi ve

years (CFR 2003).

Cities were left on their own to

invent their homeland security

responsibilities, a task that began

almost immediately after the

attacks ( Pionke 2001 ). Common

sense dictated taking an inven-

tory of critical infrastructure, increasing surveillance,

developing emergency plans for possible biological

and chemical attacks, and devising the most effi cient

evacuation routes. But cities received no advice from

the DHS until July 2003, when the department issued

guidelines designed to help local governments con-

duct a needs assessment. Th e DHS never addressed

the issue of how diff erent communities ought to re-

spond to changing alert levels ( Sostek 2003 ). Local

governments were not included as partners in any

eff ort to articulate a national strategy ( Khademian

2004 ). Funding delays, pork barrel aid distribution

patterns, and the burdens imposed by federal reim-

bursement requirements generated constant com-

plaints (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2004b).

State and City in the Partnership Th e fi scal partnership between Washington and local

governments is mediated by the states. All homeland

security funding comes to the states, which must, in

turn, pass through 80 percent to local governments.

Th e federal role in the homeland security partnership is a mix of highly centralized

control and the sort of diffi dence that has come to

characterize more routine inter- governmental relations.

542 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006

States are required by the DHS to submit a homeland

security strategy as a condition of receiving any federal

grants, and local governments are bound to spend

their funds according to the priorities identifi ed by the

state. Several issues of contention between states and a

signifi cant minority of cities arose early on. According

to Veronique Pluviose-Fenton, principal legislative

counsel for the National League of Cities, these in-

cluded delays in passing federal funds down to locali-

ties, the development of state plans without local

input, the perceived preference of states for funding

counties rather than cities, and the imposition of

spending priorities that did not accord with local

assessments (interview, February 2, 2005).

Th e states were well positioned to develop their home-

land security responsibilities even before the attacks of

9/11. All 50 states had in place some sort of emergency

planning body, with terrorism preparedness as part of

its portfolio, and they built on this planning experi-

ence. Th e National Emergency Management Associa-

tion has reported that within nine months of the

attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., 19

states had established new positions or agencies with

special responsibility for terrorism planning, and 38

states had established a new or revamped terrorism task

force or working group (NEMA 2003). Nevertheless,

the responsiveness of states to local concerns was un-

even, worrying a number of mayors that their priorities

would be ignored and their fl exibility constrained.

Although between two-thirds and half the cities ex-

pressed satisfaction with the planning and funding

processes mediated by the states, the complaints of

one-half to one-third of the cities sampled are re-

fl ected in the three surveys that the U.S. Conference

of Mayors conducted between September 2003 and

June 2004 (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2003, 2004a,

2004b). Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine

reliably whether matters have improved or deterio-

rated because the surveys canvass diff erent groups of

cities. About one-third in each survey, give or take a

few percentage points, reported that state spending

priorities were not those of the city. Many of these

cities said they were unable to buy the equipment they

needed because it was not on the state list. About half

the cities surveyed each time said they had been cut

out of the process that planned the expenditure of

SHSPG, and approximately one-third said the same

about the UASI program. In the June 2004 survey, 29

percent of the cities said they had no idea what criteria

their state was using to distribute the SHSPG funds.

Th e survey provides no information on which types of

cities — small or large, central city or suburb, fi scally

solvent or distressed — were particularly unhappy.

Th ese survey results suggest in the main that the

state – local relationship functions satisfactorily, but a

persistent minority of cities feel shut out of planning

at the state level and believe their spending priorities

are not respected.

Imperfect Federalism Th ree aspects of homeland security as an intergovern-

mental responsibility are of particular interest. First,

prevailing modes of intergovernmental interaction in

the federal system were not well-suited to crafting and

implementing a coherent national homeland security

policy. Second, after a period of contention fueled by

local government complaints, the federal system has

begun to adapt, moving toward a closer partnership.

And third, the counterweight of state power in the

federal system, embodied in the representative institu-

tions of Congress, represents a fundamental fl aw in

this rare area of domestic policy that calls for highly

centralized national leadership.

Homeland security poses an unusual problem in

American federalism. Security is a high-stakes issue on

which there has been an immediate confl uence of

interests among all three levels of government.

Although the prevailing federalism template normally

predicts a highly decentralized approach to any new

concern, states and localities did not respond to the

challenge of homeland security by proclaiming states ’

rights, invoking the sanctity of home rule, or promis-

ing the sort of laboratory of democracy experimenta-

tion that, say, the run-up to federal welfare reform

represented or that gay marriage currently presents.

Nor did homeland security represent a largely federal

priority or enthusiasm, such as the No Child Left

Behind program or the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit

of the Carter years, for which states and localities

had to be forced to fall into line. Instead, states and

communities looked to Washington to enlist, lead,

and support them in a close partnership in the na-

tional interest. Washington fell short in meeting those

expectations, failing to provide swift fi nancial aid,

failing to provide a clear national security policy with

a role for localities, and failing to help individual

cities understand their specifi c vulnerabilities or

appropriate roles.

But the federal system has a certain capacity for adap-

tation and responsiveness. In March 2004, then Secre-

tary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge began the

process of adaptation by appointing a task force to

examine why federal funds were so slow in reaching

local governments. Unlike the Homeland Security

Council appointed by the president immediately after

the attacks, the task force included state, local, and

tribal offi cials, and it was cochaired by Governor Mitt

Romney of Massachusetts and Mayor Donald

Plusquellic of Akron. Th e fi nal report of the task

force, released three months later, acknowledged the

federal government ’ s primary responsibility for overall

management and funding of homeland security and

made several key recommendations to ease the fi scal

Imperfect Federalism 543

burden on local governments (DHS 2004). 10 Th e

creation of the task force and the reforms it success-

fully advocated quelled much local discontent and

strengthened the sense of partnership (interviews,

Veronique Pluviose-Fenton, February 2, and Ed

Somers, chief of staff , U.S. Conference of Mayors,

February 4, 2005).

Other changes followed in response to local concerns.

Th e Department of Homeland Security changed the

UASI distribution formula to

include more risk factors, thus

reducing some of the per capita

funding inequities. Federal of-

fi cials understand that even more

needs to be done to address this

issue. For fi scal year 2006, the

president ’ s budget proposal

would reduce the minimum state

allocation of homeland security

funds from 0.75 percent to 0.25

percent, thus redressing in some

measure the rural state bias, and

it would require the Department of Homeland Secu-

rity to use more risk and threat factors in distributing

the money instead of counting population so heavily

(U.S. Conference of Mayors 2005). Finally, to stream-

line a fragmented grant process that forced cities to

seek help through six diff erent programs, the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security consolidated these into a

single Homeland Security Grant Program for fi scal year

2005. Th e bloc grant nevertheless retains the identities

of the six individual programs to guide local spending

(CRS 2004c).

It is hard to escape habitual patterns entirely, and

therein lies a key weakness of the federal system in

times of external threat: When Congress disburses

funds to states and localities, the politics of distribu-

tion usually take higher precedence over targeting

need. So it is that even in the case of homeland secu-

rity, money is spread widely across the country, with

small cities, low-profi le cities, inland ports, and small

states receiving disproportionate per capita allocations.

Despite the reforms, the politics of distribution tend

to prevail over allocation rules governed by vulner-

ability assessments and the presence of critical infra-

structure. 11 Although the disparities in federal grants

between vulnerable and less vulnerable places have

been reduced in most cases, anomalies still abound in

the 2005 allocations of SHSGP and UASI funds. Los

Angeles received $17.62 per capita in 2005, whereas

Pittsburgh got $28.99; Chicago received $16.57,

whereas Atlanta ’ s grant was $31.93. In a recent report

by the Department of Homeland Security ’ s inspector

general, the department was castigated for failing to

take vulnerability considerations into account through

four rounds of funding its port security program.

Instead, the department has spread the funds widely,

making grants to ports in Ludington, Michigan, and

Martha ’ s Vineyard, as well as to ports in Arkansas,

Oklahoma, and Kentucky. Th e Port Authority of New

York and New Jersey, which overseas the seaport that

accounts for 12 percent of the nation ’ s maritime cargo

traffi c, received only 1 percent of the port security

grants ( Lipton 2005 ).

Th e American federal system is designed to share

the resources of the nation broadly, and in many

situations — for example, federal

highway funding — a case can be

made that this norm is in the

national interest, even when per

capita shares show great dispari-

ties. Federalism also permits

some redistribution of funds

from wealthy states to poorer

states, a situation for which a

case can be made on equity

grounds. But the practice of

allocating funds to help the

nation ’ s cities and states guard

against acts of foreign terror by adhering to the distri-

butional norms of decentralized federalism is a direct

challenge to the rational public administration of

homeland security.

Notes 1. Or, as the mayor of New Haven, Connecticut,

put it during the aftermath of the September 11

attacks, when disaster strikes, “ We ’ re the people

who show up ” ( Peirce 2003 ).

2. Local governments bore heavy costs. Cities

reported that they had spent $2.1 billion of their

own revenues in 2002 for increased security in

the form of overtime wages for fi rst-responder

personnel and new equipment ( U.S. Conference

of Mayors 2002 ). During periods of heightened

security, cities were spending an additional $70

million per week, according to the Congressional

Research Service (CRS 2003a).

3. Th e act ’ s formal title is the Robert T. Staff ord

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

4. Th e FIRE grants are no longer distributed di-

rectly to fi re departments, as they initially were,

but are now sent fi rst to the states for pass-

through to local governments.

5. In the reauthorization of the FIRE Act in 2004,

the cap was increased on a sliding scale for large

jurisdictions. Th e maximum now is $2.75 million

for cities with populations over 1 million.

6. In 2004, the overtime prohibition was eased in a

supplemental appropriation bill that permitted

cities to use federal funds for overtime costs when

the national alert level is raised.

7. Th e precise weighting of the elements of the

formula has not been made public. Th e fi nal

determination of the amount of money any city

… the practice of allocating funds to help the nation ’ s cities and states guard against acts of foreign terror by adhering to the distributional norms of decentralized federalism is a

direct challenge to the rational public administration of

homeland security.

544 Public Administration Review • July | August 2006

gets is at the discretion of the secretary of home-

land security.

8. However, the president ’ s 2006 budget request

calls for lowering the minimum state allocation

from 0.75 percent to 0.25 percent.

9. Department of Homeland Security secretary

Michael Chertoff initiated a review of the color-

code system in the late spring of 2005, with an

eye toward possibly replacing it.

10. Th e critical recommendation was to persuade

Congress to exempt cities from the Cash

Management Act requirement that forced them

to lay out their own funds and seek

reimbursement.

11. As Senator Frank Lautenberg observed,

“ High-risk states are not getting enough funding

because, under current law, 40 percent of all

homeland security grants — over $1 billion

each year — is given to each and every state

regardless of risk and threat. Th at doesn ’ t make

sense ” ( Congressional Record, February 15, 2005,

sec. 15).

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Imperfect Federalism 545

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