Semester Long Journal (50%)

Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in Haiti

Author(s): Francois Pierre-Louis

Source: Journal of Black Studies , MARCH 2011, Vol. 42, No. 2, The Haiti Earthquake of 2010: The Politics of a Natural Disaster (MARCH 2011), pp. 186-202

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41151335

REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41151335?seq=1&cid=pdf- reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Black Studies

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in Haiti

Journal of Black Studies 42(2) 186-202

©TheAuthor(s)20ll Reprints and permission: http://www.

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: I O.I 177/0021934710395389

http://jbs.sagepub.com

®SAGE

Francois Pierre-Louis1

Abstract

On January 12, 2010, the Haitian people suffered the most dramatic and unimaginable catastrophe in the Caribbean in recent times. More than 222,570 citizens perished as a result of a 7.0 earthquake, and over 1 .3 million are cur- rently homeless. The city of San Francisco, in California, United States, had a similar earthquake in the 1990s, and fewer than 100 people were killed. Chile a few months ago had an earthquake that was fár stronger than Haiti's, but fewer than 1,000 people were killed. So why did a 7.0 earthquake on the Richter scale cause so much destruction in Haiti? In this article, the

author argues that the historical boycott of Haiti's government in the 1 9th and 20th centuries by the international community, the constant internal struggle among the members of the elite for the control of state power, and the weakening of state structures through the creation of nongovernmental organizations have weakened the government's capacity to deal with major catastrophe and meet the needs of its citizens.

Keywords

Haiti, earthquake, NGOs, USAID, development

'Queens College, City University of New York, Flushing, NY, USA

Corresponding Author: Francois Pierre-Louis, Queens College, City University of New York, 65-30 Kissena Blvd., Flushing, NY 1 1367 Email: [email protected]

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis 187

On January 12, 2010, Haiti suffered the most dramatic and unimaginable catas-

trophe in the Caribbean. More than 222,570 citizens perished in a 7.0 earth- quake, and over 1.3 million people are currently homeless (www.usgs.gov). Although we cannot prevent earthquakes nor hurricanes nor other natural disasters from taking place, we know that their impact on our environment and

the population can be lessened if the right conditions exist. For example, San Francisco had a similar earthquake in 1993, and fewer than 100 people were killed. Chile, a few months after Haiti's catastrophe, had a massive 8.5 tremor.

Fewer than 1,000 people lost their lives, and not many buildings collapsed. So why did a 7.0 earthquake on the Richter scale cause so much destruction in Haiti? In this article, I argue that given Haiti's past and the failure of nongov- ernmental organizations (NGOs) to address the needs of the population, with- out a new paradigm of development the country will not succeed in rebuilding itself from the devastating earthquake that took place on January 12, 2010. Three months after the devastating earthquake that destroyed Haiti's capital

and killed more than 222,000 people, the New York Times published an article on April 12, 2010, about a Haitian dancer, Fabienne Jean, whose leg had to be amputated to save her life (Sontag, 2010). According to the Times article, when the story was first published, a huge amount of support was manifested for Ms. Jean to help her regain the ability to dance again since that was her liveli- hood as a member of the Haitian National Dance Company. The doctor from Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York City who saved Ms. Jean's life wanted her to travel to the United States for additional care. However, the NGO that provided

Ms. Jean with the prosthetic wanted her to stay in Port-au-Prince because they did not want to lose her for "professional and personal reasons." In other words,

the NGO wanted to use her as a poster child to raise money for their agency. Finally, Ms. Jean decided not to travel to New York City.

This story mirrors Haiti after the devastating earthquake that destroyed most of the country's capital and left more than 3 million people in need of aid. At the dawn of the 2 1 st century, the country is caught between the aspira- tion of the Haitian people to obtain genuine support to rebuild their lives and the legacy of foreign interventions, either armed or humanitarian, that have

contributed to creating a country that is totally dependent on foreign assis- tance to function.

Independence and Isolation In 1804, when Haiti proclaimed its independence from France, it was the rich- est colony of the French Empire. Mintz (1995) notes that with the combina-

tion of cheap land, African labor, and European capital, French St Domingue,

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1 88 Journal of black Studies 42(2)

which Haiti was known as then, had become the zenith of the Atlantic slave

system since "it could produce sugar, together with all those other miraculous healers of torment, such as rum, tobacco and coffee that accompany it" (p. 75).

As a result of the wealth that Haiti provided to France, it was called "la Perle des Antilles," meaning Jewel of the Caribbean. However, soon after the revolutionary war that succeeded in creating the first Black republic in the

Western Hemisphere, Haiti instantly was isolated by the international com- munity under pressure from Napoleon and the French colonialists who ended up in the United States, primarily in the Louisiana Territory, which was still a French possession. Thomas Jefferson, who is revered as a freedom fighter and a great U.S. president, sided with the French establishment to isolate Haiti even though the Haitian revolutionary war allowed the United States to pur- chase the Louisiana Territory from France, thereby making it possible for the United States to expand from coast to coast. Matthewson (1995) notes that although Jefferson was in favor of the emancipation of U.S. slaves, in the case of Haiti he told his secretary of state, James Madison, that "the United States opposed the island's independence under black rule and wanted to see French authority restored" (p. 214). The boycott of the first Black republic in the Western Hemisphere by France and the international community from 1804 to 1825 devastated the country's economy, which was primarily based on commodities export. Not only did the country's economy was destroyed, but also Haiti's infrastructure such as the education system, roads, and ports col-

lapsed since the country had to rely on the informal market to trade its goods and had no access to foreign technology to improve its agriculture and economic systems. According to Clement (1979), economic factors during the period of 1804 to 1915 had the most profound effect on educational development in Haiti. Not only were most of the country's commodities such as cotton, sug- arcane, and banana plantations destroyed in the war, but also Haiti had to pay for its independence, which sapped the country's national treasury and caused a chronic lack of sufficient funds for education.

Indeed, by 1825, as the international movement to abolish slavery began to mobilize, citizens in Europe, the United States, and France decided to rec-

ognize Haiti's independence on the condition that it assumed all the losses that the colonialists and French citizens suffered because of the revolution. France

demanded that the Haitian government pay 150 million French francs as a condition to recognize the new nation, an amount that is equal to $21 billion today. Haiti had to borrow that money from foreign banks to pay the French government. All of the revenues that the Haitian government collected from taxes and trade at that time went to pay the debt. It took 80 years for the country

to finish paying it. Instead of using state revenues to build schools and roads

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis 189

and develop the country's economy, Haiti had to use all its tax levies to buy its independence from France. Haitian historians and economists as well as foreign scholars have often traced the roots of Haiti's current poverty to the dreadful decision to pay that debt. The French clergy who "educated" the population during the colonial era also left the country after it declared its independence. With the absence of an education system and with the boycott of the international community, which prevented the new nation from acquiring goods and technology to improve its economy, the country felt further behind. Haiti became the center for mercan-

tilists, pirates, and fortune seekers to engage in all kinds of shady deals that they could not do anywhere else (Ardouin, 1958; Benoit, 1954). As a result, constant revolutions, military coups, and social, economic, and political insta- bility became the model based on which many Haitian leaders govern. From the time of the assassination of the founding leader, Jean- Jacques Dessalines, in 1 806 to the violent overthrow of the democratically elected President Jean-

Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and 2004, Haiti never had a long period in its history

when national interests supported individual ambition. As a result, the country suffered several occupations in the past two centuries. Most of them were to broker peace between rival sectors whose interests were closely linked to for- eign powers. In 1915 the United States occupied Haiti to prevent Germany from taking over after President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was dragged from the

national palace and executed. The U.S. army stayed for 19 years and created a new political and economic class that was completely subservient to its inter- ests. By 1957 the new political and economic class that the United States had created was running out of steam. It could no longer maintain the country's stability and prevent a social explosion since it was unable to meet the grow- ing needs of the population. Francois Duvalier, who became Haiti's president in 1957 with the blessing of the Eisenhower administration, used an anti- communist strategy to maintain power. The decision by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to support the Duvalier regime in the 1960s contrib- uted to the deterioration of economic and social conditions of the country since most skilled Haitians went into exile and very few investments were made in the economy.

The Emergence of NGOs By 1971, when Jean Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) took over from his father, the country's economic conditions had worsened and Haiti was becoming more dependent on foreign NGOs to feed its population. Beginning in 1971, the international community began to shift its policy of providing direct aid

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

]90

to the government to outsourcing it to NGOs as a means to combat corruption. Brinkerhoffand Goldsmith (1988) note that

faced with a national administrative network that lacked modern skills

and was riddled with corruption, most external agencies in Haiti in the 1970s and 1980s chose to work around the central administration, either

by collaborating with NGOs or by setting up autonomous public bodies over which they could exercise close oversight, (p. 104)

Therefore, since the administration of Baby Doc Duvalier, the success of the government has been measured by how well it gets along with foreign NGOs. Staff members spend a lot of time trying to please them by provid- ing a welcoming atmosphere for their employees and offering them special privileges. The decision by the donor states to bypass the Haitian government and

work with the international NGOs has set precedent in the country that no successive government has been able to reverse (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 1988). Following the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, the chaos that arose gave the international community more reasons to continue to negotiate with the NGOs. As a result, there was an increase in the number of NGOs doing business in the country. In 1984 the Haitian American Voluntary Association estimated that there were between 200 and 300 NGOs working in Haiti; 10 years later the number had increased to 800 (Pierre Etienne, 1997). By 2010, no one could give an official number of NGOs functioning in Haiti. Several sources have estimated that there are over 10,000 NGOs working in some capacity in the country and only 500 are officially registered with the govern- ment (The Economist, 2010). It is possible that the number of NGOs has con- siderably increased since the earthquake.

NGOs in World's Politics

The level of independence that NGOs began to assume from governments by engaging directly in projects and activities that were once the domain of the state after World War II was further increased by donor countries that wanted

to reorient many developing countries' market toward a neoliberal economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. NGOs that were strictly limited to provid- ing humanitarian assistance were now being engaged by donor countries in programs dealing with civil society issues such as democracy enhancement, conflict resolution, and economic projects. When NGOs strictly engage in activities that complement the work of the state, they are seen as an extension

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis 191

of the state, and their role then is to help it meet its many social and economic

obligations. Landim (1996) notes that an important aspect about NGOs is that "their actions are very much based on the social, political, and economic contexts of the countries in which they operate" (p. 208). For a long time NGO actions were seen as helping weak nation-states consolidate their domestic power.

Wapner (1995) noted that during the 1960s and 1970s, NGOs received tremen- dous attention from scholars who perceived NGOs as an extension of state power. Since genuine political activity was perceived to occur in the interac- tion of nation-states, the author remarked that "NGOs became important, but only because they influenced state behavior" (p. 319). But the mission and objectives of NGOs began to change by the end of the cold war. Many of them began to compete with the state by addressing key state issues such as governance, corruption, and legitimacy. As a result, NGOs were not only influencing state's behavior but also, in many instances, used as substitutes by international institutions and donor countries to implement pro- grams that were once administered by the state. Reimann (2006) notes that compared to the level of cooperation in the 1 950s and 1 960s, the United Nations

since the 1980s has not only funded NGOs to implement UN projects but also funded their attendance at UN conferences. Similar policy was implemented by the World Bank, which has increased NGO participation in its projects from 6% in 1988 to 50% in the late 1990s (Reimann, 2006). As a result of their increased participation at international conferences and their partnerships with international institutions such as the World Bank,

the character of these meetings has also changed. Bessis (1994) argues that the very presence of all kinds of NGOs at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1994 showed that they have "emerged as both the agents and the exponents of the new divisions that are redrawing the international landscape" (p. 12). Otto (1996) has also argued that the participation of NGOs at international conferences has "introduced a new dynamic of embryonic participatory democracy to the global community and to the shaping of inter- national law" (p. 107). Although Otto, Bessis, et al. argue that the participation of NGOs at inter- national conferences reinforced participatory democracy, others have noted that their role is to carry on the neoliberal agenda that emerged from indus- trialized countries after the end of the cold war (Schuller, 2009; Fisher, 1 997). The neoliberal agenda includes an open market economy, liberalization of tariffs, and the privatization of key government functions. Since many donor states did not trust certain governments to restructure their economy to the demand of the neoliberal agenda, they encouraged the proliferation of NGOs through funding and other support to replace government in functions that

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

m

they once fulfilled. As Reimann (2006) argues NGOs would not be able to survive without material resources. In addition to private donations and gov- ernmental support, the survival of many NGOs would not have been possible without institutional partners such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID), the World Bank, the United Nations, and International Monetary Fund. In 1980, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated the number of international NGOs at 1,600. In 1993, 13 years later, there were more than 2,970 NGOs with annual expenditures of more than $5.7 billion (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Currently, the number of registered NGOs has been estimated to be over 40,000 (Anheier et al., 2001). NGOs are civil society institutions that are often supported by intergovern- mental organizations (IGOs) and private citizens. Instead of being mere extensions of the nation-state, NGOs tend to perceive

themselves as separate from it and according to Matthews (1997) are competing with it for constituencies. She argues that national governments are losing not only autonomy in the global economy but also their ability to implement national policies due to the increasing capacity of NGOs through the develop- ment of modern communication to build constituencies of their own and estab-

lish direct connections to people around the world. Matthews notes that there are

only a few countries that are still ruled by authoritarian regimes where NGOs have not yet been able to influence public policy. In many others, their role and influence have exploded in the past decade, and they have been able to push around even the largest governments.

NGOs have pushed states to consider domestic public opinion in other countries before adopting national policies, and they have given citizens across borders the opportunity to influence issues that were once restricted to govern- ments. For example, no one can deny the considerable influence NGOs had on the environmental agreement that was signed among states in 1992.

With the broader independent base of public support that environmental

groups command, NGOs set the original goal of negotiating an agreement to control greenhouse gases long before governments were ready to do so, proposed most of its structure and content, and lobbied and mobilized

public pressure to force through a pact that virtually no one else thought possible when the talks began. (Matthews, 1997, p. 55)

The president of the Sudan, Omar Bashir, was accused by several humanitarian NGOs of committing crimes against humanity in 2009 (Agence France- Presse, 2009). Although no state has yet taken the initiative to arrest or press charges against President Bashir, the mere action of being accused by these

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis 193

NGOs has not only embarrassed the Sudanese government but also forced several Western countries to distance themselves from the regime.

NGOs in Haiti

Haiti's biggest donor is US AID. US AID is an intergovernmental agency that is involved in every sector that the Haitian government should be engaged in: from building schools to providing drugs to health care clinics and preventing HTV. Instead of channeling the funds directly to the Haitian government to imple-

ment these programs, USAID often invites NGOs to apply for these grants and provide these services on behalf of the Haitian government. Since the Haitian government authorizes these organizations to operate only in the country, it has little oversight of them, and often these NGOs do not feel accountable to the government because their funding is not coming from it.

In 2006 following the election of President Rene Převal after the second overthrow of President Aristide in 2004, Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis,

who was chosen by the newly elected president, decided to engage the donor community in a new paradigm regarding the way international aid is given and

administered in Haiti. This new paradigm included the following: more gov- ernment oversight of the aid by holding NGOs accountable to projects that have been signed on by the government; a gradual transfer of project imple- mentation from NGO to state agencies; the reinforcement of state agencies by recruiting, training, and nurturing national and international experts to increase

the state's capacity to execute the projects and a systematic anticorruption campaign; and the alignment of projects that are being implemented in the country with the government's budgetary and developmental priorities.

In 2007, USAID committed to invest $245 million in Haiti. The amount

was earmarked for all sectors in the country and was broken down into differ-

ent agencies. Table 1 provides an overview of the agencies that receive the bulk of the funding.

As one can read in the table, USAID is involved in practically all spheres of Haitian society and works with the key ministries of the country. For every ministry, there is also a parallel NGO that executes the program. In addition to distributing the funds to the NGOs, USAID also divided the funding for the same project among several local NGOs. Some of these NGOs have been in Haiti since the Duvalier regime and have played a major role in the transforma-

tion of Haitian's society from an agrarian self-sufficient economy to a depen- dent country. The Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) is a prime example of the nefarious effect of NGOs on Haitian society. CARE is

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

]94

Table I . Distribution of U.S. Agency for International Development Funding

to NGOs working in Haiti, With the Name of the Project and the Parallel

Government Ministry (2007)

Government

Project Name Ministry NGOs Amount (US$)

Investments and Commerce Chemonics 1 ,6 1 4,650 Trade International

Port Security Finance Caribbean Central 2,350,000 American Action

Economic Finance U.S. Treasury 250,000 Development Department Micro-credit Sogebank and 697,350

Capital Bank

Energy United Nations 4,1000,000 Office for Projects Services

Support to Small and DAI 4, 1 1 3,000 Medium Businesses

Health Ministry of MSPP 12,936,754 Health (MSPP)

Primary Education Minister of Education 5,42 1 ,097 Education Development (MENFP) Center (EDC)

Education MENFP EDC 5,539,575

Higher Education MENFP American Council 2,298, 1 3 1 on Education

Food Security (a) Agriculture, Catholic Relief 6,692,357 Environment Services and Health

Food Security (b) Agriculture, Save the Children 3,24 1 ,996 Environment

and Health

Food Security (c) Agriculture, World Vision 2,832,8 1 1 Environment International and Health

Food Security (d) Agriculture, Cooperative for 5, 1 50,000 Environment American Relief

and Health Everywhere Governance and Interior Associates in Rural 2,000,000 Decentralization Development

(continued)

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis

Table I. (continued)

Government

Project Name Ministry NGOs Amount (US$)

Human Rights Justice Pan American 1,121 ,877 Development Foundation

Governance/Support State University of 1 ,586,000 to Parliament New York Electoral Council OAS 1,240,000

Support to Judges Justice National Center for 5,470,644 and the Court State Courts

System

Program to Fight Heritage Foundation 850,640 Corruption for Haiti

Program Against Finance Systems Research 2,034,813 Corruption and Applications

Corporation International, Inc.

Short-Term Finance CHF International 30,250,000

Employment

Program to Promote International 44,546,390 Peace-Democratic Organization for Governance Migration

Support to Private Agencies 1 ,885, 1 74 Civil Society Collaborating Organizations Together

Technical Assistance All ministries Center for Training 1 ,967,890 to the Haitian and Technical Government Assistance

Program to Prevent Health Plan International 1 ,294,000 AIDS (a)

Program to Prevent Health World Vision 1 ,250, 1 8 1 AIDS (b) International

Program to Fight Health World Concern 3,005,405 AIDS

Abbreviations: DAI = Development Alternatives, Inc.; OAS = Organization of American States. Source: http://www.usaid.gov/ht/.

one of the oldest NGOs in Haiti. It began to operate in the country after the 1954 Hurricane Hazel, which destroyed the country's cash crops of coffee, cocoa, and plantains in the southeast. In 1966 CARE moved to the northwest of Haiti, where it began to implement community development activities

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

m

(www.care.org). The development activities that CARE mentioned were pri- marily a program called Food for Work. As part of the international community's

strategy to decrease Haiti's dependence on subsistence agriculture and cash crops,

the government of Jean Claude Duvalier in agreement with NGOs began to encourage Haitian peasants to migrate to Port-au-Prince to seek employment in

the assembly industries that were being built. The Food for Work program was

a means of paying peasants for building roads and installing drinkable water systems in rural communities and then paid them through surplus food that was

donated by the United States, Canada, and other countries. The impact of this program in the northwest of Haiti was a massive exodus of peasants from the countryside to urban areas. Peasants began to abandon their land since the surplus food that was dumped in the market was cheaper than the food locally produced. Since they were also attracted by the factory jobs in Port-au-Prince, they preferred to settle there instead of eking out a living off the land.

Although the program appeared innovative at the time that CARE was implementing it, the truth was that after a while it could not employ all those who wanted a job. Land in the northwest was abandoned, and many peasants who could not make it to Port-au-Prince left the country by boat to the United

States and other Caribbean islands. The refugee and boat people crisis that erupted in the United States in the 1980s was a direct result ofthat policy. Grassroots International (1997) revealed in a report that emphasized the mech-

anism through which USAID feeds dependency in Haiti that

[Haitian officials] revealed consistent complaints that foreign aid pro- grams, generally implemented by private agencies such as CARE and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) largely by pass relevant Haitian governmental entities, often putting resulting devel- opment projects at odds with stated national, regional, and local pri- orities, (p. 2)

Dewind and Kinley (1988) in their seminal work on migration and poverty in Haiti concluded that it was the U.S. policy of encouraging Haitian govern- ments to forego investments in the rural, health, and education sectors that led to the refugee crisis of the 1980s.

ACDI

After the overthrow of President Aristide by the United States and France,

the Canadian government increased its foreign aid to Haiti to support the government of Gerard Latortue that replaced Aristide in 2004. Haiti became

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis 197

the second largest recipient of Canadian aid after Afghanistan in 2004. Like the Americans, the Canadians have their own agency to distribute, monitor, and supervise the aid. ACDI, which is the Canadian Agency for International Development, is the key IGO that coordinates all the aid that the Canadian government provides to Haiti. After President Převal took office in May 2006, Haiti received a number of Canadian public officials including the prime min- ister, who stated that Canada was firmly committed to helping stabilize Haiti by providing money for good governance and combat corruption. A few months

later, in November, the Canadian government announced that it had granted Haiti $7.2 million to modernize its public administration. The grant was to be given over a period of 5 years (Rock, 2007). In addition to aid to reform public administration, Canada also provided money for education, road building, and health. ACDI, which administers the Canadian aid, is not obli- gated to report to Haitian officials how its funds are used and whether the proj- ects are implemented.

The European Union The European Union practically suspended all its aid to Haiti under the Aristide

regime. After the departure of President Aristide in 2004, the European Union, like other foreign donors, resumed its aid. At the beginning the aid consisted primarily of money to support the presidential and parliamentary elections that

were scheduled for 2006. For example the European Union provided 18 million to the Electoral Council for the elections. Additional money was given to develop and support the pacification of Cite Soleil, which was the seat of violence during the transitional period of 2004-2006. Cite Soleil is the largest urban poor dwelling in the country and where the fiercest battle took place between President Aristide partisans and UN peacekeeping forces that occu- pied Haiti in 2004. The Haitian government's Ministry of Planning is the agency responsible to monitor and license all the foreign NGOs that work in the country. There is a special unit in the Ministry in charge of monitoring them. However, that unit

has no idea how many NGOs are operating in the country and the scope of their activities. As the years have passed, things have gotten worse. In an inter-

view with the southeast regional planning director of the Ministry of Planning, the latter admitted that his greatest frustration was that there were a number

of foreign NGOs operating in his department without his knowledge and that some of these organizations were doing the same activities in the same locality. None of them shared their plans with the ministry and his department (Pierre- Louis, 2000).

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

m

The lack of coordination and planning was well illustrated with Hurricane Noel, which hit the country in November 2007. The hurricane damaged several towns and villages in the country, primarily the town of Cabaret to the north of Port-au-Prince. The storm not only destroyed homes and schools but also wiped out peasants' crops. The government had no idea which NGO was intervening in the town. A few weeks after the hurricane, on a return trip to Haiti from New York, a UNICEF worker who was sitting next to me mentioned

that UNICEF had projects in Cabaret. In addition to UNICEF, I found out that Oxfam too was helping rebuild the irrigation canals in Cabaret and had been involved in that area for several years. All of this was news not only to me (I was working with the prime minister) but also to his staff members, who were unaware of where and what the majority of the NGOs did in the country.

Although the government is unaware of the activities of most NGOs in the coun-

try, it is nevertheless held accountable by the population when a hurricane or other disaster occurs. Often, the NGOs that are funded to intervene disappear or change their activities. In 2008, after the three hurricanes that destroyed the

city of Gonaives in the Artibonite region, the population blamed the govern- ment for its ineptitude and the work that the NGOs were doing in the city, which contributed to the destruction.

The NGO Sector After the Earthquake The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, epitomizes all the symp-

toms that existed in the country in relation to the way international NGOs oper-

ate in the country. Three days after the earthquake, the government of Rene Převal was unable to either communicate with the population or provide any form of assistance. Although the government lost 17 of its 18 ministries and most of the media were also affected, the reality was that two radio stations were constantly on the air, keeping in touch with the population and seeking assistance for those who were pinned down under the rubble. The failure to communicate with the population was blamed on the president's lack of lead- ership and the fact that the government had no contingency plan to address any catastrophe in the country. There was no emergency management system in place that could be rapidly activated. Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital, was an urban jungle where residents built homes wherever they wanted. Since 1971 with the neoliberal agenda imposed by foreign donors, the mantra has been "less government is better." Therefore, governmental agencies that used to supervise construction in the city have been stripped of their staff. Junior state employees take government jobs in order to gain enough experience to work for NGOs, which pay them better and also provide material and career

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis 199

advancement. Canada, as part of its policy to increase the number of skilled individuals in the country, has been offering residency to any Haitian profes- sional that had a valid university degree. Several state employees have taken advantage of this program to emigrate to Canada. The Haitian government, which was already experiencing a deficit of qualified employees, was further depleted of its manpower. The politics of allowing the NGOs to control key sectors in the country finally showed its limitations on January 12, 2010. It was not until Friday morning, 3 days after the tremor, that international aid began to appear on the

streets of Port-au-Prince. Most of the aid at the beginning was coming from the

Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Venezuela. NGOs such as the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders were more visible since they provided health care assistance to the people immediately. However, they could not address the other needs of the population such as establishing order, distributing food, and

ensuring citizens' safety.

Postearthquake Policy Instead of using the earthquake to rethink their aid policy in Haiti, the donor countries continue to support the same failed approach. A recent USAID report on the Haitian earthquake showed that most of the aid from the international community went to the same organizations that have been in the country for years. More than a million Haitians were still living in makeshift shelters 6 months after the earthquake, and there are no real plans to move them anytime soon despite the fact that over $1 billion has been collected. Although for decades studies have shown the limited abilities of NGOs to create wealth and promote development, that model is still being endorsed by donor countries. However, the devastating earthquake in Haiti has put more pressure on Haiti's leaders to rethink that approach. As Birdsall (2008) notes,

The problems with aid quality matter tremendously because research indicates that they reduce considerably the effective value of the aid that

is transferred, and in the most aid-dependent countries may well mean that the way the "business of aid" is conducted actually undermines those countries' long term development prospects, (p. 516)

When the earthquake hit Port-au-Prince on January 12, 2010, it exposed all the fault lines that existed in the country's institutions as a result of the histori-

cal boycott of the new nation and the systematic weakening of state authority. Therefore, the destruction was not only physical but also emotional. The only

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

200

international airport in the country was damaged and unable to receive large airplanes that wanted to bring in relief. Even when the planes landed, there was

no coordination of the aid. As each NGO began to grab a sector of the territory

that was affected by the earthquake, competition for resources and turf hege- mony began to erupt among them. John Holmes, the coordinator of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, criticized his employees for failing to adequately manage the relief effort in Haiti after the quake. He lamented the lack of coordination on the ground among the NGOs which resulted in an inefficient management of the crisis in Haiti (Lynch, 2010). The aftermath of the earthquake prompted the United Nations and other agen- cies to coordinate their aid to Haiti by creating an Interim Reconstruction Commission. The agency, which is run jointly by the president of Haiti and the special UN envoy, Bill Clinton, has been given mandates to collect funds and coordinate all the reconstruction projects in the country. Since its creation in March 2010, over $5 billion has been pledged by donor coun- tries. So far, it has received only $150 million, and President Clinton is hav- ing a hard time getting the NGOs to work together on projects that the commission has identified. The difficulties that the agency was already facing a few months after the earthquake showed that Haiti was beginning to revert to business as usual. The more than 200,000 people who lost their lives as a result of bad governance and neoliberal policy will soon be forgotten when all the rubble is collected and dumped unless the people organize to change the current paradigm.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship

and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/

or authorship of this article: research for this article was supported by a grant from PSC- CUNY.

References

Agence France-Presse (AFP). (2009). Bashir wants all foreign NGOs out in a year. France 24. Retrieved from http://www.france24.com/en/20090316-bashir-wants-

all-foreign-ngos-out-year-?quicktabs_ 1 =0

Anheier, H., Glasius, M., Kaldor, M. (Eds.). (2001). Global Civil Society 2001. Lon- don, UK: LSE Global Governance. Retrieved from http://www.LSE.ac.uk/depts/

global/yearbook 01chapters.htm

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pierre-Louis 20 1

Ardouin, Α. Β. (1958). Etudes sur l'Histoire d'Haïti [Studies on Haitian history]. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: François Dalencour, éditeur.

Benoit, P. V. ( 1 954). Cent Cinquante Ans de Commerce Extérieur d 'Haïti, 1804-1954

[150 years of Haitian Foreign Commerce, 1804-1954]. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: Imprimeri de l'Etate.

Bessis, S. (1994). NGOs: The fight to be heard. UNESCO Courier, 47, 12-14.

Birdsall, N. (2008). Seven deadly sins: Reflections on donor failings reinventing foreign

aid. In W. Easterly (Ed.), Reinventing foreign aid (pp. 515-552). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Goldsmith, A. A. (1988). The challenge of administrative reform

in post-Duvalier Haiti: Efficiency, equity and the prospects for systemic change.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, 54, 89-1 14.

Clement, J. B. (1979). History of education in Haiti: 1804-1915. Revista de Historia de America, 87, 141-181.

Dewind, J., & Kinley III, D. H. (1988). Aiding migration: The impact of international

development assistance on Haiti. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Edwards, M., & Hulme, D. (Eds.). (1996). Beyond the magic bullet: NGO performance

and accountability in the post-cold war world. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Fisher, W. F. (1997). Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices.

Annual Review of Anthropology, 26, 439-464.

Grassroots International. (1997). Feeding dependency, starving democracy: USAID policies in Haiti. Boston, MA: Author.

Landim, L. (1996). Nongovernmental organizations in Latin America. In R. Ai Camp

(Ed.), Democracy in Latin America (pp. 207-222). Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.

Lynch, С (2010). Top UN aid official critiques Haiti aid efforts in confidential email.

Retrieved from http^/blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts^Oll

Matthews, T. J. (1997). Power shift. Foreign Affairs, 76, 50-66.

Matthewson, T. (1995). Jefferson and Haiti. Journal of Southern History, 61, 209-248.

Mintz, S. W. (1995). Can Haiti change? Foreign Affairs, 74, 73-86.

Otto, D. (1996). Nongovernmental organizations in the United Nations system: The

emerging role of international civil society. Human Rights Quarterly, 18, 107-141.

Pierre Etienne, S. (1997). Haïti: L 'Invasion des ONG, 1977 [Haiti: The invasion of the NGOs]. Montreal, Canada: CIDIHCA.

Pierre-Louis, F. (2000, May). Decentralization and democracy in Haiti. Paper presented at the International Conference on Democratic Decentralization, Kerala, India.

Reimann, К. D. (2006). A view from the top: International politics, norms and the worldwide growth of NGOs 2006. Tucson, AZ: International Studies Association.

Rock, N. (2007, November 8). Haiti-Canada: Le Canada accorde $7,2 millions à Haïti

pour la modernisation de Г administration publique. Alter Presse.

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

202 Journal of Black Studies 42(2)

Schuller, M. (2009). Gluing globalization: NGOs as intermediate in Haiti. Political

and Legal Anthropology Review, 32, 84-104.

Sontag, D. (2010, April 12). Leg lost, dancer is caught between caregivers. New York

Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/world/americas/

13amputee.html

The Economist. (2010). Rebuilding Haiti: Dreaming beyond the rubble. The Econo-

mist, April 17.

Wapner, P. (1995). Politics beyond the state. World Politics, 47, 311-340.

Bio

Francois Pierre-Louis is associate professor of political science at Queens College,

City University of New York. His interests are citizen participation and urban and

comparative politics. He is the author of Haitians in New York City: Transnationalism

and Hometown Associations. His articles have appeared in US Catholics, Wadabagei,

Journal of Haitian Studies, and Education and Urban Society.

This content downloaded from �������������131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 04:52:01 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms