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From Person-in-Environment to Strengths: The Promise of Postmodern Practice

Phillip Dybicz

Social work relies heavily on its value base to guide practice; however, there are no conceptual models—on par with person-in-environment (PIE)—to describe how these values are implemented within an evidence-based approach. However, the philosophical foundation of empiricism and positivism that lends PIE its strength also brings with it inherent weaknesses: Namely, empirical observation cannot produce value judgments, and positivism’s verification of causality cannot capture the workings of free will. Postmodern thought is uniquely suited to address these short- comings. Its philosophical foundation of phenomenology and social constructionism speak to a value-based approach to practice and hold out the promise of engendering conceptual models that can illustrate these values in action.

The intellectual landscape currently informing social work practice may be described as falling into two broad areas: modern, scientific thought and postmodern, humanistic thought. Since its inception in the 1970s (e.g., Germain, 1973), the person-in-environment (PIE) conceptual model has come to dominate the modern traditional practice of social work. Practice in this vein is heavily based in science; it emphasizes problem solving and evidence-based approaches. Beginning in the early 1990s, postmodern thought began to inform social work practice, resulting in approaches such as the strengths perspective (Saleebey, 1992), narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990), and solution-building therapy (De Shazer & Berg, 1992). Practice in this vein is heavily based in the humanities; it emphasizes consciousness-raising and a value- based approach.

Using the PIE model as an example of modernist thought guiding social work interven- tions, the first part of this article will elaborate particular strengths and shortcomings of the model specifically and then of modernist thought in general. Briefly, the strength that empiricism brings to bear on validating conceptual models contains the inherent shortcoming of embracing a value-free stance in the development of these models. In addition, the strength of positivism in explaining cause-and-effect mechanisms contains the inherent shortcoming of emphasizing causal determinism when seeking to explain human behavior.

Accepted: August 2013 Phillip Dybicz is assistant professor at Valdosta State University. Address correspondence to Phillip Dybicz, Department of Social Work, Valdosta State University, Health Science and

Business Administration, Social Work Administrative Suite 2002, 1500 N. Patterson Street, Valdosta, GA 31698, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Social Work Education, 51: 237–249, 2015 Copyright © Council on Social Work Education ISSN: 1043-7797 print / 2163-5811 online DOI: 10.1080/10437797.2015.1012923

Next, the article will turn toward elaborating particular aspects of postmodern thought and how it is uniquely positioned to address these inherent shortcomings in applying PIE and modernist thought.

STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF PIE

Scientific inquiry is built on the philosophical foundations of empiricism and positivism. Each brings to bear a formidable strength in the development of knowledge; however, inherent in each of these strengths is a shortcoming. Like two sides of the same coin, the shortcoming arises from the strength; so the shortcoming can never be sundered from the strength—rather, one can merely compensate for it. Empiricism embraces a neutral, or value-free, stance when making observations—relying purely on the sensory input. This provides a strong foundation for claims of reality as they are based on evidence rather than on mere opinion. Consequently, this evidence is what informs our conceptual models.

The PIE conceptual model is based on the evidence established in ecological systems theory. Empirical observations of ecological systems in nature lead to the proposition that organisms have an interdependent relationship with other organisms in their ecological environment. To translate the validity of this proposition from ecological systems in nature to ecological systems in human society, human beings must be viewed in a neutral manner, as being another example of a bio-psycho-social organism. Science is the study of the natural world—thus to scientifically study human beings, they must be viewed as existing in nature. And if one views the early writings of both Germain and Gitterman (1980) and Gordon (1969)—both pioneers in the development of the PIE model—one is able to see that they liberally use the word organism to describe human beings to bolster the validity of the model via its comparison to ecological systems in nature. This scientific stance of viewing human beings as products of nature results in emphasizing humans’ continuity with animals. We see this dynamic at work with other scientific theories of human behavior as well; for example, as noted in most human behavior in the social environment (HBSE) textbooks (e.g., Robbins, Chatterjee, & Canda, 2011; Thyer, Dulmus, & Sowers, 2012), foundational aspects of behaviorism are built on Pavlov’s experiments on dogs and Skinner’s experiments on pigeons and rats: as with ecological systems, we can study animals to learn something about ourselves. However, empiricism’s reliance on pure sensory observation means that various values we attribute to the human condition—such as the inherent worth and dignity of the individual—are excluded from scientific understanding and conceptual models. We must look outside of scientific knowledge for our understanding of values. Thus in scientific, evidence-based practice, we seek to compensate for this shortcoming through the adoption of a strong base of social work values based in a philosophy of ethics.

Positivism—through its emphasis on the repeatability of results—serves as the philoso- phical floor on which claims of cause-and-effect mechanisms are made. This confidence in the nature of a cause-and-effect mechanism—when applied to human behavior—similarly carries with it an inherent shortcoming: causal determinism. Science recognizes free will in human beings, but in the process of describing cause-and-effect mechanisms, science can never explain human behavior as a reflection of free will. When one states that cause “A” (e.g., abuse) results in effect “B” in human behavior (e.g., difficulty in forming intimacy), one is removing free will from this equation. When applied to ecological systems in nature,

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cause-and-effect mechanisms translate into attempts at adaptation. Building on empiricism’s emphasis of humans’ continuity with animals, we are able to translate this theme of adaptation into ecological systems of human society; goodness-of-fit is the adaptive term used to describe the harmonious balance sought within the interdependent relationships of PIE.

Now although science cannot explain the workings of free will, it does recognize its existence in human beings. As notably recognized by Kant (trans. 1785/1997), reason is the quality that frees will from ever being a determined effect in human action. The exercise of free will can serve only as a cause within a cause–effect framework. Adaptation by an animal within an ecological system in nature predominantly occurs at the genetic level. By contrast, human beings’ attempts at adaptation within an ecological system occur predomi- nantly through learning—which stems from the exercise of reason. However, this difference does not shatter the validity of translating the premises of adaptation and interdependence from ecological systems of nature to ecological systems of human society established by emphasizing humans’ continuity with animals. This is because it is a difference in degree, not kind. Scientifically, it is recognized that some animals possess rudimentary reasoning— they can problem solve and use tools. But there is a vast chasm separating this rudimentary use of reasoning from the highly advanced use by human beings. Through first developing an understanding of various cause-and-effect mechanisms affecting a client’s behavior (via diagnosing the problem) and then communication of this understanding to the client (via a treatment plan), the social worker makes an appeal to the client’s reason to promote positive change.

So the adoption of a strong ethic of social work values and making appeals to the client’s reason are the ways social workers compensate for the shortcomings of empiricism and positivism. There are some notable implications that stem from this strategy. First, social work values are left without a vigorous philosophical foundation on par with empiricism and positi- vism that serves to inform conceptual models concerning their implementation. Consequently, the understanding of social work values (such as self-determination or recognizing the impor- tance of human relationships) is not something that must be studied and learned but rather absorbed. This is reflected in the fact that foundational courses in social work programs require two courses specifically on human behavior theory. In contrast, the transmission of social work values is infused throughout the curriculum. This lack of need to transmit social work value conceptual models allows for this diffuse approach. Postmodern thought—supporting value- based approaches—addresses this shortcoming by offering the vigorous philosophical founda- tion (namely, phenomenology and social constructionism) from which conceptual models of social work values can arise.

Second, by emphasizing humans’ continuity with animals, qualities of the human con- dition that make us unique are deemphasized. Science is the broad field of the study of nature. The humanities—comprising history, literature, language, and so forth—is the broad field of the study of human beings as unique entities. Yes, by appealing to reason science recognizes free will, but free will falls outside the framework of scientific conceptual models describing its operation. So again, how to effectively engage a client’s free will to foster the change process is knowledge that must be absorbed rather than studied and learned. Again, postmodern thought provides the philosophical foundation for these con- ceptual models to arise.

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PHENOMENOLOGY

The following quotation by Gadamer (trans. 1960/1999) illustrates the shift in thinking con- cerning human action offered by phenomenology:

But it is thus clear that man [sic], unlike all other living creatures, has a “world,” for other creatures do not in the same sense have a relationship to the world, but are, as it were, embedded in their environment…. Moreover, unlike all other living creatures, man’s relationship to the world is characterized by freedom from environment [original emphasis]…. this does not mean that he leaves his habitat but that he has another posture toward it—a free, distanced orientation—that is always realized in language. (pp. 444–445)

This quote introduces the notion of individual-in-world as a more encompassing conceptualiza- tion than PIE. To simply be embedded in one’s environment harks back to the causal determin- ism predominantly guiding the actions of animals. The world that human beings inhabit encompasses all of the bio-psycho-social qualities of interdependence offered by the PIE model, and then adds the additional layer of a relationship with one’s environment realized through language.

Some important implications arise from this shift. First, emphasizing the role of language highlights a quality that is uniquely human: although animals communicate, they do not possess language—that is, the ability to create meaning via new strings of symbols that comprise new sentences. So phenomenology emphasizes a difference in kind between humans and animals. Although the various similarities between humans and animals are still recognized, the ability to formulate conceptual models elaborating these similarities falls outside the scope of phenomen- ology. This is a similar in dynamic to science recognizing free will but being unable to form conceptual models elaborating its use.

Second, Gadamer’s (trans. 1960/1999) reference to “freedom from environment…realized in language” (pp. 444–445) refers to humans’ ability to use their imagination to posit new worlds different from the one they currently occupy, and new modes of being in these worlds. Again, the use of imagination is a difference in kind between humans and animals—animals do not possess the ability to imagine themselves being different. This is not surprising as postmodern thought is based within the humanities—the study of humans as unique entities. When applied to the field of social work, phenomenology marks a shift away from appealing to a client’s reason to promote change efforts (this is still done; it is simply divested of its central role) toward appealing to the client’s imagination to promote change. This is reflected in the strengths perspective’s directive to understand a client’s hopes and dreams of a better life (Rapp & Goscha, 2006) and the use of “the miracle question” in solution-building therapy (De Jong & Berg, 2008) to get the client to imagine a life absent the problem.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF PHENOMENOLOGY

It is the work of Husserl (e.g., trans. 1939/1975) and Heidegger (e.g., trans. 1927/1962) that ushers phenomenology into a postmodern framework. The first key phenomenological principle that informs its embrace of language is the phenomenological distinction between meaning/ identity (i.e., essence) and object (i.e., existence; Husserl, trans. 1939/1975). By divesting itself

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of a role for language and concentrating solely on pure observation, empiricism only recognizes and describes qualities of existence. In contrast, phenomenology views a phenomenon as consisting of an existence (i.e., qualities of nature) plus an essence (i.e., meaning/identity realized through language). In addition, multiple meanings/identities can apply to the same object. So, for example, the same triangle may be described as being either equilateral or equiangular: both names express different meanings but designate the same object. Thus the name chosen to identify this object will emphasize certain qualities of its nature over others (length of its sides vs. measurement of its angles).

When this concept is applied to a human being (or human beings in the form of groups and communities), the possible meanings/identities become numerous. This principle translates into social work practice via spotlighting the dynamic of how we as social workers come to know the client (the term client here and throughout the article reflects its broadest possible conception in social work terms: individual, group, or community), and how clients comes to know themselves. “Do clients come to know themselves primarily through the problems and failures they are experiencing or through their strengths?” is a primary question asked by the postmodern practitioner. If clients are viewing themselves primarily through the problems and failures they are experiencing, it is through appealing to the client’s imagination, not reason, that will produce a change in the client’s essence (meaning/identity) and, consequently, a change in the client’s behavior. A further elaboration of this dynamic will be given shortly.

The second key phenomenological principle marking its postmodern turn is the recon- ceptualization of time begun by Husserl (trans. 1913/1982) and brought to full fruition by Heidegger. As reflected in the title of Heidegger’s (trans. 1927/1962) magnum opus Being and Time, time is privileged as determining being (i.e., existence and essence). Being is defined as a phenomenon’s presence in a continuously succeeding series of “nows” (i.e., the present). Previously, the various properties of a phenomenon were privileged as determining its being. Husserl (1913/1982) dubbed this view the “natural standpoint.” So, for example, Plato (trans. c. 370 BCE/2008) states as way of illustration that a specific dog has many observable qualities determining its existence. Among these, certain of these qualities will be shared by all dogs, thus determining the essence of “dogness.” Consequently, for Plato, the essence of a phenomenon lies in eternal abstract qualities that find their expression in a specific phenomenon.

At first glance, this difference in determining how being (i.e., reality) arises may seem like simple nitpicking among philosophers. However, the shift to privileging time carries with it some profound implications. First, meaning/identity becomes something unique to the phenom- enon being observed rather than resting in fixed abstract qualities. Heidegger (trans. 1927/1962) creates the word Dasein to capture this notion of a unique individual revealing oneself tempo- rally, rather than the abstract term human. Second, privileging time results in identity being realized through language: language (e.g., equilateral or equiangular) orders the natural qualities of a phenomenon’s existence as it passes through time (Mensch, 1988). Flowing from this implication is the first key principle outlined above—being realized through language, the identity of a phenomenon is malleable: multiple identities are possible for the same object. Thus the being of a phenomenon can be transformed through a shift in language use. As will be illustrated below, this has profound implication for promoting change within the client or his or her environment.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVE

Building on the insights laid down by Heidegger (trans. 1927/1962) in Being and Time, Ricoeur (1984–1988), in his multivolume work Time and Narrative, further elaborated the connection that language has to the role played by time in ordering existence. Ricoeur described time as falling into two categories: cosmic time and human time. Cosmic time is time as measured by the clock; it governs the cause–effect mechanisms found in nature. So, for example, if a woman becomes pregnant, it is the passage of clock time (typically, 9 months) that will govern when she gives birth.

By contrast, human time is time as it is realized through language/narrative. As such, it governs the shaping of the essence (i.e., identity) of a phenomenon. As way of illustration, if I were to ask you, “How was your day?”, a typical response would include some type of qualitative measure followed by a listing of events acting as evidence in support of this measure. It would not consist of a second-by-second account of everything you did. Rather, the time marking your “day” would be compressed by narrative into the span of a few sentences. Furthermore, the selection of events for this narrative is determined by the theme of my inquiry (i.e., “How was your day?”). So, for example, what you ate for breakfast would typically be deemed irrelevant and, thus, not included in your response. However, if I were to ask you “How’s your diet coming along?”, this theme grants much greater importance to what you ate for breakfast. Thus multiple identities are possible for the same “your day.” When applied to the scenario of a woman becoming pregnant, the existence of pregnancy (the observed facts, or definition of pregnancy) is the same for all women; however, the meaning/identity (i.e., essence) attributed to the pregnancy may range anywhere from blissful to dreadful. Similarly for groups and communities, one’s sexual orientation or racial makeup are observable traits; yet the mean- ing attributed to these traits in terms of identity features varies widely in human society and throughout human history.

So by elaborating the link between human time and narrative, Ricoeur (1984–1988) com- pleted the formula begun by Heidegger (trans. 1927/1962): Being-Time-Narrative. Doing so allows for the elaboration of conceptual models describing how narrative shapes being and, consequently, human action—human action that is guided by free will. Ricoeur (1984–1988) turned to Aristotle’s (trans. c. 335 BC/1996) theory of mimesis in his treatise Poetics. This is a theory that seeks to describe human behavior as it occurs in narrative. Appealing to human imagination, simply put, Aristotle’s mimesis states that each of us have a current image of “who I am” as well as an image of “who I would like to be” in the future. Acting on the image of “who I would like to be” is what guides present actions. Thus, “All human action is always an imitation of action—Achilles is living up to his own image of himself…like all brave men, he wants ‘to die like Achilles’” (i.e., courageously; Davis, 1992, p. xviii).

Ricoeur (1984–1988) updated Aristotle’s mimesis for a postmodern context, lending it a deeper and richer elaboration. This conceptual model guides such postmodern practices as elucidating a client’s dreams and goals and the highlighting of strengths. The full implications for social work practice arising from Ricoeur’s theory of mimesis has been given comprehensive treatment elsewhere (Dybicz, 2010). For the purposes here, it is sufficient to note that mimesis addresses the shortcoming of positivism by offering a conceptual model—grounded in the equally rigorous philosophical thought of phenomenology—that describes the operation of free will.

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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

As with phenomenology, the following quote by Berger and Luckman (1966) in their founda- tional treatise on social constructionism describes people as living in a world as opposed to simply an environment:

Animals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose structures are predetermined by the biological equipment of the several animal species. By contrast, man’s [sic] relationship to his environment is characterized by world-openness. (p. 47)

Again, this quote emphasizes the unique human qualities of free will and the ability to imagine one’s world and one’s self as consisting of many possibilities (i.e., world openness).

Yet creating an image of “who I am” and “who I would like to be” is not merely an exercise of imagination. For myself to begin basing my actions on such an image, I need to find it believable—it must be supported by evidence. One cannot escape the realities of one’s existence. So, for example, I may have daydreams of being a rock star, but I will not base any of my actions to pursue this dream unless I believe I have the necessary talent. The evidence of my musical talent (or lack thereof) does not simply occur in my own mind but, rather, in the court of public opinion. I can find this evidence in society at large (e.g., favorable reactions from an audience) or through the responses of a few important people (e.g., family, friends who know me well) or knowledgeable people (e.g., other rock musicians) in my life, communicating to me, in effect, “Yes, I see you that way too—you have the talent to become a rock musician.”

Two aspects from this dynamic are worthy of note. First, because the evidence supporting my image occurs in the court of public opinion, it is social in character. This is from where the “social” in social constructionism derives. Second, while relying on observations, evidence of my musical talent is not strictly empirical in nature: The quality of my talent can never be established as a scientific fact. Rather, evidence of my musical talent requires a judgment to be made—this makes it a value-laden, not value-free, endeavor. Putting this all together, my dream of becoming a rock musician forms the theme guiding the selection of events that act as evidence of my musical talent (e.g., again, what I ate for breakfast would be considered irrelevant). In this manner, a socially constructed narrative is created that directly speaks to both “who I am” and “who I can be.”

KEY PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

The first key principle that informs this inquiry is that of legitmation (Berger & Luckman, 1966): the notion that some social constructions, due to the preponderance of evidence supporting them, achieve a dominant status in society. The sensibility of the value-laden judgment is so apparent that it goes unquestioned. So using the example given earlier of a woman’s experience of pregnancy and impending motherhood, phenomenology tells us that the meaning of this pregnancy can range from blissful to dreadful. Now if we apply a specific scenario to this example of pregnancy—the woman is 16 years old—a definitive social construction arises that lends meaning to this event: It is deemed unwise and undesirable. Note that this is not a scientific empirical fact (i.e., in all times and circumstances, giving birth at age 16 is undesirable) but rather a value-laden judgment based on the observed demands of modern society. The

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preponderance of evidence supporting the social construction, “It is unwise and undesirable for teenagers in the United States to become pregnant,” is so overwhelming that the value-laden judgment becomes legitimized over all others. And this is with good reason. At a societal level, we do not wish to encourage U.S. teenagers to become pregnant.

Now as stated earlier, phenomenology tells us that social constructions create narratives that directly comment on the identity of the individual experiencing the specific situation. So for the vast majority of U.S. teenagers—those who avoid pregnancy—the above social construction attributes a life-affirming value judgment to their identity, depicting them as wise, mature women. They meet the normal expectation. By contrast, for those teenagers who do become pregnant each year in the United States, the above social construction attributes a negative value judgment to their identity, depicting them as unwise, immature, and ill equipped for motherhood. Failing to achieve this standard norm, these women, consequently, are viewed as failures in this area, and their pregnancy is not simply unplanned but also a mistake. It is not hard to see that such negative valuations of identity do not honor the inherent dignity and worth of the individual. When working with a pregnant teenager, a social worker who either overtly or tacitly accepts this social construction (or simply does not think to question it) actively contributes to undermining the client’s inherent worth and dignity. As will be demonstrated shortly, an alternative social construction is necessary to guide practice in a way that the social worker can honor the inherent dignity and worth of the client.

The second key principle is that multiple realities are possible for a particular observed reality (Berg & Luckman, 1966; Gergen, 1999). Social constructionism accepts the phenomenological position concerning multiple identities/realities for the same object. It adds to this notion, by describing how these alternative identities/realities are constructed: socially, through the lan- guage use of value-laden statements. Thus although a particular dominant narrative may hold sway in depicting an experience (e.g., teenage pregnancy) and client in negative terms, it is possible through the social process to construct alternative narratives that give the experience a new meaning that is life-affirming and that honors the dignity and worth of the client. Social constructionism provides the philosophical foundation—on par with empiricism—for guiding such value-laden practice.

One element at work in crafting an alternative social construction with the client is when the social worker moves away from primarily viewing the client empirically (a representative of a population group—e.g., pregnant teenagers) and begins to primarily view the client phenomen- ologically (an a unique individual temporally unfolding—e.g., Jane S.). When viewing the client phenomenologically, the social worker is able to understand that although a particular dominant narrative is useful at the societal level, in this particular individual instance it is damaging. This realization prompts an effort to generate an alternative social construction, which offers positive valuations for the client. So returning to the example of the pregnant teenager, the many challenges that she will face are not simply ignored. Rather, they move from the foreground of a narrative constructed about her pregnancy (wherein they represent key dynamics determin- ing her functional adaptation to her environment) to the background of an alternative construc- tion (wherein they represent various obstacles to achieving her dream of becoming a good mother). In such a counternarrative, evidence of Jane’s qualities and those of her environment that will contribute to achieving her dream are looked for and highlighted—for example, her courage in deciding to face these challenges, various caregiving skills she has developed through her family relationships, supportive relationships in her life, and so forth. These will be qualities

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that honor her inherent worth and dignity as well as recognize the importance of human relationships—two key social work values. In effect, the alternative social construction commu- nicates to the client, “Yes, I see that in you too—you have the talent to be a good mother.” Consequently, actions taken by the teen mother-to-be to prenatally care for her baby and prepare for its arrival take on positive valuations that honor her dignity and worth—that is, actions reflective of being a good mother rather than being defined primarily as actions taken to adapt to one’s environment due to failure to meet a norm of functioning.

An additional element worthy of note pertaining to the process of social construction is the role that power plays in shaping these constructions. Foucault (1981) reconceptualized power by positioning it within the structure of language use in this process of social construction. This new conceptualization of power helps to explain instances when dominant social constructions arise from baser human qualities, such as the many examples throughout human history of negative valuations attributed to minority communities in society simply for being different. Similarly to the example above, the mode to counteract these negative identity valuations often takes the form of providing experiences in mainstream society that contradict these negative valuations (e.g., civil rights marches, gay pride parades, positive and richer depiction in literature, televi- sion, and movies) and foster new life-affirming social constructions.

THEORIES OF MEANING CREATION IN LANGUAGE

As stated earlier, the application of social work values lies outside the scientific paradigm of evidence-based practice; empiricism and positivism are unable to spawn conceptual theories or models describing the implementation of these values. By contrast, social constructionism and phenomenology do provide such a philosophical base, spawning a number of theories for understanding how values are applied to construct meaning and, consequently, reality. Some prominent examples are the following: Foucault’s (1981) theory on power-knowledge; Derrida’s (trans. 1967/1997) theory of deconstruction and the notion of the absent but implicit; and Wittgenstein’s (trans. 1958) theory of language games. More important, postmodern social work practitioners have turned to each of the above theories to guide them in their value- based approach to practice—for example, White and Epston (1990) used Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge; De Shazer and Berg (1992) and White (2004, 2005) made use of Derrida’s theory of deconstruction; and De Shazer et al. (2007) turned to Wittgenstein’s theory of language games. Space limitations prevent a detailed analysis in explaining exactly how the above authors implemented each of the above theories. The points being argued are simply this: that these theories exist, they are uniquely suited to provide conceptual frameworks for guiding valued- based approaches, and postmodern practitioners are employing them.

BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE

As Saari (1991) noted early on in the postmodern movement, a view of human behavior solely in terms of adaptation is inadequate, not yielding a comprehensive understanding of the client’s struggles:

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The perspective taken in this book asserts that the adaptive point of view has provided an inadequate foundation for clinical social work theory. A theory of meaning in which psychological health is indicated by a constructed personal meaning system (or identity) that is highly differentiated, articulated, and integrated is proposed to take the place of conceptualizations about adaptation. (p. 4)

These philosophically grounded theories of meaning (e.g., Derrida, 1997/1967; Foucault, 1981; Ricoeur, 1984–1988; Wittgenstein, 1958) to which postmodern practitioners have turned inform how social work values are applied in the helping situation to stoke the client’s spirit and inspire the client’s imagination for positive change. This is the promise that postmodernism holds for social work practice: a fuller, richer description of the human condition and human behavior.

Yet if one makes the postmodern move of placing the adaptive point of view in the back- ground as Saari (1991) suggested, what is now needed is a postmodern conceptual model of meaning making on par with PIE. One of the most highly appealing aspects of PIE as a conceptual model has been its versatility. Not only is it able to provide insights directly to the intervention process, but it can act as a meta-framework under which can be plugged in the various scientific theories on bio-psycho-social functioning (Greif, 1986; Siporin, 1980). From the earlier descriptions of phenomenology and social constructionism, one can glean a nascent concept of individual-in-world. But even this formulation owes its origin to scientifically grounded theory: It is a reaction to PIE and thus retains the same grammatical structure. PIE arises as a conceptual model from scientific theory: ecological systems theory. Similarly, to achieve a versatile postmodern conceptual model for practice on the meaning making that occurs in the articulation of identity, one must turn to humanistic theory to securely ground the model.

At least one such attempt has already been made. In his conceptual model “hero(ine) on a journey,” Dybicz (2012) turned to the humanistic theory of Joseph Campbell (1949/1968) in his work Hero of a Thousand Faces. Campbell examined numerous myths across cultures and time periods. He noted that heroic myths and folk tales were narratives of personal transformation: they involved the struggle of meaning making involved in the articulation of a new identity, or being-in-the-world. Campbell (1949/1968) explained, “This popular motif gives emphasis to the lesson that the passage of the threshold is a form of self-annihilation….the hero goes inward, to be born again” (p. 91). Campbell further explained,

Beyond the threshold, then, the hero [sic] journeys through a world of unfamiliar yet strangely intimate forces, some of which severely threaten him (tests), some of which give him magical aid (helpers). When he arrives at the nadir of the mythological round, he undergoes a supreme ordeal and gains his reward…intrinsically it is an expansion of consciousness and therewith of being. (p. 246)

Campbell identified a common narrative framework among all these various heroic narratives, which he labeled a monomyth: This monomyth was encapsulated by the phrase “hero on a journey.” Within the framework of this monomyth, there is a physical journey of the hero(ine) taking action in his or her surrounding environment, but at the same time, this physical journey also involves a journey of self-transformation. And it is the journey of self-transformation that more powerfully speaks to the actions of the hero(ine), rather than the physical journey of adapting to one’s environment. This dual recognition of the journey undertaken by the hero(ine)—a physical journey and a journey of self-transformation—makes it ideally suited to reflect phenom- enology’s stance of recognizing both existence (i.e., observable qualities of nature) and essence

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(value judgments on identity/meaning) and social constructionism’s insights into the creation of these essences in the form of narratives.

So when applied to social work practice, the conceptual model of “hero(ine) on a journey” recognizes that the client, spurred on by a presenting problem, is undertaking a physical journey: the client acts to restore her or his functioning to a normal or healthy level. In this manner, the meta-framework of PIE fits within the even broader framework of hero(ine) on a journey. Thus, hero(ine) on a journey incorporates the conceptual model of PIE and all the scientific under- standing that finds a home there. Yet this scientific understanding yields insights into only one of the two journeys undertaken by the client. The journey of self-transformation—meaning making that informs a new articulation of identity—occurs at a narrative level. And as noted earlier, postmodern practitioners have turned to theories of meaning making by Derrida (1997/1967), Foucault (1981), Ricoeur (1984–1988), and Wittgenstein (1958), to name a few, for guidance in speaking to this journey of self-transformation. This journey powerfully speaks to those client actions precipitated by free will and value judgments.

Once again, space limitations prevent the full elaboration of the hero(ine) on a journey conceptual model for social work practice. As noted earlier, the aforementioned article is already devoted to this task. The purpose here is simply to outline the basic requirements that must be met by a postmodern meta-framework for practice. And through the brief illustration of one such model, the point being argued is simply that such a model is possible. And as explicated above, PIE (and all the scientific understanding that it brings with it) gets absorbed into such a postmodern model and, in so doing, has its importance repositioned.

CONCLUSION

So although, as Saari (1991) noted, the adaptive point of view may prove inadequate serving as the philosophical foundation on which to base practice, it still represents useful knowledge. It simply does not represent all knowledge. Postmodern practice approaches do not eschew scientific understanding. By addressing gaps in scientific conceptual models concerning free will and values, they seek to add an extra, richer layer to traditional understanding of social work interventions. The definition of “evidence” is expanded to include value-laden narratives that speak to identity, reflective of an individual inhabiting a world. This more comprehensive view of human behavior still uses the conceptual framework of PIE, but this knowledge is moved to the background, playing a supporting role to philosophically grounded value-based approaches that form the new foundation for practice.

This has important implications concerning the role to be played by HBSE within the social work curriculum. As reflected in current HBSE textbooks (Thyer, Dulmus, & Sowers, 2012; Van Wormer, 2010; Zastrow & Kirst-Ashman, 2012), scientific theories comprise the content of HBSE courses. At best (e.g., Robbins, Chatterjee, & Canda, 2011), the foundational theories of social constructionism and phenomenology are given a nod. Notably absent are theories from postmodern authors such as Derrida, Foucault, and Wittgenstein, which, like their scientific counterparts, spring from these foundational theories and speak directly to human behavior. The reason for this is the long-held assumption in our profession that only science can reliable expound on human nature. This has resulted in the division of HBSE courses in terms of macro and micro (scientific) theories. Accepting the argument that postmodern

FROM PERSON-IN-ENVIRONMENT TO STRENGTHS 247

theories have a vital role to play in social work instruction calls for a new division of HBSE courses to take place: one course on scientific (i.e., modern) theories of human behavior and one course on humanistic (i.e., postmodern) theories of human behavior. For the latter, the “social environment” is that of language.

What cannot be denied is the following: currently, social work instruction does not offer any theoretical frameworks to guide the application of social work values. Furthermore, scientific theory will never be able to address this lack. Postmodern theories, however, can do so and thus have an important role to play in social work instruction in this regard. Thus the promise of postmodern practice lies in this fuller, richer description of the human condition that it offers. By conceiving of individuals inhabiting a world, rather than simply living in an environment, social workers are armed with conceptual models that allow them to highlight what is best in clients. More akin to the role of an editor, social workers’ expertise lies in their ability to use these conceptual models to inspire clients to conceive of new possibilities of being-in-the-world and to foster hope that they can realize these new possibilities. Consequently, although not eschewing the importance of appealing to reason, postmodern approaches are staked on the claim that the power of change arises more strongly by inspiring the human spirit and imagination.

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