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Ideology Hegemony

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Nihonjinron: Ideology Hegemony

The term Nihonjinron designates a complex concept that absorbs theories of Japanese cultural specificity. The original idea that reflects this oriental standing in the society comprises the ideology of “national hegemony” or hegemonic nationalism (Yamamoto, 2015). The state of nationalism in Japan denotes the state philosophy and the practice of its application by the country’s authorities for political purposes. In the context of Nihonjinron, Japanese nationalism embodies a unique construct of national hegemony created by the ruling elites to satisfy the internal and external needs and interests of the nation (Smith, 2013). In this regard, the nature of Japanese nationalism can be explained from the standpoint of the nationalism theory. It considers the development of a nation as a long-term and continuous component of its historical development.

The nature of Japanese nationalism can be seen from the perspective of modernists. They consider the development of a nation and species nationalism as a result of their recent modernization (Yamamoto, 2015). According to modernist theory, during the period of modernization, the state and ruling elites mobilize and unite the nation via an innovative nationalist ideology, which is usually more aggressive and offensive than the old one. Shipper (2010) asserts that the latter is done to make it easier to fit in and stay in the new system of international relations, where stability, as a rule, is fraught with new challenges and threats to the survival of the nation.

At the current stage of its development, Japanese state nationalism incorporates a complex of ideological views and political practice of its authorities. This mondus operadi manipulates of the mass consciousness of the Japanese “on behalf of the nation and for it’s good” represents a central matter (Sugimoto, 1999). At the same time, the authorities quite effectively instill in the Japanese the hegemonic ideas of their superiority over other nations and refer to this basis to consolidate the state of the nation. It is noteworthy that nationalism and nationalist ideology in Japan have not declined by the beginning of the twenty-first century, breaking the predictions of many theorists, including Anthony Smith, about the downward trajectory of this phenomenon’s development (Smith, 2013). On the contrary, it continues gaining momentum. Even now, the nationalism keeps being a unifying protective force in Japan. It is likely to be the same in the future. This is connected with the fact that nationalism as a state ideology has always been finding support from the overwhelming part of society; it is inseparable from the existence and survival of the Japanese nation and state (Shipper, 2010). The authorities subtly manipulate national feelings, myths, and traditional Japanese culture. At any time, they are ready to correct the deviations in the national ideology and guide it in the right direction. According to McVeigh (2004), the modern Japan authorities are interested in making every effort to “awaken dormant nationalism in society” on the premise of the understanding that this is “healthy nationalism for the nation.”

Case Study: Zainachi Koreans and the Ideology of Hegemony

When, What, and How Japanese Treated Zainachi Koreans

The first phase of Korean immigrants to Japan started as forced laborers in the twentieth century that engaged in performing dangerous but lowly paid jobs during the colonization period. Based on the history of immigration, Koreans were highly linked with negative reputation and images as poor immigrants, cheap laborers, and criminals (Ronald & Alexy, 2017). Besides, considering that the high numbers of Zainachi Koreans are descendants of the first immigrants, they are highly subject to discriminatory treatments and negative connotations by Japanese. In 1920 when Korea was a major colony of Japan that sought to make use of its resources in the wake of the Second World War, several rural farmers from Korea chose to migrate to japan for economic reasons as cheap laborers from the year 1910 to 1923 (Dasgupta, 2017). Even though Japan offered an unstable working environment for Zainichi Koreans, they classified themselves as sojourners (Dasgupta, 2017). Furthermore, they saw themselves in not only that manner but also the native Japanese classified them as foreign laborers that should eventually return to their country after the completion of the industrial building and military amenities.

Since most of the Zainichi Koreans arrived in Japan without knowing the Japanese Language or any information about the conditions, as soon as the demand for cheap labor diminished, these Koreans were mistreated in workplaces, and most of them received low wages relative to Labourers of Japanese descent. The mistreatment encompassed racist stereotypes of Zainichi Koreans (Dasgupta, 2017). For instance, Allan, Vucetic, & Hopf, (2018) argue that relative to Japanese workers, Japanese officials saw Zainichi as inferior because they lacked vigor and physical constitution. Moreover, some of them lamented that they came up short in terms of self-discipline to better themselves and take the initiative to ensure that they improve their efficiency. This argument represented the general opinion of Japanese society on Zainichi Koreans during the first phase of the twentieth century when they went through high levels of discrimination and stereotypes about their work ethics. Dasgupta (2017) believes that there was sufficient evidence to showcase that Zainichi Koreans workers were just as efficient as Japanese counterparts, and, on some occasions, they were superior and better than them.

Due to such negative connotations of Zainachi Koreans, they were unable to rent proper housing and were isolated to form their own regional or ethnic communities. McVeigh (2004) argues that Japanese officials believed Koreans are fundamentally different. Since their lifestyle and way of life is disorganized and unclean, it is only natural that they live away from the Japanese. Japanese landlords despised Zainichi Koreans, even refusing to lend them houses purportedly due to the unsanitary living conditions and their rent unreliability. Their (Zainachi Koreans’) perceived difference contributed entirely to the discrimination. Allan, Vucetic, & Hopf (2018) observe that they were also segregated from the entire Japanese peoples, as evidenced by the fact that in 1923, Zainachi Koreans were the only large community living in cheap boarding houses, tenements, and in homes of their bosses as laborers.

Based on the initial immigration history that exposed them to special treatment, it is imperative to note that the repatriation boom witnessed after the culmination of the Second War also played a vital role in the predicament that they encounter. After the first- and second-word war, as well as the Korean War that happened in 1950, Zainachi Koreans were going through a situation where they were seen neither as legal citizens of Japan nor of the divided Korean republic (Allan, Vucetic, & Hopf, 2018). Even though Zainachi citizens at some point became Japanese citizens under the Colonial Rule, they forfeited their Japanese citizenship in the wake of the 1952 San Fransisco Peace Treaty that happened between the United States and Japan. Dasgupta, (2017) states that a few days before the passing of the treaty, the government of Japan circulated a notice announcing that Japanese nationality and Taiwanese had disappeared as a result of the Peace Treaty irrespective of where an individual’s is residence. Thus, the Koreans and Taiwanese had to review the naturalization process once again, like every other foreigner. Furthermore, the government of Japan did not attempt to curb the issue of statelessness, and any person that failed to get a new nationality was pronounced stateless (Ronald & Alexy, 2017). The only logic behind this Peace Treaty and the denouncement of citizenship is that Korans were now living as independent beings from Japanese control and that most of them no longer acted as Japanese nationalities.

The matters got worse for Zainachi Citizens as soon as South Korea and Japan resumed their diplomatic relationship. They remained stateless for more than 20 years after the culmination of the Second World War (Yoshimi, 2002). Even after the commencement of the year 1965, there were no unified solutions and strategies in place to assist Zainachi Koreans in choosing their citizenship, nationality, and residency. Ronald & Alexy (2017) argue that Because of such confusion, Kim 11 Sung, the North Korean premier indicated that the North Korean state is willing to welcome the repatriation of Zainanchi Koreans living in Japan (Lee, 2016). As a result, most Zainanchi Koreans were willing to relocate to North Korea because of the prolonged poverty levels and miserable lives they were experiencing in Japan. A high number of Zainanchi Koreans decided to move to North Korea in large numbers only for their hopes to diminish because of the harsh reality of living in North Korea was exposed. Apart from a limited number of them that decided to naturalize and become Citizens of Japan, Zainanchi citizens remained stateless. They were not allowed to have voting rights or any HealthCare benefits (Dasgupta, 2017). Not long ago, Zainanchi Koreans were required to carry their alien registrations cards wherever they went, and failure to do so would attract fines and imprisonment.

Resistance and Empowerment of Zainich Koreans to Japanese Hegemony-the Power of Names

Zainichi Koreans have attempted to assimilate themselves into Japanese culture and society ever since they migrated to Japan as forced laborers in the wake of the First World War. Since then, they have encountered poverty and discrimination, alongside the division of Korea, among others. Additionally, a growing number of Zainichi Koreans have taken on Japanese names in a bid to avoid unfavorable treatment. Some scholars such as Lee (2016) have explored how the decision of Zainichi to go by their Koreans or Japanese names serves to hide or assert their ethnic identity and in the process, harm or benefit them in Japanese society. Tolerance of individual embracement of diversity is not Japan’s strength when it comes to ethnic identities. Individuals that go by their Japanese names and can present themselves as ordinary Japanese citizens receive the tag of traitors of their native land (Yoshimi, 2002). Besides, individuals that possess Japanese Aliases encounter uncomfortable discovery that if they chose to remain visible Zainichi Koreans without adopting Japanese names, the benefits they have enjoyed would have no longer existed. However, it is crucial to note that the Zainichi Koreans that remain tooted with their Korean names receive the respect of others as ethnically conscious people. Nonetheless, the acceptance acts as pressure for those Zainichi Koreans that lack political desires or inclinations to serve as role models for the entire Zainichi Koreans in Japan as Dasgupta (2017) notes.

The Japanese community is hostile to Zainichi that prefer using their native names since, as a society, Japanese dislike individuals that tend to announce their ethnic identity publicly. Some of the reasons behind this unwelcoming attitude can be traced to the 1868 Meiji Restoration, coupled with the contemporary Japanese history that concentrated heavily on mono-ethnicity as the main attribute defining Japan relative to other countries (Yoshimi, 2002). Due to the elongated history of contemporary history that pointed out the nature of japan as a mono-ethnic country, the members of the public in Japan believe that homogeneity is still the way to go despite the existence of several minorities such as Chinese, Burakumin, Okinawans among others. Due to the prominence of such ideology and the history of such norms and beliefs, Zainichi Koreans and their decisions to prefer Korean names receive rising levels of hostility and apathy in Japanese society.

For Zainichi Community, their names, whether Japanese or Korean, have power as an element of their identity. Their names showcase how other communities perceive Zainichi Community and how they also perceive themselves in the face of others. They act as a tool of both resistance and empowerment for their survival of Zainichi Korean in a society that is exceptionally discriminative (Lee, 2016). In other words, for those Zainichi Koreans that have Korean names believe in the form of empowerment they assert through their ethnic identity and their technique of survival in the comate. Furthermore, Zainichi Koreans also use their Korean names as an avenue of resistance to Japanese society and its false representation of a mono-ethnic country (Dasgupta, 2017). To some of the Zainichi community members, that they use Japanese names is an element of empowerment since they feel like part of the majority community. Finally, Lee, (2016) argues that Japanese names act as an element of resistance against expectations of ensuring that the Zainichi tribe is visible or that they are explicitly known to fasten the process of discrimination or maltreatment.

Conclusion

The ideology hegemony in Japan remains a highly dynamic phenomenon; it is not static and is subject to modification. The example of Zainachi Korean as a national minority in Japan proves that the country has other types of nationalisms different from the state Ideology of Hegemony. In modern Japan, new types of nationalism are developing, which used to be officially hushed up, not recognized, and suppressed throughout the entire period of colonial assimilation inside the framework of Nihonjinron. The development of Zainichi’s nationalism has been continually evolving up to date, turning into a modernized, engaging example of how foreign policy and international law might force the Japanese government to take into account changes in national identity and consider the interests of minorities. The recognition in Japan of the national identity inherent to the minorities undermines the official ideology of “homogeneity” and exclusivity. Current recognition of Zainichi’s national identity also destroys another myth of a single Japanese nation, politicizes nationalism in Japan, and leads to another crisis of Japanese identity. Apart from Zainichi’s, there are other minority groups in Japan. These ethnic communities have been present in the country for a long time but in an assimilated form. They also demand recognition of their national identity and breaking the limits of hegemonic Nihonjinron.

 

 

 

 

References

McVeigh, B. J. (2004). Nationalisms of Japan: managing and mystifying identity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Shipper, A. (2010). Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan. Asian Politics & Policy. 2. 55 - 75.

Smith, A. (2013). Nations and nationalism in a global era. John Wiley & Sons.

Sugimoto, Y. (1999). Making Sense of Nihonjinron. Thesis Eleven, 57(1), 81–96. doi: 10.1177/0725513699057000007

Yamamoto, K. (2015). The Myth of Nihonjinron, Homogeneity of Japan, and its Influence on the Society. CERS Working Paper 2015: 1–6. https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content /uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-myth-of-%E2%80%9CNihonjinron%E2%80%9D -homogeneity-of-Japan-and-its-influence-on-the-society-Kana-Yamamoto.pdf.

Yoshimi, Y. (2002). Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II, New York: Columbia University Press\

Ronald, R., & Alexy, A. (2017). Continuity and change in Japanese homes and families. In Home and Family in Japan (pp. 21-44). Routledge.

Lee, J. Y. (2016). Hegemonic authority and domestic legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese hegemonic order in early modern East Asia. Security Studies, 25(2), 320-352.

Allan, B. B., Vucetic, S., & Hopf, T. (2018). The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects. International Organization, 72(4), 839-869.

Dasgupta, R. (2017). Acting straight? Non-heterosexual salarymen working with heteronormativity in the Japanese workplace. In East Asian Men (pp. 31-50). Palgrave Macmillan, London.