Last Minute Essay Outline on Civil Rights Act of 1964

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Chapter 5 The Senate and Civil Rights

John G. Stewart

In 1968, four years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted into law, John G. Stewart earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of

Chicago. His doctoral dissertation was entitled "Independence and Control: The Challenge of Senatorial Party Leadership." The major portion of the

dissertation addressed the question of how political party leaders in the U.S. Senate maintain "control" over a body composed of highly "independent"

individual senators.

The concluding chapters of Stewart's dissertation addressed the question of how the party leadership in the U.S. Senate dealt with the herculean task of

maintaining political party control during the southern Democratic filibuster of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In this lengthy description and analysis,

Stewart focused his attention on Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Dem., MT) and Senate Majority Whip Hubert Humphrey (Dem., MN) and their

efforts to win the support of Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (Rep., IL) for a cloture vote on the southern filibuster.

This particular firstperson account, written after some time had gone by for further research and reflection, emphasizes the way Mansfield and Humphrey

were able to work within the established rules of the Senate to move forward a highly controversial and divisive piece of legislation. It is a true "insider"

view of the detailed strategic and tactical thinking that goes into moving a major piece of legislation through the U.S. Senate.

Stewart's account of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been divided into five sections that will constitute the next five chapters of this

book. In the first section, Stewart discussesCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be

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un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 7/14/2019 12:08 PM via ASHFORD UNIVERSITY AN: 8373 ; Loevy, Robert D..; The Civil Rights Act of 1964 : The Passage of the Law That Ended Racial Segregation Account: s8856897

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the historical role of the U.S. Senate in dealing with civil rights legislation and the everpresent threat of a filibuster. He next reviews the events that led

the Kennedy administration to press for enactment of a major civil rights bill by Congress in 1963. Stewart then traces the bill's tumultuous but steady

progress to passage by the House of Representatives in early 1964. 1

The Impact of the Filibuster

At the root of the party leaders' problems ... was the fact that a filibuster makes it impossible for a simple majority to conduct the Senate's business.2 The senators

who are filibustering simply refuse to yield the floor to permit any votes on the legislation. The majority, in short, never is given the chance to act.3

In these circumstances the party leaders have to choose from among three main alternatives if they desire further action on the bill: (1) produce a twothirds majority

to apply cloture and limit debate to one hour per senator, (2) break the filibuster by exhausting the opponents, or (3) concede to the substantive demands of the

opponents so the filibuster stops voluntarily. At this point the majority can again assert itself.

Each alternative brings its own problems for the party leaders. The infrequency of cloture being applied on any bill, much less a civil rights bill, suggests the difficulty of

this approach. When the Senate voted to invoke cloture during the Communications Satellite debate of 1962, it was the first time since 1927 that a cloture motion had

prevailed.4 In most instances, however, a twothirds majority is not prepared to vote affirmatively on invoking cloture. When such a twothirds majority does exist,

the filibuster poses no serious threat.

In the process of rounding up the additional votes for cloture, the party leaders must usually give special attention to the group of 8 to 15 senators who generally

represent theCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y

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difference between the simple majority for the bill and the twothirds majority needed for cloture. Although cloture is strictly a procedural weapon, the ability of these

8 to 15 senators to demand substantive changes in the legislation as their price for cloture tends to link substantive issues with procedure. Since the filibuster cannot be

stopped by cloture without the votes of these senators, their bargaining leverage with the party leaders is greatly enhanced. A major effect, then, of any filibuster is to

involve the Senate majority leader far more deeply than usual in questions of substance as he struggles to accumulate the twothirds majority required by Rule XXII

[the cloture rule].

The second alternative—attempting to break the filibuster by exhausting the filibustering senators—rarely succeeds because the principal physical burden falls, not on

the small group of senators who are speaking, but on the remainder of the Senate, which has to answer quorum calls at any hour of the day or night. Even if the

majority leader holds the Senate in session 24 hours a day, the filibusterers can easily divide into teams and arrange their schedules so that each speaker has ample

time for rest and recuperation.

Richard Russell of Georgia, the postWorld War II leader of the southern Democrats, usually divided his 18 hardcore senators into three teams of six senators each

and assigned each team to cover the Senate floor for one day. This provided at least two days rest between assignments, not counting weekends.

Meanwhile their nonfilibustering colleagues have been forced to appear on the Senate floor approximately every two hours when the senator who has the floor

"suggests the absence of a quorum." 5 These efforts usually end with the filibustering senators ready to continue for weeks and the rest of the Senate near physical

collapse.

Extreme proponents of the legislation under siege will often advocate roundtheclock sessions when cloture appears remote or when the substantive price for cloture

is tooCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y

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fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

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high. "Hold their feet to the fire," these senators demand of their party leaders. But other senators, although not participating in the filibuster, will likely oppose any

hasty or summary action. For them, the filibuster represents the Senate's capacity to stand against the immediate demands of a simple majority. Any illconsidered

attempt by the party leadership to hinder the exercise of this prerogative may backfire by increasing the support which the filibustering senators are able to maintain

among their colleagues.

While the alternatives of cloture and physical exhaustion are difficult to execute, the third approach—one of simply conceding what the filibustering senators demand,

even if that means abandoning the legislation—becomes increasingly attractive to the majority leader and a large portion of the Senate as the debate drags on. The

filibuster, for example, will disrupt the Senate's normal routine in many ways. Procedural shortcuts in the consideration of legislation made possible by unanimous

consent of the Senate are sometimes eliminated because one senator will object. Minor Senate business, such as approving the prior day's Journal, can consume

hours. Other important legislation backs up on the Senate calendar and in committees. Everyone, except the filibustering senators, is subjected to the repeated

inconvenience and annoyance of being summoned to the Senate floor for quorum calls. Tempers are apt to fray and emotions rise in these unpleasant working

conditions.

In some cases the filibustering senators will permit all kinds of normal business to transpire since this will tend to lower the frustration level among senators and permit

the filibuster to continue unimpaired. One must bear in mind that the filibusterers have only one objective: to prevent votes on the legislation they oppose. Anything else

which occurs is to them immaterial. But senators trying to break the filibuster often will object to such unanimous consent requests, thereby hoping to increase the

irritation and frustration of other senators against the filibuster.Co py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

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th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le

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The flexibility and deference usually paid to the majority leader in scheduling and controlling the conduct of Senate business disappears. And he finds it increasingly

difficult to avoid fragmentation of the senatorial party itself. Once a filibuster has begun, differences among contending factions become more difficult to resolve.

Senators tend to assume public positions which cannot be compromised easily. Some senators simply get mad at each other. But the fact that a filibuster takes place

on the Senate floor, the majority leader's domain, means it will be largely his responsibility to somehow bring the Senate through its time of trouble.

These multiple pressures and departures from normal generally create within the Senate a climate ripe for concession or abandonment of the legislation. Senators not

identified as strong supporters, usually a substantial majority, frequently are ready to settle for half a loaf, or even no loaf, as the price for ending the misery of a

filibuster. The majority leader, moreover, is not likely to expend his limited resources of power and persuasion in an illfated drive to apply cloture on a non

compromised bill. Knowing that he must manage the Senate's response to the president's total legislative program, and knowing further that this job will require the

cooperation of many senators conducting the filibuster, 6 or representing the deciding cloture votes, the majority leader is likely to eliminate the more controversial

sections of the legislation. When this price has been paid and the legislation amended appropriately (or dropped entirely), the Senate can return to its normal

procedures of rule by a simple majority.

A filibuster also increases the impact of the president's decision whether to defend the bill under attack. Given the pressures on the majority leadership to concede

whatever is necessary to end the filibuster, the president becomes the person best equipped to preserve the controversial parts of the bill. A strong presidential effort

to forestall major compromises can on occasion give the party leaders a reason for continuing the fight.Co py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll

ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut

pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r

U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

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When a filibuster threatens or actually begins, and cloture cannot be invoked easily, the pressures on the majority leader increase rapidly either to compromise the

legislation or drop the issue entirely. If neither of these alternatives is acceptable to the president, however, the majority leader is likely to be faced with a difficult

decision. Should he lead a legislative battle without even his normal instruments of control or his normal degree of influence? [Under the filibuster, it is the filibustering

senators, and not the majority leader, who are in control of what is happening on the Senate floor.]

In 1957 and again in 1960, the Senate passed a major civil rights bill by acceding to certain of the principal demands of the southern Democrats. In 1962, the Senate

failed even to consider another civil rights bill when cloture could not be applied to shut off the southern Democratic filibuster.

1963: The Issue Returns to Congress

In 1963 the nation suddenly found itself swept up in a crisis of race relations far surpassing in urgency anything which previously had taken place. In June, 1963,

President John F. Kennedy had proposed a new omnibus civil rights bill as a direct outgrowth of the violence and racial strife which gripped Birmingham, Alabama, in

April and May of that year. The frontpage photographs of police dogs attacking black demonstrators in Birmingham, 7 the reports of highpressure hoses being used

to disperse crowds of black school children,8 and the bombing of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, motel room and the home of King's brother dramatized and personalized

the demands of the civil rights movement. The key demands were for additional federal legislation to combat the barriers of legalized segregation in education, public

facilities, and places of public accommodations, and the need to promote greater equality in employment and voting.Co py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

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fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or

ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

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Following several weeks of intensive consultations and drafting by Department of Justice officials and the White House staff, President Kennedy announced his general

proposals to the nation in a televised message on the evening of June 11, 1963.

''We are confronted primarily with a moral issue," Kennedy said. "It is as old as the Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution. The heart of the question is

whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. ... It is a time to act in the Congress, in your state and local legislative body and, above

all, in all of our daily lives. ... I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race

has no place in American life or law." 9

June 11, 1963, was also the day of Governor George C. Wallace's unsuccessful attempt to stand in the doorway of the University of Alabama's administration building

to block the admission of two black students.10 And even as the president spoke, a sniper was preparing to assassinate Medgar Evers, the Mississippi field secretary

of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), in the early hours of June 12.11

The legislation President Kennedy sent to Congress on June 19, 1963, was drawn primarily to provide legal authority for desegregating places of public

accommodation and public facilities, the principal source of the unrest which rocked Birmingham. It also provided additional authority for the federal government to

combat discrimination against black voting applicants, to assist in school desegregation suits, and to secure nondiscrimination in the operations of federal programs.

Finally, the bill proposed creation of a federal Community Relations Service to assist in mediating racial disputes, a fouryear extension of the U.S. Commission on

Civil Rights, and statutory authority for the President's Committee on Equal Employment OpporCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

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th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le

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tunity, the body charged with securing nondiscrimination in the performance of government contracts. 12 In his message to Congress transmitting the legislation,

President Kennedy also called for passage of federal fair employment practices legislation already pending in both the House and Senate.13

The House Considers Civil Rights

The obstacles in the Senate which awaited any civil rights bill, much less one of this magnitude, dictated the wisdom of completing action in the House of

Representatives before making any attempt to initiate in the Senate. In the Senate there would be a struggle of unknown duration and one whose outcome probably

would depend upon whether a southern Democratic filibuster could be defeated. Party leaders projected final House action by middle to late summer, with the Senate

hopefully completing its work on the bill prior to adjournment of the first session of the 88th Congress in December of 1963.14

This timetable, however, collapsed almost immediately. Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Committee, chaired by Emanuel Celler (Dem., NY), had been

considering civil rights proposals since May 8, 1963, and promptly scheduled hearings on the new omnibus bill, but the large number of persons and groups seeking to

testify made it impossible to adhere to the original time schedule.15 When the hearings finally concluded on August 2, the subcommittee began the difficult task of

evaluating many suggested changes in the bill with a view toward achieving final passage in the House by late September.

But during this period the lobbyists for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights diligently pressed a number of strengthening amendments upon the civil rights

activists on the Celler subcommittee. These subcommittee activists inCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

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cluded Peter W. Rodino (Dem., NJ), Byron G. Rogers (Dem., CO), and Robert W. Kastenmeier (Dem., WI). Substantial pressure also was directed against Celler

himself.

Throughout the civil rights debate in both House and Senate, the principal lobbyists for the Leadership Conference were Clarence Mitchell, Jr., director of the

NAACP Washington Office, and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Washington lawyer and counsel to the Leadership Conference. Mitchell and Rauh were joined frequently by

Andrew Biemiller, the chief lobbyist for the AFLCIO labor unions, Jack Conway, executive director of the Industrial Union Department of the AFLCIO, Arnold

Aronson, executive director of the Leadership Conference, and representatives of various service groups, religious instrumentalities and denominations, and other

labor organizations.

The efforts of the Leadership Conference paid off handsomely in vote after vote. The subcommittee, dividing largely along party lines, adopted a number of these

strengthening amendments 16 and, on October 2, 1963, reported to the full Judiciary Committee a bill that went far beyond the Kennedy administration's position in

certain critical areas. It created, for example, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with authority to issue enforceable administrative orders. It added the

old "Part III" stricken from the 1957 civil rights bill giving the attorney general authority to seek injunctions to prevent violation of any federal right under the

Constitution or laws of the United States. It broadened the voting rights provisions to apply both to state and federal elections. It barred discrimination in any business

operating under state or local authorization, or if segregation was directly or indirectly sanctioned by the state. All this was coverage far broader than proposed by the

administration in its bill.17

Party leaders had estimated that approximately 5060 Republican votes (out of 177) would be needed on the House floor to offset the expected solid opposition of

aboutCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed .

Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r,

ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

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100 southern Democrats. Fearing that the bulk of Republicans would never accept the subcommittee's amendments, and that consequently the entire bill was in

jeopardy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy's brother, advocated that the full Judiciary Committee return to the general provisions of the

administration's original bill. [Robert Kennedy urged the Judiciary Committee to] begin to hammer out a compromise version in negotiations with Celler, William

McCulloch (Rep., OH), ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, and Charles Halleck (Rep., IN), minority floor leader. 18

The fact that a number of southern Democrats on the Judiciary Committee subsequently voted to support the stronger subcommittee bill, apparently believing that it

would be easier to defeat on the House floor, gave credence to the administration's concern that the strong subcommittee bill would not survive unless modified.19

President Kennedy Intervenes

On October 29, 1963, following several White House meetings where President Kennedy personally enlisted the support of Halleck and McCulloch, the Judiciary

Committee approved a compromise bill containing a number of amendments sought by the administration, as well as some advocated by the Republican negotiators.

The public accommodations provision was again limited to specific categories of businesses. The attorney general's power under Part III was restricted to authority to

intervene in suits brought by private individuals claiming a violation of federal rights on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. Court enforcement of non

discrimination orders by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was substituted for administrative enforcement. The Community Relations Service was

eliminated.20 Co py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on

fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or

ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

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Although the compromise version still was stronger than the administration's original bill in some respects, President Kennedy announced that the Judiciary

Committee's action "had significantly improved the prospects for enactment of effective civil rights legislation in Congress this year." 21

Although the Judiciary Committee formally reported the approved bill (H.R. 7152) to the House on November 20, 1963—three months late according to the original

timetable—further action had to await the 2nd session of the 88th Congress, starting January 1, 1964.22 Two days after the committee's report had been filed,

President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. In his address to a joint session of the Congress on November 27, 1963, President Johnson emphasized his

determination to press forward on the civil rights front. "No memorial oration or eulogy," he said, "could more eloquently honor President Kennedy's memory than the

earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long. We have talked long enough in this country about equal rights. We have talked for 100

years or more. It is time now to write the next chapter, and to write it in the books of law."23

But the delaying tactics of Howard W. Smith (Dem., VA), chairman of the Committee on Rules, in combination with a jammed legislative calendar and the disruptions

associated with President Kennedy's death, prevented H.R. 7152 from being cleared for House debate until January 30, 1964, more than seven months after its

introduction.

The time had not been wasted. When debate on the House floor finally commenced on January 31, 1964, the bipartisan coalition which had been forged during the

difficult negotiations within the Judiciary Committee stood firm against a flood of amendments offered by southern Democrats and conservative Republicans.24 The

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the Democratic Study Group, an informal gathering of liberal Democrats, developed an adCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

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hoc communications system which summoned absent representatives to the House floor whenever a crucial vote was about to occur. Possessing the votes, as well as

a method of producing them on the floor at the proper time, the managers of H.R. 7152 were able to defeat every amendment which they decided to oppose. 25

The debate in the House also revealed a determination, particularly pronounced among Republicans, not to accede to any weakening of the bill by the Senate. William

McCulloch (Rep., OH), the ad hoc leader of the procivil rights Republicans in the House, recalled the events of 1957 when the Senate allegedly jettisoned the

Housepassed Title III as the price for averting a southern Democratic filibuster. McCulloch vowed he would not be party to any similar operation in 1964. He further

indicated that any major change in the Senate would jeopardize Republican support when the bill returned to the House.26

On final passage the bill was approved by the margin of 290130. In this key House vote, 152 Democrats (59 percent of all House Democrats) and 138 Republicans

(78 percent of all House Republicans) voted for H.R. 7152, illustrating again the remarkable coalition which had thrown its weight behind the legislation.27

During the months of debate in the House, the racial climate in America had grown still worse. Demonstrations and violence in Cambridge, Maryland, forced the

governor to call out the National Guard to restore order.28 Attorney General Robert Kennedy finally helped patch together a shaky peace between black and white

leaders in this troubled Eastern Shore of Maryland community.29 Marches and sitins against segregated public accommodations and facilities in Jackson, Mississippi,

produced repeated outbreaks of violence and continuing unrest throughout the summer. Civil rights groups in New York City, Chicago, and other northern cities

demonstrated against discriminatory membership practices in construction unions.Co py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on

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On August 28, 1963, over 200,000 persons participated in the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, implementing the idea first broached in 1941 by A.

Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, to pressure President Roosevelt into requiring nondiscrimination in government war contracts. 30 Following the partial desegregation of Birmingham's schools in September, 1963, a bomb exploded at the home of a black civil rights lawyer. On Sunday,

September 15, another bomb ripped into a black church, killing four young girls attending Sunday school. President Kennedy spoke for millions of shocked and

outraged Americans when he expressed "a deep sense of outrage and grief over the killing of children."31

Senate Action Necessary

In summary, the continuing deterioration of race relations, coupled with the serious delays in passing the civil rights bill in the House, made prompt action by the Senate

highly desirable. Rightly or wrongly, H.R. 7152 was becoming viewed increasingly by the Johnson administration, members of Congress, and the civil rights community

as the principal answer to the racial crisis which gripped the nation. In passing the bill in the Senate, however, it appeared necessary to reject any strategy based on

compromising essential elements of the bill to avoid or halt a southern Democratic filibuster, the strategy used by Lyndon Johnson in 1957 and 1960.

In 1964, however, this strategy of compromise not only would sacrifice the legislation's capacity to help resolve the current racial crisis, but it would likely insure the

bill's rejection in conference by the House of Representatives or even its veto by President Johnson. In fact, the bill probably would never have emerged from a

HouseSenate conference committee due to the refusal of principal House ReCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on

fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or

ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

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publicans to accede to the Senate's changes. Without Republican support in the House Rules Committee and on the House floor, the conference report would be

doomed.

If the Senate conferees had backed down and agreed to the House bill, however, the legislation would have been subject to another filibuster when Majority Leader

Mansfield moved to accept the conference report in the Senate. If the southern Democrats had been successful earlier in forcing basic changes in the bill, they would

have likely prevailed again when the conference committee report was filibustered. Of course, the House might have relented and accepted the Senate's amendments,

as it largely did in 1957, but there was no evidence whatsoever to indicate this would have happened.

The Senate thus headed for a truly historic confrontation. Its traditions in support of independent deliberation and opposed to absolute rule by a simple majority were

about to run directly into an overwhelming sentiment in the executive branch and among a clear majority of the senators for quick and comprehensive action on H.R.

7152—with a minimum of amendments.

There were, however, mitigating factors in the situation. The president and the principal Democratic leaders in the Senate were publicly committed to passage of the

House bill and to work unreservedly to that end. Their prestige and power, however limited it might prove to be in practice, were nevertheless major sources of

strength usually denied senators attempting to enact strong civil rights legislation. The severity of the racial crisis in the country, while it increased the pressure on the

party leaders to achieve victory, also generated pressure on all senators which might make this victory possible. In the final analysis, however, the outcome in the

Senate rested principally on how Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Majority Whip Hubert H. Humphrey would perform as leaders of the majority senatorial party

re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e

pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le

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In formulating a strategy capable of handling this delicate legislative situation, the party leaders needed to build a civil rights coalition drawn from the ranks of both

parties, one which surpassed the level of Republican support in 1957 and the Democratic strength in 1960. This coalition eventually had to produce enough votes to

invoke cloture on the expected southern Democratic filibuster. Past evidence suggested that the crucial senators in this effort would likely be predisposed against

limiting debate by cloture, especially in its early stages, and more interested in a strategy of compromise and concession as the way to end the debate.

Mansfield and Humphrey began developing the specific components of a strategy to bring the legislation safely through the Senate.

Notes

1. John G. Stewart, Independence and Control: The Challenge of Senatorial Party Leadership (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968). This section is

from ch. 4, pp. 136140, 161169.

2. For recent comments on the filibuster see Joseph S. Clark, The Senate Establishment (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), pp. 1314; William S. White, Citadel:

The Story of the U.S. Senate (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 3940; Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

PrenticeHall, 1964), pp. 7778; Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 248.

3. Standing Rule XIX reads simply: "No senator shall interrupt another senator in debate without his consent." U.S., Congress, Senate, Standing Rules of the United

States Senate, corrected to January 9, 1963, XIX, sec. 1, p. 21. Charles L. Watkins and Floyd Riddick, Senate Procedure: PreCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

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th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le

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cedents and Practice (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 270, note further: "A motion to limit debate is not in order, as it requires

unanimous consent. ... The cloture rule, if invoked, places a limitation on debate on that pending business."

4. Congress and the Nation (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965), p. 1637.

5. According to Standing Rule V: "If, at any time during the daily sessions of the Senate, a question shall be raised by any senator as to the presence of a quorum, the

presiding officer shall forthwith direct the secretary to call the roll and shall announce the result, and these proceedings shall be without debate. ..." U.S., Congress,

Senate, Standing Rules of the United States Senate, corrected to January 9, 1963, V, sec. 2, p. 4.

6. This was especially true during civil rights debates when many of the filibustering senators were also chairmen of standing committees.

7. New York Times, May 4, 1963, p. 1.

8. New York Times, May 8, 1963, p. 1.

9. Congressional Quarterly Almanac—1963, p. 967.

10. New York Times, June 12, 1963, p. 1.

11. New York Times, June 13, 1963, p. 1.

12. Congressional Record, CIX, pp. 1107781. On February 28, 1963, President Kennedy had proposed a more limited civil rights bill, dealing only with voting

rights, extension of the Civil Rights Commission, and providing federal technical assistance to school districts in the process of desegregation. Congressional Record,

CIX, pp. 324549. These earlier provisions were included in the omnibus bill proposed in June.

13. Congressional Record, CIX, pp. 1115761. These measures, H.R. 405 and S. 1937, 88th Congress, had not been proposed by the Kennedy administration but

resulted from congressional initiative.

14. In 1963 the Senate Commerce Committee held hearings on a bill, S. 1732, covering only the public accomCo py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m

wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

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modations provisions; it was reported favorably to the Senate on February 10, 1964. U.S., Congress, Senate, Majority Report—S. 1732, Report No. 872, 88th

Congress, 2nd Session, 1964. The Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee also held eleven days of hearings in 1963, which

consisted primarily of detailed questioning of Attorney General Robert Kennedy by Chairman Sam Ervin (Dem., NC) on the bill's principal titles. But neither the

subcommittee nor the full Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator James Eastland (Dem., MS), reported any legislation. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare

Committee reported S. 1937 on February 5, 1964, dealing with equal employment opportunities. U.S., Congress, Senate, Majority Report: Equal Employment

Opportunity—S. 1937. Report No. 867, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964. Both S. 1732 and S. 1937 were subsequently abandoned in favor of the omnibus

civil rights bill, H.R. 7152.

15. New York Times, June 20, 1963, p. 18. Celler said the bill would be reported by the end of July and the House could ''easily" pass the bill by "early September at

the latest." See also Tom Wicker, "Kennedy's Program," New York Times, August 4, 1963, p. E9.

16. The Democrats held a 74 majority on Subcommittee No. 5.

17. U.S., Congress, House Bill 7152, Committee Print, October 2, 1963.

18. New York Times, October 16, p. 1; October 17, p. 1; October 24, p. 1; October 25, p. 1.

19. C.Q. Almanac—1963, pp. 348349.

20. New York Times, October 30, 1963, pp. 1, 22. See also Anthony Lewis, "Civil Rights Compact," New York Times, October 30, 1963, p. 22.

21. Anthony Lewis, "Civil Rights Compact," New York Times, October 30, 1963, p. 22.

22. U.S., Congress, House, Majority Report: Civil Rights Act of 1963, Report No. 914, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963.Co py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be

re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed

un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

Page 166

23. New York Times, November 28, 1963, p. 20.

24. C.Q. Almanac—1964, pp. 344353.

25. For a detailed resume of the system used to control the House floor debate see "Intensive Lobbying Marked House Civil Rights Debate," Revolution in Civil

Rights (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965), pp. 4446. One hundred and twentytwo amendments were proposed on the House floor; 28 were

accepted by the bill's bipartisan managers.

26. "House Clears Bipartisan 1964 Bill, 290130," Revolution in Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965), p. 43.

27. Congressional Record, CX, 28042805.

28. New York Times, June 15, 1963, p. 1.

29. New York Times, July 24, 1963, p. 1.

30. For a summary of racial disturbances in the summer of 1963, see C.Q. Almanac—1963, pp. 336338.

31. New York Times, September 16, 1963, p. 1.Co py ri gh t © 1 99 7. S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s

re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m

th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir u se s pe rm it te d un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le

co py ri gh t la w.