Literature Review

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Y

h d'

'ty betw een

the develop· there be under ~apitalism

to d ovtc~;,;~~ufati~::; capital on the one side,

~nne;:h~f ::~,~~~t~vr'c~~~~~:::nd tspeheres of influence for finance capital on the

other?

.;

.,

- W

,yf,,,._.) I If,)

Source: E .H

. C

arr (1939)

The Tw enty Years' C

risis. L ondon,

M acm

illan, pp. 67-71 and 75-88. C opyright E

.H . C

arr, reproduced by perm

ission of C hris B

row n ltd, L

ondon.

Follow ing the carnage of the G

reat W ar of 1914-18, academ

ics and statespeople had operated on the assum

ption that only the insane w ould resort to w

ar in the future. W

ars w ere caused in som

e w ay by a series of errors, m

isunderstandings or m

isperceptions. In future the security of the w

orld could be assured by creating international organizations like the L

eague of N ations that w

ould pro- vide a forum

for m ediation, clarification and the resolution of conflicts. C

arr attacks this view

as utopian. H e argues that all appeals to a 'harm

ony of interests' or som

e 'cosm opolitan'

idea of a universal com m

unity of hum ankind

should be seen for w

hat they really are: an attem pt to dom

inate by prom oting

one's ow n

view s as though in the interests of all.

TH E

R E

LA TIV

ITY OF TH

O U

G H

T

T he outstanding

achievem ent of m

odern realism , how

ever, has been to reveal, not m

erely the determ inist aspects of the historical process, but the relative and

pragm atic

character of thought

itself. Jn the last fifty years, thanks m

ainly though

not w holly to the influence of M

arx, the principles of the historical

school have been applied to the analysis of thought; and the foundations of n

·• new

science have been laid, principally by G erm

an thinkers, under the nam e of

the 'sociology of know ledge.' T

he realist has thus been enabled to dem onstrate

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/ that the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism

, far from being

( the expression of absolute and a priori principles, a:e historical! conditioned,

J being both ~ducts of circum

stances and interests an w

eapons fram ed for the

furtherance of interests. 'E thical notions, as M

r B ertrand R

ussell has rem arked,

'are very seldom a cause, but alm

ost alw ays an effect, a m

eans of claim ing

universal legislative authority for our ow n preferences, not, as w

e fondly im

agine, the actual ground of those preferences.' 1 T his is by far the m

ost for· m

idable attack w hich utopianism

has to face; for here the very foundations of its belief are underm

ined by the realist critique. In a general w

ay, the relativity of thought has long been recognised. A s early

as the seventeenth century B ishop B

urnet expounded the relativist view as

cogently, if not as pungently, as M arx:

A s to the late C

ivil W ars, 'tis pretty w

ell know n w

hat notions of govern- m

ent w ent current in those days. W

hen m onarchy w

as to be subverted w e

knew w

hat w as necessary to justify the fact; and then, because it w

as con· venient for the purpose, it w

as undoubtedly true in the nature of things that governm

ent had its original from the people, and the prince w

as only their trustee ....

B ut afterw

ards, w hen m

onarchy took its place again ... another notion of governm

ent cam e into fashion. T

hen governm ent had

its original entirely from G

od, and the prince w as accountable to none but

H im

.... A

nd now , upon another turn of things, w

hen people have a liberty to speak out, a new

set of notions is advanced; now passive obe·

dience is all a m istake, and instead of being a duty to suffer oppression,

'tis a glorious act to resist it: and instead of leaving injuries to be redressed by G

od, w e have a natural right to relieve ourselves. 2

In m odern tim

es, the recognition of this phenom enon has becom

e fairly general. 'B

elief, and to speak fairly, honest belief', w rote D

icey of the divisions of opinion in the nineteenth century about slavery, 'w

as to a great extent the result not of argum

ent, not even of direct self-interest, but of circum stances ....

C ircum

· stances are the creators of m

ost m en's opinions. ' 3 M

arx narrow ed dow

n this som

ew hat vague conception, declaring that all thought w

as conditioned by the econom

ic interest and social status of the thinker. T his view

w as perhaps unduly

restrictive. In particular M arx, w

ho denied the existence of 'national' inter~sts, underestim

ated the potency of nationalism as a force conditioning the thought

of the individual. B ut the peculiar concentration w

hich he applied to the princi· pie served to popularise it and drive it hom

e. T he relativity of thought to the

interests and circum stances of the thinker has been far m

ore extensively recognised and underst0od since M

arx w rote.

T he principle has an extrem

ely w ide field of application. It has becom

e a com -

m onplace to say that theories do not m

ould the course of events, but are invented

1. P roceedings of the A

ristotelian Society, 1915-16 1 p. 302.

2. B urnet, E

.uay upo11 Goverm nent, p, 10.

3. D icey, Law

and O pinion (1905 ed.), p. 27.

.. ·~ '

C A

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181

to explain them . 'E

m pire precedes im

perialism .'' E

ighteenth-century England 'put into practice the policy of laissez-faire before it found a justification, or even an apparent justification, in the new

doctrine'; 5 and 'the virtual break-up of /aissez1aire as a body of doctrine ...

has follow ed, and not preceded, the

decline of laissez-faire in the real w orld'. 6 T

he theory of 'socialism in a single

country' prom ulgated in Soviet R

ussia in 1924 w as m

anifestly a product of the failure of Soviet regim

es to establish them selves in other countries.

B ut the developm

ent of abstract theory is often influenced by events w hich

have no essential connexion w ith it at all.

In the story of political thought [w rites a m

odern social thinker] events have been no less potent than argum

ents. T he failure and success of

institutions, the victories and defeats of countries identified w ith certain

principles have repeatedly brought new strength and resolution to the

adherents or opponents of these principles as the case m ight be in all

lands .... Philosophy as it exists on earth is the w

ord of philosophers w

ho, authority tells us, suffer as m uch from

toothache as other m ortals,

and are, like others, open to the im pression of near and striking events and

to the seductions of intellectual fashion. 7

G erm

any's dram atic rise to pow

er in the sixties and seventies of the last century w

as im pressive enough to m

ake the leading B ritish philosophers of the next

generation - C

aird, T .H

. G reen, B

osanquet, M cT

aggart - ardent H

ege!ians. T

hereafter, the K aiser's telegram

to K ruger and the G

erm an naval program

m e

spread the conviction am ong B

ritish thinkers that H egel w

as a less good phi- losopher than had been supposed; and since 1914 no B

ritish philosopher of repute has ventured to sail under the H

egelian flag. A fter 1870, Stubbs and Free-

m an put early E

nglish history on a sound T eutonic basis, w

hile even in France Fustel de C

oulanges had an uphill struggle to defend the L atin origins of French

civilisation. D uring the past thirty years, E

nglish historians have been furtively engaged in m

aking the T eutonic origins of E

ngland as inconspicuous as possible. N

or is it only professional thinkers w ho are subject to such influences. Popular

opinion is not less m arkedly dom

inated by them . T

he frivolity and im m

orality of French life w

as an established dogm a in nineteenth-century B

ritain, w hich still

rem em

bered N apoleon. 'W

hen 1 w as young', w

rites M r B

ertrand R ussell, 'the

French ate frogs and w ere called "froggies", but they apparently abandoned this

practice w hen w

e concluded our entente w ith them

in 1904 - at any rate, 1 have

never heard it m entioned since that date.' 8 Som

e years later, 'the gallant little Jap' of I 905 underw

ent a converse m etam

orphosis into 'the Prussian of the E ast'.

In the nineteenth century, it w as a com

m onplace ofB

ritish opinion that G erm

ans w

ere efficient and enlightened, and R ussians backw

ard and barbarous. A bout

4. J.A . H

obson, F rl!l! Thougl,t in tht Social Scitnces, p. 190.

S. H aU

vy, T hi! Grow

th of P hilosopM

t: R

adit:alism (Engl. transl.), p. 104.

6, M . D

obb. P olitkaf Econom

y 1m d Cttpitalism

, p. 188.

7. L T

. H obhoust, T

ht U

niryof W

tsU rn C

ivilisation, ed. F .S. M

arvin (3rd c-d.)1 pp. 177-8. 8. B

ertrand Russell, W hich W

ay P 1tt1t:d p. 158,

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1910, it w as ascertained that G

erm ans (w

ho turned out to be m ostly Prussians)

w ere coarse, brutal and narrow

-m inded, and that R

ussians had a Slav soul. T he

vogue of R ussian literature in G

reat B ritain, w

hich set in about the sam e tim

e, w

as a direct outcom e of the political rapprochem

ent with R ussia. T

he vogue of M

arxism in G

reat B ritain and France, w

hich began on a m odest scale after the

success of the B olshevik revolution in R

ussia, rapidly gathered m om

entum , par-

ticularly am ong intellectuals, after 1934, w

hen it w as discovered that Soviet

R ussia w

as a potential m ilitary ally against G

erm any. It is sym

ptom atic that

m ost people, w

hen challenged, w ill indignantly deny that they form

their opi- nions in this w

ay; for as A cton long ago observed, 'few

discoveries are m ore

irritating than those w hich expose the pedigree of ideas'. 9 T

he conditioning of thought is necessarily a subconscious process.

~al in~e!e_s!_a~cU

he.universaL go_o_d_

T he realist should not, how

ever, linger over the infliction of these pin-pricks through chinks in the utopian defences. H

is task is to bring dow n the w

hole card- board structure of utopian thought by exposing the hollow

ness of the m aterial

out of w hich it is built. T

he w eapon of the relativity of thought m

ust be used to dem

olish the utopian concept of a fixed and absolute standard by w hich

policies and actions can be judged. If theories are revealed as a reflexion of prac- tice and principles of political needs, this discovery w

ill apply to the fundam ental

theories and principles of the utopian creed, and not least to the doctrine of the harm

ony of interests w hich is its essential postulate.

It w ill not be difficult to shew

that the utopian, w hen he preaches the doc·

trine of the harm ony of interests, is innocently and unconsciously adopting

W alew

ski's m axim

, and clothing his ow n interest in the guise of a universal

interest for the purpose of im posing it on the rest of the w

orld. 'M en com

e easily to believe that arrangem

ents agreeable to them selves are beneficial to others', as

D icey observed;'" and theories of the public good, w

hich turn out on inspection to be an elegant disguise for som

e particular interest, are as com m

on in interna- tional as in national affairs. T

he utopian, how ever eager he m

ay be to establish an absolute standard, does not argue that it is the duty of his country, in confor- m

ity w ith that standard, to put the interest of the w

orld at large before its ow n

interest; for that w ould be contrary to his theory that the interest of all coincides

w ith the interest of each. H

e argues that w hat is best for the w

orld is best for his country, and then reverses the argum

ent to read that w hat is best for his

country is best for the w orld, the tw

o propositions being, from the utopian

standpoint, identical; and this unconscious cynicism of the contem

porary utopian has proved a far m

ore effective diplom atic w

eapon than the deliberate and self-conscious cynicism

of a W alew

ski or a B ism

arck. B ritish w

riters of the

9. A cton, llistury of F

reedom , p. 62,

10. D icey, Law

and O pif1ion in E

ng{and(lnd ed.), pp. 14-tS. '

C A

R R

183

past half-century have been particularly eloquent supporters of the theory that the m

aintenance of B ritish suprem

acy is the perform ance of a duty to m

ankind. 'If G

reat B ritain has turned itself into a coal-shed and blacksm

ith's forge', rem

arked The Tim es ingenuously in 1885, 'it is for the behoof of m

ankind as w

ell as its ow n.' 11 T

he follow ing extract is typical of a dozen w

hich m ight be

culled from m

em oirs of public m

en of the period:

I have but one great object in this w orld, and that is to m

aintain the greatness of the E

m pire. B

ut apart from m

y John B ull sentim

ent upon the point, I firm

ly believe that in doing so I w ork in the cause of C

hris- tianity, of peace, of civilisation, and the happiness of the hum

an race generally. 12

'I contend that w e are the first race in the w

orld,' w rote C

ecil R hodes, 'and that

the m ore of the w

orld w e inhabit the better it is for the hum

an race.' 13 In 1891, the m

ost popular and brilliant journalist of the day, W .T

. Stead, founded the R

eview of R

eview s. 'W

e believe in G od, in E

ngland and in H um

anity', ran the editorial m

anifesto in its opening num ber. 'T

he E nglish-speaking race is one of

the chief of G od's chosen agents for executing com

ing im provem

ents in the lot of m

ankind.' 14 A n O

xford professor w as convinced in 1912 that the secret of

B ritain's history w

as that 'in fighting for her ow n independence she has been

fighting for the freedom of E

urope, and that the service thus rendered to E urope

and to m ankind has carried w

ith it the possibility of that larger service to w hich

w e give the nam

e E m

pire'. IS

T he first w

orld w ar carried this conviction to a pitch of em

otional frenzy. A

bare catalogue, culled from the speeches of B

ritish statesm en, of the services

w hich B

ritish belligerency w as rendering to hum

anity w ould fill m

any pages. In 1917, B

alfour told the N ew

Y ork C

ham ber of C

om m

erce that 'since A ugust,

1914, the fight has been for the highest spiritual advantages of m ankind, w

ithout a petty thought or am

bition'. 16 T he Peace C

onference and its sequel tem po-

rarily discredited these professions and threw som

e passing doubt on the belief in B

ritish suprem acy as one of the m

oral assets of m ankind. B

ut the period of disillusionm

ent and m odesty w

as short. M om

ents of international tension, and especially m

om ents w

hen the possibility of w ar appears on the horizon, alw

ays stim

ulate this identification of national interest w ith m

orality. A t the height of

the A byssinian crisis, the A

rchbishop of C anterbury adm

onished the French public through an interview

in a Paris new spaper:

W e are anim

ated by m oral and spiritual considerations. 1 do not think I

am departing from

m y role by contributing tow

ards the clearing up of this m

isunderstanding .••. ti.

T he T

im ts,A

ugust27, 188S.

12. M l.'lurice

and A rthur, T

ht L ift of L

ord W olseley, p. 314.

13. W .T

. Stead, T ht I.A

st W ill 111,d Testam

tnt of C ecil). R

hodes, p. 58. 14. R

r11ieivo/R tview

s,Jrm uary 15, 1891.

15. Spencer W ilkinson, G

ovtm m

eftt ,w cl tl1e \V

ar, p. 116. J6. Q

uoud in B eard, T

he R ist of A

m ericdll C

i11i/isatio1t, ii. p. 646.

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It is , .. no egoist interest that is driving us forw ard, and no considera-

tion of interest should keep you behind.'7 In the follow

ing year, Professor T oynbee w

as once m ore able to discover that

the security of the B ritish E

m pire 'w

as also the suprem e interest of the w

hole w

orld'.t 8 In 1937, L ord C

ecil spoke to the G eneral C

ouncil of the L eague of

N ations U

nion of 'our duty to our country, to our E m

pire and to hum anity at

large', and quoted: N

ot once nor tw ice in our rough island story

T he path of duty is the w

ay to glory. 19

A n E

nglishm an, as M

r B ernard Shaw

rem arks in The M

a11 of D estiny, 'never

forgets that the nation w hich lets its duty get on to the opposite side to its interest

is lost', It is not surprising that an A m

erican critic should recently have described the B

ritish as 'Jesuits lost to the theological but gained for the political realm ', 20

or that a form er Italian M

inister for Foreign A ffairs should have com

m ented,

long before these recent m anifestations, on 'that precious gift bestow

ed upon the B

ritish people - the possession of w

riters and clergym an able in perfect good

faith to advance the highest m oral reasons for the m

ost concrete diplom atic

action, w ith inevitable m

oral profit to E ngland'. 21

In recent tim es, the sam

e phenom enon has becom

e endem ic in the U

nited States. T

he story how M

cK inley prayed for divine guidance and decided to

annex the Philippines is a classic of m odern A

m erican history; and this annexa-

tion w as the occasion of a popular outburst of m

oral self-approval hitherto m ore

fam iliar in the foreign policy of G

reat B ritain than of the U

nited States. T

heodore R oosevelt, w

ho believed m ore firm

ly than any previous A m

erican President in the doctrine L'etat, c'est m

oi, carried the process a step further. T he

follow ing curious dialogue occurred in his cross-exam

ination during a libel action brought against him

in 1915 by a T am

m any leader:

Q uery: H

ow did you know

that substantial justice w as done?

R oosevelt: B

ecause I did it, because ... I w

as doing m y best.

Q uery: Y

ou m ean to say that, w

hen you do a thing, thereby substantial justice is done. R

oosevelt: I do. W hen I do a thing, I do it so as to do substantial justice.

I m ean just that. 22

W oodrow

W ilson w

as less naively egotistical, but m ore profoundly confident of

the identity of A m

erican policy and universal justice. A fter the bom

bardm ent

of V era C

ruz in 1914, he assured the w orld that 'the U

nited States had

17. Q uoted in M

anchester G uardian, O

ctober 18, 1935. 18 . .T

oynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1935, ii. p. 46. 19. H

eadw ay, N

ovem ber 1937.

20, C arl B

ecker, Yale R eview

, xxvii. p. 452. 21.

C ount Sforza

1 F oreign A

ffairs, O ctober 1927, p. 67.

22. Q uoted in H

.F . P

ringle, Theodore R oost:velt, p. 318,

,:,

C A

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gone dow n to M

exico to serve m ankind'. 23 D

uring the first w orld w

ar, he advised A

m erican naval cadets 'not only alw

ays to think first of A m

erica, but alw

ays, also, to think first of hum anity' -

a feat rendered slightly less difficult by his explanation that the U

nited States had been 'founded for the benefit of hum

anity'.2' Shortly before the entry of the U nited States into the w

ar, in an address to the Senate on w

ar aim s, he stated the identification still m

ore categorically: 'T

hese are A m

erican principles, A m

erican policies .... T

hey are the principles of m

ankind and m ust prevail.' 25

It w ill be observed that utterances of this character proceed alm

ost exclusively from

A nglo-Saxon statesm

en and w riters. It is true that w

hen a prom inent

N ational Socialist asserted that 'anything that benefits the G

erm an people is

right, anything that harm s the G

erm an people is w

rong', 26 he w as m

erely pro- pounding the sam

e identification of national interest w ith universal right w

hich had already been established for E

nglish-speaking countries by W ilson, Pro-

fessor T oynbee, L

ord C ecil and m

any others. B ut w

hen the claim is translated

into a foreign language, the note seem s forced, and the identification unconvinc-

ing, even to the peoples concerned. T w

o explanations are com m

only given of this curious discrepancy. T

he first explanation, w hich is popular.in E

nglish- speaking countries, is that the policies of the E

nglish-speaking nations are in fact m

ore virtuous and disinterested than those of C ontinental states, so that W

ilson and Professor T

oynbee and L ord C

ecil are, broadly speaking, right w hen they

identify the A m

erican and B ritish national interests w

ith the interest of m ankind.

T he second explanation, w

hich is popular in C ontinental countries, is that the

E nglish-speaking peoples are past m

asters in the art of concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the general good, and that this kind of hypocrisy is a special and characteristic peculiarity of the A

nglo-Saxon m ind.

It seem s unnecessary to accept either of these heroic attem

pts to cut the knot. T

he solution is a sim ple one. T

heories of social m orality are alw

ays the product of a dom

inant group w hich identifies itself w

ith the com m

unity as a w hole, and

w hich possesses facilities denied to subordinate groups or individuals for im

pos- ing its view

of life on the com m

unity. T heories of international m

orality are, for the sam

e reason and in virtue of the sam e process, the product of dom

inant nations or groups of nations. For the past hundred years, and m

ore especially since 1918, the E

nglish-speaking peoples have form ed the dom

inant group in the w

orld; and current theories of international m orality have been designed to

perpetuate their suprem acy and expressed in the idiom

peculiar to them . France,

retaining som ething of her eighteenth-century tradition and restored to a

position of dom inance for a short period after 1918, has played a m

inor part in the creation of current international m

orality, m ainly through her insistence on

the role of law in the m

oral order. G erm

any, never a dom inant Pow

er and

23. P ,,blic P

apers of W oodrow

W ilson: T

he N ew

D em

ocracy, ed. R .S. B

aker. 24. /M

d. i. pp. 318-19. 25. Ibid. ii. p. 414. 26.

Q uoted in T

oynbee, S,m ,ey of Jnurnationa/ A

ffairs, 1936, p. 319.

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reduced to helplessness after 1918, has rem ained for these reasons outside the

charm ed circle of creators of international m

orality. B oth the view

that the E

nglish-speaking peoples are m onopolists of international m

orality and the view

that they are consum m

ate international hypocrites m ay be reduced to the plain

fact that the current canons of international virtue have, by a natural and inevitable process, been m

ainly created by them .

T he realist critique of the harrt1ony of interest;-------,

T he doctrine of the harm

ony of interests yields readily to analysis in term s of this

principle. It is the natural assum ption of a

ros erous and ri_v_\!eged

class, w

hose m em

bers ave a

om m

ant voice in the com m

unity and are therefore naturally pr;~~-t;;-identify its intereStw

ithtncirow n. ln V

trtue-ofih1ffclerifffic.:- tion, any assailant of the interests ol the dom

inant group is m ade to incur the

odium of assailing the alleged com

m on interest of the w

hole com m

unity, and is told that in m

aking this assault he is attacking his ow n higher interests. T

he doc- trine of the harm

ony of interests thus serves as an ingenious m oral device

invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and m ain-

tain their dom inant position. B

ut a further point requires notice. T he suprem

acy w

ithin the com m

unity of the privileged group m ay be, and often is, so over-

w helm

ing that there is, in fact, a sense in w hich its interests are those of the

com m

unity, since its w ell-being necessarily carries w

ith it som e m

easure of w ell-

being for other m em

bers of the com m

unity, and its collapse w ould entail the col-

lapse of the com m

unity as a w hole. In so far, therefore, as the alleged natural

harm ony of interests has any reality, it is created by the overw

helm ing pow

er of the privileged group, and is an excellent illustration of the M

achiavellian m axim

that m

orality is the product of pow er. A

few exam

ples w ill m

ake this analysis of the doctrine of the harm

ony of interests clear. In the nineteenth century, the B

ritish m anufacturer or m

erchant, having discovered that laissez-faire prom

oted his ow n prosperity, w

as sincerely con- vinced that it also prom

oted B ritish prosperity as a w

hole. N or w

as this alleged harm

ony of interests betw een him

self and the com m

unity entirely fictitious. T he

predom inance of the m

anufacturer and the m erchant w

as so overw helm

ing that there w

as a sense in w hich an identity betw

een their prosperity and B ritish pro-

sperity as a w hole could be correctly asserted. From

this it w as only a short step

to argue that a w orker on strike, in dam

aging the prosperity of the B ritish

m anufacturer, w

as dam aging B

ritish prosperity as a w hole, and thereby dam

ag- ing his ow

n, so that he could be plausibly denounced by the predecessors of Professor T

oynbee as im m

oral and by the predecessors of Professor Z im

m ern as

m uddle-headed. M

oreover, there w as a sense in w

hich this argum ent w

as perfectly correct. N

evertheless, the doctrine of the harm ony of interests and of

solidarity betw een the classes m

ust have seem ed a bitter m

ockery to the under- privileged w

orker, w hose inferior status and insignificant stake in 'B

ritish pros- perity' w

ere consecrated by it; and presently he w as strong enough to force the e· . ,; '

C A

R R

- 187

abandonm ent of laissez-faire and the substitution for it of the 'social service

state', w hich im

plicitly denies the natural harm ony of interests and sets our to

create a new harm

ony by artificial m eans.

T he

sam e analysis m

ay be applied in international relations. B

ritish nineteenth-century statesm

en, having discovered that free trade prom oted

B ritish prosperity, w

ere sincerely convinced that, in doing so, it also pro- m

oted the prosperity of the w orld as a w

hole. B ritish predom

inance in w orld

trade w as at that tim

e so overw helm

ing that there w as a certain undeniable

harm ony betw

een B ritish interests and the interests of the w

orld. B ritish

prosperity flow ed over into other countries, and a B

ritish econom ic collapse

w ould have m

eant w orld-w

ide ruin. B ritish free traders could and did argue that

protectionist countries w ere not only egotistically dam

aging the prosperity of the w

orld as a w hole, but w

ere stupidly dam aging their ow

n, so that their behaviour w

as both im m

oral and m uddle-headed. In B

ritish eyes, it w as

irrefutably proved that international trade w as a single w

hole, and flourished or slum

ped together. N evertheless, this alleged international harm

ony of interests seem

ed a m ockery to those under-privileged nations w

hose inferior status and insignificant stake in international trade w

ere consecrated by it. T

he revolt against it destroyed that overw helm

ing B ritish preponderance w

hich had provided a plausible basis for the theory. E

conom ically, G

reat B ritain

in the nineteenth century w as dom

inant enough to m ake a bold bid to im

pose on the w

orld her ow n conception of international econom

ic m orality. W

hen com

petition of all against all replaced the dom ination of the w

orld m arket by

a single P ow

er, conceptions of international econom ic m

orality necessarily becam

e chaotic. Politically, the alleged com

m unity of interest in the m

aintenance of peace, hose am

biguous character has already been discussed, is capitalised in the sam e

ay by a dom inant nation or group of nations. Just as the ruling class in a com

- unity prays for dom

estic peace, w hich guarantees its ow

n security and predom

inance, and denounces class-w ar, w

hich m ight threaten them

, so inter- national peace becom

es a special vested interest of predom inant Pow

ers. In the past, R

om an and B

ritish im perialism

w ere com

m ended to the w

orld in the guise of the pax R

om ana and the pax B

ritannica. To-day, w hen no single Pow

er is strong enough to dom

inate the w orld, and suprem

acy is vested in a group of nations, slogans like 'collective security' and 1resistance to aggression' serve the sam

e purpose of proclaim ing an identity of interest betw

een the dom inant group

and the w orld as a w

hole in the m aintenance of peace. M

oreover, as in the exam

ples w e have just considered, so long as the suprem

acy of the dom inant

group is sufficiently great, there is a sense in w hich this identity of interesis

exists. 'E ngland', w

rote a G erm

an professor in the nineteen-tw enties, 'is the

solitary Pow er w

ith a national progtam m

e w hich, w

hile egotistic through and through, at the sam

e tim e prom

ises to the w orld som

ething w hich the w

orld passionately desires: order, progress and eternal peace.' 27 W

hen M r C

hurchill

27. O ibelius, E

ngland, p. 109.

188 ~-D

E R

IN

IN TE

R N

A TIO

N A

L RE LA

TIO N

S

A N

D P

O LITIC

A L TH

E O

R Y

declared that 'the fortunes of the B ritish E

m pire and its glory are inseparably

interw oven w

ith the fortunes of the w orld', 28 this statem

ent had precisely the sam

e foundation in fact as the statem ent that the prosperity of B

ritish m anufac-

turers in the nineteenth century w as inseparably interw

oven w ith B

ritish pro· sperity as a w

hole. M oreover, the purpose of the statem

ents w as precisely the

sam e, nam

ely to establish the principle that the defence of the B ritish E

m pire,

or the prosperity of the B ritish m

anufacturer, w as a m

atter of com m

on interest to the w

hole com m

unity, and that anyone w ho attacked it w

as therefore either im

m oral or m

uddle-headed. It is a fam iliar tactic of the privileged to throw

m

oral discredit on the under-privileged by depicting them as disturbers of the

peace; and this tactic is as readily applied internationally as w ithin the national

com m

unity. 'International law and order', w

rites P rofessor Toynbee of a recent

crisis, 'w ere in the true interests of the w

hole of m ankind ... w

hereas the desire to perpetuate the reign of violence in international affairs w

as an anti-social desire w

hich w as not even in the ultim

ate interests of the citizens of the handful of states that officially professed this benighted and anachronistic creed.' 29 T

his is precisely the argum

ent, com pounded of platitude and falsehood in about equal

pares, w hich did duty in every strike in the early days of the B

ritish and A m

erican L

abour m ovem

ents. It w as com

m on form

for em ployers, supported by the w

hole capitalist press, to denounce the 'anti-social' attitude of trade union leaders, to accuse them

of attacking law and order and of introducing 'the reign of violence',

and to declare that 'true' and 'ultim ate' interests of the w

orkers lay in peaceful co-operation w

ith the em ployers. 30 In the field of social relations, the dis-

ingenuous character of this argum ent has long been recognised. B

ut just as the threat of class-w

ar by the proletarian is 'a natural cynical reaction to the sen- tim

ental and dishonest efforts of the privileged classes to obscure the conflict of interest betw

een classes by a constant em phasis on the m

inim um

interests w hich

they have in com m

on' , 31 so the w ar-m

ongering of the dissatisfied Pow ers w

as the 'natural, cynical reaction' to the sentim

ental and dishonest platitudinising of the satisfied Pow

ers on the com m

on interest in peace. W hen H

itler refused to believe 'that G

od has perm itted som

e nations first to acquire a w orld by force

and then to defend this robbery w ith m

oralising theories', 32 he w as m

erely echoing in another context the M

arxist denial of a com m

unity of interest betw

een 'haves' and 'have-nots', the M arxist exposure of the interested character

of 'bourgeois m orality', and the M

arxist dem and for the expropriation of the

expropriators. T

he crisis of Septem ber 1938 dem

onstrated in a striking w ay the political

im plications of the assertion of a com

m on interest in peace. W

hen B riand pro-

claim ed that 'peace corn es before all', or M

r E den that 'there is no dispute w

hich

28. W inston C

hurchill, A rm

s and tht C ovenont, p. 272.

29. T oynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1935, ii. p, 46.

30. 'P ray earnestly that right m

ay trium ph', said the representative

o( the P hiladclphi:i coal-ow

ners in an early strike organised by the U

nited M ine W

orkers, 'rem em

bering that the L ord G

od O

m nipotent still reigns, and that H

is reign is one of law and order, and not o( violence and crim

e' (H

.F . P

ringle, Thtodo,e R oosevtlt, p. 267).

31. R

. N iebuhr, M

oral M an and Im

m oral Society, p, 153.

32, Speech in the R ckhstag, JanU

ary JO , 1939,

' /.

C A

R R

- 189

cannot be settled by peaceful m

eans' , 33 the assum

ption underlying these platitudes w

as that, so long as peace w as m

aintained, no changes distasteful to France or G

reat B ritain could be m

ade in the status quo. In 1938, France and G

reat B ritain w

ere trapped by the slogans w hich they them

selves had used in the past to discredit the dissatisfied Pow

ers, and G erm

any had becom e sufficiently

dom inant (as France and G

reat B ritain had hitherto been) to turn the desire for

peace to her ow n advantage. A

bout this tim e, a significant change occurred

in the attitude of the G erm

an and Italian dictators. H itler eagerly depicted

G erm

any as a bulw ark of peace m

enaced by w ar-m

ongering dem ocracies. T

he L

eague of N ations, he declared in his R

eichstag speech of A pril 28, 1939, is a

'stirrer up of trouble', and collective security m eans \:on:inuous danger of w

ar'. M

ussolini borrow ed the B

ritish form ula about the possibility of settling all inter·

national disputes by peaceful m eans, and declared that 'there are not in E

urope at present problem

s so big and so active as to justify a w ar w

hich from a E

uro- pean conflict w

ould naturally becom e universal'." Such utterances w

ere sym p-

tom s that G

erm any and Italy w

ere already looking forw ard to the tim

e w hen,

as dom inant Pow

ers, they w ould acquire the vested interest in peace recently

enjoyed by G reat B

ritain and France, and be able to get their w ay by pillorying

the dem ocratic countries as enem

ies of peace. T hese developm

ents m ay have

m ade it easier to appreciate H

alevy's subtle observation that 'propaganda against w

ar is itself a form of w

ar propaganda'. 3S

--------- T

he realist critique of internationalism

/

-- T

he concept of internationalism is a special form

of the doctrine of the harm ony

of interests. It yields to the sam e analysis; and there are the sam

e difficulties about regarding it as an absolute stan

· dent of the interests and

policies of those w ho prom

ulgate it C

osm opolitanism

', rote Sun Y

at-sen,.'is

\ . the sam

e thing as C hina's theory of ~orldem

pire tw

o thousand years ago ... C

hina once w anted to be sovereign lord of the eaith and to stand above every

other nation, so she espoused cosm opolitanism

:16 in the E gypt of the E

ight· eenth D

ynasty, according to Freud, 'im perialism

w as reflected in religion as

universality and m onotheism

'Y

T he doctrine of a single w

orld-state, pro- pagated by the R

om an E

m pire and later by the C

atholic C hurch, w

as the sym bol

of a claim to universal dom

inion. M odern internationalism

has its genesis in seventeenth· and eighteenth·cem

ury France, during w hich F

rench hegem ony in

E urope w

as at its height. T his w

as the period w hich produced Sully's G

rand D

essin and the A bbe Saint-Pierre's P

rojet de P aix P

erpetuel/e (both plans to perpetuate an international status quo favourable to the French m

onarchy), w

hich saw the birth of the hum

anitarian and cosm opolitan doctrines of the

33. L

tag11t of N atium

: E ighlttnth A

sstm bly, p, 63.

34. T he T

im es, M

ay IS, 1939 . .15. lfolC

vy, A H

istory of the E 11glisb Peoplt ill 1895-1905 (E

ngl. 1rnnsl.), i. Introduction, p. xi. .16, Sun Y

aM cn1 Satt M

i1t Chu I (E ngl. 1ransl.), pp. 68-9,

J7, Sigm und J.'rt'ud, M(Jses t111d Mm

totheism , p. 36.

190 A aE

R

IN IN

TE R

N A

TIO N

A L RE

LA TIO

N S

AN D

·P ~~;~IC

A L TH

E O

R Y

E nlightenm

ent, and w hich established French as the universal language of

educated people. In the next century, the leadership passed to G reat B

ritain, w

hich becam e the hom

e of internationalism . O

n the eve of the G reat E

xhibition of I 851 w

hich, m ore than any other single event, established G

reat B ritain's title

to w orld suprem

acy, the Prince C onsort spoke m

ovingly of 'that great end to w

hich ... all history points -

the realisation of the unity of m ankind'; 38 and

T ennyson hym

ned 'the parliam ent of m

an, the federation of the w orld'. France

chose the m om

ent of her greatest suprem acy in the nineteen-tw

enties to launch a plan of 'E

uropean U nion'; and Japan shortly afterw

ards developed an am bi-

tion to proclaim herself the leader of a united A

sia. It w as sym

ptom atic of the

grow ing international predom

inance of the U nited States w

hen w idespread

popularity w as enjoyed in the late nineteen-thirties by the book of an A

m erican

\ journalist advocating a w

orld union of dem ocracies, in w

hich the U nited States

1 w ould play the predom

inant role. 39 Just as pleas for 'national solidarity' in dom

estic politics alw ays com

e from a

Jom inant group w

hich can use this solidarity to strengthen its ow n control over

the nation as a w hole, so pleas for international solidarity and w

orld union com e

from those dom

inant nations w hich m

ay hope to exercise control over a unified w

orld. C ountries w

hich are struggling to force their w ay into the dom

inant group naturally tend to invoke nationalism

against the internationalism of the

controlling Pow ers. In the sixteenth century, E

ngland opposed her nascent nationalism

to the internationalism of the Papacy and the E

m pire. In the past

century and a half G erm

any opposed her nascent nationalism to the inter-

nationalism first of France, then of G

reat B ritain. T

his circum stance m

ade her im

pervious to those universalise and hum anitarian doctrines w

hich w ere popular

in eighteenth-century France and nineteenth-century B ritain; and her hostility to

internationalism w

as further aggravated after 1919, w hen G

reat B ritain and

F rance endeavoured to create a new

'international order' as a bulw ark of their

ow n predom

inance. 'B y "international",' wrote a G

erm an correspondent in T

he Tim

es, 'w e have com

e to understand a conception that places other nations at an advantage over our ow

n.•• 0 N evertheless, there w

as little doubt that G

erm any, if she becam

e suprem e in E

urope, w ould adopt international slogans

and establish som e kind of international organisation to bolster up her pow

er. A

B ritish L

abour ex-M inister at one m

om ent advocated the suppression of A

rti- cle 16 of the C

ovenant of the L eague of N

ations on the unexpected ground that the totalitarian states m

ight som e day capture the L

eague and invoke that article to justify the use of force by them

selves." It seem ed m

ore likely that they w ould

seek to develop the A nti-C

om intern Pact into som

e form of international

organisation 'T he A

nti-C om

intern Pact', said H itler in the R

eichstag on January 30, 1939, 'w

ill perhaps one day becom e the crystallisation point of a group of

Pow ers w

hose ultim ate aim

is none other than to elim inate the m

enace to the peace and culture of the w

orld instigated by a satanic apparition.' 'E ither E

urope

38. T . M

artin, U /e of the P

rince C onsort, iii. p. 247,

-'9. C luencc

Streit, U 11io11 Now

, 40.

1'he T im

es, N ovem

ber 5, 1938. 41. L

ord M arley in the H

ouse 0£ L ords, N

ovem ber 30, 1938: O

fficial R eport, col. 258,

·,; a , • /.'<:.

' I!

1;

: :. 8:- ,

. .:: : i t

C A

R R

- 191

m ust achieve solidarity,' rem

arked an Italian journal about the sam e tim

e, 'or the "axis" w

ill im pose it.' 42 'E

urope in its entirety', said G oebbels, 'is adopting a

new order and a new

orientation under the intellectual leadership of N ational

Socialist G erm

any and Fascist Italy .' 43 T hese w

ere sym ptom

s not of a change of heart, but of the fact that G

erm any and Italy felt them

selves to be approaching the tim

e w hen they m

ight becom e strong enough to espouse internationalism

. 'International order' and 'international solidarity' w

ill alw ays be slogans of those

w ho feel strong enough to im

pose them on others.

T he exposure of the real basis of the professedly abstract principles com

m only

invoked in international politics is the m ost dam

ning and m ost convincing part

of the realist indictm ent of utopianism

. T he nature of the charge is frequently

m isunderstood by those w

ho seek to refute it. T he charge is not that hum

an beings fail to live up to their principles. It m

atters little that W ilson, w

ho thought that the right w

as m ore precious than peace, and B

riand, w ho thought that peace

cam e even before justice, and M

r E den, w

ho believed in collective security, failed them

selves, or failed to induce their countrym en, to apply these principles con-

sistently. W hat m

atters is that these supposedly absolute and universal principles w

ere not principles at all, but the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular tim

e. T here is

a sense in w hich peace and co-operation betw

een nations or classes or indivi· duals is a com

m on and universal end irrespective of conflicting interests and

politics. T here is a sense in w

hich a com m

on interest exists in the m aintenance

of order, w hether it be international order or 'law

and order' w ithin the nation.

B ut as soon as the attem

pt is m ade to apply these supposedly abstract principles

to a concrete political situation, they are revealed as the transparent disguises of selfish vested interesrs. T

he bankruptcy of utopianism resides not in its failure

to live up to its principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduce of international affairs. T

he utopian, faced by the collapse of standards w hose interested character he

has failed to penetrate, takes refuge in condem nation of a reality w

hich refuses to conform

to these standards. A passage penned by the G

erm an historian

M einecke after the first w

orld w ar is the best judgm

ent by anticipation of the role of utopianism

in the international politics of the period: T

he profound defect of the W estern, natural-law

type of thought w as that,

w hen applied to the real life of the state, it rem

ained a dead letter, did not penetrate the consciousness of statesm

en, did not hinder the m odern

hypertrophy of state interest, and so led either to aim less com

plaints and doctrinaire suppositions or else to inner falsehood and cant. 44

T hese 'aim

less com plaints', these 'doc;trinaire suppositions', this 'inner falsehood

and cant' w ill be fam

iliar to all those w ho have studied w

hat w as w

ritten about international politics in E

nglish-speaking countries betw een the tw

o w orld w

ars.

42. R

daiirm i J11tem

atim 1<1/i,

quoted in T he T

im es, D

ecem ber 5, 1938.

43. V

cilkisrl,rr Brnhachtn, A rri! I, 19.l9.

44. M einc-cke, Staatriiso11, p. 5JJ.