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Third World Quarterly

Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s Author(s): Saad Eddin Ibrahim Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, Islam & Politics (Apr., 1988), pp. 632-657 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992660 . Accessed: 11/09/2014 15:09

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SAAD EDDIN IBRAIIIM

Egypt's Islamic activism in the 1 980s

Islamic resurgence has gradually come to dominate the Egyptian political landscape. Islamic resurgence as a form of political discourse is currently competing successfully with its secular counterparts- liberalism, socialism, and nationalism. Egypt's Islamic resurgence, though significant in itself, is only one instance in the context of far more complex phenomena that are sweeping the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia. Questions of 'identity', 'modernisation', 'cultural authenticity', socio-economic grievances, political participation, and foreign domination are all involved in the resurgence. While there may exist certain similarities between Islamic movements in various parts of the world, there also exist differences that set country experiences apart and that may result in quite different developments taking place, often within the same country. Egypt is no exception. It is therefore neither wise nor accurate to oversimplify or overgeneralise about Islamic resurgence.

If Islamic resurgence was to be roughly defined as a marked increase in religious activities and action, involving the participation of greater numbers of individuals and groups than one would generally expect under 'normal' circumstances, then Egypt's Islamic resurgence could at present be characterised as a broad movement of activity, action and participation, several different tendencies or branches influencing its direction. To be more exact, it is possible to identify at least three distinct tendencies within the religious movement in Egypt, which are often grouped together under the general term of 'Islamic resurgence'. For the lack of better terms, these tendencies may respectively be labelled as 'establishment Islam', 'Sufi Islam', and 'activist Islam'.

Before we elaborate on these three tendencies that constitute the resurgence movement, a brief account of what has come to be known as 'Islamic fundamentalism' is in order. In a sense it is this 'fundamentalism' that binds all three tendencies together. The differences among these three tendencies are very much matters of emphasis, concerning such details as their mode of organisation, strategy, and tactics.

632 TWQ 10(2) April 1988/ISSN 0143-6597/88. $1.25

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EGYPT'S ISLAMIC ACTIVISM IN THE 1980s

Fundamentalism is a concept more often used in Western mass media than in Muslim countries. Its closest equivalent in Arabic is usuliyya-from usul al din, meaning origins or roots of religion. The Arabic term salafiyya-that of the past or predecessors is sometimes used interchangeably with usuliyya. The 'past' in this case refers specifically to the time of the early Muslims who faithfully adhered to the original principles of Islam. Thus 'Islamic fundamentalism' simply means the belief in the precepts and commandments of Islam as stated in the Holy Koran; and, as enunciated and practised by the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunna.' In other words, Islamic fundamentalism is a return to the purest sources of the religion, a movement to cleanse Islam from all the impurities, heresies, and revisionisms which may have influenced its body-intellect as well as its body-practice.

Believers, that is those that fit the fundamentalist description, are convinced that such adherence to the purest sources will deliver them, their society, and the world from all the ills of our time-from the world's decadence, corruption, weakness, poverty and humiliation-in other words, purity of religious practice is believed to be the road to total salvation. It will enable the faithful to establish a perfect social order on earth-an order that is virtuous, just, human, compassionate, free, strong, and prosperous. It is an order that is believed to be far superior to both communism and capitalism. For the Islamic order balances the interests of the individual with the welfare of the community. It balances the material of the 'here and now' on earth with the commandments of the 'hereafter' in preparation for Heaven: 'You do for your world, as if you would live for ever; and for the hereafter as if you would die tomorrow'. Adherence to the purest sources of Islam, the Holy Koran and Sunna, furthermore ensures the faithful Paradise or Heaven when all humans are resurrected in the Day of Judgement.

In concentrating on this world, unlike other religions, Islam has provided not only guidelines to live by, but also a set of comprehensive principles for the regulation of all aspects of life-from the interpersonal to the international. In some major aspects, Islam has even provided detailed codes for human conduct. Its penal codes, hudud, is a case in point.

Reinforcing this conviction in the perfection of Islam is not just the deep religiosity of the faithful, but also, their reading of past as well as their interpretation of the recent history of the umma (Islamic nation or I These distinctions are elaborated in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Contemporary Islamic militancy', in

Ideen Unserar Zeit, Zurich: Rugger Verlag, 1987, pp 109-27.

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community of the believers). The glorious period for many believers was the seventh and eighth centuries of the Christian era and the first century of the Islamic era when the Prophet Muhammad and his four successors, the rightly guided Caliphs, presided over a society that strictly adhered to the spirit and letter of the Holy Koran and Sunna. During that Golden Age, Muslims not only established a perfect society on earth, but were also the masters of the entire world. Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) was the strongest force and the bearer of the torch of world civilisation. Their reading of more recent history is that Dar al-Islam has decayed and become vulnerable to Western encroachment because Muslims have strayed away from their religion: they no longer strictly adhere to its purest sources. The road to salvation, therefore, is self-evident.

The mainstream of fundamentalist thought (al-salafiyya or al-usuliyya) espouses a reading of Islam that is far from extremist. As expounded by Jamal el-Din, al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu in the later part of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century, fundamentalism prides itself on being the epitome of 'moderation'. The umma is a moderate or Middle Nation (ummatun wasta) among all nations. The 'straight path' of Islam is the path that forms the geometric centre between extremes.

Accordingly, Islam is consistent with human nature. It recognises mankind's instincts and impulses but attempts to refine, sublimate, or moderate them. Politically, it emphasises a participatory society through a system of shura -the community's selection of its rulers-counselling them, and holding them accountable on the basis of Sharia (Islamic law). As such, Islam is consistent with Western-type democracy, the Holy Koran being the functional equivalent of a Divine Constitution. There is no priesthood, and hence no theocracy, under Islam. The ulema are learned men of religion; but, they do not constitute a clergy in the Western sense. While rulers may perform some religious functions, for example, leading prayers, and rule according to a Divine Constitution (the Holy Koran), they are not themselves divine, nor do they possess any divine rights. Islamic economic theory regards human labour as the only legitimate basis for generating and accumulating wealth. It recognises private property as guardianship, and protects it in all spheres except those having direct bearings on the community as a whole, for example, in such spheres as water, energy, and other public utilities. It prohibits usury (interest on loans) and the production, trade and

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consumption of commodities which are considered repugnant by Islam: alcohol and intoxicating drugs. In social terms, Islam considers the family as the basis of society. It recognises women's 'equal, but different' rights with men. It accepts religious pluralism with differential rights and obligations for Muslims and Peoples of the Book (Christians and Jews). While recognising classes, Islam frowns upon great class differences and provides several measures to check excessive wealth. It ensures satisfaction of basic needs for the poor, disabled, orphans, and the aged. Finally, Islam glorifies the human mind, the pursuit of knowledge and reason, so long as such intellectual activities cast no doubt on the existence of God Almighty. Thus, today's fundamentalism has no quarrel with modern science and technology.

Articulated in the above terms contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is hard to describe as the ideology of the fanatic. In fact, the majority of today's activists in Egypt are quite moderate in words and deeds. While vigorous in the advocacy of their vision, they do not as a rule resort to violence. The exception to this statement is what we may call, for the lack of a better term, 'Muslim militants'. Thus, while it is a century old, modern Islamic fundamentalism whether at the hands of its pioneers, al-Afghani and Abdu, or its mid-century propagators (Hassan al-Banna and Sayed Qutb in Egypt, and Abu al-Aala al-Mawdudi in Pakistan), the emphasis has always been on consciousness-raising, moral teachings, and peaceful pressure on rulers to heed the call of Islam. Occasional calls for the use of force were mainly directed against the foreign occupation or Zionism. However, even in that respect, Islamic activists were in tune with Egypt's other secular nationalist and patriotic forces.

While much of this article will deal with 'activist Islam' in Egypt, we shall deal first with the other two branches of contemporary Islamic resurgence: 'establishment Islam' and 'sufi-Islam'.

Establishment Islam

Establishment Islam is symbolised by Al-Azhar, the Muslim world's foremost and oldest religious university. It is the centre of Islamic teaching and spiritual guidance. Establishment or official Islam is also embodied in Egypt's Ministry of Religious Endowments-Awkaf (henceforth the MRE). Together, since the time of Mohamed Ali (1805-48) (the founder of the modern Egyptian State), these two bodies

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of establishment Islam have formed the religious arm of the State.2 Previously, Al-Azhar had been an important lobbying institution for the powerless Egyptian masses vis-a-vis their despotic rulers. With Al-Azhar's incorporation into the state, it came to abdicate this vital function. This was largely due to state control over religious endowments. Religious endowments have since the ninth century provided Al-Azhar with an economic base, securing for the university some degree of economic and therefore political independence. Under Mohamed Ali, such endowments were brought under state control. The ulema or sheikhs of Al-Azhar and other religious functionaries became in effect state employees, losing their independence and consequently their political role as spokesmen for the masses. To be sure, occasionally tenacious towering figures such as Muhammad Abdu and Ali Abdul Razek from Al-Azhar opposed the Egyptian rulers. But these figures have tended to be the exception rather than the rule, and have often had to be men of independent means, in order to secure with subsequent dismissal, an alternative income source. Even with such rare figures, the government has usually managed to rally other Al-Azhar ulema figures against dissenters as was the case with Abdul-Razek and then Taha Hussein in the 1920s and 1930s.3 This trend of emasculating Al-Azhar continued steadily through the post-Second World War period, both under the Royals as well as under Egypt's revolutionary leadership after 1952.

Establishment Islam is now an easily manipulated tool of the Egyptian state. It can be counted on to issue pronouncements (fatwa) to legitimise government policies. When King Fouad made his bid to become a Muslim Caliph in the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman Empire (and with the abolition of this institution in Turkey), some Al-Azhar sheikhs were ready to provide the necessary pronouncements. Some went as far as fabricating genealogical links between the aspiring King and the Prophet Muhammad. Gamal Abd al-Nasser, at a later stage, had no trouble obtaining fatwas to justify Arab Socialism and his struggle against Israel. Justification was provided on Islamic grounds, in terms of precepts on social Islamic justice and jihad respectively. Sadat obtained 2 Hanafi, Hassan, 'Islam and politics in Egypt: 1952-1977' in S E Ibrahim, Egypt in a Quarter of a

Century (in Arabic). Beirut: Arab Development Institute, 1980, pp 265-340; and Barbara, Rosewiez, 'Prestigious Al-Azhar is a force of moderation', Wall Street Journal, 10 August 1987, p 18.

3 The reference here is to Ali Abdel Razek's book Islam and Fundamentals of Rule (in Arabic, al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm) in which he advocated the separation between Islam and governments; and to Taha Hussein's book, The Jahiliyya Literature (in Arabic, al-Adab al-Jahili), both appeared in the early 1930s and were considered by Al-Azhar as 'heretical'.

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fatwas for the sake of justifying opposing policies, including his treaty with Israel. Mrs Jehan Sadat found enough ulema to support her drive for changing the Personal Status Law in the late 1970s. With Sadat's death in 1981, many ulema expressed their misgivings as regards this law and the law was amended accordingly in 1985.4

This lack of backbone has logically resulted in an erosion in the credibility of establishment Islam, particularly among young educated Egyptians. The latter would have nothing good to say about A1-Azhar and the MRE ulema. Some of them, especially militant activitists, are plainly hostile toward these ulema. They often describe them as 'parrots of the pulpit' (babghawat al-manaber), 'stooges of the government', or 'religious mercenaries'.5

Despite its emasculation and diminishing credibility with the young, establishment Islam still commands considerable respect and prestige with common Egyptians. It controls some 10,000 mosques, hundreds of secondary educational institutions and several provincial branches of Al-Azhar University.6 It has monopoly access to the state-controlled media, especially radio and television. In the last fifteen years, activities of establishment Islam have grown as rapidly as those of 'activist Islam'. Between 1970 and 1985, the state-supported mosques have more than doubled their number of religious educational institutions and their student intake has more than tripled. Finally the number of radio and television hours of religious programmes have quadrupled during this period. There is now a radio station which is exclusively devoted to such programmes (twelve hours daily); religious broadcasting accounts for nearly one-quarter of the hours of all other radio and television channels. Publications issued by Al-Azhar, MRE and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA), which affirm the officially approved version of Islam, have also increased four fold.

This tremendous growth in the activities of establishment Islam in Egypt has been partly a genuine response to grass-roots needs, especially after Egypt's defeat in 1967 at the hands of Israel. But equally, the growth in establishment Islam has also been an attempt by the government to counterbalance the upsurge in 'activist Islam'. The latter 4 See an elaborate account of the changing relationship between the religious establishment and the

state in Fahmy Howaidi, The Quran and the Sultan (in Arabic), Cairo: Dar al Shuruk, 1982. 5 These descriptions were used by young Islamic militants interviewed in prison by the author

between 1977 and 1979. See details on this point in S E Ibrahim 'Anatomy of Egypt's militant Islamic groups', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12, December 1980, pp 423-53.

6 These figures are obtained from a mimeographed report prepared by Egypt's Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMS), titled Imams and Preachers in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Cairo, June 1984. See also, Rosewiez 'Prestigious Al-Azhar'.

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is considered by the state and establishment Islam as 'deviant', 'fanatic' or 'lunatic'.

Antagonisms between 'establishment' and 'activist' Islam are often heightened during episodes of violent confrontations between the Islamic activists and the Egyptian state. But for the most part, the two 'Islams' actually reinforce the general religiosity of the Egyptian masses. Establishment Islam emphasises beliefs, worship, and rituals, while it generally remains silent on matters of 'politics'. If pressed, it cannot but acknowledge the virtues of implementing Sharia (Islamic law), although suggesting a 'gradualist' path, often qualified with a statement of 'preconditions' that must first be fulfilled.

Sufi Islam Sufi Islam in contemporary Egypt has, likewise, witnessed an impressive upsurge in recent years. Some fifty major Sufi orders and twice as many minor orders are registered in a federation known as the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders (scso)-al-Majlis al-Aala Lilturuk al Sufiyya. Each order has its central leadership and headquarters, mostly in Cairo, with provincial and village branches throughout Egypt.7

Classical Sufism-along the lines expressed by al-Ghazali, Rabia al-Adawiyya, Ibn Arabi and similar figures of medieval Islam-is known for its puritanic spiritualism and retreat from worldly concerns. Sufism is a perpetual quest for 'unity with God'. It seeks human salvation and eternal peace and harmony through minimum involvement in societal affairs. Egypt's Sufi orders, however, do not strictly conform to such an 'ideal type'. They are mostly loosely organised fraternities around mystical leaders. Members of a tarika (order), are fully engaged in everyday pursuits. But they gather together periodically (weekly, monthly, or annually) for collective prayers, religious chanting, dancing (zikr) and dining. Every tarika has its own recitals, insignia, parades and other identifying symbols. On the occasion of the Prophet's birthday, all of Egypt's Sufi orders gather for several days around the mosque of al-Hussein (the mosque named after the Prophet's grandson). Their ceremonies culminate in a grand parade in the Old City. Each order usually mobilises its membership for the occasion. The parade often goes on for hours. And it is at times like these that an observer takes ready note of the annual growth of such orders. 7 For a detailed account on Egypt's sufi orders, see Morroe Berger, Islam in Egypt Today: Social

and Political Aspects of Popular Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970 especially pp 62-89.

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There is little information available on the membership of Egypt's Sufi orders. But members who have registered with the scso, and hence have the privilege of participating in the annual parades have tripled between 1970 and 1985.8 In the mid-1960s the parade march took no more than two hours following the afternoon prayer (al-asr) and ending well before the sunset prayer (al-maghreb). In the mid-1980s, the parade begins after the noon prayer (al-zuhr) and may continue long after sunset.

Sufi Islam provides its members with an intimate sense of belonging (to a tarika). The spirit of fellowship and communion is exhilarating. There is a good deal of mutual help among each order's membership. There are no harsh demands or strict organisational obligations. As such the Sufi orders seem well suited for traditional middle-aged urbanites. On the surface, Sufi orders in Egypt are apolitical. As such they represent no threat to the state or the regime. If anything, the government is sufficiently comfortable with their activities for it to provide facilities for their congregation in Cairo and other cities. While there is peaceful rivalry among the different orders, the orders as a whole do not take sides on socio-political issues. They neither condemn nor condone 'establishment Islam' or 'activist Islam'; establishment Islam (Al-Azhar and MRE) tends to take a benign attitude toward Sufi Islam. In fact several well-known Azhar ulema were and are known to be Sufis themselves. Activist Islam, on the other hand, holds a critical view of Sufism in general, and of Egypt's Sufi orders in particular. Muslim militants see these orders as inimical to true belief. A true believer for them should be engaging and striving in matters of this world 'as if he would live forever' in the same manner as 'he prepares for the hereafter as if he would die tomorrow'.

Despite their apolitical appearance and manners, Sufi orders are potential social activists. It is not unusual for a member who joined an order for 'individual salvation' to discover or be persuaded that such salvation is better attained collectively and through other means as well. The late Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood is a case in point. He started as a young Sufi during his college career. But soon after, he smoothly made the transition into religio-political activism.

8 Information obtained directly from Egypt's Supreme Council of Sufi Orders (scso) indicate that the number of such registered orders has grown from twenty-one in 1960 to sixty in 1985. Some minor orders in existence and active are not registered, especially if they are split-offs from major orders.

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Activist Islam

Contemporary 'Islamic activism' in Egypt has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. Thus, while millions of Egyptian Muslims subscribe to fundamentalist ideas, and take their cues from 'establishment Islam' or 'Sufi Islam', only Islamic activists are willing to go one step further. They strive to bring about the Islamic order-to restore a 'paradise lost'. The activists propagate the vision of Islam by words and deeds. In their advocacy they use peaceful or violent means; and often, a mixture of both.

In its sixty years, the Brotherhood has managed to politicise Islam as no other indigenous popular movement has ever done in Egypt's history. The impressive development and the march of the Brotherhood is beyond the scope of this paper, and details of its development can be found elsewhere.9 In its most violent phase (1945-65) the Brotherhood was implicated in assassinations of its political opponents in both royal and revolutionary Egypt.'0 It was such an attempt on Nasser's life in 1954 that broke the Brotherhood's back and marginalised it in Egyptian politics for nearly twenty years. Nasser hit back with unprecedented ferocity. Thousands of the Brotherhood's members were jailed and tortured. Several of the Brotherhood's leaders were executed, including top theoreticians such as Abdel Qader in 1955 and Sayyed Qutb in 1965.

It was not until Nasser's defeat in 1967 that the Muslim Brotherhood was to gradually recover from its twenty-year eclipse. When it did, its remaining leaders had made the strategic decision to discard violence. The decision was preceded by heated debates among the membership inside and outside Nasser's prisons. Younger members never accepted the new strategy of 'non-violence'. Others had decided to divorce themselves not only from violence but from politics as well. Thus, by the time Sadat released them from jail, the Muslim Brothers were divided into four broad tendencies, all of them activists and committed to the cause of an Islamic socio-political order, but widely differing on issues of strategy, tactics, and internal organisation. These four tendencies were

9 The best and most detailed account of the foundation and evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood is found in Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, London: Oxford University Press, 1969. See also, Ishaq Musa Husayni, The Muslim Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements (translated from Arabic), Beirut: Khayat College Book Cooperation, 1956; Rifat al-Said, Hassan al-Banna (in Arabic), Cairo: Madbouly Bookshop, 1978.

10 See an account of the Brotherhood's acts of violence in Fahmy Howaidi, 'The new Commander [of the Faithful] in Upper Egypt' (in Arabic), Al-Ahram, 17 November 1987. Among these assassinations before 1952 was a judge A al-Khazendar and a prime-minister M F al-Noukrashi in 1947 and 1948-49, respectively.

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the apolitical Muslim Brotherhood; the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood; the anti-regime Muslim groups; and the anti-society Muslim groups.

The ideological underpinnings of the four tendencies are fairly clear; and will be dealt with shortly. Organisationally however, the boundaries between them, particularly the last two, are not as clear. The official security reports are often confusing as to the names, numbers, size, and relative weight of these groups. We rarely learn anything definitive about them until their membership is either implicated, arrested or tried for 'illegal acts'. In the last several years the violence-prone groups have received much of the media attention at home and abroad especially after the Iranian revolution. Their acts of defiance and bloody confrontations with the Egyptian state have been sensational enough to warrant such attention. But in the longer term it is probably the first two tendencies that are gradually, if less dramatically, having an impact on the 'body-social' of Egypt.

The apolitical Muslim Brotherhood Encompassing a smaller number, mostly middle-aged professionals, this group while still loyal to the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood has decided to devote its time and energy to religious teaching, moral reinforcement, and setting up modem economic and service institutions along 'Islamic lines'.'1 As it turns out, this group has been as active as the other groups, though without the same blatant public profile, and without resorting to violence or extra-legal methods. Its members try to be as 'Islamic' as possible within the existing 'non-Islamic' socio-political order of the Egyptian state.

Its initial success in setting up economic enterprises (Islamic Banks, investment companies, factories, large-scale farming and agribusiness) has tempted several intruders (not originally Muslim Brothers) to follow suit, using the same religious appeal of usury-free enterprises. By the mid-1980s, the original as well as the intruding Islamic entrepreneurs

Having escaped Egypt to the oil-rich Arab countries during Nasser's crack-down on the Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, many members of the Brotherhood accumulated substantial savings abroad; returned to Egypt in the early 1970s, took advantage of Sadat's new open-door economic policy, and set-up various types of industrial enterprise. The Al-Sherif brothers are perhaps a good example of Brotherhood entrepreneurship. In one decade their small plastic enterprise had grown into an agglomeration of multi-industries agribusiness, and investment companies. The total value of its assets are estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars at home and abroad. See, al-Ahram al-Iktisadi (in Arabic-Al-Ahram Economist), 8 December 1986.

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had amassed substantial deposits from a broad strata of Egyptian Muslims. The competition with public (state-owned) and other conventional private institutions is increasingly in their favour. Press reports have estimated the volume of Islamic venture-capital held by these institutions to be anywhere between $5 billion and $15 billion.12 With the exception of Islamic banking (which like all banking is regulated by Egypt's Central Bank), most of the other Islamic economic enterprises are simple contractual arrangements between a major entrepreneur and thousands of individual 'partners' (depositors). 3 Hence, the details of their transactions, through accounts and annual reports, etc, are not publicly monitored. This fact alone has been a belated cause for alarm by the state-controlled press since mid-1986. A sustained campaign was intensively waged against 'the so-called Islamic investment companies' in the autumn of that year. Citizens were warned to stop dealing with them. One of these companies, al-Rayyan, was rumoured to have lost millions of dollars while speculating in gold and hard currencies abroad.'4 The campaign and the rumour resulted in a run on the company's offices by thousands of clients demanding their money. To the surprise of all, including the government, al-Rayyan honoured every request for withdrawal. This episode strengthened, rather than weakened, the Islamic investment companies, particularly al-Rayyan. Most of those who had withdrawn their money returned it shortly after. The loud publicity surrounding the episode encouraged new clients to deal with these companies, particularly as the news of their high rate of return (20 per cent annually or more-twice the rate of return given by the commercial banking sector) became widely known.

Apolitical Islamic activism has not confined itself to the economic sphere. There is a broad range of services rendered under the catchword 'Islamic'. Again most of these were started by the original Muslim Brothers in the 1970s. Among the most widely used facilities of the Brotherhood are the medical services clinics to be found in more than

12 ibid., see also an interview with Dr Atef Sidky Egypt's Prime Minister, Al-Ahram, 14 August, 1987. The higher estimates of L.E. 48 billion (about $25 billion) of the 180 Islamic investment companies was given by the Cairo weekly Sawt al-Arab, 9 August 1987.

13 The typical contractual arrangement takes the form of a statement to the effect that 'the undersigned has agreed to put the amount of ... at the disposal of ... (the name of the enterpreneur) to invest on his behalf in Islamically lawful activities; and accepts the risks of such an investment. In case of positive return he gets the profits ... (monthly, quarterly, or annually).

14 See details of this campaign in the state-controlled Cairo weeklies al-Mosawwar, 14, 21, and 28, November 1986, and Al-Ahram al-Iktisadi, 1, 8 December 1986.

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20,000 non-governmental mosques,'5 many of which have operating facilities for minor surgery. The Islamic clinics charge their clients a nominal or modest fee for a generally better and more compassionate service than their state-run counterparts.'6

Similar educational and other social services are rendered by apolitical Islamic activists. Often these are also located on the premises of non-governmental mosques. These are run on a low-cost overhead basis and generally provide good-quality services given the donated time and expertise of their volunteer workers. More recently, Islamic economic entrepreneurs have also involved themselves in providing similar services on a graded service-charge basis, according to ability to pay.'7 Thus al-Rayyan, the controversial and well publicised investment company, has advertised daily for its newly established nurseries, schools, medical clinics, restaurants, and publishing houses.

This strand of Islamic activism has therefore set about establishing concrete Islamic alternatives to the socio-economic institutions of the state and the capitalist sector. Islamic social welfare institutions are better run than their state-public counterparts, less bureaucratic and less impersonal, if slightly more expensive and riskier. They are definitely more grass-roots oriented, far less expensive and far less opulent than the institutions created under Sadat's infitah (open-door policy), institutions which mushroomed in the 1970s and which have been providing an exclusive service to the top 5 per cent of the country's population.

Apolitical Islamic activism has thus developed a substantial socio-economic muscle through which it has managed to baffle the state and other secular forces in Egypt. The Islamic non-governmental organisations are operating within the bounds of Egyptian law but independently of the state. So far they are displaying a high degree of vitality and viability that is envied by their secular counterparts. And so

5 In 1980, the number of mosques in Egypt was about 28,000 of which slightly more than 7,000 were government controlled and the remainder (more than 20,000) were independently controlled. The former are maintained, their preachers and employees are paid, and their activities (including the text of the Friday Ceremony, (Khutba) are directly supervised by the government's MRE and Al-Azhar. The latter remained completely outside government control till 1981, when they too were placed under partial governmental supervision. See CAPMAS' report, Imams and Preachers, op. cit.

16 This statement is based on field observations by a research team currently working with the author. Three medical institutions in Cairo-one Islamic (Mustafa Mahmoud Mosque), one governmental (Abu al-Rish Hospital), and one private (al-Salamm International Hospital) have been sampled for comparable services.

7 See, for example, al-Rayyan's and al-Hoda's advertising for such services in Egypt's major daily Al-Ahram 6, 13 November 1987.

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far, attempts to smear or discredit them by the state media have had little impact. The irony of the matter is that while the Egyptian public may often be exposed to hostile editorials against such organisations, they will also be exposed to positive promotional advertising on behalf of these Islamic organisations, usually in the same daily newspapers and weekly magazines.'8 In fact, most of these institutions are quite sophisticated in their advertising. Their style combines an appeal of 'Islamic authenticity' and a Madison Avenue-like attraction. The atmosphere they have created is also beneficial to the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood.

The mainstream Muslim Brotherhood Encompassing the majority of the old Muslim Brothers, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood has retained the original name and is perceived by the state and the public to be an extension of the original Brotherhood. Although still technically banned (since the attempt on Nasser's life in 1954), the Brotherhood has enjoyed 'de facto recognition' by the Egyptian government since the mid-1970s and has also issued its own monthly publication (al-Daawa, al-Iitisam, and al-Mukhtar al-Islami) regularly between 1974 and 1981.

When Sadat released Brotherhood leaders from prison in the early 1970s, and then allowed them a reasonable measure of freedom, his motives were concerned with the support that the Brotherhood could give in countering his Nasserist and leftist detractors. In the first years of Sadat's presidency, the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups were largely to keep their side of the bargain.'9

While committed as ever to its historical objective of bringing about an Islamic social order, the Brotherhood is now equally committed to achieving this objective by non-violent means, a decision that led in the early 1970s to the breakaway of several groups from its ranks. Even when its disenchantment with Sadat grew steadily in the late 1970s, the Brotherhood remained true to its commitment, confining its opposition to legal political means. Many of President Sadat's policies were 18 See, for example, issue of Al-Ahram al-Iktisadi, 2 Nov 1987 in which the editorial and three

articles (pp 8-2 1) were directed against these companies. Meanwhile the Al-Ahram daily (the same publishing house) on the same day carried promotion advertising for three of these companies (al-Rayyan, al-Huda, and al-Saad). This practice is not confined to the state-controlled media. The leftist weekly Al-Ahali issue of 25 November 1987 published an article against Islamic investment companies (p 3) and an advertisement for one of them (al-Rayyan) on the back page.

'9 For an account of the relationship between the Brotherhood and Sadat, see Ibrahim, 'An Islamic alternative in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat', Arab Studies Quarterly, 4 (2) Spring 1982.

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vehemently criticised, especially his 'peace initiative' with Israel. The Brotherhood has had a long-standing hostility toward Zionism. Its volunteers had fought beside the Palestinian resistance long before the Arab armies entered the war of 1948. The Brotherhood's position on Sadat's policy towards Israel centred on the impossibility of peaceful co-existence with the Jewish state. Israel is viewed as 'a villain aggressor on the abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam). Israel is directly or indirectly behind major calamities befalling Muslims everywhere, particularly in Palestine. Israel has desecrated Muslim Shrines in the Holy Land. As an evil it must be eradicated'.20 These assertions were echoed in nearly every issue of al-Daawa and al-Iitisam, with increasing passion following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and before these two magazines and other Brotherhood publications were banned by Sadat in September 1981. It was the openness of the attack by the Brotherhood that emboldened other opposition groups to come out against Sadat's policy of reconciliation with Israel. His alliance with the West, especially the USA, was criticised as well. The Brotherhood's criticism was credible, effective, and painful.

Thus, in his September 1981 crackdown on the opposition, Sadat spared one or two top leaders of each opposition party, for example, K Mohi-eldin of the Progressive Unionist Party (PuP) and Ibrahim Shukry of the Socialist Labour Party (SLP). However, with the Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat's arrests included all elements within the top leadership, in addition to the seventy-year-old Supreme Guide, Omar el-Telmessani. Out of the 1,500 arrested and detained between 3-5 September 1981, about two-thirds were from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups.

Shortly after Sadat's assassination on 6 October 1981, by the Islamic group al-Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership was released from jail. The Brotherhood was not implicated in the use of violence on this occasion nor had it been in earlier confrontations with Sadat that had occurred in April 1974 and January and July 1977. This violence-free record of the Brotherhood further consolidated its image as a respectable and responsible opposition. Under the wise stewardship of its third Supreme Guide, Omar el-Telmessani, the Brotherhood increased its membership and considerably improved its relationship with other opposition parties. There was also a significant shift in the Muslim Brotherhood's political thought and practice. 20 See the Brotherhood's monthly al-Dawa, issues of December 1977 to April 1981.

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Beside discarding violence and opting for change by peaceful means, the Brotherhood in the 1980s had clearly accepted political pluralism and parliamentary democracy as the road forward. In earlier decades, the Brotherhood had firmly asserted that only two types of party can possibly exist: God's Party (Hisbu Allah) and Satan's Party (Hisby Ashytan). The Brotherhood was the former, and all others the latter. Not only has the Brotherhood come to discard this stand in recent years but it also entered into alliance with other parties in coalitional arrangements for parliamentary elections. Thus in 1984 the Brotherhood, which is still illegal as regards formal political participation and cannot run on a separate party2l list, chose to form an alliance with the Wafd party (wp). This decision was all the more significant for the fact that the wp has been the most 'secular' of Egypt's modern political parties since the 1919 revolution. The coalition managed to win some sixty-five seats (out of 450), seven of which were for the Brotherhood. The coalition came second only to Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) and served as the major opposition in the People's Assembly (Egypt's Parliament) for three years. In the 1987 elections, the Brotherhood shifted its alliance and formed a coalition with two smaller parties: the Socialist Labour Party (SLP) and the Liberal Party (LP). The new coalition took the name of Islamic Alliance (IA)-al-Tahaluf al-Islami. Again this bloc came second to the NDP, with some sixty seats, thirty-eight of which went to the Brotherhood. The IA now forms the major opposition group to the ruling party.

The 1987 election was a landmark for the Muslim Brotherhood. Three years earlier it was a minor partner in a coalition dominated by the wp. In contrast, the Brotherhood was now the dominant partner in the IA; and was responsible not only for the IA'S 'Islamic' name but also for the first demand in the coalition's ten-point election platform, which called for the implementation of Islamic Sharia.22 The campaign's only slogan was 'Islam is the Solution'. The Brotherhood's resounding success was 2' Egypt's electoral law was changed in 1984 (shortly before the election) from an individual

candidacy to a complicated proportional representation. Candidates must be on a party-list for a given enlarged district (Egypt was divided into some fifty electoral districts) to compete for its seats (ranging from seven to ten seats per district). A given party must first obtain a minimum of 8.0 per cent of the popular vote nation-wide, then gets a number of seats (or none) in each district proportional to the number of votes it obtained in that district. In the 1984 Elections no 'independent' candidate could run for the People's Assembly. The law was amended again, also shortly before the 1987 Election, because of the Supreme Constitutional Court's ruling, and allowed 'independents' to run, but only for one seat per district. The 1987 electoral law is also contested in Court by the opposition.

22 For the Islamic Alliance Platform, see the SLP weekly al-Shab issues of 17 March through to 15 April.

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dramatised by the fact that the son of its founder and first Supreme Guide, Seif al-Islam Hassan al-Banna was among those elected, along with the son of the Brotherhood's second Supreme Guide, Maamoun H al-Hudhaiby. While all other major parties, namely the government's NDP and the wp, registered a net loss in votes cast in 1987 as compared to 1984,23 the Brotherhood also increased its number of seats in the Assembly by more than five-fold, the number of seats rising from seven to thirty-eight.

Equally significant was the IA'S accommodating and sophisticated election campaign. The campaign went out of its way to dispel the fears of Egypt's Christian Copts by both words and deeds. The second demand of the ten-point election platform was the unequivocal affirmation of the IA's desire for 'full equal rights and obligations between Muslims and their Coptic brothers'.24 To couple these words with deeds, the IA placed several Copts on its candidacy lists. The only Copt who was put at the top of a party list and was elected in the 1987 Election was with the IA.25

Spearheading the IA, the Brotherhood's position during and after the 1987 election was one of moderation, gradualism, and constitutionalism. Its spokesmen emphasised the imperative of going slowly, but steadily, with the implementation of Sharia, making clear that they do not wish a repeat of the premature and ill-fated experience of the Sudan,26 nor its implementation in the convulsive revolutionary manner of Iran. By the same token, the Brotherhood has painstakingly distanced itself from the anti-regime violence-oriented Muslim groups, such as Repentance and Holy Flight (al-Takfir wa al-Hijra) and Holy War (al-Jihad). The Brotherhood has largely benefited from the fanaticism of such groups, 23 Out of the 448 seats, the NDP had 391 in 1984, which dropped to 353 in 1987 (a net loss of

thirty-eight seats). The wp (with the Brotherhood combined) had fifty-seven seats in 1984, which dropped to thirty-five in 1987. Since the Brotherhood was not with wp in the latter election its net loss is actually twelve seats (i.e. from forty-seven to thirty-five).

24 Al-Shaab, 17 March, 1987. 25 The reference is to Mr Gammal Asad Abdel-Malak. The NDP (the majority party) did not put any

Copt on the top of any of its districts' lists. Dr Botrous Ghali, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1977, is a Christian (but not a Copt) and was on one of the NDP's lists for the number two District of Central Cairo and was the only other Christian elected in 1987. It is noteworthy that there are ten seats in the Assembly whose occupants are appointed by the President; most of which go to Egyptian Copts. For other accommodating statements by the Brotherhood vis-a-vis the Copts, see Sheikh Mustafa Mashhour, 'The correct Islamic understanding of national unity', al Shaab, 3 November 1987, p 5.

26 The reference is to former President Numeiri of Sudan when he hurriedly implemented the Islamic Penal Code in September 1983. As this coincided with the severe drought in the Sudan (1983-85), not to mention the chronic economic problems of the country, the result was that hundreds of poor Sudanese had their hands chopped for thieving. Wide-spread protest inside and outside the Sudan broke out. Ultimately Numeiri was toppled, for this and other reasons, in April 1985.

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looking quite sane and respectable by comparison. Meanwhile the Brotherhood never fails to point out that had the state allowed its own organisation political rights, these fanatic groups would not have flourished underground.27

The Brotherhood has taken full advantage of present conditions in Egypt. It has capitalised on the upsurge in the overall religiosity of the Egyptian masses since 1967. It has been steadily filling the political vacuum created by Nasser's departure from the scene in 1970. Its religious populism is proving to be the functional equivalent to Nasser's national socialism. Both types of populism seem to appeal to the same constituency: the lower-middle class in particular and the middle class in general. The mainstream politicised Muslim Brotherhood has also taken advantage of the growing economic muscle of the apolitical Muslim Brotherhood tendency. And as we have also noted, the Brotherhood has benefited, by default, from the actions of the other more violence-prone Islamic groups.

The Brotherhood's success can be attributed to a number of factors. One of the main factors was its decision to pursue its objectives peacefully. A factor of equal significance was the leadership of Sheikh Omar el-Telmessani, the third Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood. Telmessani was a seasoned and shrewd politician. He navigated steadily but gently in post-Nasserite Egypt. He never compromised in matters of principles under Sadat or Mubarak. His advocacy of Islamic Sharia remained relentless till his death in 1986. Telmessani vehemently objected to Sadat's policies: especially Camp David, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and alliance with the USA. He did all this with a style that baffled and at times outraged Sadat; but, without libellous or illegal implications. Telmessani was also successful in ending the Brotherhood's half-century of self-imposed alienation from secular political forces in the country. He instituted the practice of cooperation with other political parties. His motto in this regard was 'we cooperate sincerely with others in matters on which there are common agreement-we sincerely excuse each other on matters of disagreement.'28 Finally, Telmessani laid firm rules of leadership in the Brotherhood, proposing that it should be-collectively organised through the Supreme Office of Guidance (soG), with command passing to the oldest member unless he wilfully declines. This practice spared the Brotherhood of one of the toughest problems faced by all mass 27 See Mashhour, 'Islamic understanding', op. cit. p 5. 28 From an interview with the author in February 1984.

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movements, namely the problem of succession. Thus, when Telmessani passed away, the issue of succession was smoothly settled without much fanfare.29

Social movements seem to go through a process of maturation. The first stage of the process is that of preaching and advocacy. The second stage is that of organisation and confrontation, in which the emphasis is on radical action. The third stage is that of 'institutionalisation' in which the emphasis is on consolidation and statesmanship. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood seems to have followed this general pattern of development. Its three successive stages fall between the periods 1928-45, when the organisation pursued its educational programme and formulated its objectives; 1945-70, when the organisation's programme of radical action led to its being declared an illegal organisation; and 1970 to the present day following successive liberalisations, first by Sadat and then by Mubarak.

The last stage in the Brotherhood's sixty-year history has coincided with external societal developments that have indirectly enhanced the Brotherhood's strength. The Brotherhood have been able to capitalise on discontent arising from actions taken in Sadat's Egypt in the 1970s and the lack of direction under Mubarak during the 1980s. Sadat's open-door policy, his alliance with the USA and peace with Israel, effectively undermined the legitimacy of his regime. In the 1980s growing inequities, coupled with rising foreign influence, and alienation from the rest of the Arab and Muslim world has also created conditions of widespread discontent. The Brotherhood has thus been able to capitalise on mass frustration, particularly among the youth and the lower-middle and middle classes. The Brotherhood, however, is not the only Islamic group to have done so. More violence-prone groups have been able to appropriate some younger elements from these same classes that make up the discontented.

The anti-regime Muslim groups The anti-regime Muslim groups represent some of the factions that broke away from the main body of the Brotherhood and have been acting on their own behalf since the early 1970s. The militant violence of these groups was aimed at toppling the regime (Sadat's and now Mubarak's) and bringing about an 'Islamic regime'. Proponents of this 29 Upon Telmessani's death in 1986, Mr Hamed Abn-Alnasr, the oldest member of SPG was

automatically chosen as the fourth Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood. Other more able but few other younger members, e.g. Sheikh Mustafa Mashhour (cited above) were bypassed.

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tendency contend that the present decadence and corruption that characterises society is rooted within the ruling political elite. No amount of preaching, religious consciousness-raising, or behaviour- modelling is sufficient to change this state of affairs (as the first tendency, the apolitical Brotherhood contends). Nor would any amount of non-violent political activism bring about the desired result (as the second tendency, the mainstream Brotherhood contends). In their view, Egyptian society at large is redeemable if, and only if, its leadership would be truly 'Islamic'. Thus, the struggle must be directed against the rulers, to remove them or force them to submit to the Islamic will. This anti-regime tendency has been embodied in the Islamic Liberation Organisation and the Jihad Organisation. The first, otherwise known as the Technical Military Academy Group (TMA), had a bloody confrontation with the Sadat regime in April 1974.30 The second, the Jihad, is believed to be an ideological, if not also an organisational, extension of the former, the TMA. The Jihad group was by far the bloodiest and most deadly in its confrontations with the state. For despite the preventive arrest of hundreds of its members by the state in September 1981, it still had sufficient organisational capability to plan and successfully carry out the assassination plot that took the life of President Sadat on 6 October 1981. And despite a second round-up of its members in the aftermath of the assassination, the Jihad was still able to storm the main police headquarters in the Governorate of Assyut, and kill or wound tens of state security men. Some members have already been tried for direct involvement in the assassination of President Sadat, receiving death sentences or varying terms of imprisonment. A second trial, involving 302 Jihad members charged for the Assyut events and membership in an unlawful organisation, ended on 30 September 1984 with 1 10 convicted, receiving prison sentences ranging from two to forty years.31

30 The TMA plan to topple the regime was fairly simple. Some 100 TMAS were to storm the Technical Military Academy (in cooperation with some of their own members inside who were cadets), seize enough arms and vehicles; march on to the Arab Socialist Union building where Sadat and other top leaders were attending an official event, arrest or kill them; and storm the nearby radio and television building to announce the birth of the 'Islamic Republic of Egypt'. The first two stages of the plot on 18 April, 1974, were carried out. Before the TAMs could leave the Academy on their way to the Arab Socialist Union, the State Security Forces counter-attacked. Eleven people were killed and twenty-seven were wounded. For more details, see Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups', op. cit., p 450.

3' For a full analytical account of the Jihad group and the events of 1981, see Nemat Guenena, 'The Jihad an "Islamic Alternative" in Egypt', Cairo Papers in Social Science (9) Monograph 2, Summer 1986.

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After a four-year lull under President Mubarak, the Jihad and other like-minded groups resumed their confrontations with the state through acts of defiance and violence. In 1986, several attacks and bombing incidents were directed against nightclubs, video shops, alcohol stores and taverns. In 1987, assassination attempts were made on the lives of two former ministers of the interior, Hassan Abu-Pasha, El-Nabawy Ismael, and a leading journalist, Makram M Ahmed. The first two were targeted by Islamic militants for their alleged role in ordering the torture of 'fellow Muslims' while in jail between 1981 and 1984. The third was singled out for his relentless smearing of Muslims groups in his editorials in the weekly magazine al-Miswar. It took a few months before the Egyptian authorities were able to arrest some, but not all, suspects in August 1987 and charge them for committing these acts in November 1987. In the process, several skirmishes and shoot-outs took place, with a score of dead and wounded on both sides.32

In a few upper-Egyptian cities, namely Assyut, Sohag, Menia, and Bani-Souef, Islamic militant students have been harassing other students either for being too 'liberal' or for being Christian Copts.33 They are audacious enough to occasionally hold hostages and make demands on the authorities in return for their release.34 They also issue their own religious pronouncements and edicts (fatwas) and proceed to implement them directly, bypassing religious (Al-Azhar) and state authorities.35

The ideological underpinnings of this anti-regime violent Islamic tendency are outlined in a small booklet al Faridha al Ghaeba (The Absent Commandment) attributed to Mohammed Abdel Salam Farag. The 'absent commandment' is the Jihad and hence the name given by the authorities to the group led by Farag, which assassinated President Sadat in 1981. Farag takes his cues from Ibn Taymiyya (AD 1263-1328), a noted Islamic thinker of more than six centuries ago.36 Both pronounced on the society of their respective times as an abode in between the abode of Peace (dar al-Silm) and the abode of War (dar al-Harb). This 'in-between' status means that the majority of subjects (citizens) are basically good Muslims, but are living under 'non-Islamic' laws and 'non-Muslim' or 'nominal Muslim' rulers. The implication of

32 For details of these shoot-outs. See Al-Ahram, 30 August 1987. 33 For details and analysis of these acts, see Al-Shaab, 27 October 1987, p 3; and F Howaidi, 'The

New Commanders of the Faithful in Upper Egypt', Al-Ahram, 17 November, 1987, p 7. 34 Howaidi, ibid, p 7. 35 ibid. 36 See a full account by both Ibn Taymiyya and Abdel Salam Farag in Mohamed Emera, The Absent

Commandment: Presentation, Dialogue, and Evaluation (Arabic) Cairo: Dar Thabet, 1982.

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this characterisation is that it is the duty (commandment) of good Muslims to fight their ungodly rulers and liquidate their laws. In Farag's words:37

The State is ruled by heathen laws despite the fact that the majority of its people are Muslims. These laws were formulated by infidel and compelled Muslims to abide by them ... And because they deserted the Jihad, Muslims of today live in subjugation, humiliation, division, and fragmentation. The Koran has aptly scolded them in the verse. Thou believers why if told to rise up for the sake of God, you hedge closer to the ground? Are you more content with earthly life than with the hereafter? The pleasures of the earthly life are little compared to that of the hereafter. If you do not rise up God will torture you most painfully . . .3 Thus, the aim of our Group is to rise up to establish the Islamic State and restore Islam to this Nation ... The means to this end is to fight against heretical rulers and to eradicate the despots who are no more than human beings who have not found those who can suppress them with the order of God almighty.

This combatant spirit, combined with religious passion, has made Islamic militants quite deadly in their confrontations. Often the leaders have no illusions about a quick victory over the 'heathen State' and its rulers. Nevertheless, they are willing to 'rise-up in anger for the sake of God' (Ghadhabah lilallah). Their death in battle, or subsequent execution after trial, is akin to martyrdom that takes one right to heavenly paradise (al-Janna).

The anti-regime Islamic tendency appeals to educated, motivated youngsters of rural or small-town and lower-middle-class backgrounds; but who are often living in large cities and away from their families at the time of their recruitment.39 Contrary to common stereotypes that these radical groups generally attract a disproportionate number of 'misfits', 'alienated', 'marginals', or otherwise 'abnormal', our fieldwork showed Egypt's Islamic militants to be almost 'model young Egyptians'.'

M A Farag, The Absent Commandment (Arabic with no publisher or date) pp 7-8, as cited in Ibid pp 10-1 1.

38 Al-Taba, Chapter of the Holy Koran, verses 38-39. 39 For details on the Militants Social Profile, see Ibrahim 'The Anatomy of Egypt's militant Islamic

groups' op. cit. pp 437-40. 40 Shukry Mustafa was a young agricultural engineer, who in the mid 1960s after the Second

crack-down on the Brotherhood was heavily influenced by Sayed Qutb, a Brotherhood hard-liner while in prison. Released by Sadat in the early 1970s, Shukry Mustafa organised what came to be known as the Takfir Wal-al-Hijra group (Repentance and Holy Flight, RHF); which in July 1977 engaged the Sadat regime in a bloody confrontation, leaving six people dead and fifty-seven wounded. Shukry Mustafa, along was four others, were sentenced to death and executed in 1978 at the age of thirty-seven.

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The anti-society Muslim groups The fourth tendency, the anti-society Muslim groups, also broke away from the Brotherhood in the early 1970s, believing that the Brotherhood's analysis of societal affairs was incorrect and that different strategy and tactics were required for the situation at hand. Initiated by Shukri Mustafa,4' this tendency deplores the corrupt, decadent, and sinful nature of Egyptian society. Thus they believed that moral change was required from the grass-roots upwards. Its strategy, therefore, is one of patience and its goals, long-term. It calls for building a nucleus 'community of believers' who would act out 'the true life of Islam'. This Islamic community of believers would grow in numbers, in spirit and in material strength, until it is capable of marching and bringing down the already crumbling sinful social order of Egypt at large. Shukri Mustafa and his young followers cite the example of the Prophet Muhammad who, surrounded and harassed by the jahiliyya people of Mecca, fled to Medina with a few followers, and established there the first true Muslim Community. Ten years later, and much stronger, the Prophet marched on Mecca and terminated the state of jahiliyya.

The notion of removing oneself, literally or metaphorically, from the present corrupt society is akin to a Hijra-holy flight from jahilliyya, a condition of infidelity, decadence, and oblivious ignorance similar to that prevailing in pre-Islamic Arabia. Hence the name given by Egyptian authorities to the group formed and led by Shukri Mustafa in the early 1970s was al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra, literally Repentance and Holy Flight (RHF).

While ultimately committed to the use of violence, RHF would only do that in the long run, the ultimate sanction in its final struggle against the jahiliyya society. Unlike the third tendency, symbolised by the Jihad, RHF was not bent on engaging the state in a continuous and immediate war of attrition, but rather on striking one final blow later. Thus, the 1977 big bloody confrontation of RHF with the Egyptian government was not part of its long-range plan. The group had scarcely begun building its 'model community' somewhere in an unpopulated hinterland on the edge of the Nile valley. According to RHF militants, the 1977 confrontation was forced on them by the regime. Egyptian security forces had arrested several of their 'brothers' and detained them without trial. Their pleas to be tried or set free were repeatedly ignored. In retaliation the RHF kidnapped Sheikh A H al-Dahabi, a former minister of Awqaf (Religious 4' For more details on this confrontation, see Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's militant Islamic

Groups', op. cit., pp 442-3; and p 450.

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Endowments), and held him as a hostage until their brothers were freed. When their deadline passed without a positive response from the government, they felt they had to kill their hostage as they had threatened. Their credibility was at stake.42

The shoot-outs that followed between RHF and the government left some sixty dead or wounded. Ultimately the state prevailed and several hundred RHF members were arrested and tried. Five RHF leaders, including Shukri Mustafa, were sentenced to death, while others received varying prison sentences ranging from five to twenty-five years.43

At present there is no evidence that RHF still exists as an organised group. But the tendency that the RHF embodied is still alive. Several small groups have sprung up, influenced by the same ideas, but bearing different names-'The Saved from Fire', 'The Pause and Reveal' groups." The intellectual roots of this anti-society tendency are to be found primarily in the writings of Sayed Qutb, the Brotherhood veteran who was executed by the Nasser regime in 1965. In his famous book, Maalemfi al-Tarik (Landmarks on the Road), Qutb declared the entire Egyptian Society as a jahiliyya society.45 His arguments have been compelling to thousands of Muslim youngsters in Egypt and elsewhere. To date, this book has been reprinted more than thirty times in Egypt alone. In addition, this tendency has been influenced by the writings of the modern Pakistani Islamic thinker Abu al Ala al-Maudoudi, and Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahab, an eighteenth-century Arabian thinker as well as by the Kharajites (al-Khawarij) tradition (which goes back to the middle of the first Islamic century).

At present, the anti-society Islamic groupings in Egypt are small. Its membership tends to have the same sociological profile as the membership of the anti-regime Islamic tendency: young, educated, high achievers, from rural or small lower-middle-class backgrounds. They represent the raw nerve not only of the Islamic Movement but also of Egyptian society at large. Three decades earlier their counterparts of similar background responded readily to Nasser's Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism. And six decades ago, the youth of Egypt also responded readily to Saad Zaghlul's anti-colonial liberal democratic call. 42 ibid., p 450. 43 See Al-Ahram, Issues of 30, 31, August and 1 September, 1987. " Sayed, Qutb, Landmarks in the Road (Arabic, Maalemfi al-Tarik), Cairo: Dar al-Shuruk, 1983

edition, p 191. 45 For details and critical analysis of these intellectual roots, see M A Khalafallah, 'Islamic

awakening in Egypt', op. cit. (footnote 10 above) pp 62-3 and pp 66-7.

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Thus successive socio-political movements of mass following in Egypt-such as liberalism, nationalism, and socialism-have had their respective share of militants in past times. We ought not to confuse the bulk of a grass-roots trend with the behavioural manifestations of its most extreme elements. The anti-regime and anti-society Islamic militants represent the margins of the otherwise moderate grass-roots Islamic activist movement that is a major force in Egypt today.

Conclusion

Islamic activism, with its various tendencies, is dominating much of the political space and discourse of Egypt at present. In recent years a day has hardly passed by without some form of media coverage of an act of violence by one of these Islamic groups. There is also alarm over their growing economic power, or their ascendancy within the political forum. In passing, we mentioned a number of the conditions responsible for the upsurge of Islamic activism in Egypt. However, a broader explanation of the phenomenon is in order. Here, the Egyptian case must be placed in the wider Arab-Islamic context.

To begin with, Islamic activism under various names, has been always an integral part of Arab-Islamic history. In fact, much of that history is one of successive religious movements striving to return to the pure sources of Islam and to put its vision into effect. Some of these movements have succeeded in seizing power at one time or another, and some have failed. Seizure of power did not always lead to implementation of the promised vision-in fact that often triggered others to take on the challenge. Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-century precursor of modern social science, noted the cyclical nature of these attempts in which assabiyya (esprit de corps) coupled with religious zeal punctuated the rise and fall of ruling dynasties in Arab Islamic history. The cycle was roughly one hundred years, the life-span of four generations in the Islamic Middle Ages.

Focusing on the last two centuries, we note the disruption of Islamic societies' traditional modes of life by Western intrusion. By the end of the nineteenth century no Muslim country was free of direct or indirect domination by one or more Western power. This swift domination was both traumatic and humiliating. It generated three modal reactions in Muslim countries. One response has been to attempt to emulate the West in its ways in order to befriend or fight it back. A second response was to reject Western ways completely and to draw back on the glorious

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heritage of Islam and adhere to its pure sources as the only means of successful resistance. The third response was one of attempting to reconcile the best elements of Islamic heritage with the best elements of Western civilisation.

The emulators, the rejecters, and the reconcilers have co-existed, debated with one another intellectually, and competed or even conflicted politically throughout the last hundred years. The names of the three trends are liberals, fundamentalists, and nationalists respectively. The emulators and reconcilers included all types of secular combinations, some even involving socialist, Marxist, or even fascist elements. Each trend has had its expansion, ups and downs, during the past century. But none of them has completely disappeared. At brief historical moments they have even cooperated.

The liberals and nationalists dominated the political scene during the fight for independence and in early decades thereafter. However, with mounting problems of modem nation-building, and especially because of failures to check new hegemonic designs of outside powers, the liberals and nationalists began to lose their credibility. To many, the defeat of Arab armies at the hand of Israel in 1967, for example, was not just a military one. It was a defeat of political regimes and their secular ideologies. Furthermore it was a blunt reminder of the century-long humiliation by the West, which is seen by Arabs and Muslims as patron and supporter of Israel. The USSR, which had befriended some of the defeated Arab regimes, did not fare much better. The rejecters of everything foreign (Western, Zionist, and Communist) were ready with their explanation of the defeat and with their prescription for salvation: the return to the purest sources of Islam. In the late 1960s and 1970s the fundamentalist call found many takers.

We submit that a fuller interpretation of the spread of Islamic activisms must be sought in understanding the century-long crisis of Muslim societies. The salient dimensions of this crisis are the frustrated quests for true independence, social equity, political participation, and economic development. The culprits behind these frustrations are said to be capitalism, communism, and Zionism; or, the West (especially the USA), the USSR and Israel.

Islamic activists have no difficulty in amassing evidence to corroborate this assertion. Along with outside culprits, there are domestic perpetrators of secular ideologies who are at best misled or brainwashed and at worst outright agents of this or that foreign power.

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EGYPT'S ISLAMIC ACTIVISM IN THE 1980s

Regardless of the truth of its claims, the above explanation is simple, clear, and enhances amorphous but deep-rooted sentiments in the Arab-Islamic world. And while many secular political forces may share some of the above explanation of the present crisis, it is only the Islamic activitists who have displayed daring and effectiveness. They ousted the hated pro-Western, pro-Zionist Shah. They shot down the pro-Western Sadat; and, they forced the US Marines out of Lebanon. They are also bleeding Israel daily. Many of the secular political forces in the Arab-Islamic world may have wanted to achieve these objectives, but only the militant Islamic activists have managed to do so.

Whether Islamic activists in general or its militant elements in particular can offer more than suicidal missions, displays of martyrdom, investment companies, and service institutions, is still to be seen. For the time being at least Islamic activism has galvanised the imagination and mobilised the energy of thousands of Islamic youth and attracted them to its ranks. In Egypt, Islamic activism is still on the rise. Its achievements are so far impressive. Its future depends on its own ability to come up with creative solutions to problems not only left over from this century and from previous centuries but-more so-for the looming challenges of the twenty-first century.

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